DR. WILHELM and Fr. Scannell have conferred upon the faithful in England a signal boon in publishing Scheeben’s scientific Dogmatik in English, and condensing it for careful and conscientious study.

St. Anselm, in his work, “Cur Deus Homo?” says, “As the right order requires that we should first believe the deep things of the Christian faith before we presume to discuss them by reason, so it seems to me to be negligence if, after we are confirmed in the faith, we do not study to understand what we believe.”

The Dogmatik of Scheeben is a profuse exposition of the deep things of faith in the light of intelligence guided by the illumination of the Church. Although, as Gregory of Valentia teaches, in accordance with the Catholic schools, that Theology is not a science proprie dicta, because it cannot be resolved into first principles that are self-evident, nevertheless it is higher than all sciences, because it can be resolved into the science of God and of the Blessed, known to us by revelation and faith.

Theology may for that cause be called wisdom, which is higher than all science, and also it may be called science for many reasons. First, because, if it be not a science as to its principles, it is so as to its form, method, process, development, and transmission; and because, if its principles are not evident, they are in all the higher regions of it infallibly certain; and because many of them are necessary and eternal truths.

Revelation, then, contemplated and transmitted in exactness and method, may be called a science and the queen of sciences, the chief of the hierarchy of truth; and it enters and takes the first place in the intellectual system and tradition of the world. It possesses all the qualities and conditions of science so far as its subject-matter admits; namely, certainty as against doubt, definiteness as against vagueness, harmony as against discordance, unity as against incoherence, progress as against dissolution and stagnation.

A knowledge and belief of the existence of God has never been extinguished in the reason of mankind. The polytheisms and idolatries which surrounded it were corruptions of a central and dominant truth, which, although obscured, was never lost. And the tradition of this truth was identified with the higher and purer operations of the natural reason, which have been called the intellectual system of the world. The mass of mankind, howsoever debased, were always theists. Atheists were anomalies and exceptions, as the blind among men. The theism of the primæval revelation formed the intellectual system of the heathen world. The theism of the patriarchal revelation formed the intellectual system of the Hebrew race. The theism revealed in the incarnation of God has formed the intellectual system of the Christian world. “Sapientia ædificavit sibi domum.” The science or knowledge of God has built for itself a tabernacle in the intellect of mankind, inhabits it, and abides in it The intellectual science of the world finds its perfection in the scientific expression of the theology of faith. But from first to last the reason of man is the disciple, not the critic, of the revelation of God: and the highest science of the human intellect is that which, taking its preamble from the light of nature, begins in faith; and receiving its axioms from faith, expands by the procession of truth from truth.

The great value of Scheeben’s work is in its scientific method, its terminology, definitions, procedure, and unity. It requires not only reading but study; and study with patient care and conscientious desire to understand. Readers overrun truths which they have not mastered. Students leave nothing behind them until it is understood. This work needs such a conscientious treatment from those who take it in hand.

Valuable as it is in all its parts, the most valuable may be said to be the First Book, on the Sources of Theological Knowledge, and the Second Book, on God in Unity and Trinity. Any one who has mastered this second book has reached the Head of the River of the Water of Life.

Of all the superstitious and senseless mockeries, and they were many, with which the world wagged its head at the Vatican Council, none was more profoundly foolish than the gibe that in the nineteenth century a Council has been solemnly called to declare the existence of God. In fact, it is this truth that the nineteenth century needs most of all. For as St. Jerome says, “Homo sine cognitione Dei, pecus.” But what the Council did eventually declare is, not the existence of God, but that the existence of God may be known with certitude by the reason of man through the works that He has created. This is the infallible light of the Natural Order, and the need of this definition is perceived by all who know the later Philosophies of Germany and France, and the rationalism, scepticism, and naturalism which pervades the literature, the public opinion, and the political action of the modern world. This was the first dominant error of these days, demanding the action of the Council. The second was the insidious undermining of the doctrinal authority of the Holy See, which for two hundred years had embarrassed the teaching of the Church, not only in controversy with adversaries without, but often in the guidance of some of its own members within the fold. The definition of the Infallible Magisterium of the Roman Pontiff has closed this period of contention The Divine certitude of the Supernatural Order completes the twofold infallibility of the knowledge of God in the natural and supernatural revelation of Himself. This was the work of the Vatican Council in its one memorable Session, in which the Councils of the Church, and especially the Councils of Florence and of Trent, culminated in defining the certitude of faith.

Scheeben has fully and luminously exhibited the mind of the Vatican Council in his First and Second Books.

HENRY EDWARD,

Cardinal Archbishop.

EPIPHANY, 1890.

INTRODUCTION

I.—DEFINITION AND DIVISION OF THEOLOGY

I. THE word “Theology” means the Science of God. This science has God not only for its subject, but also for its source and its object; hence the Divine character of Theology cannot better be described than by the old formula: “Theology teaches about God, is taught by God, and leads to God.” Theology may be taken objectively as doctrine, or subjectively as knowledge. But it is not every knowledge of Divine doctrine, especially not the mere apprehension of it, that is called Theology. The term is restricted to scientific knowledge; and consequently Theology, in its technical sense, is the scientific exposition of the doctrine concerning God and things Divine.

The knowledge of God which can be obtained by means of Revelation is called Revealed Theology, in contra-distinction to Natural Theology, which depends on human reason alone. The “Natural Theology” of Paley and other English writers—that is, the knowledge of God obtainable by the study of Nature—is a branch of this more extensive Natural Theology.

II. Theology is usually divided into Dogmatic and Moral Theology. The former treats of dogmas—that is, rules of belief,—and is of a speculative character, while the latter deals with rules of conduct, and is practical. In this work we deal with Dogmatic Theology.

Theology may also be divided according to its various functions. When it demonstrates and defends the grounds of belief, it is called General or Fundamental Theology. This is more properly a vestibule or outwork of Theology, and may be considered as Applied Philosophy. It is also called the Treatise on the True Religion (Tractatus de Vera Religione), and sometimes Apologetics, because of its defensive character. When Theology expounds and coordinates the dogmas themselves, and demonstrates them from Scripture and Tradition, it takes the name of Positive Theology. When it takes the dogmas for granted, and penetrates into their nature and discovers their principles and consequences, it is designated Speculative Theology, and sometimes Scholastic Theology, because it is chiefly the work of the Schoolmen, and also because, on account of its abstruseness, it can only be acquired by scholars. Positive Theology and Speculative Theology cannot be completely separated. Hence the theological works of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were entitled Theologia Positivo-Scholastica, or Dogmatico-Scholastica. The present work likewise possesses this two-fold character.

A fuller account of these various distinctions will be found in the concluding sections of Book I.

II.—A SHORT SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF THEOLOGY

The history of Theology may be divided into three epochs, which coincide with the great epochs of the history of the Church:—

A.—The Ancient or Patristic Epoch;

B.—The Mediæval or Scholastic Epoch;

C.—The Modern Epoch.

Each of these has as its centre one of the great Councils of the Church, Patristic Theology being grouped round the Council of Nicæa, Mediaeval Theology round the Fourth Lateran Council, and Modern Theology round the Council of Trent. In each epoch also the growth of Theology has followed a similar course. A period of preparation has led up to the Council, which has been followed by a period of prosperity, and this in turn has given place to a period of decay. During the Patristic Epoch, Theology was engaged in studying Holy Scripture, in consolidating Tradition, and in defending the chief doctrines of Christianity against paganism and heresy, and was cultivated principally by the official representatives of Tradition, the Bishops. The foundation having thus been securely laid, the work of the Mediæval theologians was to develop and systematize what had been handed down to them; and this work was carried on almost entirely in the cloisters and universities. Finally, Modern Theology has taken up the work of both of the foregoing epochs by defending the fundamental dogmas of Religion against modern agnostics and heretics, and at the same time carefully attending to the development of doctrine within the Church.

A.—The Patristic Epoch

Theology was not treated by the Fathers as one organic whole. They first enunciated Tradition and then interpreted Scripture. In this way, particular dogmas were often explained and proved at considerable length. Some approach to systematic treatment may, indeed, be found in their catechetical works; but the greater part of the Patristic writings, besides the commentaries on Holy Scripture, consists of treatises written against the different heresies of the day, and thus, without directly constructing a system, the Fathers provided ample materials in almost every department of theology. The struggle against Paganism and Manichæism gave rise to treatises on God, man, and creation; the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity was proved against the Arians and Macedonians; the Incarnation against the Nestorians and Eutychians; Grace and Sin were discussed with the Pelagians; the schism of the Donatists brought out the doctrine concerning the Constitution of the Church.

In the East the Fathers were occupied chiefly in discussing speculative questions, such as the Blessed Trinity and Incarnation, while the Western Church directed its attention more to the practical questions of Sin and Redemption, Grace and Free Will, and the Constitution of the Church. The Easterns, moreover, excelled both in exactness of method and sublimity of expression. This difference in method and choice of subjects was due chiefly to the fact that Theology was treated in the East by men trained in Greek metaphysics, whereas in the West it was treated by men trained in Roman Law. Greek metaphysics supplied ideas and expressions capable of conveying some notion of the Divine Substance, the Divine Persons, and the Divine Nature. On the other hand, the nature of Sin and its transmission by inheritance, the debt owed by man and satisfied by Jesus Christ, were worked out on the lines of the Roman theory of obligations arising out of Contract or Delict, the Roman view of Debts, and the modes of incurring, extinguishing, and transmitting them, and the Roman notion of the continuance of individual existence by universal succession.

The Greek Fathers most highly esteemed for their dogmatic writings are:—The chiefs of the Catechetical School at Alexandria, Clement, Origen, and Didymus, from whom the subsequent writers drew their inspiration; Athanasius; the three great Cappadocians, Gregory of Nazianzum, Basil, and Gregory of Nyssa; Cyril of Alexandria, Leontius of Byzantium, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, and lastly, John Damascene. In the West may be mentioned Tertullian, Ambrose, Leo, Hilary of Poictiers, Fulgentius, and the great St. Augustine. The works of the last-named form a sort of encyclopædia of theological literature. The early Schoolmen, such as Hugh of St. Victor, did little more than develop and systematize the material supplied by him. After a time the influence of the Greek Fathers began to be felt, especially in the doctrine of Grace, and hence, long afterwards, the Jansenists accused both the Schoolmen and the Greek Fathers of having fallen into Pelagianism.

B.—The Mediæval or Scholastic Epoch

During the so-called Dark Ages, Theology was cultivated chiefly in the cathedral and monastic schools. It was for the most part merely a reproduction of what had been handed down by the Fathers. The most valuable writings of these ages are: Venerable Bede’s commentaries on Holy Scripture; Paschasius Radbert’s treatises on the Holy Eucharist, and those directed against Berengarius by Lanfranc and Guitmundus. Scotus Erigena created a sort of theological system in his celebrated work De Divisione Naturæ, but he can in no way be looked upon as the Father of Scholasticism, as he is sometimes styled in modern times; in fact, the Schoolmen completely ignore him.

I. The title of Father of Scholasticism rightly belongs to St. Anselm of Canterbury (d. 1109). He did not indeed supply a complete treatment of theology, but he dealt with the most important and difficult dogmas in such a way that it became easy to reduce them to a system. “Faith seeking understanding” was his motto. It was his severe and strictly logical method which set the fashion to those who came after him. His Monologium treats of God as one in Nature, and three in Persons; the Proslogium further develops the treatment of the unity of God, while the treatise De Processione Spiritus Sancti adversus Græcos develops his teaching on the Trinity; De Casu Diaboli and De Conceptu Virginali et Originali Peccato deal with sin; Cur Deus Homo contains his celebrated theory of Redemption. He also wrote on Grace and Free Will: De Libero Arbitrio and De Concordia Præscientiæ et Prædestinationis nec non Gratiæ Dei cum Libero Arbitrio.

The rationalistic tendencies of Abelard were successfully combated by St. Bernard (1153), Hugh of St. Victor (Summa Sententiarum and De Sacramentis Fidei), and Robert Pulleyn. Peter Lombard (Archbishop of Paris, 1104) was the author of the great mediaeval text-book, Sententiarum libri quattuor, in which the materials supplied by the Fathers are worked up into a complete system of Theology. William of Auxerre (Altissiodorensis), Richard of St. Victor, Alanus of Lille, and William of Paris, form the transition from the preparatory period to the period of prosperity.

II. During the early years of the thirteenth century the foundation of the two great Mendicant Orders by St. Francis and St. Dominic, and the struggles with the Arabico-aristotelian philosophy introduced into the west by the Spanish Moors, gave astonishing impetus to theological studies. Theology embraced a larger field, and at the same time became more systematic. Greek philosophy drew attention to the Greek Fathers, who began to exercise greater influence. Aristotle’s logic had already found its way into the schools; now his metaphysics, psychology, and ethics became the basis of Christian teaching. As might be expected from such studies, the great doctors of this period are characterized by clear statement of the question at issue, continual adoption of the syllogistic form of argumentation, frequent and subtle use of distinctions, and plain unvarnished style of language which is not, however, without a charm of its own. They sometimes treated of theology in commentaries on Holy Scripture, but their usual text-book was the Sentences of the Lombard. They also wrote monographs on various questions, called Quodlibeta or Quæstiones Disputatæ. Some doctors composed original systematic works on the whole domain of theology, called Summæ Theologiæ, most of which, however, remain in a more or less unfinished state. These Summæ have often been likened to the great Gothic cathedrals of this same age, and the parallel is indeed most striking. The opening years of the thirteenth century mark the transition from the Roman (or, as we call it, Norman) style to the Gothic or pointed style, and also from the Patristic to the Scholastic method. The period of perfection in both Scholasticism and Gothic architecture also extends from 1230 to the beginning of the fourteenth century. The Mendicant Orders were the chief promoters of both. The style of the Schoolmen is totally wanting in the brilliant eloquence so often found in the Fathers. They split up their subject into numberless questions and subdivide these again, at the same time binding them all together to form one well-ordered whole, and directing them all to the final end of man. In like manner the mediæval architects, discarding the use of all gorgeous colouring, elaborate the bare stone into countless pinnacles and mullions and clusters, all of them composing together one great building, and all of them pointing to Heaven. And just as in after ages a Fénélon could call Gothic architecture a barbarous invention of the Arabs; so there have been learned men who have looked upon Scholasticism as subtle trifling. But it is noteworthy that in our own day Scholasticism and Gothic architecture have again come into honour. As the German poet Geibel says:—

“Great works they wrought, fair fanes they raised, wherein the mighty sleep, While we, a race of pigmies, about their tombs now creep.”

This flourishing period of Scholasticism opens with the great names of Alexander of Hales (Doctor irrefragabilis) and Blessed Albert the Great. The former was an Englishman, but taught theology in the University of Paris. He composed the first, and at the same time, the largest Summa Theologica, which was partly drawn from his earlier commentary on the Lombard, and to which his disciples, after his death, probably made additions from the same source. It is remarkable for breadth, originality, depth, and sublimity. If it yields the palm to the Summa of St. Thomas, still St. Thomas doubtless had it before him in composing his own work. But Alexander’s chief influence was exercised on the Franciscan Order which he joined in 1225. To this day he is the type of the genuine Franciscan school, for his disciple, St. Bonaventure, wrote, no Summa, while the Scotist school was critical rather than constructive. His works deserve greater attention than they have received. He died about 1245. St. Bonaventure, the “Seraphic Doctor,” (1221–1274) did not actually sit under Alexander, but is nevertheless his true heir and follower. His mystical spirit unfitted him for subtle analysis, but in originality he surpassed St. Thomas himself. He wrote only one great work, a Commentary on the Sentences, but his powers are seen at their best in his Breviloquium, which is a condensed Summa containing the quintessence of the theology of his age. Whilst the Breviloquium derives all things from God, his Itinerarium Mentis ad Deum proceeds in the opposite direction, bringing all things back to their Supreme End. In another work, the Centiloquium, he sketched out a new book of Sentences, containing a rich collection of passages from the Fathers, but in a strange though ingenious order.

The Dominican school was founded by Albert the Great (1193–1280). His chief glory is that he introduced the study of Aristotle into the Christian schools, and that he was the master of St. Thomas Aquinas. His numerous works fill twenty-one folio volumes (Lyons, 1651). They consist of commentaries on the Gospels and the Prophets, homilies, ascetical writings, and commentaries on the Areopagite, on Aristotle, and on the Sentences. His Summa Theologica, of which the four intended parts were to correspond with the four books of the Lombard, was written in his advanced old age, after St. Thomas’s Summa, and goes no further than the end of the second part. He also composed a so-called Summa de Creaturis, partly answering to the Summa contra Gentiles of St. Thomas, and, like it, more philosophical than theological.

St. Thomas Aquinas, the “Angelical Doctor” (1225–1274), towers over all the theologians of his own or of any other age. He is unsurpassed in knowledge of Holy Scripture, the Fathers, and Aristotle, in the depth and clearness of his ideas, in perfection of method and expression, and in the variety and extent of his labours. He wrote on every subject treated by the Schoolmen, and in every form: on physics, ethics, metaphysics, psychology; on apologetic, dogmatic, moral and ascetical theology; in commentaries on Holy Scripture, on Aristotle, on the Areopagite and the Lombard; in monographs, compendia, and in two Summæ. His chief dogmatic writings are the following:—

1. The Commentary on the Sentences written in his early years, and expressing many opinions subsequently rejected by him.

2. The so-called Questiones Disputatæ, a rich collection of monographs, on the most important subjects of the whole province of theology, which St. Thomas here treats more fully than in his other writings. Written as occasion required, they have been grouped in a somewhat confusing way under the titles De Potentia, De Malo, De Spiritualibus Creaturis De Virtutibus and De Veritate. A better arrangement would be under the three headings: De Ente et Potentia, De Veritate et Cognitione, De Bono et Appetitu Boni. We should then possess a fairly complete system of theologicophilosophical Ontology, Psychology and Ethics.

3. The Summa contra Gentiles is for the most part philosophical, but it contains only such philosophical subjects as bear on theology. It is divided into four books: the first two treat of the Essence and Nature of God and of creatures; the third treats of the movement of creatures to their end in God, and of supernatural Providence; the fourth book deals with the various mysteries which bear on the union of creatures with God. The method of exposition is not dialectical but positive. An excellent commentary on this work appeared towards the end of the fifteenth century, written by Francis of Ferrara. An English translation, by Fr. Joseph Rickaby, S.J., has just been published (1905).

4. But the Saint’s masterpiece is his Summa Theologica, composed towards the end of his life and never completed. It contains his mature opinions on almost the entire province of theology. It is divided into three great parts, the second of which is subdivided into two parts, termed respectively, Prima Secundæ and Secunda Secundæ. Each part is divided into “questions” and these again into “articles.”

Part I. treats of God as He is in Himself and as the Principle of all things:

A. Of God Himself:

(a) His Being (qq. 2–13);

(b) His internal activity (14–26);

B. Of God as Cause of all things:

(a) His causal relation to them:

(α) Generally (44–49);

(β) Specially:

(1) Angels (50–64);

(2) The material world (65–74);

(3) Man (75–102).

(b) The government of creatures and their share in the course of the universe (103–119).

Part II. treats of the motion of rational creatures towards God:

A. Generally (Prima Secundæ):

(a) The end or object of their motion (1–6);

(b) Human acts (7–48);

(d) The influence of God on their motion by means of Law and Grace (90–114).

B. Specially (Secunda Secundæ):

(a) The Theological (1–47) and Moral Virtues (48–170);

(b) Various classes of persons:

(α) Those gifted with extraordinary Graces (171–178);

(β) Those who have devoted themselves to the active or contemplative life (179–182);

(γ) Those found in different occupations (183–189).

Part III. treats of God’s action in drawing man to Himself:

A. Through Christ:

(a) His Person (1–26);

(b) His life and works (27–59).

B. By means of Christ’s Sacraments (60–90).

The first regular commentary on the Summa was composed in the beginning of the sixteenth century by Cardinal Cajetan, and is still printed in the large editions of the Summa; but it was not until the end of the sixteenth century that the Summa displaced the Sentences as the text-book in theological schools. The editions are too numerous to mention. Perhaps the most beautiful modern edition is that published by Fiaccadori (Verona) in quarto.

5. The Compendium Theologiæ, sometimes called Opusculum ad Reginaldum, treats of theology in its relation to the three theological virtues, Faith, Hope, and Charity, just like our English Catechism. Only the first part was completed, De Fide Trinitatis Creatricis, et Christi Reparantis; the second part, connected with the Our Father, goes down to the second petition. The treatment is not uniform: the work seems to grow in the Saint’s hands, and consequently some matters are here better treated than in the larger works.

To this flourishing period belong the great apologetic works of the two Dominicans, Raymund Martini (died 1286), Pugio Fidei, and Moneta (d. about 1230), Summa contra Catharos et Waldenses; the Summa of Henry of Ghent, (d. 1293); the magnificent Life of Jesus Christ, by Ludolph of Saxony; the Postilla on Holy Scripture, by Nicholas of Lyra (Franciscan, d. 1340), corrected and completed by Paul of Burgos (d. 1433); the Rationale Divinoram Officiorum, by William Durandus (d. 1296), surnamed Speculator on account of his Speculum Juris; the three great encyclopædic Specula, by Vincent of Beauvais; and the writings of the English Franciscan, Richard Middleton, who taught at Oxford (d. 1300), Commentary on the Sentences and various Quodlibeta.

John Duns Scotus (1266–1308), the “Subtle Doctor,” was a disciple of William Ware (Varro) at Oxford, who was himself the successor of William de la Marre, the first opponent of St. Thomas. His extraordinary acuteness of mind led him rather to criticize than to develop the work of the thirteenth century. His stock of theological learning was by no means large. He composed no commentary on Holy Scripture, which to his predecessors was always the preparation for and foundation of their speculative efforts, nor did he complete any systematic work. His subtlety, his desultory criticisms, and his abstruse style make him far more difficult reading than the earlier Schoolmen, and consequently he is seldom studied in the original text, even by his own school. His principal work is the great Oxford Commentary on the Sentences, Opus Oxoniense. Besides this, he wrote a later and much shorter commentary, Reportata Parisiensia, the Questiones Quodlibetales (corresponding with St. Thomas’s Questiones Disputatæ), and various smaller opuscula on metaphysics and the theory of knowledge. The handiest edition of the Opus Oxoniense is that of Hugh Cavellus, an Irish Franciscan in Louvain, and afterwards Archbishop of Armagh, who enriched the text with good explanatory scholia.

Scotus cannot be considered as the continuer of the old Franciscan school, but rather as the founder of a new school which rightly bears his name. His excessive realism has a tendency quite opposed to the Platonism of the early members of his Order, and, indeed, agrees with Nominalism on many points. His stiff and dry style is very different from the ease and grace which charm us in St. Bonaventure. However, Scotus is the direct antagonist of St. Thomas, and it is in relation to him that the character of his mind stands out most clearly. St. Thomas is strictly organic; Scotus is less so. St. Thomas, with all his fineness of distinction, does not tear asunder the different tissues, but keeps them in their natural, living connection; Scotus, by the dissecting process of his distinctions, loosens the organic connections of the tissues, without, however, destroying the bond of union, and thereby the life of the loosened parts, as the Nominalists did. In other words, to St. Thomas the universe is a perfect animal organism, wherein all the parts are held together in a most intimate union and relation by the soul; whereas to Scotus it is only a vegetable organism, as he himself expresses it, whose different members spring from a common root, but branch out in different directions; to the Nominalist, however, it is merely a mass of atoms arbitrarily heaped together. These general differences of mode of conception manifest themselves in almost all the particular differences of doctrine.

III. About the beginning of the fourteenth century the classical and creative period of mediaeval scholasticism came to a close. In the two following centuries no real progress was made. The acquisitions gained in the period of prosperity were reproduced and elaborated to meet the hypercritical and destructive attacks made at this time both on the teaching and the public action of the Church. Nominalism springing from, or at least occasioned by Scotism (partly as an exaggeration of its critical tendencies, partly as a reaction against its realism), destroyed the organic character of the revealed doctrines and wasted its energies in hair-splitting subtlety. Pierre Aureole (Aureolus, a Frenchman, d. 1321) led the way and was followed by the rebellious William of Occam (d. 1347), who was educated at Oxford and at Paris. Both of these were disciples of Scotus. Oxford now almost disputed the pre-eminence with Paris. St. Edmund of Canterbury (d. 1242) had introduced there the study of Aristotle, and his great follower was Roger Bacon, a Franciscan (d. 1292), the author of the Opus Majus, the true Novum Organum of science. The Oxford Friars, especially the Franciscans, attained a high reputation throughout Christendom. Besides St. Edmund and Roger Bacon, the university claimed as her children Richard Middleton, William Ware, William de la Marre, Duns Scotus, Occam, Grosteste, Adam Marsh, Bungay, Burley, Archbishop Peckham, Bradwardine, Fitzralph, Archbishop of Armagh, Thomas Netter (Waldensis), and the notorious Wyclif.

Many of the theologians present at the councils of Constance and Basle, notably Pierre d’ Ailly (Alliacensis, d. 1425), belonged to the Nominalist school. Its best representatives were Gregory of Rimini and Gabriel Biel. The Dominicans, with the exception of Durandus of St. Portiano (d. 1332), and Holkot (d. 1349), remained faithful to the Thomist traditions of the thirteenth century. Among their later writers may be mentioned St. Antoninus of Florence, John Capreolus, the powerful apologist of Thomism (Clypeus Thomistarum), Torquemada, Cardinal Cajetan, the first commentator on the Summa, and Francis of Ferrara, the commentator on the Summa contra Gentes. The Franciscans were split up into several schools, some adhering to Nominalism, others to Scotism. Lychetus, the renowned commentator on Scotus, belongs to this period, as also do Dionysius Ryckel, the Carthusian, and Alphonsus Tostatus, Bishop of Avila. Thomas Bradwardine, Archbishop of Canterbury (Doctor Profundus, 1290–1349) was the most famous mathematician of his day. His principal work, De Causa Dei contra Pelagianos, arranged mathematically, shows signs of great skilfulness of form, great depth and erudition, but gives a painful impression by its rigid doctrines. Some look upon him as one of the forerunners of Wyclif, an accusation which might with more justice be made against Fitzralph (d. 1360).

Thomas Netter (d. 1431), provincial of the Carmelites and secretary to Henry V., composed two works against Wyclif, Doctrinale Antiquitatum Fidei Catholicæ adversus Wicliffitas et Hussitas and Fasciculus Zizaniorum Magistri Johannis Wyclif cum Tritico. Nicholas Cusa surpasses even Bradwardine in the application of mathematics to theology.

During this period of decay the ordinary treatment of theology consisted of commentaries on the Sentences and monographs on particular questions (Quodlibeta). The latter were, as a rule, controversial, treating the subjects from a Nominalist or Scotist point of view, while some few were valuable expositions and defences of the earlier teaching. The partial degeneracy of Scholasticism on the one hand, and of Mysticism on the other, led to a divorce between the two, so that mystical writers broke off from Scholasticism, to their gain, no doubt, as far as Scholasticism had degenerated, but to their loss so far as it had remained sound. As Nominalism by its superficiality and arbitrariness had stripped the doctrines of grace and morals of their inward and living character, and had made grace merely an external ornament of the soul: so did false mysticism by its sentimentality destroy the supernatural character of grace and the organic connection and development of sound doctrine concerning morals; and as both Nominalism and pseudo-mysticism endangered the right notion of the constitution of the Church, they may with reason be looked upon as the forerunners of the Reformation of the sixteenth century. It does not fall within our province to speak of the anti-scholastic tendencies of the Renaissance which were found partly among the Platonists as opponents of Aristotle, and partly among the Humanists as opposed to what was considered “Scholastic barbarism.” There was, as we have seen, some reason for a reaction against the degenerate philosophy and theology of the day. But instead of returning to the genuine teaching of the earlier period, the cultivators of the New Learning contented themselves with a vague Platonic mysticism or a sort of Nominalism disguised under a new and classical phraseology.

C.—The Modern Epoch

About the end of the fifteenth century and the opening of the sixteenth, three events produced a new epoch in the history of theology, and determined its characteristic tendencies: the invention of printing, the revival of the study of the ancient classics, and the attacks of the Reformers on the whole historical position of the Church. These circumstances facilitated, and at the same time necessitated, more careful study of the biblical and historical side of theology, and thus prepared the way for a more comprehensive treatment of speculative theology. This new and splendid development had its seat in Spain, the land least affected by the heretical movement. The Universities of Salamanca, Alcala (Complutum), and Coimbra, now became famous for theological learning. Spanish theologians, partly by their labours at the Council of Trent (Dominic Soto, Peter Soto, and Vega), partly by their teaching in other countries (Maldonatus in Paris, Toletus in Italy, Gregory of Valentia in Germany), were its chief promoters and revivers. Next to Spain, the chief glory belongs to the University of Louvain, in the Netherlands, at that time under Spanish rule. On the other hand, the University of Paris, which had lost much of its ancient renown, did not regain its position until towards the end of the sixteenth century. Among the religious bodies the ancient Orders, the heirs of the theology of the thirteenth century, were indeed animated with a new spirit; but all were surpassed by the newly founded Society of Jesus, whose members laboured most assiduously and successfully in every branch of theology, especially in exegesis and history, and strove to develop the mediaeval theology in an independent, eclectic spirit and in a form adapted to the age. The continuity with the theological teaching of the Middle Ages was preserved by the Jesuits and by most of the other schools, by their taking as a text-book the noblest product of the thirteenth century—the Summa of St. Thomas, which was placed on the table of the Council of Trent next to the Holy Scriptures and the Corpus Juris Canonici as the most authentic expression of the mind of the Church.

This modern epoch may be divided into four periods:—

I. The Preparatory Period, up to the end of the Council of Trent;

II. The Flourishing Period, from the Council of Trent to 1660;

III. The Period of Decay to 1760.

Besides these three periods, which correspond with those of the Patristic and Mediæval Epochs, there is another,

IV. The Period of Degradation, lasting from 1760 till about 1830.

I. The Preparatory Period produced comparatively few works embracing the whole domain of theology, but its activity was proved in treatises and controversial writings, and its influence shown in the decrees of the Council of Trent and the Roman Catechism.

The numerous controversialists of this period are well known, and an account of their writings may be found in the Freiburg Kirchen-Lexicon. We may mention the following: in Germany, John Eck of Eichstätt, Frederick Nausea and James Noguera of Vienna, Berthold of Chiemsee, John Cochlœus in Nuremberg, Fred. Staphylus in Ingolstadt, James Hogstraeten, John Gropper and Albert Pighius in Cologne, Cardinal Stanislaus Hosius and Martin Cromer in Ermland, and, lastly, Blessed Peter Canisius; in Belgium, Ruard Tapper, John Driedo, James Latomus, James Ravestein (Tiletanus), and others; in England, the martyrs Blessed John Fisher, Bishop of Rochester (Roffensis), and Blessed Thomas More, Card. Pole, Stephen Gardiner, Bishop of Winchester; and later Cardinal Allen, Blessed Edmund Campion, S.J., and Nicholas Sanders; in France, Claude d’Espence, Claude de Sainctes, John Arborée, Jodocus Clichtovée, James Merlin; in Italy, the Dominicans Sylvester Prierias, Ambrose Catharinus, and James Nacchiante (Naclantus), and Cardinal Seripandus, an Augustinian; in Spain, the Minorites Alphonsus de Castro, Andrew Vega and Michael de Medina, the Dominicans Peter and Dominic Soto, and Melchior Canus; in Portugal, Payva de Andrada, Perez de Ayala and Osorius. These writers treat of the Church, the sources and the rule of Faith, Grace, Justification, and the Sacraments, especially the Blessed Eucharist, and are to some extent positive as well as controversial. The following treatises had great and permanent influence on the subsequent theological development: M. Canus, De Locis Theologicis; Sander, De Monarchia Visibili Ecclesiæ; Dom. Soto, De Natura et Gratia, and Andr. Vega, De Justificatione, written to explain the Sixth Session of the Council of Trent, in which both authors took a prominent part; B. Canisius, De Beata Maria Virgine, a complete Mariology—his great Catechism, or Summa Doctrinæ Christianæ, with its copious extracts from Holy Scripture and the Fathers may be considered as a modern “Book of Sentences.”

Apart from controversy, few works of any importance appeared. Among systematic works we may mention the Institutiones ad Naturalem et Christianam Philosophiam of the Dominican John Viguerius, and the Compendium Instit. Cathol. of the Minorite Cardinal Clement Dolera, of which the first named, often reprinted and much sought after, aims at giving a rapid sketch of speculative theology. On the other hand, important beginnings were made in the theologico-philological exegesis of Holy Scripture, especially by Genebrard, Arboreus, Naclantus, D. Soto and Catharinus, the last three of whom distinguished themselves by their commentaries on the Epistle to the Romans which was so much discussed at this time. Sixtus of Siena furnished in his Bibliotheca Sancta (first published in 1566) abundant materials for the regular study of Holy Scripture.

II. The Flourishing Period began immediately after the Council of Trent, and was brought about as much by the discussions of the Council as by its decrees. This period has no equal for richness and variety. The strictly theological works (not including works on Moral Theology, History, and Canon Law) may be divided into five classes: 1. Exegesis; 2. Controversy; 3. Scholastic; 4. Mystic; 5. Historico-patristic Theology. These classes, however, often overlap, for all branches of theology were now cultivated in the closest connection with each other. Exegesis was not restricted to philology and criticism, but made use of scholastic and patristic theology for a deeper knowledge and firmer consolidation of Catholic doctrine. The great controversialists gained their power by uniting a thorough knowledge of exegesis and history to their scholastic training. Moreover, the better class of scholastic theologians by no means confined their attention to speculation, but drew much from the Holy Scriptures and the Fathers. On the other hand, the most eminent patristic theologians made use of Scholasticism as a clue to a better knowledge of the Fathers. Finally, many theologians laboured in all or in several of these departments.

I. At the very opening of this period Exegesis was carried to such perfection, principally by the Spanish Jesuits, that little was left to be done in the next period, and for long afterwards the fruits gathered at this time were found sufficient. The labours of the Protestants are not worthy to be compared with what was done in the Catholic Church.

The list of great exegetists begins with Alphonsus Salmeron, S.J. (1586). His gigantic labours on the New Testament (15 vols. folio) are not a running commentary but an elaboration of the books of the New Testament arranged according to matter, and contain very nearly what we should now call Biblical Theology, although as such they are little used and known. Salmeron is the only one of the first companions of St. Ignatius whose writings have been published. He composed this work at Naples in the last sixteen years of his life, after a career of great public activity. His brother Jesuits and fellow-countrymen, Maldonatus (in Paris), and Francis Toletus (in Rome), and Nicholas Serarius (a Lorrainer), should be named with him as the founders of the classical interpretation of Holy Scripture. We may also mention the following Jesuits: Francis Ribera, John Pineda, Benedict Pereyra, Caspar Sanctius, Jerome Prado, Ferdinand de Salazar, John Villalpandus, Louis of Alcazar, Emmanuel Sa (all Spaniards); John Lorin (a Frenchman), Bened. Justinianus (an Italian), James Bonfrère, Adam Contzen and Cornelius à Lapide (in the Netherlands), the last of whom is the best known. Besides the Jesuits, the Dominicans Malvenda and Francis Forerius, and Anthony Agelli (Clerk Regular) distinguished themselves in Italy; and in the Netherlands, Luke of Bruges, Cornelius Jansenius of Ghent, and William Estius.

For dogmatic interpretation, the most important, besides Salmeron, are—Pereyra and Bonfrère on Genesis; Louis da Ponte on the Canticle of Canticles; Lorin on the Book of Wisdom; Maldonatus, Contzen, and Bonfrère on the Gospels; Ribera and Toletus on St. John; Sanctius, Bonfrère, and Lorin on the Acts; Vasquez, Justinianus, Serarius and Estius on the Epistles of St. Paul; Toletus on the Romans, and Justinianus, Serarius, and Lorin on the Catholic Epistles.

2. During this period, in contrast to the preceding, controversy was carried on systematically and in an elevated style, so that, as in the case of Exegesis, there remained little to be done in after ages except labours of detail. Its chief representatives, who also distinguished themselves by their great speculative learning, were Robert Bellarmine, Gregory of Valentia, Thomas Stapleton, Du Perron, Tanner, Gretser, Serarius, and the brothers Walemburch.

Cardinal Bellarmine, S.J. (d. 1621), collected together, in his great work, Disputationes de Rebus Fidei hoc tempore controversis, the principal questions of the day under three groups: (a) on the Word of God (Scripture and Tradition), on Christ (the Personal and Incarnate Word of God), and on the Church (the temple and organ of the Word of God); (b) on Grace and Free Will, Sin and Justification; (c) on the channels of grace (the Sacraments). He treats of almost the whole of theology in an order suitable to his purpose. The extensive learning, clearness, solidity, and sterling value of his work are acknowledged even by his adversaries. It continued for a long time to be the hinge of the controversy between Catholics and Protestants.

Gregory of Valentia, S.J. (a Spaniard who taught in Dillingen and Ingolstadt, d. 1603), wrote against the Reformers a series of classical treatises, which were afterwards collected together in a large folio volume. The most important of these are Analysis Fidei and De Trinitate. He condensed the substance of these writings in his Commentary on the Summa.

Thomas Stapleton was born at Henfield, in Sussex, in the year 1535, and was educated at Winchester and New College, Oxford, of which he became fellow. When Elizabeth came to the throne he was a prebendary of Chichester. He soon retired to Louvain, and was afterwards for some time catechist at Douai, but was recalled to Louvain, where he was appointed regius professor of theology. He died in 1598. Stapleton is unquestionably the most important of the controversialists on the treatment of the Catholic and Protestant Rules of Faith. He concentrated his efforts on two principal works, each in twelve books. The first of these refutes, in a manner hitherto unsurpassed, the Protestant Formal Principle—the Bible the only Source and Rule of Faith: De Principiis Fidei Doctrinalibus (Paris, 1579), to which are added a more scholastic treatise, Relectio Principiorum Fidei Doctrinalium, and a long defence against Whitaker. The other deals with the Material Principle of Protestantism—Justification by Faith only: Universa Justificationis Doctrina hodie controversa (Paris, 1582), corresponding with the second part of Bellarmine’s work, but inferior to it. The two works together contain a complete exposition and defence of the Catholic doctrine concerning Faith and Justification.

Nicolas Sander, or Sanders (b. 1527), was also, like Stapleton, scholar of Winchester and fellow of New. On the accession of Elizabeth he went to Rome, and was afterwards present at the Council of Trent. His great work, De Visibili Monarchia Ecclesiæ, was finished at Louvain in 1571. Another work, De Origine ac Progressu Schismatis Anglicani, was published after his death, and has lately been translated and edited by Mr. Lewis (Burns & Oates, 1877). Sander was sent to Ireland as Nuncio by Gregory XIII., where he is said to have died of want, hunted to death by the agents of Elizabeth, about the year 1580.

Cardinal Allen was born in Lancashire in the year 1532 and was educated at Oriel College, Oxford. He became in due course Principal of St. Mary Hall. On the death of Mary he left England, and resided for some time at Louvain. He was the founder of the famous English seminary at Douai, and was raised to the cardinalate by Sixtus V His work entitled Souls Departed: being a Defence and Declaration of the Catholic Church’s Doctrine touching Purgatory and Prayers for the Dead, has lately been edited by Father Bridgett (Burns & Oates, 1886). He died in Rome, 1594.

Cardinal James Davy du Perron (a Frenchman, d. 1618), wrote in his own mother tongue. His chief works are the Traité du Sacrement de l’Eucharistie, his controversies with James I. of England (that is, really with Casaubon), and the celebrated acts of the discussion with Philip Mornay, the so-called Calvinist pope.

In Germany Valentia found worthy disciples in the keen and learned Adam Tanner (d. 1635), and the erudite and prolific James Gretser (d. 1625), both Jesuits of Ingolstadt, who worked together and supplemented each other’s labours. Tanner, who was also a scholastic of note, followed the example of his master by condensing his controversial labours in his commentary on the Summa. Gretser, on the other hand, spread out his efforts in countless skirmishes, especially on historical subjects. His works fill sixteen volumes folio. Germany was also the scene of the labours of the brothers Adrian and Peter Walemburch, who were natives of Holland, and were both coadjutor-bishops, the one of Cologne, the other of Mayence. They jointly composed numerous successful controversial works, though only in part original, which were afterwards collected under the title of Controversiæ Generales et Particulares, in two volumes folio.

About this time and soon afterwards many classical treatises on particular questions appeared in France. Nicolas Coeffeteau, a Dominican, wrote against M. A. de Dominis, Pro Sacra Monarchia Ecclesiæ Catholicæ; Michael Maucer, a doctor of Sorbonne, on Church and State, De Sacra Monarchia Ecclesiastica et Sæculari, against Richer; and the Jansenists Nicole and Arnaud composed their celebrated work De la Perpétuité de la Foi on the Eucharist, etc. Of the Controversies of St. Francis of Sales we have only short but very beautiful sketches.

At the end of this period and the beginning of the next, may be mentioned Bossuet’s Histoire des Variations, his celebrated Exposition de la Foi, and among his smaller works the pastoral letter, Les Promesses de l’Eglise. Natalis Alexander has inserted many learned dogmatic polemical dissertations in his great History of the Church.

3. Scholastic, that is, Speculative and Systematic, Theology, like Exegesis and Controversy, and in close union with them, was so highly cultivated that the labours of this period, although (at least in the early decades) inferior to those of the thirteenth century in freshness and originality, and especially in moderation and calmness, nevertheless surpassed them in variety and in the use of the treasures of Scripture and early Tradition. When Pius V. (1567) raised St. Thomas, and Sixtus V. (1587) raised St Bonaventure to the dignity of Doctors of the Church on the ground that they were the Princes of Scholastic Theology, and, also at the same time, caused their entire works to be published, it was the Church herself who gave the impulse and direction to the new movement.

The great number of works and the variety of treatment make it difficult to give even a sketch of what was done in this department. Generally speaking, the theologians both of the old and of the newly-founded Religious Orders, and also most of the universities, kept more or less closely to St. Thomas. Scotism, on the contrary, remained confined to the Franciscans, and even among them many especially the Capuchins, turned to St. Thomas or St. Bonaventure. The independent eclectic line taken by the Jesuits, in spite of their reverence for St. Thomas, soon provoked in the traditional Thomist school a strong reaction which gave birth to protracted discussions. Although the peace was thereby disturbed, and much time, energy, and acuteness were spent with little apparent profit, nevertheless the disputes gave proof of the enormous intellectual power and activity which distinguished the first half of this period. As the Religious Orders were still the chief teachers of Theology, we may group the theologians of the period under the schools belonging to the three great Orders.

(a) The strict Thomist school was naturally represented by the Dominicans. At their head stand the two Spaniards, Dominic Bannez (d. 1604) and Bartholomew Medina (d. 1581), both worthy disciples of Dominic Soto and Melchior Canus, and remarkable for their happy combination of positive and speculative elements. Bannez wrote only on the Prima and Secunda Secundæ, whereas Medina wrote only on the Prima Secundæ and Pars tertia. Their works consequently complete each other, and together form a single work which may be considered as the classical model of Thomist theology. Bannez’s doctrine of grace was defended by Didacus Alvarez, Thomas Lemos (Panoplia Divinæ Gratiæ), and Peter Ledesma (d. 1616). Gonet (Clypeus Theologiæ Thomisticæ), Goudin, and the Venetian Xantes Marialles ably expounded and defended the teaching of St. Thomas. The Carmelites reformed by St. Theresa proved powerful allies of the Dominicans. Their celebrated Cursus Salmanticensis in Summam S. Thomæ (15 vols. folio), is the vastest and most complete work of the Thomist school.

Among other theologians whose opinions were more or less Thomist may be mentioned the Benedictine Alphonsus Curiel (d. 1609), the Cistercian Peter de Lorca (d. 1606), the Augustinians Basil Pontius and Augustine Gibbon, an Irishman who taught in Spain and in Germany (Speculum Theologicum); and Louis de Montesinos, professor at Alcala (d. 1623). Among the universities, Louvain was especially distinguished for its strict Thomism. The Commentary on the Sentences, by William Estius, is remarkable for clearness, solidity, and patristic learning. The Commentaries on the Summa, by John Malderus (d. 1645), John Wiggers (d. 1639), and Francis Sylvius (dean of Douai, d. 1649), are written with moderation and taste. The three most important scholastic theologians of the Sorbonne were less Thomistic, and approached more to the Jesuit school: Philip Gamache (d. 1625), who was unfortunately the patron of Richer; Andrew Duval (d. 1637), an opponent of Richer; and Nicholas Ysambert (d. 1642). The last two are very clear and valuable. In Germany, Cologne was the chief seat of Thomism, and a little later the Benedictine university of Salzburg strenuously supported the same opinions. One of the largest and best Thomistic works, although not the clearest, was composed towards the end of this period by the Benedictine Augustine Reding (d. 1692), Theologia Scholastica.

(b) Scotism was revived and developed in Commentaries on the Sentences by the older branches of the Franciscan Order, especially by the Irish members, the fellow-countrymen of Scotus, who had been driven from their own land by persecution, and were now dispersed over the whole of Europe; and next to them by the Italians and Belgians. The most important were Maurice Hibernicus (d. 1603), Antony Hickey (Hiquæus, d. 1641), Hugh Cavellus, and John Pontius (d. 1660). Towards the middle of the seventeenth century the Belgian, William Herincx, composed, by order of his superiors, a solid manual for beginners, free from Scotist subtleties, Summa Theologiæ Scholastiæ, but it was afterwards superseded by Frassen’s work.

The Capuchins, however, and the other reformed branches of the Order, turned away from Scotus to the classical theology of the thirteenth century, partly to St. Thomas, but chiefly to St. Bonaventure. Peter Trigos, a Spaniard (d. 1593), began a large Summa Theol. ad mentem S. Bonav., but completed only the treatise De Deo; Jos. Zamora (d. 1649) is especially good on Mariology; Theodore Forestus, De Trin. Mysterio in D. Bonav. Commentarii; Gaudentius Brixiensis, Summa, etc., 7 vols., folio, the largest work of this school.

(c) The Jesuit School, renowned for their exegetical and historical labours, applied these to the study of scholastic theology. As we have already observed, they were eclectics in spite of their reverence for St. Thomas, and they availed themselves of later investigations and methods. Their system may be described as a moderate and broad Thomism qualified by an infusion of Scotism, and, in some instances, even of Nominalism.

The chief representatives of this School, next to Toletus, are Gregory of Valentia, Francis Suarez, Gabriel Vasquez, and Didacus Ruiz, all four Spaniards, and all eminently acute and profound, thoroughly versed in Exegesis and the Fathers, and in this respect far superior to the theologians of the other Schools.

Valentia, the restorer of theology in Germany (d. 1603), combines in the happiest manner in his Commentaries on the Summa (4 vols., folio, often reprinted), both positive and speculative theology, and expounds them with elegance and compactness like Bannez and Medina.

Suarez (d. 1617, aged 70), styled by many Popes “Doctor Eximius,” and described by Bossuet as the writer “dans lequel on entend toute l’école moderne,” is the most prolific of all the later Schoolmen, and at the same time renowned for clearness, depth, and prudence. His works cover the whole ground of the Summa of St. Thomas; but the most extensive and classical among them are De Legibus, De Gratia, De Virtutibus Theologicis, De Incarnatione, and De Sacramentis, as far as Penance.

Vasquez (d. 1604), whose intellectual tendency was eminently critical, was to Suarez what Scotus was to St. Thomas. Unlike Scotus, however, he was as much at home in the exegetical and historical branches of theology as in speculation.

Ruiz surpasses even Suarez himself in depth and learning. He wrote only De Deo (6 vols., folio). His best work, and indeed the best ever written on the subject, is his treatise De Trinitate.

Besides these four chiefs of the Jesuit school, a whole host of writers might be mentioned. In Spain: Louis Molina (d. 1600), whose celebrated doctrine of Scientia Media was the occasion of so much controversy, was not really the leader of the Jesuit school, but was more distinguished as a moral theologian; Jos. Martinez de Ripalda (d. 1648), famous for his work against Baius (Michael Bay), and for his twelve books De Ente Supernaturali, in which the whole doctrine of the supernatural was for the first time systematically handled; Cardinal John De Lugo (d. 1660), better known as a moral theologian, is remarkable for critical keenness rather than for positive knowledge—his most important dogmatic work is the often-quoted treatise De Fide Divina. The Opus Theologicum of Sylvester Maurus, the well-known commentator on Aristotle, is distinguished by simplicity, calmness, and clearness, and by the absence of the subtleties so common in his day.

In Italy: Albertini, Fasoli, and Cardinal Pallavicini (d. 1667).

In France: Maratius, Martinon, and the keen and refined Claude Tiphanus (d. 1641), author of a number of treatises (De Hypostasi, De Ordine, De Creaturis Spiritualibus) in which the nicest points of theology are investigated.

In Belgium: Leonard Lessius (d. 1623), a pious, thoughtful, and elegant theologian, who wrote De Perfectionibus Moribusque Divinis, De Summo Bono, De Gratia Efficaci, and a commentary on the third part of the Summa; Ægidius Coninck, John Præpositus, and Martin Becanus.

Germany at this time had only one great native scholastic theologian, Adam Tanner (d. 1632). His Theologia Scholastica (in 4 vols. folio) is a work of the first rank, and completes in many points the labours of his master, Gregory of Valentia. During this period, however, and far into the eighteenth century, German theologians directed their attention chiefly to the practical branches of theology, such as controversy, moral theology, and canon law, and in these acquired an acknowledged superiority. It is sufficient to mention Laymann (d. 1625), Lacroix (d. 1714), Sporer (d. 1714), and Schmalzgrueber (d. 1735).

4. We omit writers who treat of the higher stages of the spiritual life, such as St. Theresa and St. John of the Cross, and mention only those who deal with dogmas as subjects of meditation, or who introduce dogmatic truths into their ascetical writings. To this period belong the Dominican, Louis of Granada, especially on account of his excellent sermons; the Jesuits, Francis Arias, Louis da Ponte (commentary on the Canticle of Canticles), Eusebius Nieremberg, Nouet (numerous meditations), and Rogacci, On the One Thing Necessary; also Cardinal Bérulle, the founder of the French oratory, author of many works, especially on the Incarnation; St. Francis of Sales, On the Love of God; the Franciscan John of Carthagena, and the Capuchin D’Argentan. The works of Lessius may also be named under this heading, De Perfectionibus Divinis and De Summo Bono. The Sorbonne doctors, Hauteville, a disciple of St. Francis of Sales, Louis Bail, and later, the Dominican Contenson, worked up the Summa in a way that speaks at once to the mind and to the heart.

5. This branch of theology was cultivated especially in France and Belgium, and chiefly by the Jesuits, Dominicans, Oratorians, and the new Congregation of Benedictines, and also by the Universities of Paris and Louvain. Their writings are mainly, as might be expected, dogmatico-historical or controversial treatises on one or other of the Fathers, or on particular heresies or dogmas. Thus, for instance, Gamier wrote on the Pelagians, and Combesis on the Monothelites, while Morinus composed treatises De Pænitentia and De Sacris Ordinibus; Isaac Habert, Doctrina Patrum Græcorum de Gratia; Nicole (that is, Arnauld) on the Blessed Eucharist; Hallier, De Sacris Ordinationibus; Cellot, De Hierarchia et de Hierarchis; Peter de Marca, De Concordia Sacerdotii et Imperii; Phil. Dechamps, De Hæresi Janseniana; Bossuet, Défense des Saints Pères, etc.; and the Capuchin Charles Joseph Tricassinus on the Augustinian doctrine of grace against the Jansenists. Much good work was done in this department, but it is to be regretted that after the example of Baius many of the historical theologians such as Launoi, Dupin, the Oratorians, and to some extent the Benedictines of St. Maur, deserted not merely the traditional teaching of the Schoolmen, which they considered to be pagan and Pelagian, but even the doctrine of the Church, and became partisans of Jansenism and Gallicanism. The Augustinus of Jansenius of Ypres (d. 1648) was the unhappy result of the misuse of splendid intellectual powers and immense erudition. The Jesuit Petavius and the Oratorian Thomassin attempted in their epoch-making works to treat the whole of dogmatic theology from a patristic and historical point of view, but both accomplished only a portion of their design.

Dionysius Petavius (Petau, d. 1647) finished no more than the treatises De Deo Uno et Trino, De Creatione and De Incarnatione, to which are subjoined a series of opuscula on Grace, the Sacraments, and the Church. Louis Thomassin (d. 1695) has left only De Deo Uno and De Incarnatione, and short treatises, De Prolegomenis Theologiæ, De Trinitate, and De Conciliis. Petavius is on the whole the more positive, temperate, and correct in thought and expression; whereas Thomassin is richer in ideas, but at the same time fanciful and exaggerated in doctrine and style. The two supplement each other both in matter and form, but both are wanting in that precision and clearness which we find in the best of the scholastic theologians.

III. The Period of Decay may be considered as a sort of echo and continuation of the foregoing, but was also a time of gradual decomposition. The Jansenists and Cartesians now played a part similar to that of the pseudo-mystic Fraticelli and the Nominalists at the end of the thirteenth century. Whilst the study of history and the Fathers was continued and even extended, systematic and speculative Theology became neglected. The change manifested itself in the substitution of quartos for folios, and afterwards of octavos and duodecimos for quartos. The best dogmatic works of the period strove to combine in compact form the speculative and controversial elements, and were therefore commonly entitled, Theologia Dogmatica Scholastica et Polemica and often too et Moralis. Many of these works, by their compactness and clearness, produce a pleasing impression on the mind, and are of great practical value, but unfortunately they are often too mechanical in construction. The Germans especially took to writing handbooks on every department of Theology. In the former period Positive Theology was cultivated chiefly in France, while Spain gave itself up to more subtle questions. Now, however, Italy gradually came to the front. A host of learned theologians gathered around the Holy See to fight against Jansenism and Regalism, which had spread over France and were finding their way gradually into Germany. Most of the older schools still remained, but they had lost their former solidity. Another school was now added—the so-called Augustinian school, which flourished among the Augustinians and also at Louvain. It took a middle course between the older schools and the Jansenists in reference to St. Augustine’s teaching.

Among the Thomists we may mention Billuart (d. 1757), Card. Gotti (d. about 1730), Drouin (De re Sacramentaria) and De Rossi (De Rubeis). The two Benedictine Cardinals, Sfondrati and Aguirre (Theologia S. Anselmi), belong to the less rigorous school of Thomists, and, indeed, have a marked leaning to the Jesuit school.

The Franciscan school produced the most important work of the period, and perhaps the most useful of all the Scotist writings: Scotus Academicus seu Universa Doctoris Sublilis Theologica Dogmata hodiernis academicorum moribus accomodata, by Claude Frassen (4 vols. folio, or 12 vols. quarto). Boyvin, Krisper, and Kick also wrote at this time. The well-known works of the Capuchin Thomas ex Charmes are still widely used.

It was from the Jesuit school, however, that most of the manuals and compendiums proceeded. Noel composed a compendium of Suarez; and James Platel an exceedingly compact and concise Synopsis Cursus Theolog. Antoine’s Theologia Speculativa is to be commended more for its clearness than for its rigid opinions on morals. Germany produced many useful manuals, e.g., for controversy, the short work by Pichler, and a larger one by Sardagna. But the most important, beyond question, is the celebrated Theologia Wirceburgensis, composed by the Wurzburg Jesuits, Kilber and his colleagues, about the middle of the eighteenth century. It includes both the positive and speculative elements, and is a worthy termination of the ancient Theology in Germany.

The Augustinian school approached closely to Jansenism on many points, but the devotion of its leading representatives to the Church and to genuine scholasticism saved it from falling into heresy. These leaders were Christian Lupus of Louvain and Cardinal Noris (d. 1704). Both were well versed in history and the Fathers, but they wrote only monographs. The great dogmatic work of this school is by Laurence Berti, De Theologicis Disciplinis (6 vols., sm. folio). The discalced Carmelite Henry of St. Ignatius is rather Jansenistic, while Opstraet is altogether so. On the other hand, the Belgian Augustinian Desirant was one of the ablest and most determined opponents of the Jansenists, and was consequently nicknamed by them Délirant.

The French Oratory, which had begun with so much promise, and had been so rich in learned historians, fell afterwards completely into Jansenism; e.g. Duguet, Quesnell, and Lebrun himself. Its best dogmatic works are the Institutiones Theol., by Gasper Juenin, and his Comment. hist. dogm. de Sacramentis. The French Benedictines, in spite of all their learning, have left no systematic work. Part of the Congregation of Saint-Maur inclined very strongly to Jansenism and Gallicanism. The Congregation of Saint-Vannes, on the other hand, was rigidly orthodox, and produced in Calmet the greatest exegetist of the age, in Maréchal and Ceillier excellent patrologists, and in Petit-Didier one of the most strenuous adversaries of Gallicanism, and a worthy rival of his religious brethren Sfrondrati, Aguirre, and Reding.

The Sorbonne was much infected with Jansenism, and after 1682 almost completely adhered to the violent Gallicanism of the French Government. Nevertheless, a tendency, Gallican indeed, but at the same time anti-Jansenistic, was maintained, notably at St. Sulpice. We may mention Louis Abelly (d. 1619), Medulla Theologiæ; Martin Grandin, Opera theol. (5 vols.); Louis Habert (d. 1718, slightly Jansenistic), Du Hamel (a thorough Gallican), L’Herminier (Gallican), Charles Witasse (1716, Jansenist). Tournely was the most learned and orthodox of this group, and his Prælectiones Theologicæ had great influence in the better-minded circles until they were supplanted by the vile work of Bailly. The Collectio Judiciorum de Novis Erroribus, by Duplessis D’Argentré, published about 1728, is an important contribution to the history of Theology.

In Germany, Eusebius Amort (Canon Regular) was the most universal theologian of his time; his principal work, Theologia Eclectica, possessed abundant positive matter, and aimed at preserving the results of the past, while at the same time meeting the claims of the present. We may also mention the Theatine, Veranus, the Benedictines Cartier, Scholliner and Oberndoffer, the Abbé Gerbert de Saint-Blaise, and, lastly, Joseph Widmann, Instit. Dogm. polem. specul. (1766; 6 vols. 8vo).

The chief theological works were polemico-historical treatises against Jansenism, Gallicanism, and Febronianism: Viva, S.J., Damnatæ Quesnelli Theses; Fontana, S.J., Bulla Unigenitus propugnata; Faure, S.J., Commentary on the Enchiridion of St. Augustine; Benaglio, Scipio Maffei, the Dominicans De Rubeis, Orsi, Mamachi, Becchetti, the Jesuits Zaccharia, Bolgeni and Muzzarelli; also Soardi, Mansi, Roncaglia, and the Barnabite Cardinal Gerdil. The learned Pope Benedict XIV., although more celebrated as a Canonist, wrote on many questions of dogma. Above all these, however, stands St. Alphonsus Liguori (d. 1787), who was raised to the dignity of Doctor of the Church by Pius IX., more on account of the sanctity of his life and the correctness of his opinions, especially in Moral Theology, than for his knowledge of dogma.

IV. The destructive and anti-Christian principles of Jansenism, Gallicanism, and Regalism, which had been gradually gaining ground during the preceding period, led to the downfall of Catholic theology. These principles, in combination with the superficial philosophy of the day, and with the deplorable reverence, disguised under the name of tolerance, for rationalistic science and Protestant learning, did much mischief, especially in Germany. Theology became a sort of systematic collection of positive notions drawn from the writers of a better age, or more commonly from Protestant and Jansenistic sources. Any attempt at speculative treatment only meant the introduction of non-Catholic philosophy, particularly that of Kant and Schelling. Lawrence Veith, Goldhagen, and the Augsburg Jesuits, were brilliant exceptions; but the best work of the period is Liebermann’s Institutions. Baader, Hermes, and Günther attempted a more profound philosophical treatment of dogma in opposition to the Protestant philosophy. Their efforts were signalized by great intellectual power, but, at the same time, by dissociation from genuine theology, and by ignorance, or at least neglect, of the traditions of the schools. Italy alone preserved the orthodox tradition; many of the writers named in the period of decay continued their labours far into the present period.

The toleration granted to Catholics in England and Scotland during the second half of the eighteenth century, gave them the opportunity of publishing works on Catholic doctrine. We may mention Bishop Challoner (1691–1781), Grounds of the Catholic Doctrine, The Catholic Christian Instructed, The Grounds of the Old Religion; Bishop Hay (1729–1811), Sincere Christian, Devout Christian, Pious Christian, and a treatise on miracles—an excellent edition of these has been published by Blackwood, Edinburgh; and Bishop Milner (1752–1826), whose End of Controversy is still the best work against Low Churchmen and Dissenters.

When order was restored to Europe after the wars of the Revolution, the Church found herself stripped of her possessions and excluded from the ancient seats of learning. In spite of these disadvantages, signs were not wanting of the dawn of a new epoch of theological learning which seems destined to be in no way inferior to those which have gone before. The movement begun in France by Lamennais, Lacordaire, and Montalembert, was taken up even more vigorously in Germany. The study of Church history was revived by Döllinger, Hefele, Hergenröther, Janssen, and Pastor; Canon law, by Walter and Philips; Scripture, by Windischmann and Kaulen; Symbolism, by Möhler; Dogma, by Klee, Kuhn, Knoll, Scheeben, and Schwane; Scholastic philosophy and theology, by Kleutgen. The labours of the German school are summed up in the great Kirchenlexicon, published by Herder, of Freiburg. In Italy Liberatore and Sanseverino brought back the Thomistic philosophy; Passaglia, Perrone, Palmieri, and Franzelin (an Austrian) composed dogmatic treatises which have become text-books in almost every Catholic country; Patrizi and Vercellone are well known for their Biblical labours. Among the French writers of the earlier years of the revival, Gousset, Gury, and Craisson deserve special mention; while the gigantic labours of the Abbé Migne, in reproducing the works of former ages, have been of the greatest service to the study of theology. In spite of persecution, France is now producing theological work admirably suited to the needs of the day. We would refer especially to the Dict. de Théologie Catholique, begun by the Abbé Vacant; the Bibliothèque de Théologie Historique, published under the direction of the Institut Catholique of Paris; Dict. d’Archéologie et de Liturgie, by Dom Cabrol; and the Bibliothèque de l’Enseignement de l’Histoire Ecclésiastique. These four collections mark a new departure in theological literature. They are composed on strictly historical lines, noting in particular the development and growth of doctrines and institutions. Vigouroux’s Dict. de la Bible is valuable, though perhaps too conservative in its tendencies. The same may be said of the Scriptures Sacræ Cursus of Cornely, Knabenbaur, and Hummelauer. The Études Bibliques edited by Lagrange, and the texts and studies of La Pensée Chrétienne are more advanced. England and the English-speaking countries have been content, as a rule, to take their theology from abroad. We have, however, some few theological works of our own, e.g. Murray’s De Ecclesia and Kenrick’s Theologia Moralis. But a whole host of writers have dealt with the Anglican controversy in its various aspects, while Cardinal Newman’s works, especially his Development of Christian Doctrine, are more than ever valuable.

III.—THE SPECIAL TASK OF THEOLOGY AT THE PRESENT TIME—THE PLAN OF THIS MANUAL

I. The special task of Theology in the present day has been pointed out by the Vatican Council. In the Proœemium to the First Constitution (as had already been indicated by Pius IX. in his allocutions and also in his encyclical Quanta Cura issued in 1864), the council sketches in a few vivid strokes the chief errors of the age. After noting that these errors have sprung from the rejection of the Church’s teaching authority in the sixteenth century, it points out how opposed they are to the errors of that time: the first Protestants held to “Faith alone” and “Grace alone;” their modern successors believe in nothing but Reason and Nature. “Then there sprang up and too widely spread itself abroad through the world that doctrine of rationalism or naturalism which, totally opposed as it is to the Christian religion as a supernatural institution, striveth with all its might to thrust out Christ from the thoughts and the life of men, and to set up the reign of mere reason or nature. Having put aside the Christian religion and denied God and His Christ, many have at last fallen into the pit of pantheism, materialism, and atheism, so that now, denying rational nature itself and every criterion of what is right and just, they are working together for the overthrow of the foundations of human society. While this wickedness hath been gaining strength on all sides, it hath unhappily come to pass that many even of the Church’s children have strayed from the path of godliness, and that in them, by the gradual minimizing of truths, Catholic feeling hath been weakened. Misled by strange doctrines, confounding nature and grace, human knowledge and Divine Faith, they have distorted the true meanings of dogmas as held and taught by Holy Mother Church, and have imperilled the integrity and purity of the Faith.” Another constitution against Naturalism was projected in which the Trinity, Incarnation, and Grace were to be treated, but it was not issued owing to the suspension of the council. Two more constitutions, on the Church and on Matrimony, were to deal with the social aspect of Rationalism and Naturalism—that is, with Liberalism,—but for the same reason only one of them (that on the Church) was published. See Vacant, Études Théologiques sur le Concile du Vatican.

The leading errors which Theology has to combat are, therefore, Rationalism, Naturalism, and Liberalism. In opposition to Rationalism it establishes the supernatural character of theological knowledge; in opposition to Naturalism it brings out the meaning and connection of the supernatural truths in all their sublimity and beauty; and in opposition to Liberalism it proves the claim, and defines the extent, of the influence of the supernatural order upon the private and public life of men. While, however, carefully distinguishing between Reason and Faith, and Nature and Grace, Theology at the same time insists upon the organic connection and mutual relation between the natural and the supernatural order. Hence it is more than ever important that Catholic doctrines should be set forth in such a way as to bring out their organic union and connection.

II. We shall begin by treating of General Theology, or, in other words, the Sources of Theological Knowledge, the rule and motive of Faith, how we are to know what we are to believe and why we should believe it (De Locis Theologicis)—Book I.

We shall then deal with Special Theology; that is, the contents of Revelation, what we are to believe. Special Theology naturally begins with God—God considered in Himself, the Unity of the Divine Nature, and the Trinity of the Divine Persons (De Deo Uno et Trino)—Book II.

Next it considers God in His fundamental and original relations to the Universe generally, and to intelligent creatures, angels and men, particularly, in so far as they receive from Him their nature by creation, and at the same time in so far as they have been called to a supernatural union with Him by Grace; in other words—God as the Origin and End of the natural and the supernatural order (De Deo Creante et Elevante)—Book III.

Inasmuch as this original relation of God to the world and of the world to Him was destroyed by the revolt of the angels and of men, theology treats, in the third place, of Sin and its consequences (De Casu Diaboli et Hominis)—Book IV.

In the fourth place it deals with the restoration of the supernatural order and the establishment of a higher order and closer union with God by means of the Incarnation of God (De Verbo Incarnato)—Book V.

Fifthly, it expounds the doctrine of Grace, whereby, through the merits of Christ, man is inwardly cleansed from sin and restored to God’s favour, and enabled to attain his supernatural end (De Gratia Christi)—Book VI.

Sixthly, it considers the means appointed by the Incarnate Word for the continuance of His work among men: the Church His mystical Body, the Blessed Eucharist His real Body, and the other Sacraments (De Ecclesia Christi, De Sacramentis)—Book VII.

Lastly, Theology deals with the completion of the course of the Universe, the Four Last Things, whereby the universe returns to God, its End and Final Object (De Novissimis)—Book VIII.

NOTE.—The quotations of Scripture are taken from the modern editions of the Douai-Rheims Version. The translations of the passages of the Fathers are mostly taken from Waterworth’s “Faith of Catholics.” Our limited space has often compelled us to confine ourselves to mere statement without any explanation or proof. In such cases the reader must not assume that the doctrines stated are incapable of proof.

BOOK I

THE SOURCES OF THEOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE

PART I

THE OBJECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF THEOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE

CHAPTER I

DIVINE REVELATION

SECT. 1.—NOTION OF REVELATION—THREE DEGREES OF REVELATION

I. THE word Revelation originally means an unveiling—a manifestation of some object by drawing back the covering by which it was hidden. Hence we commonly use the word in the sense of a bringing to light some fact or truth hitherto not generally known. But it is especially applied to manifestations made by God, Who is Himself hidden from our eyes, yet makes Himself known to us. It is with this Divine Revelation that we are here concerned.

II. God discloses Himself to us in three ways. The study of the universe, and especially of man, the noblest object in the universe, clearly proves to us the existence of One Who is the Creator and Lord of all. This mode of manifestation is called Natural Revelation, because it is brought about by means of nature, and because our own nature has a claim to it, as will be hereafter explained. But God has also spoken to man by His own voice, both directly and through Prophets, Apostles, and Sacred Writers. This positive (as opposed to natural) Revelation proceeds from the gratuitous condescension of God, and tends to a gratuitous union with Him, both of which are far beyond the demands of our nature. Hence it is called Supernatural Revelation, and sometimes Revelation pure and simple, because it is more properly a disclosure of something hidden. The third and highest degree of Revelation is in the Beatific Vision in Heaven where God withdraws the veil entirely, and manifests Himself in all His glory. Here on earth, even in Supernatural Revelation, “we walk by faith and not by sight;” “we see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then [in the Beatific Vision] face to face;” “we shall see Him as He is” (2 Cor. 5:7; 1 Cor. 13:12; 1 John 3:2).

SECT. 2.—THE NATURE AND SUBJECT-MATTER OF NATURAL REVELATION

Natural Revelation is the principle of ordinary knowledge, and therefore belongs to the domain of philosophy. We touch upon it here because it is the basis of Supernatural Revelation, and also because at the present day all forms of Revelation have been confused and have lost their proper significance.

I. All natural knowledge of intellectual, religious, and ethical truths must be connected with a Divine Revelation of some kind, and this for two reasons: to maintain the dependence of these truths upon God, and the better to inculcate the duty of obeying them. This Revelation, however, is nothing else but the action of God as Creator, giving and preserving to nature its existence, form, and life. Created things embody Divine Ideas, and are thus imitations of their antitypes, the Divine Perfections. The human intellect, in particular, is an image of the Divine Intellect: the Creator endows it with the power to infer, from visible nature, the existence and perfections of its Author; and, from its own spiritual nature, the spiritual nature of the Author of all things. The revealing action of the Creator, then, consists in exhibiting, in matter and mind, the image of Himself, and in keeping alive in man the power of knowing the image and, through the image, Him who is represented. Theories which confound this Natural Revelation with Positive Revelation, like Traditionalism, or with the Revelation of Glory, like Ontologism completely misapprehend the bearing and energy of God’s creative operations and of created nature itself.

II. The following propositions, met with in the Fathers, and even in Holy Scripture, must be understood to refer to a Natural Revelation. When rightly explained they serve to confirm the doctrine stated above.

1. “God is the Teacher of all truth, even of natural truth,” i.e. not by formal speech nor by an inner supernatural enlightenment, but by sustaining the mind and faculties with which He has endowed our nature (cf. St. August. De Magistro, and St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. XI.).

2. “God is the light in which we know all truth,” that is, not the light which we see, but the Light which creates and preserves in us the faculty of knowing things as they are.

3. “God is the truth in which we read all truth,”—not as in a book or as in a mirror, but in the sense that, by means of the light received from God, we read in creatures the truths impressed upon them. The same idea is sometimes expressed by saying that God impresses His truth upon our mind and writes it in our souls.

4. It is particularly said that God has written His law upon our hearts (Rom. 2:14, 15) and that He speaks to us in our conscience. This, however, does not mean a supernatural intervention; through the light of reason God makes known to us His Will in a more vivid manner than even human language could do.

III. Natural Revelation embraces all the truths which we can apprehend by the light of our reason. Nevertheless only those which concern God and our relations with Him are said to belong to Natural Revelation, because they are the only truths in which He reveals Himself to us and which He commands us to acknowledge. Thus St. Paul (Rom. 1:18–20 and 2:14–15) points out as naturally revealed “the invisible things of God,” especially “His eternal power and Divinity,” and also the Moral Law.

It must not, however, be thought that all that can be or ought to be known about God, His designs, and His works, is within the sphere of Natural Revelation. The unaided light of reason can attain only a mediate knowledge of God by means of the study of His creatures, and must consequently be imperfect. Both the subjective medium (the human mind) and the objective medium (creation), are finite, whereas God is infinite. Moreover, the human intellect, by reason of its dependence on the senses, is so imperfect that it knows the essences of things only from their phenomena, and therefore only obscurely and imperfectly. And lastly, the study of nature can result only in the knowledge of such truths as are necessarily connected with it, and can tell us nothing about any free acts which God may have performed above and beyond nature, the knowledge of which He may nevertheless require of us.

Thus, even if the knowledge of God through the medium of nature without any special help were sufficient for our natural vocation, there would still be room for another and a supernatural revelation. But Natural Revelation is, in a certain sense, insufficient even for our natural vocation, as we shall now proceed to prove.

SECT. 3.—THE OBJECT AND NECESSITY OF A POSITIVE REVELATION—ITS SUPERNATURAL CHARACTER

I. The direct object or purpose of Positive Revelation is to impart to us the knowledge of the truths which it contains or to develop and perfect such knowledge of them as we already possess. The remote, but at the same time the chief, object is to enable us to attain our last end. The measure of the knowledge required depends upon the end ordained to man by his Creator; its necessity is determined by the capability or incapability of man to acquire this knowledge. Thus the necessity of a Positive Revelation varies according to the end to be attained and man’s capacity to attain it.

II. Man, as we shall see, is destined to a supernatural end, and consequently the principal object of a Positive Revelation is to enable him to reach it. But this supernatural vocation does not relieve him from his natural duties, and even for the fulfilment of these a Positive Revelation is in a certain sense necessary. The Catholic doctrine on this point has been defined by the Vatican Council. “To this Divine revelation it belongeth that those Divine things which are not impervious to human reason may, in the present state of the human race, be known by all with expedition and firm certainty, and without any mixture of error. Nevertheless not on this account must Revelation be deemed absolutely necessary, but because God of His infinite goodness hath ordained man to a supernatural end, that is to say, to be a sharer in the good things of God which altogether surpass the understanding of the human mind; for eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man what things God hath prepared for them that love Him” (sess. iii., chap. 2). We must therefore distinguish two different kinds of necessity.

1. Positive Revelation is not absolutely, categorically, and physically necessary for the knowledge of truths of the natural order bearing upon religion and morals, but it is relatively, hypothetically, and morally necessary. If Positive Revelation were absolutely necessary for the acquisition of natural, moral, and religious truths, then none of these truths could be known by any man in any other way. But this is plainly opposed to the doctrine that God and the moral law may be known by man’s unaided reason. Many difficulties, however, impede the acquisition of this knowledge. Very few men have the talent and opportunity to study such a subject, and even under the most favourable circumstances there will be doubt and error, owing to man’s moral degradation and the influences to which he is exposed. Positive Revelation is needed to remedy these defects, but the necessity is only relative, because it exists merely in relation to a portion of mankind, a part of the moral law, and in different degrees under different circumstances; the necessity is moral, because there is no physical impossibility but only great difficulty; and hypothetical, because it exists only in the hypothesis that God has provided no other means of surmounting the difficulties.

2. On the other hand Positive Revelation is absolutely, categorically, and physically necessary for the attainment of our supernatural end. To reach this end we must tend towards it supernaturally while we are here on earth (in statu viæ), and this supposes the knowledge of the end and of the means thereto. As both are supernatural, both must be made known by means of a direct communication from the Author of the supernatural order. And the necessity is absolute, because it extends to every truth of this order and arises from the very nature of man; physical, because of man’s physical incapacity of knowing God as He is in Himself; and categorical, because God cannot substitute any other means for it.

III. Positive Revelation is always a supernatural act as far as its form is concerned, because, in making it, God is acting beyond and above His ordinary activity as Creator, Conservator, and Prime Mover of nature, and out of purely gratuitous benevolence. This supernatural character belongs to it even when it merely supplements Natural Revelation. But it is purely and simply supernatural in all respects only when it manifests supernatural truths and is the means to a supernatural end.

SECT. 4.—THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF SUPERNATURAL REVELATION—MYSTERIES

I. We learn from the preceding section that Supernatural Revelation gives us knowledge of truths unrevealed by Natural Revelation. These truths constitute the specific and proper contents of Supernatural Revelation. As, however, this Revelation is by word of mouth, and not, as in the Revelation of Glory, by the vision of its object; as it does not entirely lift the veil from revealed things: it leaves them in obscurity, entirely withholding their reality from the mind’s eye, and only reproducing their essence in analogical concepts taken from the sphere of our natural knowledge. This peculiar character of the contents of Supernatural Revelation is called Mystery, or mystery of God; that is, a truth hidden in God, but made known to man by a free communication.

II. Mystery in common parlance means something hidden or veiled, especially by one mind from another. It implies the notion that some advantage attaches to the knowledge of it which gives the initiated a position superior to outsiders. The heathens gave the name of “mysteries” to the symbolical or sacred words and acts which they kept secret from the multitude, or to the hidden meaning of their liturgy, understood only by the initiated. The Fathers applied the term to the sacred words and acts of the true religion, kept secret from the heathen and catechumens, and understood only by the perfect, especially the mysteries knowable only by Faith which are veiled under the sacramental appearances (cf. Card. Newman, Development, p. 27).

1. The notion of theological mystery properly so called implies that the mysterious truth is incapable of being discovered by human reason, and that, even after it is revealed, reason cannot prove its existence. These conditions, however, are fulfilled by many truths which are not usually styled mysteries. Hence we must add the further condition that the truth should be naturally unknowable on account of its absolute and objective superiority to our sphere of knowledge, and that we should consequently be unable to obtain a direct and proper, but only an analogical, representation of its contents. A mystery is therefore subjectively above reason and objectively above nature.

2. That there are such mysteries has been defined by the Vatican Council. “Besides those things which natural reason can attain, there are proposed for our belief the mysteries hidden in God, which, unless they were divinely revealed, could not be known.” Although by means of analogy we may obtain some knowledge of these mysteries, nevertheless human reason is never able to perceive them in the same way as it perceives the truths which are its proper object. “The Divine mysteries, by their very nature, so far surpass the created intellect that, even when they have been imparted by Revelation and received by Faith, they nevertheless remain hidden and enveloped, as it were, in a sort of mist, as long as in this mortal life we are absent from the Lord, for we walk by faith and not by sight” (sess. iii., chap. 4). And the Council speaks of the two elements, subjective and objective, in the corresponding canon 1: “If any one shall say that in Divine Revelation no mysteries properly so called are contained, but that all the dogmas of the Faith may be understood and demonstrated from natural principles by reason duly cultured, let him be anathema” (cf. the Brief of Pius IX., Gravissimas inter).

3. The doctrine of the Council is based on many passages of Holy Scripture, some of which are quoted or alluded to in the decrees. The fullest text is 1 Cor. 2: “Howbeit we speak wisdom among the perfect, yet not the wisdom of this world, neither of the princes of this world that come to nought; but we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery [a wisdom] which is hidden, which God ordained before the world unto our glory: which none of the princes of this world knew.… But, as it is written; that eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him. But to us God hath revealed them by His Spirit. For the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God. For what man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him? So the things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God. Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God: that we may know the things that are given us from God” (6–12). Compare also Eph. 3:4–9; Col. 1:26, 27; Matt. 11:25–27, and John 1:18. The writings of the Fathers are very rich in commentaries on these texts, many of which are quoted in the Brief Gravissimas inter. See especially St. Chrysostom and St. Jerome on Eph. 3; also St. Peter Chrysologus, horn. 67, sqq., on the Lord’s Prayer.

4. The presence of mysteries in Christian Revelation is essential to its sublime character. The principle of Revelation is God Himself in His character of Father, sending His Son and, through Him, the Holy Ghost into this world to announce “what the Son received from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both.” Again, the motive of Revelation is the immense love of the Son of God for us: He speaks to us a friend to friends, telling us the secret things of His Father (John 15:14). And the end of Revelation is to lead us on to a truly supernatural state, the direct vision of God face to face. Moreover, without mysteries, Faith would not be “the evidence of things that appear not” (Heb. 11:1), nor would it be meritorious (Rom. 4, Heb. 10). In fact, the very essence of Revelation is to be supernatural and therefore mysterious, so that all who deny the existence of mysteries deny also the supernatural character of Christianity. We may add that the study of the revealed truths themselves will plainly show their mysterious nature.

5. The mysteries which are the subject-matter of Revelation are not merely a few isolated truths, but form a supernatural world whose parts are as organically connected as those of the natural world—a mystical cosmos, the outcome of the “manifold wisdom of God” (Eph. 3:10). In their origin they represent under various forms the communication of the Divine Nature by the Trinity, the Incarnation, and Grace; in their final object they represent an order in which the Triunity appears as the ideal and end of a communion between God and His creatures, rendered possible through the God-Man, and accomplished by means of grace and glory.

6. It is folly to maintain that the revelation of mysteries degrades our reason; on the contrary, it is at once an honour and a benefit. To say that there are truths beyond the reach of our reason is surely not to degrade it, but to acknowledge the true extent of its powers. And what an honour it is to man to be made in some way a confidant of God! Moreover, the more a truth is above reason the more precious it is to us. Finally, the knowledge of things supernatural is a pledge and foretaste of the perfect knowledge which is to come.

SECT. 5.—THE PROVINCE OF REVELATION

I. Revelation embraces all those truths which have been revealed in any way whatever.

1. Some revealed truths can be known only by means of Revelation; as, for instance, the Blessed Trinity, the Incarnation, and Grace. Others can be known by natural reason also; for instance, the Unity of God, Creation, and the Spirituality of the Soul. The former, which are purely and simply matters of Faith, are revealed in order to be made known; whereas the latter are mentioned in Revelation to serve as a basis.

2. Another important distinction is that between matters of Faith and matters of morals. Matters of Faith refer to God and His works, and are primarily of a speculative character. Matters of morals refer to man and his conduct, for which they prescribe practical rules.

3. A third distinction is between truths revealed for their own sake and truths revealed for the sake of those. This distinction is of great importance with regard to the contents of Holy Writ.

4. Lastly, some truths stand out clearly in Revelation, and are revealed in their completeness, while others can only be inferred by means of reflection and study. The latter are called corollaries of the Faith, or theological truths. It may come to pass that these may be proposed as matter of Faith by the Church, because they are necessary for the support of the Faith and also for the attainment of its object.

These four groups of revealed truths may not inaptly be compared to the different parts of a tree. Matters of Faith, pure and simple, are like the trunk; the natural truths which serve as a basis are the roots; truths incidentally revealed are the bark which envelops and protects the trunk; truths inferred by ratiocination are the branches which spring from the trunk; while the practical truths are the buds and flowers, from which proceeds the fruit of Christian life.

II. Although, strictly speaking, things revealed are alone the subject-matter of Faith, nevertheless many truths belonging to the domain of natural reason, but at the same time so connected and interwoven with Revelation that they cannot be separated from it, may also be reckoned as matter of Faith. These truths are, as it were, the atmosphere in which the tree of Revelation lives and thrives. The determination of the meaning of words used for the expression of dogmas (e.g. ὁμοούσιος), and of passages in Holy Scripture and other documents, are instances. In like manner many truths are inseparably connected with matters of morals, e.g. discipline, ceremonies, Religious Orders, the temporal power of the Pope, etc.

SECT. 6.—PROGRESS OF REVELATION

I. Supernatural Revelation was not given at once in all its completeness. From the day of Creation to the day of Judgment God has spoken, and will speak, to mankind at sundry times and in divers manners (Heb. 1:1). Natural and Supernatural Revelation run in parallel lines. Yet, whilst the former is addressed to all men at all times in the same form, the latter is made immediately only to individuals, and is not necessarily meant for all mankind. We are not, however, concerned here with private revelations, but only with those which are public, i.e. destined for all men.

II. Public Revelation may be divided into two portions: the Revelation made to man in his original state of integrity in Paradise, and the Revelation made to fallen man—that is, the Revelation of Redemption.

1. The Revelation in Paradise was public because it was to be handed down to all men as an inseparable complement of Natural Revelation. Holy Scripture mentions as its subject-matter only the law of probation given to Adam, but it connects this law with the supernatural order because the possession of immortality was to be the reward of obedience. It may be inferred, however, that all other necessary elements of the order of grace were clearly revealed, e.g. the Divine adoption of man, and the corresponding moral law, although the Old Testament mentions only the gift of integrity.

2. The Revelation of Redemption, or of the Gospel, was preparatory in the Old Testament and complete in the New. The preparatory stage was begun with the Patriarchs and continued with Moses and the Prophets. The Patriarchal Revelation contained the promise of the coming of the Redeemer, and pointed out the family from which He was to spring; it also enacted some few positive commandments. But as it did not form a complete system of religious truths and morals, and added little to what might be known by the unaided light of reason, it may be called the Law of Nature. The next stage, the Mosaic Revelation, was a closer preparation for the Revelation of the Gospel, and laid the foundation of an organized kingdom of God upon earth. Its object was to secure the worship of the one God and to keep alive the expectation of the Redeemer. Man is considered as a guilty servant of God, not as His child (Gal. 4:1). Nevertheless even this Revelation contains little more than Natural Revelation, except the positive ordinances for safeguarding the Law of Nature, for the institution of public worship, and for the atonement for sin. In the days of the Prophets the Revelation of the Gospel already began to dawn: the supernatural and the Divine began to appear in purer and clearer outline. Finally, the Revelation completed through Christ and the Holy Ghost surpasses all the others in dignity because its Mediator was the Only Begotten Son of God (Heb. 1:1), Who told what He Himself had heard (John 1:18), nay, Who is Himself the Word of God, and in Whom God speaks (John 8:25). The descent of the Holy Ghost upon the Apostles supplemented and completed what Christ had revealed. “When He, the Spirit of truth, is come, He will teach you all truth,” (John 16:13).

III. The dignity and perfection of Christian Revelation require that no further public Revelation is to be made. The Old Testament dispensation pointed to one that was to follow, but the Christian dispensation is that “which remaineth” (2 Cor. 3:11; cf. Rom. 10:3, sqq.; Gal. 3:23, sqq.); an “immovable kingdom” (Heb. 12:28); perfect and absolutely sufficient (Heb. 7:11, sqq.); not the shadow, but the very image of the things to come (Heb. 10:1). And Christ distinctly says that His doctrine shall be preached until the consummation of the world, and declares “All things whatsoever I have heard from My Father I have made known unto you” (John 15:15), and “when He, the Spirit of truth, is come, He will teach you all truth,” πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν (John 16:13). The Apostles also exhort their disciples to stand by the doctrine which they received, and to listen only to the Church (2 Tim. 2:2, and 3:14). And the epistle ascribed to St. Barnabas contains the well-known formula: “The rule of light is, to keep what thou hast received without adding or taking away.” Moreover, the Church has always rejected the pretension of those who claimed to have received new revelations of a higher order from the Holy Ghost, e.g. the Montanists, Manichæans, Fraticelli, the Anabaptists, Quakers, and Irvingites.

The finality of the present Revelation does not, however, exclude the possibility of minor and subsidiary revelations made in order to throw light upon doctrine or discipline. The Church is the judge of the value of these revelations. We may mention as instances of those which have been approved, the Feast of Corpus Christi and the devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus.

From the above we deduce the existence of a gradual progress, both extensive and intensive, in Revelation. The extensive progress does not start from Adam or Noah, but from Abraham, the patriarch selected among fallen mankind. Patriarchal Revelation was made to a family, Mosaic Revelation to a people, Prophetical Revelation to several peoples, Christian Revelation to the whole world. The intensive progress consists in a higher degree of illumination and a wider range of the revealed truths. The intensive progress likewise begins with Abraham and ascends through Moses and the Prophets to Christ, Who leads us to the bright day of eternity (infra, pp. 71, 105).

CHAPTER II

THE TRANSMISSION OF REVELATION

SECT. 7.—THE PROTESTANT THEORY AND THE CATHOLIC THEORY CONCERNING THE MODE OF TRANSMITTING AND ENFORCING REVELATION

DIVINE Revelation, although destined for all men in all times and places, has not been communicated to each individual directly and immediately. Certain means have been appointed by God for this purpose. Catholics and Protestants, however, hold diametrically opposite views as to what these means are. We shall first state both theories, and then develop and prove the Catholic theory.

I. The Protestant theory takes two different forms, both alike opposed to the Catholic theory. According to the older Protestants, Holy Scripture, the divinely written document of Revelation, together with an interior illumination of the Holy Ghost, is the sole means whereby Revelation asserts itself to the individual. All other institutions or external means of communicating Revelation are the work of man, coming violently between Revelation and Faith, and destroying the supernatural character of the latter. Modern Protestants, however, admit the existence of other means of transmission besides Holy Writ itself, but they deny that such means are ordained by God and participate in the Divine character of Revelation; while some even go so far as to deny the supernatural character of Holy Scripture. Revealed truth is handed down by purely human witnesses, whose authority depends, not on the assistance of the Holy Ghost, but on their natural abilities and industry. Both forms protest—the one in the name of Christian, the other in the name of natural, freedom—against the notion of a Revelation imposing itself authoritatively on mankind; and they also protest against any living and visible authority claiming to be established by God and to have the right to impose the obedience of Faith.

II. The Catholic theory is a logical consequence of the nature of Revelation. Revelation is not simply intended for the comfort and edification of isolated individuals, but as a fruitful source of supernatural knowledge and life, and a sovereign rule of Faith, thought, and conduct for all mankind as a whole, and for each man in particular. God wills that by its means all men should be gathered into His kingdom of holiness and truth, and should obtain, by conformity to His Will, the happiness which He destines for them, at the same time rendering to Him the tribute of glory which is His due. Revelation is especially intended to be a principle of Faith, leading to an infallible knowledge of revealed truth, and also to be a law of Faith, by submitting to which all men may offer to God the most perfect homage of their intellect. Hence it follows that God should provide efficient means to enable mankind to acquire a complete, certain, and uniform knowledge of revealed truth, and to secure to Himself a uniform and universal worship founded on Faith. This exercise of God’s Jus Majestatis over the mind of man is rightly insisted upon by the Vatican Council against the rationalistic tendencies of the day. Moreover, God could not cast upon the world the written document of His revealed Word, and leave it to an uncertain fate. Had He done so, the purposes of Revelation would have been completely frustrated. The only efficient mode of transmitting Revelation with authority is that the Word of God, after having once been spoken, should be continually proposed to mankind by His authorized envoys, and promulgated in His name and power as the principle and rule of Faith. These envoys are called the Teaching Body; their functions are called the Apostolate.

Thus, according to the Catholic theory, there is a means of transmitting Revelation distinct from Revelation itself and its written document; and this means, having been instituted by God, detracts in no way from the dignity of Revelation, but rather safeguards it. Other means of transmission, such as Scripture and history, are by no means excluded; they are, however, subordinate to the one essential and fundamental means.

SECT. 8.—FURTHER EXPLANATION OF THE CATHOLIC THEORY

I. The promulgation of revealed truth, being an act of God as Sovereign Lord of all creatures, must be made in the name of His sovereign authority and by ambassadors invested with a share of that authority. Their commission must consist of an appointment emanating from God, and they must be armed with the necessary credentials and the power of exacting Faith from those to whom they are sent. Thus qualified, the promulgation may be technically described as official, authentic, and authoritative: official, because made by persons whose proper office it is to publish—like heralds in human affairs; authentic, because with the commission to promulgate there is connected a public dignity and authority, in virtue of which the holder guarantees the truth of his utterances, and makes them legally credible—as in the case of public witnesses, such as registrars; authoritative, because the holder of the commission is the representative of God, invested with authority to exact Faith from his subordinates, and to keep efficient watch over its maintenance.

II. A threefold Divine co-operation is required for the attainment of the end of Revelation: the promulgation must be made under Divine guarantee, Divine legitimation, and Divine sanction. The object of the Apostolate is to generate an absolute, supernatural, and Divine certainty of the Word of God. Moreover, the promulgating body claims a full and unconditional submission of the mind to the truths which it teaches. But this certainty could not be produced, and this submission could not be demanded, except by an infallible body. The intrinsic and invisible quality of infallibility is not enough to convey the authenticity and authority of the Apostolate to the knowledge of mankind—some external mark is required. Christ proved the authority of His mission by miracles, and then instituted the Apostolate. His words and works were sufficient evidence for those who actually witnessed them. For us some other proof is necessary; and this may be either some special miracle accompanying the preaching of the Gospel, or the general moral miracle of the continuity and efficiency of the Apostolate. This subject will be treated at greater length in the treatise on Faith. The sanction of the Apostolate consists in the rewards and punishments reserved hereafter for those who accept or reject its teaching, and is the complement of its authority. Submission to Revelation is the fundamental condition of salvation, and consequently submission to the Apostolate, which is the means of transmitting Revelation, must be enforced by the same sanctions as submission to Revelation itself.

III. The act of promulgation must be a teaching (magisterium), and not a mere statement; this teaching must witness to its identity with the original Revelation, i.e. it must always show that what is taught is identical with what was revealed; it must be a “teaching with authority”—that is, it must command the submission of the mind, because otherwise the unity and universality of the Faith could not be attained.

IV. The subject-matter of the Apostolate is co-extensive with the subject-matter of Revelation. It embraces, besides the truths directly revealed, those also which are intimately connected and inseparably interwoven therewith (cf. § 5). Divine Faith cannot indeed be commanded in the case of truths not directly revealed by God; nevertheless the Teaching Body, the living witness and ambassador plenipotentiary of the Word of God, must, when occasion requires, be empowered to impress the seal of authenticity on subordinate truths also, for without this power the object of the Apostolate would in many cases be thwarted. The Church exercises this power when authoritatively passing judgment on dogmatic facts (facta dogmatica), or applying minor censures to unsound pro positions.

SECT. 9.—DEMONSTRATION OF THE CATHOLIC THEORY

The Catholic theory that Revelation is transmitted and communicated by means of envoys and teachers accredited by God, is evident à priori, i.e. the consideration of the nature of Revelation and its object shows that no other theory is practically possible. There are, however, other proofs also, which are set forth under the following headings:—

I. Proof from our Lord’s words

1. The documentary proof of the institution of a teaching Apostolate is found in Holy Scripture exactly where we should expect to find it, viz. at the end of the Gospels and at the beginning of the Acts of the Apostles.

(a) The first Evangelist, St. Matthew (28:18, 19), gives the narrative around which all the others group themselves. He shows, first, that the Apostles’ mission is based upon the sovereign power of Christ, and he then characterizes this mission as the visible continuation of the mission of Christ—the working of the Apostolate is described as an authorized teaching of the whole doctrine of Christ to all men of all times; lastly, baptism is stated to be the act by which all mankind are bound to become the disciples of the Apostolate. “All power is given to Me in Heaven and on earth. Going therefore [in virtue of, and endowed with this My sovereign power, “As the Father hath sent Me, I also send you” John 20:21] teach ye [μαθητευσάτε—make to yourselves disciples, teach as having power; cf. Mark 1:22] all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost: teaching them (διδασκόντες) to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you (ἐνετειλάμην): and behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world.” It is evident from the text that the promised presence of Christ is intended to secure the object of the Apostolate, and, consequently, that the Apostolate must be infallible. (See Bossuet, Instructions sur les Promesses faites à l’ Eglise; and Wiseman, The Principal Doctrines and Practices of the Church, lect. iv.)

(b) The second Evangelist, St. Mark, describes the “teaching” of St. Matthew as a “preaching,” and mentions, instead of the intrinsic guarantee of infallibility, the extrinsic signs of authority and sanction. “Go ye into the whole world and preach (κηρύξατε) the Gospel to every creature [as an authorized message from the Creator and Sovereign Lord to all mankind as His creatures]. He that believeth [your preaching] and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be condemned. And these signs shall follow them that believe: in My name they shall cast out devils.… But they [the eleven] going forth, preached everywhere: the Lord working withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed” (16:15–20).

(c) The third Evangelist, St. Luke, draws attention to the mission to “preach,” but afterwards lays special stress on its principal act—the authentic witnessing—and points to the Holy Ghost, of Whom the human witnesses are the mouthpiece, as the guarantee of the infallibility of the testimony. “Thus it is written, and it behoved Christ to suffer, and to rise again from the dead on the third day; and that penance and the remission of sins should be preached in His name unto all nations, beginning at Jerusalem. And you are witnesses of these things, and I send the promise of My Father upon you” (24:46–49). “You shall receive the power of the Holy Ghost coming upon you, and you shall be witnesses unto Me in Jerusalem and in all Judea and Samaria, and even to the uttermost part of the earth” (Acts 1:8).

(d) Whilst the synoptic Gospels chiefly describe the universal propagation and first diffusion of the doctrine of Christ, St. John, the fourth Evangelist, points out especially the unity, conservation, and application of the doctrine. He narrates, as the last act of our Lord, the appointment of a permanent visible Head of the Church. St. Peter is chosen to take the place of Christ, with power to feed mankind with the bread of doctrine (21:15–17), and to lead them in the light of truth. The apostolic organism thus receives a firm centre and a permanent consistency. The abiding and invisible assistance of Christ announced in St. Matthew to the members of the Apostolate is here visibly embodied in His supreme representative to whom it was especially promised (Matt. 16:17–19; Luke 22:31, 32). Moreover, the very figure of a shepherd feeding his lambs and sheep contains an allusion to the authority and sanction of the promulgation of the Word (cf. John 10:11 sqq.; Ps. 22.; Ezech. 34:23).

Thus the last Evangelist comes back to the point from which St. Matthew started: “All power is given to Me in Heaven and on earth.” The mission of the Apostolate is an emanation from and a continuation of the mission of Christ, and consequently the functions of both are described in similar terms. Our Lord Himself is spoken of as a Doctor and Master, teaching as one having power (Mark 1:22); a Preacher of the Gospel sent by God to man (Luke 4:16–21); a Witness, giving testimony to what He saw with the Father (John 8:14–18); and, lastly as the Shepherd of the sheep (John 10:11).

2. The beautiful picture of the institution of the Apostolate given at the end of the Gospel narratives is brought out more clearly when viewed side by side with the previous teaching of our Lord.

The mission described in Matt. 28 is represented in John 17:17, 18, as a continuation of the mission of Christ Himself: “Sanctify them in truth: Thy word is truth. As Thou hast sent Me into the world, I also have sent them into the world.” Moreover the coercive authority spoken of by St. Matthew and St. Mark is mentioned by St. Luke 10:16 (cf. John 13:20; Matt. 10:40) on the occasion of the first preparatory mission of the seventy-two disciples. “He that heareth you heareth Me; and he that despiseth you despiseth Me; and he that despiseth Me despiseth Him that sent Me.” And the promise of the Holy Ghost, Who, according to St. Luke’s narrative, was to support and strengthen the testimony of the Apostles, is made at great length in St. John’s account of our Lord’s discourse at the Last Supper, in which the duration, importance, and efficacy of the Holy Ghost’s assistance are declared. “And I will ask the Father, and He shall give you another Paraclete, that He may abide with you for ever, the Spirit of truth, Whom the world cannot receive: … but you shall know Him; because He shall abide with you, and shall be in you” (14:16, 17). “These things have I spoken to you, abiding with you. But the Paraclete, the Holy Ghost, Whom the Father will send in My name, He will teach you all things, and bring all things into your mind, whatsoever I shall have said to you” (ibid., 25, 26). “But when the Paraclete cometh, Whom I will send you from the Father, the Spirit of truth, Who proceedeth from the Father, He shall give testimony of Me: and you shall give testimony, because you are with Me from the beginning” (15:26, 27). “When He, the Spirit of truth, is come, He will teach [ὁδογήσει] you all truth” (16:13). It is plain that these promises were made to the Apostles as future propagators of the Faith, and the stress laid upon the functions of the Holy Ghost as the Spirit of truth, as Teacher and Witness, as Keeper of and Guide to the truth, is intended to show that the transmission of Revelation was to be endowed with all the qualifications required for its object, and especially with infallibility. Lastly, the Pastor appointed by Christ (John 21:15–17) had been previously designated as being strengthened in Faith in order to confirm his brethren, and as the rock which was to be the indestructible foundation of the Church (Luke 22:31, 32; Matt. 16:18).

These passages taken together may be summarized as follows. After accomplishing His own mission, Jesus Christ, in virtue of His absolute power and authority, sent into the world a body of teachers and preachers, presided over by one Head. They were His representatives, and had for their mission to publish to the world all revealed truth until the end of time. Their mission was not exclusively personal—it was to extend to their successors. Mankind were bound to receive them as Christ Himself. That their word might be His word, and might be recognized as such, He promised them His presence and the aid of the Holy Ghost to guarantee the infallibility of their doctrine; He promised external and supernatural signs as vouchers for its authenticity; finally, He gave their doctrine an effective sanction by holding out an eternal reward to those who should faithfully adhere to it, and by threatening with eternal punishment those who should reject it.

This summary is a complete answer to certain difficulties drawn from detached texts of Holy Scripture, and likewise fills up the gaps in isolated passages. The picture we have drawn corresponds exactly, even in minute details, with the theory of the Catholic Church on the Apostolate. Certain points, as, for instance, the infallibility of the Apostolate in matters indirectly connected with Revelation, are at least implicitly and virtually contained in the texts quoted. There is even reason to maintain that the words, “He shall lead you into all truth” (John 16:13), imply the promise of the infallible guidance of the Holy Ghost in all truths necessary to the Church. It should also be noted that, although these passages, as a whole, apply to the future of the Christian dispensation, some of them apply chiefly to its commencement, e.g. the signs and wonders, and the ocular evidence of the Apostles. The transitory elements can, however, be easily distinguished, and are therefore no argument against the perpetuity of the essential elements required for the permanent object of Revelation—the salvation of all mankind.

II. Proof from the writings of the Apostles

The writings of the Apostles represent the Apostolate as an accomplished fact, destined to endure in all its essential elements until the end of time

1. The theory is set forth especially in Rom. 10:8–19 and Eph. 4:7–14. In the former passage, St. Paul insists on the necessity and importance of the apostolic preaching as the ordinary means of transmitting the doctrine of Christ. “The word is nigh thee [i.e. all men, Jews and Gentiles], even in thy mouth, and in thy heart. This is the word of faith which we preach. For, if thou confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in thy heart that God hath raised Him up from the dead, thou shalt be saved.… For whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved. How then shall they call on Him in Whom they have not believed? Or how shall they believe Him of Whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? And how shall they preach unless they be sent?… Faith then cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of Christ [as preached by those who have been sent].… But I say, Have they not heard? Yes verily, their sound hath gone forth into all the earth, and their words unto the ends of the whole world.” “But all do not obey the Gospel [preached by the Apostles], for Isaias saith, Lord, who hath believed our report?” In writing to the Ephesians the Apostle describes how the organic body of living teachers is by its manifold functions the means designed by God to produce the unity, firmness, and security of the universal Faith. He speaks more particularly about the organization of the Apostolate, as it existed in his own day, when the Apostles were still living, and the extraordinary graces (charismata) were still in full operation. His description is not that of the ordinary organization, which was to endure for all ages, but, in spite of this, it is plain that what he says of the importance of the earlier form, may also be applied to that which was to come. “And He gave some apostles, and some prophets, and other some evangelists [both graces peculiar to the first epoch], and other some pastors and doctors [this alludes to the ordinary teachers, the bishops appointed by the Apostles] for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ, until we all meet together into the unity of faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the age of the fulness of Christ: that henceforth we be no more children, tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine by the wickedness of men, by cunning craftiness by which they lie in wait to deceive” (Eph. 4:11–15). The Apostles were the foundation of the whole organization; after their death their place was taken by the successor of St. Peter, to whom the other pastors stand in the same relation as the first bishops stood to the Apostles.

2. In practice, the Apostles announced the Gospel, and carried on the work of their ministry; they represented themselves as the ambassadors of Christ (Rom. 1:5; 15:18; 1 Cor. 2:16; 3:9, etc.), and, above all, as witnesses sent to the people by God; they proved the Divinity of their mission by signs and wonders, as Christ promised them (1 Cor. 2:4; 2 Cor. 12:12; 1 Thess. 1:5, etc.); they demanded for the word of God, to which they bore authentic and authoritative witness, the obedience of Faith (ὑπακὸη πίστεως, Rom. 1:5), and claimed the power and the right to enforce respect for it: “For the weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but mighty to God unto the pulling down of fortifications, destroying counsels (λογισμοὺς), and every height that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God, and bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ, and having in readiness to revenge all disobedience, when your obedience shall be fulfilled” (2 Cor. 10:4–6). They apply the sanction established by Christ, “He that believeth not shall be condemned,” and themselves pronounce the sentence. “But though we, or an angel from heaven, preach a gospel to you besides that which we have preached to you, let him be anathema” (Gal. 1:8).

The mode of promulgation, in its essentials, was to be permanent, and not to cease with the Apostles, as may be gathered from the principles laid down by St. Paul (Rom. 10) and from the fact that the Apostles appointed successors to themselves to watch over and keep the doctrine entrusted to them. “Hold the form of sound words which thou hast heard of me … Keep the good thing committed to thy trust by the Holy Ghost Who dwelleth in us” (2 Tim. 1:13, 14). They add the commandment to appoint further successors with the same charge. “The things which thou hast heard of me by many witnesses, the same commend to faithful men who shall be fit to teach others also” (2 Tim. 2:2). The practical application of this system is thus described by St. Clement of Rome, the disciple of the Apostles: “Christ was sent by God, and the Apostles by Christ. Therefore they went forth with the full persuading power of the Holy Ghost, announcing the coming of the kingdom of God. Through provinces and in towns they preached the word, and appointed the first fruits thereof, duly tried by the Spirit, to be the bishops and deacons of them that should believe.… They appointed the above-named, and then gave them command that when they came to die other approved men should succeed to their ministry” (Ep. i. ad Cor., nn. 42, 44).

This proof from Scripture by no means presupposes the inspiration of the books of the New Testament; it is enough for our present purpose to assume that they are authentic narratives. We thus do not fall into the vicious circle of proving the Apostolate from the inspired books, and the Inspiration of the books from the Apostolate. Nor do we make use of the authority of the Church in interpreting the texts. Their meaning is sufficiently manifest without any such help.

III. Historical proofs

But we have historical proofs of unimpeachable character that already, in the first centuries, the Catholic Rule was held by the Fathers. St. Irenæus, Origen, and Tertullian taught that, in consequence of the mission given to the Apostles, their successors preached the word with authenticity and authority; that the preaching of these successors infallibly reproduced the preaching of the Apostles; that, consequently, Ecclesiastical Tradition was to be followed, notwithstanding any private appeal to Holy Scripture or to any other historical documents.

1. St. Irenæus insists upon these points against the Gnostics, who appealed to Scripture or to private historical documents.

(a) He insists upon the existence and importance of the mission of the Apostles, and also upon the succession in the Apostolate: “Therefore in every church there is, for all those who would fain see the truth, at hand to look unto, the tradition of the Apostles made manifest throughout the whole world; and we have it in our power to enumerate those who were by the Apostles instituted Bishops in the churches, and the successors of those Bishops down to ourselves, none of whom either taught or knew anything like unto the wild opinions of these men. For if the Apostles had known any hidden mysteries, which they apart and privately taught the perfect only, they would have delivered them before all others to those to whom they entrusted even the very churches. For they sought that they whom they left as successors, delivering unto them their own post of government, should be especially perfect and blameless in all things.” He then demonstrates the continuity of succession in the church of Rome: “But as it would be a very long task to enumerate, in such a volume as this, the successions of all the churches; pointing out that tradition which the greatest and most ancient and universally known church of Rome—founded and constituted by the two most glorious Apostles Peter and Paul—derives from the Apostles, and that faith announced to all men, which through the succession of (her) Bishops has come down to us, we confound all those who in any way, whether through self-complacency or vain-glory, or blindness and perverse opinion, assemble otherwise than as behoveth them. For to this church, on account of more potent principality, it is necessary that every church, that is, those who are on every side faithful, resort, in which (church) ever, by those who are on every side, has been preserved that tradition which is from the Apostles.… By this order and by this succession both that tradition which is in the Church from the Apostles, and the preaching of the truth, have come down to us. And this is a most complete demonstration that the vivifying faith is one and the same, which from the Apostles even until now, has been preserved in the Church and transmitted in truthfulness.” After mentioning other disciples and successors of the Apostles, he continues: “Wherefore, since there are such proofs to show, we ought not still to seek amongst others for truth which it is easy to receive from the Church, seeing that the Apostles have brought together most fully into it, as into a rich repository, all whatever is of truth, that every one that willeth may draw out of it the drink of life.… But what if the Apostles had not left us writings: would it not have been needful to follow the order of that tradition which they delivered to those to whom they committed the churches—an ordinance to which many of the barbarian nations who believe in Christ assent, having salvation written, without paper and ink, by the Spirit, in their hearts, and sedulously guarding the old tradition?” (Adv. Hæres., l. iii., 3, 4).

(b) Irenæus then shows that the preaching of the Apostles, continued by their successors, contains a supernatural guarantee of infallibility through the indwelling of the Holy Ghost. “The public teaching of the Church is everywhere uniform and equally enduring, and testified unto by Prophets and by Apostles, and by all the disciples, as we have demonstrated, through the first and intermediate and final period, and through the whole economy of God and that accustomed operation relative to the salvation of man, which is in our faith, which, having received from the Church, we guard (quam pcrceptam ab ecclesia custodimus); and which by the Spirit of God is ever in youthful freshness, like something excellent deposited in a beautiful vase, making even the very vase, wherein it is, seem newly formed (fresh with youth). For this office of God has been entrusted to the Church, as though for the breathing of life into His handiwork, unto the end that all the members that partake may be vivified; in this [office], too, is disposed the communication of Christ, that is, the Holy Spirit, the pledge of incorruption, the ladder whereby to ascend unto God. For in the Church, saith he, God hath placed Apostles, prophets, doctors, and every other work of the Spirit, of which all they are not partakers who do not hasten to the Church, but by their evil sentiment and most flagrant conduct defraud themselves of life. For where the Church is, there is the Spirit of God, and where the Spirit of God is, there is the Church and every grace: but the Spirit is truth. Wherefore they who do not partake of that [Spirit] are neither nourished unto life from a mother’s breasts, nor see the most clear spring which proceeds from Christ’s body; but dig unto themselves broken cisterns out of earthy trenches, and out of the filth drink foul water, fleeing from the faith of the Church lest they be brought back; but rejecting the Spirit that they may not be instructed” (lib. iii., c. 24).

(c) Lastly, Irenæus links together the Apostolic Succession and the supernatural guarantee of the Holy Ghost. “Wherefore we ought to obey those presbyters who are in the Church, those who have a succession from the Apostles, as we have shown; who, with the succession of the episcopate, have received according to the good will of the Father the sure gift of truth; but the rest who depart from the principal succession, and assemble in any place whatever, we ought to hold suspected either as heretics and of an evil opinion, or as schismatics and proud, and as men pleasing themselves; or, again, as hypocrites doing this for gain’s sake and vain-glory.… Where, therefore, the gifts of God are placed, there we ought to learn the truth, [from those] with whom is that succession of the Church which is from the Apostles; and that which is sound and irreprovable in conversation and unadulterated and incorruptible in discourse, abides. For they both guard that faith of ours in one God, Who made all things, and increase our love towards the Son of God, Who made such dispositions on our account, and they expound to us the Scriptures without danger, neither uttering blasphemy against God, nor dishonouring the patriarchs nor contemning the prophets” (lib. iv. 26).

2. Origen, in the preface to his work De Principiis, states the principle of the Apostolate in the Church in the following pregnant terms: “There being many who fancy that they think the things of Christ, and some of them think differently from those who have gone before, let there be preserved the ecclesiastical teaching which, transmitted by the order of succession from the Apostles, remains even to the present day in the churches: that alone is to be believed to be truth which in nothing differs from the ecclesiastical and apostolical tradition.” And commenting on Matt. xxiv. 23, he says, “As often as they [heretics] bring forward canonical Scriptures in which every Christian agrees and believes, they seem to say, ‘Behold in the houses is the word of truth.’ But we are not to credit them; nor to go out from the first and the ecclesiastical tradition; nor to believe otherwise than according as the churches of God have by succession transmitted to us.… The truth is like the lightning which goeth out from the east and appeareth even into the west; such is the truth of the Church of God; for from it alone the sound hath gone forth into all the earth, and their words unto the ends of the world.”

3. Tertullian treats of this subject in his well-known work De Prcæcriptionibus. “[Heretics] put forward the Scriptures and by this their boldness they forthwith move some persons; but in the actual encounter they weary the strong, catch the weak, send away the wavering anxious. We therefore interpose this first and foremost position: that they are not to be admitted to any discussion whatever touching the Scriptures. If these be those weapons of strength of theirs, in order that they may possess them, it ought to be seen to whom the possession of the Scriptures belongs, lest he may be admitted to it to whom it in no wise belongs.… Therefore there must be no appeal to the Scriptures, nor must the contest be constituted in these, in which the victory is either none or doubtful, or too little doubtful. For even though the debate on the Scriptures should not so turn out as to confirm each party, the order of things required that this question should be first proposed, which is now the only one to be discussed, ‘To whom belongs the faith itself; whose are the Scriptures; by whom, and through whom, and when and to whom was that rule delivered whereby men became Christians?’ for wherever both the true Christian rule and faith shall be shown to be, there will be the true Scriptures and the true expositions and ail the true Christian traditions” (nn. 15, 19).

IV. The Divine legitimation of the Apostolate

A strong argument in favour of the Divine origin of the Apostolate, stronger even than the proof from the Holy Scriptures and early Fathers, may be drawn from its actual existence and working in the Catholic Church.

If the power over the human mind and the infallible possession of Divine truth claimed by the Catholic hierarchy did not really come from God, the claim would be a horrible blasphemy, and the hierarchy would be the work of the devil. But if this were the case, it would be impossible for the Church to do all the good which she does, to contribute so wonderfully to the sanctification of mankind, and to be so constantly and so energetically attacked by the enemies of Christ. God would be bound to oppose and extirpate this monster of deception, which pretends to be the work of His hands and to be guided by His Spirit. He could not allow it to prevail so long, so universally, with such renown and success among the very best of mankind. But, far from doing this, God marvellously supports the Apostolate and confirms its authority from time to time by supernatural manifestations. These, of course, demonstrate the Divine origin of the Church as a whole, but they also demonstrate the Divine origin of the Apostolate which is the means of communicating the Faith which the Church professes.

SECT. 10.—ORGANIZATION OF THE TEACHING APOSTOLATE—ITS RELATIONS WITH THE TWO POWERS AND THE TWO HIERARCHICAL ORDERS INSTITUTED BY CHRIST

The usual place to treat of the Organization of the Teaching Apostolate is in the treatise on the Constitution of the Church. For our present purpose, however, which is to show to whom and in what manner belongs the right to expound and propose Revelation, it will be sufficient to give a clear notion of the two hierarchical powers.

I. The power to teach is vested by right, as well as by the institution of Christ, in those same dignitaries who are appointed to be the instruments of the Holy Ghost for the communication of His grace to mankind (potestas ordinis) and who are the representatives of Christ for the government of His kingdom upon earth (potestas jurisdictionis) in a word, the Apostolate belongs to the Hierarchy. But the Apostolate is not only intimately connected with the two above-named functions of the Hierarchy: it is also itself an hierarchical function. As such, its value and importance depend on the rank held by the members of the Hierarchy by right either of ordination or of jurisdiction. The Apostolate is not, however, an independent hierarchical function. It springs from and forms an essential part of the other two. To enlighten the mind with heavenly truth and to generate Faith are acts belonging to the very nature of the Power of Orders, inasmuch as in this way the gifts of the vivifying Spirit are dispensed. And the same may be said of the Power of Jurisdiction, for the noblest part of this power is to feed the flock of Christ on Faith, and so to guide it to salvation.

II. We have already distinguished two functions of the Apostolate: (1) the authentic witnessing to the doctrine of Christ, and (2) the authoritative enforcement of it. The first element belongs to the Power of Orders, the second to the Power of Jurisdiction.

1. The act of witnessing to the doctrine of Christ is not in itself an act of jurisdiction, but rather, as being a communication of grace and of supernatural life, belongs to the Power of Orders. The function of this power is to transmit the Grace of Christ, especially the grace of Faith, while the Apostolate transmits the truth of Christ and provides the subject-matter of the act of Faith. The members of the Hierarchy invested with the power of communicating the gifts of Grace in general and the gift of Faith in particular, are therefore also the instruments of the Holy Ghost in communicating the doctrine of Faith. The grace which they receive in their ordination consecrates them for and entitles them to both functions, so that they are, in a twofold sense, “the dispensers of the mysteries of God.” Hence the witnesses of the Apostolate, which was instituted to produce supernatural Faith, are invested with a supernatural character, a public dignity, and a power based upon an intimate union with the Holy Ghost. They represent the testimony of the Holy Ghost promised by Christ, because they are the instruments of the Holy Ghost. They cannot, however, individually claim infallibility, as will presently be shown.

The Power of Orders has different degrees which constitute the Hierarchy of Orders. To each of these degrees belongs a corresponding share in the right and power to expound revealed doctrine. The High Priests (the Pontiffs or Priests of the first order, i.e. the Bishops) alone possess the fulness of the Power of Orders, and are by themselves independent of any other order in the performance of their functions. Hence, in virtue of their Orders, the Bishops alone are, in a perfect sense, “Fathers of the Faithful,” independent teachers and authentic witnesses in their own right. The subordinate members of the Hierarchy of Orders receive their orders from the Bishops, and are mere auxiliaries. Thus the Deacons are exclusively called to assist in the functions of the higher orders, and the Priests of the second order, i.e. simple Priests, in the ordinary sense of the word, act as the Bishop’s assistants, and often with his positive co-operation. Their participation in the Apostolate is limited, like their participation in the Power of Orders, and may be expressed in the same terms.

2. The act of imposing the doctrine of Christ, that is, of commanding adhesion to it, clearly appertains to the Power of Jurisdiction, especially to that branch of it which is called the Power of Teaching. Bishops, in virtue of their consecration, are called to the government of the Church; but this does not of itself constitute them rulers of any particular portion of the Christian flock, and therefore does not give them the right to command submission to their doctrinal utterances. This right is the result of, and is co-extensive with their jurisdiction, i.e. with their actual participation in the government of the Church. On the other hand, the right to act as authentic witnesses and as simple doctors, not imposing submission to their doctrine, is independent of their governing any flock, and may extend beyond the particular flock actually committed to their charge.

In general, the power of authoritative teaching implies complete jurisdiction over the domain of doctrine, and therefore includes (1) the right of administration, which entitles the holder of it to use the external means necessary for the propagation of the doctrine, especially to send out authorized missionaries; (2) the right of superintendence, together with the right of punishing, entitling the holder to forbid, prevent, or punish all external acts opposed to the propagation of the true doctrine; (3) judicial and legislative powers, including the right of prescribing external acts relating to the Faith, but having for their principal function the juridical and legal definition and prescription of the Faith. This last is the highest exercise of authoritative teaching, because it affects the innermost convictions of the mind; it is eminently Divine and supernatural, like the exercise of jurisdiction in the Sacrament of Penance, and like this, too, it implies that the holder represents Christ in a very special manner.

The right of authoritative teaching has various degrees. Simple Bishops, placed over only a portion of the Christian flock, possess only a partial and subordinate, and hence an imperfect and dependent, Power of Teaching. The Chief of the Episcopate, as Pastor of the entire flock, alone possesses the universal and sovereign, and hence complete and independent, Power of Teaching, to which the Bishops themselves must submit. The difference between his power and theirs appears most strikingly in the legal force of their respective doctrinal decisions. The Pope’s decisions, as Christ’s chief judge upon earth, alone have the force of laws, binding generally; whereas those given by the Bishops have only the force of a judicial sentence, binding the parties in the suit. In matters of Faith Bishops cannot make any laws for their respective dioceses, because a law requiring assent to a truth cannot be more restricted than truth itself, and, moreover, a law of this kind must proceed from an infallible lawgiver. Universality and infallibility are not the attributes of individual Bishops, but of the Pope alone; and therefore Bishops can make merely provisional laws for their own dioceses, subject to the approbation of the Sovereign Pontiff. It is not their business to give final decisions in controversies concerning the Faith, or to solve the doubts still tolerated in the Church—their ministry is not even indispensable for these purposes. They are, indeed, judges empowered to decide whether a doctrine is in conformity with generally received dogma, but as individuals they cannot make a dogma or law of Faith. They wield the executive, not the legislative power. In short, although the Bishops are pre-eminently witnesses and doctors and, within certain limits, also judges of the Faith, yet their Head, the Pope, has the distinctive attributes of supreme promulgator of doctrine, universal judge in matters of Faith, arbiter in controversies of Faith, and “Father and Teacher of all Christians” (Council of Florence).

SECT. 11.—ORGANIZATION OF THE APOSTOLATE (CONTINUED).—ORGANIZATION OF THE TEACHING BODY

On the basis of what has been laid down in the foregoing section, we now proceed to treat of the organization of the members of the Apostolate, the allotment among them of apostolic powers and privileges, and more especially of the gift of infallibility.

It is manifest that there exists for the purposes of the Apostolate a number of different organs adjusted together so as to form one well-ordered whole, the several members of which share, according to their rank, in the various powers and privileges of the Apostolate. Taken in a wide sense, this body embraces all the members of the Church Teaching who in any way co-operate in the attainment of the ends of the Apostolate. In a narrower sense, however, the Teaching Body is understood to consist only of the highest members of the Hierarchy of Orders, who are at the same time by Divine institution the ordinary members of the Hierarchy of Jurisdiction, viz. the Pope and the Bishops. In them the fulness of the Apostolate resides, whereas the lower members are only their auxiliaries. We shall treat first of the organization of the Teaching Body itself; then of its auxiliaries; and lastly of its connection with the body of the Faithful.

I. The principles which determine the composition of the Teaching Body are the following:—

1. The first object to be attained by means of the Apostolate is the universal diffusion of Revelation, paving the way for supernatural Faith. For this purpose a number of consecrated organs of the Holy Ghost are required, to be authentic witnesses and teachers. As representatives of Christ, they must be endowed with a doctrinal authority corresponding to their rank, and must have power to appoint auxiliaries and to superintend and direct the Faith of their subjects.

2. The second object of the Apostolate is to produce unity of Faith and doctrine. To accomplish this, one supreme representative of Christ is required, to preside over the whole organization, and to possess a universal and sovereign doctrinal power.

3. The unity resulting from this sovereign power is threefold: material unity of the Teaching Body, consisting in the juridical union of the members with their Head, in virtue of which they have and hold their functions—a unity resulting from the administrative power of their Head; harmonic and external unity in the activity of the members, arising from the power of superintendence; and formal and intrinsic unity of doctrine and Faith, produced by authoritative definition.

4. The unity of the Teaching Body is not that of a lifeless machine but of a living organism. Each member is formed to the likeness of the Head by God Himself, Who gives life to Head and members alike through the action of the Holy Ghost.

II. The original members of the Apostolate chosen by Christ Himself for the fundamental promulgation and propagation of the Gospel possessed the attributes of the Apostolate in an eminent degree. This was necessary in view of the objects they had to attain. Their superiority over their successors appears in the authenticity of the testimony of each of them taken individually, in the authoritative power to teach conferred upon all of them and not restricted to the chief Apostle, and lastly in the personal infallibility of every one of them. As they were the first witnesses of the doctrine of Christ they were not only the channels but also the sources of the Faith of every age, and therefore it was necessary that their testimony should be endowed with a special internal and external perfection. The internal perfection arose from the fact of their being eye-witnesses and ear-witnesses of the whole Revelation, and of their being so filled with the Holy Ghost that each of them possessed a complete and infallible knowledge of revealed doctrine; while the external perfection was the gift of miracles, by which they were enabled to confirm the authenticity of their testimony. Again, the Apostles were to give an efficient support to their Chief—who was to be the permanent foundation of the Church—in the original establishment of the kingdom of God upon earth, and particularly in the original promulgation of Christian truth. Each of them therefore received the same authority to teach as their Chief, although it was not purely and simply a sovereign authority. And, lastly, their infallibility was a necessary consequence of the authenticity of their testimony and the assistance of the Holy Ghost.

This view of the eminent character of the Apostolate as possessed by its original members is proved more by their conduct than by positive texts of Scripture. Besides, it is and always has been the view held by the whole Church.

III. As soon as the original and fundamental promulgation of the Gospel was complete there was no longer any necessity for the extraordinary Apostolate. Another object had now to be obtained: the conservation and consolidation of the apostolic doctrine in the Church. The place of the extraordinary Apostolate was taken by the Episcopate, i.e. the body of the ordinary members of the hierarchy established for the transmission of the grace and truth of Christ and the government of the Church. This Episcopal Apostolate is a continuation of the primitive Apostolate, and must therefore be derived from the Apostles; it must also in its nature and organization be homogeneous with the original, and yet at the same time must in some respects be different. The doctrinal and other personal and extraordinary powers of the Apostles ceased at their death. Their Head, in whom these powers were ordinary, alone transmitted them to his successors. In these, then, is invested the power of completing and perpetuating the Teaching Body by admitting into it new and duly authorized members. The Sovereign Pontiffs are the bond that unites the Bishops among themselves and connects them uninterruptedly with the primitive Apostolate. The Popes thus represent the original apostolic power in an eminent degree, wherefore their see is called emphatically the Apostolic See.

IV. The Apostolate has still, on the whole, the same objects as it originally had, and consequently must still be so constituted that it can give authentic and authoritative testimony; in other words, it must possess infallibility in doctrinal matters. Although this infallibility is no longer found in the individual members, nevertheless it can and ought to result from the unanimous testimony of the whole body. It ought, because otherwise universal Faith would be impossible; nay, universal heresy might take its place. It can, and as a matter of fact does, result, because the assistance of the Holy Ghost cannot be wanting to the Teaching Body as a whole, and the unanimous consent of all its members is a sure token that they reproduce the testimony of the Spirit of truth. Personal infallibility as a witness cannot be claimed even by the Chief of the Episcopate any more than by the subordinate members. Nevertheless when he pronounces a sovereign judgment in matters of Revelation, binding upon all, teachers as well as taught, he can and ought to be infallible. He ought, because otherwise the unity of Faith might turn into a unity of heresy. He can be, and in fact is infallible, because the Holy Ghost, the Guide of all Christ’s representatives, cannot abandon the highest representative precisely in that very act which is the most essential expression of His assistance, and which in case of error would lead the whole Church astray. And, à fortiori, when the Head and the members of the Teaching Body are unanimous, their testimony is infallible. However, taken apart from the testimony of their Head, the testimony of even all the Bishops would not constitute an obligatory doctrinal definition, but simply a strong presumption. The Sovereign Pontiff alone can pronounce such a definition by reason of his universal jurisdiction, and then only in that exercise of it which enforces the unity of Faith in the whole Church.

V. The two Apostolates, or rather the two forms of the Apostolate, must however have certain points of difference, as indeed may be gathered from what has just been said. The Bishops are not, as the Apostles were, immediately chosen by Christ, but are selected by members of the Church. In the case of the Chief Bishop the person is designated by the members and then receives, not indeed from them but directly and immediately from Christ, the powers inherent in his office; the other Bishops are appointed to a particular see by the Chief Bishop, and receive their jurisdiction from him. Besides, he alone inherits the fulness of the Apostolate. Moreover, if we consider the authenticity of the testimony of the Bishops we must hold that the office of witness is conferred upon them directly by Christ in the sacrament of Orders; their admission to the office by the Sovereign Pontiff is merely a condition required for its lawful exercise. Nevertheless they are not eye and ear witnesses of what they teach. They gather their knowledge from intermediate witnesses or from the written documents, and do not possess individually the gift of infallibility.

The infallibility of the Church assumes a twofold form, corresponding with the twofold action of the Holy Ghost as Lord and Life-giver. As Lord, He gives infallibility to the governing Chief: as Life-giver, He bestows it on the entire Body, Head and members. The infallibility of the Head is required to produce universal unity of Faith; the infallibility of the Body is required to prevent a disastrous conflict between the Body and its Head, and also to deliver the mass of the Faithful from the danger of being led astray by their ordinary teachers in cases where no decision has been given by the Holy See. The two forms, moreover, support and strengthen each other mutually, and prove the Apostolate to be a masterpiece of that Divine Wisdom “which reacheth from end to end mightily and disposeth all things sweetly” (Wisd. 8:1).

SECT. 12.—ORGANIZATION OF THE APOSTOLATE (CONTINUED)—THE AUXILIARY MEMBERS OF THE TEACHING BODY

The Teaching Body is a living organism, and consequently has the power of producing auxiliary members to assist in its work, and of conferring upon them the credentials required for their different functions. These auxiliary members may be divided into two classes: (1) auxiliaries of the Bishops, and (2) auxiliaries of the Chief Bishop.

I. The ordinary auxiliaries of the Episcopate are the priests and deacons. They receive their orders and their jurisdiction from the Bishops, and hold an inferior rank in the Hierarchy. Their position as regards the office of teaching, though far below that of the Bishops, is nevertheless important. They are the official executive organs of the Bishops, their missionaries and heralds for the promulgation of doctrine. They have a special knowledge of doctrine, and they receive, by means of the sacrament of Holy Orders, a share in the teaching office of the Bishops, and in the doctrinal influence of the Holy Ghost. Hence their teaching possesses a peculiar value and dignity, which may, however, vary with their personal qualifications. Moreover the Bishops should, under certain circumstances, consult them in matters of doctrine, not, indeed, to receive direction from them, but in order to obtain information. When we remember the immense influence exercised by the uniform teaching of the clergy over the unity of Faith, we may fairly say that they participate in the infallibility of the Episcopate both extrinsically and intrinsically: extrinsically, because the universal consent of all the heralds is an external sign that they reproduce the exact message of the Holy Ghost; and intrinsically, inasmuch as by their ordination they obtain a share in the assistance of the Spirit of Truth promised to the Church.

When and where necessary, the Bishops have the power of erecting Schools or Seminaries for the religious or higher theological education of a portion of their flocks. The professors in these institutions are auxiliaries of the Bishops, and are, if possible, in still closer union with the Teaching Apostolate than the clergy engaged in the ministry.

II. The Chief of the Episcopate, in virtue of his universal teaching authority, has the power of sending Missionaries into regions beyond the bounds of the existing dioceses, and can also establish, even within the dioceses, Religious Orders as his own auxiliaries, subject immediately to himself. He can also found Universities for the more profound and scientific study of Revelation. He can make all these persons and corporations comparatively independent of the Bishops, and invest them with a teaching authority analogous to that of the Episcopate. The Universities of the Middle Ages, for example, were not private, or state, or even episcopal institutions. They derived their mission from the Popes, together with the power of perpetuating themselves by the creation of doctors and professors, and the power of passing judgment on matters of doctrine. These decisions, however, did not carry with them any binding force, because their authors had no jurisdiction; but they possessed a value superior to that of many episcopal decisions. It is evident that the importance of the Universities as representatives of the teaching of the Church depends upon their submission to the Apostolate, whose auxiliaries they are, and also upon the number, the personal qualifications, and influence of their members.

Further, the Pope, in the exercise of his administrative power, can invest individual members of the inferior clergy, either for a time or permanently, with authoritative teaching power. But, even in this case, they are only auxiliaries of the Episcopate, existing side by side with it; as, for instance, Abbots exempt from episcopal jurisdiction (Abbates nullius) and the generals of Religious Orders, or acting as delegates of the sovereign teaching power of the Popes, e.g. the Cardinals and the Roman Congregations. All these auxiliaries, like those above mentioned, are assisted by the Holy Ghost, but their decisions acquire force of law only when confirmed by the Head of the Apostolate.

III. From time to time the Holy Ghost raises certain persons to an extraordinary degree of supernatural knowledge. Their peculiar position gives them a special authority as guides for all the members of the Church. They are not, however, exempt from the universal law that within the Church no teaching is of value unless approved by lawful authority. In so far, then, as it is evident that the Pope and the Bishops approve of the doctrine of these burning and shining lights, such doctrine is to be considered as an infallible testimony coming from the Holy Ghost. Thus, in Apostolic times, “Prophets and Evangelists” (Eph. 4:11) were given to the Apostles as extraordinary auxiliaries, not indeed for the purpose of enlightening the Apostles themselves, but to facilitate the diffusion and acceptance of their doctrine. In succeeding ages the Fathers and great Doctors have been of much use to the ordinary members of the Apostolate by helping them to a better knowledge of revealed truth. The function of these auxiliaries must, however, be carefully distinguished from those of the Prophets of the Old Testament. The former are not the organs of new revelations, nor do they possess independent authority—they are merely the extraordinary supports of the ordinary Teaching Body. “It is indeed a great matter and ever to be borne in mind … that all Catholics should know that they should receive the doctors with the Church, not that they should quit the faith of the Church with the doctors (‘se cum Ecclesia doctores recipere, non cum doctoribus Ecclesiæ fidem deserere debere’).”—Vine, of Lerins, Common. n. 17.

SECT. 13.—ORGANIZATION OF THE APOSTOLATE (CONTINUED)—ORGANIC UNION BETWEEN THE TEACHING BODY AND THE BODY OF THE FAITHFUL

I. The Teaching Apostolate, with its auxiliaries on the one hand and the body of believers on the other, together constitute the Church. The union between them is not mechanical, but is like the mutual union of the members of a living organism. To obtain a correct idea of the relations between the two parts, we must bear in mind that infallibility and the other attributes granted to the Teaching Apostolate are intended only as means to secure an unerring Faith in the entire community, and that the supernatural Faith of all the members, both teachers and taught, is the result of the influence of the Holy Ghost. From this we infer that the teachers and their hearers compose one indivisible, complete organism, in which the teachers figure as the principal members, the head and the heart; that they constitute a homogeneous organism, because the teachers are at the same time believers, and because the belief of the Faithful is a testimony to and confirmation of the doctrines taught. They are an organism living supernaturally, because the Holy Ghost infuses into all the members the life of Faith by external teaching and internal grace. This union between teachers and taught likewise leads us to further consequences. The doctrine of Christ is manifested in two ways: in authoritative proposition and in private belief. The latter form, being only an echo of the former, and, moreover, being the result of the action of the Holy Ghost, becomes in its turn a kind of testimony of doctrine. The private form reacts upon the public proposition and confirms it. The Faith of the whole Church cannot be wrong, and, therefore, what all believe must infallibly be true, and must represent the doctrine of Christ as well as do the teachings of the Apostolate. Nay, the external manifestations of the Holy Ghost may be seen especially in the Body of the Faithful, in its Martyrs and Confessors, and these manifestations constitute, in connection with the universal belief, a powerful motive of credibility.

II. This notion of the organic character of the Church will enable us to understand many expressions met with in Theology, e.g. the “Church Teaching” and the “Church Hearing” or “Learning;” the “Mission and Authority of the Church,” i.e. of the members of the Hierarchy; the “Teaching Apostolate, or its Chief, represents the Church,” i.e. not in the same way as a member of parliament represents his constituents, but in the sense that the Faith of the Apostolate or of its Chief is a true expression of the Faith of the whole Church. It has lately been said, “Infallibility belongs only to the Church, but the Hierarchy is not the Church, and therefore the Hierarchy is not infallible.” We might just as well say, “Life belongs only to the body, but the head and heart are not the body, therefore the head and heart are not alive.” This false notion originated either from a comparison between the Hierarchy and the parliaments of constitutional States, or from the materialistic conception of authority according to the formula: “Authority is the result and sum-total of the power of the members taken individually, just as the total force of a material body is the result and sum-total of the energies of its parts.” But, in truth, authority is a principle implanted in society by God in order to give it unity, life, and guidance. In order to give to the infallibility of the Church as broad a basis as possible, some well-meaning persons have adopted the materialistic view, and have made the universality and uniformity of the belief of the Faithful the chief motive of credibility. This theory, however, is naturalistic, and is opposed to the teaching of Scripture. Moreover, it is intrinsically weak, for without the independent authority of the Teaching Apostolate and the assistance of the Holy Ghost, uniformity and universality could never be brought about, or at least could not last for any length of time.

The attribute of infallibility belonging to the entire community of the Faithful manifests itself differently in its different parts. In the Teaching Body it is Active Infallibility, that is, inability to lead astray; in the Body Taught it is Passive Infallibility—that is, incapability of being led astray.

SECT. 14.—ORGANIZATION OF THE APOSTOLATE (CONCLUDED)—EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL INDEFECTIBILITY OF DOCTRINE AND FAITH IN THE CHURCH—RECAPITULATION

I. Intimately connected with the infallibility of the Church is her Indefectibility. There is, however, a difference between the two. Infallibility means merely that what the Church teaches cannot be false, whereas the notion of Indefectibility implies that the essentials of Revelation are at all times actually preached in the Church; that non-essentials are proposed, at least implicitly, and are held habitually; and that the inner, living Faith never fails. The Indefectibility of truth in the Church is less limited than the Infallibility. The perfection of the latter requires merely that no doctrine proposed for belief should be false, whereas the perfection of the former requires that all the parts of revealed doctrine should be actually, and at all times, expressed in the doctrine of the Church. Indefectibility admits of degrees, whereas a single failure, for a single day, on a single point of doctrine, on the part of the public teaching authority, would utterly destroy Infallibility.

II. The Indefectibility of the Teaching Body is at the same time a condition and a consequence of the Indefectibility of the Church. A distinction must, however, be drawn between the Indefectibility of the Head and the Indefectibility of the subordinate members. The individual who is the Head may die, but the authority of the Head does not die with him—it is transmitted to his successor. On the other hand, the Teaching Body as a whole could not die or fail without irreparably destroying the continuity of authentic testimony. Again, the Pope’s authority would not be injured if, when not exercising it (extra judicium), he professed a false doctrine, whereas the authenticity of the episcopal testimony would be destroyed if under any circumstances the whole body fell into heresy.

III. The Indefectibility of the Faith in individual members is closely connected with the external and social Indefectibility of the Church. The two stand to each as cause and effect, and act and react on each other. The interior Faith of individual members, even of the Pope and the Bishops, may fail; but it is impossible for the Faith to fail in the whole mass. The Infallibility and Indefectibility of the Church and of the Faith require on the part of the Head, that by means of his legislative and judicial power the law of Faith should be always infallibly proposed; but this does not require the infallibility and indefectibility of his own interior Faith and of his extrajudicial utterances. On the part of the Teaching Body as a whole, there is directly required merely that it should not fail collectively, which, of course, supposes that it does not err universally in its internal Faith. Lastly, on the part of the Body of the Faithful, it is directly and absolutely required that their inner Faith (sensus et virtus fidei) should never fail entirely, and also that the external profession should never be universally wrong.

The whole doctrine of the Organization of the Teaching Apostolate may be summarized as follows. The teaching function bound up with the two fundamental powers of the Hierarchy, Orders and Jurisdiction, fulfils all the requirements and attains all the purposes for which it was instituted. It transmits and enforces Revelation, and brings about unity and universality of Faith. It is a highly developed organism, with the members acting in perfect harmony, wherein the Holy Ghost operates, and whereby He gives manifold testimony to revealed truth, at the same time upholding and strengthening the action of individuals by means of the reciprocal action and reaction of the different organs. Just as God spoke to our fathers through the Prophets before the coming of Christ,” at sundry times and in divers manners” (Heb. 1:1), so now does Jesus Christ speak to us at sundry times and in divers manners in the Church “which is His body, and the fulness of Him Who is filled all in all” (Eph. 1:23).

SECT. 15.—GRADUAL PROGRESS IN THE TRANSMISSION OF REVELATION—APOSTOLIC DEPOSIT: ECCLESIASTICAL TRADITION: RULE OF FAITH

I. The office-holders in the Teaching Apostolate form one unbroken chain, derived from God, and consequently the doctrine announced by them at any given time is a continuation and a development of the doctrine originally revealed, and is invested with the same Divine character Jesus Christ, the immediate Envoy of His Father, announced what He had heard from the Father; the Apostles, the immediate envoys of Christ, preached what they had heard from Christ and the Holy Ghost; the successors of the Apostles, the inheritors of the apostolic mission, in their turn taught and still teach the doctrine received from the Apostles, and thus Revelation has been handed down from generation to generation without a single break.

The transmission and the teaching of Revelation are really one and the same act under two different aspects. Whenever the Word of God is announced, it is also transmitted, and it cannot be transmitted without being announced in some form or other. Thus transmission and publication are not two acts of a distinct nature, as they would be if Revelation was handed down only by means of a written document, or on merely historical evidence. The Council of Trent tells us that Traditions, “dictated by the Holy Ghost, have reached us from the Apostles, handed down as it were by hand,” and it speaks of “Traditions preserved by continual succession in the Catholic Church” (sess. iv). The transmission is the work of living, authorized officials, who hand down Revelation to the lawful heirs of their office. We must, however, distinguish between the authenticity and the authority of the act of transmission. When, for instance, a council makes the belief in some dogma obligatory, this act contains a twofold element: it bears authentic witness to the existence of the dogma in the Apostolic Deposit, and it authoritatively imposes Faith in that dogma. The authentic testimony belongs to the whole Church, which, either in teaching or in professing belief, witnesses to the existence of certain truths, whereas the power of imposing the obligation of belief resides only in the governing body and its Head. But the word “Tradition” does not express any notion of “Faith made obligatory,” but only of “Faith handed down by authentic witnesses.” We shall therefore use the term in the latter sense, although, as a matter of fact, transmission and imposition usually go together.

II. Three phases, more or less divided by time, but still alike in their nature, may be observed in the development and gradual progress of the transmission of revealed doctrine: (1) The Apostles confiding the Deposit of Revelation to the Church with the obligation to continue its promulgation; (2) The transmission of Revelation in and by means of the Church; and (3) The enforcement of belief by the Rule of Faith imposed by the Chiefs of the Apostolate.

1. The Apostles were the original depositaries of Christian Revelation, as well as its first heralds. They handed over to their successors the truths which they possessed, together with the powers corresponding to their mission, This first stage is called Apostolic Tradition, or Apostolic Deposit, the latter expression being derived from 1 Tim. 6:20, “Keep that which is committed to thy trust” (depositum, παραθήκην). All subsequent knowledge of Revelation is drawn from the Apostolic Deposit, which is consequently said to be the Source or Fount of Faith.

The Apostolic Deposit was transmitted in a twofold form: by word of mouth and by writing. The New Testament, although composed by the Apostles or their disciples, is not a mere reproduction of the Apostolic teaching. It was written at God’s command by men under His inspiration, and therefore it is, like the Old Testament, an original and authentic document of Revelation. Both Testaments were, as we shall see, transmitted to the Church by an authoritative act of the Apostolate. The Apostolic Deposit comprises, therefore, the Old Testament, the New Testament, and the oral teaching of the Apostles. By a process of desynonymization, the term “Deposit” has become restricted to the written Deposit, and the term “Tradition” to the oral teaching.

2. It is the Church’s office to hold and to transmit the entire Deposit, written and oral, in its integrity, and to deal with it as the Apostles themselves would if they were still living. This action of the Church is called Active Tradition; the doctrines themselves are called Objective Tradition. The term “Ecclesiastical Tradition” is sometimes used in a narrow sense for the unwritten truths of Revelation, and stands in the same relation to the Holy Scriptures as the oral teaching of the Apostles stood. In the course of time this Tradition has also been committed to writing, and as a written Tradition its position with regard to the living Active Tradition is now analogous to that occupied by the Holy Scriptures.

3. But the Church has a further office. The heirs of the Apostles have the right and duty to prescribe, promulgate, and maintain at all times and in behalf of the whole Church the teaching of the Apostles and of the Church in former ages; to impose and to enforce it as a doctrinal law binding upon all; and to give authoritative decisions on points obscure, controverted, or denied. In this capacity the Church acts as regulator of the Faith, and these doctrinal laws, together with the act of imposing them, are called the Rule of Faith. All the members of the Church are bound to submit their judgment in matters of Faith to this rule, and thus by practising the “obedience of Faith” to prove themselves living members of the one kingdom of Divine truth.

Thus we see that the Divine economy for preserving and enforcing Christian truth in the Church possesses in an eminent degree all the aids and guarantees which are made use of in civil society for the safe custody and interpretation of legal documents. In both there are documents of various kinds, witnesses, public and private, and judges of different rank. But in the Church the judges are at the same time witnesses, administrators, and legislators. In the Protestant theory there are written documents and nothing more.

CHAPTER III

THE APOSTOLIC DEPOSIT OF REVELATION

THE doctrine concerning the Sources of Revelation was formally defined by the Council of Trent (sess. iv.) and the Vatican Council (sess. iii., chap. 2). At Trent the principal object was to assert, in opposition to the early Protestants, the equal value of Oral and Written Tradition. As regards the Holy Scriptures, the controversial importance of which was rather overrated than otherwise by the Protestants, the Council had only to define their extent and to fix upon an authentic text. But the Vatican Council had to assert the Divine character of Scripture, which was not contested at the time of the earlier Council. Both Councils, however, declared that the Written Deposit was only one of the sources of theological knowledge, and that it must be understood and explained according to the mind and tradition of the Church.

SECT. 16.—HOLY SCRIPTURE THE WRITTEN WORD OF GOD

I. The “Sacred and Canonical Books,” i.e. the definitive collection of the authentic documents of Revelation preserved and promulgated by the Church, have been considered in recent times by writers tinged with rationalistic Protestantism, as being documents of Revelation merely because the Church has acknowledged them to be historically trustworthy records of revealed truth. This, however, is by no means the Catholic doctrine. The books of Holy Scripture are sacred and canonical because they are the Written Word of God, and have God for their Author, the human writers to whom they are ascribed being merely the instruments of the Holy Ghost, Who enlightened their minds and moved their wills, and to a certain extent directed them as an author directs his secretary.

1. The Council of Trent had declared that the whole of the books of the Old and New Testaments with all their parts were to be held as sacred and canonical. To this the Vatican Council adds: “The Church doth hold these [books] for sacred and canonical, not because, after being composed by merely human industry, they were then approved by her authority; nor simply because they contain Revelation without any error: but because, being written under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, they have God for their author, and as such have been handed down to the Church.” And even before the Council of Trent the Council of Florence had said, “[The Holy Roman Church] professeth that one and the same God is the author of the Old and the New Testaments, because the holy men of both Testaments spoke under the inspiration of the same Holy Ghost” (Decret. pro Jacobitis). Again, the Council of Trent takes the Divine origin of Scriptures for granted when it says, “The Holy Synod receiveth and venerateth with like devotion and reverence all the books both of the Old and New Testament, since the one God is the author of both.”

2. The doctrine defined by the councils is likewise taught in Holy Scripture itself. Christ and His Apostles when quoting the Old Testament clearly imply that God is the author. “The Scripture must needs be fulfilled which the Holy Ghost spoke before by the mouth (διὰ στόματος) of David” (Acts 1:16). “David himself saith in the Holy Ghost” (Mark 12:36; Matt. 22:43). Sometimes instead of “the Scripture saith” we find “God saith,” where it is the sacred writer who is speaking (Heb., passim). St. Paul distinctly declares that all Scripture is “breathed by God,” πᾶσα γραφὴ θεόπνευστος (2 Tim. 3:16). St. Peter also speaks of the Prophets as instruments in the hands of the Holy Ghost: “No prophecy of Scripture is made by private interpretation; for prophecy came not by the will of man at any time, but the holy men of God spoke inspired by the Holy Ghost, ὑπὸ Πνεύματος ἁγίου φερόμενοι (2 Pet. 1:20, 21). This last text, it is true, applies primarily to prophecies strictly so called (foretelling events to come), but it refers also to the whole of the teaching of a Prophet, because he speaks in the name and under the influence of God (cf. 1 Kings 10:6; Mich. 3:8).

3. The Fathers from the very earliest days taught the Divine authorship of Scripture.

(a) “The Divine Scriptures,” “the Divine Oracles,” “the Scriptures of God,” “the Scriptures of the Lord” are the usual phrases by which they expressed their belief in Inspiration. “The Apostle moved by that Spirit by Whom the whole of Scripture was composed” (Tertull., De Or., 22). Gelasius (or, according to Thiel, Damasus) says that the Scriptures were composed “by the action of God.” And St. Augustine: “God having first spoken by the Prophets, then by Himself and afterwards by the Apostles, composed also the Scripture which is styled canonical” (De Civit. Dei, xi. 3). Origen, too, says that “the Scriptures were written by the Holy Ghost” (Præf. De Princ., nn. 4, 8). Theodoret (Præf. in Ps.) says that it does not matter who was the human writer of the Psalms, seeing that we know that they were written under the active influence of the Holy Ghost (ἐκ τῆς τοῦ Πνεύματος ἁγίου ἐνεργείας). Hence the Fifth General Council (the second of Constantinople) calls the Holy Ghost purely and simply the author of Holy Writ, and says of Theodore of Mopsuestia that he rejects the book of Job, “in his rage against its author, the Holy Ghost.” The Fathers frequently call the Bible “an epistle from God.” “What is Scripture but a sort of letter from Almighty God to His creature?” … “The Lord of Heaven hath sent thee His letters for thy life’s sake.… Study therefore, I pray thee, and meditate daily upon the words of thy Creator” (Greg. M., lib. iv., ep. 31). Further, the Scriptures are words spoken by God: “Study the Scriptures, the true words of the Holy Ghost” τὰς ἀληθεῖς ῥήσεις Πνεύματος το͂υ ἁγίου (Clem. Rom. ad Cor. i., n. 45). “The Scriptures were spoken by the Word and His Spirit” (Iren., Adv. Hæres, lib. ii., cap. 28, n. 2). Hence the manner of quoting them: “The Holy Ghost saith in the Psalms” (Cypr., De Zelo, n. 8). “Not without reason have so many and such great peoples believed that when [the sacred writers] were writing these books, God spoke to them or through them” (Aug., De Civit. Dei, xviii. 41).

(b) The Fathers also determine the relation between the Divine author of Scripture and the human writer. The latter is, as it were, the secretary, or the hand, or the pen employed by God—analogies which are set forth in the following well-known passages. “[Christ] by the human nature which He took upon Himself is the Head of all His disciples, who are, as it were, the members of His body. Hence when they wrote what He manifested and spoke, we must by no means say that it was not He Who wrote, for His members have done what they learnt from the orders of their Head. Whatever He wished us to read concerning His words and works He ordered them, His hands, to write down. Any one who rightly understands this union and this ministry of members performing in harmony their various functions under one head, will receive the Gospel narrative as though he saw the hand of the Lord writing, the very hand which belonged to His own body” (Aug., De Cons. Evang., l. i., c. 35). “It is quite useless to inquire who wrote this, since the Holy Ghost is rightly believed to be the author of the book. He therefore Who dictated it is the writer: He is the writer Who was the Inspirer of the work and Who made use of the voice of the [human] writer to transmit to us His deeds for our imitation. When we receive a letter from some great man, and know from whom it comes and what it means, it is folly for us to ask what pen he wrote it with. When therefore we learn something, and know that the Holy Ghost is its author, any inquiry about the writer is like asking about the pen” (Greg. M., In Job, præf.). And St. Justin compares the human writer to a lyre played upon by God through the action of the Holy Ghost (Cohort. ad Græcos, n. 8).

(c) From this dependence of the human writer on the Holy Ghost, the Fathers infer the absolute truth and wisdom of every, even the minutest, detail of Scripture. “We who extend the perfect truthfulness of the Holy Ghost to the smallest lines and letters (ἡμεῖς δὲ οἵ καί μέχρι τῆς τυχούσης κεραίας καὶ γραμμῆς τοῦ Πνεύματος τὴν ἀκρίβειαν ἕλκοντες) do not and dare not grant that even the smallest things are asserted by the writers without a meaning” (Greg. Naz., Orat., ii., n. 105). And the following passage of St. Augustine is especially worthy of notice: “I acknowledge to your charity that I have learnt to pay only to those books of Scripture which are already called canonical, this reverence and honour, viz. to believe most firmly that no author of them made any mistake, and if I should meet with anything in them which seems to be opposed to the truth, not to doubt but that either the codex is incorrect, or that the translator has not caught what was said, or that my understanding is at fault” (Ep. ad Hieron., lxxxii. [al. 19.] n. 3).

II. The Catholic Church expressly teaches that God is the author of the Holy Scriptures in a physical sense. That God may be the author of Scripture in a physical sense, and that Scripture may be the Word of God as issuing from Him, it is not enough that the Sacred Books should have been written under the merely negative influence and the merely external assistance of God, preventing error from creeping in; the Divine authorship implies a positive and interior influence upon the writer, which is expressed by the dogmatic term Inspiration. Although a negative assistance, preserving from error, such as is granted to the Teaching Apostolate, is not enough for the physical authorship of Holy Scripture, yet, on the other hand, a positive dictation by word of mouth is not required. The sacred writers themselves make no mention of it; nay, they expressly state that they have made use of their own industry; and the diversity of style of the different writers is distinctly opposed to it. Of course, when something previously unknown to the writer has to be written down by him, God must in some way speak to him; nevertheless, Inspiration in itself is “the action of God upon a human writer, whereby God moves and enables the writer to serve as an instrument for communicating, in writing, the Divine thoughts.” Inspiration arises in the first instance from God’s intention to express in writing certain truths through the instrumentality of human agents. To carry out this intention God moves the writer’s will to write down these truths, and at the same time suggests them to his mind and assists him to the right understanding and faithful expression of them. The assistance has been reduced by some theologians to a mere surveillance or watching over the writer; but the stress laid by the Fathers on the instrumental character of the writers in relation to God, and the Scriptural expression, ὑπὸ τοῦ Πνεύματος ἁγίου φερόμενοι, are plainly opposed to it (cf. St. Thom. 2 2, q. 174, a. 2). The diversity of style in the different books is accounted for by the general law, that when God employs natural instruments for a supernatural purpose, He does not destroy their natural powers, but adapts them to His own purpose.

III. 1. Though the Bible is not mere history or mere literature, it nevertheless has to do with history, and it is literature in the highest sense of the word. It has a human element as well as a Divine element; and how far the books are human and how far Divine is the great Scripture problem. The two elements are united somewhat after the fashion of the soul and the body. Just as the soul is present in every part of the body, so too the action of the Holy Ghost is present in every part of Scripture. But the Schoolmen went on to say that though the soul is whole and entire in every part of the body, it does not exercise all its powers in each and every part, but some powers in some parts and other powers in other parts. Hence we must not restrict Inspiration to certain portions of Scripture. On the other hand, the action of the Holy Ghost is not necessarily the same throughout.

2. When it is said that God is the Author of the Sacred Books, we must not take this in the same sense as when it is said that Milton is the author of Paradise Lost. This would exclude any human authorship. The formula was originally directed against the Manichæans, who held that the Evil Spirit was the author of the Old Testament.

3. The Church has never decided the question of the human authorship of any of the Books. There may be a strong opinion, e.g., that Moses wrote the Pentateuch, or that the whole of the Book of Isaias was written by the Prophet of that name; but no definition has ever been given.

4. We cannot admit that the Sacred Author Himself has been guilty of error. He may, however, make use of a story, not necessarily history, for the purpose of teaching some dogmatic principle or pointing some moral lesson. Again, He must adapt Himself to the circumstances of those whom He addresses. If He acted otherwise, He would fail to be understood. As St. Jerome says (In Jerem. Proph. xxviii.): “Multa in Scripturis Sanctis dicuntur secundum opinionem illius temporis quo gesta referuntur, et non juxta quod rei veritas continebat.” And St. Thomas (I, q. 70, a. 1): “Moyses autem rudi populo condescendens, sequutus est quae sensibiliter apparent.”

5. On the Catholic canon of Scripture, see Franzelin, De Script, sect. ii.; Loisy, Hist. du Canon de l’A.T.; Hist. du Canon du N. T.

SECT. 17.—HOLY SCRIPTURE AS A SOURCE OF THEOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE

I. Holy Scripture, being the work of God Himself, far surpasses in value and excellence any human account of Revelation. The Old Testament is inspired by the Holy Ghost, “Who spake by the Prophets,” as well as the New. Both are of equal excellence, and form together one general source of theological knowledge. The Old Testament is not a mere history of Revelation. It contains a fuller exposition of many points of Faith and morals than the New; it is as it were the body of which the New Testament is the soul: the two pervade and complete each other.

II. There are two fundamentally distinct senses in Holy Scripture: the Literal, conveyed by the words, and the Spiritual, conveyed by the things expressed by the words, whence it is also called Typical. The former is that intended by the human writer, and conveyed by the letter of the text. The Spiritual Sense has its foundation in the all-embracing knowledge of the Holy Ghost, Who inspired the writer. Sentences and even single words written under Divine direction have, in some circumstances, a significance beyond that which they would convey if they were of merely human origin. An historical fact, an institution, a precept, may stand isolated in the mind of the writer, whereas in the mind of God it may be related to other facts and truths, as a type, a confirmation, or an illustration. These relations are the basis of the Spiritual Sense of Scripture. We derive our knowledge of them from the things expressed by the words, and from the words themselves. Thus, to us the spiritual sense is mediate, but to the Holy Ghost it is immediate.

From these different senses of Holy Scripture it follows that a text is capable of many interpretations. All of them, however, must be based upon the Literal Sense. A text may have several spiritual or mediate meanings, but usually only one Literal Sense. Many applications of the Sacred Text commonly adopted by the Church may be regarded as belonging to the Mediate Sense, i.e. as being foreseen by the Holy Ghost, although in purely human writings such interpretations would appear to be distortions. Familiar instances are the passages Prov. 8 and Ecclus. 24 as applied to the Blessed Virgin.

A demonstrative argument that a certain doctrine is revealed can be obtained from any sense demonstrably intended by the Holy Ghost, whether literal, or logically inferred from the literal, or purely spiritual. The Literal Sense affords the most obvious proof. Where, however the language is figurative, the meaning of the figure must be ascertained before an argument can be drawn from it. The Inferential Sense is equal in demonstrative force to the Literal Sense, but in dignity it is inferior because only intended, and not directly expressed by the Holy Ghost The Spiritual Sense likewise offers a cogent argument, provided that the relation between the type and the thing typified be either directly stated in the Literal Sense or contained in it as an evident consequence. Indirectly, the Spiritual Sense acquires demonstrative force from explanations given in Scripture itself or handed down by Apostolical Tradition. Such explanations are often insufficient to determine the Spiritual Sense with complete certainty, and give us only probabilities. Sometimes a number of them, taken together, form a strong argument. See Wiseman’s Essays: Miracles of the New Testament, where arguments in favour of many Catholic doctrines are drawn from the typical signification of various miracles.

The principal object of Holy Scripture is to give us certain knowledge of Revelation. But the constant practice of the Church has made it serve another purpose, which, however, is quite in keeping with the former. In the book of nature we have a faithful though imperfect image of God’s Wisdom, but in the Inspired Books the defects are remedied, and a more perfect representation is set before us, destined to kindle in our minds a manifold knowledge of the supernatural world. This purpose is attained by that sense and interpretation of Holy Writ, whereby we gather from the Sacred Text pious considerations and suggestions, not necessarily intended by the Holy Ghost in the precise form which they take in the reader’s mind, and yet not wholly arbitrary.

III. The careful study and comparison of different passages of Holy Scripture throws great light on the dogmatic teaching of the Church; and, on the other hand, a sound knowledge of this teaching gives us a deeper insight into the Written Word. Theological Exegesis far surpasses mere philological criticism, and attains results beyond the reach of the latter. Scripture, for instance, tells us that God has a Son, and that this Son is the Word, the Image (Figure), the Mirror, the Wisdom of His Father. The combination and comparison of these expressions are of great help towards understanding the Eternal Generation of the Son; and, on the other hand, the theological knowledge of generation is the only basis of an accurate interpretation of these expressions.

SECT. 18.—THE FALSE AND SELF-CONTRADICTORY POSITION OF HOLY SCRIPTURE IN THE PROTESTANT SYSTEM

We have seen that Holy Scripture holds a very high position as a source of Faith. This, however, does not mean that it is the only source, or even a source accessible and necessary to each and all of the Faithful. Indeed, without the intervention of some living authority, distinct from Holy Scripture, we should never be able to prove that Scripture is a source of Faith at all. Nevertheless, Protestants reject the Teaching Apostolate, and maintain that the Bible, the whole Bible, and nothing but the Bible, is the sole Source and Rule of Faith. We shall prove in § 21 that Oral Tradition is a substantial part of the Apostolic Deposit, and consequently that Holy Scripture is not the only source of Faith. That it is not the only rule may be seen from the following considerations.

I. The Rule of Faith should be materially complete, that is, it should embrace the entire sphere of revealed truth: formally perfect, that is, it should not need to be supplemented by any other: and universal, that is, applicable to all men, always and everywhere. None of these characteristics can be affirmed of Holy Scripture. There are, as we shall see, a number of revealed truths handed down by Oral Tradition only. Moreover, the Bible, notwithstanding the excellence of its contents, is but a dead letter, wanting in systematic arrangement, often obscure and hard to be understood, and exposed to many false interpretations. Some means must be provided by God to remove these difficulties, otherwise the object of Revelation would be frustrated. And, lastly, some of the very circumstances which constitute the excellence of the Bible—its being a written document of considerable dimensions, full of deep and difficult matter expressed in the metaphorical language of the East—make it unfit for the general use of the people.

Protestants cannot help feeling the force of these arguments. They usually admit more or less explicitly some other rule of Faith; for instance, the mind of the reader guided by a private supernatural revelation, or by its own natural light and inclination. The result has been that the Bible has become the sport of innumerable sectaries and the source of endless divisions. Practically, however, the mischief has been to a great extent prevented by the submission of the people to the guidance of others, or even to “Confessions of Faith and Formularies,” though the latter have no recognized authority.

After what has been said it is clear that the reading of the Bible is not necessary for salvation, or even advisable for every one under all circumstances. Hence the Church has with great wisdom imposed certain regulations on the subject. See The Pope and the Bible, by Rev. R. F. Clarke, S.J.

II. But the Protestant theory is not only false, but also contradictory. Inspiration is the result of such a mysterious influence of God that its very existence can be known only by means of Revelation. We cannot infer it from the character of the writers or the nature of their writings. There have been Prophets and Apostles who were not inspired (in the technical sense), and some of the inspired writers were neither Apostles nor Prophets. Some of the Sacred Books, indeed, state that their writers were animated by the Holy Ghost, but this does not necessarily mean that particular Divine influence which goes by the name of Inspiration. Even if we admit this, there still remains the question whether these statements themselves were inspired. The only way to avoid a vicious circle is to appeal to some testimony external to the Inspired Books. The consoling effect upon the reader, the “gustus spiritualis” of the early Protestants, cannot seriously be put forward at the present day as a test of Inspiration. There must be some public and authentic witness to the fact of Inspiration, and this we have seen to be the Teaching Body in the Catholic Church (cf. Card. Newman’s Idea of a University, p. 270).

Moreover, there is another difficulty in the Protestant theory. Even if we were to grant that the inspired character of all the books of the Bible was made known at the time of their original publication, we should still require official testimony of this fact. Besides, how could we be sure that the copies which we now possess agree with the originals? Apart from the authority of the Church, the common belief in the canon of Holy Scripture and the identity of later copies, rests on evidence which is by no means historically conclusive. And this common belief has, as a matter of fact, been produced by the action of the Church. We may still assert what St. Augustine said long ago: “I, for my part, should not believe the Gospel except on the authority of the Catholic Church.”

SECT. 19.—THE POSITION AND FUNCTIONS OF HOLY SCRIPTURE IN THE CATHOLIC SYSTEM

The position and functions of Holy Scripture in the Catholic System may be briefly expressed in this proposition: Scripture is an Apostolic Deposit entrusted to the Church; in other words, the Apostles published Holy Scripture as a document of Divine Revelation, and handed it over as such to their successors. It is on this ground that the Teaching Body claims the right of preserving and expounding the sacred writings. Protestants, on the other hand, have no right to call the Bible the, or even an, Apostolic Deposit. They reject the authoritative promulgation by the Apostles, and the necessity of entrusting the Deposit of Revelation to a living Apostolate; and consequently the word “deposit” is in their mouth devoid of meaning. To them the Bible is a windfall, coming they know not whence.

I. Catholics maintain, and they can prove their doctrine by evidence drawn from the earliest centuries, that the Apostles promulgated by God’s order both the Old and New Testaments, as a document received from God, and thus gave it the dignity and efficacy of a legitimate source and rule of Faith. This promulgation might have been expected from the nature of Holy Scripture and the functions of the Apostles. God would not have cast His Word upon the world to be the sport of conflicting opinions. Rather He would have committed the publication of it to the care of those whom He was sending to preach the Gospel to all nations, and with whom He had promised to be for all days, even to the consummation of the world. This fact of promulgation by the Apostles is generally treated of by the Fathers in connection with the transmission of Holy Scripture. The mere writing and publishing, even by an Apostle, were not deemed a sufficient promulgation of inspiration. It was necessary that the document should be put on a footing with the Old Testament, and approved for public reading in the Church. As St. Jerome says of the Gospel of St. Mark: “When Peter had heard it, he both approved of it and ordered it to be read in the churches” (De Script. Eccl.).

II. Besides promulgating Holy Scripture as a Divine document, the Apostles transmitted it to their successors with the right, the duty, and the power to continue its promulgation, to preserve its integrity and identity, to expound its meaning, to make use of it in demonstrating and illustrating Catholic doctrine, and finally to resist and condemn any attacks upon its teaching, or any abuse of its meaning. All this again is implied in the nature of the Apostolate, and the character of the Sacred Writings. See the passages quoted from St. Irenæus and Tertullian in § 9, III.

III. The function of Holy Scripture in the Catholic Church is determined by the two facts, that it is an Apostolic Deposit, and that its lawful administration belongs to the Church. Hence:—

1. Holy Scripture, in virtue of its permanent and official promulgation, is a public document, the Divine authority of which is evident to all the members of the Church.

2. The Church necessarily possesses an authentic text of the Scriptures, identical with the original. If either by constant use or by express declaration a certain text has been approved of by the Church, that text thereby receives the character of public authenticity; that is to say, its conformity with the original must be not only presumed juridically, but admitted as certain on the ground of the infallibility of the Church.

3. The authentic text, duly promulgated, becomes a Source and Rule of Faith; but it is still only a means or instrument of instruction and proof in the hands of the members of the Teaching Apostolate, who alone have the right of authoritatively interpreting it.

4. Private interpretation must submit to authoritative interpretation.

5. The custody and administration of the Holy Scriptures is not entrusted directly to the body of the Church at large, but to the Teaching Apostolate; nevertheless, the Scriptures are the common property of all the members of the Church. The duty of the administrators is to communicate its teaching to all who are in the obedience of the Faith. The body of the Faithful thereby secure a better knowledge than if each one were to interpret according to his own light. Besides, such private handling of Scripture is really opposed to the notion of its being the common property of all.

6. The Bible belongs to the Church and to the Church alone. If, however, those who are outside her pale use it as a means of discovering and entering the Church, such use is perfectly legitimate. But they have no right to apply it to their own purposes, or to turn it against the Church. This is the fundamental principle of Tertullian’s work, De Præscriptionibus Hæreticorum. He shows how Catholics, before arguing with heretics on single points of scriptural doctrine, should contest the right of the latter to appeal to the Scriptures at all, and should thus defeat their action at the outset (præscribere actionem, a mode of defence corresponding to some extent with demurrer).

7. Lastly, the rights of the Teaching Apostolate include that of taking and enforcing disciplinary measures for promoting the right use, or preventing the abuse of Scripture.

SECT. 20.—DECISIONS OF THE CHURCH ON THE TEXT AND INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE

The principles laid down in the preceding section were applied by the Councils of Trent (sess. iv.) and the Vatican (sess. iii.).

I. The Council of Trent issued two decrees on the Sacred Text, one of which is dogmatic, and the other disciplinary. These decrees, however, did not so much confer upon the Vulgate its public ecclesiastical authenticity, but rather declared and confirmed the authenticity already possessed by it in consequence of its long-continued public use. “If any one,” says the Council, “receiveth not, as Sacred and Canonical, the said books, entire with all their parts (libros integros cum omnibus suis partibus) as they have been used to be read in the Catholic Church, and as they are contained in the old Latin Vulgate edition; let him be anathema.… Moreover, the same sacred and holy Synod—considering that no small profit may accrue to the Church of God if it be made known which out of all the Latin editions, now in circulation, of the Sacred Books is to be held as authentic—ordaineth and declareth that the said old and Vulgate edition, which, by the lengthened usage of so many ages, hath been approved of in the Church, be, in public lectures, disputations, sermons, and expositions, held as authentic; and that no one is to dare to reject it under any pretext whatsoever.”

1. These decrees are not exclusive. They affirm the authenticity of the Vulgate, but say nothing about the original text or about other versions. Hence the latter retain their public and private value. No Hebrew text has ever been used in the Church since the time of the Apostles; but the Greek text in public use during the first eight centuries must be considered as fully authentic for that time; since the schism, however, its authenticity is only guaranteed by the use of the Greek Catholics.

2. The conformity of the Vulgate with the original is not to be taken as absolute. Differences in distinctness and force of expression, even in dogmatic texts, may be admitted, and also additions, omissions, and diversities in texts not dogmatic. But in matters of Faith and morals the Vulgate does not put forth anything as the Word of God which either openly contradicts the Word of God or is not the Word of God at all. Again, the entire contents of the Vulgate are substantially correct, and are upon the whole identical with the original. Cf. Kaulen, History of the Vulgate (in German), p. 58 sqq.; Franzelin, De Script., sect. iii.

3. In demonstrating and expounding doctrines of Faith and morals the Vulgate may confidently be used, and its authority may not be rejected. It should be used in all public transactions relating to Faith and morals, as possessing complete demonstrative force within the Church. Hence the saying, “The Vulgate is the theologian’s Bible.” At the same time, the decree does not forbid the use of other texts, especially the originals, even in public transactions, in order to support and illustrate the Vulgate, or against non-Catholics as an argumentum ad hominem, or in purely scientific disquisitions.

Clement VIII., in execution of the Tridentine decrees, published an official edition of the Vulgate which came into general use, and must now be considered as an authentic reproduction of the text approved by the Council.

II. The Council of Trent also issued a decree concerning the Interpretation of Scripture. This decree, although further explained in the Creed of the council drawn up by Pius IV., was in later days very much misunderstood. Hence the Vatican Council has explained its true extent and meaning. The Tridentine decree quoted above continues, “Furthermore, in order to restrain petulant spirits, [the council] decrees that no one, relying on his own skill shall, in matters of faith and of morals pertaining to the edification of Christian doctrine, wresting the Sacred Scripture to his own senses, presume to interpret the said Sacred Scripture contrary to that sense which Holy Mother Church—to whom it belongeth to judge of the true sense and interpretation of the Holy Scriptures—hath held and doth hold; or even contrary to the unanimous consent of the Fathers; even though such interpretations were never intended to be at any time published.” The passage in the Creed runs thus: “I also admit the Holy Scriptures according to that sense which Holy Mother Church hath held and doth hold, to whom it belongeth to judge of the true sense and interpretation of the Scriptures; neither will I ever take and interpret them otherwise than according to the unanimous consent of the Fathers.” The conclusion of the Vatican decree is as follows: “Forasmuch as the wholesome decree of the holy and sacred council of Trent concerning the interpretation of the Divine Scripture … hath been perversely explained by divers persons, We, while renewing the said decree, declare this to be its meaning: in matters of Faith and morals pertaining to the edification of Christian doctrine, that is to be held as the true sense of Sacred Scripture which Holy Mother Church hath held and doth hold, to whom it belongeth to judge of the true sense and interpretation of the Holy Scriptures; and therefore it is lawful to no man to interpret the said Sacred Scripture against this sense or even against the unanimous consent of the Fathers.” Hence, according to the explanation given by the Vatican Council, the meaning of the Tridentine decree is that the Church has the right to give a judicial decision on the sense of Holy Scripture in matters of Faith and morals; that is, to give an interpretation authentic, infallible, universally binding, not only indirectly and negatively, but also directly and positively. To oppose such a decision is unlawful, because to do so would be a denial of the true sense of Scripture and not merely an act of disobedience. Moreover, the unanimous interpretation of the Fathers, whose writings reproduce the authentic teaching of the Church, has a similar value.

A very little thought will convince any one that the Catholic rule of Scriptural interpretation does not clash with a reasonable liberty and the development of scientific exegesis. On the contrary, the period subsequent to the Council of Trent produced the most famous Biblical commentators (see supra, Introd., p. xxxi.), while the principle of private judgment has produced nothing but errors and destructive criticism.

Stapleton, Princ. Fid. Demonstr., 11. x. et xi.; Franzelin, De Script., sect. iii.; Vacant, Etudes Theol. sur le Concile du Vatican, t. i. p. 405, sqq.

SECT. 21.—THE ORAL APOSTOLIC DEPOSIT—TRADITION, IN THE NARROWER SENSE OF THE WORD

The Protestant rejection of a permanent Teaching Apostolate while, as we have seen, injurious to the Written Word, destroys the very existence of Oral Tradition. The Catholic doctrine, on the other hand, maintains that the preaching of the Apostles, unwritten as well as written, is an independent and trustworthy Source of Faith, and is, like the Holy Scriptures, an essential part of the Apostolic Deposit. The Council of Trent “seeing clearly that this truth and discipline are contained in the written books and the unwritten traditions which, received by the Apostles from the mouth of Christ Himself, or from the Apostles themselves, the Holy Ghost dictating, have come down even unto us, transmitted as it were from hand to hand, following the examples of the orthodox Fathers, receiveth and venerateth, with an equal affection of piety, all the books both of the Old and of the New Testaments … and also the said traditions, as well those appertaining to Faith as to morals, as having been dictated either by Christ’s own word of mouth or by the Holy Ghost, and preserved in the Catholic Church by a continuous succession” (sess. iv.).

I. The Catholic doctrine is an evident consequence of the perpetuity of the Apostolate. It is plain from Holy Scripture and the testimony of the early Fathers that the Apostles handed over to their successors, together with the written documents of Revelation, the contents of their oral teaching as an independent and permanent Source of Faith. This Oral Deposit can, by reason of the natural and supernatural qualifications of the depositary, be transmitted as securely and perfectly as the Written Deposit.

1. Scripture nowhere says plainly, or even implies, that it is to be the only Source of Faith. The whole composition of the books supposes the existence of a Teaching Body, and the fact of the perpetuity of the Apostolate implies also the perpetuity of the authority of their teaching. St. Paul expressly enjoins the holding of the things which he preached as well as of those which he wrote. “Therefore, brethren, stand fast, and hold the traditions which you have learned, whether by word, or by our epistle” (2 Thess. 2:14; cf. St. John Chrysostom in h. 1.). And again, “Hold the form of sound words, which thou hast heard of me in faith, and in the love which is in Christ Jesus. Keep the good thing committed to thy trust (τὴν καλὴν παραθήκην) by the Holy Ghost” (2 Tim. 1:13–14); “The things which thou hast heard of me by many witnesses, the same commend to faithful men, who shall be fit to teach others also” (ib., 2:2). In the earliest ages of the Church, too, it was universally held that the contents of the apostolic preaching were transmitted to the Church as a permanent Source and Rule of Faith. See above, § 9, iii. The same doctrine is proved by the fact that in patristic times the true interpretation of Scripture was ruled by the Teaching Apostolate. Many truths not contained in Scripture were held on the authority of the Apostolate. Cf. Stapleton, l. c., l. xi., c. 3.

2. Protestant objections on the ground that an Oral Deposit cannot be perfectly transmitted, by reason of the imperfection of the Apostolate, do not touch the Apostolate as we conceive it, viz., as infallible through the assistance of the Holy Ghost. Any force that these objections may have can be turned against the transmission of Scripture itself. Even from a merely human point of view, the constitution and organization of the Apostolate afford an almost perfect guarantee for the purity of the doctrine transmitted. The cohesion of the different members, their fidelity to and respect for apostolical traditions, the constant mutual watchfulness, the daily application of most of the truths in question in private practice and public worship—all of these are admirably adapted for the preservation of truth and the prevention of error (cf. Franzelin, De Trad., th. ix.; Kuhn, Dogmatik, introd., § 5). The very fact that a doctrine is universally held in the Church is a sufficient proof of its apostolic origin and faithful transmission. “Granted that all (the churches) have erred, … that the Holy Ghost hath looked down upon none of them to lead them into the truth, although it was for this that He was sent by Christ and asked of the Father that He might be a Teacher of truth; granted that God’s steward, the Vicar of Christ, hath neglected his duty, … is it likely that so many and such great churches should have gone astray into one faith? Never is there one result among many chances. The error of the churches would have taken different directions. Whatever is found to be one and the same among many persons is not an error but a tradition” (Tertull., De Præscr., c. 28).

II. Oral Tradition could, absolutely speaking, be the sole Source of Faith, because it could hold its own even if no Written Deposit existed, whereas, as we have shown, the inspiration and interpretation of Scripture cannot be known without the aid of Tradition. Nevertheless, the Holy Scriptures have a value of their own, and are in a certain sense even necessary. They contain not only the Word, but also the language of God, and they give details, developments, and illustrations to an extent unattainable by Tradition. They are a sort of text-book of Tradition, enabling the Faithful to acquire a vivid knowledge of revealed truths. There is no revealed doctrine which has not at least some foundation in the Bible. The most important truths are explicitly stated there. On the whole, we may say that Oral Tradition is the living and authentic commentary upon the written document, yet, at the same time, not a mere commentary, but something self-subsistent, confirming, illustrating, completing and vivifying the text.

III. The Fathers and the Schoolmen often insist upon the completeness and sufficiency of Holy Scripture, but they do so in the sense of the present section. The Bible clearly teaches the doctrine of the Teaching Apostolate, and this implicitly contains the whole of Revelation. Hence we may say that the Bible itself is complete and sufficient. Sometimes, however, the Fathers speak of the completeness of Scripture merely with regard to certain points of doctrine. Thus in the well-known passage of St. Vincent of Lerins (Common., c. 2) where it is said that “the canon of the Scriptures is perfect, and of itself enough and more than enough for everything” the Saint is really putting an objection, which he proceeds to answer in favour of the necessity of tradition. And Tertullian’s saying, “I worship the fulness of Scripture,” refers to the doctrine of creation (cf. Franz., De Trad., th. xix.). On the other hand, certain texts of the Fathers which at first sight might be quoted in support of our thesis refer to discipline rather than to dogma.

There are many regulations which have been handed down with apostolic authority, but not as revealed by God. These are called Merely-Apostolic Traditions, in contradistinction to the Divino-Apostolic Traditions. This distinction, though clear enough in itself, is not easy of application, except in matters strictly dogmatical or strictly moral. In other matters, such as ecclesiastical institutions and discipline, there are various criteria to guide us; e.g. (1) the distinct testimony of the Teaching Apostolate or of ecclesiastical documents that some institution is of Divine origin—for instance, the validity of baptism conferred by heretics; (2) the nature of the institution itself—for instance, the essential parts of the sacraments as opposed to the merely ceremonial parts. Where these criteria cannot be applied and the practice of the Church does not decide the point, it remains an open question whether a given institution is of Divine right and belongs to the Deposit of Faith. In any case we are bound to respect such traditions, and also those which are merely ecclesiastical. Thus in the Creed of Pius IV. we say: “I most steadfastly admit and embrace Apostolical and Ecclesiastical Traditions and all other observances and institutions of the said Church.… I also receive and admit the received and approved ceremonies of the Catholic Church used in the solemn administration of all the Sacraments.”

CHAPTER IV

ECCLESIASTICAL TRADITION

SECT. 22.—ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF ECCLESIASTICAL TRADITION

I. ECCLESIASTICAL tradition differs essentially from human tradition, whether popular or scientific. Human tradition can produce only human certitude; it increases or decreases with the course of time, and may ultimately fail altogether. Ecclesiastical Tradition is indeed human, inasmuch as it is in the hands of men, and it may be popular or scientific, historical or exegetical. But it is also something far higher. Its organs are the members of Christ’s Church; they form one body fashioned by God Himself, and animated and directed by His Holy Spirit. Hence their testimony is not the testimony of men, but the testimony of the Holy Ghost. Its value does not depend upon the number of witnesses or their learning, but on their rank in the Church and the assistance of the Holy Ghost; and the authenticity of their testimony remains the same at every point of the stream of Tradition.

II. Nevertheless it must be admitted that the human element modifies the perfection of Tradition. There may be a break in its continuity and universality. A temporary and partial eclipse of truth is possible, as are also further developments. It is possible that for a time a portion of the Deposit may not be known and acknowledged by the whole Church or expressly and distinctly attested by the leading organs of the Apostolate. We may therefore assert that the essential integrity, continuity, and universality of Oral Tradition, as required by the infallibility and indefectibility of the Church and as modified by the imperfections of the human element, are subject to the following laws:—

1. Nothing can be proposed as Apostolic Tradition which is not Apostolic Tradition, or is opposed to it; and no truth handed down by the Apostles can be altogether lost.

2. The most essential and necessary truths must always be expressly taught, admitted, and handed down in the Church, if not by every individual teacher or hearer, at least by the Body as a whole. Truths belonging to the Apostolic Deposit which have been so obscured as not to be known and professed by all the members of the Church, and even to be rejected by some or not distinctly enforced by others, must be attested and transmitted at least implicitly; that is to say, truths clearly expressed and distinctly professed must contain the obscured truths in such a way that by careful reflection and the assistance of the Holy Ghost these obscured truths may be evolved and proposed for universal acceptance. There are, we may observe, several ways in which one truth may be implied in another. General truths contain particular truths; principles imply consequences; complex statements involve simpler statements whether as constituent parts or as conditions; practical truths presuppose theoretical principles and vice versâ. The dogmas of the Immaculate Conception and of Papal Infallibility are implied in other dogmas in all of these four ways (infra, p. 105).

Only the actual and express Tradition of a truth can be appealed to in proof that it is a matter of Faith. If we can show that at a given time the Tradition was universal this alone is sufficient—continuity is not absolutely necessary. However, except in cases of an authoritative definition, Tradition, to become universal, requires a long time. Even when an authoritative definition is given, it is always based upon the fact that the Tradition in question was universal for a long time. Hence the duration for a more or less long period should be proved.

SECT. 23.—THE VARIOUS MODES IN WHICH TRADITIONAL TESTIMONY IS GIVEN IN THE CHURCH

The modes or forms in which the infallible testimony of the Holy Ghost is given are as manifold as the forms of the living organism of the Church. For our present purpose we may distinguish them according to the rank of the witnesses.

I. The most adequate testimony exists when the entire Body of the Church, Head and members alike, profess, teach, and act upon a certain doctrine. This unanimity is expressed and maintained by professions of Faith universally admitted, by catechisms in general use, and by the general practice of the Church either in her liturgy, discipline, or morals, in so far as such practice supposes and includes Faith in particular doctrines. Hence the old rule quoted against the Pelagians, “Legem credendi statuat lex supplicandi.”

II. Next in extent, though far lower in rank, is what is called the “Sensus fidelium,” that is, the distinct, universal, and constant profession of a doctrine by the whole body of the simple Faithful. As we have shown in § 13, this sensus fidelium involves a relatively independent and immediate testimony of the Holy Ghost. Although but an echo of the authentic testimony of the Teaching Apostolate, the universal belief of the Faithful is of great weight in times when its unity and distinctness are more apparent than the teaching of the Apostolate itself, or when a part of the Teaching Body is unfaithful to its duty, or when the Teaching Body, about to define a doctrine which had for a time been obscured in the Church, appeals to all the manifestations of the Holy Ghost in its favour. Thus, during the Arian troubles, St. Hilary could say, “The faithful ears of the people are holier than the lips of the priests.” And before the definition of the Immaculate Conception the profession and practice of the Faithful were appealed to in favour of the definition. Cf. Franzelin, De Trad., th. xii., p. 112, where he rejects the interpretation given in the Rambler for July, 1859, p. 218 sqq. See also Card. Newman’s Arians, pp. 464, 467; Ward, Essays on the Church’s Doctrinal Authority, p. 70. “As the blood flows from the heart to the body through the arteries; as the vital sap insinuates itself into the whole tree, into each bough, and leaf, and fibre; as water descends through a thousand channels from the mountaintop to the plain; so is Christ’s pure and life-giving doctrine diffused, flowing into the whole body through a thousand organs from the Ecclesia Docens.” Murray, De Ecclesia, disp. x., n. 15, quoted by Ward.

III. The universal teaching of the Bishops and Priests is another mode of ecclesiastical testimony to revealed truth. The testimony of all the Bishops is in itself infallible, independently of the teaching of the inferior clergy and the belief of the Faithful, because the Episcopate is the chief organ of infallibility in the Church. It is, moreover, an infallible testimony at every moment of its duration (“I am with you all days”). This mode of testimony is sometimes called the testimony of the Particular Churches, because the teaching of each Bishop is reflected and repeated by the clergy and the Faithful of his diocese. Hence the testimony of the Priests and of Theological Schools in subordination to the Bishop holds a sort of intermediate position and value between the “Sensus fidelium” and the testimony of the Episcopate.

IV. The central, perfect and juridical representative of Tradition is the Apostolic See. From the earliest times it has been the custom to consider the formula, “The Roman Church or Apostolic See hath held and doth hold,” as equivalent to “The Catholic Church hath held and doth hold;” because the universal Church must hold, at least implicitly, the doctrines taught by the Holy See. When the Pope pronounces a judicial sentence he can bind the whole Church, teachers as well as taught, and the authority of his decisions is not impaired, even by opposition within the Teaching Body. Moreover, as a consequence of the connection between the Head of the Church and the Roman See, there exists in the local Roman Church, apart from the authoritative decisions of the Pope, a certain actual and normal testimony which must be considered as an expression of the habitual teaching of the Holy See. This arises from the fact that the Faith professed in the Roman Church is the result of the constant teaching of the Popes, accepted by the laity and taught by the clergy, especially by the College of Cardinals who take part in the general government of the Church.

V. Besides the Apostolic See and the ordinary Apostolate, God has provided auxiliary channels of Ecclesiastical Tradition in the person of the extraordinary auxiliary members described above, § 12. Their position and importance have been defined by St. Augustine (Contra Julianum, 11. i. et ii., especially ii. c. 37), and by St. Vincent of Lerins who comments on the text of St. Augustine (Commonitor., c. xxviii. sqq., and c. i. of the second Commonitorium). In the early days of the Church, when the teaching functions were almost exclusively exercised by the Bishops, the extraordinary representatives of Apostolical Tradition were usually eminent members of the episcopate. They received the name of “Fathers” because this was the title commonly given to Bishops by their subjects and by their successors. They are also called “Fathers of the Church,” because, living as they did in the infancy of the Church, when extraordinary means were needed for its preservation, they received a more abundant outpouring of the gifts of the Holy Ghost, and thus their doctrine represents His teaching in an eminent degree. Besides, their special function was to fix the substance of the Apostolic Deposit so that, naturally, their writings became the basis of the further development of doctrine, and were placed side by side with Scripture as channels of Apostolic doctrine. Thus they were the Fathers, not only of the Church in their own day, but also in subsequent ages. Compared with them, the later writers are regarded as the “Sons of the Fathers,” and sometimes as “Pædagogi,” with reference to what St. Paul says (1 Cor. 4:15), “If you have ten thousand instructors (pædogogi) in Christ, yet not many fathers.” The Sons of the Fathers were not all bishops. Many of them were priests or members of Religious Orders, or masters of theological schools. They represent the mind (sensus) of the Catholic Schools and of the Faithful, and are distinguished for human learning and industry, which they apply to the development and fuller comprehension of doctrine rather than to the fixing of its substance. Hence their name of “Doctors” or “Theologians.”

SECT. 24.—DOCUMENTARY TRADITION, THE EXPRESSION OF THE LIVING TRADITION

I. Ecclesiastical Tradition by its very nature is oral. Writings and documents are not needed for its transmission; nevertheless they are useful for the purpose of fixing Tradition, and of remedying the imperfections of the human element. Hence it follows that the Holy Ghost, Who watches over the living Tradition, must also assist in the production and preservation of such documents so as to cause them to present, if not an adequate, at least a more or less perfect exposition of previous Tradition.

II. When the writings of the Fathers reproduce the authentic teaching of the Church, they constitute a Written Tradition, equal in authority to the subsequent Oral Tradition, and are, like Holy Scripture, an objective and remote Rule of Faith running side by side with Oral Tradition. Still they are not by themselves a complete and independent Source and Rule of Faith. Like the Holy Scriptures, they too are in the Church’s custody and are subject to the Church’s interpretation. There can be no contradiction between the teaching of the Fathers and the doctrine of the Church; apparent contradictions are due either to spuriousness or lack of authenticity on the part of the documents, or to a mistaken interpretation of them.

III. The various writings and documents which constitute Written Tradition may be divided into two classes.

1. The first class comprises those which emanate from the official organs of Ecclesiastical Tradition in the exercise of their functions, and which, therefore, belong by their very nature to the Written Tradition, e.g. Decisions of the Popes and of Councils; Liturgical documents and monuments, such as Liturgies, Sacramentaries, Ordines Romani, pictures, symbols, inscriptions, vases, etc., connected with public worship; the writings of the Fathers and approved Theologians in so far as they contain distinct statements on the truths of Tradition. These documents and monuments have more than a mere historical value. They all participate more or less in the supernatural character of the living Tradition of which they are the emanation and exponents, and, even when they are not the work of the authors to whom they are ascribed, they may still be of great weight.

2. The second class of documents is composed of those which, independently of the ecclesiastical rank of their author, or of the authority of the Church generally, contribute to the history or better scientific knowledge of Tradition. To this class may belong the writings of doubtful Catholics, and even of heretics and pagans. The two classes do not exclude each other. Many documents belong to both, under different aspects.

The Roman Catacombs have lately acquired great importance as monuments of the earliest Tradition. See Roma Sotteranea, by Dr. Northcote and Canon Brownlow.

SECT. 25.—RULES FOR DEMONSTRATING REVEALED TRUTH FROM ECCLESIASTICAL TRADITION

The rules for the application of the laws mentioned in the above section may be gathered from the laws themselves. Catholics, believing as they do in the Divine authority of Tradition, will of course obtain different results from Protestants who acknowledge only its historical value. Catholics, too, will apply the rules differently, according as their object is to ascertain with infallible certitude the apostolicity of a truth, or to expound and defend it scientifically.

I. For the Catholic it is not necessary to demonstrate positively from coeval documents that the Church has always borne actual witness to a given doctrine. The scantiness of the documents, especially of those belonging to the sub-apostolic age, makes it even impossible. The Tradition of the present time, above all if it is attested by an authoritative definition, is quite sufficient to prove the former existence of the same Tradition, although perhaps only in a latent state. Any further knowledge of its former existence is merely of scientific interest. When, however, the Ecclesiastical Tradition of the present is not publicly manifest, and the judges of the Faith have to decide some controverted question, they must investigate the Tradition of the past, or, as St. Vincent of Lerins expresses it, they must appeal to antiquity. It is not necessary to go back to an absolute antiquity: it is sufficient to find some time when the Tradition was undoubted. Thus, at the Council of Ephesus (A.D. 431), the decisions were based upon the testimony of the Fathers of the fourth century. When the Tradition is not manifest either in the present or in the past, we can sometimes have recourse to the consent of the Fathers and Theologians of note. The temporary uncertainty and even partial negation of a doctrine within the Church is not, in in itself, a conclusive argument against the traditional character of the doctrine. The opposition can generally be shown to be purely human, and can often be turned to good account. We can sometimes ascertain its origin and show that the Church resisted it. Sometimes the difficulty arises from an appeal to merely local traditions; or the opposition is inconsistent, varying, indefinite, mixed with opinions distinctly heretical or destructive of Catholic life and thought. It would be easy to prove that all these marks are applicable to the Gallican opposition to the Infallibility of the Pope. Even when the investigation of antiquity does not result in absolute certitude, it may at least produce a moral conviction, so that denial would be rash

II. The Tradition of a truth being once established, a Catholic has no further interest in the investigation of its continuity, except for the purposes of science and apologetics. Heretics, moreover, have no right to demand direct proof of the antiquity of a doctrine. We may indeed reply to their arguments from Tradition, and set before them the traces of the doctrine in the different ages, but it is better to prove to them the Catholic principle of Tradition, for which there is abundant historical evidence.

SECT. 26.—THE WRITINGS OF THE FATHERS

I. The “Fathers” are those representatives of Tradition who have been recognized by the Church as excelling in sanctity and in natural and supernatural gifts, and who belong to the early Church. This latter mark distinguishes them from the doctors who have lived in more recent times, but it has only a secondary influence upon their authority. No great significance was attached by the Council of Ephesus or the older theologians to the antiquity of the Fathers. The Church herself has bestowed the title of “Doctor Ecclesiæ,” by which it honours the most illustrious Fathers in the Liturgy, upon many saints of later date, and has thereby put them on the same level. We may even say that the canonization of a theological writer raises him to some extent to the dignity of a “Father.” Still, the mark of antiquity is not without importance, as we have already explained.

II. The domain of doctrine covered by the authority and infallibility of the Fathers is co-extensive with that of the Church, whose mouthpiece they are. Hence it does not embrace truths of a purely natural and philosophical character, or truths revealed only per accidens, because these are not part of the public teaching of the Church. On the other hand, their authority is not limited to their testimony to truths expressly and formally revealed, but extends to the dogmatico-theological interpretation of the whole Deposit of Revelation. The material and formal authority of the Fathers—that is, the subject-matter with which they deal, and the ecclesiastical use of their writings—are beautifully expressed by St. Vincent of Lerins, when speaking of the Fathers quoted at the Council of Ephesus: “Only these ten, the sacred number of the commandments, were brought forward at Ephesus as teachers, counsellors, witnesses, and judges; [and the Council] holding their doctrine, following their advice, believing their testimony, and obeying their decision … passed judgment concerning the rules of Faith” (n. 30). The modern view which reduces the authority of the Fathers to that of mere historical witnesses could not better be refuted.

III. We must be careful to distinguish between the authority of one or a certain number of the Fathers, and the consentient testimony of all of them. It is evident that the former is not infallible, because the Church’s approbation of their writings is not intended to be a guarantee of the truth of all that they teach. Some particular works, as, for instance, St. Cyril’s Anathemas, have, however, received this guarantee. The Church’s approbation implies: (1) that the writings approved were not opposed to any doctrine publicly held by the Church in the time of the author, and consequently were not subject to any censure; (2) that the doctrines for which the Father was renowned, and on which he insisted most, are positively probable; (3) that there is a strong presumption that the doubtful expressions of the Fathers should be interpreted in accordance with the commonly received doctrine, and that no discrepancy should be admitted among them except on the strongest grounds; (4) under extraordinary circumstances it may give us a moral certainty of a doctrine when, for instance, some illustrious Father has, without being contradicted by the Church, openly enforced that doctrine as being Catholic, and has treated those who deny it as heretics. When, however, all the Fathers agree, their authority attains its perfection. The consent of the Fathers has always been looked upon as of equal authority with the teaching of the whole Church, or the definitions of the Popes and Councils. But inasmuch as it is hardly possible to ascertain the opinions of every Father on every point of doctrine, and as the Holy Ghost prevents the Church from ascribing to the whole body of the Fathers any doctrine which they did not hold, it follows that the consent of the Fathers must be regarded as fully ascertained whenever those of them whose writings deal with a given doctrine agree absolutely or morally, provided that they are numerous and belong to different countries and times. The number required varies with the nature of the doctrine, which may be public, a matter of daily practice and of great importance, or, on the other hand, may be of an abstract, speculative character, and comparatively unimportant: and with the personal authority of the Fathers, with their position in the Church, with the amount of opposition to the doctrine, and with many other circumstances.

The Consent of the Fathers does not always prove the Catholic character of a doctrine in the same way. If they distinctly state that a doctrine is a public dogma of the Church, the doctrine must be at once accepted. If they merely state that the doctrine is true and taught by the Church, without formally attributing to it the character of a dogma, this testimony has by no means the same weight. The doctrine thus attested cannot, on that account, be treated as a dogma. Nevertheless it is at least a Catholic truth and morally certain, and the denial of it would deserve the censure of temerity or error.

IV. The authority of the Fathers is held in high esteem by the Church in the interpretation of Scripture. They made the Bible their especial study, whereas later writers have not been so directly concerned with it, and when they have treated of it they have followed the lead of the Fathers. The consent of the Fathers is a positive and not an exclusive rule, i.e. the interpretation must be in accordance with it where it exists, but where it does not exist we may lawfully interpret even in opposition to the opinions of some of the Fathers. This consent must be gathered from all their writings and not merely from their commentaries, because in the latter they often have in view particular points of doctrine of a practical or ascetic nature, whereas in their other writings they are rather engaged in expounding Catholic dogma. But even in both kinds of writings a complete scientific exposition of the text can seldom be found, because, as a rule, the Fathers have in hand some particular doctrine which they endeavour to draw from and base upon the text. Hence the many apparent differences in their exegesis, which may, however, be easily explained by a collation of the various passages. (See supra, p. 65.)

SECT. 27.—THE WRITINGS OF THEOLOGIANS

I. By Theologians we mean men learned in Theology, who as members or masters of the theological schools which came into existence after the patristic era, taught and handed down Catholic doctrine on strictly scientific lines, in obedience to and under the supervision of the bishops. The title belongs primarily to the Schoolmen of the Middle Ages—the Scholastic Theologians strictly so-called; then to all who followed the methods of the School during the last three centuries; and, generally, to all distinguished and approved writers on Theology whether they have adhered to the Scholastic methods or not. It is only in exceptional cases that the Church gives a public approbation to an individual Theologian, and this is done by canonization or by the still further honour of conferring on him the title of Doctor of the Church. When we speak of an Approved Author, we mean one who is held in general esteem on account of his learning and the Catholic spirit of his teaching. Some approved authors are of acknowledged weight, while others are of only minor importance. What we are about to state concerning the authority of Theologians must not be applied indiscriminately to every Catholic writer, but only to such as are weighty and approved (auctores probati et graves).

II. The authority of Theologians, like that of the Fathers, may be considered either individually and partially, or of the whole body collectively. As a rule, the authority of a single Theologian (with the exception of canonized Saints, and perhaps some authors of the greatest weight) does not create the presumption that no point of his doctrine was opposed to the common teaching of the Church in his day; much less that, independently of his reasons, the whole of his doctrine is positively probable merely on account of his authority. When, however, the majority of approved and weighty Theologians agree, it must be presumed that their teaching is not opposed to that of the Church. Moreover, if their doctrines are based upon sound arguments propounded without any prejudice and not contradicted very decidedly, the positive probability of the doctrines must be presumed. No more than this probability can be produced by the consent of many or even of all Theologians when they state a doctrine as a common opinion (opinio communis) and not as a common conviction (sententia communis). These questions have been discussed at great length by Moral Theologians in the controversy on Probabilism. See Lacroix, Theol. Mor., lib. I., tr. i., c. 2.

The consent of Theologians produces certainty that a doctrine is Catholic truth only when on the one hand the doctrine is proposed as absolutely certain, and on the other hand the consent is universal and constant (Consensus universalis et constans non solum opinionis sed firmæ et ratæ sententiæ). If all agree that a particular doctrine is a Catholic dogma and that to deny it is heresy, then that doctrine is certainly a dogma. If they agree that a doctrine cannot be denied without injuring Catholic truth, and that such denial is deserving of censure, this again is a sure proof that the doctrine is in some way a Catholic doctrine. If, again, they agree in declaring that a doctrine is sufficiently certain and demonstrated, their consent is not indeed a formal proof of the Catholic character of the doctrine, nevertheless the existence of the consent shows that the doctrine belongs to the mind of the Church (catholicus intellectus), and that consequently its denial would incur the censure of rashness.

These principles on the authority of Theologians were strongly insisted on by Pius IX. in the brief, Gravissimas inter (cf. infra, § 29), and they are evident consequences of the Catholic doctrine of Tradition. Although the assistance of the Holy Ghost is not directly promised to Theologians, nevertheless the assistance promised to the Church requires that He should prevent them as a body from falling into error; otherwise the Faithful who follow them would all be led astray. The consent of Theologians implies the consent of the Episcopate, according to St. Augustine’s dictum: “Not to resist an error is to approve of it—not to defend a truth is to reject it.” And even natural reason assures us that this consent is a guarantee of truth. “Whatever is found to be one and the same among many persons is not an error but a tradition” (Tertullian). (Supra, p. 68.)

The Church holds the mediaeval Doctors in almost the same esteem as the Fathers. The substance of the teaching of the Schoolmen and their method of treatment have both been strongly approved of by the Church (cf. Syllab., prop. xiii., and Leo XIII., encyclical Æterni Patris on the study of St. Thomas).

CHAPTER V

THE RULE OF FAITH

SECT. 28.—THE RULE OF FAITH CONSIDERED GENERALLY; AND ALSO SPECIALLY IN ITS ACTIVE SENSE

I. THE nature and dignity of the Word of God require that submission to it should not be left to the choice of man, but should be made obligatory. The Church should put it forth in such a way as to bind all her members to adhere to it in common, and with one voice and in all its fulness, as a public and social law.

II. The Rule of Faith was given to the Church in the very act of Revelation and its promulgation by the Apostles. But for this Rule to have an actual and permanently efficient character, it must be continually promulgated and enforced by the living Apostolate, which must exact from all members of the Church a docile Faith in the truths of Revelation authoritatively proposed, and thus unite the whole body of the Church, teachers and taught, in perfect unity of Faith. Hence the original promulgation is the remote Rule of Faith, and the continuous promulgation by the Teaching Body is the proximate Rule.

III. The fact that all the members of the Church actually agree in one Faith is the best proof of the efficiency of the Catholic Rule of Faith. This universality is not the Rule of Faith itself, but rather its effect. Individual members are indeed bound to conform their belief to that of the whole community, but this universal belief is produced by the action of the Teaching Apostolate, the members of which are in their turn subject to their Chief. Hence the Catholic Rule of Faith may be ultimately reduced to the sovereign teaching authority of the Holy See. This was asserted long ago in the Creed drawn up by Pope Hormisdas: “Wherefore following in all things the Apostolic See and upholding all its decrees, I hope that it may be mine to be with you in the one communion taught by the Apostolic See, in which is the true and complete solidity of the Christian Religion; and I promise also not to mention in the Holy Mysteries the names of those who have been excommunicated from the Catholic Church—that is, those who agree not with the Apostolic See.”

IV. The act or collection of acts whereby the Word of God is enforced as the Rule of Catholic Faith is called in technical language “Proposition by the Church” (Propositio Ecclesiæ, Vat. Council, sess. iii. chap. 3). It is called “Proposition” because it is an authoritative promulgation of a law, already contained in Revelation, enjoining belief in what is proposed; and “Proposition by or of the Church,” because it emanates from the Teaching Body and is addressed to the Body of the Faithful; and not in the sense that it emanates from the entire community.

V. The manner in which the Proposition is made and the form which it assumes are determined by the nature of the Teaching Apostolate and of the truths proposed. The ordinary Proposition of the law of Faith is identical with the ordinary exercise of the Teaching Apostolate; for the Word of God by its very nature exacts the obedience of Faith, and is communicated to the Faithful with the express intention of enforcing belief. Hence the ordinary teaching is necessarily a promulgation of the law of Faith and an injunction of the duty to believe, and consequently the law of Faith is naturally an unwritten law. But the Proposition of or by the Church takes the form of a Statute or written law when promulgated in a solemn decision. Such decisions, however, are not laws strictly speaking, but are merely authoritative declarations of laws already enacted by God, and in most instances they only enforce what is already the common practice. Both forms, written and unwritten, are of equal authority, but the written form is the more precise. Both also rest ultimately on the authority of the Head of the Apostolate. No judicial sentence in matters of Faith is valid unless pronounced or approved by him; and the binding force of the unwritten form arises from his tacit sanction.

VI. The authority of the Church’s Proposition enforcing obedience to its decrees and guaranteeing their infallibility, is not restricted to matters of Divine Faith and Divine Revelation, although these are its principal subject-matter. The Teaching Apostolate, in order to realize the objects of Revelation, i.e. to preserve the Faith not only in its substance but also in its entirety, must extend its activity beyond the sphere of Divine Faith and Divine Revelation. But in such matters the Apostolate requires only an undoubting and submissive acceptance and not Divine Faith, and consequently is, so far, a rule of theological knowledge and conviction rather than a Rule of Divine Faith. Hence there exists in the Church, side by side with and completing the Rule of Faith, a Rule of Theological Thought or Religious Conviction, to which every Catholic must submit internally as well as externally. Any refusal to submit to this law implies a spiritual revolt against the authority of the Church and a rejection of her supernatural veracity; and is, if not a direct denial of Catholic Faith, at least a direct denial of Catholic Profession.

VII. The judicial, legislative, and other similar acts of the members of the Teaching Apostolate are not all absosolutely binding rules of Faith and theological thought, but rather resemble police regulations. These disciplinary measures may under certain circumstances command at least a respectful and confident assent, the refusal of which involves disrespect and temerity. For instance, when the Church forbids the teaching of certain points of doctrine, or commands the teaching of one opinion in preference to another, external submission is required, but there is also an obligation to accept the favoured view as morally certain. When a judicial decision has been given on some point of doctrine, but has not been given or approved by the highest authority, such decision per se imposes only the obligation of external obedience. Points of doctrine expressed, recommended, and insisted upon in papal allocutions or encyclical letters but not distinctly defined, may create the obligation of strict obedience and undoubting assent, or may exact merely external submission and approval. Thus in the Rule of Faith we distinguish three degrees: (1) the Rule of Faith in matters directly revealed, exacting the obedience of Faith; (2) the Rule of Faith in matters theologically connected with Revelation, exacting respect and external submission, and, indirectly, internal assent of a certain grade; (3) the Rule of Faith in matters of discipline, exacting submission and reverence.

The difference between the rules of theological knowledge and the disciplinary measures is important. The former demand universal and unconditional obedience, the latter only respect and reverence. Moderate Liberalism, represented in the seventeenth century by Holden (Analysis Fidei), in the eighteenth century by Muratori (De Ingeniorum Moderatione) and Chrismann (Regula Fidei), is an attempt to conciliate Extreme Liberalism by giving up these various distinctions, and reducing all decisions either to formal definitions of Faith or to mere police regulations.

SECT. 29.—DOGMAS AND MATTERS OF OPINION

I. Everything revealed by God, or Christ, or the Holy Ghost is by that very fact a Divine or Christian Dogma; when authoritatively proposed by the Apostles it became an Apostolic Dogma; when fully promulgated by the Church, Ecclesiastical Dogma. In the Church’s language a dogma pure and simple is at the same time ecclesiastical, apostolic, and Divine. But a merely Divine Dogma—that is, revealed by God but not yet explicitly proposed by the Church—is called a Material (as opposed to Formal) Dogma.

1. Dogmas may be classified according to (a) their various subject-matters, (b) their promulgation, and (c) the different kinds of moral obligation to know them.

(a) Dogmas may be divided in the same way as the contents of Revelation (§ 5) except that matters revealed per accidens are not properly dogmas. It is, however, a dogma that Holy Scripture, in the genuine text, contains undoubted truth throughout. And consequently the denial of matters revealed per accidens is a sin against Faith, because it implies the assertion that Holy Scripture contains error. This principle accounts for the opposition to Galileo. The motions of the sun and the earth are not indeed matters of dogma, but the great astronomer’s teaching was accompanied by or at any rate involved the assertion that Scripture was false in certain texts.

(b) With regard to their promulgation by the Church, dogmas are divided into Material and Formal. Formal Dogmas are subdivided into Defined and Undefined.

(c) With regard to the obligation of knowing them, dogmas are to be believed either Implicitly or Explicitly. Again, the necessity of knowing them is of two kinds:—Necessity of Means (necessitas medii) and Necessity of Precept (necessitas præcepti); that is, the belief in some dogmas is a necessary condition of salvation, apart from any positive command of the Church, while the obligation to believe in others arises from her positive command The former may be called Fundamental, because they are most essential. We do not, however, admit the Latitudinarian distinction between Fundamental articles, i.e. which must be believed, and Non-fundamental articles which need not be believed. All Catholics are bound to accept, at least implicitly, every dogma proposed by the Church.

2. The Criteria, or means of knowing Catholic truth, may be easily gathered from the principles already stated. They are nearly all set forth in the Brief Tuas Libenter, addressed by Pius IX. to the Archbishop of Munich.

The following are the criteria of a dogma of Faith: (a) Creeds or Symbols of Faith generally received; (b) dogmatic definitions of the Popes or of ecumenical councils, and of particular councils solemnly ratified; (c) the undoubtedly clear and indisputable sense of Holy Scripture in matters relating to Faith and morals; (d) the universal and constant teaching of the Apostolate, especially the public and permanent tradition of the Roman Church; (e) universal practice, especially in liturgical matters, where it clearly supposes and professes a truth as undoubtedly revealed; (f) the teaching of the Fathers when manifest and universal; (g) the teaching of Theologians when manifest and universal.

II. Between the doctrines expressly defined by the Church and those expressly condemned stand what may be called matters of opinion or free opinions. Freedom, however, like certainty, is of various degrees, especially in religious and moral matters. Where there is no distinct definition there may be reasons sufficient to give us moral certainty. To resist these is not, indeed, formal disobedience, but only rashness. Where there are no such reasons this censure is not incurred. It is not possible to determine exactly the boundaries of these two groups of free opinions; they shade off into each other, and range from absolute freedom to morally certain obligation to believe. In this sphere of Approximative Theology, as it may be styled, there, are (1) doctrines which it is morally certain that the Church acknowledges as revealed (veritates fidei proximæ); (2) theological doctrines which it is morally certain that the Church considers as belonging to the integrity of the Faith, or as logically connected with revealed truth, and consequently the denial of which is approximate to theological error (errori theologico proximo); (3) doctrines neither revealed nor logically deducible from revealed truths, but useful or even necessary for safeguarding Revelation: to deny these would be rash (temerarium). These three degrees were rejected by the Minimizers mentioned at the end of the last section, and all matters not strictly defined were considered as absolutely free. Pius IX., however, on the occasion of the Munich Congress in 1863, addressed a Brief to the Archbishop of that city laying down the Catholic principles on the subject. The 22nd Proposition condemned in the “Syllabus” was taken from this Brief, and runs thus: “The obligation under which Catholic teachers and writers lie is restricted to those matters which are proposed for universal belief as dogmas of Faith by the infallible judgment of the Church.” And the Vatican Council says, at the end of the first constitution, “It sufficeth not to avoid heresy unless those errors which more or less approach thereto are sedulously shunned.”

SECT. 30.—DEFINITIONS AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS CONSIDERED GENERALLY

The chief rules of Catholic belief are the definitions and decisions of the Church. Before we study them in detail, it will be well to treat of the elements and forms more or less common to them all.

I. Definitions and decisions are essentially acts of the teaching power, in the strictest sense of the word; acts whereby the holder of this power lays down authoritatively what his subjects are bound to accept as Catholic doctrine or reject as anti-Catholic. Hence, as distinguished from other acts of the Teaching Apostolate, they are termed decrees, statutes, constitutions, definitions, decisions concerning the Faith. In the modern language of the Church, “Definition” means the positive and final decision in matters of Faith (dogmas), and “Judgment” means the negative decision whereby false doctrines are condemned (censures). The wording of definitions is not restricted to any particular form. Sometimes they take the form of a profession of Faith: “The Holy Synod believeth and confesseth;” at other times they take the form of a declaration of doctrine, as in the “chapters” of the Council of Trent and the Vatican Council, or of canons threatening with “anathema” all who refuse to accept the Church’s teaching.

II. The general object of authoritative decisions in doctrinal matters is to propose dogmas in clear and distinct form to the Faithful, and thereby to promote the glory of God, the salvation of souls, and the welfare of the Church. Sometimes, however, there are certain specific objects; e.g., (1) to remove existing doubts. The definitions of the Immaculate Conception and the Infallibility of the Pope are cases in point. (2) To condemn criminal doubts prevailing against dogmas already defined, e.g. the case of the five propositions of Jansenius. (3) To prevent future doubts and to confirm the Faith of the weak. In this case, as in the preceding, the new definition takes the form of a confirmation or renewal of a former definition. Thus the Vatican Council, at the end of its first constitution, insists upon the duty of conformity to the doctrinal decision of the Holy See. The question of the “Opportuneness” of a definition must be decided by the judges themselves. Under certain circumstances they may withhold or postpone a definition in order to avoid greater evils, as in the case of the Gallican doctrines. Once the definition is given, there can be no further question as to its opportuneness. The Holy Ghost, who assists in making the definition, also assists in fixing its time.

III. Authoritative definitions and decisions can emanate only from the holders of the teaching power in the Church. Learned men and learned societies, such as universities, may publish statements of their views, and may thus prepare the way for a dogmatic definition. These statements may even have greater weight than the decisions of individual bishops. Nevertheless they are merely provisional, and stand to the final judgment in the relation of a consulting vote. Hence the importance of acting in conjunction with the Holy See. Even from the earliest times it has been the rule to refer to Rome the more important questions of Faith, and in recent times bishops and local (as opposed to general) councils have been ordered not to attempt to decide doubtful questions, but only to expound and enforce what has already been approved.

Each holder of the teaching power can judge individually, except those whose power is only delegated, and those who by reason of their functions are bound to act in concert; as, for instance, the Cardinals in the Roman Congregations. Still, it follows from their office, and it has always been the practice of the Church, that the Bishops, as inferior judges, should judge collectively in synods and councils, except when they act simply as promulgators or executors of decisions already given. The Pope, the supreme and universal judge, is subject to no other judges or tribunals, but all are subject to him. Matters of general interest (causæ communes) or of great importance (causæ majores) are of his cognizance. He is the centre of unity, and he possesses, in virtue of his sovereign power, a guarantee of veracity which does not belong to individual Bishops. But before coming to any decision he is bound to study the Sources of Faith, and to consult his advisers either individually or collectively. He may, nay sometimes he must allow his ordinary and extraordinary counsellors to act as subordinate colleges of judges, whose decisions he afterwards completes by adding his own. He may also place himself at the head of these various colleges, so that the members become his assessors. “The bishops of the whole world sitting and judging with us,” says the Proœmium of the first constitution of the Vatican Council. The same council also enumerates the various ways in which the Popes prepare their definitions: “The Roman Pontiffs, according as circumstances required,—at one time, by summoning ecumenical councils, or by ascertaining the opinion of the Church dispersed over the world; at another time, by means of local synods, or again by other means—have defined that those things are to be held which they have found to be in harmony with the Sacred Writings and Apostolical Traditions” (sess. iv., chap. 4).

IV. Dogmatic definitions being judicial acts presuppose an investigation of the case (cognitio causæ). If this is not made, the judge acts rashly, but the judgment is binding. When the authority of the judge is not supreme, and consequently the presumption in favour of the justice of the judgment is not absolute, a statement of the reasons may be necessary, and an examination of them may be permitted. Sometimes even the highest authority states his reasons for coming to a decision, but he does this merely to render submission easy. As regards the manner of conducting the investigation of the case, it should be noted that an examination of the Sources of Faith and the hearing of witnesses, although integral portions of the judicial functions, are not always necessary. When an already-defined doctrine has only to be enforced these processes may be dispensed with. However, even in this case, they may be advisable, so as to remove all suspicion of rashness or prejudice, and to enable the judges to affirm that they speak of their own full knowledge (ex plena et propria cognitione causæ).

Although doctrinal definitions are always supported by strong arguments, their binding force does not depend on these arguments but upon the supernatural authority of the judges, in virtue of which they are entitled to say, “It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us.” In the case of individual judges the Divine guarantee depends upon the legitimacy of their appointment; in the case of councils or other bodies of judges it depends upon the legitimacy of their convocation. Hence the expression, “The synod lawfully assembled in the Holy Ghost (In Spiritu Sancto legitime congregata).” We must, however, remember that the Divine guarantee is perfect only when final decisions for the universal Church are given. In other cases it is merely presumptive, and this presumption is not sufficient to make the judgment infallible or to exact unconditional submission. The formula, “It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us,” does not necessarily imply that the accompanying judgment is infallible. The authority of the judgment depends upon the rank of the judge. Inferior ecclesiastical judges as a rule ask the Pope to ratify their decisions, or they add the qualification, “Saving the judgment or under correction of the Apostolic See (salvo judicio, sub correctione Sedis Apostolicæ).” Hence no process is complete and final until the Holy See has given its judgment.

We shall now examine the various sources of Decisions and Judgments.

SECT. 31.—PAPAL JUDGMENTS AND THEIR INFALLIBILITY

I. The Pope, the Father and Teacher of all Christians and the Head of the Universal Church, is the supreme judge in matters of Faith and Morals, and is the regulator and centre of Catholic Unity. His decisions are without appeal and are absolutely binding upon all. In order to possess this perfect right and power to exact universal assent and obedience it is necessary that they should be infallible. The Vatican Council, completing the definitions of the Fourth Council of Constantinople, the Second Council of Lyons, and the Council of Florence, and the Profession of Faith of Pope Hormisdas, thus defines Papal Infallibility: “The Roman Pontiff, when he speaks ex cathedra—that is, when, in discharge of the office of Pastor and Doctor of all Christians, by virtue of his supreme Apostolic authority he defines a doctrine regarding Faith or Morals to be held by the Universal Church—by the Divine assistance promised to him in Blessed Peter, is possessed of that Infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer willed that His Church should be endowed for defining doctrine regarding Faith or Morals; and therefore such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable of themselves and not from the consent of the Church.”

II. The person in whom the Infallibility is vested is the Roman Pontiff speaking ex cathedra; that is to say, exercising the highest doctrinal authority inherent in the Apostolic See. Whenever the Pope speaks as Supreme Teacher of the Church, he speaks ex cathedra; nor is there any other ex cathedra teaching besides his. The definition therefore leaves no room for the sophistical distinction made by the Gallicans between the See and its occupant (Sedes, Sedens). An ex cathedra judgment is also declared to be supreme and universally binding. Its subject-matter is “doctrine concerning Faith or Morals;” that is, all and only such points of doctrine as are or may be proposed for the belief of the Faithful. The form of the ex cathedra judgment is the exercise of the Apostolic power with intent to bind all the Faithful in the unity of the Faith.

The nature and extent of the Infallibility of the Pope are also contained in the definition. This Infallibility is the result of a Divine assistance. It differs both from Revelation and Inspiration. It does not involve the manifestation of any new doctrine, or the impulse to write down what God reveals. It supposes, on the contrary, an investigation of revealed truths, and only prevents the Pope from omitting this investigation and from erring in making it. The Divine assistance is not granted to the Pope for his personal benefit, but for the benefit of the Church. Nevertheless, it is granted to him directly as the successor of St. Peter, and not indirectly through the medium of the Church. The extent of the Infallibility of the Pope is determined partly by its subject-matter, partly by the words “possessed of that Infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer willed that His Church should be endowed for defining doctrine regarding Faith or Morals.” Moreover, the object of the Infallibility of the Pope and of the Infallibility of the Church being the same, their extent must also coincide.

From the Infallibility of ex cathedra judgments, the council deduces their Irreformability, and further establishes the latter by excluding the consent of the Church as the necessary condition of it. The approbation of the Church is the consequence not the cause of the Irreformability of ex cathedra judgments.

III. Ex cathedra decisions admit of great variety of form. At the same time, in the documents containing such decisions only those passages are infallible which the judge manifestly intended to be so. Recommendations, proofs, and explanations accompanying the decision are not necessarily infallible, except where the explanation is itself the dogmatic interpretation of a text of Scripture, or of a rule of Faith, or in as far as it fixes the meaning and extent of the definition. It is not always easy to draw the line between the definition and the other portions of the document. The ordinary rules for interpreting ecclesiastical documents must be applied. The commonest forms of ex cathedra decisions used at the present time are the following:—

1. The most solemn form is the Dogmatic Constitution, or Bull, in which the decrees are proposed expressly as ecclesiastical laws, and are sanctioned by heavy penalties; e.g. the Constitutions Unigenitus and Auctorem Fidei against the Jansenists, and the Bull Ineffabilis Deus on the Immaculate Conception.

2. Next in solemnity are Encyclical Letters, so far as they are of a dogmatic character. They resemble Constitutions and Bulls, but, as a rule, they impose no penalties. Some of them are couched in strictly juridical terms, such as the Encyclical Quanta cura, while others are more rhetorical in style. In the latter case it is not absolutely certain that the Pope speaks infallibly.

3. Apostolic Letters and Briefs, even when not directly addressed to the whole Church, must be considered as ex cathedra when they attach censures to the denial of certain doctrines, or when, like Encyclicals, they define or condemn in strict judicial language, or in equivalent terms. But it is often extremely difficult to determine whether these letters are dogmatic or only monitory and administrative. Doubts on the subject are sometimes removed by subsequent declarations.

4. Lastly, the Pope can speak ex cathedra by confirming and approving of the decisions of other tribunals, such as general or particular councils, or Roman Congregations. In ordinary cases, however, the approbation of a particular council is merely an act of supervision, and the decision of a Roman Congregation is not ex cathedra unless the Pope makes it his own.

SECT. 32.—GENERAL COUNCILS

I. The Pope, speaking ex cathedra, is infallible independently of the consent of the subordinate members of the Teaching Body. On the other hand, the whole of the Bishops apart from the Pope cannot pronounce an infallible judgment. The Pope, however, can assemble the Bishops and constitute them into a tribunal which represents the Teaching Body more efficiently than the Pope alone. Their judgments given conjointly with his are the most complete expression of the Teaching Body. This assembly is termed a Universal or Ecumenical Council. It is not an independent tribunal superior to the Pope. It must be convened by him, or at least with his consent and co-operation; all the Bishops of the Church must be commanded, or at least invited to attend; a considerable number of Bishops must be actually present, either personally or by deputy; and the assembled prelates must conduct their deliberations and act under the direction of the Pope or his legates. Some of the Councils styled ecumenical do not, however, fulfil all of these conditions. The First and Second Councils of Constantinople are well-known instances. But these Councils were not originally considered as ecumenical except in the sense of being numerously attended, or on account of the ambition of the Patriarchs. It was only in the sixth century, some time after the Creed of the First Council of Constantinople had been adopted at Chalcedon, that this Council was put on a level with those of Nicæa, Ephesus, and Chalcedon. Similar remarks apply to the Second Council of Constantinople. See Hefele vol. i., p. 41, and vol. ii., § 100.

It may seem strange that none of the early Western Councils, although presided over by the Roman Pontiff and accepted by the whole Church, received the title of Ecumenical. This, however, may be easily accounted for. The Western Councils only represented the Roman patriarchate, and consequently their authority was identical with that of the Holy See. Moreover, before the Great Schism the notion of a General Council was that of a co-operation of the East with the West: in other words, of the other patriarchates with the patriarchate of Rome. The Eastern Bishops attended personally, whereas the Pope and the Western Council sent deputies. Thus a Council, although meeting in the East, was really composed of representatives of the whole Church. The later Councils held in the West were far more conformable to the theological notions already given, because the entire, episcopate was convened in one place, by express command, not by mere invitation, and the body of the Bishops acted on the strength of their Divine mission, no distinction being made in favour of patriarchs or metropolitans, or other dignitaries.

II. Councils, when defining a dogma, perform a double function: they act as witnesses and as judges. The cooperation of the Pope is especially required as supreme judge. Care must be taken not to lay too much stress on the function of witnessing, lest the importance of the papal co-operation be unduly minimized and the true notion of a council be distorted. It is true, indeed, that many expressions of the Fathers of the fourth century concerning the Council of Nicæa seem to insist almost exclusively on the witnessing function. We must, however, remember that this Council was the first of the General Councils, and that under the then existing circumstances an appeal to the solemn testimony of so many Bishops was the best argument against the heretics. The subsequent Councils, especially the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon, followed quite a different line of action. Stress was there laid upon the judicial function, and consequently upon the influence of the Roman Pontiff and the various grades of hierarchical jurisdiction.

III. The special object of General Councils is to attain completely and perfectly the ends which particular councils can attain only partially and imperfectly. In relation to the Pope’s judgment, which is in itself a complete judgment, the object of General Councils is (1) to give the greatest possible assistance to the Pope in the preparation of his own judgment by means of the testimony and scientific knowledge of the assessors; (2) to give the Papal definition the greatest possible force and efficacy by the combined action and sentence of all the judges; and (3) to help the Pope in the execution and enforcement of his decisions by the promulgation and subsequent action of the assembled judges. The co-operation of the Council brings the testimony and the judicial power of the whole Church to bear upon the decision of the Pope.

IV. The action of General Councils essentially consists in the co-operation of the members with their Head. To the Pope therefore belongs the authoritative direction of all the proceedings of the Council. He can, if he chooses to exercise his right, determine what questions shall be dealt with and the manner of dealing with them. Hence no decision is legitimate if carried against his will or without his consent. Even a decision accepted by his legates, without an express order from him, is not absolutely binding. On the other hand, no decision is unlawful or void on account of a too extensive use of the papal right of direction, because in such a case the restriction of liberty is caused by the internal and legitimate principle of order, not by external and illegitimate pressure. The decision would not be illegitimate even if, as in many of the earlier Councils, and indeed in all Councils convoked for the purpose of promulgating and enforcing already existing papal decisions, the Pope commanded the acceptance of his sentence without any discussion. At most, the result of this pressure would affect the moral efficiency of the Council. On the other hand, the forcible expulsion of the papal legates from the “Latrocinum” (Council of Bandits) at Ephesus was rightly considered by the Catholics as a gross violation of the liberty of a Council. The sentence of the majority, or even the unanimous sentence, if taken apart from the personal action of the Pope, is not purely and simply the sentence of the entire Teaching Body, and therefore has no claim to infallibility. Such a sentence would not bind the absent Bishops to assent to it, or the Pope to confirm it. Its only effect would be to entitle the Pope to say that he confirms the sentence of a council, or that he speaks “with the approval of the Sacred Council” (sacro approbante concilio).

The Vatican Council, even in the Fourth Session, may be cited as an instance of a Council possessing in an eminent degree, not only the essential elements, but also what we may call the perfecting elements. The number of Bishops present was the greatest on record, both absolutely and in proportion to the number of Bishops in the world; the discussion was most free, searching, and exhaustive; universal tradition, past and present, was appealed to, not indeed as to the doctrine in question itself, but as to its fundamental principle, which is the duty of obedience to the Holy See and of conformity to her Faith; absolute unanimity prevailed in the final sentence, and an overwhelming majority even in the preparatory judgment.

The decrees of the General Councils may be found in the great collections of Labbe, Hardouin, Mansi, Catalani; the more important decrees are given in Denzinger’s Enchiridion.

SECT. 33.—THE ROMAN CONGREGATIONS—LOCAL OR PARTICULAR COUNCILS

I. The Roman Congregations are certain standing committees of Cardinals appointed by the Pope to give decisions on the various questions of doctrine and discipline which arise from time to time. The most important Congregations are the following:—

1. The Congregation of the Council of Trent;

2. The Congregation of Bishops and Regulars;

3. The Congregation of the Propagation of the Faith (Propaganda);

4. The Congregation of Sacred Rites;

5. The Congregation of the Index of Prohibited Books;

6. The Congregation of the Holy Office (the Inquisition).

To these must be added the Pœnitentiaria, which is a tribunal for granting absolutions from censures and dispensations in matters of vows and matrimonial impediments. It also passes judgment on moral cases submitted to its decision.

These Congregations have as their principal function the administration, or, if we may so term it, the general police of doctrine and discipline. It is their duty to prosecute offences against Faith or Morals, to prohibit dangerous writings, and to attach authoritative censures to any opinions the profession of which is sinful. They do not give decisions without appeal, because finality is inseparable from infallibility. Although they act in the Pope’s name, their decrees are their own and not his, even after receiving his acknowledgment and approbation. If, however, he himself gives a decision based upon the advice of a Congregation, such decision is his own and not merely the decision of the Congregation. What, then, is the authority of the Roman Congregations?

1. Doctrinal decrees of the Congregations, which are not fully and formally confirmed by the Pope, are not infallible. They have, however, such a strong presumption in their favour that even internal submission is due to them, at least for the time being. The reason of this is plain. The Congregations are composed of experienced men of all schools and tendencies; they proceed with the greatest prudence and conscientiousness; they represent the tradition of the Roman Church which is especially protected by the Holy Ghost. We may add that their decrees have seldom needed reform. Hence Pius IX. points out that learned Catholics “must submit to the doctrinal decisions given by the Pontifical Congregations” (Brief to the Archbishop of Munich, Tuas libenter, 1863).

2. If the Pope fully and formally confirms the decrees they become infallible. It is not easy, however, to decide whether this perfect confirmation has been given. Certain formulas, e.g. the simple approbavit, may signify nothing more than an act of supervision or an act of the Pope as head of the Congregation, and not as Head of the Church.

II. Particular or Local Councils are assemblies of the Bishops of a province or a nation as distinguished from assemblies of the Bishops of the world. When the council is composed of the Bishops of a single province, it is called a Provincial Council; when the Bishops of several provinces are present, it is called a Plenary or National Council. Thus in England, where there is only one province, the province of Westminster, the English Councils are called the “Westminster Provincial Councils.” In Ireland there are four provinces, and consequently when all the Irish Bishops meet in council the assembly is called the “National Council.” The usual name given to similar assemblies in the United States is Plenary Council. Every Particular Council must be convened with the approbation of the Holy See. The Bishops act indeed in virtue of their ordinary power, and not as papal delegates; nevertheless it is only fitting that they should act in union with their Head. Moreover, the decrees must be submitted to the approval of Rome. The approval granted is either Simple or Solemn (approbatio in forma simplici, approbatio in forma solemni). The Simple form, which is that usually granted, is a mere act of supervision, and emanates from the Congregation of the Council. The Solemn form is equivalent to an adoption of the decrees by the Holy See as its own, and is seldom granted. The Provincial Councils held against Pelagianism are well-known instances. In modern times, Benedict XIII. granted the solemn approbation to the decrees of the Council of Embrun. Without this solemn approval the decrees of Provincial Councils are not infallible. The presumption of truth in their favour depends partly on the number and the personal ability and character of the Bishops present, and partly on the nature of their proceedings and the wording of their decrees. Peremptory and formal affirmation of a doctrine as Catholic, or condemnation of a doctrine as erroneous, would not be tolerated by the Holy See unless such affirmation or condemnation was in accordance with the teaching of Rome; and consequently even the simple approval of decrees of this kind gives a strong presumption of truth. When, however, the decrees have not this peremptory and formal character, but are simply expositions of doctrine or admonitions to the Faithful, the presumption in their favour is not so strong.

See Bellarmine, De Conciliis; Benedict XIV., De Synodo Diocesana, 1. xiii. c. 3. The decrees of the various Provincial and other Particular Councils may be found in the great collections of Councils named above. The more recent decrees are given in the Collectio Lacensis (Herder, Freiburg). The Westminster Councils, of which four have been held, have been published by Burns and Oates. The most important National Council of Ireland is the Synod of Thurles held in 1851. There have been three Plenary Councils of Baltimore (United States), held in the years 1852, 1866, and 1884 respectively.

SECT. 34.—DOGMATIC CENSURES

I. The Vatican Council has spoken of the right of censure belonging to the Church in the following terms: “Moreover, the Church having received, together with the apostolic office of teaching, the command to keep the Deposit of the Faith, hath also the right and the duty of proscribing knowledge falsely so-called, lest any one should be deceived by philosophy or vain deceit. Wherefore all the Faithful are forbidden, not only to defend as legitimate conclusions of science opinions of this kind which are known to be contrary to the doctrine of the Faith, especially if they have been condemned by the Church, but are also bound to hold them rather as errors having the deceitful semblance of truth” (sess. iii., chap. 4). See also Pius IX.’s brief Gravissimas inter.

II. Dogmatic censures impose most strictly the duty of unreserved assent. In matters of Faith and Morals they afford absolute certainty that the doctrines or propositions censured are to be rejected in the manner required by the particular censure affixed to them. Sometimes the obligation of submitting to the Church’s judgment is expressly mentioned; e.g. in the Bull Unigenitus: “We order all the Faithful not to presume to form opinions about these propositions or to teach or preach them, otherwise than is determined in this our constitution.” In cases of this kind the infallibility of the censures is contained in the infallibility concerning Faith and Morals which belongs to the Teaching Apostolate, because submission to the censure is made a moral duty. No difference is here made between the binding power of lesser censures and that of the highest (heresy). Moreover, these censures bind not only by reason of the obedience due to the Church, but also on account of the certain knowledge which they give us of the falsity or untrustworthiness of the censured doctrines. To adhere to these doctrines is a grievous sin because of the strictness of the ecclesiastical prohibition sanctioned by the heaviest penalties, and also because all or nearly all the censures represent the censured act as grievously sinful.

The duty to reject a censured doctrine involves the right to assert and duty to admit the contradictory doctrine as sound, nay as the only sound and legitimate doctrine. The censures do not expressly state this right and duty, nevertheless the consideration of the meaning and drift of each particular censure clearly establishes both. In the case of censures which express categorically the Church’s certain judgment, such as “Heresy,” “Error,” “False,” “Blasphemous,” “Impious,” and also in cases where moral certainty is expressed, such as “Akin to Heresy,” “Akin to Error,” “Rash,” there can be no question as to this. Doubt might perhaps arise whether the other censures, such as “Wicked,” “Unsound,” “Unsafe,” and mere condemnations without any particular qualification, impose the duty of admitting the falsity of the condemned doctrines as at least morally certain, or whether it is enough to abstain from maintaining them. As a rule, however, we must not be content with the latter.

III. The Church’s judgment is also infallible when condemning doctrines and propositions in the sense meant by some determinate author. This infallibility is already contained in the infallibility of the censure itself when no distinction can be drawn between the meaning of the words and the meaning intended by the author. But, where this distinction can be drawn, the infallibility of the judgment concerning the author’s meaning is at least virtually contained in the infallibility of the censure itself. The Church sometimes condemns an author’s propositions in the sense conveyed by their context, and sometimes formulates propositions conveying the author’s meaning. In the former case the censure applies to the context as well as to the proposition; in the latter case there is a twofold censure, one on the propositions as formulated by the judge, and another on the text as containing the sense of the propositions. In neither of these cases would the censure be infallible, if it were not infallible in determining the sense of the author. For this reason the Church does not give a separate judgment to establish that a particular text conveys a particular meaning; she simply attaches the censure to the text as it stands.

These various distinctions were of great importance in the Jansenistic controversy. The Jansenists admitted that the five propositions censured by Innocent X. were worthy of condemnation, but denied that they were to be found in their master’s works.

SECT. 35.—DEVELOPMENT OF DOGMA

I. The truths which God has been pleased to reveal to mankind were not all communicated in the beginning. As time went on, the later Patriarchs had a larger stock of revealed truth than those who preceded them; the Prophets had a still larger share than the Patriarchs. But when the Church was founded, the stock of Revelation was completed, and no further truths were to be revealed (§ 6). The infallibility of the Church manifestly precludes any change in dogmas previously defined. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Church has not always possessed the same explicit knowledge of all points of doctrine and enforced them just in the same way as in the time of the Apostles. In what terms should this difference be stated?

II. 1. It is not enough to say that the difference between the earlier and the later documents is merely nominal; viz. that the terminology of the earlier Creeds is obscure and vague, while in the later ones it becomes clear and precise.

2. Nor, again, will it do to make use of the comparison of a scroll gradually unrolled or of a casket whose contents become gradually known. There is, indeed, some truth in these comparisons, but they cannot account for all the facts.

3. A better comparison is that the later defined doctrines are contained in the earlier ones as the conclusion of a syllogism Is contained in the premisses. This is to admit that there has been a real, though only logical, development in the Church’s doctrine. Such is the argument of St. Augustine in the dispute concerning the re-baptism of heretics. According to him, a dogma may pass through three stages: (1) implicit belief; (2) controversy; (3) explicit definition. Thus in the early ages the validity of heretical Baptism was admitted in practice by the fact of not repeating the Sacrament. But when the question was formally proposed, there seemed to be strong arguments both for and against the validity. At this stage the most orthodox teachers might, and indeed did, disagree. Finally, the matter was decided, and thenceforth no further discussion was lawful within the Church. (De Bapt, II. 12–14; Migne, ix. 133. See also Franzelin, De Trad., thes. xxiii.)

4. But can we not go further and admit an organic development? In the case of logical development all the conclusions are already contained in the premisses, and are merely drawn out of them, whereas in organic development the results are only potentially in the germs from which they spring (Mark 5:28–32). In organic development there is no alteration or corruption, no mere addition or accretion; there is vitality, absorption, assimilation, growth, identity. Take, for example, the doctrines mentioned above. Scripture teaches plainly that there is only one God; yet it speaks of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and it speaks of Jesus Christ in such terms that He must be both God and Man. It was not until after some centuries that these truths were elaborated into the definitions which we are bound to believe. Who can doubt that during these centuries the primitive teaching absorbed into itself the appropriate Greek elements, and that the process was analogous to the growth of an organism? (Supra, p. xx.) This view of the organic development of the Church’s teaching is a conclusive answer to those who ask us to produce from ancient authorities the exact counterpart of what we now believe and practise. They might just as well look for the branches and leaves of an oak in the acorn from which it sprang.

“Shall we then have no advancement of religion in the Church of Christ? Let us have it indeed, and the greatest.… But yet in such sort that it be truly an advancement of faith, not a change (sed ita tamen ut vere profectus sit ille fidei, non permutatio), seeing that it is the nature of an advancement, that in itself each thing (severally) grow greater, but of a change that something be turned from one thing into another.… Let the soul’s religion imitate the law of the body, which, as years go on, develops indeed and opens out its due proportions, and yet remains identically what it was.… Small are a baby’s limbs, a youth’s are larger, yet they are the same.… So also the doctrine of the Christian religion must follow those laws of advancement; namely, that with years it be consolidated, with time it be expanded, with age it be exalted, yet remain uncorrupt and untouched, and be full and perfect in all the proportions of each of its parts, and with all its members, as it were, and proper senses; that it admit no change besides, sustain no loss of its propriety, no variety of its definition. Wherefore, whatsoever in this Church, God’s husbandry, has by the faith of our fathers been sown, that same must be cultivated by the industry of their children, that same flourish and ripen, that same advance and be perfected” (Commonitorium, nn. 28, 29).

III. Revelation does not follow the merely natural laws of development like any other body of thought. While it is indeed necessarily influenced by the natural environment in which it exists, this influence works under Divine Providence and the infallible guidance of the Church. Moreover, it can never come to pass that an early dogmatic definition should afterwards be revoked, or be understood in a sense at variance with the meaning originally attached to it by the Church. “The doctrine which God has revealed has not been proposed as some philosophical discovery to be perfected by the wit of man, but has been entrusted to Christ’s Spouse as a Divine deposit to be faithfully guarded and infallibly declared. Hence sacred dogmas must ever be understood in the sense once for all (semel) declared by Holy Mother Church; and never must that sense be abandoned under pretext of pro-founder knowledge (altioris intelligentiæ).” (Vat. Council, Sess. iii. chap. 4.) On the whole subject, see Newman’s great work, Development of Christian Doctrine.

SECT. 36.—THE CHIEF DOGMATIC DOCUMENTS—CREEDS AND DECREES

The most important dogmatic documents are the Creeds, or Symbols of Faith, and the decrees of the Popes and of General and Particular Councils.

I. Creeds

1. The simplest and oldest Creed, which is the foundation of all the others, is the Apostles’ Creed. There are, however, twelve different forms of it, which are given in Denzinger’s Enchiridion. See Dublin Review, Oct., 1888, July, 1889; and Le Symbole des Apôtres, by Batiffol and Vacant, in the Dict. de Théol. Catholique.

2. The Nicene Creed, published by the Council of Nicæa (A.D. 325), defines the Divinity of Christ. It originally ended with the words, “and in the Holy Ghost.” The subsequent clauses concerning the Divinity of the Holy Ghost were added before the First Council of Constantinople. In its complete form it is now used in the Mass.

3. The Athanasian Creed was probably not composed by St. Athanasius, but is called by his name because it contains the doctrines so ably expounded and strenuously defended by him. It is aimed at the heresies of the fourth and fifth centuries, and dates back at least to the sixth or seventh century.

4. The Creed of Toledo, published by the sixth council of Toledo (A.D. 675), further develops the Athanasian Creed, and is the most complete of the authentic expositions of the dogmas of the Blessed Trinity and Incarnation. As it closely follows St. Augustine’s teaching, it might almost be called “St. Augustine’s Creed” with even more reason than the preceding creed is called the creed of St. Athanasius. See Denzinger, n. xxvi.

5. The Creed of Leo IX. is a free elaboration of the Nicene Creed, with some additions against Manichæans and Pelagians. See Denzinger, n. xxxix. It is still used at the consecration of Bishops.

6. The Creed of the Fourth Lateran Council, the famous caput Firmiter credimus, under Innocent III. (1215), which is the first Decretal in the Corpus Juris Canonici, is in substance similar to the foregoing, but further develops the doctrine concerning Sacrifice, Baptism, and particularly Transubstantiation. The subjoined condemnation of Abbot Joachim completes the dogmatic definition of the Holy Trinity. See Denzinger, n. lii.; also St. Thomas, Expositio Primæ et Secundæ Decretalis, Opuscc. xxiii. and xxiv.

7. The formula prescribed by the same Pope Innocent III. (1210) to the converts among the Waldenses, states more or less extensively the doctrine concerning the Sacraments, and also various matters of morals and discipline. Denzinger, n. liii.

8. The Confession of Faith made by Michael Palæologus in the Second Council of Lyons, 1274, accepted by Pope Gregory X., is based upon the Creed of Leo IX., but adds clauses containing the doctrine concerning the Four Last Things (Death, Judgment, Hell, Heaven), the Sacraments, and the Primacy of the Roman Church.

After the Council of Trent three more professions of Faith for the use of converts were issued by the Popes, all of which begin with the Nicene Creed, and contain in addition appropriate extracts from the decrees of several councils.

9. The so-called Tridentine Profession of Faith, drawn up in 1564 by Pius IV. for converts from Protestantism, recapitulates the most important decrees of the Council of Trent. Denzinger, n. lxxxii.

10. The Profession of Faith prescribed by Gregory XIII. to the Greeks contains the principal decrees of the Council of Florence concerning the Trinity, the Four Last Things, and the Primacy. Denzinger, n. lxxxiii.

11. Lastly, the Profession of Faith for the Easterns, prescribed by Urban VIII., is copied from the Decretum pro Jacobitis, published by the Council of Florence. It is a summary of the teaching of the first eight ecumenical councils, and contains the same extracts from the Council of Florence as the foregoing Profession. It also includes many definitions of the Council of Trent. It is composed on historical lines, and is the most complete of all the Creeds. Denzinger, n. lxxxiv.

II. The decrees of the Popes and the councils are sometimes negative and aphoristic, and sometimes positive and developed formulas. The drawing up of these formulas was, as a rule, the work of doctors or of particular Churches or of the Holy See; in a few cases these were the results of the combined labours of the bishops assembled in councils. In this respect the Council of Trent excelled all others. The various decrees are given in Denzinger’s Enchiridion.

PART II

THEOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE CONSIDERED IN ITSELF, OR SUBJECTIVELY

THEOLOGICAL knowledge should be considered under a twofold aspect: (1) as act of Faith; and (2) as theological science. Faith assents to revealed truths on the authority of God Who reveals them, whereas theological science, under the guidance of Faith, submits them to examination and discussion in order to gain a clearer and deeper insight into them. This distinction has been disregarded in modern times even more than the various distinctions in the objective principles of theological knowledge. Hence the Vatican Council has dealt with it in detail, especially in the third and fourth chapters of the Constitution concerning Catholic Faith.

See Denzinger, Religious Knowledge, books iii. and iv. (in German); Kleutgen, Theology of the Olden Time, vol. iii. (in German); Schrader, De Fide, utrum ea imperari possit? These three authors have made the best use of the materials contained in the older theological works. See also Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. iii., q. 68, 69; St. Thomas, 2 2, q. I sqq.; Quæst. Dispp. De Veritate, q. 14, and various portions of the opusculum, Super Boetium De Trinitate. The question of Faith was exhaustively treated in the century following the Council of Trent. See among the commentators on the Secunda Secundæ, Bannez, Salmanticenses, Reding, Valentia, Tanner, Ysambert; Suarez, De Virtut. Theol.; Lugo, De Fide. In English, we have Card. Newman’s Grammar of Assent, and Mr. Wilfrid Ward’s brilliant little work, The Wish to Believe.

CHAPTER I

FAITH

SECT. 37.—ETYMOLOGY OF THE VARIOUS WORDS USED FOR FAITH—THE TRUE NOTION OF FAITH

I. The English word Faith is derived from the Latin Fides, and is akin to the Greek πίστις; Belief is akin to the German Glauben; Creed, Credibility are derived from the Latin Credere. We have, therefore, to examine the four words, fides, credere, πίστις, and glauben. Both fides and credere convey the fundamental meaning of trowing, trusting (Germ. trauen). Credere is akin to κρατεῖν, to grasp firmly and to hold; Sanscr. Krat-dha, to give trust, to confide. The noun Fides conveys also the meaning of trust, confidence, and fidelity. The notion of confidence or trust appears in the derived forms, fido, fidentia, fiducia; the notion of fidelity, i.e. firm adherence, in fidelis, fidelitas, and fidus.

Πίστις, so often used in Holy Scripture, comes from πείθειν, which, according to its root bhidh, bhadh, originally meant to bind, fasten, hold fast. It afterwards became specialized in the sense of binding by means of speech—that is, to convince, to persuade. We can thus understand how πίστις has all the significations of fides. It must, however, be remarked that when used to express some relation between God and man, πίστις is used in a passive or middle sense, (πειθέσθαι = to be bound, convinced, or persuaded, and to allow one’s-self to be bound, convinced, or persuaded), and that this use is noticeable everywhere in the Sacred Writings. Hence πίστις involves, first, on the part of the πειθόμενος, the believer, a willing listening and submission (ὑπακούειν, obaudire, obedire) to the commanding call of God, by Whom the hearer allows himself to be bound; secondly, a cleaving to God, to Whom the hearer allows himself to be bound by accepting His good gift, and by entering into a pact, fœdus, with Him.

In these are included fidelity and confidence, in a form peculiar to religious πίστις, namely, as a docile and confident submission to the Divine guidance. The two elements of πίστις, obedience and fidelity appear manifestly in the two expressions used to designate the contrary notions, ἀπείθεια, inobedientia, disobedience, and ἀπιστία, perfidia, faithlessness, and diffidentia, distrust.

The German word Glauben has the same root as lieben, loben, geloben, to love, to praise, to promise; viz. “lubh,” in lubet, libet = to wish to find good, to approve. Hence it has the radical meaning of accepting willingly and holding fast, approving.

It is plain that these various words, according to their etymology and theological use, do not exclusively refer to acts or habits of the intellect. They often express the affections and dispositions of the will, especially obedience and hope, as based on or aiming at some act of knowledge. As a rule, however, they express acts of the intellect only, in so far as these are dependent on or connected with acts of the will. In Holy Scripture πίστις and πιστεύειν, when used with reference to God, mean, purely and simply, to cling and hold fast to God, and consequently all the acts involved in clinging to God, or any one of them, according to the context. When applied to acts of knowledge, these expressions designate only those which have some analogy with acts of the will, such as to admit, hold, cling to, approve, consent, amplecti, adhærere, συγκατατίθεσθαι. The sense in which the “holding something for true” is called fides, πίστις, is manifold. Thus fides and πίστις are often used generically to designate every “holding for true,” every conviction; nay, they are sometimes used as the technical terms for conviction, like the German Ueberzeugung. On the other hand, “to believe” is often used as equivalent to mean, think, opine, as expressing a more or less arbitrary assent founded on imperfect evidence.

II. The special signification of the terms Faith, Fides, Πίστις, with which we are now concerned, is “assent on authority;” that is to say, the acceptance of a proposition, not because we ourselves perceive its truth, but because another person tells us that it is true. The notion of Faith implies that the assent is considered as something good and desirable. “Assent on authority” results from our esteem for the mental and moral qualifications of the witness, and is, therefore, accompanied by a willing acknowledgment of a sort of perfection in him, and also by a respectful and confiding submission to the authority which that perfection confers Hence Faith is not simply an act of the intellect, but an act commanded and brought about by the will acting on the intellect: the assent of the intellect to what is true is determined by the consent of the will to what is good. This consent implies an approbation given to the assent of the intellect, and a willing acknowledgment of the authority of the speaker.

III. The part played by the will in this sort of Faith resembles any other sort of deference to authority. It consists in submitting to a legitimate order or call to perform some action. The person who gives the order is the author of the action rather than he who actually performs it, whence comes the term Authority. In ordinary cases we are invited rather than commanded to assent on the authority of another. We may have some doubt as to his knowledge or veracity, and even if we have no such doubt, he has no power or right over us. But when the author or speaker is the Supreme Lord, Infinite Wisdom, and Infinite Truth, He is entitled to exact complete consent of our will, and to set before us His knowledge, not merely as a basis, but even as a rule, of conviction. The act of Faith is, however, distinguishable from most other acts of submission to authority by the peculiarity that the authority which exacts it must also make it possible, and must co-operate in its production. This is brought about by the Divine Author constituting Himself the guarantee of the truth of what He communicates. The speaker, in virtue of the moral perfection of His will, guarantees that He communicates only what He knows to be true; and that, moreover, by virtue of the perfection of His intellect all danger of error is excluded, thus offering to the mind of the hearer a foundation for certitude, surer than the latter’s own personal knowledge.

IV. The manner in which authority asserts itself to and is received by a believer varies according to the nature of the authority and of the communication made. The nearest approach to Divine authority and Divine Faith is found in the relations between parents and their offspring. Parents have a natural superiority and dominion over their children, as being the authors of their existence; hence their authority, unlike that of any other person, is in itself, apart from any external legitimation, sufficient to command the assent of their children. And in like manner, the respect and reverence due to parents cause the child to take for granted their knowledge and veracity. The relation between God and man is a sort of spiritual paternity (cf. Heb. 12:9) whereby we are entitled to address Him as “Our Father.” Human parents, although their children reasonably assume their knowledge and veracity, may, however, deceive or be deceived. But our Heavenly Father is Infinite Wisdom and Truth itself.

SECT. 38.—NATURE OF THEOLOGICAL FAITH

I. Theological Faith is assent given to the Word of God in a manner befitting its excellence and power. It is also termed Divine Faith, in opposition to human faith—that is, faith founded on the authority of man; Supernatural Faith, because it leads to supernatural salvation and has God for its Author and Generator; Christian Faith, because its subject-matter is the Revelation made by Christ, and because it is interwoven with the Christian economy of salvation; Catholic Faith, because it is assent to the doctrines proposed by the Catholic Church. These four appellations are not exactly synonymous, but they all designate the same act, though under different aspects.

II. The nature of Theological Faith has been clearly defined by the Vatican Council, sess. iii., chap. 3: “Seeing that man wholly dependeth upon God as his Creator and Lord, and seeing that created reason is entirely subject to Uncreated Truth, we are bound to submit by Faith our intellect and will to God the Revealer. But this Faith, which is the beginning of man’s salvation, the Church confesseth to be a supernatural virtue, whereby, with the help of God’s grace, we believe what He revealeth, not because we perceive its intrinsic truth by the natural light of our reason, but on account of the authority of God the Revealer, Who can neither deceive nor be deceived. For Faith, according to the Apostle, is ‘the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not’ (Heb. 11:1).”

This definition means (1) that Theological Faith is faith in the strictest sense of the word—that is to say, assent on authority, implying an act of the intellect as well as an act of the will; (2) that it is faith in an eminent degree, because it implies unlimited submission to God’s sovereign authority and an absolute confidence in His veracity, and is therefore an act of religious worship and a theological virtue; and (3) that it is influenced, not only externally by Divine authority, but also internally by Divine Grace, and consequently is supernatural. These three characteristics of Theological Faith distinguish it from all natural knowledge with which the Rationalists confound it, and also from all forms of rational or irrational, instinctive emotional Faith.

The classical text Heb. 11:1, is quoted by the council in confirmation of its teaching. It describes Faith as the act of spiritually seizing and holding fast things that are beyond the sphere of our intellect—things the vision of which is the object of our hope and the essence of our future happiness. It tells us that Faith is a conviction pointing and leading to the future vision, and even anticipating the fruition of it. Hence it implies that Faith, like the future vision itself, is a supernatural participation in the knowledge of God and a likening of our knowledge to His, inasmuch as our Faith has the same subject-matter as the Divine knowledge, and resembles it in its inner perfection. The literal meaning of the text is as follows: “The substance, ὑπόστασις, of things to be hoped for” is a giving in hand, as it were, a pledge and security for the future good gifts, and so a sort of anticipation of their possession; “the evidence ἔλεγχος, of things that appear not, μὴ βλεπομένων,” is an evident demonstration, a clear showing, hence a perfect certitude and conviction, concerning things invisible. These expressions are applicable to the habit of Faith without any figure of speech; to the act of Faith they apply only figuratively as being the result of the giving in hand and the clear manifestation. Moreover, these relations of our Faith to the Beatific Vision bring out, as clearly as the definition of the council, the difference between Theological Faith and every other sort of faith or knowledge.

III. We are now in a position to trace the genesis of Theological Faith. The believer, moved by grace, submits to the authority of God and trusts in God’s veracity, and strives to conform his mental judgment to that of God and to connect his convictions in the closest manner with God’s infallible knowledge. Grace makes this connection so perfect that a most intimate union and relationship are established between the believer’s knowledge and the Divine knowledge; the excellence and virtue of the latter are thus communicated to the former, and mould it into an introduction to and participation of eternal life.

IV. We subjoin some remarks on the use of the term Faith in theological literature. Fides is used to signify either the act (credere, fides quâ creditur); or the principle of the act (gratia fidei, lumen seu virtus fidei); or its subject-matter (fides quæ creditur), especially the collection of creeds, definitions, and the like. A distinction is sometimes drawn between Explicit and Implicit Faith, founded upon the degree of distinctness with which the act of Faith apprehends its subject-matter; also between Formal Faith, which supposes an explicit knowledge of the motive and an express act of the will, and Virtual Faith, which is a habit infused or resulting from repeated acts of Formal Faith, and produces acts of Faith as it were instinctively without distinct consciousness of Formal Faith. The expression Credere Deum signifies belief in God as the subject-matter of the act—”I believe that God exists;” Credere Deo means belief on the authority of God—”I believe what God says;” Credere in Deum implies both of the former meanings—”I believe in God on God’s authority.”

SECT. 39.—THE FORMAL OBJECT OR MOTIVE OF FAITH

I. To the question, “Why do we believe?” or “What is the motive of our Faith?” many answers may be given. Some motives of Faith are similar to those which induce us to elicit other free acts of the will. They may be grouped under the head of what is fitting and useful (decens et utile, or justum et commodum), and are the following: Faith contributes to our moral perfection, and leads to our eternal salvation; it ennobles the soul and satisfies the moral necessity of submission to and union with God; it enriches and elevates our mental knowledge by increasing its store and by strengthening its certitude. As a rule, however, when we speak of the motive of Faith we understand that by means of which the act of Faith is produced. In the case of Theological Faith this is the Word of God, whence the name “theological,” that is, relating immediately to God, is applied to this sort of Faith. We believe a truth proposed to us because it is the Word of God—a word founded upon Divine Authority, and therefore entitled to the homage of our intellect and will.

II. Divine Authority influences Faith in a twofold manner: it is a call to Faith and it is a testimony to the truth of Faith. As a call to Faith, Divine Authority is the expression of the Divine will and power to which man is bound to submit. As a testimony to the truth of Faith, Divine authority acts as the Supreme Truth, guaranteeing the truth of the Faith and supplying a perfect foundation for certitude. In both respects the Divine authority is based upon God’s Essence, in virtue of which He is the Highest Being, the Uncreated Principle of all things, the Possessor of all truth, the Source of all goodness. Hence the classical form “God is the motive of Faith inasmuch as He is the First Truth.” Now God is the First Truth in a threefold sense: in being (in essendo), because of the infinite perfection of His Being; in knowledge (in cognoscendo), because He possesses infinite knowledge; in speech (in dicendo), because, being infinitely holy, He cannot deceive. Divine authority, as the motive of Faith, acts on the will. The will, moved by respect and confidence, reacts upon the intellect, urging it to elicit an act of Faith in what is proposed by the Infallible Truth. As in every act of faith, of whatever kind, the believer bases his assent on the knowledge and veracity of the witness, so in the case of Divine Faith, the will urges the intellect to base its assent upon the infallible knowledge and veracity of the great First Truth. The motive of Faith is impressed by the will upon the intellect as a light which enlightens and manifests the truth of the Word proposed, which thus in its turn acts on the intellect directly and not merely by means of the will. Again: the motive of Faith—that is, God as the First Being and First Truth—is at the same time, conjointly with the contents of Revelation, the end and object towards the apprehension of which the will moves the intellect.

SECT. 40.—THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF FAITH

I. A proposition or fact becomes the subject-matter of Faith when God reveals it and commands us to believe it on His authority. When these two conditions are fulfilled, Faith finds in God both its “substance” and its “evidence” (Heb. 11:1). All such truths must be believed with Divine Faith properly so-called. In the following cases it is doubtful whether, or at least how far, a truth can be believed with Divine Faith.

1. Truths which are revealed only mediately and virtually—that is, evidently inferred from truths directly and immediately revealed—are the subject-matter of Theological Knowledge rather than of Divine Faith. If, however, God intended to reveal them, and if they were known to the first promulgators of Revelation, some theologians (e.g. Reding) think that they may be believed with Divine Faith. But most theologians (e.g. Suarez, Lugo, Kleutgen) are of opinion that Divine Faith is possible in the case of these truths only when they are authoritatively proposed by the Church. The reason is that the proposal of them by the Church takes the place of the immediate proposal by God Himself, and assumes the form of an extensive interpretation of the Divine Word.

2. Truths which only indirectly belong to the domain of Revelation (supra, § 5, II.) are primarily the subject-matter of human knowledge; they become the subject-matter of Faith when the Church has authoritatively proposed them for belief. In such cases God Himself gives testimony by means of the Church, which acts as His plenipotentiary and ambassador. The assent given resembles Theological Faith in this, that it springs from respect for the knowledge, veracity, and authority of God, and is infallible. Nevertheless, as this assent is not directly founded upon God’s knowledge but rather upon the knowledge possessed by the Church, there is an essential difference between Theological Faith and the assent given to truths indirectly connected with Revelation. The latter, which is called Ecclesiastical Faith, is less perfect than the former, but still, by reason of its religious and infallible character, is far above any purely human faith. Many theologians, notably Muzzarelli, declare that these truths are the subject-matter of Divine Faith on account of the Divinely promised infallibility of the Church. They claim Divine Faith especially for matters connected with morals and for the canonization of Saints, because an error in either would tell against the divinely revealed sanctity of the Church, while the latter is moreover based upon the miracles wrought by God in proof of the holiness of His Saints. We may observe, in reply, that the relation of moral matters with the sanctity of the Church only indirectly bases Faith in them on God’s knowledge. Again, the miracles wrought through the intercession of holy persons are not direct revelations, but are only indications of the Divine Will which the Church interprets, and consequently Faith founded upon them is only Ecclesiastical Faith.

II. Foremost among the attributes cf the subject-matter of Faith is its truth. Whatever is proposed for our belief must be true in itself. Still, Faith does not suppose in the believer a direct knowledge of the truths which he believes, nor an illumination of his mind similar to that of the Beatific Vision. On the contrary, Faith being “the evidence of things that appear not,” implies that its subject-matter is inaccessible to the natural eye of the mind, even when revealed; it is the peculiar excellence of Faith that it makes the unseen as certain to our minds as the seen (Heb. 11:27). Trusting in God’s knowledge and veracity, Faith glories in truths above reason, and delights in mystery; it transcends all human faith and science, inasmuch as it embraces objects far beyond the sphere of the human mind. But although “the things that appear not” are the proper subject-matter of Faith, it must not be supposed that absolute invisibility is required. The relatively invisible can also be made its subject-matter (cf. St. Thom. 2 2. q. 1, a. 3: “Utrum objectum fidei possit esse aliquid visum,” and a. 4: “Utrum possit esse scitum”).

III. In accordance with its being “the substance of things to be hoped for,” and in accordance with the intentions of its Author, Faith aims at giving us the knowledge of the things concerning our future supernatural happiness. Hence, God Himself, in His invisible Essence, as He is and as He will reveal Himself to the blessed in the Beatific Vision, and God’s Nature as the principle which causes our supernatural perfection and beatitude by communicating Itself to us, are the chief subjects of Faith. Hence we see again how much the subject-matter of Faith transcends all human knowledge, for no natural faculties can reach the heights or fathom the depths of the Divine Essence and its relations with the soul of man (cf. 1 Cor. 2). Indeed, the whole supernatural economy of salvation is subordinate to the belief in God as the final object of our eternal beatitude.

IV. Faith is founded on God’s knowledge and veracity; it has God and His Divine Nature for its subject-matter; and it tends to the Beatific Union with Him. Seeing to a certain extent, as it were, all things in God and through God, it not only reduces all its own tenets to a certain unity in God, but also apprehends in God and through God all created truth, and judges of all created things with reference to God, Who is their ultimate End and immutable Ruler. Faith is therefore, in a certain sense, what modern philosophers call a “transcendental knowledge.” Adhering to God in all humility, it effects what philosophers have vainly attempted by their exaggeration of the natural powers of the human mind (Matt. 11:25).

SECT. 41.—THE MOTIVES OF CREDIBILITY

I. To enable us to elicit an act of Divine Faith in a revealed truth, the fact of its being revealed must also be perfectly certain to us. Without this perfect certitude we could not reasonably assent to it on the authority of God. Hence Innocent XI. condemned the proposition; “The supernatural assent of Faith necessary for salvation is compatible with merely probable knowledge of Revelation, nay even with doubt whether God has spoken” (prop. xxi.). No certitude is perfect unless based upon reasonable motives. We cannot, therefore, accept with certitude any proposition as being the word of God without Motives of Credibility—that is, marks and criteria clearly showing the proposition to be really the Word of God.

The Motives of Credibility are not the same thing as the Motives of Faith. The former refer to the fact that a particular doctrine was originally revealed by God, the latter refer to the necessity of believing generally whatever God has revealed. Both are the foundation of the reasonableness of our Faith. This will be clear if we bear in mind that the assent given in an act of Faith is inferential: “Whatever God reveals is true; God has revealed, e.g., the mystery of the Blessed Trinity; therefore the mystery is true.” The Motives of Faith are the reasons for assenting to the major premise; the Motives of Credibility are the reasons for assenting to the minor. The Motives of Faith—that is to say, God’s knowledge and veracity—are, however, so evident that no one can call them in question; whereas the Motives of Credibility—that is, the proofs that a given doctrine is of Divine origin—are by no means self-evident, but are the object of the fiercest attacks of unbelievers. It is on this account that, in dealing with the reasonableness of Faith, stress is laid principally upon the Motives of Credibility.

II. The chief errors concerning the Motives of Credibility are: (1) Rationalism, which denies the possibility of any reasonable certainty in matters said to be revealed. (2) Protestantism, at least in some of its forms, which substitutes for external criteria inward feelings and consolations. (3) Some Catholic Theologians have also erred by assigning too prominent a place to these inward feelings. Against these errors the Vatican Council has defined the Catholic doctrine on the nature of the certitude concerning the fact of Revelation, and has especially declared how the proposition by the Church of doctrines as revealed, is a legitimate promulgation of the Divine word: “In order that the submission of our Faith might be in accordance with reason, God hath willed to give us, together with the internal assistance of the Holy Ghost, external proofs of His Revelation, namely, Divine facts and, above all, miracles and prophecies, which, while they clearly manifest God’s almighty power and infinite knowledge, are most certain Divine signs of Revelation adapted to the understanding of all men. Wherefore Moses, and the Prophets, and especially Christ our Lord Himself, wrought and uttered many and most manifest miracles and prophecies; and touching the Apostles we read, ‘They going forth preached the word everywhere, the Lord working withal, and confirming the word with the signs that followed’ (Mark 16:20). And again, it is written, ‘We have the more firm prophetical word, whereunto you do well to attend, as to a light that shineth in a dark place’ (2 Pet. 1:19). But in order that we may fulfil the duty of embracing the true Faith, and of persevering therein constantly, God, by means of His Only Begotten Son, hath instituted the Church, and hath endowed her with plain marks whereby she may be recognized by all men as the guardian and mistress of the revealed word. For to the Catholic Church alone belong all the wonders which have been divinely arranged for the evident credibility of the Christian Faith. Moreover, the Church herself, by her wonderful propagation, exalted sanctity, and unbounded fertility in all that is good, by her Catholic unity and invincible stability, is both an enduring motive of credibility and an unimpeachable testimony of her Divine mission. Whence it is that like a standard set up unto the nations (Isai. 11:12) she calleth to her them that have not yet believed, and maketh her children certain that the Faith which they profess resteth on the surest foundation” (sess. iii., chap. 3).

The Catholic Church therefore teaches: (1) that we must have a rational certitude of the fact of Revelation in order that our Faith may be itself rational; (2) that this certitude is not founded exclusively on internal experience, but also, and indeed chiefly, on external and manifest facts; (3) that these external and manifest facts which accompany the proposition of Revelation can produce a perfect certitude of the fact of Revelation in the minds of all; and (4) that these facts not only accompany the original proposition of Revelation, and thus come down to us as facts of past history, but that by means of the unity and stability of the Church they are perpetuated in the same way as the promulgation of the Divine Word, and are at all times manifest to all who inquire.

III. The following paragraphs will serve to explain and prove the doctrine just stated.

1. First of all it is evident that our Faith cannot be a “reasonable worship” unless sound reasons, distinct from Revelation and the result of our own inquiries, persuade us of the fact that the doctrines proposed for our belief are really the Word of God. If we believe without any reason, our Faith is manifestly irrational. On the other hand, if we believe for revealed reasons exclusively, our Faith is also irrational, because we thereby fall into a vicious circle. We do not, however, maintain that the assent must be purely rational.

2. It is not necessary, according to the teaching of most theologians, nor is it implied in the terms of the Vatican definition, that the certitude of the fact of Revelation should be invariably, in each and every case, absolutely perfect. It is enough if it appears satisfactory to the believer, and excludes all doubt from his mind; in other words, a subjective and relative certitude is sufficient. But this applies especially to the cases of children and uneducated persons, and even then it supposes that those persons upon whose human testimony they rely have a perfect and objective certitude. Cf. Haunold, Theol. Spec., lib. iii., tract ix., c. 2; also Bishop Lefranc de Pompignan’s controversy with a Calvinist, Sur la Foi des Enfants et des Adultes ignorants, in Migne’s Curs. Theol., tom. vi., p. 1070.

3. Among the signs of the Divine origin of a doctrine must be reckoned the inner experiences of the believer. The effects of grace upon the soul are especially important. Nevertheless, these inner experiences cannot be either the exclusive or even the primary criteria of the Divine origin of a doctrine, because they are subjective, that is, restricted to the person who feels them, liable to illusions, and can be felt only after the fact of the Revelation of the doctrine has been otherwise apprehended. The Faith is proposed by public authority, and exacts public and universal obedience. It must therefore be supported by public and plain signs of its Divine origin.

4. Among the external signs of the fact of Revelation, purely human testimony has a place only in so far as it bears witness to the Divine facts connected with Revelation to those persons who cannot personally apprehend them. The proper criterion of the Divine origin of a verbal communication, as might be expected from the nature of the thing, and also according to the teaching of the Church, consists in external, supernatural, and Divine facts or effects, which God intimately connects with the proposition of His Revelation, and by which He signifies to us His will that we should believe that He has spoken.

5. As God has ordained that His word should be proposed to the faithful by the ministry of authentic witnesses, the first point to be established is the Divine mission of these witnesses. Although in theory it would be conceivable that it was only the first promulgators of the Faith who had their mission attested by Divine signs, and that this fact should have been handed down to us in the same way as any other historical event,—nevertheless, as a matter of fact, and as might be expected from the nature of Faith and Revelation, God has ordained that the signs or criteria of Divine origin should uninterruptedly accompany the preaching of His doctrine. The fact of Revelation is thereby brought home to us in a more lively, direct, and effective manner. This question is of the greatest importance at the present time, when the Divine mission of even Christ Himself is the object of so many attacks. When the Divine mission of the Church was denied, and thereby the existence of a continual, living testimony was rejected, Faith in the Divine mission of Christ thenceforth rested upon merely historical evidence, and so became the prey of historical criticism. Besides, without a continuous Divine approbation, Christ’s mission becomes such an isolated fact that its full significance cannot be grasped. Some Catholic theologians, in their endeavours to defend Christianity and the Church on purely historical grounds, have not given enough prominence to the constant signs of Divine approbation which have accompanied the Church’s preaching in all ages. The Vatican definition has therefore been most opportune. It is now of Faith that the Church herself is “an enduring motive of credibility and an unimpeachable testimony of her Divine mission.” Her wonderful propagation, in spite of the greatest moral and physical difficulties, not only in her early years, but even at the present day; her eminent sanctity, as manifested in her Saints, combined with their miracles; her inexhaustible fertility in every sort of good work; her unity in Faith, discipline, and worship; her invincible constancy in resisting the attacks of powerful enemies within and without for more than eighteen centuries: all these are manifest signs that she is not the work of man, but the work of God.

6. The certitude of the fact of Revelation must be in keeping with the firmness required by Faith. Hence all theologians teach that the demonstration of this fact from visible signs, such as prophecies and miracles, must be so evident as to generate a certitude excluding all doubt and fear of error—a certitude sufficient to place a reasonable man under the obligation of adhering to it. This, however, does not mean that the evidence must be of the most perfect kind, so as to render denial absolutely impossible. The proofs of the fact of Revelation may admit of unreasonable dissent, as is manifest by daily experience. Our judgment on the credibility of the fact of Revelation—”It is worthy of belief that God has revealed these things; they must, therefore, be believed,”—is formed with reference to God’s veracity and authority; that is to say, the signs and wonders appear as indications of God’s command to believe and as pledges of His veracity. Now, it is clear that the moral dispositions of the inquirer exercise the greatest influence upon such a judgment. If he has a love of truth, a deep reverence for the authority and holiness of God, and firm confidence in God’s wisdom and providence, he easily sees how incompatible it would be with the supreme perfection of God to give such positive indications of the existence of a revelation if in fact He had made no revelation at all. The inquirer is confronted with the dilemma: “Either God is a deceiver or He has given a revelation to mankind;” and his good dispositions urge him unhesitatingly to accept the latter alternative. On the other hand, if he has a dislike for, or no interest in, the truth, and if he is wanting in submission to God and confidence in Him, he will endeavour to persuade himself that the signs do not come from God, or are not intended to prove a revelation. It is possible to refuse assent to the fact of Revelation by rebelling against Divine authority, and treating God as a deceiver, and herein consists the enormity of the sin of infidelity. Hence St. Paul says, “Having faith and a good conscience, which some rejecting have made shipwreck concerning the faith” (1 Tim. 1:19). Cf. Card. Newman, Occasional Sermons, v., “Dispositions for Faith.”

7. The prophecies, miracles, and other signs by which we prove the credibility of the fact of Revelation, must not be confounded with the Motive of Faith, which is the authority and veracity of God. The Motives of Credibility do not produce the certitude of Faith; they merely dispose, lead, and urge the mind to submit to the Divine authority, of which they are signs. This explains the condemnation of Prop. ix. among those condemned by Innocent XI.: “The will cannot make the assent of Faith more firm in itself than is demanded by the weight of reasons inducing us to believe.” By the “weight of reasons” are meant the Motives of Credibility, the rational certainty of which is neither the measure of the confidence with which the will clings to the contents and facts of Revelation, nor the measure of the firmness with which the intellect impelled by the will adheres to them.

8. In order to elicit an act of Faith, we must know not only the fact, but also the contents, of Revelation: in other words, we must know not only that a Revelation has been made, but also the things which have been revealed. The latter are either communicated directly by God or are proposed by His infallible Church. In the former case, Faith is possible even without their being proposed by the Church. The ordinary way, however, in which God makes Faith accessible to mankind is the authoritative teaching of the Church. The object of this teaching is not simply to convey to our minds the knowledge of revealed truth, as a book would do, but to render possible the “faith which cometh by hearing,” upon which the Apostle insists. By submitting to the testimony and authority of the Church, our Mother, we yield that obedience of Faith which is the result of our reverence for our Heavenly Father, and which is of the very essence of Faith. It is, indeed, more difficult, because more against our pride, to submit to the Church than to God directly; but by so doing we act in the true spirit of Faith.

The authoritative teaching of the Church does not supply an entirely independent motive of Faith, or the highest motive, or even a part of the highest motive. It acts rather as an instrument or vehicle of the real motive. The Church sets before us the contents of Revelation as worthy of belief; she proposes detailed points of doctrine as a living and ever-present witness, and demands our assent thereto on the authority of God.

SECT. 42.—FAITH AND GRACE

I. It is not absolutely impossible for man unaided by grace to elicit an act of faith of some kind. Man is naturally able to perceive revealed truth when brought under his notice, and also the authority of God and the motives of credibility. His moral nature, too, prompts him to reverence and honour God. An act of faith of some kind is, therefore, naturally possible. But the act of Faith intended and commanded by God transcends our natural faculties, and is supernatural in two ways: supernatural in its very substance or essence (secundum substantiam sive essentiam), inasmuch as it is the beginning, the root and foundation of man’s salvation; and also supernatural in its mode (secundum modum or secundum quid) by reason of the great difficulty which the natural man finds in embracing the Faith and accepting its consequences. The first-named supernatural character is given by Elevating Grace—that is, by grace which raises nature to the supernatural order; the other comes from Medicinal Grace—that is, grace which makes up for the shortcomings of nature. The Vatican Council teaches that Faith is a “supernatural virtue whereby we believe with the help of God’s grace;” and it repeats the words of the Seventh Canon of the Second Council of Orange: “No man can assent to the gospel preaching, in the manner requisite for salvation (sicut oportet ad salutem consequendam), without the light and inspiration of the Holy Ghost, Who giveth to every man sweetness in assenting to and believing in the truth.”

A complete explanation and proof of these various points must be deferred till we come to the treatise on Grace. For our present purpose the following will be sufficient.

II. The definition just quoted teaches directly that Faith is supernatural in its cause and in its object. But the supernatural cause must communicate to the very act of Faith the worth which enables that act to attain a supernatural object. Hence the act itself must be supernatural; it must be substantially different from every merely natural act, and must be capable of attaining an object transcending the natural order. Speaking generally, the supernatural essence of the act of Faith consists in our accepting revealed truths in a manner befitting our dignity of adopted sons of God, destined to the Beatific Vision; and in a manner befitting the paternal condescension of God, Who has deigned to speak to us as His children, and to call and raise us to the most intimate union with Himself. But more particularly it consists in the transformation of our sense of Faith (pius credulitatis affectus) into a filial piety towards God, and into a striving after its supernatural object in a manner commensurate with the excellence of that object; and also in the union and assimilation of our knowledge with the Divine knowledge, so that Faith becomes as it were a participation of God’s own Life and Knowledge, and an anticipation and foretaste of the supernatural knowledge in store for us in the Beatific Vision. The supernatural essence of Divine Faith thus contains two elements, one moral, the other intellectual, intimately interwoven but still distinct.

III. Faith is Divine, not only because its certitude is based upon God’s authority, but also because God Himself is the efficient cause acting upon the mind of the believer and producing in him subjective certainty. God is the author of Faith as no one else can be. Holy Scripture teaches that Christian Faith requires an internal illumination in addition to the external revelation (Matt. 16:17), and, besides the hearing of the external word, the hearing of an internal one, and the learning from an internal teacher (John 6:45): the external revelation is attributed to the visible Son, the internal to the invisible Father. It follows that Faith cannot be produced by purely external influences, nor can the mind of man produce it by his own natural exertions. Faith must be infused into the soul by Divine light, and must be received from the hand of God.

IV. The acts of the mind preceding the infusion of the light of Faith have merely the character of preparatory dispositions or of co-operation enabling the light of Faith to exert its own power. But even these acts are supernatural from their very outset, and must therefore be the result of the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Ghost. Hence the illumination which gives the soul the immediate inclination and power to elicit a supernatural act of Faith is not the only one to be taken into account. The practical judgment “that we can and ought to believe” which precedes the “pius affectus” must itself be the result of a supernatural illumination, otherwise it could not produce a supernatural act of the will. The illumination has also the character of an internal word or call of God, at least so far as it repeats and animates internally the command to believe given to us by external revelation. Nevertheless a natural knowledge of this same practical judgment must be presupposed in order that the supernatural illumination may itself take place. The best way to explain this is to consider the natural judgment as merely speculative until the action of the Holy Ghost transforms it into an effective practical judgment determining the act of Faith.

V. The secondary and relatively supernatural character of Faith, although less important, is nevertheless more apparent. Faith is beset with difficulties arising partly from the intellectual and moral conditions of our nature and partly from the obligations which Faith imposes upon the intellect and will of the believer. Without the help of God’s grace man could not surmount these difficulties, and consequently the act of Faith would be, even in this respect, morally impossible. All men, however, have not the same difficulty in believing. Hence the necessity for God’s assisting grace is not absolute but relative, varying with the moral and intellectual dispositions of the persons to whom Revelation is proposed.

SECT. 43.—MAN’S CO-OPERATION IN THE ACT OF FAITH—FAITH A FREE ACT

I. Although so many external causes are brought to bear on the act of Faith, and although God is its principal cause, nevertheless the act of Faith is a Human Act and a Free Act. According to the Vatican Council it is, as we have seen, essentially an act of obedience, “an entire submission of the intellect and the will.” It is therefore not simply a passive or receptive act, nor a blind, instinctive act, nor an act forced upon us by Divine grace or by the weight of demonstration. The Council of Trent (sess. vi. chaps. 4–5) describes Faith as a “free movement towards God,” implying a twofold operation: hearing His outward word and receiving His inward inspiration. The Vatican Council further explains the Tridentine doctrine in sess. iii., chap. 3. It speaks of “yielding free obedience to God,” thus meeting the rationalistic assertion that the assent of Christian Faith is the necessary result of human arguments. The same doctrine may be gathered from Holy Scripture, which always speaks of the act of Faith as a free and moral act, an act of obedience, of worship, and the like: cf. Rom. 4:20; Mark 10:22; John 20:27; Matt. 16:17; Luke 1:45; Matt. 9:29; Rom. 4:3–20 sqq.; Gal. 3:6.

II. The Council of Trent also indicates the positive character of the free act of the will determining the act of Faith: the will determines the act of Faith freely because its moral dispositions move it to obey God. Besides this primary liberty of Faith, there is also a secondary liberty, arising from the non-cogency of the motives of credibility, which allows the will to withhold its consent and leaves room for doubt and even denial. Hence every act of Faith must be determined by an act of free will. The non-cogency of the motives of credibility may be referred to three causes—(a) the obscurity of the Divine testimony (inevidentia attestantis); (b) the obscurity of the contents of Revelation; (c) the opposition between the obligations imposed upon us by Faith and the evil inclinations of our corrupt nature.

III. In eliciting the act of Faith man’s freedom is elevated to the supernatural order. This supernatural dignity and excellence lead to a supernatural and Divine freedom of the mind, the freedom of the children of God, the freedom from error and doubt, the full and perfect possession of the highest truth in the bosom of the Eternal Truth. Its childlike simplicity is really the highest sense, and leads to the highest intellectual attainments, whereas infidelity leads only to folly. “No more children tossed to and fro and carried about with every wind of doctrine by the wickedness of men, by cunning craftiness” (Eph. 4:14; cf. Luke 10:21).

SECT. 44.—THE SUPREME CERTITUDE OF FAITH

I. Faith requires the fullest assent, excluding every doubt and every fear of deception, and including the fullest conviction that what is believed cannot be other than true. No other faith answers to the excellence and force of God’s infallible truth. Faith is thus essentially different from mere opinion without certitude, and also from so-called practical or moral certitude. The certitude of Faith, as regards the firmness of assent, is essentially higher and more perfect than the certitude of science. The motive of Faith, which is the authority of God, is more trustworthy than the light of our reason, by which we obtain scientific certitude. We are bound therefore to reject unconditionally any doubts or difficulties arising from the exercise of our reason. As theologians say, the certainty of Faith is supreme, surmounting all doubts and rising above all other certainties (certitudo super omnia). The Vatican Council, as we have seen, declares Faith to be a complete submission of the mind, consisting in the perfect subjugation of the created intellect to the uncreated Truth. And the council also enjoins the unconditional rejection of any scientific inquiry at variance with the Faith (sess. iii. c. 4).

II. In order to understand this, a threefold distinction must be made.

1. The supreme certitude of Faith is appreciative in its nature—that is to say, it includes and results from a supreme appreciation of its motive, but is not necessarily felt more vividly than any other certitude. As a rule, this certitude is felt even less vividly than human certitude based upon unimpeachable evidence.

2. The supreme firmness of Faith must likewise be distinguished from the incapability of being shaken which belongs to evident human knowledge.

3. That the certitude of Faith is supreme does not imply that all other certitude is untrustworthy, or that we must be ready to resist evident human certitude apparently conflicting with the Faith. A real conflict between Faith and reason is impossible.

III. The high degree of certitude which belongs to the act of Faith is attained and completed by means of the supernatural light of Faith which pervades all the elements of the act. This light, being, as it were, a ray of the Divine Light, participates in the Divine infallibility and cannot but illumine the truth. The certitude produced by it is therefore Divine in every respect, and so absolutely infallible that a real act of Faith can never have falsehood for its subject-matter. This has been defined by the Vatican Council, repeating the definition of the Fifth Lateran Council: “Every assertion contrary to enlightened Faith (illuminatæ fidei, i.e. Faith produced by Divine illumination) we define to be altogether false” (sess. iii., chap. 4). The words “illuminatæ fidei” signify the Faith as it is produced in the believer, as distinct from the external objective proposition of revealed truth, and also as distinct from the act of human faith. In like manner the Council of Trent states that Faith affords a certitude which cannot have falsehood for its subject-matter (cui non potest subesse falsum). The light of Faith cannot be misapplied to belief in error; nevertheless it is possible for man to mistake an act of natural faith in a supposed revelation for a supernatural act elicited by the aid of the light of Faith. Some external criterion is needed whereby we may distinguish the one from the other. Such a criterion is supplied by the Faith of the Church, which cannot err. Catholic Faith carries with it the consciousness that it is Divine Faith produced by Divine light, whereas the self-made faith of Protestants cannot assert itself as Divine without leading to fanaticism.

IV. The supreme certitude of Faith implies that we must have the will to remain true to the Faith without doubt or denial, and the firm conviction that it can never be given up on account of its turning out to be false. Hence, every act of Faith is an irreformable act, and possesses a certitude that cannot be shaken. Faith can, however, be destroyed by an abuse of our free-will. Again, we are bound to reform faith which is erroneously thought to be Divine but is applied by mistake to propositions not revealed by God. The Vatican Council, after declaring how God co-operates in the acceptance of Faith and in perseverance therein, concludes thus: “Wherefore the condition of those who have by the heavenly gift of Faith cleaved to Catholic truth is by no means on a footing with the condition of those who, led by human opinions, follow a false religion; for those who have received the Faith under the teaching of the Church can never have any just cause for changing or calling the Faith in doubt” (sess. iii., chap. 3). And in Canon 6, directed against the doctrines of Hermes, the council enacts, “If any one shall say that the condition of the Faithful is on a footing with that of those who have not yet reached the one true Faith, so that Catholics can have just cause for calling in doubt the Faith which they have received under the Church’s teaching, until they shall have completed a scientific demonstration of the truth and credibility of their Faith, let him be anathema.” Every one who embraces the Catholic Faith binds himself most strictly to adhere to it for ever. “I promise most constantly to retain and confess the same [Faith] entire and inviolate, by God’s help, to the last breath of my life” (Creed of Pius IV.). No excuse can be made for any breach of fidelity, except on the score of ignorance. Every doubt against the Faith must unhesitatingly be rejected as sinful.

SECT. 45.—NECESSITY OF FAITH

I. The Necessity of Faith is twofold: a Necessity of Means and a Necessity of Precept. The latter always includes the former, but not vice versâ.

The Faith which is a necessary means of justification and salvation is Theological Faith, perfect in its kind. In infants the Habit of Faith is sufficient; in those who have reached the use of reason some act is required bearing in some way on the economy of salvation as revealed by God. Faith, in the broad sense of the word—that is, faith founded on the testimony which creatures give of God’s existence and providence—is not enough (see prop. xxiii., condemned by Innoc. XI., March 2, 1679). Nor is Inchoate Faith sufficient—that is, a faith in the germ, not extending beyond a willingness and readiness to believe. The act of Faith must be complete, and must be based upon a supernatural Divine Revelation. Faith alone can give that knowledge of the supernatural economy of salvation which enables man to dispose his actions in harmony with his supernatural end. This reason is adduced by the Apostle (Heb. 11:6) to prove that Abel and Henoch, like Abraham, obtained their justification and salvation by means of Faith, although Holy Scripture does not say of them, as of Abraham, that their Faith was founded upon a positive Divine Revelation: “Without Faith it is impossible to please God; for he that cometh to God [to serve Him] must believe that He is, and is [becomes, γίνεται] a rewarder to them that seek Him.”

1. The two points of Faith mentioned in this text are indispensable, because they are the two poles on which the whole economy of salvation turns. There is probably some allusion to the words spoken by God to Abraham: “I am thy protector and thy reward exceeding great” (Gen. 15:1). Hence the words, “that He is,” refer to the existence of God, not in the abstract, but as being our God, as leading us on to salvation under the care of His paternal Providence. A belief in His existence, in this sense, is the fundamental condition of all our dealing with Him, and this belief is as much above our natural knowledge as is the belief in God the Rewarder. If, as St. Peter Chrysologus states, the first article of the Apostles’ Creed expresses belief in God as our Father, then the words “that He is” correspond with this article, just as the words “that He is a rewarder to them that seek Him” correspond with the last article, “Life everlasting.” Theologians rightly conclude from Heb. 11:6 that, at least in pre-Christian times, the two points there mentioned were alone necessary to be expressly believed. They suffice to enable man to tend by hope and charity towards God as the Source of salvation.

2. It is an open question whether, after Christ’s coming, Faith in the Christian economy is not indispensable. Many texts in Holy Scripture seem to demand Faith in Christ, in His death and resurrection, as a necessary condition of salvation. On the other hand, it is not easy to understand how eternal salvation should have become impossible for those who are unable to arrive at an explicit knowledge of Christian Revelation. The best solution of the difficulty would seem to be that given by Suarez (De Fide, disp. xii., sect. iv.). The texts demanding Faith in Christ and the Blessed Trinity must not be interpreted more rigorously than those referring to the necessity of Baptism, especially as Faith in Christ, Faith in the Blessed Trinity, and the necessity of Baptism are closely connected together. The Faith in these mysteries is, like Baptism, the ordinary normal means of salvation. Under extraordinary circumstances, however, when the actual reception of Baptism is impossible, the mere implicit desire (votum) suffices. So, too, the implicit desire to believe in Christ and the Trinity must be deemed sufficient. By “implicit desire” we mean the desire to receive, to believe, and to do whatever is needful for salvation, although what is to be received, believed, and done is not explicitly known. The implicit wish and willingness to believe in Christ must be accompanied by and connected with an explicit Faith in Divine Providence as having a care of our salvation; and this Faith implies Faith and Hope in the Christian economy of salvation (see St. Thom., 2 2, q. 2, a. 7).

II. The Necessity of Precept—that is, the obligation arising from the command to believe—extends conditionally to the whole of Revelation. As soon as we know that a truth has been revealed, we are bound to believe it explicitly. The number of revealed truths which we are bound to know and believe explicitly, varies with the circumstances and abilities of the individual. There is no positive law concerning them. Every Christian, however, is bound to know explicitly those revealed truths which are necessary for leading a Christian life and for the fulfilment of the duties of his state. It is the general opinion of theologians that there is a grave obligation to know the contents of the Apostles’ Creed, the Decalogue, the Lord’s Prayer, and all that is required for the worthy reception of the Sacraments and for proper participation in public worship. Cf. St. Thom. 2 2, q. 2, aa. 3–8, with the commentaries thereon

CHAPTER II

FAITH AND UNDERSTANDING

SECT. 46.—DOCTRINE OF THE VATICAN COUNCIL ON THE UNDERSTANDING OF FAITH

I. WE have now to consider how far we can understand the supernatural truths or mysteries which we believe on the authority of God and the Church. Rationalists and Agnostics of all times have held that no understanding is possible of things beyond the sphere of natural reason. Abelard and some theologians of the thirteenth century, and in modern times Günther and Frohschammer, were of opinion that nothing is beyond the grasp of human reason, and, consequently, that supernatural truths can be demonstrated by reason, and that Faith can be replaced by knowledge. Other theologians allow the co-existence of Faith with knowledge, pretending that reason adds a new certitude to Faith.

II. Against these errors the Vatican Council teaches that some understanding of mysteries is possible, and it lays down its conditions and rules: “When Reason enlightened by Faith maketh diligent, pious, and sober inquiry, she attaineth, by God’s gift, most fruitful knowledge of mysteries, both from the analogy of things naturally known and from the relation of mysteries with one another and with the end of man.” Then the Council sets forth that this understanding is less clear and less perfect than our understanding of things natural: “Still she (Reason) is never rendered fit to perceive them in the same way as the truths which are her own proper object. For the Divine mysteries, by their very nature, so far surpass the created intellect that, even when conveyed by Revelation and received by Faith, they remain covered by the veil of the Faith and, as it were, hidden by a cloud, as long as in this mortal life we are absent from the Lord, for we walk by faith and not by sight” (sess. iii., chap. 4).

III. Faith, then, seeking after understanding (fides quærens intellectum) first adapts the natural notions of the mind to things Divine by determining the analogies or likenesses between the two orders. An understanding is thus obtained of the several mysteries varying in perfection with the perfection of the analogical conceptions. Further, comparing the mysteries with one another, and grouping them in the order determined by the principle of causality, the mind, enlightened by Faith, contemplates a magnificent cycle, beginning and ending with God, and constituted after the manner of a living organism. Unity is given to this noble cosmos of supernature by the terminus to which every part of it is directed—the glory of God in the Beatific Vision, which is also the last end of man.

Practical illustrations of this theory will be found in every chapter of the following treatises; for the harmony of the whole, see the Division of the work given at the end of the Introduction.

IV. The Understanding of Faith cannot lead to any independent certitude, nor can it afford any additional certitude to the certitude of Faith. Its only effect is to facilitate and strengthen the act of Faith by removing apparent difficulties, and by inducing the mind to accept truths so beautifully in harmony with one another and with the Nature of God and the nature of man. The Understanding of Faith has, therefore, a moral rather than a purely logical character, and corresponds with the pious dispositions of the will which incline to Faith. Its moral persuasiveness is felt more as regards the first principles of the supernatural order; its logical persuasiveness is more manifest in connection with inferred truths.

SECT. 47.—THEOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE

I. The immediate object of the Understanding of Faith is to present to the mind of the believer a true, distinct, and comparatively perfect notion of what he must believe. A further object is to evolve from Faith a wider and deeper knowledge rooted in Faith but not formally identical with it, and having a certitude of its own similar to the certitude of Faith, but not exactly of the same kind.

Revealed truths, just like natural truths, can be used as principles from which other truths may be logically inferred. When so used, these revealed truths are called Theological Reasons, as distinguished from human or natural reasons. In the domain of natural science, the certitude with which we adhere to the conclusion of an argument is only an extension of our certitude of the premises, and is of the same kind. But in the domain of Faith our certitude of the conclusion of an argument is the result of two distinct factors—Faith and reason,—and is therefore essentially different from and inferior to our certitude of one of the premises. This kind of certitude is called Theological Certitude. Hence Theological Knowledge differs, on the one hand, from philosophical or natural science; and, on the other hand, from the knowledge of the revealed principles from which it starts. Like natural science, it has complete scientific value only when its demonstrations are based on principles which are the real objective causes of the conclusions; in other words, only when it shows not merely that the thing is (quia est, ὅτι), but also why and wherefore it is (propter quid sit, διότι). But since Faith, as such, requires us to know only what its subject-matter is, we have here another difference between simple Faith and Theological Knowledge.

II. It is an open question whether the certitude of theological conclusions is supernatural or merely natural. If we consider that the conclusion cannot be stronger than the weaker of the premises, it would seem that theological conclusions are only humanly or naturally certain. On the other hand, theological conclusions are organically connected with the Understanding of Faith, from which they spring as their root, and of which they are a natural expansion. They are also supported by the pious and loving disposition to believe. The true theologian looks upon the rational minor premise less as a partial motive than as a means whereby he arrives at the full comprehension of the major premise. God, Who preserves His Church from error when she proposes theological conclusions for our belief, will likewise extend His grace to the assent which the theologian gives to similar conclusions. At any rate, all this goes to prove that the assent to theological conclusions is of a higher character than the assent of heretics and infidels founded upon human motives, and that consequently these latter can no more possess true theological science than supernatural Faith. We see, too, that Theological Knowledge, in its principles and conclusions, enjoys a more sacred and inviolable certitude than any human science, and that every human certitude not intrinsically and extrinsically perfect must give way to theological conclusions perfectly ascertained.

SECT. 48.—SCIENTIFIC CHARACTER OF THEOLOGY

I. A science pure and simple should be, not merely a collection of facts or truths, but a complete system organically linked together by fixed laws and reducible to objective unity. Theology fulfils these conditions in an eminent degree. Its subjective principle of cognition is one, and its subject-matter is one, viz. God, the supreme substantial unity. Created things are dealt with only in as far as they tend towards God and are factors or elements of the Divine order of things. Science, it is sometimes said, should deal only with necessary, eternal, and universal truths, not with what is contingent, temporal, and particular. This, rightly understood, would mean that science is not concerned with the transient and changeable, but with the ideas and laws that govern and connect such phenomena. In this sense also theology is eminently a science. Its primary object, God, is necessary and eternal, and rules over all things. Besides, the contingent facts of which it treats are considered in so far as they eternally exist in the all-commanding will of God, and many of them, as for instance the birth of Christ, are of lasting, nay eternal importance, and so possess as it were a universal character.

II. Theology is a distinct and separate science by reason of its peculiar principle of cognition and its peculiar subject-matter. The peculiarity of its principle of cognition makes it a science generically distinct from all other sciences. So, too, does its subject-matter, which embraces the whole supernatural order. This, however, does not prevent Theology from including in its domain many truths which also belong to the other sciences. It derives its knowledge from God’s omniscience, and therefore can throw light on everything that can be known. But the supernatural is its primary, direct, and proper subject-matter. The natural belongs to theology only in certain respects and for a special purpose, viz. in so far as what is natural is related to the supernatural order. Theology, therefore, does not deal with the subject-matter of the other sciences in the same way and with the same exhaustiveness as these sciences do. See St. Thom., Contra Gentes, l. ii., c. 4; Card. Newman, Idea of a University, p. 430.

SECT. 49.—THE RANK OF THEOLOGY AMONG THE SCIENCES

I. Theology, by reason of the excellence of its subject-matter and of its principle of knowledge, is both subjectively and objectively the highest and noblest of all sciences. Objectively, the dignity and excellence of a science depend upon the dignity, universality, and unity of its subject-matter—three attributes which we have just shown to belong in an eminent degree to the subject-matter of Theology. Subjectively, the excellence of a science is measured by the degree of certainty which it affords. But Theology, both in its principles and conclusions, especially when they are guaranteed by the Church, possesses the highest certitude. Moreover, as it demonstrates all its contents on the ground of Eternal Reasons (rationes æternæ), i.e. of God and His eternal ideas, it is also the most profound and thorough of all the sciences. It is, indeed, inferior to some of the sciences as regards clearness and distinctness, because its evidence is not direct, and its notions are analogical. This, however, does not degrade Theology, because this defect—if such it be—is amply atoned for by other excellences, and is even a proof of the dignity of Theology, because it is a consequence of the exalted character of supernatural knowledge. This supreme excellence may be fitly expressed by styling Theology the Transcendental Science; for, borne up by Faith and the pious boldness of Faith, it really attains what a godless and reckless modern science vainly strives after.

II. The Fathers and theologians, following the example of Holy Scripture, express the peculiar dignity of Theology by terming it Wisdom pure and simple, or Divine Wisdom (Sapientia). By this is meant a knowledge far above common knowledge,—a knowledge dealing with the highest principles and most exalted things, and yet with the greatest certitude; perfecting the mind and elevating it to God the highest Good and ultimate End of all; enabling us in the practical order to direct all our actions and tendencies towards their proper object—Eternal Beatitude. Human reason, indeed, endeavours to attain a knowledge fulfilling these conditions, wherefore Aristotle called Metaphysics “Wisdom,” because to him it was the noblest science. The wisdom of this world is styled Philosophy, that is, a love of and seeking after wisdom; but it is Theology alone that is the true Wisdom itself. Hence the name of Wisdom is given in many passages of Holy Scripture to the knowledge contained in or developed from Faith (see especially 1 Cor. 1 and 2).

SECT. 50.—THE THREE GREAT BRANCHES OF THEOLOGY—FUNDAMENTAL, POSITIVE, AND SPECULATIVE

We have already mentioned the various branches of Theology (Introduction, p. xvii.). We are now in a position to speak of them in detail.

I. Theology may be said to be the science of Revelation. It tells us (1) that there is a Revelation; (2) how we are to know the things that have been revealed; (3) what are the things that have been revealed; and (4) what are the relations between these things, and what the inferences that can be drawn from them. Now, it is clear that 1 and 2 are the groundwork of 3 and 4; that 3 is of a positive character—that is, dealing with fact; and that 4 is more subtle and metaphysical than the others. Hence we have three great branches of Theology: Fundamental, Positive, and Speculative.

II. The existence and attributes of God are proved in that branch of Philosophy called Natural Theology. They come within the province of unaided reason, and need no supernatural Revelation to manifest them (Rom. 1:20; 2:14, 15; Acts 14:14–16; Wisd. 13:1–9). But God has freely bestowed upon us a higher way of knowing Him and His dealings with man. He has spoken directly by His own voice and the voice of His Son, and indirectly through Prophets, Apostles, and Inspired Writers (Heb. 1:1, 2). Those who originally heard God or His envoys were convinced of the Divine origin of what they heard, by the working of miracles and the fulfilment of prophecies. Those who lived in after ages had first to be convinced of the truth of the record of these sayings and doings handed down by word of mouth or by writing, and then were able to infer that these really came from God. Now it is the business of Fundamental Theology to prove the trustworthiness of these records, to examine the evidence for the various miracles and prophecies, and so to establish that God has indeed “at sundry times and in divers manners spoken in times past to the fathers by the Prophets,” and afterwards by His Son. But the evidence for the fact of Revelation is not merely a matter of history. We have before our eyes a plain proof that God has spoken, and has worked supernaturally. The Catholic Church herself, by her wonderful propagation, her eminent sanctity, and her inexhaustible fertility in all that is good, is a standing unanswerable argument of her Divine origin and mission. The dogmatic constitution published in the third session of the Vatican Council summarizes the scope and function of Fundamental Theology under four headings: (1) God the Creator of all things; (2) Revelation; (3) Faith; (4) Faith and Reason.

As soon as we know that God has spoken we naturally ask, How are we to find out the things that He has revealed? This question was the turning-point of the controversy between the Catholics and the Protestants in the sixteenth century, and was decided by the Council of Trent (sess. iv.). The branch of Theology that deals with it may be styled fundamental, inasmuch as the question concerns the very basis of our belief; but it is more usually called Polemical or Controversial Theology.

The other branch of Fundamental Theology is sometimes designated Apologetic Theology, because its function is to defend Revelation against Rationalists, Deists, Atheists, and others.

III. After having established that God has made a Revelation, and after having discovered the means of knowing the things that He has revealed, our next step is to inquire what these things are. Positive Theology takes for granted all that has been proved by Fundamental Theology, both Apologetic and Controversial. It examines the various sources of Revelation, written and unwritten; it tells us that in God there are Three Persons, that God raised man to the supernatural order, that man fell, that God the Son took flesh and died for us, and so on with the other great mysteries. Its proper function is to establish the truths of Revelation, and not to penetrate into their inner and deeper meaning and mutual relations. But those who treat of it do not restrict themselves to the former task, but make excursions into the higher region.

IV. The noblest branch of Theology is that which is concerned, not with proving the contents of Revelation, but with comparing revealed truths and entering into their very essence as far as reason, guided by Faith, will allow. Speculative Theology starts where Positive Theology ends: Positive Theology proves a dogma; Speculative Theology examines it closely, views it in connection with other dogmas, and strives thereby to get a deeper insight into it and into them. The attacks made by Protestants on the Rule of Faith, and those made by Rationalists on the very existence of Revelation, have naturally drawn off attention from this profound and sublime study. But at the present time signs are not wanting that it is once more being cultivated. The deep and many-sided insight which it gives into things Divine is itself a most desirable enrichment of the mind, enabling us to participate more fully in the blessings and fruits of the Faith. It is also of help to our Faith, not indeed by increasing its certainty, but by presenting revealed truths to better advantage in the light which they throw on one another, and in the harmony of their mutual relations. Even against heretics it is not without value. Their chief strength lies in the confusion of ideas, in the falsification of true notions, and in the abuse of logic. On all these points Speculative Theology renders great service to the truth. The great controversialists of the last three centuries have been at the same time profound speculative theologians. See Canus, l. viii., and l. xii., c. 2; Kleutgen, Theol., vol. iii., diss. 1 and 5.

V. An example will perhaps help us to understand the various distinctions spoken of in this section. We take the dogma of the Blessed Trinity.

1. Natural Theology, which is really a branch of Philosophy, proves to us that God exists.

2. Apologetic Theology proves that He has revealed to us truths above our reason.

3. Controversial Theology proves that the testimony and authority of the Catholic Church is the means of finding out what God has revealed.

4. Positive Theology proves that it has been revealed that there are three Persons in God.

5. Speculative Theology teaches us how One Divine Essence is possessed by Three distinct Persons, viz. that One Person possesses It as uncommunicated; a Second possesses It as communicated by knowledge; and a Third possesses It as communicated by love.

We repeat in this place that the present manual deals chiefly with Positive Theology. Occasionally we shall rise into Speculative Theology, notably in Book II., Part II., chap. iv., where we strive to penetrate into the mystery of the Trinity.

SECT. 51.—RELATION BETWEEN REASON AND FAITH

I. Human reason, like Faith, has its own proper subject-matter and province. It also lays the foundation of Faith, and aids in the development of revealed doctrines. There is, however, a certain territory which is common to both Reason and Faith. Hence we must consider the mutual relations of the two. This subject has been clearly expounded by the Vatican Council (sess. iii., chap. 4), so that we need only quote and explain what is there laid down.

1. “If any one shall say that in Divine Revelation no mysteries properly so-called are contained, but that all the dogmas of the Faith can be understood and proved from natural principles by reason duly cultivated: let him be anathema.

2. “If any one shall say that human sciences are to be treated with such freedom that their assertions, although at variance with revealed doctrine, can be received as true, and cannot be proscribed by the Church: let him, etc.

3. “If any one shall say that it can come to pass that at some time, according to the progress of science, a meaning should be attributed to the dogmas proposed by the Church other than that which the Church hath understood and doth understand: let him,” etc.

In these three canons the principal claims of the Rationalists are condemned: (1) The right to treat of revealed truths in the same way as natural truths, that is, on purely natural principles and with purely natural certitude; (2) the right of human reason to hold its scientific conclusions, notwithstanding their opposition to revealed doctrines, and independently of the authority of the Church; and (3) the right to substitute new meanings for old ones, in the definitions of Faith. It is plain that these claims not only entirely emancipate Reason from the control of Faith, but also invade the proper domain of Faith and destroy its supernatural character.

II. The fundamental principles upon which the relations between Faith and Reason are based are stated by the Council to be the following:—

1. Reason is a principle or source of knowledge, and possesses a domain of its own. Faith, too, is a principle of knowledge, higher in dignity than reason, and likewise having its own proper domain.

2. As both Faith and Reason come from God, they cannot be opposed to each other, or arrive at contradictory conclusions.

3. From these two principles the Council infers that any conclusion or assertion opposed to illuminated (supernatural) Faith is altogether false, and only apparently reasonable. Hence a Catholic has the right and the duty to reject any such assertion or conclusion as soon as he is informed by the infallible teaching of the Church that his Faith is really illuminated. Again, Faith and Reason combine for mutual aid and support, yet in such a way that each retains its own proper character and comparative independence. Reason assists Faith by demonstrating the credibility of Faith, by contributing to the understanding of its subject-matter, and by developing it into theological science. On the other hand, Faith is of service to Reason, by rescuing it from many errors, even in the domain of human science, and by guiding it to a profounder and more comprehensive knowledge of natural truths. This influence of Faith on Reason implies, indeed, a certain weakness and dependence on the part of Reason, but does not interfere with its legitimate conclusions or legitimate freedom. It is only a false liberty or licence that is inconsistent with submission to Faith.

III. The relations between Reason and Faith can be summed up in the well-known formula: “Reason is the hand-maiden of Faith.” That is to say, Faith and its theological development are the highest science, and are the supreme object and highest end towards which the activity of man can be directed. St. Thomas expresses the same doctrine thus: “Seeing that the end of the whole of Philosophy is lower than and is ordained to the end of Theology, the latter should rule all the other sciences, and take into her service what they teach” (prol. in I. Sent. q. I. a. 1). And St. Bonaventure: “Theology takes from nature the materials to make a mirror in which Divine things are reflected, and she constructs as it were a ladder, the lowest rung of which is on earth, and the highest in Heaven” (Prol. Breviloq.). The Seraphic Doctor develops the same idea in his splendid work, Reductio artium ad Theologiam. See Dr. Clemens, De Scholasticorum sententia: Philosophiam phiam esse ancillam Theologiæ: Kleutgen, vol. iv., n. 315 sqq. Franzelin, De Trad., Append., cap. vi.: Card. Newman, Idea of a University, p. 428.

IV. Hence it follows that philosophy must be, in a certain sense, Christian and Catholic in its spirit, in its principles, and in its conclusions. Its spirit is Catholic when the philosopher is guided by the doctrines of Faith, when he aims at a fuller knowledge of the natural truths contained in Revelation, and prepares the way for the scientific development of supernatural truths. Its principles and conclusions are Catholic when they agree with Faith, or at least do not clash with it, and when they can be used in speculative theology. In other words, philosophy is Christian and Catholic when it is really true and sound philosophy. Non-Christian philosophy can indeed, to a certain extent, be true and sound; nevertheless, the nature of the science itself, and its history, prove that its proper development is dependent on its Christian spirit. In pre-Christian times, Socratic philosophy attained a high degree of perfection, and became the foundation upon which Christian philosophy is built. The Fathers recognized in this fact the Hand of God preparing the way for the science of the Gospel. By Socratic philosophy we mean the due combination of its two forms, Platonic and Aristotelian. These two correct and supplement each other, and should not be separated. (See the interesting parallel between Plato and Aristotle, in St. Thom. Opusc., De Substantiis Separatis.) Christian philosophy blends them together, although it has sometimes given more prominence to one than to the other. The use which the Church has made, and continues to make, of this combined system is a guarantee of the truth of its main principles and conclusions. Hence any attempt to substitute for it a totally new or different system must be viewed with distrust, so much the more as all modern attempts of the kind have miserably failed.

SECT. 52.—THEOLOGY AS A SACRED SCIENCE

1. A supernatural illumination of the mind is in the first place needed to assist the mind in overcoming the difficulties naturally inherent in a knowledge of supernatural things. These difficulties arise from the nature of the human mind, which draws its notions from the sensible world, and is subject to the influence of passion and prejudice. Both sorts of difficulties are alluded to by the Apostle: “The sensual (ψυχικὸς) man perceiveth not these things that are of the Spirit of God: for it is foolishness to him, and he cannot understand: because it is spiritually (πνευματικῶς) examined. But the spiritual (πνευματικὸς) man judgeth all things” (1 Cor. 2:14, 15). The Divine assistance required for their removal is often mentioned in Scripture, e.g. “His unction teacheth you of all things” (1 John 2:27; cf. Eph. 1:17).

Again, the action of the Holy Ghost is required, at least morally, to produce that purity of disposition and humility of heart which are indispensable for all moral and religious knowledge, and especially for a knowledge of the supernatural. This assistance is often so effective, that it contributes more to the perfection of spiritual science than the best-developed but unassisted natural abilities. Hence children and uneducated people sometimes have a clearer perception of the mysteries of the Faith than persons calling themselves philosophers. “I give thee thanks, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent (ἀπὸ σοφῶν καὶ συνετῶν), and hast revealed them to little ones” (νηπίοις, Matt. 11:25; cf. 5:8, and Wisd. 1:4). Card. Newman, Oxford University Sermons, xiii., “On Implicit and Explicit Reason;” Grammar of Assent, chap. viii., § 3, “Natural Inference.”

II. The influence of the Holy Ghost on our spiritual knowledge reaches its perfection when He diffuses in our soul the supernatural life of Divine Love. This life brings us into most intimate connection with the mysteries of the Faith, keeps them continually before our mind, and, as it were, identifies us with them. Divine charity, which is fruitful of good works, is also productive of increased knowledge of spiritual things. It transforms the elementary understanding into a perfect Wisdom which is a foretaste and beginning of the Beatific Vision. Charity give a keenness to the spiritual eye, and fixes it upon the Divine Love; Charity gives us a sense of the Divine Beauty and Sweetness; Charity likens us to God Himself, inasmuch as He is the principle of the greatest mysteries the more we love the better we understand the love of others. The spiritual contentment produced by Charity in the soul helps us to understand the perfect harmony existing between revealed truth and the noblest aspiration of our nature. The fire of Divine Charity is naturally accompanied by a Divine light, by means of which God manifests Himself in a marvellous manner. 1 Cor. 2:13–16; 2 Cor. 3:16–18; Eph. 3:14, sqq.

SECT. 53.—PROGRESS OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE

I. The possibility, and indeed the necessity, of progress in Theology result in general from the inexhaustible riches of revealed truths, the perfectibility of the human mind, the wise dispensation of Providence which gradually evolved Revelation, and lastly from the necessity of combating heresy and infidelity.

II. Progress in Theology necessarily differs from progress in human sciences. Theology, for instance, can never desert the standpoint of Faith so as to substitute for it purely rational principles; it cannot give up or alter anything which has once been defined; it cannot discover any new province—except, indeed, in certain auxiliary branches of research—because its limits have already been fixed by the fact that Revelation has been closed. Positive progress is possible in three directions only: (1) what is uncertain, indefinite, or obscure may be made certain, definite, and clear; (2) erroneous opinions held by some may be corrected; and (3) demonstration and defence may be remodelled or improved. Speaking generally, progress is made chiefly in the correction of partially held erroneous opinions.

III. Progress in Theology is not as constant and steady as progress in dogma, because theology depends, much more than dogma, on the abilities of individual members of the Church. Epochs of profound theological learning have been succeeded by epochs of comparative sterility. Mathematics, the natural sciences, and history progress more steadily than Theology, because they deal with fixed formulas and facts. Nevertheless Theology advances more steadily than Philosophy, because the fundamental principles of Theology are fixed, and also because the assistance of the Holy Ghost, working through the Church, preserves it from straying far from the truth.

IV. In recent times the enemies of Theology, and even some of its less prudent friends, have tried to give sacred science a “liberal” basis. Liberalism in Theology consists in questioning its principles either categorically, that is, doubting them until natural science has proved them to be true (as Hermes did); or hypothetically, that is, accepting them, but subject to scientific ratification (Günther). In both cases the principle of the Faith is denied, and progress in Theology is rendered as impossible as progress in a philosophy based on the negation of first principles. The only permissible doubt is Methodic Doubt. A Catholic theologian may treat of the truths which he firmly believes, as though they were still uncertain, for the purpose of discovering for his own benefit or for that of unbelievers the grounds upon which they are based. A third form of liberalism, less serious than the other two, is the rejection of the method and principles of the old scholastic theologians. (See Syllabus, prop. xiii.) To do this would be an insult to reason, to the vital power of the Church and to Divine Providence. Besides, no progress is possible except on the basis of previously acquired results. On the whole, Liberalism is opposed to authority because it looks upon authority as an obstacle to progress. It demands unlimited freedom in its methods, its principles, and its conclusions. But a comparison of the state of Theology in Germany and Spain shows that progress results not from licence but from authority. In Spain, in the sixteenth century, when the Congregation of the Index ruled supreme over theological science, theology attained an unparalleled height of splendour. In Germany, during the eighteenth century, when “freedom of thought” flourished, Theology was in a pitiable state of decay.

The true conditions of a fruitful progress in Theology are: (1) a firm adhesion to the Faith; (2) the acceptance of the progress already made; (3) a willing submission to the authority of the Church; (4) prudence in the use of auxiliary sciences hostile to the Church; and (5) exactness and thoroughness of method.

See Hist. de la Théologie Positive, par J. Turmel; La Théologie Catholique au XIX Siècle, par J. Bellamy.

BOOK II

GOD

THE natural and usual division of the treatise on God is founded upon the Unity of the Divine Substance and the Trinity of the Divine Persons. While, however, opposing the Unity to the Trinity, as is done in the division “Of God as One,” and “Of God as Three” (De Deo Uno, De Deo Trino), we shall here connect them organically by first studying the Existence and Nature of God, then the Divine Life, and, lastly, the Divine Internal Activity, whereby the One Substance is communicated to the Three Divine Persons.

PART I

GOD CONSIDERED AS ONE IN SUBSTANCE

THE Fathers treat of God as One when they speak of Creation against pagans and Manichæans. They enter more into detail in their polemical writings on the Trinity and Incarnation, especially against the Arians: e.g. St. Basil, St. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunonium; St. Hilary, De Trinitate; and, above all, St. Augustine, De Trinitate. The completest patristic treatise on God as One is that of Dionysius the Areopagite (so-called), De Divinis Nominibus, with the commentary by St. Maximus the Confessor. The best collections of texts from the Fathers on this question are those of John of Cyprus, Expositio materiaria eorum quæ de Deo a theologis dicuntur (Bibl. Patrum, Lugd., tom. xxi.), Petavius, Thomassinus, and Frassen, De Deo; and Theophil. Reynaud, Theol. Naturalis. In the Middle Ages St. Anselm’s Monologium was an epoch-making work. Alexander of Hales and St. Thomas (I., qq. 2–26) contain copious materials. Of the countless modern writers we need only name Lessius, De Perfectionibus Moribusque Divinis. Among theologians of the present time the best treatises are by Staudenmaier, Berlage, Kuhn, Schwetz, Kleutgen, Franzelin, Pesch, Billot, and Janssen.

CHAPTER I

OUR KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

A.—NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

SECT. 54.—NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD CONSIDERED GENERALLY

I. THE Catholic doctrine on man’s natural knowledge of God was defined by the Vatican Council: “Holy Mother Church doth hold and teach that God, the beginning and end of all things, can certainly be known from created things by the natural light of reason; ‘for the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made’ (Rom. 1:20).… If any one shall say that the One true God, our Creator and Lord, cannot be certainly known by the natural light of human reason from the things that are made, let him be anathema” (sess. iii., De Fide Catholica, ch. 2 and the corresponding can. ii. 1).

Holy Scripture, upon which the council’s definition is based, teaches the same doctrine in many passages.

ROM. 1.

WISD. 13.

For the wrath of God is revealed from Heaven against all ungodliness and injustice of those men that detain the truth of God in injustice (ver. 18); (For professing themselves to be wise they became fools, and they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man, … and they liked not (ἐδοκίμασαν) to have God in their knowledge). (Vers. 22–28.)

Because that which is known of God is manifest in them (τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ φανερόν ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς). For God hath manifested it unto them (ver. 19).

For the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made (ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμον τοῖς ποιήμασι νοούμενα καθορᾶται); His eternal power also and divinity (ἥτε ἀΐδιος αὐτου δύναμις καὶ Θειότης).

So that they are inexcusable. Because that when they knew God (γνόντες τὸν θεόν), they have not glorified Him as God, or given thanks, but became vain in their own thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened (vers. 20, 21).

But all men are vain (μάταιοι μὲν γὰρ πάντες ἄνθρωποι φύσει), in whom there is not the knowledge of God:

and who by these good things that are seen could not understand Him that is (τὸν ὄντα), neither by attending to the works have acknowledged who was the Workman: but have imagined either the fire, or the wind, or the swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the great water, or the sun and moon to be the gods that rule the world (vers. 1, 2).

With whose beauty if they being delighted, took them to be gods: let them know how much the Lord of them is more beautiful than they; for the First Author (γενεσιάρχης) of beauty made all those things.

Or if they admired their power and their effects (δύναμιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν), let them understand by them that He that made them is mightier than they: for by the greatness of the beauty and of the creature, the Creator of them may be seen, so as to be known thereby (ἐκ γὰρ μεγέθους καλλονῆς κτισμάτων ἀναλόγως ὁ γενεσιάρχης αὐτῶν θεωρεῖται). (Vers. 3–5.)

But then again they are not to be pardoned; for if they were able to know so much as to make a judgment of the world, how did they not more easily find out the Lord thereof? (Vers. 8, 9.)

And again: “For when the Gentiles who have not the law do by nature those things that are of the law, these having not the law are a law to themselves; who show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness to them, and their thoughts between themselves accusing or also defending one another” (Rom. 2:14–16). Compare also St. Paul’s discourses at Lystra and at Athens (Acts 14, 17), in which a natural knowledge of God is presupposed as a foundation of and a point of contact with Faith.

II. The doctrine of Holy Scripture and the Council may be expressed in the following paragraphs:—

1. Man is able and is bound to acquire a true knowledge of God by means of his own natural faculties, and is responsible for ignorance or denial of God’s existence, and for any consequent neglect of religious or moral duties.

2. Although it is most difficult for unaided reason to attain a perfect knowledge of God, nevertheless some elementary knowledge of Him is natural to the human mind; that is to say, a notion of God is acquired spontaneously at the very dawn of reason; no external help, certainly no profound philosophical instruction, is needed. The notion of God is likewise so much in harmony with the spiritual nature of man, that no adverse influences can altogether destroy it. This doctrine is not formally expressed by the Vatican Council; but it is contained clearly enough in Holy Scripture, and is universally taught by the Fathers and by theologians (cf. § 2).

3. This knowledge of God is also natural as proceeding from the very nature of human reason, and as being in accordance with its laws; that is to say, this knowledge arises, not from some blind instinct, or blind submission to authority, but from a most simple process of reasoning. Created nature is the medium whereby, as in a mirror, God manifests Himself to the eye of our mind. Our knowledge of Him, therefore, is not a direct or immediate intuition of Him as He is in Himself, but an inferential knowledge of Him as the Cause of created things. The Council directly states only that human reason is unable to attain to an immediate apprehension of God, and that the mediate apprehension by means of created things possesses a real, true, and perfect certitude. Hence the definition does not formally exclude the possibility of some other objective and immediate perception of God, not having the character of an intuition of or direct gazing upon His Essence. Revelation, however, does not recognize any such immediate knowledge, and the attempts made by theologians to establish its existence are not only without foundation, but even tend to endanger the dogma of the Divine Invisibility, and the dogma of the independent force of the mediate knowledge.

4. Our natural knowledge of God is based upon the consideration of the external world, that is, of the things apprehended by the senses, and also upon the consideration of the spiritual nature of the human soul. The external world manifests God chiefly in His Omnipotence and Providence; the life of the soul manifests the inner attributes of the Divine Life. The material and the spiritual world are thus, as it were, two mirrors in which we behold the image of the Creator. The material mirror is less perfect than the other, but for that very reason the knowledge acquired by means of it is easier, more natural, and more popular. Holy Scripture and the Fathers lay special stress upon it.

5. Our natural knowledge of God is aided by the supernatural manifestations of the Divine power, which can be perceived by our senses and intellect, the natural means of our knowledge. Physical and moral miracles, special and general instances of Providence, such as the hearing and answering of prayer, the punishment of evil-doers, the reward of the good, and the like, are instances of what we mean. This species of Divine Revelation also serves to authenticate the verbal Revelation—the medium of Faith,—and is the continuation of natural Revelation. On the other hand, by it alone the existence, and many attributes of God, may be known, and therefore it is particularly adapted to excite, develop, and complete the knowledge founded upon simply natural contemplation. Cf. Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. viii.

SECT. 55.—THE DEMONSTRATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

The complete treatment of the proof of the Existence of God belongs to Philosophy and Apologetics. We shall here confine our attention to some remarks on the nature, force, and organic connection of these proofs.

I. To be or to exist belongs to God’s very essence. The proposition, “God exists,” is therefore immediately evident in itself (per se nota secundum se). Nevertheless, since we have no immediate perception of the Divine Essence, this proposition is not immediately evident to us (per se nota quoad nos). To our mind it is a knowledge acquired by experience. The manifestations of God are immediately perceivable by us, and through these we prove the existence of God.

II. Although the existence of God requires proof, still our certitude of His existence is not necessarily the result of a scientific demonstration. A natural demonstration, sufficient to generate a perfect certitude, offers itself to every human mind, as it were spontaneously. The processes of scientific demonstration, if made use of at all, find already in the mind a conviction of God’s existence, and only serve to confirm and deepen this conviction.

III. The proofs of the existence of God are of two kinds—direct and indirect.

1. The indirect proofs show that our knowledge of the Divine existence is the necessary result of our rational nature, whence they infer that the existence of God is as certain as the rationality of our nature. Hence we have: (1) the Historical proofs, taken from the universality and constancy of this knowledge; (2) the Moral proof, based upon the moral and religious activity resulting from it; and (3) the proof taken from the logical and psychological character of this knowledge, by showing that it cannot result from internal or external experience, or from artificial combination, and must therefore result from the natural tendencies of reason itself.

2. The direct proofs represent God as the only Sufficient Cause of some effect which we perceive. They tend directly to prove His existence, and are a development of that natural process of human reason which, previous to any scientific demonstration, has already convinced us that He exists. They are classified according to the nature of the effect used as a medium of demonstration. At the same time, they form one organic whole, the several parts of which complete and perfect each other. They may be arranged as follows:—

A. Proofs taken from existing things of which God is the Cause:

(a) From attributes common to all things, and pointing to God as the Absolute Being (= Metaphysical Proofs):

(α) From the dependent and conditional existence of things, which requires an independent and absolute Cause (causa efficiens);

(β) From the imperfection, mutability, and natural limitation of things, which require an immutable and absolutely perfect Cause (causa exemplaris);

(γ) From the motion and development of which things are capable and which they accomplish, supposing thereby an immovable Prime Mover and Final Cause (causa finalis).

(b) From attributes proper to certain classes of things, and pointing to God as the Absolute Spiritual Nature (= Cosmological Proofs):

(α) From the nature and energies of matter, and the design in its arrangements, which can only be accounted for by the existence of an intellectual Being, the Author and Disposer of the material universe;

(β) From the nature and energies of mind, which suppose a Creator and an Absolute Mind;

(γ) From the twofold nature of man, in whom mind and matter are so intimately blended that a higher creative principle must be admitted, the Author of both mind and matter.

B. Proofs taken from possible or ideal things of which God is the Principle:

The possibility, necessity, and immutability inherent in certain conceptions of the possible, the unlimited domain of things possible—all of these suppose the existence of a Being, real, necessary and infinite, the foundation and source of all being and truth.

See St. Thom., I., q. 2, a. 3.

IV. It is an article of Faith that the Existence of God can be known by natural means. From this it follows that the proofs which are the natural means must themselves be convincing. It does not, however, imply that each of the above-mentioned arguments taken apart has the power of convincing. All, or at least some of them, taken together are capable of producing the requisite certitude. But the evidence of the demonstration is not like that of a mathematical proposition. In mathematics, especially in geometry, our imagination aids our reason; no moral considerations oppose the admission of the truths to be proved. The proofs of God’s existence appeal to our reason alone, and compel it to rise above the images of our fancy and to accept a truth often most opposed to our natural desires. At the same time, the evidence is far more than a moral evidence. It produces absolute certainty, and imposes itself upon the mind in spite of moral obstacles.

SECT. 56.—OUR CONCEPTION OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE AND THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES

I. As our natural knowledge of God is mediate and indirect, our knowledge of the Divine Essence cannot be intuitive—that is, resulting from direct intuition; nor can it be even equivalent to intuitive cognition—that is, reflecting the Divine Essence as It is in Itself purely and simply. The latter could be the case only if creatures were perfect images of the Creator, and also if, in addition, we had a perfect knowledge of their essences. Holy Scripture tells us that the vision of God, as He is, is promised as the reward of the sons of God in Heaven (1 John 3:2); and describes our present knowledge as a seeing through a glass in a dark manner (διʼ ἐσόπτρου ἐν αἰνίγματι) (1 Cor. 13:12).

II. An idea or conception of God as He really is, is impossible. Nevertheless, our idea of God is not simply negative and relative, showing merely what He is not and in what relations He stands to other beings. It is true, indeed, that the first element of our notion of Him is that He has none of the imperfections of finite things, and that He possesses the power to produce the perfections of creatures; yet, as these perfections are a reflection of His perfections, we are enabled to gather from them notions or conceptions of God, imperfect and indirect indeed, but still, at the same time, positive and truly representing the perfections belonging to the Divine Essence.

III. The perfections found in nature are but faint reproductions of the perfections of the Creator. Hence our natural conceptions, before they can be applied to the Divine Substance, must be purified of all imperfections, and must be enlarged and elevated so as to be made worthy of God (θεοπρεπεϊς). This “eminent sense,” as it is called, is expressed in the language of Holy Scripture and the Church in three ways: (1) The simplicity and substantiality of the Divine perfections are indicated by the use of abstract terms, e.g. by calling God not only good and wise, but also Goodness itself and Wisdom (αὐταγαθότης, αὐτοσοφία). (2) The infinite fulness of His perfections is expressed by adjectives with the prefix “all,” e.g. almighty, all-wise. (3) The intensity and super-eminent excellence of these perfections is pointed out by the prefix ὑπέρ, super, which may be expressed in English by the adverb “supremely,” e.g. supremely wise.

IV. The analogical value or the eminent signification is not the same in all conceptions. Some of the perfections of creatures can be conceived as divested of all imperfection, e.g. the transcendental attributes of unity, truth, goodness, force, and the attributes which go to make spiritual creatures the images of God. When these notions are applied to God they remain analogical indeed, but still they are used in a positive and proper sense, as opposed to a metaphorical, improper, or symbolical sense. But some natural perfections cannot be conceived without some imperfection adhering to them; they cannot therefore be predicated of God except in a symbolical and metaphorical sense, e.g. God is a lion, a rock, a fire, God is angry. Such metaphors, however, have a deeper meaning than ordinary metaphors, because they are founded upon the fact that the First Cause is reflected in every perfection of the creature. Perfections of the first kind are called “pure, and simple, and unadulterated perfections” (perfectiones simplices); the latter are called “mixed perfections”—that is, perfections combined with imperfection. The Greek Fathers designate the two classes and our corresponding knowledge of God by the expressions, κατηγορήματα τέλεια or ἀποδεικτικά, θεολογία ἀποδεικτική, for the first class, and κατηγορήματα ἀπόρρητα, or μυστικά and θεολογία συμβολική for the second. The two classes complete each other; the simple attributes enabling us to understand what is obscure and undetermined in the mixed attributes, and the latter giving a concreteness to the first.

IV. Theologians distinguish three ways of arriving at correct notions of God by means of the analogical conceptions gathered from natural perfections. The first is the Positive method, or the method of Causality (causa exemplaris), by which we consider the created perfection as an image and likeness of the corresponding Divine perfection. The second is the method of Negation, or removal (negationis seu remotionis), whereby we deny that certain perfections exist in God in the same manner as in creatures, viz., mixed with imperfection. The third is the method of Eminence (καθʼ ὑπεροχήν), which is a combination of the two preceding methods, and consists in conceiving the Divine perfections as of the most exalted character, and as having in themselves in a supreme degree whatever is perfect in creatures, without any admixture of imperfection. Hence there are three ways of predicating of God the perfections found in creatures. We can say: God is a spirit, God lives, God is rational; meaning that these perfections really exist in God. We can also say: God is not a spirit, is not living, is not rational; meaning that these perfections do not exist in God as they exist in creatures. To reconcile this seeming contradiction, the perfections should be predicated of God in the eminent sense: God is superspiritual, superrational. This doctrine is often expressed by the Fathers by saying that God is at the same time πανώνυμος, ἀνώνυμος, ὑπερώνυμος (all-names, nameless, above all names).

These three methods may be aptly compared with the methods of the three principal fine arts. The painter produces a picture by transferring colours to the canvas; the sculptor executes a statue by chipping away portions of a block of marble; while the poet strives to realize his ideal by the aid of metaphor and hyperbole.

The indirect and analogical character of our knowledge of God renders us unable to embrace in one idea all the perfections of the Divine Substance, or even the little that we can naturally know of them. We are obliged to combine several particular conceptions into one relatively complete representation. But the subject will be considered in the chapter on the unity and attributes of God.

V. The names which we give to things are the expression of our conceptions of those things. Hence what has been said concerning our conceptions of God applies to the names by which we designate them. Negative names exclude all idea of imperfection and represent God as a Being sui generis—which can alone be properly predicated of Him. All positive names transferred from the creature to the Creator are more or less improper names of Him, because they are not predicated of Creator and creature in exactly the same sense. Still, not being predicated of God in quite a different sense, they are not simply improper but analogical names. The most perfect among them are the names of pure or spiritual perfections, because they express perfections formally contained in Him. Although they are predicated of Him by way of eminence, still they belong to Him more than to creatures, because the perfections they express exist in God with more purity, fulness, reality, and truth than in creatures. For this reason they are sometimes attributed to Him exclusively: “Who alone is,” “One only is good, God.” The names of mixed perfections, especially specific names of material things can only be given to God in a metaphorical or symbolical sense.

VI. From what has been said it follows that the Divine Essence can neither be conceived or expressed by us as it really is in itself, but still that some conception and some expression of it are not beyond the power of our natural faculties—an absolute knowledge is impossible, a relative and imperfect knowledge is within our reach.

The doctrine contained in this section is beautifully expressed by St. Gregory of Nazianzum, in his “Hymn to God:”—

“In Thee all things do dwell, and tend

To Thee Who art their only End;

Thou art at once One, All, and None,

And yet Thou art not all or one.

All-name! by what name can I call

Thee, Nameless One, alone of all?”

SECT. 57.—CONTENTS AND LIMITS OF OUR NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

I. Our natural knowledge of God embraces all those Divine attributes without which God cannot be conceived as the First and Supreme Cause of the visible universe. This doctrine is set forth by the Apostle when he teaches that “the invisible things of God” are knowable in so far as they are reflected in things visible in nature, the Divine Nature (Θειότης) being especially mentioned.

II. The Trinity of the Divine Persons—that is, the manner in which the Divine Nature subsists in Itself and communicates Itself to several Persons—lies absolutely beyond the sphere of human knowledge; our reason cannot discover it, or even prove it on natural grounds after its existence has been revealed. This is taught by Holy Scripture in the general passages concerning the inscrutableness of the mysteries revealed to us by God. These expressions refer, not merely to His inscrutable counsels, but also to the inscrutable depths of His Being. “The Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God. For what man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him? So the things also that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God” (1 Cor. 2:10, 11). “No one knoweth the Son but the Father, neither doth any one know the Father but the Son, and he to whom it shall please the Son to reveal Him” (Matt. 11:27; cf. John 1:18). The same can be demonstrated from the dogmatic conception of the Trinity compared with the sole medium of our natural knowledge of God. The Divine Persons operate externally as one single principle (unum universorum principium, Fourth Lateran Council). Now, from the effects we can know only so much of the cause as actually concurs in the production of the effects; wherefore from God’s works we can infer nothing concerning the Trinity of Persons.

The indemonstrability of the Blessed Trinity largely contributes to the incomprehensibility of the mystery. Whatever cannot be arrived at by reason is difficult of mental representation. Conversely, the incomprehensibility of the Trinity, that is, the impossibility of forming a conception of it in harmony with natural things—is a further reason of its indemonstrability. Both the indemonstrability and the incomprehensibility originate from the fact that the Trinity is God as He is and lives within Himself, apart from and above the manifestations of Him in nature. Hence it is that no process of mere reasoning can lead to a knowledge of God as He is. Faith gives us an obscure knowledge of Him: the Beatific Vision will disclose Him to us. See St. Thom. I., q. 32, a. 1.

B.—SUPERNATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

Our supernatural knowledge of God differs essentially from natural knowledge, although the nature of the conceptions is the same in both. Faith fixes the mind on its object, and enables it to free its conceptions from the disfiguring elements which an unguided imagination might introduce. The light of Faith illuminates the Divine manifestations in nature, and better adapts our conceptions to the dignity of God. The moral and spiritual life, which is one of the fruits of Faith, elevates the mind above mere animal nature, perfects the image and likeness of God, and so produces a more faithful mirror of the Divine perfections. Holy Scripture tells us of many Divine operations in nature which would have escaped the eye of our mind, and it also reveals many supernatural works of God which place the Divine perfections in a brighter light. Lastly, the manifestation of God in the Incarnation has given us the most perfect manifestation of the Deity, and the best adapted to our capacities.

SECT. 58.—REVEALED NAMES OF GOD

I. Divine Revelation gives a progressive development of the idea of God, even if we abstract from the final revelation of the mystery of the Trinity. Nothing new was revealed to the Patriarchs concerning the Divine Nature and attributes; their knowledge was the same as natural knowledge and as that handed down by tradition. The object of the Mosaic Revelation was to preserve in its purity the idea of one God against the corruptions of idolatry and polytheism. It proclaimed God’s exalted power over all things finite and material, and His absolute dominion over mankind; it revealed the essential characteristic of God in the name Jehovah. The Prophets point out and describe in magnificent language the Divine attributes which can be known by the light of reason; especially unity, eternity, unchangeableness, infinite greatness, creative omnipotence, omnipresence, omniscience, wisdom, goodness, justice, and holiness. But all these attributes are spoken of simply to bring out the infinite Majesty of God, and not in order to reveal anything further concerning His Essence. This latter aspect is first opened up in the Sapiential books (Prov. 8, Wisd. 7, Ecclus. 24), where, under the name of the Eternal Wisdom, the inner life of the Deity is exhibited in its internal and external communication, and the theology of the New Testament is thereby anticipated. The object and tendency of Christian Revelation is to raise man to a most intimate union with God, his Father, and consequently it manifests the inner perfection of the Divine Life of which man becomes a partaker. It presupposes the Old Testament Revelation without making any further disclosures concerning the Divine Nature; but, as it tells us of the mystery of the Trinity, it enables us to gain some insight into the Divine internal fecundity, and to conceive the Divine Nature as the purest spirituality—as the Light, the Life, the Truth, the Love, and so as the principle and ideal of the supernatural perfection to which we should tend.

II. The names applied to God are either substantives or adjectives. In the present section we shall confine ourselves to the former. There are seven substantives applied to God in the Old Testament. These “Holy Names” may be divided into three classes.

I. The first class comprises the names which designate the supreme excellence of God rather than His Essence: אֵל, אֱלוחִים, אֲרוֹנָי.

אֵל, El, the Mighty, is often used with appositions, such as אֵל שַׁדַּי, παντοκράτωρ, omnipotens, almighty; אֵל אֱלוהִים, God of Gods. The name El, even without apposition, is seldom used of false gods.

אֱלוהִים Elohim, plural of Eloah, the Arabic Allah, the Powerful, with the correlative significations of Awe-inspiring, Worthy of adoration. This name is given ironically to false gods, and in a true but weak, inferior sense to beings inferior to God as reflections of His Majesty, e.g. angels, kings, judges. When applied to the one, true God, Elohim must be taken as the majestic plural rather than as an indication of the Trinity. Appositions are sometimes used to define the sense, e.g. Elohim Zebaoth, the God of hosts,—that is, the hosts or armies of angels, of the stars, or of men; sometimes it means the God of all creatures.

אֲרוֹנָי, Adonai, Κύριος, δεσπότης, Dominus, Judge, Commander, Lord pre-eminently. This name combines the meanings of El and Elohim, because God, the Supreme Lord, not only inspires fear on account of His physical might, but also exacts reverence and submission as a moral power. Adonai is used without apposition as a proper name of God. Other beings can indeed be judges and commanders, but they are so only inasmuch as they represent God, and not in the eminent sense indicated by the plural of majesty. It is never used of the false divinities of the heathen, because the idea of supreme moral power and sovereignty was not associated with them.

2. The second class contains only one name, essentially a proper name, because it describes the Divine Essence. It is יְהוָֹה, Jehovah (Exod. 3:14–16), “I am Who am.” The correct pronunciation is probably Yahweh, whence the abbreviation יָה, Yah. Its meaning is that God is the One Who is, purely and simply; Whose Being is dependent on no external cause, Who therefore can neither be limited nor changed by anything, and Who, by reason of this mode of existence, is distinguished from all other beings, real or possible, especially from all pretended divinities, and also from powerful, ruling, or unearthly beings, which might possibly be designated by the other Divine names. Hence it is, in the strictest sense of the word, a proper name, such as Moses asked for in order to make known to the people the characteristic name of the God, Elohim, of their fathers. It is moreover a name of alliance, as being intimately connected with the covenant between God and Israel; the knowledge of the true God as revealed in the name Jehovah was the pledge, the medium, and the proof of the alliance. As the name Jehovah was in use before the time of Moses, the question arises as to the sense in which God said to Moses (Exod. 6:3) that he appeared to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob by the name of God Almighty, El Schadai, and did not reveal to them His name Jehovah. The best solution of the difficulty is, perhaps, that Jehovah was His most appropriate name, and that it was, as a matter of fact, adopted by Him to serve as a symbol and watchword of the public worship of the one God, whereas El Schadai expresses more accurately the relation of God to the families of the Patriarchs as their powerful protector.

3. The third class embraces those names akin to the first class, but expressing with more force the sublime excellence of the true God. In their substantive form they are, however, applied to false divinities.

הַשַׁרָי, Haschadai—from schadad, to overpower (?)—the Strong, Mighty, akin in meaning to El, but designating with more energy the independence, self-sufficiency, and inviolability of the Power, and therefore it is equivalent to “the Almighty.”

הַעֶלְיון, Haelion, Altissimus, the High, Sublime, the Most High, akin to Elohim.

הַקָּרוֹשׁ, Hakadosch, the Holy, found chiefly in the Prophets and among these especially in Isaias: the Holy One of Israel, the Holy Lord, Judge and Lawgiver of the chosen people. Akin to Adonai.

In the New Testament these names are replaced by their Greek or Latin equivalents, e.g. ὁ Κύριος, ὁ ὤν, ὁ ὕψιστος, etc. The most frequent name applied to God is the classical word Θεός, Deus.

SECT. 59.—THE DOCTRINE CONCERNING GOD AS DEFINED BY THE CHURCH, ESPECIALLY IN THE VATICAN COUNCIL

Just as the New Testament takes over from the Old Testament the doctrine concerning the Divine Essence and Nature, and only occasionally insists upon this doctrine, so has the Church from her very infancy looked upon it as sufficiently proposed and as universally admitted. Hence it is that, notwithstanding the importance and the fecundity of the dogma of the Divine Essence and Nature, it is the subject of so few definitions. It was only in our own day, when the most grievous errors concerning God had spread even among Christians, that the Church at length issued a formal definition in the Vatican Council (sess. iii., chap. 1). “The Holy, Catholic, Apostolic, Roman Church believeth and confesseth that there is one true and living God, the Creator and Lord of Heaven and earth, Almighty, Eternal, Immense, Incomprehensible, Infinite in intellect and will and in all perfection; Who, being one, individual, altogether simple and unchangeable Substance, must be asserted to be really and essentially distinct from the world, most happy in Himself and of Himself, and ineffably exalted above everything that exists or can be conceived.

“This one true God, of His own goodness and of His almighty power,—not to increase His happiness, nor to acquire but rather to manifest His perfection by means of the good things which He bestoweth upon creatures,—most freely in the very beginning of time made out of nothing both kinds of creatures, to wit, angelic and mundane, and afterwards human nature, participating of both because composed of spirit and body.

“But God, Who reacheth from end to end mightily and ordereth all things sweetly (Wisd. 8:1), protecteth and ruleth by His providence all the things that He hath made. For all things are naked and open to His eyes (Heb. 4:13), even those things which will come to pass by the free agency of creatures.”

The corresponding canons are the following:—

“1. If any one shall deny the one true God, the Creator and Lord of things visible and invisible, let him be anathema.

“2. If any one shall not be ashamed to say that besides matter nothing doth exist, let him be anathema.

“3. If any one shall say that the substance or essence of God and of all things is one and the same, let him be anathema.

“4. If any one shall say that finite things, whether spiritual or corporeal, or at least spiritual things, have emanated from the Divine Substance;

“Or that the Divine Essence by the manifestation or evolution of Itself becometh all things;

“Or, finally, that God is the universal or indefinite being which by self-determination doth constitute the universe of things distinguished into genera, species, and individuals, let him be anathema.

“5. If any one shall not confess that the world and all things contained therein, both spiritual and material, have been as to their entire substance produced out of nothing by God;

“Or shall say that God created not by will free from all necessity, but necessarily, just as He necessarily loveth Himself;

“Or shall deny that the world was made for the glory of God, let him be anathema.”

The definition of the Council is directed (1) against Atheism, and especially against Materialism; (2) against Pantheism; (3) against certain modern opinions mentioned in detail in can. 5. The Council develops the idea of God positively through the attributes which manifest His absolute greatness as Supreme Being, and then defines His absolute independence of and entire distinction from all other beings. Lastly, the Council firmly establishes His absolute dominion over the universe.

CHAPTER II

THE ESSENCE AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD, CONSIDERED GENERALLY

SECT. 60.—FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTION OF GOD’S ESSENCE AND NATURE

WE have now to inquire whether, among our conceptions of God, there is some one which may be considered as the foundation of all the others.

I. A direct and intuitive representation of the Divine Substance as It is in Itself, is manifestly impossible. Our knowledge of God is restricted to His attributes which we see reflected in creatures, and which we refer to the Divine Substance; but the Substance itself we have no power to apprehend. Whatever God is or has in Himself, He is or has of Himself without external cause, and it is all one and the same with His Substance. There are, however, certain elements in our conception of God which, when compared with the others, may be considered as fundamental and as the root from which the latter spring. The fundamental conception of a substance may be formed either from the consideration of its being, or from the consideration of its activity, notably its vital activity. In the former case, the substance is termed “essence,” to signify what it really is; in the latter case, it is called “nature”—that is, the source or principle of activity. The nature of a thing is sometimes styled its “physical essence,” an expression also used to signify all that belongs essentially to a substance. The essence itself, considered as the root of the essential properties, is called the “metaphysical essence.” Among modern theologians the question of the fundamental conception of God is spoken of as the question concerning the metaphysical essence of God, or the essence which distinguishes Him from all other beings, and accounts for all His essential properties.

II. When we wish to distinguish God from all other beings we think of Him as a substance existing of itself—a substance which owes its existence to no external principle, but possesses existence essentially and absolutely. In other words: Aseity (aseitas, αὐτουσία) is the first distinguishing attribute which we conceive of the Divine Substance, and from which we infer the other Divine attributes. “I am Who am:” that is to say, “I am of Myself and absolutely, in contradistinction to all other beings which have a derivative and precarious existence.” Aseity excludes not only all external principles, but also the notion that God is constantly giving Himself existence (“das absolute Werden” or the “Selbstverwirklichung,” Self-realization, of Günther). God cannot produce Himself any more than any other being can. When He is said to be His own cause, or Self-caused, this only means that He does not require or admit of any cause.

III. There is a still deeper and more exhaustive conception of the Divine Substance contained in the expressions, “God is His own existence;” “God’s essence is existence;” “God is Being;” ὁ ὤν, He Who is, Jehovah. The Schoolmen express this by saying, “God is a pure act (actus purus);” that is, pure actuality without any admixture of potentiality. Every perfection possible in any being is actually possessed by God, and is only possible in others because it actually exists in Him. The name Jehovah, understood in this sense, is really the essential name of God. This Divine Actuality is the foundation of God’s Simplicity and Infinity. His Simplicity consists in the identity of possibility and reality, and His Infinity means that every possible perfection is actually possessed by Him.

We must bear in mind throughout that the conceptions of essence and substance as applied to God are only analogous, because the essences which we know are not identical with existence. Hence the expressions: “God is αὐτοούσιος, ὑπερούσιος, and ἀνούσιος,” that is, God is His own Essence, is above all essences, and is without essence.

IV. Just as the Divine Substance exists of Itself, so does It act of Itself. It is the sole, adequate principle of Its whole Life; It cannot be conceived as animated or vivified, but must be considered as Absolute Life. The Divine Substance is Its own Life, Life pure and simple, Life in its absolute fulness and perfection. Moreover, the Divine Nature must be conceived as absolutely and in the highest degree Spiritual. When we speak of created nature, we distinguish the life-giving principle from the lifeless matter. We term the former “Spirit” when we consider it, not so much as animating matter, but as active and self-subsistent. Hence immaterial and intellectual substances are said to have a spiritual nature and to be spirits. Much more, then, is the Divine Life, which is absolutely independent and immanent, a spiritual Life.

The above description contains the generic difference between the Divine Nature and created nature—viz. the manner in which God possesses His Life; and also contains the fundamental characters which make the Divine Life most eminent and sublime—viz. the absolute immateriality and consequent intellectuality of the Divine Substance. When we designate the Divine Nature as a spirit (John 4:24), we express Its immateriality and intellectuality, the former being the source of the latter. The word “Spirit,” in its eminent signification, is applicable to God’s exalted nature purely and simply, because God is not only the uncreated and highest possessor of a spiritual nature, but also the noblest form of spiritual nature.

SECT. 61.—THE PERFECTION OF THE DIVINE BEING

I. A being is perfect when it possesses all the qualities of which it is capable, or which are suitable and due to it. Created beings do not receive their perfection with their substance; they acquire it by exerting their own internal energy, or by means of external agents. They thus attain their end, τέλος, which is the completeness of their being, or perfection, τελειότης. The perfection of created beings is always relative; that is to say, it can never embrace more than the good qualities due to a particular class of things, nor can it reach such a high degree that there is not some higher degree possible.

II. Just as God is an absolute Being—that is, without any origin or beginning, independent, necessary, essentially existing—so is He also absolutely all that He can or ought to be by His Nature. He is essentially perfect (αὐτοτέλης); He is self-sufficient for His perfection (αὐτάρκης); He possesses in His Substance, without any internal evolution or external influence, entire perfection.

III. God’s perfection is absolute, not only in the sense that whatever constitutes Divine perfection belongs essentially to Him, but also because His perfection embraces every existing or conceivable-perfection (παντελής). He is the perfect principle of all things, and must therefore be, not only self-sufficient, but also capable of bestowing their perfections on all things, and must possess in Himself every kind of perfection. This existence of all perfections in God, this fulness of being, implies more than the possession of creative power and ideal knowledge. It implies that He possesses in His own perfection, which is the source and exemplar of all created perfection, a real and complete equivalent of this perfection. This equivalent is the fund from which He draws His universal power and universal knowledge. Cf. Exod. 33:14; τὸ πᾶν ἐστιν αὐτός, Ecclus. 43:29; Acts 17:25; Rom. 11:36, etc.

The manner in which the particular perfections of created things exist in the universal perfection of God is expressed in the language of the Schoolmen by the terms “Virtually” and “Eminently.” Created things are not contained in God materially, and do not flow from Him as water from a spring, but are produced by His power (virtus); and, besides, He possesses in Himself a perfect equivalent of their perfections, which is their type or model. Again, God does not contain the perfections of His creatures exactly as they exist outside Him. He contains them in their purity, free from all admixture of imperfection; He contains them in a perfection of a higher character—as, for instance, the sense of vision is included in the higher power of understanding. The manifold perfections of creatures are consequently concentrated in one Divine Perfection, which is not, indeed, a combination of them all, but contains and surpasses them all by reason of its richness and value.

IV. The Divine perfection alone is essential and universal, and is the acme of all perfection (ὑπερτέλης, αὐτὸ τὸ τέλος). There does not exist, nor can we conceive, anything above God by means of which God’s perfection can be measured or defined. His perfection is the principle, and hence the measure and object, of all other perfections, which are indeed perfections only in as far as they resemble and participate in the Divine perfection. Moreover, it can never be exhausted or equalled by created perfections; hence it is incomparable and all-surpassing. Cf. Ps. 34:10; Isai. 44:7, and 40:15–17.

SECT. 62.—OUR CONCEPTION OF THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES—CLASSIFICATION

I. All the Divine attributes which designate something necessarily contained in God, designate the Divine Substance Itself, and not something distinct from It, inhering in it after the manner of an accident. This principle applies to the attributes of Unity, Truth, Beauty; and also to the Divine essential Activity—such as Self-consciousness and Self-love; because all of these necessarily belong to the integrity of the Divine Essence and Nature. It is also true of the Divine intellectual and volitional acts concerning contingent things; for although these acts are not essential to God, still they are not accidents of His Substance, but are the Divine Substance Itself as related to contingent objects. But the principle is true only to a certain extent in the case of attributes which express Divine external action—that is, active influence on creatures; because the power and will to act are in God, whereas the action itself (actio transiens), and still more its effect, are external to Him. Lastly, this principle cannot be applied to attributes expressing a relation between creatures and God—such as Creator, Redeemer, Rewarder; because these relations are not in God but outside Him. They need not belong to Him from all eternity, as may also be said of attributes designating Divine external actions, because their basis is not eternal. Essential attributes, on the contrary, and also attributes expressing something in God, even if not essential, belong to Him from all eternity. All this is the common teaching of the Fathers and theologians, and is based upon the dogmas of the Simplicity and Unchangeableness of God (cf. infra, §§ 63, 65).

II. It is evident that attributes expressing external relations of God to His creatures, such as Creator, Redeemer, Rewarder, are not identical with each other, but are separate rays emanating from a common centre. Again, the attributes designating the Divine Substance are not necessarily identical with each other. Although all of them express the same Divine Object, nevertheless each of them corresponds with a particular conception of our mind, arrived at in different ways and from different starting-points. They are not, therefore, identical subjectively. They also differ objectively—that is, as regards what they represent. None of the attributes represent the Divine Substance as such and in its totality, but only under some particular aspect, and such aspects are manifold, even in finite things.

III. There are various ways of classifying the Divine attributes. The arrangement which we propose to follow is based upon the fact that God is a being, and a living, spiritual being. A created being has composition of some sort; it has limits, and it is subject to change. It forms part of the universe; it exists in space and in time. It can be seen by bodily or mental eye; it can be grasped by a finite mind, and can be expressed in language. All of these qualities imply some sort of imperfection; hence, none of them can belong to God. Their contradictories must be predicated of Him, and these are styled His Negative attributes. Again, every created being is in itself one, true, good, and beautiful, and externally it has power and is present to other beings. These attributes, although imperfect in creatures, do not themselves imply imperfection. Hence they may be predicated of God as Positive attributes. Lastly, God, being a spirit, must have the two faculties of a spirit—intelligence and will.

The following table will make this arrangement clear:—

A. Attributes belonging to God as a Being:

(a) Negative attributes:

(α)

{

Simplicity;

Infinity;

Immutability.

(β)

{

Inconfusibility;

Immensity;

Eternity.

(γ)

{

Invisibility;

Incomprehensibility;

Ineffability.

(b) Positive attributes:

(α) Internal:

(1) Unity;

(2) Truth;

(3) Goodness;

(4) Beauty.

(β) External:

(1) Omnipotence;

(2) Omnipresence.

B. Attributes belonging to God as a living, spiritual Being:

(a) Intelligence;

(b) Will.

CHAPTER III

THE NEGATIVE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD

SECT. 63.—THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD

I. THE physical Simplicity, or, in other words, the immateriality and incorporeity, of God is included in His absolute Simplicity, and may be proved by the same arguments. It may be also demonstrated by special proofs; and there are certain special difficulties to which it gives rise, and which demand solution.

1. The Divine immateriality, or spirituality, is practically set forth in the Old Testament by the prohibition of material representations of God (Deut. 4:16). Our Lord Himself says: “God is a Spirit, and they that adore Him must adore Him in spirit and in truth” (John 4:24). Wherever Scripture speaks of God as invisible, infinite, immutable, omnipresent, and the rest, His immateriality is evidently implied. And from the earliest days of the Church this attribute was laid down as a fundamental dogma against the pagans, as may be seen in the writings of the Apologists. Tertullian and Lactantius indeed ascribed to God a body, or spoke of His form and figure; but they did so in opposition to the Gnostics, or to the pantheism of the Stoics, who maintained that the Divine Substance was indefinite, vague, empty, and formless, like the air, and thus perverted the true notion of spirituality.

2. The proofs from reason for the Divine Simplicity are most conclusive, but they need not be dwelt on here. The first active principle of all things cannot be itself capable of resolution into simpler elements, because the latter ought to be anterior to it in time or at least in nature, and moreover would require an external cause to bring them together. Again, the attributes of pure actuality, infinity, omnipresence, and the rest, which flow from the nature of the first principle, are all incompatible with physical composition.

II. The attribute of metaphysical Simplicity excludes from God every kind of composition, and consequently every difference between potentiality and actuality, or between realities completing each other. Hence this attribute requires that God should not only possess all that is perfect, but that He should also be His perfection, and that all that is real in Him should be one indivisible reality: “One Supreme Thing” (Fourth Lateran Council, Cap. Damnamus). Conversely, if God is one indivisible reality, it follows that no composition exists in Him. Even before the Fourth Lateran Council, this doctrine was defined more in detail by Eugenius III. in the Council of Rheims against Gilbert.

1. Holy Scripture teaches the absolute simplicity of God when it says that God is the Life, Truth, Wisdom, Light, Love, not that He has these qualities. There is no reason for not taking these expressions in their literal sense; on the contrary, the literal sense is required by the peculiar nature of God. Besides, Scripture uses them to point out that God is the sole original possessor of these perfections. It could not say with truth that “God is Light, and in Him there is no darkness,” if He were not Light in its greatest purity and perfection—that is, if the perfections connoted by the term “Light” were not all one and the same identical perfection, as indeed is expressed by the very name Jehovah.

2. Internal reasons for the Divine Simplicity were also given by the Fathers. Without absolute Simplicity, they say, God could neither be absolutely infinite nor absolutely immutable. And again, Simplicity is in itself a great perfection, because it connotes the excellence of the perfection of which it is predicated, and the completeness and thoroughness of the manner in which it is possessed. Aseity and absolute necessity can only belong to a Being absolutely simple, because the several parts of a composite being would be dependent on each other. God being absolutely independent and self-sufficient, we cannot conceive Him as a subject perfected and completed by anything whatsoever. See these arguments developed by St. Anselm, Monolog., cc. xvi., xvii.; St. Thomas, I., q. 3, a. 7; Scotus in I. Sent. d. 8; St. Bernard, De. Consid., l. v., c. 7.

III. We subjoin a list of the kinds of composition excluded by the metaphysical Simplicity of God, but which are found even in spiritual creatures.

1. Composition of essence and existence, is excluded because the Essence of God is to exist. In created things this kind of composition is the source of all other kinds of composition. Its exclusion from God is in like manner the source of the exclusion of all composition from Him.

2. The composition of essence and hypostatic characters is also excluded; that is to say, the Divine Essence is not determined by any individual character, as, for instance, the human essence is determined by special marks or characters in each human individual.

3. There is likewise excluded the composition of substance and its various accidents.

4. Lastly, the Divine Simplicity excludes any composition that might result from the real difference between several activities, such as between knowing, willing, and acting, between immanent and transient operation, and between necessary and contingent acts. All activity in God is one simple act.

IV. Physical simplicity is not exclusively proper to God; it also belongs to all created spirits, and constitutes their likeness to the Creator. Metaphysical simplicity, on the contrary, belongs to God alone. Created spirits, elevated by grace, may be made, to some extent, partakers of the simplicity of the Divine Life, but their elevation itself implies a composition of a peculiar kind, viz. that of a spiritual substance with an external accidental perfection. The simplicity of the life by which the created spirit shares supernaturally in the Simplicity of the Divine Life, consists in its being freed from the influence of creatures; and being enabled to know God immediately in Himself, and to know and love everything else in Him and for Him.

V. The attribute of Simplicity excludes from the Divine Substance everything that implies composition. If there were no other distinctions but such as entail composition, distinction could no more be attributed to God than composition. There are, however, distinctions which do not imply composition, but are based upon and are necessitated by the very simplicity and perfection of their object. Thus in God distinctions may be established which do not conflict with His Simplicity, because they are made, not between separate elements, but between different ways of looking at one and the same perfection. Such differences are even necessary in God, for without them the real distinction between the three Persons, and the essential difference of attitude in God’s activity within and without could not exist. An exaggerated notion of the Divine Simplicity was condemned by Pope John XXII. See Denzinger, lxvi. 23, 24.

Distinctions of the kind last mentioned are called in theological language Mental distinctions (distinctiones rationis) because the thing distinguished, although objectively one and the same, is represented in our mind by different conceptions. Such distinctions, therefore, really exist only in our mind; but they are not mere subjective fictions, because the perfection of the object furnishes an objective foundation for them. Hence they are called “distinctiones rationis ratiocinatæ,” or “cum fundamento in re.” They thus occupy a position between Real distinctions implying objective composition, and Merely-mental distinctions having no objective value (distinctiones rationis ratiocinantis).

SECT. 64.—THE INFINITY OF GOD

I. The Infinite—that is, the endless or limitless—may be conceived under three different aspects, which are thus expressed in the language of the Schoolmen: (1) that than which nothing greater can be conceived (quo nihil majus cogitari potest); (2) that which contains all conceivable greatness or magnitude (quod continet omnem magnitudinem quæ cogitari potest); (3) that which is incomparably and immeasurably greater than anything conceivable (quod est incomparabiliter vel incommensurabiliter majus omnibus aliis quæ cogitari possunt).

II. God was defined by the Vatican Council to be “Infinite in understanding and will and all perfection” (sess. iii., chap. 1). This is to say, (1) God cannot be thought of as greater, better, or more perfect than He is, nor can any other being be conceived greater, better, or more perfect than God; (2) there is no limit to the Divine perfection, because God contains all conceivable perfections, and the fulness of His Being attains the utmost limits of possible being both intensively and extensively, that is, God has every conceivable perfection and every conceivable form and degree of each perfection; and (3) the plenitude of the Divine Being is such that no sum of finite perfections, however great, can either equal or measure it—on the contrary, finite being and its indefinite increase and multiplication are possible only on account of God’s inexhaustible plenitude of Being. The absolute substantial infinity of God evidently implies that He is infinite (1) not only as compared with a certain kind of created beings, but as infinitely transcending all conceivable degrees and kinds of perfection; (2) not only in some one attribute but in all; (3) not only as to the magnitude or multitude of the objects of His activity, but also as to the perfection of His Essence and activity, Intellect, and Will in themselves.

The Divine Infinity in Substance and perfection may be shown both à posteriori and à priori. Assuming as certain the infinity of certain particular attributes (e.g. omnipotence and omniscience) and their identity with God’s Essence, and with all the other attributes, the infinity in Substance and perfection plainly follows. And à priori, this infinity is contained in the Divine Aseity; no limitation can be in God because no external principle can determine it, nor can it be due to internal incapacity for greater perfection. The infinity of particular attributes is based upon the infinity of the Substance because they are identical with it, and because their infinity is essentially contained in the plenitude of being required by the essence of the substance. Cf. Toletus, in I., q. 7.

Hence we infer: I. The notion of Divine Infinity excludes the possibility of things existing independently outside God, but not of things existing dependently on Him.

2. Things outside the Divine Substance cannot be added to the Divinity so as to produce, either a greater being, or at least a greater aggregate of beings. Hence God plus the universe, is not more than God alone. For the same reason it cannot be said that the Incarnation added being to the Divinity; for the human nature of Christ is only united to the Divine Person inasmuch as God produces it and a Divine Person possesses it.

3. The Divine Infinity does not prevent God’s knowledge, volition, and activity from being extended to objects outside Him (ad extra). Such extension does not imply any real expansion or motion ad extra, but only an ideal intention or direction; much less does it imply an increase from without, as it only bears upon things entirely dependent on God.

III. Absolute Infinity of Substance and perfection is an attribute proper to God alone; no substance, no perfection outside God can be infinite in the strict sense of the term, because infinity is incompatible with dependence. The infinite dignity of God can, it is true, be communicated by hypostatic union to a created nature; but Infinity does not therefore cease to belong to God alone. This communication is effected, not by the production of a new and independent dignity, but by the assumption of a human nature by a Divine Person, Who makes it His own and is adored in it. Spiritual creatures resemble God in the simplicity of their substance; they are also like Him in comparative infinity, inasmuch as they are not limited to the same extent as material creatures, and inasmuch as their intellectual faculties can know all things, even the Divine Infinity, and can embrace in their general conceptions an immense multitude of possible beings. They participate still more in the Divine Infinity by means of grace and glory, whereby they are elevated above all sensible nature, nay, above their own nature, and are enabled to apprehend, if not to comprehend, the Infinite Being of God Himself.

SECT. 65.—THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD

I. God is absolutely immutable: no change whatever can affect the Divine Substance; He is always absolutely the same in Substance, Attributes, and Life.

1. “I am the Lord, and I change not” (Mal. 3:6); “the Father of lights, with Whom there is no change nor shadow of alteration” παραλλαγὴ ἢ τροπῆς ἀποσκίασμα (James 1:17; cf. Ps. 101:27, 28, and Heb. 1:11, 12; Rom. 1:23; 1 Tim. 1:17, 6:16; Wisd. 7:27, etc.).

2. Tradition, too, abounds with similar testimonies. The Councils and Fathers take for granted the Divine Immutability as an article of Faith in their disputes with the Arians, who opposed the Son of God to the Father as the changeable to the unchangeable; they demonstrate it against the Gnostics and Manichæans, who taught the emanation of creatures from God; against the Stoics, who maintained the passivity of God; against the Eutychians and Patripassiani, who affirmed a conversion of the Divine Nature into the human nature, or conversely. After the Creed, the Council of Nicæa added the words, “The Catholic and Apostolic Church anathematizes those who say that the Son of God is variable (ἀλλοιωτόν) or changeable (τρεπτόν).” Moreover, this doctrine is a prominent feature of all apologetics against the heathen. It is a favourite theme of St. Augustine (cf. De Civ. Dei, l. xi., cc. 10, 11, and l. xii., c. 17).

3. The rational proofs of the Divine Immutability are derived from the very Essence of God, which is Being pure and simple, excluding all beginning and end; from the independence and self-sufficiency of the Divine Essence, which exclude all external influence and all internal reasons requiring or producing change; from the Divine Simplicity, which excludes all composition or decomposition consequent upon mutability; from the Divine Infinity, which is incompatible with increase and decrease, or substitution of one state of being for another in the Divine Substance; and, lastly, from the necessity by which God actually is all that He can be, which excludes the possibility of acquisition or loss. These arguments, especially the last named, would seem at first sight not to apply to God’s contingent acts of thought and will. But it is absolutely necessary that His cognition and volition of things outside Him should be themselves determined, because indetermination would involve imperfection; and if this determination in God (ad intra) is absolutely necessary, its direction on this or that particular object cannot be something with a beginning or end. Moreover, although these intentions or directions of the Divine Intellect and Will upon contingent objects do not constitute the essential Being and Life of God, and although the Divine Essence and Life are entirely independent of them, still, as a matter of fact, they are contained in the Divine Essence and Life, and consequently they must participate in the immutability of these.

By basing the immutability of God’s free decrees upon the necessity of His whole Being, we have also given the principle for explaining the apparent contradiction between the Divine Immutability and the freedom of God’s Will. It is evident that the power of changing a decision once freely taken is not essential to freedom; on the contrary, consistency belongs to the ideal of freedom. Now, in order to produce a change in God, a free determination should cause a new act or new existence in such a way as to be opposed to the Divine Simplicity and Infinity. But, as we have already seen (§ 64, II.), this is not the case. Indeed, the difficulty of accounting for free will in God arises less from His Immutability than from His Simplicity, Infinity, and Necessity, although, when rightly understood, these very attributes are the foundation of His freedom. The following thesis supplies the key to the solution of the other difficulties.

II. “God, although immutable in Himself, is the principle of all mutable beings and of all the changes which take place in them; wherefore God’s essential Immutability does not exclude the variability of His external activity and of His relations to creatures. Everything, however, which would involve any change in the Divine Substance must be excluded, notably all newness of volition or motion in execution, and every affection and determination received from without.” This doctrine is of Faith, and is also theologically and philosophically evident; but theologians differ in their way of expressing and applying it.

1. The works of the Divine Omnipotence are not eternal. Creation and all the acts of Providence are measured by time, and therefore, when the effect commences, the Divine action (ad extra) that causes it commences likewise. But the realization, in time, of the eternal decree is not a formal change in the producer, nor does it presuppose such a change. God does not produce effects by means of forces or instruments, but by simply enacting His Omnipotent Will. Much less do the attributes of Creator, Lord, and the rest, based upon God’s external activity, involve a change in Him (cf. St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, l. xii., c. 17; Abelard, Introd., l. iii., c. 6).

2. Again, God enters into various relations with His creatures, notably in the Incarnation and by means of the operation of His grace. These relations constitute a variation which proceeds from God, and in a certain manner also terminates in Him. But here, also, the creature alone is substantially and inwardly affected by the change; grace brings the creature nearer to God, and in the case of the Incarnation the creature is elevated to unity in Person and dignity with God, Who Himself is neither elevated nor lowered in the process (cf. St. Augustine, Lib. 83 Quæst., q., 73, De Incarn.).

3. Thirdly, God takes notice of the changes which occur in creatures, and disposes His operations accordingly. It would seem, therefore, that such changes in creatures react on the Creator, and affect even His inmost life. But the real motive determining the Divine operations is in God Himself; that He is disposed differently, according to the good or evil conduct of creatures, does not entail a variety of acts or dispositions in Him. His infinite love for the Supreme Good is at the same time love for the good among His creatures, and hatred and anger against the wicked. Moreover, His pleasure or displeasure bestowed at various times has really existed from all eternity in Him, but is manifested in time. Repentance, indeed, seems to be most incompatible with the Divine Immutability. Holy Scripture sometimes denies its existence in God, but at other times attributes it to Him. We must therefore understand that the Divine operations or affections manifest themselves externally, in various times and circumstances, in such a manner as to resemble human repentance. Cf. St. Augustine, Ad Simplicium, q. ii., n. 2.

III. Absolute immutability belongs to God alone. It cannot be communicated to creatures, because they are by their very essence subject to change. However, by means of grace all defective mutations natural to creatures can be prevented, and even made impossible; and when this takes place the immutability which belongs to God is, to some extent, communicated to His creatures. But this communicated immutability is never absolute, because it does not exclude multiplicity and progress in the creature’s inner life. We should note that a sort of immutability belongs by nature to all spiritual creatures, viz. the incorruptibility of their substance and the immortality of their life.

SECT. 66.—THE INCONFUSIBILITY OF GOD

I. The attribute which we have now to consider is a complement of the Divine Simplicity. It excludes from God the possibility of entering into composition with any other substance, form, or matter, and of His being numbered or classed with other things. Hence, too, the exclusion of the Pantheistic system, which would degrade the perfection of the Divinity below that of created spirits. The Vatican Council asserts this attribute by stating that God is “ineffably exalted above all things that exist or can be conceived” (sess. iii., chap. 1).

II. God can no more enter into necessary or substantial composition with any other substance than He can admit of composition within Himself; for the component substance would have to become part of the Divine Substance, and would thus destroy its Simplicity. God cannot become identical with other substances, because either these substances would cease to be distinct from each other, or there would be an end of the Divine Simplicity.

1. God cannot be the matter or substratum of all things, because His Substance is eminently one, simple, and indivisible. He cannot, again, be the root of all things in the sense that things partake of His Substance and live by His own proper energy.

2. Nor can He be the soul or substantial form of the universe, even in such a way that His Substance only partially acts as soul of the world, and has an independent existence besides. All these hypotheses directly contradict the attributes of Simplicity, Immutability, and Infinity, not to mention various absurdities which they involve.

3. God cannot, even in a supernatural manner, form part of a composition resulting in the production of a nature. Hence in the Incarnation there is neither unity of nature nor loss of independence or self-sufficiency on the part of the Divine Person Who makes the human nature His own, and submits it to Himself. A union of this kind, viz. by active assumption and dominion, and without any fusion of the united natures, is not excluded by any Divine attribute; on the contrary, it is possible only on the ground of the Absolute Being, Power, and Dominion.

4. God cannot be reckoned or classed with other beings, because He has nothing in common with them. No general notion can embrace God and His creatures. Even the notions of substance and being have different meanings when applied to God, and when applied to creatures.

III. Although the absolute simplicity of the Divine Substance exalts it above all created substances, nevertheless this same attribute renders it possible for God to permeate creatures with His Substance in a manner far more intimate than one creature could penetrate and permeate another. That innermost presence of which the Apostle speaks: “Who is above all, and through all, and in us all,” ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων καὶ διὰ πάντων καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν (Eph. 4:6), is an immediate consequence of the creation and preservation of all things. In a certain degree it extends to all things, but it increases according to the increase of God’s influence on creatures. An intimate union with Him requires the elevation of the creature to a supernatural state, and is therefore limited to certain classes of creatures. We shall treat further on of the Hypostatic Union by which God the Son unites to Himself a human nature, and also of the intellectual union of the Divine Substance with the blessed in the Beatific Vision.

SECT. 67.—THE IMMENSITY OF GOD

I. The dogma of the Divine Immensity and Incircum-scriptibility (ἀχώρητος) is based upon the fact that God is entirely independent of space and place. He has no formal extension, nor is He contained in any definite room or place; He is exalted above space and place; His virtual extension is such that no formal extension whatsoever can exceed, equal, or measure it; no space, real or possible, can include His Immensity; all space, real and possible, is included in Him. Consequently, God is everywhere in an eminent manner; we cannot conceive Him absent from any existing place, and if any new space came into existence, God would be there also.

1. In Holy Scripture the attribute of Immensity appears more in its concrete form of Omnipresence as opposed to the circumscribed presence of creatures. “The Lord He is God in Heaven above and in the earth beneath” (Deut. 4:39). “Whither shall I go from Thy Spirit? or whither shall I flee from Thy face? If I go up into heaven, Thou art there; if I go down into hell, Thou art present. If I take my wings early in the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there also shall Thy hand lead me, and Thy right hand shall hold me. And I said, Perhaps darkness shall cover me, and night shall be my light in my pleasures. But darkness shall not be dark to Thee, and night shall be as light as the day: the darkness thereof and the light thereof are alike to Thee” (Ps. 138:7–12). “Am I, think ye, a God at hand, saith the Lord, and not a God afar off? Shall a man be hid in secret places, and I not see him, saith the Lord? Do not I fill heaven and earth, saith the Lord?” (Jer. 23:23, 24). “Peradventure thou wilt comprehend the steps of God, and wilt find out the Almighty perfectly? He is higher than heaven, and what wilt thou do? He is deeper than hell, and how wilt thou know? The measure of Him is longer than the earth, and broader than the sea” (Job 11:7–9). See also 1 Kings 8:29; Isai. 40:12, etc.

2. The Fathers very often insist upon this attribute. We must here confine ourselves to referring to the most important passages: St. Gregory the Great, Moral, in Job, l. ii., c. 8, on the words, “Satan went forth from the presence of the Lord;” St. Hilary, De Trinitate, l. i., near the beginning. Abelard has put into verse the text of St. Gregory. We give it as containing an abridgment of the doctrine of the Fathers.

“Super cuncta, subtus cuncta, extra cuncta, intra cuncta:

Intra cuncta nec inclusus, extra cuncta nec exclusus,

Subter cuncta nec subtractus, super cuncta nec elatus;

Super totus possidendo, subter totus sustinendo,

Extra totus complectendo, intra totus es implendo;

Intra nusquam coarctaris, extra numquam dilataris,

Subtus nullo fatigaris, super nullo sustentaris.”

(Rythm. De Trin., v. 3 sqq.)

3. The Divine Exaltedness above, and Independence of space and place result from the spirituality of the Divine Substance. Immensity, in its full import, is a necessary condition of the absolute Immutability of God. For either God is essentially excluded from space, or He is in some definite space, or He fills and exceeds all space. The first alternative is absurd. As to the second, if God were in a definite place and not outside it, He would have to move in order to pass from place to place, which would be inconsistent with God’s sovereign self-sufficiency and immobility. Moreover, the Divine Immensity is a consequence of the Divine Omnipotence. For even granting the possibility of action from a distance, this action cannot be conceived in God in Whom action and substance are identical. But as God has the power of producing every possible creature, no place can be thought of for a creature where God is not already present in Substance and in Essence. The immensity of the virtual extension is based on the infinite plenitude of the Divine Being which implies the capability of being present to all things.

II. The attributes of Immensity and Ubiquity belong to God alone; they cannot be communicated to creatures any more than the Divine Substance itself. We can, however, conceive a creature endowed with a sort of ubiquity in the sense of filling all the space really existing. Moreover, a created spirit, and even a material body, can be supernaturally endowed with the power of Replication—that is, the capability of being in several places at the same time. Concerning the Replication of the Body of Christ in the Holy Eucharist, more will be said in the treatises on the Incarnation and Holy Eucharist.

SECT. 68.—THE ETERNITY OF GOD

I. The Divine Eternity signifies (1) that the duration of God is above and independent of time, inasmuch as He has neither beginning nor end and is in no wise limited by time, but coexists with and exceeds all time; (2) that the Divine duration is absolutely without change or succession, and is in no way affected by the flow of time; (3) that the duration of God is absolutely and essentially indivisible: it admits of no past or future, but is an ever-standing present. The simplicity and virtual extension of God’s duration are a superabundant equivalent for all real and possible time. All this is admirably summed up in the well-known definition given by Boëthius (De Consol Phil., l. v., prop. 6): “Æternitas est interminabilis vitæ tota simul et perfecta possessio”—”Eternity is the possession, perfect and all at once, of life without beginning or end.” That is to say, God’s activity is absolutely changeless, but yet is life indestructible; all limit is excluded from this life, but yet endlessness is a consequence of Eternity rather than its essence; and this life is possessed “all at once,” to show that there is no succession in it, but that God in His everpresent “now” enjoys everything that He could have possessed or can ever possess.

1. Holy Scripture, as might be expected, refers frequently to God’s Eternity. The very name “He Who is” implies the necessity of endless and ever-present existence. “I the Lord, I am the first and the last” (Isai. 41:4). “Grace be unto you and peace from Him that is, and that was, and that is to come” (Apoc. 1:4). “Before the mountains were made, or the earth and the world was formed; from eternity and unto eternity Thou art God” (Ps. 89:2, cf. Ecclus. 42:21). “Amen, amen, I say to you, before Abraham was made, I am” (John 8:58). “In the beginning, O Lord, thou didst found the earth, and the heavens are the work of Thy hands. They shall perish but Thou remainest; and all of them shall grow old like a garment; and as a vesture shalt Thou change them and they shall be changed. But Thou art always the self-same, and Thy years shall not fail” (Ps. 101:26–28). “A thousand years in Thy sight are as yesterday which is past” (Ps. 89:4). “One day with the Lord is as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day” (2 Pet. 3:8).

2. Among the Fathers St. Augustine should be especially consulted. “Eternal life,” he says, “surpasses temporal life by its very vivacity; nor can I perceive what eternity is except by the eye of my mind. For by that I exclude from eternity all change, and in eternity I perceive no portions of time, because these are made up of past and future movement. But in eternity nothing is past or future, because what is past has ceased to be, and what is future has not yet begun; whereas eternity only is,—not was, as though it were not still, not will be, as though it were not yet (‘Æternitas tantummodo est, nec fuit, quasi jam non sit, nec erit, quasi adhuc non sit’). Wherefore it alone can most truly say of itself: ‘I am who am;’ and of it alone can be said, ‘He Who is sent me to you’ “ (De Vera Relig., c. 49; see also In Psalm. cxxi., n. 6; Tract. in Joannem, xcix.).

II. God, in virtue of His Eternity, bears certain relations to time and to temporal events. His duration has no beginning, succession, or end, but it necessarily coexists with, precedes, and exceeds all real time. The Divine Eternity, having the simplicity of the Divine Essence and being only virtually extended, coexists in its entirety with every single moment of time, just as the central point of a circle coexists with all the points of the circumference. Hence temporal things have no successive duration in the eye of God; that is, in comparison with the Divine Eternity, they do not come and go, and pass by or along parts of it. In God’s sight they have neither past nor future, but are eternally present. Thus the points of a circumference in motion change their positions relatively to other points but always remain at the same distance from the centre. This, however, does not involve the eternal existence of events and things. Their eternal presence in God’s sight is owing, not to a duration coextensive with eternity on the part of creatures, but to the fact that the Divine Eternity encompasses and embraces all created duration, in the same way as the virtual extension of the Divine Substance encompasses and embraces all space. God sees and knows as actually standing before Him in His presence all things of all times, so that the Divine knowledge cannot rightly be called either memory or foreknowledge.

III. Eternity in the strict sense of the word belongs to God alone, and is the result of His independent and necessary mode of existence. Both reason and Scripture manifestly teach this. But it is not certain whether duration without beginning or end is incommunicable to creatures. Weighty theologians admit the possibility of a being created from all eternity; but it is of faith that no such being exists. Duration without end can of course be communicated to creatures, and will be the lot of all rational beings made according to God’s image and likeness. Nay, in a supernatural manner, God can elevate them even to a participation in the simplicity of His eternal Life, inasmuch as He grants them a life the object of which is His own eternal Substance, and which therefore participates in the simple immobility and uniformity of the Divine Life. Cf. St. Thomas, Contra Gentes, l. iii., c. 61.

SECT. 69.—THE INVISIBILITY OF GOD

I. Vision is properly the act of the noblest of our senses; but, analogically, the term is also applied to the knowledge acquired by the mind’s eye, particularly to the knowledge acquired by direct, immediate intuition of an object. All created things are visible, if not to all, at least to some created beings. But God is invisible to the bodily eye of creatures, even independently of His Simplicity, because He is a pure Spirit. This invisibility is a matter of faith; so much, at the least, is implied by the texts which will be quoted.

II. God is also invisible to the mental eye of angels and of men, and indeed of every conceivable created spirit; but it is possible for Him to make Himself visible to the supernaturally illuminated eye of created spirits. “Who alone hath immortality and dwelleth in light inaccessible (φῶς οἰκῶν ἀπρόσιτον), Whom no man hath seen nor can see” (1 Tim. 6:16). Here the eminent perfection of God, His inaccessible light, is given as the cause of His Invisibility. “No man hath seen God at any time” (John 1:18). “We see now through a glass in a dark manner: but then face to face. Now I know in part; but then I shall know even as I am known” (1 Cor. 13:12). “The invisible (τα ἀόρατα) things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made” (Rom. 1:20); that is to say, God is invisible, unknowable in Himself, but is seen mediately and indirectly through the medium of creatures. See also above, sect. 56.

The reason why God is invisible to the bodily eye is because He is physically simple; His absolute metaphysical simplicity and immateriality make Him invisible to the mental eye also. These attributes establish such a disproportion between the Divine Essence and the intellectual faculties of creatures, that God cannot be the object of such faculties. “It is impossible,” says St. Thomas, “for any created intellect by its own natural powers to see the Divine Essence. For cognition takes place so far as the object known is in the subject knowing. But the former is in the latter according to the manner of existence of the latter; wherefore all knowledge is in accordance with the nature of the subject knowing. If, therefore, the mode of existence of the object to be known is of a higher order than that of the subject knowing, the knowledge of this object is above the nature of the subject.… The knowledge of Self-existing Being is natural to the Divine Intellect alone; for no creature is its own existence, but all creatures have a participated, dependent existence. The created intellect therefore cannot see God by means of His Essence, except in so far as God by His grace unites Himself to the created intellect as knowable by it” (I., q. 12, a. 4).

III. At first sight the arguments given would seem to prove that God is altogether unknowable to any creature. If the bodily eye cannot behold a created spirit because the latter is simple, much less can a spirit gaze upon God whose simplicity is infinitely more above the simplicity of a created spirit than this is above matter. This difficulty is answered by St. Thomas, Contra Gentes, l. iii., c. 54: “The Divine Substance is not beyond the reach of the created intellect as being entirely extraneous thereto (as for instance sound is to the eye, or as an immaterial substance is to the senses), for the Divine Substance is the first thing intelligible (primum intelligibile), and is the principle of all intellectual cognition. It is outside the created intellect only as exceeding the powers of the latter, in the same way as in the domain of the senses excessive light is blinding and excessive sound is deafening (excellentia sensibilium sunt extra facultatem sensuum). Whence the Philosopher (Aristotle) says in the second book of the Metaphysics, that our intellect is to the most manifest things what the eye of the owl is to the sunlight. The created intellect, therefore, requires to be strengthened by some Divine light in order to be able to gaze on the Divine Essence.” See also I., q. 12, a. 4 ad 3.

God enables the created intellect to behold His Substance by elevating and refining its cognitive powers and by impressing Himself upon them as intelligible form. This elevation and “information” of the intellect is possible by reason of His infinite Simplicity. The elevation, indeed, is but an assimilation to His infinitely simple Intellect, and can therefore only be communicated by God in virtue of His Simplicity; whereas the “information” is possible because God’s Substance is infinitely more simple than that of created spirits, so that He can infuse Himself into them and unite Himself so intimately with them as to become their vivifying form. See, on this point, St. Thomas, Contra Gentes, l. iii., c. 51.

IV. To gaze on God is so much above the nature of the human mind in its present state of union with the body, that, according to the common teaching, such a vision could not take place without producing either an ecstasy or the suspension, if not the complete extinction, of the natural life. Hence the vision of God cannot be granted to man during this mortal life unless as an exception or special privilege. This privilege, however, as far as we know with certainty, exists only for the human soul of Christ, which, in virtue of the Hypostatic Union, is from the beginning in the bosom of God with the Divine Person.

What we have said easily explains the meaning of Exod. 33:20: “Thou canst not see My Face; for man shall not see Me and live.” In the Old Testament the expression, “to see God face to face,” is often used in connection with any clear manifestation, internal or external, of God or of His Angels; e.g. Gen. 32:30; Exod. 33:11.

SECT. 70.—THE INCOMPREHENSIBILITY OF GOD

I. In the Church’s language the term “comprehend” (comprehendere, καταλαμβάνειν, χωρεῖν) sometimes designates intuitive knowledge, as opposed to mediate, indirect, or abstract knowledge; sometimes adequate knowledge—that is, knowledge exhaustive of its object, embracing whatever is knowable in and of the object. As the simplicity of God makes Him invisible to all beings except Himself, so does His infinity make Him incomprehensible to all but Himself. The adequate comprehension of the Divinity cannot be communicated, even in the Beatific Vision, to any creature. This is of faith as defined in the Fourth Lateran Council (cap. Firmiter), and again in the Vatican Council (sess. iii., chap. 1), where God is described as incomprehensible as well as immense and omnipotent. Besides, the term Incomprehensible, as applied to God in Holy Scripture and Tradition, has always been taken to imply the absolute impossibility of being adequately known by any creature.

II. The Divine Incomprehensibility is often spoken of in Holy Scripture in connection, not, indeed, with the Beatific Vision, but with man’s limited knowledge. Nevertheless, the reasons which show the impossibility for man adequately to know God, apply also to the case of the blessed in Heaven. “O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God! How incomprehensible are His judgments and unsearchable are His ways! For who hath known the mind of the Lord? Or who hath been His counsellor? Or who hath first given to Him and recompense shall be made him?” Rom. 11:33–35; see also Job 11:1–9; Ecclus. 43:30 sqq.; Ps. 144:3. The doctrine of the Fathers may be found in Petavius (De Deo, vii. 3, 4) and Ruiz (De Scientia Dei, disp. vi.).

III. The inner and formal reason of God’s Incomprehensibility lies in His infinity. An infinite object surpasses the powers of a finite mind; and as the “light of glory” granted to the blessed in Heaven still leaves them finite, it does not enable them to fully grasp the Infinite. In the language of the Schoolmen, a blessed spirit sees the Infinite but not infinitely (infinitum non infinite); and sees the whole of it, but not wholly (totum non totaliter).

SECT. 71.—THE INEFFABILITY OF GOD

I. An object may be ineffable in two ways. First, the knowledge we have of it may be defective, and consequently the expression of it must be defective; or, secondly, language may be inadequate to express the knowledge really possessed.

1. God is ineffable or inexpressible inasmuch as no created mind has an adequate knowledge of Him. In this sense the Divine Ineffability is a corollary of the Divine Incomprehensibility, and is likewise a matter of faith. We have already explained in § 56 how, notwithstanding the attribute of Ineffability, man is able to speak about God and to give Him various names.

2. God is also ineffable in the sense that no created mind can give to the highest knowledge of God an expression adequate to convey it to other minds. In this sense the Divine Ineffability is a corollary of the Divine Invisibility. Moreover, a created medium cannot be adequate to convey a knowledge of the Infinite as it is in itself. The kind of ineffability in question belongs also, to a certain extent, to the supernatural knowledge of God sometimes communicated to saints even in this life—a knowledge which they cannot express in words; like St. Paul, who “heard secret words which it is not granted to man to utter” (2 Cor. 12:4).

II. It is highly probable, though by no means certain, that in the Beatific Vision the knowledge of the blessed is not a mental representation (species expressa), as in all other acts of intellectual cognition. If this is the case, God is ineffable to such a degree that not only is an adequate expression of Him impossible, but even any sort of expression of Him as He is in Himself.

III. To Himself, however, God is not ineffable. He produces in Himself an adequate expression of His Being which is His consubstantial Word (λόγος.) By means of this Word, Who is, as it were, the Face of God, the blessed see the Divine Essence as it is in itself.

CHAPTER IV

THE POSITIVE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD

A.—INTERNAL ATTRIBUTES

SECT. 72.—THE UNITY OF GOD

I. GOD, by reason of the perfect simplicity of His Substance and Being, is one in a supreme and unique manner: “maxime unus,” as St. Thomas says, or “Unissimus” according to St. Bernard. He is the primarily One; that is, not made one, but eminently one by His own Essence, immeasurably more one than anything beneath Him. And this Oneness of God has a particular excellence from its being on the one hand infinitely comprehensive, and on the other hand perfectly immutable and always the same. Hence the Fathers call God, not only one, but “The Unity,” Ipsa Unitas, ἑνάς, μονάς.

II. In virtue of the absolute perfection of His Unity, God is absolutely unique; there can be no other being above or beside Him; He necessarily stands alone above all other beings. His absolute simplicity excludes especially the possibility of multiplication of His Essence. “I am Jehovah, and there is none else; there is no God besides Me” (Isai. 45:5). The proofs of this Unicity or Uniqueness are best given by St. Thomas, Contra Gentes, l. i., c. 42. Of these we may mention one; viz. that from the Divine Infinity God exhausts the plentitude of being; no being independent of Him can be conceived or can exist. If there were another God, neither would be the highest being, and so neither would be God at all.

III. God, by His eminent and all-perfect unity, is the foundation and highest ideal of the unity of all other beings. He is at the same time, by the plenitude and richness of His unity, the principle and ideal of multiplicity and variety. By His eternal immutability He is the centre round which other beings gravitate, and by which they are held together. He is at once the Alpha and Omega of all things.

SECT. 73.—GOD, THE OBJECTIVE TRUTH

I. As God is essentially the most simple, infinite, and immutable perfection, He possesses the attribute of ontological or objective truth in an infinite degree. The act by which the Divine Essence knows itself is not merely a representation of the Divine Essence to the Divine Mind: it is identically one and the same with His Essence. Hence God is the clearest and purest truth. Again, as the perfection of the Divine Essence is infinite, it is also infinitely knowable, and fills the Divine Mind with a knowledge than which no greater can be conceived; wherefore God is the highest and completest truth. Moreover, the Divine truth participates in the immutability of the Divine Essence, and therefore God is the immutable truth. Lastly, as God is His own Being, so is He also His own truth, and truth pure and simple; that is, He necessarily knows Himself as He is, and His knowledge is independent of everything not Himself.

This doctrine is but a repetition, in another form, of the doctrine on the Divine Essence. It is implicitly contained in John 14:6, “I am the way, the truth, and the life,” and 1 John 5:6, “Christ is the truth (ἡ ἀλήθεια).”

II. God is, further, the First Truth (prima veritas). No truth is before Him or above Him. As First Cause He is the foundation of the objective truth of all things existing, and also of the possibility of all things possible. He is the prototype, the ideal, of all things, and consequently the measure of the truth they contain. He is, as it were, the mirror or the objective light, in which all things can be known better than in themselves, although not necessarily by us. Hence it follows (1) that we can know nothing as true except by some influence of the First Truth on our mind; (2) that the affirmation of any truth implies the affirmation of the First and Fundamental Truth; and (3) that the negation of God implies the negation of all objective truth, thus not only making all knowledge uncertain, but changing it into falsehood and deception.

SECT. 74.—GOD, THE OBJECTIVE GOODNESS

I. Whatever creatures are or possess, comes to them from without; hence they are not sources of goodness, but rather subjects capable of being made good by the accession of new perfections. Creatures never contain in themselves all their goodness; their internal goodness is but part of their total goodness, or is a means of acquiring and enjoying external goods. God, on the contrary, being essentially the fulness of perfection, appears to our mind as good,—containing eminently all that is worth desiring or possessing. He is not perfectible by the accession of external goodness. All extra-Divine goodness is merely a communication or outflow from the Divine abundance of perfection. He is not a good of some kind or class; He is the Good pure and simple, the essential Goodness.

II. The infinite Essence of God is not only the good of God Himself, wherein He finds all He can desire and possess, but is, besides, the good of all other things; that is to say, it is the inexhaustible source from which all other things draw their goodness, and which all other things, because of their self-insufficiency, desire to possess. The Divine Goodness is the good of all others, because it contains more than the equivalent of all others, and produces all others, and is what we desire, or tend to, when we desire all other goods. It is, moreover, the only necessary and all-sufficient good, and the sovereign and highest good; it is the first and fundamental good, and the end and object of all good; all other goods must be desired as coming from God, and must be possessed as a participation of the Divine Goodness itself.

III. It is especially in relation to His intelligent creatures that God appears as the highest Good, and as the end of all goodness. He is the good of irrational creatures, inasmuch as He communicates to them existence and its concomitant created perfections; whereas to reasonable creatures He communicates Himself, to be possessed by means of knowledge and love. In this capacity God is the highest good of His reasonable creatures, standing out above all their other goods, surpassing them all in perfection, and alone able to gratify all the desires and to realize all the aspirations of the created mind. He stands out as the end of all other goods because these either are not objects of enjoyment or are not merely such, but at the same time means for attaining the fruition of the Divine Good. The Schoolmen express this doctrine by saying that God is bonum fruendum, “the Good to be enjoyed;” whereas creatures are bona utenda, “goods to be used.”

The classical texts from the Fathers on the Divine Goodness are St. Augustine, De Trinitate, l. viii., n. 4, 5; Dionysius (Vulg.), De Div. Nom., c. iv., esp. § 4; St. Anselm, Proslog., cc. 23–25.

IV. God is also eminently good and lovable, because He actually possesses in an infinite degree whatever is good and lovable, and because nothing outside Him is good and lovable except in as far as it partakes of the Divine Goodness.

SECT. 75.—GOD, THE ABSOLUTE BEAUTY

I. God is the highest Good, and consequently the most beautiful good. This implies that God is not desired merely as a means to an end, but as desirable in Himself, on account of His essential perfection; that God is not merely lovable on account of the benefits He bestows, but lovable in Himself and for His own sake; and that He is admirable not merely on account of His works, but on account of His internal perfection.

II. God is, moreover, the absolute Beauty, and the self-subsisting Ideal of all that is beautiful, because in His infinite perfection He contains eminently whatever can make creatures the object of pleasurable contemplation. To Himself God is the object of eternal joy, and the delight which He finds in the contemplation of Himself moves Him to impress beauty upon His external works. To His intellectual creatures He is the only beauty which can fully satisfy their craving, the ideal of which all created beauty is a faint copy.

The Divine Beauty, however, is not the result of the harmony of parts or of anything that presupposes composition. God’s Beauty resides in the absolute simplicity of His perfection, in virtue of which each element of it is refulgent with the beauty of all.

Holy Scripture usually mentions the Divine Beauty as Glory. Cf. Wisd. 13:3, and also 7, 8; Ecclus. 24. Among the Fathers, see St. Basil, Reg. Fus., Disp. interr. ii.; St. Hilary, De Trin., l. i.; Dion. (Vulg.), De Div. Nom. c. iv., § 7.

III. The Divine Beauty contains the type of all that is beautiful in creation. We find it copied with various degrees of perfection in every work of God’s power and wisdom. It appears most faintly in the beauty of mathematical proportions, which contain a certain unity in multiplicity, but abstracted from all reality. The inorganic substances, especially the nobler metals and gems, represent more of the Divine prototype. But the best image of the Divine Beauty, in the inorganic world, is light. Light not only has its own beauty, it also lends beauty to all other material things. Its rarity is the nearest approach, as far as our sensitive knowledge goes, to the Divine simplicity. Organic beings represent the Divine Ideal of beauty in the manifold energies proceeding from the unity of their organization. Created spirits reflect the Divine Beauty in their life and motion, knowledge and love.

The Divine Beauty shines most perfectly and sublimely in the Blessed Trinity, which is the highest development of Divine perfection; in It we can easily detect all the elements of beauty, viz. unity and multiplicity, the splendour of perfection and life, the resemblance of the image to the ideal or prototype. In fact, there is no greater unity in multiplicity than the perfect identity of the Three Divine Persons; no more perfect unfolding of essential perfection and life than the trinitary fecundity in God, wherein the whole Divine Essence is communicated—the whole wisdom of the Father uttered in His Word, the whole love of the Father and the Son poured forth in the Holy Ghost; and there is no greater resemblance of any image to its prototype, than the resemblance of the Divine Word to the Eternal Father. By appropriation, beauty is especially attributed to God the Son, because He is the splendour of the glory of the Father, the perfect expression of the Divine perfection.

B.—EXTERNAL ATTRIBUTES

SECT. 76.—THE OMNIPOTENCE OF GOD

I. The possession of absolute power is necessarily included in the infinite perfection of God. As this power immediately flows from the Divine Essence, its attributes correspond with those of the Divine Essence. Hence it is without beginning, independent, necessary, self-sufficient, self-subsisting and essential to God; absolutely simple, that is, purely active and communicating perfection, without any composition in itself; infinite, including all conceivable power; perfectly immutable; present in all space at all times. All this is contained in the words, “I believe in God the Father Almighty (παντοκράτορα).”

II. The Creeds, the Fathers of the Church, and Theologians, following Holy Scripture, consider creation out of nothing as the specific work of the Divine Omnipotence. Created causes, which receive their being from without, can only act on something already existing; they never are the total causes of the effects produced. The power of God, on the contrary, not only modifies pre-existing things, but brings things forth out of nothing as to their whole substance, and maintains them in existence in such a way that they depend on Him not only for the first, but for every, moment of their existence. Without the Divine Being no other being would even be conceivable as existing. This doctrine is condensed in the Greek word παντοκράτωρ, which, in the Septuagint, the New Testament, and the Greek Creeds, takes the place of the Latin omnipotens. This latter implies a power to or above all things, whereas the former designates a power holding and supporting all things (omnitenens), and hence ruling all things and penetrating all things.

III. God possesses the power to give existence to whatever is possible—that is, to whatever does not involve contradiction. Things intrinsically possible become possible extrinsically on account of the Divine Power, which is able to transfer them from non-existence to existence. “I know that Thou canst do all things” (Job 42:2); “With man this is impossible: but with God all things are possible” (Matt. 19:26). As to the intrinsic possibility of things, which results from the compatibility of their various elements, the Divine Mind alone can grasp its extent; for many things must appear feasible to an infinite intellect, which to the finite mind seem simply impossible, or indeed have never entered it. “Who is able to do all things more abundantly than we desire or understand, according to the power that worketh in us” (Eph. 3:20).

The Divine Omnipotence is infinite in itself or subjectively, and also externally or objectively. Its interior infinity is evident; its objective infinity must be understood in the sense that no greater power is conceivable than the Divine Omnipotence, and that no number, however great, of finite productions can exhaust the Divine Power. Although the effects produced are finite, still the Power which produces them manifests itself as infinite; for the creation and preservation of things suppose in the Creator an infinite fulness of being or perfection, which is also, at the same time, the foundation of the inexhaustibility of the Divine Power. Thus the production of the smallest creature points to a Force which rules the very essence of things, and on which, therefore, all being depends for its existence.

Omnipotence does not imply the power of producing an infinite being, because the notion of a being at once infinite and produced is self-contradictory. Although, however, God cannot create the infinite, He can and does manifest His Omnipotence in communicating His own infinity. Such a communication takes place, within, to the Second and Third Persons of the Trinity; without, to the humanity of Christ, which, through the Hypostatic Union with the Divine Person, acquires an infinite dignity; likewise to spiritual creatures who, by means of grace and glory, are made participators of the infinite beatitude of God Himself. Again, God cannot undo the past, because to do so would involve a contradiction; but He can prevent or annul all the consequences of actions done, e.g. the consequences of sin. Furthermore, Omnipotence does not imply the power of committing sin, because sin is something defective. In like manner the power to suffer, or to perform actions involving motion or change in the cause, is not included in Omnipotence.

IV. The Divine Omnipotence is the source, the foundation, the root, and the soul of all powers and forces outside God. It is the source from which they spring; the foundation upon which they rest; the root which communicates to them their energy; the soul co-operating immediately with them, and intimately permeating their innermost being. Thus the Divine Force appears in the inorganic world as the principle of all motion; in the organic world as the principle of vital activity; and, above all, in the spiritual world as the principle of intellectual and spiritual life. Spirits alone receive their being immediately from God; their life alone cannot be made subservient to a higher life; they alone are able to be so elevated and ennobled as to have a share with God in the fruition of His own Essence.

V. The power to produce every possible thing is manifestly a perfection proper to God alone, and cannot, even supernaturally, be communicated to creatures. Not only is the power to create all things peculiar to God, but also the power to produce one single thing out of nothing; because such power presupposes in its possessor the infinite fulness of being. That, as a matter of fact, no creature has co-operated, even as an instrument, in creation is, according to the common teaching of theologians, of faith; that no creature can so co-operate is theologically and philosophically certain, although many difficulties of detail can be brought against this doctrine. See, on this special point, Kleutgen, Phil., diss., ix., chap. iv., 1005; St. Thomas, Contra Gentes, l. ii., c. 21; and Suarez, Metaph., disp. 26.

SECT. 77.—THE OMNIPRESENCE OF GOD

I. God, the absolute cause of the innermost essence of created things, is present to them in the most intimate manner. He is not only not separated from them by space, but He penetrates, pervades, and permeates their very substance. The Divine presence in spirits has a character exclusively proper to itself. As spirits have no parts and fill no space, presence in them necessarily means more than coexistence with them in the same place; it implies a penetration of their substance possible only to the simple substance of the infinite Author of things. So much is of faith. A controversy, however, has arisen as to the manner in which God is present in creatures. Theologians of the Thomist School, starting from the principle that a cause must be in the place where it produces its effect, maintain that the contact of God with creatures consists formally in creative action. On the other hand, the followers of Duns Scotus and others, admitting the possibility of action from a distance, maintain that God is not necessarily present to creatures because He is their Creator; and, consequently, these theologians describe the Divine Omnipresence as formally consisting in the absence of local distance between the substance of the Creator and that of the creature. The Thomist view is more logical and attractive; the Scotist view reduces the existence of God in creatures to a simple coexistence.

The existence of God in creatures must not be conceived as a mingling of the Divine and the created substances, for this would be opposed to the Divine Simplicity; nor as an inclusion of the Creator in the creature, for this would be against His Immensity. God’s presence in the existing world is not a limit to His Omnipresence, for He embraces all possible worlds. As God is in all things, so all things are in God,—not, indeed, filling and pervading or even touching the Divine Substance, but upheld by it as their first principle. Things are contained in God because by His virtual Immensity He fills all space, and because by His Omnipotence He actually upholds all existence.

II. Holy Scripture insists more on the extension of the Divine Omnipresence, which corresponds to the Divine infinity and immensity, than on the intensive presence above described. Still, this also is clearly pointed out in many places, especially in Eph. 4:6: “One God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in all” (ἐπὶ πάντων, καὶ διὰ πάντων, καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν). Cf. Rom. 11:36, and Col. 1:16, 17; Heb. 4:12, 13.

Since the power of penetrating the innermost substance of spirits is an attribute proper to the Divine Omnipresence, the Fathers insist particularly upon this point. In the controversy with the Arians and with the Macedonians, the indwelling of the Holy Ghost or of the Son in created spirits is often brought forward as an evident proof of the Divinity of the Son and of the Holy Ghost (see Petav., De Trin., l. ii., c. 15, n. 7 sqq.; Thomassin, De Deo, l. v., c. 5). Many Fathers and Theologians touch upon this point when dealing with the question how far the devil can penetrate the human soul (Peter Lomb., II. Sent., dist. 8, p. ii.). They hold that the innermost recesses of the soul are a sanctuary to which God alone has access, into which the devils cannot introduce their substance, and which is accessible to them only in as far as the soul conforms itself to their evil suggestions.

III. The whole doctrine of the Divine Omnipresence has been summed up by St. Gregory the Great in the formula, “God is in all things by essence, power, and presence”—Deus est in omnibus per essentiam, potentiam, et præsentiam (Mor. in Job, l. ii., c. 8),—which St. Thomas expounds as follows: “God is in all things by His power, inasmuch as all things are subject to His power; He is in all things by His presence, inasmuch as all things are bare and open to His eyes; He is in all things by His Essence, inasmuch as He is in all things as the cause of their being” (I., q. 8, art. 3).

IV. Just as the soul, although present in all parts of the body, does not act with the same energy in every part, so also God, though present in all creatures, does not fill them all with the same perfection nor act in all to the same extent. The supreme degree of Divine presence is attained in the supernatural life of the soul and of the blessed. The indwelling of God in the sanctified soul fills it with a new life, of which God Himself is the soul: the creature participates in the life of the Creator. God is present in the rest of the world as in His kingdom, but in the sanctified soul as in His temple, where He manifests His glory and majesty (1 Cor. 3:17). Creatures not so filled with the Divine presence, e.g. the souls of sinners and the damned in hell, appear, as it were, far from God, cast out and abandoned, although even in them also God exists and manifests His power and sovereign dominion.

V. The active presence of God in all things created extends, of course, to all space and every place. Created spirits, who are not bound by the limits of space, occupy a portion of space, inasmuch as they are not distant from it; but the space is not dependent on them. God, on the contrary, is not only not far from any space, but so fills it that its very existence is dependent on His active presence. The Divine presence so encompasses all things and all space that it is impossible for God to act at a distance, while, at the same time, His presence enables distant things to act upon each other. God, the unchangeable, is the principle of all change; and God, the immovable, is the principle of all motion. From the nature of the presence of God we gather that it must extend to all times as well as to all things. If the possibility and existence of creatures depend on the active power of God, their continued duration or time depends on it also, so that whenever a thing exists or is possible, God is present. Holy Scripture calls God “the King of ages” (1 Tim. 1:17), distinguishing Him from the kings of this world, who rule but for a time, and to whose power time is not subject, as it is to the power of God.

CHAPTER V

THE DIVINE LIFE

SECT. 78.—THE DIVINE LIFE IN GENERAL—ITS ABSOLUTE PERFECTION

I. FAITH and reason alike teach us that God is a living God, that His life is spiritual, personal, and pure—not mixed with other forms of life as the life of man is. But the attribute of life applies to God only analogically. Life, as we conceive it, is a mixed and not a simple perfection; it involves a transition from potentiality to actuality; the immanent activity proceeds from the substance, and remains in it to perfect it. Still it is not essential to immanent activity to commence in the substance and to subsist in it as in its subject; the immanence is greatest when the action is identical with the substance. Hence life is attributed to God analogically, but possessed by Him in the most proper and eminent manner.

II. Unlike creatures which possess life, God is Life. It is not imparted to Him from without, but He imparts it to all things, and is the fundamental life, the life of all that lives. In this respect He is eminently the supreme Spirit (“the God of the spirits of all flesh,” Num. 16:22), inasmuch as we conceive spirits as having independent life and as infusing life. Created pure spirits bear to God a relation somewhat similar to the relations of the body to the soul, their life-activity being caused, preserved, and moved by the Divine Life. Hence the dictum: “God is the life of the soul, as the soul is the life of the body” (Deus vita animæ sicut anima corporis).

The Old Testament speaks of the Living God, whereas the New Testament calls Him the Life. Cf. John 14:6; 1 John 5:20; John 1:4, and 5:26; Acts 17:22 sqq.; etc.

III. A proper and adequate expression of the specific character of the Divine Life as the highest form of spiritual life, is Wisdom. Holy Scripture very frequently thus designates the life of God, and uses the name of Wisdom as a proper name of God, even oftener than that of Being (ὁ ὧν) and Living. The appellation of Wisdom is most appropriate, because Wisdom designates the perfection of spiritual life as manifested in the acts of the intellect and of the will, and in external actions. Hence Wisdom implies the most perfect knowledge of the highest truth, and the most perfect love of the highest good, as also a just appreciation of all other things in reference to the Supreme Truth and Goodness, and, consequently, the capability of ordering and disposing all things in accordance with their highest ideal and last end. When speaking of creatures, we give the name of Wisdom, not to the sum-total of their living activities, but only to the highest of them; in God, on the contrary, in Whom there is no multiplicity or division, Wisdom expresses the full perfection of Life.

SECT. 79.—THE DIVINE KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL

I. That God possesses most perfect intellectual knowledge is contained in the very idea of the Divinity. The First Principle of the order of the universe, the Source and Ideal of all knowledge, must necessarily be possessed of wisdom. “O Lord, Who hast the knowledge of all things” (Esth. 14:14); “The Lord knoweth all knowledge” (Ecclus. 42:19; 1 Kings 2:3; Rom. 11:33; Col. 2:3; Ecclus. 1:1, 5, etc.).

II. God is His knowledge: in Him there is no real distinction between the faculty and the act of knowing, nor between these two and their object. Even when His knowledge extends to things outside Him, the adequate reason for such extension of the Divine knowledge is in God Himself; nothing external affects, moves, determines or influences it in any way. This is of faith, because it is evidently contained in the simplicity and independence of God, and because it is formally expressed in the propositions: God is Wisdom, God is Light. As God is the Light of all other spirits (“the light which enlighteneth every man,” John 1), so also is He Himself the sun, in the light of which He sees all things (Ecclus. 42:16).

III. The mode of action of the Divine knowledge is essentially different from that of the knowledge of creatures. The created mind knows itself as it knows other things; the knowledge of its own being is only the starting-point, and a condition of the rest of its knowledge, not its source and root. God, on the contrary, possesses in His Essence an object which itself determines and produces His knowledge from within, and is sufficient to fill the Divine Intellect and to extend the Divine knowledge to all things knowable. The Divine Essence can act this part in the process of the Divine knowledge, because it is intimately and essentially present to the Divine Intellect—nay, is identical with it; because, again, it presents to the infinite faculty of knowing an adequate object, an object of infinite perfection; and, lastly, because, inasmuch as it is the essential principle of all that exists outside God, the perfect knowledge of it implies the perfect knowledge of all that is or can be. The knowledge which God has of things outside Him, does not presuppose in these things an existence independent of the Divine knowledge; on the contrary, God knows them as caused and produced by His knowledge. In fact, things exist because God, seeing their possibility in His own Essence, decrees that they shall exist either by an immediate act of His Omnipotence or through the agency of created causes. In the language of the Schoolmen this doctrine is briefly expressed by saying that the Divine Essence is the “formal object” of the Divine knowledge, and that all other things knowable are its “material object.” This point of doctrine (viz. that the Divine Essence is the formal and primary object of God’s knowledge, and that other things knowable are its material and secondary object) is a development of defined dogmas, and is commonly taught by theologians. St. Thomas (I., q. 14, a. 8), puts it as follows: “The things of nature stand midway between God’s knowledge and ours. We receive our knowledge from natural things, of which God, through His knowledge, is the cause: wherefore, as natural things precede our knowledge of them and are its measure, so God’s knowledge precedes them, and is their measure; just as a house stands midway between the knowledge of the architect who designed it and the knowledge of him who knows it only after seeing it built.”

IV. By reason of its identity with the Divine Essence, the Divine knowledge possesses the highest possible perfection. It is in a unique manner an intellectual knowledge, because it attains its object from within, from its Essence and Nature, unlike human knowledge which penetrates to the essence and nature of things only by observing their external phenomena. It is in a unique manner an intuitive knowledge, because it adequately comprehends its object in a single act, free from abstractions, conjectures, or ratiocinations; it comprehends all possible beings in the very foundation of their possibility; things are present to the Divine intention before they are present to themselves. Moreover, the Divine knowledge is comprehensive and adequate, inasmuch as it grasps the inmost essence of things in the most exhaustive manner. Lastly, it is an eminently certain and unerring knowledge: uncertainty and error being incompatible with intuition and comprehensiveness of knowledge. All these attributes are of faith, because implied in the infinite perfection of the Divine intellect, and are clearly set forth in many texts of Holy Scripture. “The eyes of the Lord are far brighter than the sun, beholding round about all the ways of men and the bottom of the deep, and looking into the hearts of men, into the most hidden parts” (Ecclus. 23:28; cf. Job 28:24; Heb. 4:13, etc.).

V. The negative attributes of the Divine perfection shine with an especial splendour in the Divine knowledge. Thus God’s knowledge is intrinsically necessary—that is, it necessarily embraces whatever is knowable. Although, as regards contingent objects, this necessity is only hypothetical, still it cannot be said that God’s knowledge of things contingent is itself contingent, because such an expression might imply an indetermination on the part of the Divine knowledge. It is absolutely simple: God knows Himself and all things outside Him in one indivisible act. It is infinite in intensity as well as in extension—that is, it is the deepest and the richest knowledge; nothing is hidden from it; it embraces an infinite object in the Divine Essence, and an infinite number of things in the domain of possibility. It is immutable: nothing can be added to or withdrawn from it. It is eternal, having neither beginning nor end nor succession, not only as regards truths of an eternal character, but also as to things temporary which are eternally visible to the eternal eye of God. The Divine Immensity and Omnipresence add another perfection to the science of God, inasmuch as they bring all things knowable into immediate contact with the Divine Intellect. Lastly, the Divine knowledge is in a special manner incomprehensible and inscrutable to the created mind, notably to the mind in its natural state. We are unable to comprehend not only its depth and breadth, but also the manner in which the Divine Intellect lays hold of things external and renders them present to itself without being in the least dependent on them or waiting for them to come into existence; and, further, we are unable to understand how He sees, in one and the same act, cause and effect, and how the intuition of a free agent involves the intuition of its free acts. A cognition of this kind is utterly beyond and above the methods of finite cognition, and indeed is partly in direct opposition to the laws which regulate created knowledge. This ought to be kept well in view in order to meet the difficulties connected with this question. Cf. Ecclus. 42:16 sqq.; St. Aug., De Trin., l. xv., c. 7; St. Peter Damian, Ep., iv., c. 7, 8.

VI. The absolute perfection of the Divine knowledge is expressed by the term Omniscience: God knows all that is knowable, and as far as it is knowable. The domain of the Divine Science comprises, therefore, (1) God Himself; (2) the metaphysically possible; (3) the things created by God; (4) the motions and modes of being of creatures as caused either by God or by creatures themselves; (5) especially the free activity of creatures, the knowledge of which constitutes the exalted and incomprehensible privilege of the Divine Omniscience.

As to (4) we should bear in mind that the activity of creatures, with all its actual and possible modifications, is as much dependent on God as their substance is. God knows this activity from within, from its very cause; whereas the created mind only knows it from its external manifestations or effects. We shall treat of (5) in the following section.

SECT. 80.—GOD’S KNOWLEDGE OF THE FREE ACTIONS OF HIS CREATURES

The difficulties which the Divine knowledge of free actions presents to our mind, arise from our inability to understand the peculiar process of God’s cognition, which is indeed more peculiar in this than in other matters. A complete solution of the difficulties is impossible. All that we can hope to do is to remove apparent contradictions by clearly pointing out the difference between the way in which God knows, and the way in which the created mind acquires its knowledge. It is not without a purpose that Revelation so often insists upon the knowledge of the free actions of man as the exclusive and wonderful privilege of God,—a knowledge in which the Divine Light illumines the most secret and dark recesses.

The knowledge which God possesses of the free actions of His creatures is distinguished by the three following characteristics: (1) God knows these actions in themselves, as they are in the mind and heart of their author, from within and so far à priori; (2) God has this knowledge from all eternity—that is, before the actions take place; (3) in the Divine Intellect the knowledge of free actions is logically preceded by the knowledge that, under certain conditions and circumstances dependent on the Divine decree, such actions would take place. The above three characteristics are termed respectively (1) “searching of hearts,” (καρδιογνωσία); (2) “knowledge of future free acts;” (3) “knowledge of conditional acts” (scientia conditionatorum or futuribilium). At each of these three degrees of Divine knowledge our difficulties increase; as far, however, as they are soluble, they find a solution in a correct exposition of the first point, especially of the relation of causality between God and created spirits.

I. It is of faith (1) that God knows the free actions of His creatures from within, before they are manifested without, exactly as they exist in the consciousness of the free agent, and even more adequately than the free agent himself knows them; (2) that God alone possesses this knowledge; (3) that, as God knows external free actions from within—that is, from the inner disposition of the agent,—so also does He know the inner free act from and in its principle, which is the free will of the creature; and this free will is entirely the work of God, and can have no tendency, no motive, no act independently of its Creator.

1. As Scripture proofs of 1, we select the following texts: “The eyes of the Lord are far brighter than the sun, beholding round about all the ways of men, and the bottom of the deep, and looking into the hearts of men, into the most hidden parts” (Ecclus. 23:28). “The Lord searcheth all hearts, and understandeth all the thoughts of minds” (1 Paral. 28:9). “For Thou only knowest the hearts of the children of men” (2 Paral. 6:30). “The heart is perverse above all things, and unsearchable, who can know it? I, the Lord, Who search the heart and prove the reins: Who give to every one according to his way, and according to the fruit of his devices” (Jer. 17:9, 10). Cf. Acts 1:24; and 15:8). “The Lord hath looked from heaven; He hath beheld all the sons of men.… He Who has made the hearts of every one of them, Who understandeth all their works” (Ps. 32:13–15).

2. As to the exclusiveness of this knowledge, Holy Scripture indeed speaks mostly of the hearts of men as being hidden from other men. The emphatic expressions used must, however, according to the unanimous teaching of the Fathers, be also applied to the angels, to whom the thoughts of men and of other angels are also imperviable. Cf. Suarez, De Angelis, l. ii., c. 21. This doctrine involves the important consequence, that the devil can no more know whether the tempted consent to temptation than he can force them to consent.

3. Creatures and their activity, including their free activity, are intrinsically dependent on God; that is, they cannot act unless God moves and co-operates with them. Hence free actions appear to the Eye of God as the course of a motion originated and supported by Him: good actions run the course which He intended; bad actions deflect from it. Consequently, God sees the free actions of His creatures, like their other actions, not as independent external manifestations, but in their origin and root—that is, in the free will and its activity of which He is the Creator and Conservator. Thus the action of the creature does not enlighten the Divine Intellect; but, on the contrary, on account of its dependence on God, the action is itself enlightened by the Divine Mind. Now, it must be remembered that God knows all effects by His knowledge of their causes, a knowledge which penetrates to their uttermost capabilities. He therefore knows the actual determinations of free will as they are elicited by the free will dependent on, and moved by, Him. This knowledge, therefore, is not inferred from the previous state of the will, or from the motives communicated to it by God; for if such a conclusion could be drawn, there would be a necessary connection between the previous disposition of the will and the subsequent determination, and consequently no freedom. The formal objective reason (ratio formalis objectiva) why God sees the free determination is the dependence of the free will on God.

All schools of Theology agree in this explanation of the manner in which God knows the free actions of creatures. Some, however, lay too much stress on the point that God knows the free actions in and through His action on the will; while others give too much prominence to the idea that the free actions are known by God in themselves, as they proceed from the created will. But both parties agree that the first description can be applied without restriction only to the knowledge of good actions; and that the second description applies, without reserve, only to bad actions, which, in as far as they are bad, do not proceed from God at all, but from the created will.

This explanation enables us to see how the knowledge which God has of free actions does not interfere with their freedom. The free will of the creature indeed determines and causes an object of the Divine knowledge, but not the knowledge itself. On the contrary, God is determined by His own Essence to the knowledge of the free acts in question. His knowledge proceeds from Himself; as Creator and Conservator He contemplates in the same act the substance of the creature, its energies and faculties, the impulse by which He enables it to act, and all the actions that actually result, or may result, from this impulse. Hence the reason why God knows the free actions of His creatures is the relation of causality and dependence between Creator and creature. God, however, does not determine free actions in the same manner as He determines other actions of creatures. Just as the self-determination of the will is consequent upon the causal influence of God, so also is it known to God by reason of the same influence. God, therefore, knows the free actions of His creatures in His own Essence, the adequate knowledge of which includes the perfect knowledge of all things dependent on it.

If this be rightly understood, the following proposition will also be clear:—”God’s certain knowledge of the free determination of the will is not the cause of this determination; nor is the determination of the will the reason why God knows it.” The fact that a free determination takes place is merely a condition of God’s knowledge of it; nevertheless, it is a necessary condition—necessary in order that God, by means of His causal influence, may extend His knowledge to that particular determination of the will.

This doctrine is thus expressed by St. John Damascene, Contra Manich., c. 79: “The foreknowing power of God has not its cause in us; but it is because of us that He foresees what we are about to do: for if we were not about to do the things, God could not have foreseen them, because they were not going to be. The foreknowledge of God is true and infallible indeed; but it is not the cause why we do certain things: on the contrary, because we are about to do certain things, God foreknows them.”

II. Like all other Divine knowledge, the knowledge of the free actions of creatures is eternal. Hence God knows the free actions of His creatures before they are performed, and knows them even better than the creatures themselves do. He further contemplates them as perpetually present with the reality they acquire when accomplished in the course of time. The Vatican Council (sess. iii. c. 1) says “All things are bare and open to His eyes, even the things which will take place by the free action of creatures.” Prescience of this kind is exclusively proper to God, a touchstone of Divinity. Cf. Ps. 138:1 sqq.; Ecclus. 39:24, 25; and 23:28, 29. “Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods” (Isai. 41:22, 23). Every one of the many prophecies contained in Holy Writ is a proof of the Divine Foreknowledge. “Every prophet is a proof of the Divine Foreknowledge”—”Præscientia Dei tot habet testes quot habet prophetas” (Tertull., C. Marcion). St. Augustine (Ad Simplicium, 1. ii., q. ii., n. 2) gives a classical description of the way in which God sees future things as present.

God’s Foreknowledge must be eternal because all that is in God is necessarily eternal. Besides, if God knew the free actions of His creatures only in time, the decrees of His Providence ought to be made in time also. The possibility of an eternal Foreknowledge is evident from the à priori nature of the knowledge, for God knows future things in their eternal cause. Further, He contemplates the future as actually present, because to Him there is no time; things temporal stand before His undivided eternity with their temporal character and are seen always as they are when they actually exist.

The Divine Foreknowledge is an eternal contemplation and therefore does not interfere with the liberty of the created will. The fact that God sees what we do, no more alters the nature of our acts than the fact that they are seen or remembered by ourselves or by others. The knowledge which God has of free actions is the same before, during, and after their performance. Besides, the Divine Knowledge, being à priori, apprehends free actions formally as such, that is, as proceeding from the will by free determination. If it only grasped the action as a material fact, the knowledge would be false or incomplete. Foreknowledge would only interfere with liberty of action if it supposed a necessary influence of God on the human will, or if it had the character of a conclusion necessarily following from given premisses.

III. The knowledge of the actions which would be performed by free agents if certain conditions were fulfilled, cannot be denied to God. It is in itself an unmixed perfection, and, moreover, it is necessary for the perfect ruling of the world by Divine Providence. In fact, without such knowledge, God could not frame His decrees concerning the government of rational creatures, or, if He did, He would deprive them of their liberty (cf. Hurter, De Deo, No. 87).

1. Holy Scripture fully supports this doctrine. God being asked by David if the men of Ceila would deliver him into the hands of Saul, answered positively, “They will deliver thee.” But David having fled, he was not delivered into the hands of his enemy (1 Kings 22:1–13). See other instances of the Divine knowledge of future actions dependent on unfulfilled conditions (Jer. 38:15 sqq.); “Woe to thee, Corozain, woe to thee, Bethsaida: for if in Tyre and Sidon had been wrought the miracles that have been wrought in you, they had long ago done penance in sackcloth and ashes” (Matt. 11:20–23). Cf. Franzelin, De Deo, p. 449 sqq.

2. The Fathers often deal expressly with the present questions in connection with Providence. In the controversies with the Manichæans and Gnostics, they all admit without hesitation that God foreknew the sins which Adam and Eve, Saul, Judas, and others would commit under given conditions. Not one of these Fathers tries to justify God for creating these men, or for conferring dignities upon them, on the plea of ignorance of what would happen under the circumstances. Cf. the commentaries on Wisd. 4:11: “He was taken away lest wickedness should alter his understanding, or deceit beguile his soul;” esp. St. Gregory of Nyssa, in the sermon on this text (Opp., torn, ii., pp. 764–770), and St. Augustine (De Corr. et Gratia, c. viii.). (See infra, p. 372, and Vol. II. p. 242.)

SECT. 81.—THE DIVINE WISDOM IN RELATION TO ITS EXTERNAL ACTIVITY—THE DIVINE IDEAS

I. Idea, ἰδεά, commonly signifies the mental representation which the artist has of his work (ratio rei faciendæ). The ideal is the highest conception of a thing. In the language of the Church, the expressions idea, exemplar, forma, species, εἶδος, are often used synonymously.

1. All the works of God are produced with perfect knowledge of what they ought to be, and all are intended to represent and manifest the Supreme Being, Beauty, and Goodness. Hence all the works of God are works of wisdom, or rather works of His wise art. “Thou hast made all things in wisdom” (Ps. 103:24). “Wisdom is the worker of all things” (Wisd. 7:21). Philosophically and theologically this doctrine is expressed as follows: God operates ad extra by artistic ideas, and all that is outside God is essentially a product and an expression of a Divine Idea.

2. The Ideas of the Divine Wisdom are, however, very different from the ideas which guide the human artist. The former are truly creative ideas, modelling not only the external appearance of things, but setting up and informing their very essence; and, being identical with God, they have in themselves the power of actuating themselves. They are absolutely original ideas, drawn from, and identical with, the Divine Substance, essentially proper to God and eternal (λόγοι οὐσιώδεις, rationes æternæ). The ideas of the created artist, on the other hand, are only relatively original; even his noblest inspirations are mostly determined by external circumstances.

3. The foundation of the Divine ideas is the infinitely perfect Divine Essence, containing in itself the perfections of all things, imitable ad extra in finite things, and comprehended as so imitable by the infinite Intellect of God. All beings outside God are, by their essence, a participation, i.e. an imperfect copy or imitation, of the Divine Being: hence their types or ideas must exist in the Divine Essence, and must be the object of the contemplation of the Divine Mind. Moreover, because of the simplicity of the Divine Substance, the ideas, their foundation and the mind contemplating them, are all one; and therefore created things are contained in God, not only as in an abstract mental representation, but as in their real model and type.

4. How many ideas are there in God? Materially there is only one idea in Him, as there is only one ideal for all things together as well as for each in particular. In His absolutely simple and infinitely rich Essence, God contemplates in one idea the type of all possible imitations ad extra. Formally speaking, however, He has as many ideas as He knows to be possible representations of His Essence.

5. Although God knows evil, still there is no ideal of evil in the Divine Mind. For evil is not a positive formation, but a difformity or deformation of things; it is not a work of the Divine Wisdom nor a work of God at all.

6. The creative power of the Divine ideas enters into action only when God decrees so by an act of His Will.

II. 1. It is essentially a work of the Divine Wisdom to give order, harmony, and organization to the things representing the Divine Ideas; to unite them in one harmonic whole, in which each holds its proper place, and each and all tend to the end proposed by the Creator. Holy Scripture calls this ordaining operation a measuring, numbering, and weighing: “Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight” (Wisd. 11:21).

2. A further attribute of the Divine Wisdom is to determine the ideal perfection to which creatures should tend as to their ultimate object, and to establish the laws by which this object is to be aimed at and attained. The laws that regulate the movements of creatures are implanted in their nature, and are, as it were, identified with their substance, thus offering an image of the eternal law in God. To rational creatures especially, the Divine Wisdom prescribes laws for the right direction of their actions towards their end. These laws are “written in the heart” (Rom. 2:14, 15), and read there by means of the light of reason. The Divine Wisdom appears here as “doctrix disciplinæ Dei,” as a guide and educator, leading man on to the participation of the All-Wise life in God.

On the relation between the eternal law in God and the natural law, see St. Thomas, 1 2, q. 91, a. 2.

III. The infinite perfection of the Divine Wisdom involves the knowledge of all the ways and means of realizing the ultimate object of creation. God knows which acts and operations should be produced or prevented, and He knows how to direct every action and operation to its end, so that nothing upsets His plans, but everything is made subservient to them. In this sense the spirit of eternal wisdom is called πανεπίσκοπον and ἀκώλυτον, overseeing all things, unimpeded (Wisd. 7:23), and of Wisdom itself it is said: “She reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly” (Wisd. 8:1). The perfection of the Divine Providence is best seen in its dealings with the free will of man. Freedom of action, including freedom to commit sin, would undermine the stability of any but an infinite Providence. God, however, Who foreknows the future and its contingencies, Who has the power to bring about or to prevent even the free actions of His creatures, and to Whose Will all things are subservient—God is able to direct evil actions to good ends, and thus to attain His own wise objects.

SECT. 82.—THE NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES OF THE DIVINE WILL CONSIDERED GENERALLY

I. That God has a Will, and a most perfect Will, is evident to faith and reason alike. The will is an essential of a living spirit; without it there could be in God no power, no beatitude, no sanctity, or justice.

II. The fundamental property of the Divine as opposed to the created will, is its real identity with the Divine Substance. “Will,” says St. Bonaventure (in I. Sent., dist. 45, a. 1), “is in God in a more proper and complete manner than in us. For in us it is a faculty distinct from our substance and actually distant from its object; whereas in the Divine Will there is no difference whatsoever between substance, power, act and object.” Hence in God there can be no successive acts of will, no desires, or tendencies. The essential act of the Divine Will consists in the delight with which God embraces and contains Himself as the Highest Good. This delight extends to things outside Him, only, however, in order to bring them into existence; not to derive from them any increment of perfection or happiness. In itself the act of the Divine Will is possession and fruition; in its relation to external goods it can but freely distribute its own abundance.

III. An immediate consequence of the identity of God’s Will with His Substance, is that with Him there can be no question of a cause moving the will, or of anything influencing it from without: the uncreated act, by which all things are created, cannot be subject to such influences. It is indeed essential to the Divine Will, even more than to the will of creatures, to act for an object, and consequently to determine Itself to the choice and disposition of appropriate means to attain the intended object. The object, however, is not a cause moving the Divine Will, but the reason why the Divine Will moves Itself. In God, the first motive and the ultimate object of His Will are really identical with His Will; they are His Essence considered as the supreme objective Good. All subordinate motives and objects are dependent on the primary one; they are only motives and objects because God wills them to be such. Hence subordinate motives and ends do not act on the Divine Will in itself; they are but the reason why It directs Itself upon some particular object, and orders or disposes it in some particular manner. The free actions of creatures are but circumstances in creation, brought about or permitted by God Himself, and of which He takes notice for His own sake; they are by no means external causes moving the Divine Will to action.

The supreme goodness of the Divine Will is the reason and the rule determining the direction of the Divine volition to definite objects. God loves His own goodness and therefore He wills its glorification and communication ad extra, and determines by what means these objects are to be attained. Thus the love of God for Himself causes Him to will things outside Him, just as the desires and inclinations of our will cause us to act; with this difference, however, that in God the satisfaction of such desires is neither a want nor a cause of new volitions.

The doctrine here stated is common among the theologians, although they differ in the way of expressing it. See Ruiz, De Voluntate Dei, disp. xv.

IV. Another consequence of the identity of Will and Substance in God is the peculiar relation between the Divine Will and its objects, and between the objects themselves. The love of self is, with creatures, a condition and the starting-point of all their volitions. As, however, the objects of their desires exist outside and independently of them, and as their perfection and felicity are themselves dependent on the possession of external goods, the love of self is not a sufficient object for all their volitions; it is itself but part of higher aims and objects. But God is Himself the proximate and principal object of His volition. All other things the Divine Will attains without being in any way determined or perfected by them; they are either not intended for themselves at all, or at most as subordinate ends. “The Lord hath made all things for Himself” (Prov. 16:4). God has created the world “of His own goodness, not to increase His happiness or to acquire but to manifest His goodness by means of the good things which He bestows on creatures” (Vatican Council, sess. iii., ch. 1).

The manner in which God’s Love of Self determines His love of creatures is as follows:—

1. As the Infinite Good is most communicable, fruitful, and powerful, the love of it implies love of communicating it.

2. Again, as it is the Supreme Beauty, and is capable of being copied and multiplied, the love of it excites a love of reproducing it.

3. The supreme dignity and majesty of the highest Good is worthy of honour and glory; hence God is induced to create beings able to give Him honour and glory.

Thus all things find the motive of their existence in the Divine Self-Love; and in it, too, they find their ultimate object. They are made in order to participate in the goodness of God, and to cling to Him with love; to reproduce His beauty, to know and to praise it; to submit to His majesty by honouring and serving Him.

From this genesis and order of God’s volitions we infer another difference between the manner in which the Divine Will and the created will bear upon their objects. The created will, when willing things as means and instruments to other ends, does not value them in themselves, but only inasmuch as they are means. God, on the contrary, although His creatures are only means to His glory, intends really and truly that they should possess the perfections communicated to them, and He takes pleasure in the goodness, beauty, and dignity, which make them copies of the Divine ideal; nay, He offers Himself as the object of their possession and fruition. Hence we perceive the benevolence, esteem, and appreciation with which God honours the goodness and dignity of His creatures. There is no selfishness on His side and no degradation on the side of creatures, although they are but means for the glory of God.

V. Another consequence of the identity of Will and Substance in God is that all the positive and negative attributes of the Divine Substance must be applied to the Divine Will. It is absolutely independent, simple, infinite, immutable, eternal, omnipresent, etc.

SECT. 83.—THE ABSOLUTE FREEDOM OF GOD’S WILL

I. First of all it is certain that liberty of choice cannot be attributed to all the volitions of the Divine Will. God’s absolute perfection necessarily includes the absolutely perfect action of His Will, necessarily directed to the Divine Essence as the highest good. The necessity of this act is even greater than the necessity which proceeds from the nature of creatures and compels them to act; because it is founded in, and identical with, the Divine Essence. For this very same reason, however, the act of the Divine Will includes the perfection essential to acts of the will, viz. the acting for an end with consciousness and pleasure; for God knowingly and willingly loves His own lovableness.

II. Liberty of choice is attributable to the Divine Will only in respect to external things; and, as these are dependent for their existence on a Divine volition, this creative volition itself is in the free choice of God. This is defined by the Vatican Council, “God created the world of freest design” (sess. iii., chap, 1), “If any one shall say that God did not create with a will free from all necessity, but did so as necessarily as He loves Himself; let him be anathema” (can. v.).

1. Holy Scripture fittingly describes the liberty of choice in God: “Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will” (Eph. 1:11); and again, “Who has predestinated us … according to the purpose of His Will” (1:5). See also Rom. 9:18; 1 Cor. 12:11; John 3:8.

2. The following considerations contain the proofs from reason and the solution of difficulties.

(a.) God is perfectly free to create or not to create beings outside of Himself. Such beings are neither necessary in themselves nor necessary to the beatitude or perfection of God; they can only serve to his external glory, which, however, is not necessary to Him because His essential glory is all-sufficient. If, indeed, God creates, He must do so for His own glory, and it is the love of His own glory that moves Him to create. But if He wills not to create, He is not bound to intend His external glory. The Love of Himself moves Him to create, in as far as it appears to Him fitting that He should be glorified by creatures and should be enabled to find delight in external glory. But there is no necessity here, because God might assert his Self-Love in another way, viz. by abstaining from producing other beings, and thus proving Himself the sole necessary and absolutely self-sufficient Being. This consideration gains additional force from the dogma that the Trinity is an infinite communication, ad intra, of the Divine perfections.

(b.) Again, God is free to create the world with any degree of perfection He chooses; He is not bound to create a world of the greatest possible perfection. If He is free to create or not to create, He is likewise free to create any of the many worlds alike possible and unnecessary to Him. Moreover, however perfect a created world be conceived, it would always be finite, and therefore a still more perfect one could be conceived. Hence, if God was bound to create the most perfect world possible, He would be unable to create at all, because a world at once finite and incapable of higher perfection involves a contradiction. All that can be said is this: once God has determined upon creating a world, His own moral perfection requires that He should realize the idea in a fitting manner, and ordain everything to His own glory. Thus God is bound by His wisdom and goodness to ordain particular things to the ends of the whole world of His choice, and the whole world to His own glory.

(c.) God is free in His choice of the particular beings through which the general object of creation is to be attained; and also in the determination of the position which each particular being is to occupy in the universe, and in the degree of perfection to be granted to them. This principle applies especially to the creation of beings of the same kind. No man has a better claim than any other to be called into existence or to be distinguished by particular gifts. Holy Scripture often mentions this point in order to set forth God’s absolute dominion over His creatures, and over His gifts to them, and to excite the gratitude of men for the gifts so freely bestowed upon them by the Divine bounty. It ought, however, to be borne in mind that, if God favours some creatures with extraordinary gifts, He refuses to none the perfections required by their nature. “And I went down into the potter’s house, and behold he was doing a work on the wheel. And the vessel was broken which he was making of clay with his hands: and turning he made another vessel, as it seemed good in his eyes to make it. Then the word of the Lord came to me, saying: Cannot I do with you as this potter, O house of Israel? saith the Lord. Behold as clay is in the hand of the potter, so are you in My hand, O house of Israel. I will suddenly speak against a nation, and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy it” (Jer. 18:3–7). Cf. Ecclus. 33:10 sqq.; Rom. 9:20 sqq.

III. Although the Divine volition of finite things is free from antecedent necessity, it is subject to the necessity consequent upon the Divine wisdom, sanctity, and immutability. Once God has freely decreed certain objects, He is bound, by “consequent necessity,” to decree likewise all that is necessarily connected as means or otherwise with these objects. The older Theologians give to this “Willing” of God, regulated by His wisdom, sanctity and immutability, the name of voluntas ordinata, in contradistinction to the voluntas simplex, a willing which has its only foundation in the Divine liberty.

The willing of an end does not always entail the necessary willing of particular means. The same end may often be attained by various means; and besides the necessary means, others merely useful or ornamental may be chosen. Hence the Divine Will, even when acting in consequence of a previous decree, has scope left for freedom. There is, then, in God a twofold simple volition, viz. the willing of ultimate ends and the willing of certain means thereto. Yet, this simple willing is not arbitrary—that is, entirely without reason,—and therefore unwise and unholy. The wisdom and sanctity of a choice do not always require a special reason for the preference given; it is sufficient that there be (1) a general reason for making a choice, (2) the consciousness that the choice is really free, and (3) the intention to direct the object of the preference to a wise and holy end; and all these conditions are all fulfilled in the Divine simple Volition. These notions are important on account of their bearing on the difficult question of predestination.

SECT. 84.—THE AFFECTIONS (AFFECTUS) OF THE DIVINE WILL, ESPECIALLY LOVE

I. The Divine perfection excludes all affections which imply bodily activity, excitement of the mind, passivity, and, à fortiori, passions which dim the mind and upset the will. When speaking of the affections of the Divine Will, we consider its acts in as far as they bear on their objects in an eminent manner, a relation analogous to that which our will bears to its objects when moved by our various feelings. Affections not essentially connected with imperfection, such as love and delight, exist formally in God; other affections, which imply imperfection, or a certain unrest, such as fear and sadness, are only improperly or metaphorically attributed to Him. In other words, God contains formally only such affections as are determined by His own Essence. The Divine Will cannot be affected by anything external; hence, if by analogy with ourselves we distinguish many affections in God, they ought not to be conceived as really distinct or conflicting, but as virtually contained in the one act of the Divine Substance. Between the affections which have God Himself for their immediate object, such as complacency in His goodness, love, benevolence, and joy, it is almost impossible to find even a virtual distinction. The other Divine affections, which have creatures for their object, spring from the former, and are ramifications of the Divine Self-Love.

II. With the aid of these principles, it will be possible to determine in detail which affections can be attributed to the Divine Will.

1. The affection most properly attributable to the Divine Will is delight in what is good and beautiful. The primary object of this Divine complacency is the infinite Goodness and Beauty of the Divine Essence; the secondary objects are its created representations. From the complacency in what is good, the hatred or abomination of what is wicked is inseparable. This affection is connected, in created wills, with a feeling of disgust and displeasure, increasing with the degree of appreciation of the evil attained. This painful sensation, however, is not essential to the abomination of evil. It does not exist in God, Who knows that by His power and wisdom evil itself is made subservient to the ultimate end of creation.

2. A benevolent inclination towards Himself, the Highest Good, and towards the beings which participate in His Goodness, is another formal and proper attribute of the Divine Will. The contrary affection, viz. hatred or malevolence, is impossible in God. Hatred consists in wishing some one evil precisely as evil; it takes pleasure in the evil of the person hated, and strives, to a greater or lesser extent, to destroy the hateful object. Such an affection is not only unworthy of God and incompatible with His absolute repose and beatitude, but is also contrary to the nature of the Divine Will, inasmuch as the latter operates on creatures only to communicate the Divine Goodness to them. God continues His benevolence to sinners, even when they are damned in hell, for He wills their natural good even in hell, and does not begrudge them happiness; He wills their punishment only inasmuch as by it the order of the whole of creation, of which the sinners are members, is maintained; and the sinners themselves receive the sole good available to them, viz. the forced submission to the order of God’s universe. When Scripture speaks of God’s hatred of sin, or uses similar expressions, the “hatred of what is wicked” ought always to be understood, and not mere malevolence.

3. Other affections formally attributable to the Divine Will are joy and delight in God’s infinite Beauty and Goodness, as enjoyed by Himself or shared by His creatures. Pain and sadness, on the contrary, are affections entirely incompatible with the repose and happiness of the Divine Will, and are only metaphorically applicable to God. The same is true of pity, the noblest kind of sadness. God acts, indeed, as if He felt pity; but, although the effect is there, the affection is wanting. The desire for things not yet possessed is likewise impossible in God.

4. If hatred and sadness can find no room in the Divine Will on account of the imperfections they imply, much more must affections like hope and fear, respect and admiration, anger and repentance be excluded. Holy Scripture hardly ever attributes hope or fear to God, but often anger and repentance. This way of speaking is adopted in order to make the actions of God intelligible to the reader. God acts as we conceive an angry man would do under the same circumstances.

III. Love is foremost among the Divine affections; it is the type upon which all His other affections are modelled. God is Love, all Love, and Love pure and simple; whatever is against love is against the Nature of God, and is essentially excluded from Him; whatever is according to love, is according to the inclination and disposition of the Divine Nature. Hence the meaning of the expressions: “God, Whose nature is goodness” (St. Leo), and “God is charity (ἀγάπη),” 1 John 4:8. Love, caritas, ἀγάπη), and bonitas here must be taken as expressing benevolent love, by which we wish well to other beings just as we do to ourselves. Love, as here described, is indeed foremost among, and characteristic of, all Divine affections; but it is not their living root and their real principle. This is Love only in as far as by love we understand the complacency which God finds in the infinite Goodness of His Essence, and which takes the form of the noblest kind of love, charity.

IV. God’s benevolent love of His creatures is characterized by the following properties:—

1. God’s benevolent love of creatures actually existing is, in substance, His love of Himself freely directed towards determinate beings which receive their existence in virtue of His Love.

2. It is a gratuitous love, freely bestowed without any claim on the part of the creature, and without any profit on the part of God.

3. By reason of its origin in the Divine Wisdom and Self-Love, God’s love of creatures is essentially wise and holy, directed towards their salvation, and necessarily subordinating them to the highest good. It is, therefore, infinitely different from a blind and weak tenderness, which would sacrifice to the capricious desires of creatures their own salvation and the honour of God. Such tenderness is unworthy of God; it would be impure love, not deserving the name of charity. Holiness is an essential element in pure love, and if we distinguish pure love from holy love it is only in order to point out the absolute gratuity of the former.

4. The Divine Love of creatures is eminently intimate. It is identical with God’s Love of Himself, and embraces creatures in their innermost being, and tends to unite them with Him in the fruition of His own perfection. Hence arises the unitive force proper to Divine Love. The love of creatures for each other brings them together, but the Love of God for creatures unites the creature to the Creator.

5. The Divine Love is eminently an ecstatic love—that is, God causes His Love, and with His Love His goodness, to expand and to overflow ad extra, and to pervade and replenish His creatures. Humanly speaking, it may even be said that, in the Incarnation, God, out of love for His creatures, “empties” Himself (Phil. 2:7), inasmuch as, without sacrificing His internal glory and absolute honour, He renounces, in His adopted humanity, all external glory. The “ecstasis” of the Divine Love aims at bringing the beloved creatures into the closest union with God; whence that famous circle of the Divine Love described by Dionysius the Areopagite, De Div. Nom., c. iv.

6. The Divine Love is eminently universal and all-embracing. On the part of God the love is the same for each and all its objects, because in the Divine act itself there are no degrees. But it manifests itself in various degrees, so that, on the part of the beloved objects, more love is shown to the better ones than to the less perfect. In this respect God loves one object more than another, because He has willed the one to be better than the other, and has adorned the one with choicer gifts than the other.

7. The Divine Love is eminently fertile and inexhaustible.

8. Lastly, the negative attributes of infinity, immutability, and eternity belong also to the act of Divine Love, although its external manifestations are subject to the limitation, mutability, and temporality of their objects.

All the distinguishing properties of the Divine Love shine forth most brilliantly in the supernatural “love of friendship” which God has for His rational creatures. By this supernatural love, He loves them as He loves Himself, elevating them to the participation in His own beatitude, and giving Himself to them in many ways. It is that “charity or love of God” which the New Testament chiefly and almost exclusively recommends.

SECT. 85.—MORAL PERFECTION OF THE DIVINE WILL

I. In God there can be no moral imperfection, no sin or anything approaching thereto. With Him, the impossibility of sinning or participating in sin is absolute and metaphysical, not only because the possibility of sinning would destroy His infinite perfection, but especially because of the nature of sin. Sin consists in preferring one’s self to God; in other words, in opposing personal interests to the Supreme Good and giving them preference. But such opposition is impossible with God, because His own Self and His interests are identical with the Supreme Good. This immaculate purity and absolute freedom from all sin is termed Sanctity or Holiness, in the sense of the classical definition given by the Areopagite: “Holiness is purity free from all fault, altogether perfect and spotless in every respect.” In order to complete the concept of sanctity, it is necessary to add that God is inaccessible to sin or to contact with sin, because He positively abominates it with an abomination proportionate to the esteem He has for the Supreme Good which sin despises—that is, with an infinite abomination. Hence the Divine purity is infinite, and implies an infinite distance between God and sin. Holy Scripture frequently insists upon the Divine sanctity as here described. “God is faithful and without iniquity, He is just and right” (Deut. 32:4); “Is God unjust (ἄδικος)? God forbid” (Rom. 3:5, 6). See, also, Rom. 9:14; 1 John 3:9; Hab. 1:13; Ps. 5:5, and 44:8.

God’s infinite detestation of sin entails the impossibility not only of willing sin as an end, but also of intending it positively as a means to other ends; He can only have the will to permit sin, and to make use of such permission as an occasion to bring about good. To permit sin, when able to prevent it, would, indeed, be against moral perfection in a created being, because the creature is bound to further the honour of God as much as lies in its power, and also because it is unable to repair the disorder inherent in sin. God, on the other hand, may dispose of His honour as He chooses, not, indeed, by sacrificing it, but by furthering it in any way He pleases, either by preventing sin or by converting or punishing the sinner. Both of these ways manifest God’s abomination of sin, and are, therefore, independently of other reasons, eligible means for the manifestation of His glory. Consequently, although sin is always an evil, the permission of sin is, on the part of God, a positive good. It may even be said that the permission of sin is better than its entire prevention.

When Holy Scripture uses expressions which seem to imply that God positively intends evil, they must be understood in the above sense. Unlike man, who permits evil only when he cannot prevent it, God, in His Wisdom and power, predetermines the permission of evil and ordains it to His ultimate ends. Cf. St. Thorn., 1 2, q. 79: “Utrum Deus sit causa peccati.”

II. Positively speaking, the moral perfection of God consists in the essential and immutable direction of His Will on Himself as the supreme object of all volition, and in the infinite love and esteem of Himself included in this act, the perfection of which is enhanced by the fact that the highest Good, the ultimate object of all volition, is, for the Divine Will, the immediate and only formal object, and that all other goods are objects of the Divine Will only because and in as far as they are subordinated to the highest good. A more pure, exalted, and constant volition of what is good cannot be conceived.

In its positive aspect also the moral perfection of God is called Holiness. This name is applied to the moral goodness of creatures when considered as a direction of the will towards the highest moral object, viz. the absolute dignity and majesty of God; and the designation is the more appropriate the more the creature disposes its whole life according to the exaltedness of such an object, and develops greater purity, energy, and constancy in morals. It is, therefore, evident that sanctity is the most, and indeed the only, convenient name for the moral perfection of God.

III. God’s absolute moral perfection necessarily implies the possession of all the virtues of creatures. It is, however, evident that many of these cannot exist actually in the Creator. Thus, for instance, religion and obedience, which imply submission to a higher being; faith and hope, which presuppose a state of imperfection; and temperance, which requires a subject composed of mind and matter, are all alike impossible in God. They are only virtually contained in the Divine perfection, viz. inasmuch as they express esteem for the highest good and for the good order of things. Some moral virtues, such as fortitude and meekness, are metaphorically attributed to God, only to bring out the absence of the opposite vices of pusillanimity and anger. Those virtues alone belong formally to the moral perfection of God which manifest and bring into operation the excellence of their subject; and they belong to Him in an eminent manner, so that all the Divine virtues are purely active and regal virtues.

The royal character of the Divine virtues appears in their exercise, in their diversity, and in their organic relations, which, in the moral life of God, are widely different from what they are in creatures. In creatures, all virtues, even those which have an external object, tend to increase the inner perfection of the virtuous subject. Not so with God; His perfection would be the same if He abstained from the exercise of any external virtue; and as the only virtue essential to His perfection (viz. self-love and self-esteem) is pure act identical with the Divine Essence, it cannot be spoken of as exercised—that is, as passing from potentiality to actuality. The virtues of creatures are manifold because they bear upon many objects and admit of various degrees of perfection. In God only one object, absolutely simple and perfect, is attained by the Divine Will, and consequently a diversity of virtues can only be based upon the remote and secondary objects of the Divine volitions. The organic unity of the virtues of creatures consists in the subordination of all others under the Love of God, which, like a bond of perfection, embraces and contains them all. But in God all virtues are one, because He can will nothing but Himself and things that are subordinated to Him as their supreme good. His infinite Love is the root from which all His other virtues spring, as it is also the root and essence of His Sanctity. The ramifications of the Divine Charity can, however, be considered as special moral virtues, because they represent special forms, or a special exercise of the Divine Goodness. The moral virtues in God are united more closely than in man, so much so that even the two most opposed of them, mercy and justice, are never exercised separately.

The Divine virtues which are directed to external objects—that is, the moral virtues—can be reduced to goodness, justice and truth, the last being taken in the sense of moral wisdom and veracity. These three are the fundamental types of all the other moral virtues in God: they are manifested in all His moral actions, and represent the principal directions into which the more special moral virtues branch off. We have already dealt with the nature of the Divine Goodness in the chapter on Divine Love; it remains, therefore, to determine the absolute character of the Divine Justice, so far as it differs from created justice and is exercised in union with Divine goodness and truth. It is precisely its inseparability from Goodness and Truth which frees the Divine Justice from the restrictions and the dependence of created justice.

SECT. 86.—THE JUSTICE OF GOD

I. Taken in its widest sense, justice may be defined as the rectitude of the will; that is, the disposition of the will and its acts in accordance with truth. In this sense, justice expresses the moral character of all the Divine virtues, including goodness. It differs from justice in creatures in that it is not a conformity with a higher rule, but a conformity or agreement with the Essence and Wisdom of God Himself, or, as the Theologians express it: “condecentia divinæ bonitatis et sapientiæ.” Taken in a narrower sense, as distinct from goodness, justice designates in God and creatures a virtue which observes or introduces a certain order in external actions, and especially adapts the actions to the exigencies of the beings to which they refer. Created justice supposes an existing order, and the beings to which it adapts its actions are always more or less independent of the agent; whereas Divine Justice deals with an order established by God, and with beings entirely dependent on Him. Hence Divine Justice can have no other object than to dispose the works of God in a manner befitting His excellence and leading to His glory. This character is best expressed by the term “Architectonic Justice,” which implies that it is not ruled or bound by any claim existing in its object, but that it consists in the conformity of determinate Divine actions with the archetypes of the Divine works existing in the Divine Mind. Thus the human artist works out his plans, not in order to satisfy the exigencies of the work of art, but to reproduce and realize his own conceptions. If the Divine Artist, unlike the human, deals with personal beings, this does not destroy the architectonic character of His Justice, for personal dignity has a claim on the Divine Justice only in as far as the Divine Wisdom effects the beauty and perfection of His works by treating each being according to its own nature, and by giving each of them exactly that place in the general order of things which its intrinsic value demands. The only real right which stands in the presence of the Divine Will, and determines the whole order of its action, is the right of Divine Majesty: to the Divine Majesty all external works of God must be subjected, to it all the beings coming within the sphere of the Divine Justice must be directed.

II. Human justice and goodness differ in this, that justice is prompted to act by a duty towards another being, whereas goodness acts freely on its own impulse. The Architectonic Justice of God, on the contrary, involves no moral necessity of satisfying the claims of any other being; whatever moral necessity it involves originates in God Himself, Who is bound to act in accordance with His Wisdom, His Will, and His Excellence. In this sense Holy Scripture often calls the Divine Justice “truth,” viz. God is just, because He is true to Himself. His Wisdom requires Him to make all things good and beautiful, and consequently to give each being what its nature demands, and to assign to each that position in the universal order which corresponds with the ultimate object of creation and with the dignity of the Divine Wisdom; His sovereign Will requires that the ends intended should be always attained in one way or another, and consequently that the means necessary to these ends be forthcoming; His excellence and dignity require Him to dispose all His works in a manner tending to the manifestation and glorification of His own goodness; above all, His truthfulness and fidelity demand that He should not deny Himself in those acts by which He invites His creatures to expect with confidence a communication of His truth and of His possessions, for if creatures were deceived in their confidence, God would appear contemptible to them. God can bind Himself to actions which in every respect are free and remain free even after they are promised. Such obligation, however, is not in opposition to perfect freedom and independence, because it is always founded upon an act of the Divine goodness. Nor does this latter circumstance interfere with the strictness of the obligation, because the respect which God owes to Himself is infinitely more inviolable than any title arising from anything outside Him. Hence, although creatures have no formal claims on God, they have a greater certainty that justice will be done to them than if they really possessed such claims. “For My name’s sake I will remove My wrath afar off, and for My praise I will bridle thee, lest thou shouldst perish.… For My own sake, for My own sake, I will do it, that I may not be blasphemed” (Isai. 48:9, 11; cf. Deut. 7:9 and 32:4; 1 John 1:9).

III. Another consequence of the architectonic character of the Divine Justice is its very intimate connection with the Divine goodness. God’s Justice crowns and perfects His goodness, which would be essentially imperfect if the beings called into existence by it were not disposed and maintained in the order upheld by the Divine Justice. Sometimes certain acts of the Justice of God are attributed to His Justice alone, as distinguished from His goodness; for instance, the punishment of sinners and the permission of sin. But these acts are also acts of goodness, not so much towards the individual as towards the universe as a whole, the beauty and perfection of which require that at least incorrigible sinners should be reduced to order by punishment. As to the permission of sin, it is quite compatible with the perfection of the universe that free scope should be given to the failings of creatures and to their liberty of choice between good and evil; it is in harmony with the nature of reasonable creatures, and affords the Creator manifold opportunities for manifesting His power, wisdom, and goodness.

IV. If we compare the Divine Justice, as extended to mankind, with the several forms and functions of human justice, it evidently appears as a royal, that is a governing and Providential, Justice. It embraces all the functions necessary for the establishment, enforcement, and maintenance of order in a community, viz. legislative, distributive, administrative, and judicial. Commutative justice, however, has no place in God, because it can only be exercised between beings more or less independent of each other. “Who hath first given Him and recompense shall be made him?” (Rom. 11:35). Nevertheless, certain functions of the Divine Justice, notably those which belong to justice as distinguished from goodness, bear an analogy with commutative justice, and are spoken of in this sense by Holy Scripture. The analogy consists in the fact that God and every rational creature stand to each other as personal beings, and that, on the ground of this mutual relation, a certain interchange of gifts and services, and a certain recognition of “mine and thine” are conceivable. There are three functions of the Divine Justice which are better understood if considered from this point of view than from that of providential Justice alone.

I. In rewarding good actions, God treats them as services done to Himself, and gives the reward as a corresponding remuneration on His side. If He has promised it in a determinate form, creatures possess a sort of title to it, and He cannot withhold it without depriving them of what is their due. But this right and property are themselves free gifts of God, because He makes the promise freely and He freely co-operates with the creature performing the good action, which, moreover, He can claim as His own in virtue of His sovereign dominion over all things. As St. Leo beautifully observes, “God rewards us for what He Himself has given us” (Sua in nobis Dens dona coronat). Thus He is in no way a debtor to creatures, because He is in no way dependent upon them.

2. The punishment of evil is, likewise, more than a reaction of Providential Justice against the disturbance of order. God treats sin as an offence against His dignity, an injustice by which the sinner incurs the duty of satisfaction, a debt which he is bound to pay even when he repents of his sin. Hence the Vindictive Justice of God is more than, the guardian of the moral order in general; it is particularly an “Exacting” Justice by which God guards His own rights. This distinction is important, because the vindictive action of God against incorrigible sinners is a necessary consequence of His wisdom, whereas the exaction of satisfaction is a free exercise of His right, and, as such, is subject to the most varied modifications.

3. Lastly the permission of sin might be brought under the head of analogical commutative justice, inasmuch as it is a “leaving to each one what is his own.” Evil and sin have their origin in the fact that creatures are nothing by themselves, and possess nothing but what is freely given them by God; whence the permission of evil and sin is, on the part of God, a leaving the creature to what is its own, and may therefore be considered as an act of “Permissive” Justice. When God allows the nothingness and the defectibility of the creature to come, so to speak, into play, He manifests His own primary right as much as when He punishes sin; for He manifests Himself as alone essentially good, owing no man anything and needing nothing from any man.

V. From these explanations it follows that the Divine Justice in all its functions, but especially in the three last-named, presupposes, and is based upon, the exercise of the Divine goodness. The Divine goodness, therefore, pervades and influences the whole working of the Divine Justice. God always gives greater rewards than justice requires; He always exacts less and punishes less than He justly could exact and punish; and He permits fewer evils than He could justly permit. Theologians commonly ascribe this influence of God’s goodness on His justice more to His Mercy or merciful bounty, not only because it manifests itself even in favour of those who make themselves unworthy of it, but also because it is chiefly determined by God’s pity on the natural misery of the creatures. In fact, God rewards beyond merit, and punishes or exacts satisfaction below what is due, on account of the limited capabilities of creatures; He softens His vindictive justice in view of the frailty of the sinner, and He restricts the permission of evil in view of the misery which evil entails upon creatures.

The intimate union of Justice and goodness in God prevents His permitting sin as a means of manifesting His vindictive Justice, just as He wills good in order to manifest His retributive justice. The manifestation of vindictive justice is the object of the punishment of sin; it is only the object of the permission of sin in as far as the permission of continuation or increase of sin is the punishment of a first fault. The first fault or sin can only be permitted by the Justice of God in as far as He thereby intends the maintenance of the order of the universe and of Divine and human liberty on the one hand, and on the other the manifestation of the nothingness of creatures and of the power of God, Who is able to make sin itself subservient to His glorification. With equal reason it might be said that God permits first sins in order to manifest His mercy, not only to those whom He preserves from sin, but especially that kind of mercy which can be shown to sinners only.

SECT. 87.—GOD’S MERCY AND VERACITY

I. The Divine goodness towards creatures assumes different names according to the different aspects under which it is considered. It is called Magnificence, Loving-kindness (pietas, gratia), Liberality, and Mercy. Of all these, the last named is the most beautiful and the most comprehensive, including, as it does, the meaning of all the others. The Divine Liberality in particular must be viewed in connection with the Divine Mercy in order to be seen in its full grandeur. In the service of Mercy, the liberality of God appears as constantly relieving some want on the part of creatures; as undisturbed by the worthlessness or even the positive unworthiness of the receiver of its gifts, nay, as taking occasion therefrom to increase its activity; as preventing the abuse or the loss of its free gifts through the frailty of the receivers. Whence we see that the supernatural graces bestowed upon creatures before they committed any sin, as well as afterwards, are attributable to the Divine Mercy. But the preservation from and the forgiveness of sin, are especially described as acts of God’s Mercy, because they imply a preservation or relief from an evil incurred through the creature’s own fault. In this respect, the Divine Mercy appears as Forgiving-kindness, Indulgence, Clemency, Meekness, Patience, and Longanimity. Holy Scripture often accumulates these various names in order to excite our hope and kindle our love of God. “The Lord is compassionate and merciful: long-suffering and plenteous in mercy. He will not always be angry, nor will He threaten for ever. He hath not dealt with us according to our sins: nor rewarded us according to our iniquities. For according to the height of the heaven above the earth: He hath strengthened His mercy towards them that fear Him” (Ps. 102:8 sqq.; see also Ps. 144:8; Wisd. 11:24 sqq.; 12:1 sqq.).

The mercy of God is infinite in its essential act; but its operations ad extra have limits assigned to them by the wise decrees of the Divine freedom. In this sense we should understand the text, “He hath mercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hardeneth” (Rom. 9:18).

II. Veracity and truth stand midway between the goodness and justice of God, inasmuch as, on the one hand, their object is the dispensing of a free gift to man, and inasmuch as, on the other hand, they imply the moral and hypothetical necessity to act in a certain manner.

1. The Divine Veracity, in general, consists in this, that God cannot directly and positively cause error in creatures, any more than He can directly cause sin. When God formally addresses His creatures and exacts their faith in His words, He cannot lead them into error. This Veracity is eminently a Divine virtue, not only because mendacity is incompatible with His sanctity, but also and especially because it is infinitely more opposed to the nature and dignity of God than it is to human nature and dignity; for a lie on God’s part would be an abuse, not of a confidence founded on ordinary motives, but of a confidence founded on sovereign authority.

2. The same must be said of the Divine fidelity in the fulfilment of promises. A promise once made by God, is irrevocable because of the Divine immutability. God is also faithful in a wider sense, viz. the Divine Will is “consequent” in its decrees, carrying out whatever it intends. “He who hath begun a good work in you will perfect it” (Phil. 1:6). Both forms of fidelity usually act together, especially in the administration of the supernatural order of grace; so that in this order the simple prayers of man have, to a certain extent, as infallible a claim on the Divine goodness and mercy as the good works of the just have on the Divine Justice. “He that sent Me is true” (John 8:26); “God is not as a man that He should lie, nor as the son of man that He should be changed. Hath He said then, and will He not do? hath He spoken, and will He not fulfil?” (Numb. 23:19. Cf. John 3:33; Rom. 3:4; Ps. 144:13; Heb. 10:23; 2 Tim. 2:13; Matt. 24:35). Although every word of God is equal to an oath—an oath being the invocation of God as a witness of the truth—still God, condescending to human frailty, has given to His chief promises the form of an oath, swearing however by Himself as there is no higher being. “God, making promise to Abraham, because He had no one greater by whom He might swear, swore by Himself” (Heb. 6:13).

SECT. 88.—EFFICACY OF THE DIVINE WILL—ITS DOMINION OVER CREATED WILLS

I. In all rational beings, the will is the determining principle of their external activity, the perfection of which is proportioned to the perfection of the will and of the person willing. The Divine Will, being in itself absolutely perfect and identical with the Divine Wisdom, Power, and Dignity, possesses the highest possible efficacy in its external operations: all being and all activity proceed from it, and are supported by it, so that nothing is done without its influence or permission. Sovereign control over every other will is exercised by the Divine Will, and is the brightest manifestation of its internal perfection. We are about to study this particular aspect of the Divine Will in its bearing upon the created will: its general efficacy has been dealt with in the section on Omnipotence.

II. The Divine Will exhibits to the created will the ideal of moral perfection and sanctity to be aimed at; and, in virtue of the absolute excellence and dominion of God, the decrees of His Will impose upon the created will a law which creatures are in duty bound to fulfil. The power of God is the only power which can impose a duty in virtue of its own excellence; wherefore also every duty ought to be founded upon the power of God as upon its binding principle. The created will is essentially dependent on no other will than the Divine, and no other will than the Will of God is absolutely worshipful. On the other hand, our notion of duty implies that we are bound to do, not only what we apprehend as most in harmony with the exigencies of our nature, but also what a superior Will, to which we are essentially subjected, and which we apprehend as absolutely worshipful, commands us to do. Other law-givers can only impose obligations inasmuch as they represent God and act in His name; the exigencies of our nature are binding upon us only inasmuch as they express the Will of the Creator. Even the eternal rule of the Divine Wisdom, whereby God knows what is fitting for His creatures, only becomes law through the Divine Will commanding creatures to conform to it.

III. Again, the Divine Will acts on the created will in such a way as to move it intrinsically; that is, it influences the genesis and the direction of the acts of the human will. The created will owes its very existence and energy to the Will of God. Hence its active liberty or self-determination is the fruit of the activity of the Divine Will. The exercise of created liberty cannot be conceived independently of a Divine motive influence, so much so, that the good actions of the creature are in the first place actions of God. For the same reason, the Divine Will can move the human will, not merely from without by presenting to it motives or inducements to act, but also physically from within, so as to incline or even to impel the will to certain acts. Hence, again, the Divine Will has the power to prevent, by direct influence, all the acts of the human will which God will not permit, and to bring about all the acts which He desires to be performed, even so as to cause a complete reversion of the inclinations existing in the created will. All this God does without interfering with created freedom. He aims at and obtains the free performance of the acts in question. “It is God Who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will” (Phil. 2:13; cf. Isai. 26:12; Prov. 21:1; Rom. 11:23). This doctrine should inspire us with great confidence when praying for the conversion of obstinate sinners, or for our own conversion from inveterate evil habits: “Ad Te nostras etiam rebelles compelle propitius voluntates!” (Secret. Dom. iv. post Pent). Cf. St. Thorn., I. q. 111, a. 2.

IV. Although, absolutely speaking, the decrees of the Divine Will are always efficacious and can never be frustrated through the interference of any other will, it is nevertheless true that, in more than one respect, not all that God wills is actually accomplished. The created will sometimes opposes the Will of the Creator, resisting it and rendering His intentions vain. We cannot, however, say that the created will overcomes the Divine Will, or that the latter is powerless. In order completely to understand this point the decrees of the Divine Will should be considered separately in their principal features.

1. The decrees relating to the moral order of the world are not always fulfilled in their first and original form—that is, as expressing the moral law which God commands His creatures to follow: for creatures are physically free to refuse submission to the moral law of God. But by so doing they neither overcome the Divine Will nor do they prove it powerless. The Divine Will is not overcome, because from the beginning its decree is directed upon the alternative that either the creature shall voluntarily submit to the law, or shall be forced into submission to it by the Divine Justice. Nor is the Divine Will made powerless, because the power proper to the Divine decree is the imposition of an obligation, an obligation which binds the sinner even when he despises it. The ruling or governing decrees of the Divine Will are still less impaired by sin, because the permission of sin is included in these same decrees. Thus God always is the conqueror of sin and sinners.

2. The Divine decrees relating to the last end of rational creatures, in as far as they express the first and original intention of the Divine Will (which is that all men should be saved, 1 Tim. 2:4), are likewise liable to be frustrated through the refusal of co-operation on the part of creatures. But here also the Divine Will asserts its power. The salvation of all mankind is subordinate to a higher object, viz. the glorification of God through rational creatures. But this higher object is always attained, either by the salvation or the just punishment of man. Furthermore, the will to save all mankind is not proved powerless by the refusal of co-operation on the part of man, because its essential efficacy only consists in making salvation possible to all men; nor does its sincerity require that God should procure unconditionally the co-operation of man. Besides, it is not want of power that prevents God from enforcing co-operation, but His free Will.

3. Lastly, the Divine decrees relating to the performance of acts dependent on human co-operation may also be frustrated in as far as they only conditionally intend the performance of these acts. The decrees do not always include the will to enforce co-operation, but only to assist it and to render it possible. Whenever the will to enforce co-operation is included, co-operation is infallibly secured, for, in this supposition, God makes such use of His power as to incline the will of man freely to co-operate in the desired action.

V. Are all good actions which actually take place the effect of a Divine decree enforcing free co-operation? This is a question of detail, which cannot be solved offhand by invoking the infallible efficacy of the Divine Will, and which it would be rash to answer at once in the affirmative. Some would hold that, besides the Divine decrees which God intends to be infallibly efficacious, there may be others likewise efficacious, although not intended to be so infallibly. Considering the way in which God wills, assists, and renders possible the good deeds of man, it is not easy to admit that only those good deeds should really be performed which God unconditionally desires to be performed. If this were the case, it would seem as if God were not in earnest when He renders possible a good deed without at the same time securing its actual accomplishment. To avoid this semblance it is best not to admit a Divine decree unconditional at the outset, but rather a general decree (or intention) conditional at the outset and made absolute by the prevision of the actual fulfilment of the condition. There still remains room for the display of a special mercy in the infallible prevention of abuses of freedom; whereas, on the other hand, the frustration of the conditional decree is exclusively attributable to the misuse of freedom. More on this subject will be found in the treatise on Grace.

In theological language the above doctrine is shortly formulated as follows: The Divine Will is not always fulfilled as Voluntas Antecedens, i.e. considered in its original designs, as they are before God takes into account the actual behaviour of created wills; it is always fulfilled as Voluntas Consequens, i.e. considered in its designs as they are after taking into account the actual behaviour of free creatures. The Voluntas Antecedens is a velle secundum quid (= conditional); the Voluntas Consequens is a velle simpliciter (= absolute). It should be noted that the terms Voluntas Antecedens and Consequens are not always used in the same sense by all theologians, because they do not all consider the same object as their term of comparison. See St. Bonaventure (in I. Sent., dist. 47, a. 1) for a beautiful exposition of the doctrine here in question.

SECT. 89.—THE DIVINE WILL AS LIVING GOODNESS AND HOLINESS—GOD THE SUBSTANTIAL HOLINESS

I. As Holy Scripture expresses the whole perfection of the intellectual life of God by calling Him “the Truth,” so it describes the whole perfection of the life of His Will by calling Him “Holy,” pure and simple, or the “Holy of Holies.” “I the Lord your God am holy” (Lev. 19:2; cf. 1 Pet. 1:16). The Holiness of God, however, is more than a direction of His Will upon, and conformity with, the good and the beautiful: it is the most intimate effective union with the most perfect objective goodness and beauty. God is “the Holiness” as He is “the Truth.”

The proposition, “God is the Holiness,” implies the three following constituents:—

1. The life of the Divine Will is Holiness pure and simple and pre-eminently, because it is directed entirely, immediately, and exclusively on the infinite Goodness and Beauty of the Divine Essence, and is united with the Divine Beauty and Goodness in every conceivable manner, as complacency, love, and fruition; hence the same attributes—such as simplicity, infinity, and immutability—are applicable to both the life of the Divine Will and the goodness and beauty of the Divine Substance.

2. The life of the Divine Will is essential Holiness, because it is essentially identical with the objective Goodness and Beauty of God, and not merely united to them.

3. It is Holiness by nature; that is, the Divine Nature contains Holiness as its proper energy. Holiness is a constituent element of the Divine Nature, whereas created nature possesses only a capacity for holiness. Thus, the Divine Holiness is a substantial Holiness, and God is Holiness just as He is Truth and Life.

It is evident that the eminent sanctity of God, as above described, is an attribute proper to Him alone.

II. As God is the substantial Holiness and, à fortiori the substantial Goodness, He is the Ideal and the source of all pleasure and love, of all joy and delight, of all the tendencies and appetites of creatures, which only acquire their goodness by adhering to goods outside and above them, and, in the last resort, by adhering to the Creator. Hence God’s Goodness and Holiness, immovable in themselves, are the principle of all motion and of all rest in created life; and the life of creatures is but an exhalation from and a participation of the Substantial Goodness of God. This applies more particularly to the life of spiritual creatures, whose goodness consists in conformity with the life of God, and is the work of the life-giving influence of the Divine Goodness. God’s bounty manifests its power and fecundity most in the supernatural order, by leading His spiritual creatures to a participation of His own life—”partakers of the Divine Nature” (2 Pet. 1:4). That participation, however, by which the blessed spirits see God face to face and are filled with His own beatitude, is but accidental to them; it makes them godlike, but not gods.

SECT. 90.—THE BEATITUDE AND GLORY OF THE DIVINE LIFE

I. God possesses, or rather is, infinite Beatitude and Glory. The life of God essentially consists in the most perfect knowledge and love of the most perfect goodness and beauty; a knowledge and love which confer the highest possible satisfaction, fruition and repose—that is, the greatest beatitude. On the other hand, the activity of the Divine Life is resplendent with all the beauty of the Divine Intellect and the Divine Substance, and is therefore the highest Glory. In a word, God is Beatitude and Glory, because He is Truth and Holiness. For this reason Scripture calls Him “the Blessed God” (ὁ μακάριος, 1 Tim. 1:11, 6:15); and often points out that He alone possesses glory pure and simple, because He alone is deserving of praise pure and simple. A created spirit neither possesses nor is entitled to a felicity and glory like the Divine. Even the felicity to which it is naturally or supernaturally destined is not intrinsically connected with its nature, but is acquired from without, under the helping and sustaining influence of God. The supernatural glory given by God to His creatures by admitting them to a participation of His own Beatitude, is a splendid manifestation of the Divine Glory, which again gives God the greatest external glory, and confers upon the creature the highest conceivable honour.

II. A deeper insight into the Divine Beatitude and glory will be gained from the following considerations.

1. The reason why the Divine Felicity is absolute is because God is Himself, and possesses in Himself, whatever can be the object of beatifying possession and fruition. He is the highest good; His Knowledge and Love of Himself adequately embrace Himself as the highest good, and thus constitute infinite honour, glory, and praise. Created beings can but imitate the glory which God draws from Himself. The possession of external goods adds nothing to the Divine Beatitude: they contribute to it only in so far as God knows and loves His power and dominion, of which external goods are manifestations; consequently they may not even be called accidental beatitude, because they are only an external revelation of the internal beatitude. The beatitude of created spirits is essentially relative. It is proportioned to their capacities and merits, and consists in the possession and fruition of external goods, in the last instance, of God, on which they are dependent for their felicity. To be loved and honoured by God is an element essential to the beatitude of creatures; nay, the highest delight of the beatified spirits is not caused by the fact that they possess the highest good, but by the fact that God possesses the highest Beatitude and Glory; they rejoice in their own felicity because they know that it contributes to the Glory of God.

2. The Divine Glory is also absolute, not only because it is the highest Glory, but because it finds in God Himself an object of infinite beauty and splendour. Outside of God, there is nothing to which He owes any honour or glory; the glory which creatures deserve is a free gift of His Goodness, and is, in the last resort, the Glory of God Himself. Hence the glory of created spirits is purely relative.

Since the Beatitude and Glory of God are absolutely perfect in themselves, no Divine operation can tend to complete or to increase them. When God operates, He can only communicate out of His own perfection. But this communication takes place in two directions—without and within. The necessary operation within, by which the fulness of God’s Beatitude and Glory is communicated and revealed, forms the fundamental idea of the mystery of the Blessed Trinity.

PART II

THE DIVINE TRINITY

THE whole doctrine of the Trinity has been extensively dealt with by the Fathers who opposed the Arian heresy. The classical writings are the following: St. Athanasius, Contra Arianos Orationes Quatuor (on the Divinity of the Son; see Card. Newman’s annotated translation), and Ad Serapionem Epistolæ Quatuor (on the Divinity of the Holy Ghost); St. Basil, Contra Eunomium (especially the solution of philosophical and dialectical objections—the genuineness of the last two books is questioned), and De Spiritu Sancto ad Amphilochium; St. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium; Didymus, De Trinitate and De Spiritu Sancto; St. Cyril of Alexandria, Thesaurus de SS. Trinitate; St. Hilary of Poitiers, De Trin. (a systematic demonstration and defence of the dogma); St. Ambrose, De Fide Trinitatis (specially the consubstantiality of the Son), and De Spiritu S.; St. Augustine, De Trinitate—the latter part of this work (bks. viii.–xv.), in which St. Augustine goes farther than his predecessors, is the foundation of the great speculations of the Schoolmen. St. Anselm first summed up and methodically arranged in his Monologium the results obtained by St. Augustine; Peter Lombard and William of Paris (opusc. de Trinitate) developed them still further; Richard of St. Victor, in his remarkable treatise De Trinitate, added many new ideas. The doctrine received its technical completion at the hands of Alexander of Hales, i., q. 42 sqq.; St. Bonaventure in l. i., Sent.; and St. Thomas, esp. I., q. 27 sqq.; C. Gentes, l. iv., cc. 2–26, and in Qq. Dispp. passim. All the work of the thirteenth century was summed up by Dionysius the Carthusian in l. i., Sent. After the Council of Trent, we have excellent treatises, positive and apologetic: Bellarmine, De Verbo Dei; Gregory of Valentia, De Trinitate; Petavius; Thomassin; but the best of all the positive scholastic treatises is Ruiz, De Trinitate. Among modern authors, Kuhn, Franzelin, and Kleutgen deserve special mention. On the Divinity of the Son, see Canon Liddon’s Bampton Lectures. Cardinal Manning has written two valuable works on the Holy Ghost: The Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost; The Internal Mission of the Holy Ghost. For the history of the Dogma, see Card. Newman’s Arians; Schwane, History of Dogma (in German), vols. i., ii.; and Werner, History of Apologetic Literature (in German).

We shall treat first of the Dogma itself as contained in Scripture and Tradition; and afterwards we shall give some account of the attempts of the Fathers and Schoolmen to penetrate into the depths of the mystery.

CHAPTER I

THE DOGMA

SECT. 91.—THE DOGMA OF THE TRINITY AS FORMULATED BY THE CHURCH

THE mystery of the Trinity, being the fundamental dogma of the Christian religion, was reduced to a fixed formula in apostolic times, and this primitive formula, used as the symbol of faith in the administration of Baptism, forms the kernel or germ of all the later developments.

I. The original form of the Creed is: “I believe in one God Father Almighty, … and in Jesus Christ His only Son, our Lord, … and in the Holy Ghost.” Father and Son are manifestly distinct Persons, hence the same is true of the Holy Ghost. They are, each of Them, the object of the same act of faith and of the same worship, hence They are of the same rank and dignity. Being the object of faith in one God, the Son and the Holy Ghost must be one God with the Father, possessing through Him and with Him the same Divine Nature. The Divinity of the Son and of the Holy Ghost is not expressed separately, because it is contained sufficiently in the assertion that they are one God with the Father. Besides, the repetition of the formula “and in one God” before the words Son and Holy Ghost, would be harsh, and would obscure the manner in which the Three Persons are one God.

II. The heresies of the first centuries, which had Jewish, pagan, and rationalistic tendencies, distorted the sense of the Catholic profession in three different directions.

1. The Antitrinitarians (Monarchians and Sabellians,) denied the real distinction between the Persons, looking upon Them simply as three manifestations or modalities (πρόσωπα) of one and the same Person.

2. The Subordinatians insisted too much on the real distinction between the Persons and on the origin of the Son and the Holy Ghost from the Father. They held that the Son and the Holy Ghost were the effect of a Divine operation ad extra, and thus were inferior to God, but above all other creatures.

3. The Tritheists taught a system aiming at the maintenance of the distinction of Persons and the equality of Nature and dignity, but “multiplying the nature” at the same time as the Persons, and thus destroying the Triunity.

III. Pope Dionysius (A.D. 259–269), in the famous dogmatic letter which he addressed to Denis of Alexandria, lays down the Catholic doctrine in opposition to the above-named heresies. The Bishop of Alexandria, in his zeal to defeat the Sabellians, had laid so much stress on the distinction of the Persons, that the Divine unity seemed endangered. The Pope first confutes the Sabellians, then the Tritheists, and lastly the Subordinatians. We possess only the last two parts, relating to the unity and equality of Essence or to the “Divine Monarchy.” They are to be found in St. Athanasius, Lib. de Sent. Dion. Alex. (See Card. Newman’s Arians, p. 125.) The letter of Pope Dionysius lays down the essential lines afterwards followed in the definitions of the Councils of Nicæa and Constantinople concerning the relations of the Son and the Holy Ghost to the Father. The last-named Council was, moreover, guided by the “Anathematisms” of Pope Damasus, which determine the whole doctrine of the Divine Trinity and Unity more in detail than the epistle of Pope Dionysius. The Councils, on the contrary, deal only with one of the Persons: that of Nicæa with the Son, that of Constantinople with the Holy Ghost.

IV. The Council of Nicæa defined, against the Arians, what is of faith concerning the Son of God, positively by developing the concept of Sonship contained in the Apostles’ Creed, and negatively by a subjoined anathema. The text of the Nicene Creed is: “And [I believe] in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the only begotten and born of the Father, God of God, Light of light, true God of true God, begotten, not made, consubstantial (ὁμοούσιον) with the Father by whom all things were made, which are in heaven and on earth.… Those who say: there was a time when the Son of God was not, and before He was begotten He was not—and who say that the Son of God was made of nothing, or of another substance (ὑποστάσεων) or essence, or created, or alterable, or mutable—these the Catholic and Apostolic Church anathematizes.”

V. The Council of Constantinople defined, against the Macedonians, what must be believed concerning the Holy Ghost. The text is: “And in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and Life-Giver (τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, τὸ κύριον, τὸ ζωοποιόν), Who proceedeth (ἐκπορευόμενον) from the Father, Who together with the Father and the Son is adored and glorified, Who spake by the Prophets.” The words, “Who proceedeth from the Father,” indicate the reason why the Third Person is equal to the two others, viz. by reason of His mode of origin. The procession from the Son is not defined explicitly, because it was already implied in the procession from the Father and was not denied by the Macedonians.

VI. Although the “Anathematisms” of Pope Damasus are anterior in date to the Council of Constantinople, and were taken as the basis of its definitions, still the last of them may be regarded as a summing up and keystone of all the dogmatic formulas preceding it. Like the formula of Pope Dionysius, it is directed against Tritheism and Subordinatianism. See the text in Denzinger, n. 6, or better in Hardouin, i. p. 805.

VII. The Athanasian Creed, dating probably from the fifth century, expounds the whole dogma of the Trinity by developing the formula, “One God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity.” It teaches that the Persons are not to be confounded nor the Substance divided, and especially that the essential attributes—”uncreated,” “immense,” “eternal,” etc.—belong to each of the Persons because of the identity of Substance, but that these attributes are not multiplied any more than the Substance to which they belong: “not three uncreated, but one uncreated.”

VIII. The most complete symbol of the dogma formulated in patristic times, is that of the eleventh Synod of Toledo (A.D. 675), which expounds the Catholic doctrine as developed in the controversies with earlier heresies. First, following the older symbols, the Synod treats of the Three Divine Persons in succession; then, in three further sections, it develops and sets forth the general doctrine, viz. (1) the true unity of Substance, notwithstanding the Trinity of Persons; (2) the real Trinity of the Persons, notwithstanding the unity of Substance; and (3) the inseparable union of the three Persons, demanded by their very distinction.

In later times the dogma received a more distinct formulation only in two points, both directed against most subtle forms of separation and division in God.

IX. The Fourth Lateran Council declared, in its definition against the abbot Joachim (cap. Damnamus), the absolute identity of the Divine Substance with the Persons as well as with Itself; pointing out how the identity of Substance in the Three Persons makes it impossible for there to be a multiplication of the Substance in the several Persons, which would transform the substantial unity of God into a collective unity: “There is one Supreme, Incomprehensible, and Ineffable Thing (res) which is truly Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, Three Persons together and each of Them singly.”

X. On the other hand, the unity of the relation by which the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son was defined more precisely in the repeated declarations of the Second Council of Lyons and that of Florence against the Greeks. The Greeks, in order to justify their ecclesiastical schism, had excogitated the heresy of a schism in the relations between the Divine Persons; for this and nothing else is the import of the negation of the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son.

XI. The compact exposition given by the Council of Florence in the decree Pro Jacobitis establishes with precision (1) the real distinction of the Persons, based upon the difference of origin; (2) the absolute unity of the Persons, and Their consequent immanence and equality; (3) especially Their diversity and unity as principles (“Pater est principium sine principio.… Filius est principium de principio,” etc.).

XII. Among decisions of more recent date, we need only mention the correction of the Synod of Pistoia by Pius VI., in the Bull Auctorem fidei, for having used the expression “Deus in tribus personis distinctus” instead of “distinctis;” and the declarations of the Provincial Council of Cologne (1860) against the philosophy of Günther.

XIII. According to the above documents, the chief points of the dogma of the Trinity are the following:—

1. The one God exists truly, really, and essentially as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; that is, the Divinity, as Substance, subsists in the form of three really distinct Hypostases or Persons, so that the Divinity, as Essence and Nature, is common to the Three.

2. The three Possessors of the one Divinity are not really distinct from Their common Essence and Nature, as, for instance, a form is distinct from its subject; They only represent three different manners in which the Divine Essence and Nature, as an absolutely independent and individual substance, belongs to Itself.

3. A real difference exists only between the several Persons, and is based upon the particular personal character of each, which consists in the particular manner in which each of Them possesses or comes into possession of the common Nature.

4. The diversity in the manner of possessing the Divine Nature lies in this, that only one Person possesses the Nature originally, and that the two Others, each again in His own way, derive it. The First Person, however, communicates the Divine Nature to the Second Person and to the Third Person, not accidentally but essentially, and These latter receive the Divine Nature likewise essentially; because the Nature, being really identical with the Three Persons, essentially belongs to, and essentially demands to be in, each of Them.

5. The diversity existing between the Three Persons implies the existence of an essential relation between each one and the other two, so that the positive peculiarity of each must be expressed by a particular name, characterizing the Second and Third Persons as receiving, and the First as giving, possession of the common Nature.

6. Although the Three Persons, being equal possessors of the Godhead, have a distinct subsistence side by side, still They have no separate existence. On the contrary, by reason of Their identity with the one indivisible Substance and of Their essential relations to each other, none of Them can be conceived without or separate from the other two. Technically this is expressed by the terms circumincessio (= περιχώρησις, coinherence), cohærentia (= συνάφεια), and ἀλληλουχία (= mutual possession).

7. For the same reasons, the most intimate and most real community exists between the Persons as to all that constitutes the object of Their possession. This applies not merely to the attributes of the Divine Substance, but also to the peculiar character of each Person, viz. the producing Persons possess the produced Person as Their production, and are possessed by This as the necessary originators of His personality. Hence, notwithstanding the origin of one Person from another, there is neither subordination nor succession between Them.

8. The activity of a person is attributed to his nature as principium quo, and to the person himself as principium quod. Hence the Divine activity, in as far as it is not specially directed to the production of a Person, is common to the Three Persons. Further, the Divine Nature being absolutely simple and indivisible, the activity proper to the Three Persons is also simple and indivisible; that is, it is not a co-operation, but the simple operation of one principium quo.

9. Thus the Three Persons, as they are one Divine Being, are also the one Principle of all things, the one Lord and Master, the Divine Monarchy (μόνη ἀρχή).

CHAPTER II

THE TRINITY IN SCRIPTURE

SECT. 92.—THE TRINITY IN THE NEW TESTAMENT

IN the Old Testament, the dogma of one God, Creator, and Ruler of the world is the doctrine round which all others are grouped; the Trinity of Persons is only mentioned with more or less distinctness in connection with the Incarnation. In the New Testament, on the contrary, the mystery of the Trinity is the central point of doctrine; it is here, therefore, that we must begin our investigation. We shall first consider the texts treating of the three Divine Persons together, and afterwards those treating of each Person in particular. We shall prove from Scripture the Personality of each Person as distinguished from the others by the mode of origin, and then the Divinity of each, from which the essential identity of the Three Persons flows as a consequence.

I. In the Gospels the Three Persons are mentioned at four of the most important epochs of the history of Revelation, viz. (1) at the Annunciation (Luke 1:35); (2) at the Baptism of our Lord and the beginning of His public life (Matt. 3:13, sqq.); (3) in the last solemn speech of our Lord before His Passion (John 14, 15, 16); and (4) after His Passion and before His Ascension, when giving the Apostles the commandment to preach and to baptize (Matt. 28:19). Of these texts, the third is the most explicit as to the distinction of the Persons; the fourth points out best the distinction and unity, and declares at the same time that the Trinity is the fundamental dogma of the Christian Faith. The second text gives us the most perfect external manifestation of the Three Persons: the Son in His visible Nature, the Holy Ghost as a Dove, the Father speaking in an audible Voice.

1. Luke 1:35: “The Holy Ghost (πνεῦμα ἅγιον) shall come upon thee, and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee, and therefore also the Holy which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God.” The “Most High” is here God as Father of the Son, according to ver. 32: “He shall be great, and shall be called the Son of the Most High.”

2. St. Matthew (3:16, 17), relating the baptism of Christ, says, “And Jesus, being baptized, forthwith came out of the water: and, lo, the heavens were opened to Him: and He saw the Spirit of God descending, as a dove, and coming upon Him. And, behold, a voice from heaven, saying, This is My beloved Son, in Whom I am well pleased.”

3. In the speech after the Last Supper, as recorded by St. John, three passages occur which may be connected thus: “I will ask the Father and He shall give you another Paraclete, that He may abide with you for ever, the Spirit of truth (14:16).… “But when the Paraclete shall come, Whom I will send you from the Father, the Spirit of truth, Who proceedeth from the Father, He shall give testimony of Me (15:26).… But when He, the Spirit of truth, shall come, He will teach you all truth: for He shall not speak of Himself, but what things soever He shall hear, He shall speak.… He shall glorify Me, because He shall receive of Mine and will declare (it) to you. All things whatsoever the Father hath, are Mine; therefore I said that He shall receive of Mine and declare it to you” (16:13–15).

4. The command to baptize: “Go ye therefore and teach all nations; baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost” (Matt. 28:19). The form of Baptism is here given as the first thing to be taught to the receiver of the Sacrament. The import of the teaching is this: the three subjects named, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are They by Whose authority and power Baptism works the forgiveness of sin and confers sanctifying grace, and are They for Whose Majesty the baptized are taken possession of and put under obligation—in other words, to Whose honour and worship they are consecrated. The latter meaning is more prominent in the Greek formula εἰς τὸ ὄνομα, the former more in the Latin in nomine. Hence (a) the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are three Persons, because only persons possess power and authority. (b) They are distinct Persons, because distinguished by different names. (c) They are equal in power and dignity, and all possess Divine power, because they all stand in the same relation to the baptized: forgiving sin, conferring sanctifying grace, exacting worship and submission of the kind required in baptism, are Divine prerogatives. (d) The singular number, “in the name,” indicates that the Divine Dignity which this formula expresses is not multiplied in the Three Persons, but is undivided, so that the one Divine principle and end proposed to the baptized is likewise but one Divine Being. Cf. Franzelin, De Trin., thes. iii.

II. From the Epistles four passages are commonly selected in which the Three Persons appear at the same time as distinct and of the same Essence. The strongest would be the comma Johanneum (1 John 5:7), the authenticity of which is, indeed, disputed, but which, on Catholic principles, may be defended. See, on this point, the exhaustive dissertation of Franzelin, l.c, thes. iv., and Wiseman’s Letters on 1 John 5:7.

1. “No man can say the Lord Jesus but by the Holy Ghost. Now, there are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit; and there are diversities of ministries, but the same Lord [= Christ, the Son of God]; and there are diversities of operations, but the same God [= the Father], Who worketh all in all” (1 Cor. 12:3–6).

2. “The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the charity of God, and the communication of the Holy Ghost be with you all” (2 Cor. 13:13).

3. “To the elect … according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, unto the sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ” (1 Pet. 1:1, 2).

4. “Who is he that overcometh the world, but he that believeth that Jesus is the Son of God? This is He that came by water and blood, Jesus Christ; not in water only, but in water and blood. And it is the Spirit which testifieth that Christ is the truth. For there are three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost: and these three are one. And there are three that give testimony on earth, the spirit, the water, and the blood: and these three are one. If we receive the testimony of men, the testimony of God is greater” (1 John 5:5–9).

The sense of the context is not without difficulty. It depends upon the question whether St. John had in view the error of the Gnostics, who attributed to Christ an apparent, not a real body; or that of the Cerinthians, who distinguished Christ the Son of God from the man Jesus, and taught that, at the Baptism, the Son of God descended upon Jesus, but left Him again at the Passion. In the first supposition, St. John had to prove the reality of the humanity of Christ; and, in this case, the water is the water that flowed from His side on the cross, and the “spirit” of vers. 6 and 8 is the spirit (= soul) which Jesus gave up on the cross (cf. John 19:30, 34, 35). In the second supposition (which is to us by far the more probable) the point was to prove the unity, constant and indissoluble, of Jesus with the Son of God; and, in this case, ver. 6 means: This Jesus, Who is the Son of God, came as Son of God in the blood of His Passion as well as in the water of the Jordan, and has shown what He is by sending the Holy Ghost and His gifts on the day of Pentecost as He had promised. In each of these three events, a testimony was given in favour of the dignity of Jesus as Son of God and Christ: at His Baptism, the voice of the Father; at the Passion, the affirmation of Jesus Himself; on the day of Pentecost, the Holy Ghost fulfilling the promises made by Jesus. St. John points to this continued threefold testimony as a proof of the continued unity of Christ, and he strengthens and explains the uniformity of this testimony on earth, by adding (ver. 7) that it corresponds with the three Heavenly Witnesses, from Whom it proceeded, and each of Whom had His share in it. In this connection, the unity asserted in ver. 7 need not be of the same order as that of ver. 8, viz. the unity of testimony; on the contrary, as it contains the highest reason of the latter, it must be of a higher order. At any rate, the Witnesses of ver. 7 appear as Persons giving testimony, whereas the witnesses of ver. 8 appear as the instrument or the vehicle of the testimony. Hence the unity of the witnesses in ver. 8 can be no other than a unity or uniformity of testimony; but the unity of the personal Witnesses, affirmed without any restriction, must be taken as an absolute and essential unity, in consequence of which They act in absolute uniformity when giving testimony—that is, They appear as one Witness, with one and the same authority, knowledge, and veracity. This is still more manifest from ver. 9, where the former testimonies are simply described as “the testimony of God,” and opposed to the testimony of man; consequently the Heavenly Witnesses must be One, because They are the one true God.

III. The doctrine contained in the above texts is further strengthened and developed in the passages relating to one or other of the Three Persons. The Personality and Divinity of the Father require no special treatment, because they are unquestioned, and, besides, are necessarily implied in the personal character of the Son. As to God the Son, His distinct Personality and origin from God the Father are so clearly contained in the name of Son, that only the identity of Substance requires further proof. But both Personality and identity of Essence must be distinctly proved of the Third Person, Whose name, Spirit, is not necessarily the name of a person, but rather the name of something belonging to a person.

SECT. 93.—THE DOCTRINE OF THE NEW TESTAMENT ON GOD THE SON

I. The doctrine of the New Testament on the Son of God centres in the idea of His true and perfect Sonship: if true Son, He is of the same Essence as the Father; if of the same Essence as God the Father, He is God just as the Father is.

The texts treating expressly of the Divinity of the Son are chiefly found in St. John’s Gospel and in his First Epistle, especially in the introduction to chap. i. of the Gospel, and in three speeches of the Son of God Himself: (1) after healing the man who had been eight and thirty years under his infirmity (5:17 sqq.); (2) in defence of His Divine authority, in the continuation of His description of the Good Shepherd (10:14); (3) in the sacerdotal prayer after the Last Supper (17), in explanation of His position as mediator. Other classical texts are Heb. 1 and Col. 1:13–20.

II. The Filiation of the Son of God is a filiation in the strictest sense of the word—that is, a relation founded upon the communication of the same living essence and nature.

1. This first results from the manner in which the name “Son of God” is used in Holy Scripture. That name is, indeed, also applied to beings not of the same essence as the Father, in order to express an analogical sonship, based upon adoption, love, or some other analogy. In such cases, however, the name is used as a common noun, and never applied in the singular, as a distinctive name to any single individual, as it is applied to the Person called Word of God, Jesus, and Christ. On the other hand, this Person is distinguished, as being the Son of God (ὁ υἵος θεοῦ) and the only begotten (μονογενής) Son of God, from all creatures, even the highest angels and the beings most favoured by grace; so that His Sonship is given as the ideal and the principle of the adoptive sonship granted to men or angels. Hence, when applied to the Son of God, the term “Son” must be taken in its strict and proper sense, there being no reason to the contrary.

In illustration of these propositions, see, for instance, Gal. 4:7; Apoc. 21:7; Exod. 4:22. “For to which of the Angels hath He said at any time, Thou art My Son?” etc. (Heb. 1:5). The comparison of the real with the adoptive sonship is found in the beginning of the Epistle to the Hebrews and of the Gospel of St. John (see Heb. 1:1, 3, 5, 6; John 1:12). The Jews who did not acknowledge Jesus as the Messiah, considered it as arrogance on His part to call Himself “the Son of God” even in the weaker sense, but they treated His claim to be the Son equal to the Father as blasphemy (John 5:18), and demanded His death on that count (Matt. 26:63; Luke 22:66–71; John 19:7).

The difficulty which some find in John 10:35, 36, where, according to them, Christ claims no other sonship than that granted to creatures, vanishes if we compare Christ’s words with the accusation which He was repelling. The Jews had said, “We stone Thee because that Thou, being a man, makest Thyself God.” To this Jesus replies, “The fact of My being a man does not essentially prevent Me from being also God. And if God called His servants gods, à fortiori, the name must be given to the Man to Whom the Father has given power over the whole world, Whom He has constituted the Heir of His dominions, and Who, in the Psalm quoted, stands out as God before the gods. And if I call Myself the Son of God, it is because I claim to be that Heir of God Who, in the Psalm, is introduced as the Judging God.” Cf. Franzelin, De Verb. Incarn., th. vii.

2. The Filiation of the Son of God is further determined in its true character by the epithets which Holy Scripture gives it. The Son of God is called “True Son” (1 John 5:20); “the own (ἰδίος) Son” (Rom. 8:32); the “only-begotten Son,” unigenitus, μονογενής (John 3:16, and 1:14); “the beloved Son” (Matt. 3:17, and Col. 1:13); “the only-begotten Son Who is in the bosom of the Father,” and there alone beholds God (John 1:18); “the Son born of the Father” (Heb. 5:5, from Ps. 2:7); “ex utero genitus” (Ps. 109:3, in the Vulg.); “proceeding from God,” ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐξῖλθον (John 8:42). If sometimes the Son of God is called “First-born” among many brethren, or from the dead, or of all creatures, the sense is that the Son of God, as only true Son, is not merely begotten by His Father before any creature received existence, but that He also is the exemplar, the principle, and the last end of all beings (Apoc. 3:14), and especially of the adoption of rational beings into the Sonship of God. This idea is magnificently set forth in Col. 1:12–19, the classical text on the primogeniture of Christ: “Giving thanks to God the Father, … Who hath translated us into the kingdom of the Son of His love; … Who is the image of the invisible God, the First-born of every creature: for in Him were all things created in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible: … all things were created by Him and in Him (εἰς αὐτόν): and He is before all, and by Him all things consist.” On the ground of this original primogeniture now follows the other: “And He is the Head of the body, the Church: Who is the Beginning, the First-born from the dead: that in all things He may hold the primacy, because in Him it hath well pleased the Father that all fulness should dwell.”

These passages fully show that the formal and proper reason why Christ is called Son of God is not His wonderful generation and regeneration as man. Texts which seem to imply this ought to be interpreted so as to agree with the above.

3. The reality and perfection of the Sonship is further described when the Son is presented as the most perfect image of the Father, reproducing the glory, the Substance the Nature and the fulness of the Divinity of the Father, equal to the Father, and a perfect manifestation or revelation of His perfection. “His Son … Who, being the brightness of His glory, and the figure of His substance, and upholding all things by the word of His power” (Heb. 1:3); “Who, being in the form of God, thought it no robbery to be equal to God” (Phil. 2:6; see also Col. 1:15, 20, and 2:9; John 14:9).

II. The Son of God is represented in the New Testament as God just as His Father is, all the names and attributes of God being bestowed upon Him.

1. The substantive nouns “God” and “Lord,” are given to the Person Who is also named the Son of God, in such a manner that nothing but the possession of the Divine Essence can be signified by them.

(a) The name “God,” Θεός, besides the express affirmation that “the Word was God” (John 1:1), is applied at least five times to the Person of God the Son: John 20:28 (ὁ θεός μου); Heb. 1:8, quoting from Ps. 44, where ὁ θεός renders the Hebrew Elohim; “Waiting for the coming of the great God and our Saviour” (Tit. 2:13); “That we may know the true God, and may be in His true Son: This is the true God, and life eternal” (1 John 5:20; also Rom. 9:5). These expressions are the more significant because in the New Testament the name ὁ θεός is exclusively reserved for God. Besides this, there are in the New Testament many quotations from the Old Testament in which texts undoubtedly referring to God, because the ineffable name Jehovah is their subject, are applied to Christ For instance Heb. 1:6 = Ps. 96:7; Heb. 1:10–12 = Ps. 101 (or 102 in the Hebrew); Mal. 3:1, quoted by Mark 1:2, Matt. 11:10, Luke 7:27. The explanation of the name Jehovah as “the First and the Last,” given in the Old Testament, is, in the New Testament, repeatedly applied to Christ, with the similar expressions, “Beginning and End,” “Alpha and Omega,” “Who is, Who was, and Who is to come” (Apoc. 1:17; 21:6; 22:13).

(b) The name “Lord” is more commonly given to the Son of God than the name God. When the Father and the Son are mentioned together, and the Father is called God, the Son is always called the Lord. The reason of this difference, after what has been said above, is not that the Son of God ought not to be called God as well as Lord. Where the Son is named Lord, He appears as manifesting in His Incarnation the dominion or sovereignty of God, Whose ambassador He is, and as the holder of a special sovereignty in His quality of Head of creation generally and of mankind in particular. On the other hand, God the Father, as the “unoriginated” holder of the Divine Nature, may be emphatically called God. Moreover, the way in which Holy Scripture applies the name of Lord to the Son of God, and the way in which it qualifies the same, clearly show that this name expresses in Christ a truly Divine excellence and dignity, just as the name God expresses the Divine Essence and Nature. Consequently, Lord in the New Testament is equivalent to Adonai in the Old. In the Old Testament the title “the Lord” had become a proper name of God; it would, therefore, never be applied without restriction and as a proper name to a person who did not possess the same Divine dignity. But no restriction is made; on the contrary, Christ is called “the only sovereign Ruler and Lord”—Dominator et Domimis, ὁ μόνος δεσπότης καὶ κύριος—(Jude 4); “the Lord of glory” (1 Cor. 2:8); “the Lord of Lords and King of Kings” (Apoc. 17:14, and elsewhere). The sovereignty of the “Lord of all” necessarily extends to all that comes from God, and is the foundation of the unity of the Christian worship in opposition to the worship of many lords by the heathen (cf. 1 Cor. 8:5, 6).

2. Not only are the substantive nouns “God” and “Lord” given to the Son of God, but likewise all the predicates which express attributes proper to God alone, are stated of Him. Christ Himself (John 16:15) claims all such predicates: “All things whatsoever the Father hath, are Mine.” And again, “All things that are Mine are Thine, and Thine are Mine” (17:10). “What things soever (the Father) doeth, these the Son also doeth in like manner” (5:19).

In detail, the Son is described as equal to the Father in the possession of that being and life in virtue of which God is the principle of all being and of all life outside of Him; in the possession of the attributes connected with such essential being and life; and particularly in the Divine dignity which makes God the object of adoration. “All things were made by Him [the Word], and without Him was made nothing that was made” (John 1:3; cf. Col. 1:16, 17; 1 Cor. 8:6; John 8:25). “As the Father raiseth up the dead and giveth life, so the Son also giveth life to whom He will.… For, as the Father hath life in Himself, so He hath given to the Son also to have life in Himself” (John 5:21, 26; 1 John 1:2, etc.).

The texts in which the Son is represented as the principle through Whom (per quem, διʼ οὗ) all things are made, and the Father as the principle from Whom (ex quo, ἐξ οὗ) all things are made, do not deny the equality of the Son with the Father, but point to the different manner in which the Son possesses the Divine Nature, viz. as principium de principio; that is, as communicated to Him by the Father. This remark also solves most of the apparent difficulties arising from texts where Christ seems to object to certain Divine attributes being given to Him, as John 5:19; 7:16; Matt. 20:28. In Mark 13:32 the question is not whether the end of the world is known to the Son of God, but whether the knowledge is communicable.

The eternity of the Son is indicated where He is said to have existed before the world (John 1:1; 17:5, 18; 8:58); His omnipresence by the assertion that He is in heaven and on earth; His omniscience by His knowledge of the hearts of men and His prevision of the future; His omnipotence appears in the miracles which He worked by His own power, and also in the forgiveness of sin; He proclaims Himself the sovereign Teacher, Lawgiver, and Judge when He says, “All power is given to Me in heaven and in earth” (Matt. 28:18; John 5:22).

3. If the Son of God is truly such, if He is God and Lord, if He possesses the attributes proper to God alone, Divine honour should certainly be paid to Him. We find Him laying claim to this honour, “that all may honour the Son as (καθὼς) they honour the Father” (John 5:23). And the Apostle declares that it is due: “In the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those that are in heaven, on earth, and under the earth” (Phil. 2:10). See Card. Newman’s Athanasius, i. p. 144. On the Divine attributes and works of Christ, consult Bellarmine, Controv. de Christo, l. i., c. 7, 8; Greg. of Valentia, De Trin. l. i. On His Divine dignity see Franzelin, De Verb. Incarn., th. v.; Knoll. De Deo, § 86.

III. The likeness of the Essence of the Son to that of the Father, implied in His Sonship and Divinity, necessarily consists in a perfect and indivisible unity of Essence. For there can be but one God, and the Son is spoken of as the God (ὁ Θεός), consequently as one with the Father. The same unity of Essence is formally affirmed by Christ: “I and the Father are one,” ἕν ἐσμεν (John 10:30). “Believe the works, that you may know and believe that the Father is in Me, and I in the Father” (ibid. 38). The unity could not be affirmed so absolutely if it did not refer to real identity of being; and the mutual immanence or περιχώρησις, of which the Saviour speaks (10:38) is only conceivable on the hypothesis of absolute identity of Essence and Nature.

IV. The whole doctrine on the Son of God is magnificently summed up in the prologue to the Gospel of St. John. The Evangelist represents the Second Person of the Trinity as He was before and independently of the Incarnation, viz. as He is in Himself. He is introduced as ὁ λόγος, Verbum, the Word, emphatically, in which the fulness of the Divine Wisdom is substantially expressed and personified, which, therefore, is one and the same substance with God, and not a new being. This Word is “with God”—that is, a Person distinct from the God Who speaks the Word; but, being the expression of His truth and wisdom, the Word is of the same Substance as the Divine Speaker. As a Person by Himself, but yet of the same Substance as God, the Word is “God” (θεός, without the article)—that is, possessor of the Divine Nature, and as truly God as the Divine Person of Whom and with Whom the Word is. As possessor of the Divine Nature, the Word is the principle of all extra-Divine existence, life, and knowledge, and therefore in Himself “the Life” that enliveneth all, and “the Light” that enlighteneth all. The Word existed “in the beginning”—that is, before any created thing,—and was Itself without beginning, like the Divine Wisdom of which It is the expression; and It existed, positively and eminently “in the beginning”—that is, before all creatures, of which the Word of Wisdom is the principle and which are made by Its power. The Word, therefore, is not created or made in time, but generated from all eternity out of the Wisdom of the Father as His only Word, and hence It is called “the only begotten of the Father” (ver. 14), Who indeed came down into the flesh with the plenitude of His grace and truth, but, at the same time, remained in the bosom of the Father (ver. 18).

V. It cannot be denied that the New Testament presents many difficulties against the Filiation, Divinity, and identity of Essence of God the Son. In general these difficulties arise from expressions used in a symbolical, analogical, or metaphorical sense, the true literal sense of which ought to be determined from the nature of the subject-matter; or they arise from the fact that the Son of God is commonly spoken of as God-man, and consequently is made the subject of many new attributes which could not be predicated of Him if He was only God. Other predicates, attributable to Him in virtue of His Divinity or of His origin from the Father, receive, as it were, a new shade or colouring when applied to the God-man, and are expressed in a way otherwise unallowable. In some passages, e.g. those relating to the sending of the Son by the Father, all the above causes of difficulties are at work. This Divine mission is entirely unlike human missions; it refers to the Person of the Son either before the Incarnation, or in the Incarnation, or to the functions of His human nature after the Incarnation. In the first two cases the mission is not an act of authority on the part of the Father, but rests simply on the relation of origin between Father and Son. In the last case only such an authority can be understood as is common to Father and Son over the human nature in Christ (cf. infra, § 108). The same reflections apply to all the texts in which the Son is said to “receive” from the Father, to obey Him, to honour Him, or, in general, to acknowledge that the Father is His Divine principle. Such texts admit of various interpretations, which accounts for the diversity of explanations given by the Fathers and the Theologians.

SECT. 94.—THE DOCTRINE OF THE NEW TESTAMENT ON THE HOLY GHOST

The impersonal character and the vagueness of the name “Spirit,” “Ghost,” “Spirit of the Father,” etc., by which Holy Scripture designates the Third Person of the Trinity, make it necessary to prove that this name really designates a distinct Person—that is, (1) that the Holy Ghost or the Spirit of God is not a mere attribute, accident, or quality going out from God to creatures, but a spiritual substance, distinct from the beings to whom the Holy Ghost is given; and (2) that the Holy Ghost is not merely the substantial vital force or energy of the Father and the Son, but a possessor of the Divine Substance, distinct from the other two Persons. To this must be added the definition of the mode of origin of the Holy Ghost, upon which depends His distinct Personality and His Divinity.

I. The first of the two points mentioned is evident from the fact that the Holy Ghost is represented as the free-acting cause of all the gifts of God to man. “All these things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as He will” (1 Cor. 12:11). Again, the Holy Ghost is often described as a subject distinct from creatures, knowing, searching, willing, teaching, sending, approving, consoling, indwelling, and generally acting as an intellectual Being.

II. The second point, viz. that the Holy Ghost is a Person really distinct from the Father and the Son, is evident from the fact that the Holy Ghost is represented as acting side by side with, and as distinct from the other two Persons, and is proposed with Them as an object of worship; from the relations to the other Persons which are attributed to Him, and which are such as can exist only between distinct Persons—for instance, receiving and giving and being sent; and from the manner in which He is mentioned together with the Father and the Son as being another Person (see texts in § 92, I. 3). The proper personality of the Holy Ghost is especially characterized in the texts which represent Him as not only being in God like the spirit of man is in man, but being from God (Spiritus qui ex Deo est, ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, 1 Cor. 2:12); and proceeding from the Father (John 15:26) as the breath proceeds from man, and consequently as having His origin in the Father like the Son.

III. The Substantiality and Personality of the Holy Ghost being proved, His Divinity results clearly from Scripture, which states that the Spirit of God is as much in God and as much the holder of the Divine Life as the spirit of man is in man. But the spirit of man is but the innermost part of his whole substance, whereas the Spirit of God, in Whom there are no parts, must be the same whole Substance as the Divine Persons from Whom He proceeds. Thus, if the name Son implies a likeness of Essence to the Father, the name Spirit is still more significant, as it implies unity or identity of Essence with the Persons from Whom the Spirit proceeds. The classical text is 1 Cor. 2:10 sqq.: “To us God hath revealed [those things] by His Spirit: for the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God. For what man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him? So the things also that are of God, no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God. Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God, that we may know the things that are given us from God.”

The Divinity of the Spirit of God, the Holy Ghost, is further confirmed by the following considerations.

1. Although the Holy Ghost is never called “God” purely and simply in Scripture, He is often represented as the same subject which, in the context or in some other text, is undoubtedly the one true God. The identity of the “Spirit” with the “Lord” is formally asserted in 2 Cor. 3:17; for this reason He is characterized in the symbol of Constantinople as “Lord.”

Instances of texts identifying the Holy Ghost with God: 1 Cor. 3:16; cf. 1 Cor. 6:19; Acts 5:3, 4; 28:25, etc.

2. The Divine Nature of the Holy Ghost is set forth in the Divine properties, operations, and relations predicated of Him, especially in relation to rational creatures.

(a) The attributes in question principally refer to the vivifying influence of the Holy Ghost on created spirits: He dwells in the inmost part of the soul and fills it with the fulness of God; He is the principle of life, and especially of the supernatural and eternal life of man which is founded upon a participation in the Divine Nature; He dwells in man as in His temple, and receives Divine worship. But such relations to creatures are proper to God alone, Who alone can make His creatures participators of His nature, and Who alone, in virtue of His simplicity and immensity, penetrates the secret recesses of created spirits. Moreover, Holy Scripture, in order to characterize the supernatural gifts of God, particularly the supernatural life of grace, as a participation of the Divine Life and coming immediately from God, represents them as the gifts and operations of the Holy Ghost. For this reason the Fathers who opposed the Macedonians appealed to these attributes of the Holy Ghost more than to others, and the Council of Constantinople added the title of Life-giver (vivificans, ζωοποιός) immediately after the name of Lord.

Passages from Scripture corroborating our argument are very numerous; John 6:64, with 2 Cor. 3:6; Rom. 8:11; 1 Cor. 6:11; 2 Cor. 3:18; Rom. 5:5; John 14:26; Acts 1:8; Rom. 8:14 sqq.; Matt. 10:20, etc.

(b) The Divinity of the Holy Ghost results from two other attributes which He receives in Holy Scripture, and which are embodied in the Creed. The first is that He is an object of adoration, “Who together with the Father and the Son is adored and glorified.” This is implied in all the texts which describe man as the “temple” of the Holy Ghost. “Adorability” being the expression of Divine dignity and excellence, Holy Scripture connects with it the manifestation of Divine authority, attributing to the Holy Ghost the inalienable right to forgive sins and to entrust the same power to others; and, further, the power to dispense all supernatural powers, notably the mission and authorization of persons endowed with such powers. “Receive ye the Holy Ghost: whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven” (John 20:22). “The Holy Ghost said to them, Separate me Saul and Barnabas for the work whereunto I have taken them” (Acts 13:2). “Take heed to yourselves, and to all the flock, over which the Holy Ghost hath placed you bishops, to rule the Church of God” (Ibid. 20:28).

(c) Further, the Divine attribute of knowing all the secrets of creatures and their future free acts is ascribed to the Holy Ghost. This the Creed expresses, by saying that the Holy Ghost “spake through the prophets.” Moreover, the original knowledge and the communication of the mysteries hidden in God and of all Divine truth is likewise ascribed to the Holy Ghost. The reason which the Apostle gives for this is that the Spirit of God is in God. Hence we have a double argument in favour of His Divinity: viz. the Holy Ghost is in man as God alone can be in man, and He is in God as God alone can be in Himself. See 1 Cor. 2:10–12. Compare also, “For prophecy came not by the will of man at any time: but the holy men of God spoke inspired by the Holy Ghost” (2 Pet. 1:21); 1 Cor. 14:2; Dan. 2:28.

3. Lastly, the Divine Nature of the Holy Ghost is manifested by His relation to the human nature of the Son of God. Whatever is Divine and supernatural in Christ, His attributes as well as His operations, is referred to the Holy Ghost as its principle; the whole of the Divine unction in virtue of which the man Jesus is “the Christ” (the anointed) is attributed to the Holy Ghost, so as to make Him the medium of the Hypostatic Union and of its divinizing effects upon the humanity of Christ. Hence also the resurrection and glorification of Christ are attributed to the Holy Ghost as well as to the Father (Rom. 8:11). Christ is led by the Spirit into the desert (Luke 4:1); He casts out devils in the Spirit (Matt. 12:28). See Luke 4:18; Heb. 9:14; Matt. 12:31, 32.

IV. The origin of the Spirit from Father and Son is also clearly stated in the New Testament. It is implied in the phrase “Spirit of God;” for this, according to 1 Cor. 2:12, is equivalent to “Spirit out of, or from, God” (ex Deo, τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ). But as the Son is God as well as the Father, and as both are but one God, the Spirit of God is necessarily “from” the Father and the Son as from His principle. This argument is abundantly confirmed by Holy Scripture, especially in the speech of our Lord after the Last Supper.

1. The Holy Ghost is called the Spirit of the Son, as well as the Spirit of the Father. “God hath sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father” (Gal. 4:6; cf. Rom. 8:9; 1 Pet. 1:11; Phil. 1:19). The expressions, “Spirit of Jesus or of Christ,” may, indeed, be taken as referring to the indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the humanity of Christ; this indwelling, however, is not an accidental one: the Holy Ghost is the own Spirit of Christ.

2. Christ expressly declares that the Holy Ghost, as “Spirit of truth,” takes and receives from the Son what the Son has received from the Father and possesses in common with the Father. “But when the Spirit of truth shall come, He will teach you all truth: for He shall not speak of Himself; but what things soever He shall hear, He shall speak: and the things that are to come He will show you. He shall glorify Me: because He shall receive of Mine, and will declare it to you. All things whatsoever My Father hath are Mine. Therefore I said, He shall receive of Mine, and declare it to you” (John 16:13–15).

3. Christ further declares that the Son, in the same manner as the Father, sends the Holy Ghost, which is only possible if the Holy Ghost has His eternal existence in God, from the Son as well as from the Father. “But when the Paraclete shall come, Whom I will send you from the Father, the Spirit of truth, Who proceedeth from the Father, He shall give testimony of Me” (John 15:26; see also 16:7). Note that “sending” cannot be understood as an act of authority, except in the wider sense of causing, in any way whatsoever, another person to act. Applied to the Persons of Holy Trinity, the Father cannot be sent (nor does Holy Scripture ever speak of the Father as being sent); the Son and the Holy Ghost are sent by the Father, and the Holy Ghost is sent by the Son, inasmuch as the Son is begotten by the Father, and the Spirit proceedeth from both: the relations of origin are the only conceivable foundation of missions on the part of the Divine Persons. (See infra, p. 343.)

4. Finally, the constant order in which the Three Persons are named, in the form of Baptism, and in 1 John 5:7, can only be satisfactorily accounted for by saying that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son. St. Basil thus comments on this point: “Let them learn that the Spirit is named (in the form of baptism) with the Son as the Son with the Father. For the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost are given in the same order. Therefore, as the Son stands to the Father, so the Holy Ghost stands to the Son according to the traditional order of the formula of Baptism. If, then, the Spirit is joined to the Son, and the Son to the Father, it is clear that the Spirit also is joined to the Father.… There is one Holy Ghost, enounced, He also, in the singular number, joined through the one Son to the one Father, and completing through Himself the Blessed Trinity, to be glorified for evermore” (De Spiritu S., c. xvii. 18).

SECT. 95.—THE DOCTRINE OF THE OLD TESTAMENT ON THE TRINITY

We learn from the New Testament that many texts in the Old Testament point to the Blessed Trinity, although in themselves (and probably in the minds even of the inspired writers) the meaning attributed to them as quoted in the Gospels and Epistles is not evident. There are, however, many passages unmistakably referring to God the Son, and describing Him with a distinctness and fulness almost equal to anything in St. John and St. Paul. As an instance, we may refer to the doctrine on the “Logos” or Son of God in John 1 and Heb. 1, as compared with Prov. 8 and Wisd. 7.

It is natural to expect more references to the Son than to the Holy Ghost in the Old Testament, because it prepares and announces the coming and manifestation of the Son in the Incarnation. Where the Son is spoken of as the “Begotten Wisdom,” Sapientia genita, the Spirit Who proceeds from Him is designated, with sufficient clearness, by the term Spiritus sapientiæ, the Spirit of Wisdom. The central point, however, of all the teachings of the Old Testament on the Trinity is the Second Person. The allusions to, or more distinct expositions of the mystery of the Trinity in the Old Testament are of more interest to the commentator on Holy Scripture, and to the historian of Dogma, than to the dogmatic theologian, who finds his demonstration perfect in the New Testament, and rather throws light upon than receives light from the older references. For this reason we shall reduce the present section to the smallest compass, confining ourselves to the outlines, and giving references to material for deeper studies.

The Second of the Divine Persons appears in the Old Testament in three progressive forms, distributed over three periods. The first period is prelude to the future sending of the Son, and is found in the theophanies in the times of the Patriarchs, Moses, and the Judges. At this first stage, the Second Person bears the general and indefinite character of an ambassador, coming from God, representing God, and Himself bearing the name of God. The second form is the direct prophecy of the Incarnation of a Divine Person, including the information that a son of David shall be at the same time Son of God and God, and that, in virtue of His Divine Sonship, He shall appear as King and Priest pre-eminently, and as the spiritual spouse of souls. The third form exhibits a comprehensive description of the Divine origin and essence of the Second Person, upon which His threefold functions as man are founded.

I. The “Angel of the Lord, Jehovah, Elohim,” spoken of in all the theophanies in question, is probably a created Angel, acting directly in the name of God. Still, upon the whole, the theophanies make the impression that a higher Divine envoy is at work, Whose instrument the created Angel is, and to Whom the titles “Angel of Jehovah,” etc., really belong. Among the Fathers a diversity of opinion exists as to particular theophanies, but, on the whole, they agree in recognizing in them manifestations of the Son of God. See Franzelin, De Trin., th. vi. Cf. Gen. 16:7, 8, 13; 18:1–19; 19:24; also 22:11, 14; 31:3, 11, 13; Exod. 3:2 (Heb. and Greek); 13:21; 14:19; 23:20; 33:14.

II. In David’s time, when the Messiah was prophesied as prefigured by Solomon, the Son of David (2 Kings 7), He is also marked out as Son of God: first in the prophecy of Nathan (2 Kings 7), to which Ps. 88 is similar in its typical form; then, in a more marked form, in Pss. 2 and 109, where His Sonship is attributed to Divine generation, and His eminent dignity of King and Priest is founded upon His Sonship. In Ps. 44 the Messias is represented as God and as the Divine Spouse of souls. His Divine Sonship is only mentioned a few times more in later books of Scripture, e.g. Prov. 30:4; Micheas 5:2, and Ecclus. 51; but His Divinity is asserted very frequently. It ought, however, to be remarked that the Messias always appears as the Ambassador and as the Anointed of God; hence, when He is mentioned as God, He must be conceived, as in Ps. 44, as a Person distinct from and originated in the God Who sends and anoints Him. The signification which we attribute to the above passages of Holy Scripture is confirmed by the fact that in the New Testament many of them are expressly applied to Christ, and adduced as proofs of His Divinity. Cf. Isai. 7:14, with Matt. 1:23; Isai. 40:3–11, with Mark 1:3; Baruch 3:36–38; Zach. 11:12, 13, with Matt. 27:9; 12:10, with John 19:37.

III. Whereas the Psalms (and similarly the Prophets and the first three Gospels) represent the Second Person in God as Son of God, and as God, the Sapiential books describe, under the title of Divinely begotten Wisdom, His Divine origin and essence with such comprehensiveness that nearly all the utterances of the New Testament may be considered as a repetition or a summing up of the older Revelation. The subject designated as “Wisdom,” is represented as the substantial exhalation and the personal representative of the Divine Wisdom, begotten and born of God from all eternity; as splendour, mirror and image of God, distinct from God as from His principle, but of the same Essence, and therefore existing in God and with God; executing and governing with Him all His external works, and hence the principle and prince of all things, their source and ideal, the mediator and the initiator of that participation in Divine Life which consists in wisdom.

These figures are, on the one hand, an introduction to or a preparation for the fuller understanding of the Incarnation, and, on the other hand, a commentary on the words of the Psalms concerning the Divine Sonship and the Divine Nature of the Messias. The figures of the three Sapiential books correspond with the three principal elements of the prologue to the Gospel of St. John; and again, each of them corresponds with one of the three principal passages in the Psalms, so as to set forth, in order, how the Anointed of the Lord, in virtue of His Divine origin and essence, is, in Ps. 2, the King pre-eminently; in Ps. 109, the Priest according to the order of Melchisedech; and in Ps. 44 the beatifying Spouse of Souls. In Prov. 8. Wisdom appears as the born Queen of all things, who has dominion because she has made all things (cf. John 1: “The Word by Whom all things were made”); in Ecclus. 24. Wisdom appears as the born priestly Mediator between God and man, who possesses the priesthood of life—not of death, like the Levitical priesthood—and who, therefore, is the real Mother of life (cf. John 1, the Logos as Life and full of grace); lastly, in Wisd. 7, 8, Wisdom appears as a Bridegroom, entering into the closest connection with souls, filling them with light and happiness (as in John 1, the Word as Light which enlighteneth every man). And, as in these three expositions there is an unmistakable progress of tenderness and intimacy, so there is a progress in the spirituality, sublimity, and completeness in the exposition of the Divine origin and essence of the Eternal Wisdom. In Prov. 8, Wisdom simply appears as begotten from all eternity; in Ecclus. 24, as the Word proceeding from the mouth of the Most High; and in Wisd. 7, as the splendour of the glory of God, one with God in essence and existence.

During the last centuries before the Christian era, the Jewish theology had substituted the Chaldaic name Memrah (= Word) for the name Wisdom. The change may have been due to Ecclus. 24, describing Wisdom as proceeding from the mouth of God, or to the influence of the Greek philosophy (cf. Plato’s Logos). Memrah was made equivalent (parallel) to the several names of the Angel of the Lord (= Maleach Jehovah, Schechinah, Chabod). Thus, the name of Word, as signifying the mediator between God and the world, was well known to the Jews when St. John wrote his Gospel, and this circumstance explains the use of the term by the Evangelist. See Card. Newman, Arians, 196, and Athanasius, ii. 337.

CHAPTER III

THE TRINITY IN TRADITION

SECT. 96.—THE ANTE-NICENE TRADITION ON THE DIVINE TRINITY AND UNITY

I. Sufficient proof for the primitive profession of the dogma of the Trinity is afforded by the formula of Baptism, by the Doxologies in universal use, and by the confessions of the martyrs. The Doxology, “Glory to the Father and to the Son, and to (or with) the Holy Ghost,” is an act of worship giving Divine honour to all and each of the three Persons. The “Acts of the Martyrs” contain, in very great number, professions of faith either in the Three Persons together or in each one of Them.

II. The Faith of the Church in the mystery of the Trinity manifested itself especially in the conflict with the ante-Nicene heresies. Not only did the Church assert the distinction of the Persons, but she also defended the absolute unity and indivisibility of the Divine Substance, from which the Sabellians and their allies took the chief argument in favour of their heresy. The whole conflict turned on this point: that the unity of God ought not to destroy the distinction of the Persons, and that the distinction of the Persons ought not to destroy the unity of God. The position taken up by the Church sufficiently shows how far she was from admitting a distinction in the Substance of the Persons. Whenever, as in the case of Denis of Alexandria, a writer used expressions that might imply such substantial distinction, protests were heard on all sides, and Denis himself retracted his unguarded expressions by order of Pope Dionysius. The ecclesiastical literature anterior to the Council of Nicæa contains many expositions of the Catholic dogma on the Trinity, sometimes with considerable development. The principal ones are to be found in the writings against the Sabellians and against the Gnostics of various forms, and in the Apologies against the heathen. See Card. Newman, Arians, ch. ii.

III. Although the substance of the dogma was well known to the faithful, and better still to the Catholic Fathers and Doctors, who lived before the Council of Nicæa, it is none the less to be expected that their writings did not treat the subject with the same definiteness and accuracy of expression as later writers. It would, however, be going too far to admit that the Fathers had, in general, an obscure or a wrong conception of the unity of Substance in the Divine Persons; in such a fundamental dogma, such an error in such quarters would be incompatible with the infallibility of the Church. Among schismatic writers it is, of course, quite possible to find wrong conceptions of the dogma. As a matter of fact, from the time of Tatian, who afterwards became a formal heretic, certain writers so misunderstood the dogma that their utterances did prepare the way for the Arian heresy. Nevertheless, if we except the Philosophumena of Hippolytus and several utterances of Origen (which are, however, annulled by opposite utterances of the same author), we have no greater fault to find, even with uncatholic writers, than a superficial knowledge and inadequate exposition of the unity of Essence in the Three Persons. All the expressions which were seized upon by later opponents of the dogma, and were most harshly judged by Catholic theologians, occur in the writings of the most orthodox of the Fathers, and admit of an orthodox interpretation.

The special difficulties met with in the ante-Nicene writings, even the orthodox, lie in the following points:—

1. The authors often lay so much stress upon the character of the Father as source and principle of the other two Persons, that they almost seem to conceive the Father alone as God pure and simple, and God above all (Deus super omnia), and to attribute Divinity to the other Persons in a less perfect degree. Holy Scripture itself, however, generally uses the term God, the God (ὁ Θεός, etc.) for the Father alone.

2. Instead of stating the identity of Substance, they often speak merely of a substantial connection, or simply of a community of power and authority, of activity and love, or of the unity of origin. They do so in order to refute Ditheism, a system which admits two Gods, the one independent of the other. But here, also, Holy Scripture had set the example, especially John 5 and 10.

3. The generation of the Son is sometimes described as voluntary, in order to exclude from it a blind and imperative necessity. This, however, admits of a correct interpretation, and is found likewise in post-Nicene writers.

4. Following up Prov. 8, they represent the generation of the Son as intended in connection with the creation of the world by and through Him. But some (e.g. Tertullian, C. Prax., cc. v.–vii.) speak with more precision of a double generation, or rather of a conception and a generation of the Logos. The conception is explained as the eternal origin from the Father (λόγος ἐνδιάθετος); the generation as His temporal mission ad extra, and His manifestation in the creation of the world (λογός προφορικός verbum prolatitium): hence Hippolytus and Tertullian sometimes seem only to apply the name of Son to the Logos after His external manifestation in creating the world, or after the Incarnation, which, as a birth, they oppose to the eternal conception.

5. Lastly, the Fathers point out that the Son and the Holy Ghost are visible, whilst the Father is invisible. This visibility, however, is only intended to prove the distinction of the Persons, and not a difference in the Essence. In fact, the Son and the Holy Ghost both appeared under sensible forms or symbols, whereas the Father never so manifested Himself, it being unbecoming to His character, as principle of the Son and the Spirit, to be sent by another. The personal characters of the Second and Third Persons make it right for Them to be sent as manifesting the Father.

“We need not by an officious piety arbitrarily force the language of separate Fathers into a sense which it cannot bear; nor by an unjust and narrow criticism accuse them of error; nor impose upon an early age a distinction of terms belonging to a later. The words usia and hypostasis were naturally and intelligibly, for three or four centuries, practically synonymous, and were used indiscriminately for two ideas which were afterwards respectively denoted by the one and the other.” Card. Newman, Arians, p. 444; cf. Franzelin, th. xi.

SECT. 97.—THE CONSUBSTANTIALITY OF THE SON DEFINED BY THE COUNCIL OF NICÆA

I. The term ὁμοούσιος, “consubstantial,” was used by the Council of Nicæa to define the identity of substance in God the Father and the Son. When applied to the consubstantiality of a human father and his son, it implies only a specific identity of substance; that is, that father and son are of a like substance, but are not numerically one and the same substance. The Arians, applying the human sense to the term, argued that the Council admitted three Divine Beings or three Gods. Protestant writers, and even some Catholic theologians, have lately repeated the Arian calumny, wherefore we deem it necessary to show briefly, from the post-Nicene tradition, the numerical identity of the one Essence in the Three Persons, in virtue of which the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are one and the same God.

II. The simple fact that the dogma of the Trinity admits of no other Christian interpretation than that the Three Persons are one God, suffices to prove that the Catholic Church held the dogma in this sense, during the fourth as well as during all other centuries. The same may, however, be gathered also from the following considerations.

1. The Homoousion consequent upon generation, is thus explained by the Fathers against the sophisms of the Arians. In the Divine generation, the Substance of the Father is communicated to the Son as it is in human generation, with this difference, however, that, on account of the simplicity and indivisibility of the Divine Substance, it is communicated in its entirety, whereas the human father only communicates and parts with a portion of his substance (cf. St. Athan., De Decr. Nic. Syn., nn. 20, 23, 24). In God, as in man, generation implies a communication of life. But in man the communication consists in giving a new life; in God the communication necessarily consists in the giving of the same identical life. For if the life received by the Son were a new life, it would not even be similar to the eternal life of the Father; and, consequently, the generation would not be Divine. The difference, then, in the substance and life of the Father and the substance and life of the Son, is merely in this: the Father possesses them as uncommunicated, the Son possesses the same as communicated or received (St. Basil, C. Eunom., 1. ii., at the end). These two arguments show also that, in the mind of the Fathers, no specific unity is possible in God, but only numerical identity of substance and life.

2. The attributes which the Fathers give to the unity of the Divine Persons are such as to mark it as identity of Essence and not merely as specific unity. They describe it as substantial and indivisible coherence and inseparability, far above the unity which similarity or relationship establishes between human persons, and more like the organic unity of parts of the same whole, such as the unity of root, stem, and branch; or of body, arm, and finger. But, considering the simplicity of the Divine Substance, a coherence such as described can only be conceived as the simultaneous possession of the same Substance by the Three Persons. The Fathers further compare the unity of the Divine Persons to the inherence and immanence of the qualities and faculties of created minds in the substance of the mind; pointing out, at the same time, this difference, that the Son and the Holy Ghost are not accidents of the Father, but are His own Substance, as inseparable from the Father as His own Wisdom and Holiness (cf. St. Athanasius, Or. Contra Arianos, iv., n. I sqq.; and St. Gregory of Nazianzum, Or., 31 (al. 37), n. 4). They describe the mutual co-inherence of the Persons as consequent upon their consubstantiality, and as being the principle of the unity of Divine actions (see Petav., De Trin., 1. iv., c. 16). They oppose the unity of essence as it exists in God to that which exists between human persons—that is, to a specific or mental unity (see St. Greg. of Naz., l.c., n. 14, 16). Lastly, they use the strongest terms at their disposal to describe the unity of the three Divine Persons as the most perfect possible identity of substance (Kilber, De Deo, disp. v.).

3. That the Fathers taught the absolute unity of the Divine Essence appears also from the way in which they spoke of the mystery of the Trinity. Far from being the greatest of all mysteries, it would not be a mystery at all if the unity of the Persons were not more than a specific unity (St. Basil, De Sp. S., c. 18; St. Greg. of Nyssa, Or. Cat., n. 3). The doctrine of the Fathers holds the right mean between the errors of the Jews and the Sabellians on the one hand, and those of the Arians and pagans on the other. For with the former it denies the multiplication of the Divine Nature, yet without denying the distinction of Persons; with the latter it admits the distinction of Persons, yet without limiting their unity to a similarity or likeness of essence (St. Greg, of Nyssa., l.c.). The Fathers represent the unity of Essence as admitting of no other distinction than that based upon the divers relations of origin; so that there would be no difference whatsoever, except for this relation of origin and the consequent manner of possessing the Divine Essence. But, if the Essence itself were multiplied, the Persons would be three distinct Persons of the same species, independently of their origin (St. Greg. Naz., Or., 31 (al. 37), n. 3).

4. Finally, the two great controversies in connection with the Council of Nicæa throw much light on the present question. They are the controversy with the Semi-Arians, against whose ὁμοιούσιος (similarity of Substance) the Catholics successfully defended the ὁμοούσιος; and the controversy among the Catholics themselves on the question “whether not only one οὐσία, but also one ὑπόστασις, ought to be affirmed of the Trinity.” The Latin doctors, who translated ὑπόστασις by substantia (and some Greeks who understood it in the same sense) objected to the expression “three hypostases,” because it seemed to imply a trinity of Substances, and consequently a triplication of the Essence. The Greeks, however, explained that such was not the meaning they wished to convey by the expression used, but that they agreed with their Latin opponents on the point of doctrine. They had used the words, “three hypostases,” only because the Greek τρία πρόσωπα (which corresponds with the Latin tres personœ) had been misused by the Sabellians to confuse the real distinction of the Divine Persons. (See Kuhn, § 29; Franzelin, th. ix., n. ii.; Card. Newman, Arians, 365, 432.)

This question was thoroughly debated in the seventh century, when the doctrine of Tritheism was formally brought to the fore, and when the discussions on the two natures of Christ and His twofold operation made a thorough investigation of the unity of the Divine Essence necessary. The opponents of the Monothelites, notably Sophronius, and the Councils held against them, leave no doubt as to what was the doctrine of the Church.

III. The absolute numerical and substantial unity of the Divine Essence is essentially connected with the received expression that the Three Persons are one God and not three gods. If the Essence was divided or distributed among three persons, there would be three gods. Nor could any other form of unity, added to such merely specific unity, prevent the division of essence. No community of origin, of love, of operation, of compenetration, will prevent separate substances from being separate substances. Besides, a perfect unity of operation cannot be conceived in separate substances, any more than perfect compenetration or inexistence: hence, where these are, there is unity of substance. If, therefore, the Fathers sometimes give the community of origin, of love, and operation, etc., as a reason why the Three Persons are one God, they do not intend to give the adequate and formal reason, which is, according to the teaching of the Fathers themselves, the absolute unity and identity of the Divine Essence, expressed in the ὁμοούσιος.

IV. In consequence of the absolute identity of Essence or Substance, the Three Persons, although each of Them is God, are not three Gods, but one God. “We are forbidden by the Catholic Religion to say that there are three Gods or three Lords” (Athanasian Creed). According to a rule common to all languages, the plural of substantive nouns and predicates signifies not only a plurality of subjects designated by the nouns, but also a multiplication of the substance named, in each of the many subjects. This is because in all languages substantive nouns designate the substance and the subject in which it is. But in God, the Substance expressed by the noun God is not multiplied or distributed among the subjects who hold it; therefore the Three Persons are one God, not three Gods. (Cf. St. Thomas, I., q. 39.) The same law of language applies to verbal nouns like Creator, Judge, but not to adjective and verbal predicates like living, saving. (See Card. Newman, Arians, p. 185; St. Athan., ii. 438.)

SECT. 98.—THE TRADITION OF EAST AND WEST ON THE CONSUBSTANTIALITY OF THE HOLY GHOST WITH THE FATHER AND THE SON

I. Just as the Arians misused the Homoousios of Nicæa against the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father, so did the Greek schismatics misuse the words “Who proceedeth from the Father,” used by the Council of Constantinople to define the consubstantiality of the Holy Ghost with the other two Persons. They read the definition as if it excluded the Son from all participation in the communication of the Divine Essence to the Holy Ghost. It is, however, easy to show that the Greek Fathers of the fourth century, to whom the schismatics especially appeal, founded all their argument in favour of the origin of the Holy Ghost from the Father and His consubstantiality with the Father, on the assumption that the Third Person proceeds from the Son. Thus the schismatics, who reproach the Latin Church with making a change in the symbol, are themselves guilty of distorting the true sense of the symbol, of forsaking the guidance of their orthodox Fathers, and of embracing the cause of the Macedonians.

II. We shall here reproduce the doctrine of the Greek Fathers of the fourth century on the procession of the Holy Ghost. This will afford us a twofold advantage. (1) The difference of conception and expression which exists between the Latin and Greek Fathers on this subject will be made clear, and possible misunderstandings will be obviated; (2) the proper value of the Greek mode of conceiving and expressing the procession of the Holy Ghost will be rightly understood.

We shall divide this section into three parts: (A) The doctrine of the Greek Church on the Divinity of the Holy Ghost. (B) The Greek manner of conceiving and expressing the procession, compared with the Latin conception and expression. (C) The origin and tendency of the negation of the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son, which is properly the “heresy of the schism.”

A.—The Doctrine of the Eastern Church of the Fourth Century on the Origin of the Holy Ghost as the Foundation of His Consubstantiality with the Father and the Son

III. In order to get at a right understanding of this doctrine, it is necessary to bear in mind the question at issue between the Church and the “Pneumatomachi” (or Macedonians), viz. whether the Holy Ghost had such an origin from God that, by reason of His origin, He received, not a new essence, but the Essence of God. The Pneumatomachi, most of whom were Semi-Arians, conceded more or less the consubstantiality consequent upon generation (at least the Homoiousios); but they thought that in God, as also in man, no other consubstantiality was possible but that founded upon generation. Hence they argued that the Holy Ghost, in order to be consubstantial with the Father and the Son, ought to be generated by either of Them, which would cause the Holy Ghost to be either the son of the Father and the brother of the Son, or the son of the Son and grandson of the Father (St. Athan., Ad. Serap., i., n. 15 sqq.; iii., n. I sqq.). As, however, both suppositions are absurd, it follows that the Holy Ghost must have an origin similar to that of the other things which are made through (διὰ) the Son; and therefore no consubstantiality with the Father, no Divine Nature can be claimed for the Holy Ghost (cf. Franzelin, th. xxxviii.).

Against this heretical opinion the Divinity of the Holy Ghost could be defended in two ways.

IV. The first way, more suited to a dogmatic definition, was to affirm directly what the opponents denied, namely, the origin of the Holy Ghost from the Substance of the Father, and then to show that, though not generated, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father as really as the Son proceeds from Him. This way was chosen by the Council of Constantinople, which—combining the texts (John 15:26), “Who proceedeth from the Father,” παρὰ τοῦ πατρός, and (1 Cor. 2:12) “the Spirit Who is of God,” ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ—defined that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father.

It was not necessary to assert here the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son, because the adversaries did not deny it, but, on the contrary, maintained it, and because the assertion of the origin of the Holy Ghost from the Father determined at once the relation of principle which the Son bears to the Holy Ghost. Moreover, according to the Pneumatomachi, the procession of another Person from the Father was, as a matter of course, effected through that Person Who proceeds from Him as Son. It was not even fitting or advisable for the Council to mention the procession from the Son. The object of the Council was to put the origin of the Holy Ghost on a footing with the origin of the Son with respect to consubstantiality with the Father; the opponents were imbued with Arian ideas, and denied the Divinity of the Son; hence they could not be refuted by affirming the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son. Besides, the Council wished to found its definition upon Holy Scripture, but the texts which formally teach the procession from the Father do not mention the procession from the Son. If it had wished to mention the Son, the Council ought to have appealed to other texts, e.g. in which the Holy Ghost is said to receive (take) from the Son. This is really done in the more explicit symbol given by St. Epiphanius in the Ancoratus (n. 121), a symbol much used in the East, and perhaps adopted by the Council as the basis of its definition. The Ancoratus was written A.D. 374; that is, seven years before the Council. It is not impossible, however, that, after the Council, Epiphanius made some additions to the Symbol in harmony with the definition. The text is, “And we believe in the Holy Ghost, Who spake in the Law and preached in the Prophets and descended on the Jordan, Who speaketh in the Apostles and dwelleth in the Saints. And this is how we believe in Him: He is the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of God, the perfect Spirit, the Paraclete, uncreated, Who proceedeth from the Father and receiveth [or taketh, λαμβανόμενον (middle voice)] from the Son, and is believed to be from the Son (το ἐκ τοῦ πατρός ἐκπορευόμενον, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὑιοῦ λαμβανόμενον καὶ πιστευόμενον).”

In the West, where the position taken up by the Pneumatomachi was not so well understood or borne in mind as in the East, the definition of the Council of 381 was soon found fault with; and whenever the Eastern doctors were asked for fuller explanations, they gave it in the terms of the Symbol of St. Epiphanius. Several Eastern Churches have adopted the same symbol in their Liturgy (cf. Van der Moeren, pp. 175 and 178).

V. The second way to oppose the Pneumatomachi was to argue from their own affirmation, viz. “that the Holy Ghost has His origin from and through the Son,” and to show how this origin from the Son is such that it implies consubstantiality with the Son and with the Father. This method was adopted by most of the Fathers. If they had denied or had not acknowledged the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son, they could have reproved the Macedonians for admitting it. At any rate, they would have had an easy answer to the objection that the third Person, owing His origin to the Son, is grandson to the Father; viz. by stating that the Holy Ghost in no wise proceeds from the Son, but only from the Father. But the Fathers do neither; on the contrary, they accept the procession from the Son as a matter of course, and make a true conception of this procession from the Son the central point of the whole controversy with the Pneumatomachi. The line of defence taken by the Fathers is invariably to correctly determine the nature of the origin of the Holy Ghost from the Son. We shall consider it (1) in its positive aspect; (2) in its apologetic or defensive aspect.

I. The thesis of the Fathers

(a.) The Fathers first show negatively that the origin of the Holy Ghost through the Son is not like the origin of creatures through the Son, but should be conceived as an origin from the Son, or as the production of a hypostasis of the same kind as its principle, proceeding from the Substance of the Son, and therefore inseparably united with Him. They state that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son as the Son proceeds from the Father, viz. as principle of creation, and especially as principle of the supernatural sanctification of creatures, and of the conformation with the Son and the union with the Father implied in the process of sanctification. Hence it is in and through the Holy Ghost that the Son creates, sanctifies, and elevates creatures to conformity and union with Himself. But this would be impossible if the Substance and power of the Son were not communicated to the Holy Ghost—that is, if the Holy Ghost were not of and in the Substance of the Son (cf. St. Athan., Ad Serap., 1. i.; St. Basil, Ep., 38 (al. 43), n. 4, etc.). The Fathers call the Holy Ghost, in opposition to the external works, the power and activity (virtus et operatio, ἐνέργεια), and sometimes also the quality (ποιότης) of the Son. These expressions are used of the Son in relation to the Father; but when applied to the Holy Ghost in relation to the Son, the Fathers illustrate their signification by comparing the Son to a flower, of which the Holy Ghost is the perfume, or to a mouth, an arm, a branch, of which the Holy Ghost is the breath, the finger, the flower. They further convey the notions of consubstantiality by comparing the relations of the two Persons to honey and its sweetness, to a spring and its waters, to water and its steam, to a ray of light and its radiance, to fire and its heat (cf. Petav., 1. vii., c. 5 and 7).

(b.) The Fathers declare positively that the origin of the Holy Ghost from the substance of the Son must be put on the same level as the origin of the Son from the Father, and that the precedence of the Son as principle of the Holy Ghost does not destroy the equality and real unity between these two Persons any more than the precedence of the Father as principle of the Son causes any real inequality between Father and Son. They lay so much stress on this parallel that they apply to the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son all the expressions used to describe the generation of the Son from the Father (except “begotten” and “Son”), although they are aware that this makes it more difficult to answer the question why the Holy Ghost is not the son of the Son. (See St. Basil, C. Eun., 1. v.) In countless places they call the Holy Ghost the Word (verbum = ῥῆμα, not λόγος), the Effulgence, the Image (εἰκών), the Countenance, the Seal, the Figure, and the Form (χαρακτήρ, μορφή) of the Son; all of which expressions convey the idea of consubstantiality between the Holy Ghost and the Son, as much as when they are used of the Son in relation to the Father. (See Petav., 1. vii., c. 7; Franzelin, th. xxxvii.)

(c.) In the third place the Fathers show that, since the Holy Ghost stands to the Son as the Son to the Father, He must also proceed from the Father through the Son, and that, though not generated like the Son, He none the less receives through the Son, as really as the Son Himself, the Substance of the Father. The substantial connection of the Holy Ghost with the Father through the Son, and vice versâ, is illustrated by the comparisons given above (a), the three Persons standing in the relation of root, flower, and odour,—light, ray, and radiance, etc.; the Son and the Holy Ghost are to the Father as His mouth and the breath proceeding from it, or as His arm and finger. The Son is the Truth and Wisdom of the Father; the Holy Ghost is the Spirit of Wisdom and of Truth. Cf. St. Athan., Ad. Serap., i., n. 19–21; and the chapter of St. Basil, C. Eunom., 1. v., inscribed, “That, as the Son stands to the Father, so the Holy Ghost stands to the Son.”

2. The defence of the Fathers against the Pneumatomachi is founded upon the above principles.

(a.) The first objection, urged principally by Eunomius, was that the order of origin in the Trinity involved a descending order in the excellence and nature of the Three Persons, and an essential difference between the substances. To this the Fathers had but one answer: that the Holy Ghost was no more inferior to the Son for proceeding from Him, than the Son was inferior to the Father for being generated by Him; and that the difference of origin implied no other difference whatsoever, except the difference of origin itself. St. Basil treats this point expressly in the beginning of his third book against Eunomius. See Franzelin, th. xxxv.

(b.) The second objection was that, if the Holy Ghost stood to the Son as the Son to the Father, the Holy Ghost ought to be the son of the Son, and the grandson of the Father. The Fathers do not evade this difficulty by stating that the Holy Ghost is only related to the Son inasmuch as He possesses the same Substance, and not by any relation of origin; on the contrary, they expressly affirm that the Holy Ghost is really from the Father through the Son. (St. Basil, C. Eunom., 1. v.: “Why is the Holy Ghost not called the Son of the Son? Not because He is not of God through the Son.”) They only point out that human relations cannot be unreservedly applied to God; that the expression “Son of the Son” leads to absurd consequences, e.g. to the supposition that in God, as in man, an indefinite series of generations is possible; that each Person in the Trinity must be as unique and individual in His personality as the Divine Substance; that, lastly, generation is not the only kind of origin, wherefore also Holy Scripture compares the origin of the Holy Ghost to the origin of the breath from the mouth. The essential difference between Divine and human generation lies in this: that man generates as an isolated substance independent of his own progenitor, whereas the Son of God can only work in unity with His Father, and so communicate the Divine Substance common to Father and Son. (St. Athan., Ad. Serap., i. 16.) Hence the expression, “through the Son,” when applied to the origin of the Holy Ghost, does not mean quite the same as when applied to human relations.

(c.) The third objection ran thus: If the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father as really and truly as from the Son, He ought to be the son of the Father and the brother of the Son. To this the Fathers answered that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Father in the same way as the Son does; and that He does not proceed from the Father alone and in every respect directly, but through the Son; the Holy Ghost being not only the Spirit of the Father, but also the Spirit of the Son. (Cf. St. Basil, Ep., 38.)

VI. From the line of argument followed by the Fathers who lived at the time of the Second Council (A.D. 381), it is evident that the words of the Symbol, “Who proceedeth from the Father,” are not intended to mean from the Father alone, but through the Son from the Father and from the Father through the Son; which formula is, with the older Greeks, the standing and self-evident commentary on the words of the Symbolum. The interpretation, “from the Father alone,” is a falsification as bad as and akin to the Protestant interpretation of the words, “Man is justified by faith without the works of the law,” leaving unheeded the other words, “Charity which worketh through faith.” Nay, by suppressing “through the Son,” the formula “proceedeth from the Father” would be deprived of its natural sense as it presented itself to the mind of the Fathers. For, in that case, the Father, as Father, would have no relation to the Holy Ghost, and the Holy Ghost ought either to be a son of the Father, or the Father ought to have another personal character besides that of Fathership. (Franzelin, th. xxxvi.)

B.—The Eastern manner of conceiving and expressing the Procession of the Holy Ghost compared with the Western

II. It is well known that the Eastern Fathers differ from the Western in their way of expressing the Procession of the Holy Ghost. The former commonly use the formula, ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ, “from the Father through the Son;” the latter, ex Patre Filioque, “from the Father and the Son.” No real difference of meaning, however, underlies these different expressions, as is sufficiently proved by the fact that Greek Fathers, who had most occasion to express the dogma in short formulas, especially St. Epiphanius and St. Cyril of Alexandria, use the Latin formula times out of number; and Latin doctors, like Tertullian and St. Hilary, frequently use the Greek expression. Besides, the Western Church never objected to the formula used in the East, but attributed a correct sense to it, although it might lead Latin scholars to a misunderstanding far from the mind of the Greeks.

VIII. As a matter of fact, the Greek formula has a sound sense and a natural origin, and has even a certain advantage over the Latin formula. It owes its origin to the fact that Holy Scripture, whenever it mentions the Divine operations, represents the Father as the principle out of which (ex quo, ἐξ οὗ) all things come, and the Son as the principle through or by means of which (per quod, διʼ οῦ) all things are made, or as the way by which all things come from and return to the Father. Moreover, the course which the controversy with the Pneumatomachi took, rendered the frequent use of this exposition natural. The sound meaning of the formula is that it represents the Father and the Son, not as two principles acting separately, but as two principles operating one in the other, or as one principle; and that it sets forth the particular position of the Father and the Son as principles of the Holy Ghost, viz. that the Son produces the Holy Ghost only as “principle from a principle” (principium de principio), whereas: the Father is “principle without a principle” (principium sine principio) and “principle of a principle: (principium principii) of the Holy Ghost. From this appears the relative advantage of the Greek formula. It clearly unfolds the meaning which lies hidden in the “ex Patre et Filio,” and which has to be expounded by the addition of “tanquam ab uno principio,” and “licet pariter ab utroque, a Patre principaliter” or “originaliter.” Its sole disadvantage is that it does not point out as clearly as the Latin formula the parity of the participation of Father and Son in the Spiration of the Holy Ghost.

IX. The special stress which the Greek Fathers laid on the formula διʼ υἱοῦ has a deeper reason in their manner of conceiving the dogma of the Trinity,—a conception which might be described as organic. To the Greek Fathers the two productions in God, Generation and Spiration, appear as a motion proceeding in a straight line, the Spiration originating in the Generation, and being intimately and essentially connected with it, so that not only does the Spiration essentially presuppose the Generation, but the Generation virtually contains the Spiration, tends towards it, and has its complement in it. They consider the productions in the Trinity as a motion of the Divinity, by which the Divinity passes first from the Father to the Son and then to the Holy Ghost, and so passes, as it were, through the Son. In harmony with this view, they chose their illustrations of the mystery from analogies in organic nature, in which one production leads to another, e.g. root, stem, and flower. The deeper reason for this conception is, however, to be found in this, that the Greek Fathers considered the production of the Son as a manifestation of the wisdom of the Father, and the production of the Holy Ghost as a manifestation of the sanctity of God which is founded upon His wisdom. In other words: they considered the Holy Ghost (according to John 15) as the Spirit of Truth Who proceedeth from the Father.

From this point of view, the production of the Holy Ghost, in as far as it was attributed to the Father, appeared as carried on by means of the generation of the Son, but going beyond this generation. Hence it was termed, as distinguished from the generation, προβολή or ἔκπεμψις (a sending forth). All the terms used exclusively to characterize either the generation of the Son or the spiration of the Holy Ghost, are explained and accounted for by the above remarks on the organic conception of the productions in the Trinity. It was the more necessary for the Greek Fathers to hold fast to a terminology based upon their “organic” conception, because any deviation from it (coupled with their formula that “the Holy Ghost stands to the Son as the Son stands to Father,” viz. as Word and Image) would easily have led to a misconception of the organic coherence of both productions, and would have made the Holy Ghost the grandson of the Father. For if, conjointly with the expression διά (through), they had used the expression ἐκ (from the Son), this might have conveyed the meaning that the Holy Ghost is of the Son exactly as the Son is of the Father, viz. by generation, and consequently that He is not directly, but only indirectly, produced by the Father. The “from” seemed to separate the Son from the Father in the production of the Holy Ghost, and was looked upon as inconvenient because it does not represent the Holy Ghost as the Spirit which is equally the Spirit of the Father and the Son. For the same reason it was deemed incorrect to call the Son the principle (αἰτία), pure and simple, of the Holy Ghost, because this seemed to imply that the Son, in the production of the Holy Ghost, acted as a principle separate from the Father, as a human son does. Therefore the Son was usually represented as only an intermediate principle, through which the Holy Ghost received His personality, whereas the Father was designated as the only principle pure and simple, from which the Holy Ghost proceeded as well as the Son. This mode of expression, however, meant only that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son inasmuch as the Son Himself, in virtue of His Sonship, is and remains in the Father, which the Latin Fathers express when they say, “Son and Father are but one principle of the Holy Ghost.”

X. The Latin conception, as developed after St. Ambrose and St. Jerome, may be termed the “personal” conception of the productions in the Trinity. It does not, like the Greek, consider the production of the Holy Ghost as a continuation of the production of the Son, but as an act in which the Person produced by generation, by reason of His unity and equality with His principle, brings into play His personal union with His principle: both, acting side by side as equals, communicate what is common to Them to the Holy Ghost. Here the Holy Ghost is the bond and the pledge of mutual love between Father and Son, or between the original model and its copy. From this point of view, nothing was more natural than to say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from Father and Son, and to find fault with a formula which made no mention of the Son. It would seem equally strange to see the Greeks put the Holy Ghost in immediate relation with the Son alone as “image of the Son;” but nobody would think of finding in the expression, “ex Patre et Filio,” a separation of the Two Persons in the act of producing the Third. The only objection of the Latin Church to the formula, “through the Son,” was that it might lead to the notion of the Son as the mother of the Holy Ghost (cf. St. Augustine, In Joan., tract. 99). The Latin Fathers, therefore, avoided the formula “through the Son,” lest the Holy Ghost should appear to be the Son of the Father and of the Son; whereas the Greeks avoided the formula, “from the Son,” lest He should be thought the grandson of the Father.

For the history of the introduction of the word Filioque into the Symbol, see Hergenröther, Photius, i., p. 692 sqq.; Franzelin, thes. xli.

XI. From what has been said, it is evident that there was no contradiction between the older Eastern and the Western Church as regards the Procession of the Holy Ghost. The former taught the Catholic doctrine as decidedly as the latter. The difference of expression was, indeed, likely to lead to misunderstandings; but, like the former misunderstandings concerning the terms “hypostasis” and “persona,” they could easily have been brought to a satisfactory issue, had it not been for the schismatic jealousy of the Greeks, who by degrees advanced from a mutilation of the Latin formula to the negation of the Eastern doctrine.

C.—The Heresy of the Schism

XII. A formal and absolute denial of the Procession of the Holy Ghost from God the Son is to be found nowhere among the older orthodox Fathers of the Greek Church. If Photius had any forerunners, they certainly were Greek heretics, Nestorians and Monothelites, who dragged this point into the controversy in order to cast suspicion on their opponents. As to the Nestorians (especially Nestorius himself, Theodore of Mopsuestia, and even Theodoret), it is most probable that they rejected the “through the Son” in the same sense as the Fathers had rejected it in the Macedonian controversy, viz. created or generated through the Son. In fact, the Nestorians accused St. Cyril of holding the views of the Macedonians. The Monothelites, on the contrary, attempted by their criticisms of the Latin formula, to show that the Western Church favoured Macedonianism—perhaps they also misinterpreted the Greek formula—but St. Maximus refuted them. Certain monks of Jerusalem, jealous of the Franks, were the first to openly deny the ancient doctrine (A.D. 808). Photius, by the proclamation of his schism, disregarding the tradition of the Greek not less than of the Latin Church, made the negation of the Procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son his fundamental dogma. On the Nestorians and Theodoret, see Card. Newman, Historical Sketches, vol. ii.; Kuhn, § 32; and Franzelin, th. xxxviii. On the audacious sophisms of Photius, see Hergenröther, Photius, iii., p. 400 sqq.

XIII. As the Photian schism has been the greatest and most enduring of all the schisms that have rent the Church, we are not surprised to find that the heresy which it invented should carry schism and division even into God Himself. All schisms, in the pretended interest of the monarchy of Christ, have rejected His visible representative on earth, and have thus destroyed the economy (οἰκονομία) of the Church. The Photian heresy, in the pretended interest of the monarchy of God the Father, rejects the character of the Son as principle; but in so doing it tears, rends, and destroys the living unity (economy) which, according to the Greek and Latin Fathers, exists in the Trinity.

The divisions and rents which the heresy of the schism introduces into the Trinity are the following: (a) It destroys the immediate and direct union of the Holy Ghost with the Son, for this union can only consist in the relation of origin; at the same time it deprives the Holy Ghost of His attribute of “own Spirit of the Son.” (b) It destroys the perfect unity of Father and Son, in virtue of which the Son possesses everything in common with the Father, except Paternity, (c) It tears asunder the indivisible unity of the Father, by dividing the character of Paternity from the character of Spirator, or προβολεύς, and so giving Him a double Personality, (d) It annihilates the fixed order and succession, in virtue of which the Three Persons form one continuous golden chain. (e) It destroys the organic coherence of the two productions in the Trinity so much insisted upon by the Greek Fathers themselves. (f) Above all, it destroys the perfect concatenation of the Divine Persons, in virtue of which each of Them stands in the closest relation to the other two and forms a connecting link between them (cf. St. Basil, Ep., 38, n. 4). Thus the Greek Fathers point out the intermediate position of the Son between the Father and the Holy Ghost: the Son goes forth from the Father, and sends forth from Himself the Holy Ghost, so that, through the Son, the Father is in relation with the Holy Ghost and vice versâ. The Latin Fathers, on the other hand, describe the Holy Ghost as the exhalation of the mutual love of Father and Son, which binds Them together like a band, “vinculum,” “osculum amplexus.” (g) Lastly, the heresy of the schism curtails and mutilates the Trinity in its very Essence. For the Father is Father only inasmuch as He gives the Son whatever He Himself possesses and can give by generation, including His entire fecundity, with the exception of the special character of Paternity. The Son is perfect Son only if He is equal and like to the Father in the Spiration of the Holy Ghost, and if, in particular, the Spirit of the Father is communicated to Him by the very act of generation and not by a new act of the Father. The Holy Ghost, too, is only conceivable as perfect Spirit and as a distinct Person if the Son is His principle. For it is an axiom accepted by the Fathers, that all personal differences in God, being founded upon the relations of origin, exist only between the principle and its product. No distinction is conceivable in God which does not include the most intimate union of those that are distinct. And as, according to the Greek Fathers, the Father produces the Holy Ghost only through the Son and not side by side with the Son, the Holy Ghost would remain in the Son and be identical with Him if He did not proceed from the Son.

SECT. 99.—THE FATHER, SON, AND HOLY GHOST, DIVINE HYPOSTASES AND PERSONS—DEFINITION OF HYPOSTASIS AND PERSON AS APPLIED TO GOD

I. Tradition, like Holy Scripture itself, had at first no common name for the three Subjects which are distinguished in the Deity. Even the dogmatic definitions of the third and fourth centuries repeat the names of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; and when the collective noun τριάς (the Three) is used, no name is added to designate the Three generally. In the course of time, however, when heresy had made it necessary to assert the unity of God as a unity of essence (οὐσία, used almost exclusively by the Greek Fathers) and of nature (natura, the favourite term of Latin writers), or, in a word, as a unity of substance, it also became necessary to determine for the three Subjects (Whose unity of essence was asserted) a name which should express in a convenient manner Their relation to the Substance, viz. that They are distinct bearers and holders of one Essence and Nature.

Even in the third century, Origen used for this purpose the term ὑπόστασις, and Tertullian, Persona. This usage, however, became general only with the Fathers of the fourth century, and by slow degrees. St. Gregory of Nazianzum often uses circumlocutions, e.g. “They in whom is the divinity, etc.” Many controversies preceded the universal acceptance of the two terms; their full etymological sense and the relation they bear to each other were only fully understood after they had come into general use. Harmony of expression and thought was obtained by translating the Greek ὑπόστασις by subsistentia (used by the Fathers in the concrete sense of subsistent, by the Schoolmen in the abstract sense of subsistence) and by suppositum. Both forms are found in St. Ambrose; but the second only became general in the schools of the Middle Ages. On the controversy concerning the terms Hypostasis and Substantia, see Petav. 1. iv., c. 4; Kuhn. § 29; Card. Newman, Arians, p. 432.

II. Ὑποστασις. when used concretely, designates in general something existing in and for itself, and consequently having and supporting in itself other things, of which it is the substratum or suppositum. Hence, an hypostasis is a substance and not a mere accident. But not every substance is an hypostasis. Substances which are parts of a whole, as, for instance, the arm of the body, are not so designated, but only substances which constitute a total or a whole in themselves. Nor is the hypostasis the substantial essence in as far as this is common to the several individuals of the same kind or species (substantia secunda), for the substantial essence does not exist in itself, but in the individuals of which it is predicated. Hence the concept of hypostasis implies an individual substance separate and distinct from all other substances of the same kind, possessing itself and all the parts, attributes, and energies which are in it (substantia prima integra in se tota). The relations between an hypostasis and its essence and nature are that the essence and nature, when and because possessed by the hypostasis, are individualized and incommunicable; the hypostasis is always the bearer (subject or suppositum) of the nature; in other words, the hypostasis has the nature. If we consider a substance formally as possessing itself, it is identical with the hypostasis; if we consider it as possessed, it is, like essence and nature, in the hypostasis.

Person is defined “an individual rational substance,”—that is, the hypostasis of an intellectual nature and essence. The note “intellectual” or “rational,” restricts the concept of hypostasis to one kind of hypostasis, the most perfect of all, viz. that of substances wholly or partially spiritual. The perfection which distinguishes a personal hypostasis from a material one consists not only in the perfection of the substance itself but also in the manner of possessing it: a person is more than the bearer, he is the holder of his substance and is “sui juris”—that is, in his own right and power.

Impersonal hypostases have no proper right over their parts, no free use of them. They are but “things” without a “self.” Persons, on the contrary, have, in virtue of their spiritual nature, a higher dignity which commands respect, and thus gives them a right over what they possess; they are conscious beings and are thus able to enjoy their various properties and to dispose of them for their own purposes. Besides, persons have a greater independence or self-sufficiency than impersonal hypostases. Their spiritual substance is imperishable and cannot be absorbed by another hypostasis; although they can be made subordinate to other persons, still they never can be treated as mere things and means; lastly, on account of the respect which one person owes to another, they are kept more apart than other hypostases of the same kind, and are not liable to be absorbed by others.

III. As to the applicability of the terms “Hypostasis” and “Person” to God, it is clear that they can only be applied analogically: whatever perfection they express is eminently present in God; whatever imperfection they imply, must be excluded from Him.

1. The perfection of a hypostasis consists in its not forming part of a whole or being an attribute of a substance, but rather the bearer and holder of a complete substance, essence, and nature. A person is an hypostasis endowed with dignity and conscious power, possessing his property immutably, and making it the end and object of his actions; equal to and not absorbable by the other holders of the same nature, and entitled to be respected by them in the same measure as he is bound to respect himself. All this is eminently applicable to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.

2. The imperfections of created hypostases are (a) that they are not absolutely independent, their principle and last end being outside of and above them; (b) persons who possess the same nature, do not possess numerically one nature, but only similar natures; so that the distinction of created persons implies a distinction and separation of their substances; (c) hence the distinction between created persons is independent of their origin one from the other, and does not of necessity imply a connection based upon mutual esteem and love. In opposition to this, the Divine Persons are (a) absolutely independent, Their perfection and dignity being absolutely the highest; (b) the unity of substance in the Trinity is perfectly undivided, excluding the possibility of multiplication, so that the difference of Persons is merely a distinction of the Persons themselves and not of Their substance; (c) the distinction between the Divine Persons is essentially and exclusively founded upon Their relations of origin, and causes Them to be essentially bound together, and necessitates the most intimate mutual esteem and love.

IV. In consequence of these differences, the concepts of Hypostasis and Person must be modified when applied to the Deity. The notion that a person is the bearer and holder, distinct from other bearers and holders, of a rational nature, is applicable to the uncreated as well as to the created person; but not so the definition of a hypostasis as a subsisting and individual substance.

In a certain sense, it must be said of God that His Substance subsists and is individual, even apart from the distinctions between the Three Persons. Without supposing this, we cannot understand the subsistence and individuality of the several Divine Hypostases. Not only does the Divine Substance exist essentially, but it also essentially exists in itself and for itself, so that it can be in no manner part of another substance, but only be possessed by itself. Further, being unique in its kind and excluding multiplication, it also is, by reason of its unicity, eminently individual. Hence, if the notion of “subsistent and individual substance” be used to characterize the Divine Hypostases, the subsistence (that is, the independence and self-possession) must be conceived, not in opposition to the dependence of partial substances, but in that peculiar form in which it exists in the individual holders of the Divine Substance; and the individuality must not be conceived, as in creatures, only in opposition to the notion of a common genus, but in opposition to the communicability of a single indivisible object to distinct holders. In other words: the notions of subsistence and individuality must be so modified as to agree with the form or manner in which the one Divine Substance is possessed by the three Divine Persons.

V. Although the Divine Persons are Persons in the highest sense of the term, they are essentially related to each other; that is, each of them separately possesses the Divine Nature only inasmuch as He stands to another in the relation of principle to product or vice versâ, and consequently each single Person possesses the Divine Nature for Himself only in as far as He possesses it at the same time for and from the other two Persons. Otherwise there would be no distinction of the Persons, nor would the Persons have that intimate union among Themselves which is required by their absolutely perfect personality. Moreover, because the relations of the Persons to each other are the one thing which determines the difference in the possession of the same Divine Nature, these mutual relations in God are not only, as in created persons, a distinctive attribute of each Person, but they constitute the fundamental character of the personality of each Person.

From what has been said, the specific notion of the Divine Persons may be completely determined as follows. The Divine Persons are more than simply related to each other; They are nothing else but “subsisting relations,” that is, relations identical with the Divine Substance, and representing it as subsisting or appertaining to itself in a distinct manner. Conversely, it may be said that the Persons are the one Divine Substance under a determined relation—that is, as having, through the relation of origin, three particular forms of possessing Itself. This essential relativity of the Divine Persons is not indeed expressed by the term person, but the thing signified by the term is in fact a subsisting relation or the substance under a determined relation; the proper names of the Persons—Father, Son, and Holy Ghost (i.e. Spirit of the Father and the Son)—clearly express their relations. (Cf. St. Thomas, I., q. 29, a. 3.)

SECT. 100.—THE DISTINCTION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS IN PARTICULAR, AND THEIR DISTINCTIVE MARKS

I. According to Tertullian, the differentiation (œconomia) of the Divine Persons presupposes the Monarchy, that is the unity and unicity of the Divine Essence and particularly the unity and unicity of one Person, in whom the Divine Essence is present originally, not as communicated or received. The differentiation is brought about by the First Person being essentially a producing and communicating Person, producing the other Persons from Himself, and communicating His essence to Them.

II. The active production and communication of the First Person is twofold, and consequently the corresponding procession (πρόοδος) is also twofold, namely, the generation (γέννησις) which has its foundation in the First Person alone; and the procession in a narrower sense (spiratio, πνεῦσις or προβολή) when expressing the action; processio, ἐκπόρευσις, when considered passively), which has its common foundation in the First and Second Persons.

III. Hence a threefold positive fundamental form of possessing the Divine Nature (τρόποι ὑπάρξεος); viz. (1) communicating possession, or possession for self and for others; (2) two forms of receiving possession, or possession for self and from others. Of these latter the one is distinguished from the other inasmuch as it partakes of the communicating form. These three fundamental forms are the three distinguishing personal characters of the three Persons (ἰδιώματα ὑποστατικά, characteres personales et constituentes), from which they also take their names—the Father from the Fathership (πατρότης, paternitas), the Son from the Sonship (ὑιότης, filiatio), and the Holy Ghost from the Spiration (πνεῦσις, spiratio).

The Active Spiration is not a personal, constituent character like Paternity and Filiation, because it is not a fundamental form of possession, existing side by side with Paternity and Filiation, but is only an attribute of these. But Active Spiration is an attribute in such a manner that it is contained in the complete concept of Paternity and Filiation, and unfolds the full signification of these two characters. The Father, as principle of the first production in the Deity, is also principle of the second production; and the Son, as product of the first production, is also principle of the second. The Father generates the Son as Spirator (Pater generat Filium Spiratorem), and the Son is one with the Father in Spiration as in all other things The Father as Father being also Spirator, and the Son as Son being likewise Spirator, it follows that the Father is principle of all communications, and is a communicating principle only; that the Son is principle of only one communication, and is at the same time a receiving and communicating principle.

IV. As from the twofold production in God results a threefold form of possession, so from the same there result four real relations (relationes, σχέσεις), or two mutual relations. Each production gives rise to two relations, viz. of principle to product and vice versâ: generation is the foundation of the relation of Father to Son and of Son to Father; spiration is the foundation of the relation of Father and Son to the Holy Ghost, and of the relation of the Holy Ghost to Father and Son. And of these real relations there are only four, because the spiration proceeds from Father and Son as from one principle, so that Father and Son bear to the Holy Ghost one indivisible relation. The relations are real, not merely logical, because they are founded upon a real production, and are the condition of the real being of the principle and of the product. Whence they have essentially a twofold function: the differentiation of the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem, and the connecting of both terms; or rather, they only distinguish, in as far as at the same time they represent, the Persons distinguished as appertaining one to another, and so bind Them together, that if one ceased to be, the corresponding one would likewise cease. This also applies to the relation of Father and Son to the Holy Ghost; for although They are not Father and Son on account of the Spiration, still without the Spiration They would not be all that They are by essence.

V. The special marks or characters which distinguish each of the three Persons from the other two, are called in theology proprietates, ἰδιώματα, or ἰδιότητες; and considered as objects of our knowledge, “Distinguishing and Personal Notions” (notiones distinguentes and personales, ἔννοιαι or γνωρίσματα διακριτικά and συστατικά); in the language of the schools they are termed simply notiones divinœ or notiones.

These notions are five in number, viz. the four relations as positive notions, to which is added the “Ingenerateness,” or “Innascibility” of the Father as a negative notion. This last characterizes the peculiar position of the Father more distinctly as First Principle in the Deity, and thus completes the notion of paternity. The negative notions that might be predicated of the Son and of the Holy Ghost (viz. that the Son is not Father, and the Holy Ghost is not Spirator) are not taken into account, because they do not complete the notions of Filiation and Spiration, but result at once from these notions. The positive notions may be conceived and expressed in a variety of ways, e.g. the Sonship as “being spoken as a Word,” or as generation in its active or passive sense. These differences of expression, however, do not alter the number of notions.

Three of the five notions appertain to the Father—Ingenerateness, Paternity, and Active Spiration; two to the Son—Filiation and Active Spiration; one to the Holy Ghost—Passive Spiration.

VI. Thus there are in God:—

1. One Nature;

2. Two Productions;

3. Three Persons;

4. Four Relations; and

5. Five Notions.

CHAPTER IV

THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRINITY FROM THE FECUNDITY OF THE DIVINE LIFE

SECT. 101.—THE ORIGINS IN GOD RESULTING FROM THE FECUNDITY OF THE DIVINE LIFE AS ABSOLUTE WISDOM

A PURELY scientific explanation of the Trinity is impossible; the only possible explanation is a theological one, starting from at least one revealed principle. That principle is “the inner fecundity of the Divine Life,” the determination of which is the object of the present portion of our treatise.

I. That the plurality of Persons is brought about and can be brought about only by the production of two of Them from the First Person, is certain from Revelation, and (given the real distinction of the Persons) is also evident to reason. The teaching of Revelation is already known to us. As regards reason we observe that, as the Divine Substance cannot be multiplied, the distinction of the Divine Persons necessarily rests upon the distinct possession of the same Substance; and a difference in the manner of possessing the Divine Nature is necessarily founded upon the distinction between giving and receiving.

II. It is likewise certain from Revelation, and evident to reason, that the Divine productions are essentially acts of life. For the products are living Persons, generated and spirated, and life can only be communicated by a living principle.

III. Since the nature of a being is the principle of the acts of its life and of the communication of life, we must hold that in God the principle (principium quo) of the inner communications of life is His Divine Nature; that is, the Divine Nature as formally identical with the acts of knowing and willing.

IV. The communication of life being the essential outcome of the absolutely actual and purely spiritual life-activity of God, its form is necessarily different from any form of productivity observable among creatures: it is neither a reproduction of the Divine Essence in the Persons produced, nor a production of organs destined to enlarge and develop the sphere of life. The form of the Divine productivity can only be conceived as an immanent radiation and outpouring of the force and energy of the Divine Life, expressing itself in distinct subjects; so that the Divine Life, by reason of this very manifestation of itself ad intra, communicates itself to the Divine Persons. Hence the foundation of the Divine fecundity or productivity is the superabundant fulness of the Divine Life; and, as God is the absolute Spirit, that is Life itself, His fecundity is, unlike that of any being outside of Him, infinitely productive.

From this also appears the deep meaning of the old Roman doctrinal formula: “The three Persons are one Spirit” (ἑν πνεῦμα).

V. In order to arrive at a more concrete determination of the productivity of the Divine Life, we must consider it as the absolute and substantial Wisdom—that is, the most perfect Knowledge of the highest Truth and the most perfect Love of the highest Good. According to this, the communication of life in God must be effected by means of acts of the Divine Intellect and Will in such a manner that the products of the communication manifest, represent, and complete the Divine Knowledge and Volition, and that the products are but the inner manifestation and the adequate expression or outpouring of the substantial Wisdom of God. Now, Wisdom contains two, and only two, distinct forms of life-activity, viz. Knowledge and Volition, and is itself a combination of the Living Truth with the Living Holiness. Hence the two productions which we know by Faith to exist in God, must be distributed between these two forms of life in such a manner that one of them must be the expression and completing terminus of the absolutely perfect Knowledge, or the manifestation of the Living Truth; and that the other must be the outpouring and terminus of the absolutely perfect Volition and manifestation of the Holy Love or the absolute Holiness of God. The productions, however, are not distributed in such a way as to be independent of one another, which would happen if the one manifested only the Knowledge of truth and the other only Love and Holiness. They are even more intimately connected in God than knowing and willing in created minds. The expression of Knowledge is essentially the expression of a Knowledge which breathes holy Love; and the outpouring of Love is essentially of a Love full of wisdom. Thus, in both productions, although in a different manner, the whole of the Divine Wisdom is manifested. (Cf. St. Aug., De Trin., l. xv., n. 8 sqq., Franzelin, th. xxvi.)

VI. The proposition, “The communication of life in God is based upon a twofold manifestation of the Divine Wisdom,” is more than a working hypothesis; it is the only admissible one, and claims the character of a fixed principle for the declaration and the evolution of the dogma. Holy Scripture indicates this clearly enough, and Tradition has from the very commencement treated it as such. It is, therefore, of such a degree of certitude that to deny it would be temerarious and erroneous.

I. The character of the first production as inner expression of the Divine Knowledge, is set forth in Holy Scripture with all possible distinctness. The Second Person’s proper name is “the Word” (Λόγος, Verbum), and the name “Wisdom” is appropriated to Him; to Him alone are applied the terms “image” (εἰκών), “figure” (χαρακτήρ), “mirror,” “radiance,” and “splendour” (ἀπαύγασμα) of God, terms which in themselves imply an expression of the Divine Knowledge, and which, taken in conjunction with the names Λόγος and Wisdom, can imply no other meaning. In this manner the first production was conceived and declared even in ante-Nicene writers, but more especially by the Fathers of the fourth century.

2. The character of the second production as a manifestation of the Divine Volition, is not so formally set forth in Holy Scripture. Still it is sufficiently indicated, negatively and indirectly, by the non-application of the names of the intellectual production to the Third Person, and by the appropriation of the first of these names (Word) to the Son; whence the second production, which must be analogous to the first, is necessarily a manifestation of the other form of life in God, viz. of the Divine Will. And also, positively and directly, in the two elements of the name of the Third Person (“Holy,” “Ghost”), and in the description of the many functions and operations attributed to Him, which all characterize Him as the representative of Divine Love. In Scripture and in early Tradition alike, the character of the production of the Holy Ghost is only hinted at; in the fourth century it received a certain amount of development during the controversies on the Divinity of the Holy Ghost. The exposition of the Greek Fathers is slightly different from that of the Latins. The Greeks represent the Holy Ghost as a manifestation of the absolute sanctity of the Divine Will, as the Spirit of Holiness, and “Subsisting Holiness.” The Latin Fathers represent Him as the hypostatic manifestation of the Love of the Divine Will existing between Father and Son; He is the “Spirit of Mutual Love and Unity,” or “Subsisting Union.” These two views differ only on the surface. The Sanctity, common to Father and Son, from which the Holy Ghost proceeds, is the Love of the supreme goodness and beauty of the Divine Essence, and as such includes Love of the Persons Who possess that Essence. On the other hand, the mutual Love of Father and Son is Love of their communion in the possession of the supreme goodness and beauty; hence this Love is but Sanctity conceived in a more concrete manner. The unity of the two views is best expressed thus: “The Father loves in the Son, as in the resplendent image of His Goodness, the Supreme Beauty; and the Son loves in the Father, as in the principle of His Beauty, the Supreme Goodness.”

SECT. 102.—THE PRODUCTIONS IN GOD ARE TRUE PRODUCTIONS OF AN INNER MANIFESTATION (1) OF THE DIVINE KNOWLEDGE THROUGH WORD AND IMAGE; AND (2) OF THE DIVINE LOVE THROUGH ASPIRATION, PLEDGE, AND GIFT

I. The chief difficulty of the doctrine of the Divine Productions consists in clearly determining how a real production in the Divine Intellect and Will is to be conceived.

The Divine Intellect and the Divine Will essentially possess their entire actual perfection, and are identical with the acts of knowing and willing. Hence a production by the acts of knowing and willing similar to that which takes place in the created mind (viz. by a transition from potentiality to act), is impossible in God. The First Person does not acquire His wisdom through the Generated Wisdom, but possesses in His own Essence Wisdom in its fullest actuality. In the created mind, all productions are the result of a faculty passing from potentiality into actuality; this being impossible in God, we cannot conclude from His acts of thought and volition that these acts result in the production of any reality. This is also the reason why the reality of the Divine Productions cannot be known by reason alone, but must be learned from Revelation. The only conceivable form of a Divine Production is that, in virtue of the superabundant fulness of the actuality of the Divine Knowledge, a manifestation of it is brought about and a fruit produced. This is the element which Revelation adds to our natural knowledge of the perfection of Divine Life, and which connects the doctrine of the Trinity with the doctrine of the Nature of God.

II. The character of the first production in God as a manifestation and an exercise of the Divine knowledge is fittingly pointed out in Holy Scripture by the names of “Word” and “Image” (John 1; Heb. 1). “The Word” designates the product formally as the expression of the knowledge; “the Image” designates it as the expression or copy of the object of the Divine knowledge—that is, the Divine Essence. The inner manifestation and expression of knowledge is called Word and Image in analogy with the external word and image which manifest our knowledge externally. But, whereas in man we apply the names “word” and “image” to the act of knowledge itself because our mental representation is distinct from its principle and from its object; in God, Whose actual knowledge is identical with its principle and its object, the terms “Word” and “Image,” in their proper sense, can only be applied to the manifestation of the knowledge and to the expression which results from the manifestation. The sense of both names is contained in the representation of the intellectual product as radiation and splendour of the Divine Light; for God is Light, especially inasmuch as He is the substantial Truth—that is, the “adequation of the highest knowable with the highest knowledge,”—and hence the “splendour and radiance” of this Light is necessarily the expression of the Divine knowledge as well as of the Divine Essence. Moreover, this way of designating the intellectual production illustrates how the Divine knowledge necessarily produces an expression of itself, not from any want, but by virtue of its essential fecundity.

III. Holy Scripture indicates the character of the second production in God as a manifestation and exercise of His Love, by representing its product as an “Aspiration” and “Gift” or “Pledge” of Love. Just as thought naturally craves to express itself, so love naturally desires to pour itself forth; the external out-pouring of love is manifested by an aspiration or sigh coming from the heart, and by the gifts which pass from the lover to the beloved as pledges of his love. In like manner the internal effusion of love, in as far as the effusion can and ought to be distinguished from love itself, must be considered as an internal aspiration, gift, and pledge. Holy Scripture applies the names of gift and pledge to the Holy Ghost only in relation to creatures; but we have to determine the operation of the Divine Love independently of creatures, and must therefore study it in its own essence.

The Divine Love must be viewed in a threefold manner:

I. First, and above all, as God’s complacency with Himself as the supreme Goodness and Beauty. The product of the Love in this sense does not yet appear as a pledge or gift, but rather as an aspiration or as a sigh of love, in which Love breathes forth its ardour and energy, or as the seal of love (Cant. 8:6: “Put me as a seal upon thy heart”). It is in this sense that the Greek Fathers conceive the Holy Ghost when, in analogy with the odour of incense or of plants, they describe Him as the odour of the sanctity of God.

2. Divine Love may be considered as the mutual love of Father and Son for each other, as founded upon their common possession of the supreme Goodness and Beauty. In this respect the manifestation of Love appears as the final act or complement of the living communion of Father and Son: the manifestation still bears the character of an aspiration, but at the same time it conveys the notion of a bond or link, which, as a bond (vinculum, nexus) of love, is called “Pledge” (pignus, arrha, inasmuch as in the pledge the lover possesses the beloved, or gives himself to be possessed by the beloved), and “kiss” (osculum) and “embrace” (amplexus, by St. Aug.).

3. God loves Himself as the infinitely communicable and diffusive Good; consequently His Self-Love contains a readiness to communicate His goodness—that is, supreme liberality. In this respect the Divine Love acts as giver, and the fruit of the Liberality of Divine Love is called Gift. This name, however, is not quite adequate, because at first sight it signifies only that the inner product of the Divine liberality should manifest it ad extra, as a gift to others, whereas the self-giving Love of God cannot pour out its entire plenitude on its product without making this the object and the subject of the communication. In other words, the term “Gift” supposes the existence of a receiver, whereas the communication of Love in God produces both Receiver and Gift.

In every one of these three ways, the effusion of the Divine Love appears as an effusion of Divine delight, happiness, and suavity; as a bright burning flame rising from the fire of Divine Love; as the burning breath escaping from a loving heart. Hence the manifestation of Love in God is as much a breathing of Love and a flame of Love, as the manifestation of knowledge is a radiation of knowledge.

SECT. 103.—THE PERFECT IMMANENCE OF THE DIVINE PRODUCTIONS; THE SUBSTANTIALITY OF THEIR PRODUCTS AS INTERNAL EXPRESSION OF THE SUBSTANTIAL TRUTH AND INTERNAL EFFUSION OF THE SUBSTANTIAL SANCTITY

I. However necessary it may be to distinguish in God the expression of knowledge from knowledge itself, and the effusion of love from love itself, it is equally necessary not to separate or divide the expression from the knowledge or the effusion from the love. As we are dealing with productions in God which have their principle and their terminus in God Himself, expression and knowledge, effusion and love are not only intimately connected, but are identical, are one and the same thing. Hence the Divine Knowledge is not only in its inner word as the thought of man is in the external word (i.e. as in its sign), or as the idea of the artist is in his work (i.e. as in its representation): the Divine Knowledge lives and shines forth in its expression exactly as it does in itself, being so produced in its expression as to completely pass into it. In like manner, the Love of God is in its inner effusion not only as a force in its effects or as human love in an external pledge, but in such a way that it burns and flows in its effusion as it does in itself; the effusion being such as to completely contain the outpoured Love.

II. The identity just described constitutes the supreme perfection, the unique reality and absolute immanence of the Divine Word and Spiration of Love. The inner Word of God is more than a Word eminently full of life and wealth, and the Divine Spiration of Love is more than a Spiration full of life and holy delight: the Divine knowledge being not a reflex of truth but Substantial Truth, its expression, identical with itself, is also a Substantial Word, the substantial expression of the Absolute Truth, and is this Truth itself. And the life of the Divine Will being not a tendency to what is good, but Substantial Goodness and Holiness, its inner effusion, identical with itself, is also a Substantial Spiration and outflow of the Absolute Goodness and Holiness, and is this Holiness itself. In God, therefore, the Word of knowledge and the Spiration of love are not immanent in the same way as they are in the human mind (e.g. as accidents in their subjects), but in such a way as to be identical with the substance that produces them; they are not so much in the substance as they are the substance itself, and they also have the substance in themselves. Hence the only difference conceivable between the principle and the terminus of a production in God is that they each possess and represent the Absolute Truth and the Absolute Goodness in a different manner.

III. Hence the life and reality of the particular products can be further determined as follows:—

1. As essential and substantial Truth, the Life of the Divine Intellect is, on the one hand, identical with the Divine Nature as principle of knowledge—that is, with the Divine Intellect itself; on the other hand, it is identical with the formal object of the Divine Intellect, viz. the Divine Essence. Consequently the expression of the Divine knowledge must re-produce, not only the knowledge, but also the knowing intellect, and not only an ideal representation of the Divine Essence, but the Divine Essence itself. Hence the expression of the Divine knowledge is not a mere word—that is, a manifestation of the knowledge or some image of it—but a real and substantial image of nature and essence, containing not only a manifestation of, but the Divine Nature and Essence itself. And the internal speech of God is a real radiation of His own Nature and Essence, just as His external speech gives to created things their nature and essence.

2. As essential and substantial Goodness and Holiness, the life of the Divine Will, or Love, is, on the one hand, identical with the Divine Nature as principle of the Divine Will; on the other hand, with the goodness and holiness of the Divine Essence as the formal object of the Divine Will. Consequently the effusion of Divine Love must contain, not only the Love, but also the Will of God; and not only an affective union with the Supreme Goodness, but the Supreme Goodness itself. Hence the effusion of the Divine Love is not only an expression of the affection, not only an affective surrender to the object of love and liberality, but (a) a spiration, wherein the Divine heart pours out its own Life and its whole Essence; (b) a pledge of love, wherein the loving persons are united, not only symbolically, but really and in the most intimate manner, because their whole life and their whole goodness are really, truly, and essentially contained therein; and (c) a fruit of the Divine Liberality, containing, on the one hand, that Liberality itself—that is, the Divine Will and its life, and, on the other hand, the whole riches of the real goodness—that is, of the Essence and power of God; which therefore is the principle and the source of all other Divine gifts, the “Gift of all gifts,” in the same manner as God is the “Good of all goods.”

SECT. 104.—THE DIVINE PRODUCTIONS AS COMMUNICATIONS OF ESSENCE AND NATURE; THE DIVINE PRODUCTS AS HYPOSTASES OR PERSONS

I. If the internal Divine productions are true productions and their products are substantial products, the productions must be conceived as communications of the Divine Nature from one subject to another, consequently as productions of other subjects, who are put in full possession of the Divine Nature and thus are Divine Hypostases and Persons.

1. The perfect actuality of the Divine Life, which requires that its product be nothing but a manifestation of its wealth of life, likewise requires that this manifestation should not take place by producing a perfection in a subject already existing. The production can only tend to communicate the perfection of the producer to another subject; and as it communicates the whole perfection—that is, the essence and nature—of the producer to the produced subjects, the latter are necessarily true receivers, and hence possessors of the Divine Nature and Essence, or Divine Hypostases and Persons.

2. Where there are productions there is also a producing subject (the principle which acts, principium quod), to which the nature (the principle by or through which the subject acts, principium quo) belongs; consequently there is a hypostasis. On the other hand, in every production the product must be really distinct from the producing Principle. But, by reason of the Divine simplicity, there can be such real distinction between the producer and his products as would entail a composition of several realities in the same subject or hypostasis. Consequently the internal productions in God must result in such a distinction between the producers and the products as will oppose the products to the producers as hypostases to distinct hypostases.

3. The products of the Divine productions are substantial products; they are the Divine Substance itself. If, then, by reason of the productions, a difference must still exist between the product and its principle, it can only be that the Substance is possessed by each of Them in a different manner: in other words, that in each of Them the Substance appertains to itself, or subsists, in a different manner. Consequently the Divine productions essentially tend to multiply the modes of subsistence of the Divine Substance, and to make the Divine Substance subsist, not only in one, but in three modes.

Moreover, the three Hypostases in God are also essentially Persons, and Persons of the most perfect kind, because their Substance is the most self-sufficient of all substances, their Nature the most spiritual of all natures, their Essence the noblest of all essences.

II. Assuming that the internal productions in God are the result of His active cognition and volition, it can be strictly demonstrated à priori that there are necessarily three Divine Persons. There cannot be less than three because the communication and manifestation of the Divine Life would be incomplete, if either the intellect or the will remained barren. Nor can there be more than three because, in this case, either other productions would take place besides those admitted by the internal manifestation of knowledge and will; or the productions would not be perfect and adequate manifestations of knowledge and volition; or, lastly, the acts of knowing and willing would be multiplied as well as the products.

The Trinity of the Divine Persons is, therefore, not accidental, but based upon the nature of the Divine fecundity, which would be manifested incompletely in less than three Persons and cannot be manifested in more than three, because in three it manifests and exhausts its full wealth.

III. Likewise, in the above hypothesis, the Three Persons appear essentially in the fixed order of succession determined by their origin as revealed in Scripture. For the production by knowledge supposes, from its nature, but one knowing Person as principle, yet, at the same time, through the intermediation of the fecundity of the knowledge, tends to give fecundity to the love which proceeds from the knowledge. The production by love from its very nature, presupposes the existence of two persons, because, in God, love can only be fruitful in as far as it proceeds from a fruitful knowledge, is essentially mutual love between the first Person and His Image, and takes the form of a gift of two persons to a third. But the order of origin does not imply an order in the Nature, Essence, or Substance of the Persons, because in kind and in number there is but one Nature. In general, the order of origin does not imply that what stands first in the order actually exists, or even is possible, before or without what stands last; or that the last is in any way dependent on or subordinate to the first. For the producing Persons cannot be conceived in their particular being without the relationship to their Product, nor can the first production be conceived without the second, which is consequent upon it; and as the producing Persons are related just as necessarily to their Products as the Products are to Them, the subordination and dependence otherwise existing between Product and Principle is here obviated.

IV. There can be no question of an order of dignity between the Divine Persons, as if the producing Persons possessed either a higher dignity than their Product or authority over it. For, although the character of principle is a true dignity (ἀξίωμα), or rather constitutes the personal dignity and personal being of the Persons Who possess it, still it is no less a dignity for the produced Persons to be the end and object to which the communicative activity of the others is directed essentially, or that the whole being of the Producers is as essentially for the Products as the whole being of the Products is essentially from the Producers. In other words, in God there is no order founded upon degrees of personal dignity, but upon the various ways, determined by the relationships of origin, of possessing the same supreme dignity, viz. the essential possession of the Godhead.

V. The reasons why the first production in God is alone termed “generation” are manifold. Some are taken from the inconveniences that would arise from applying the same name to both productions. All the others may be reduced to the fact that the first production alone has a special likeness to the generation of bodies, considered as a natural operation (operatio per modum naturæ), and as a “building up” and “representative” operation. As regards the mode of operation, the likeness rests upon this, that the first production, being carried out by the intellect, is similar to the mode of operation of nature, as opposed to operation by free will; in a more special sense, it proceeds from its principle spontaneously and essentially, and is effected through the fundamental life-force of the Divine Nature. On the part of its tendency the first production possesses the specific type of generation, in as far as in it the communication of life is effected by the expression of an intellectual word and the impression of a real image, and consequently it has essentially the tendency to express and represent, in the most perfect manner, the essence of its principle. Again, it is not only generation really and truly, but generation in the purest and highest sense of the word, because it is free from all the imperfections of material generation, and, most of all, because it perfectly realizes the fundamental idea of all generation, viz. the attestation or representation of what the progenitor is. It produces, in the most sublime sense of the word, a “Speaking Likeness,” in which the whole Essence of the Progenitor is substantially, vitally, and adequately contained and represented. The second production is not named “generation,” because all the elements which stamp the first production as true generation are taken precisely from the specific character of this first production, and are not found in the second.

VI. The first production, being alone a generation, its product may be illustrated in many ways by a comparison with the product of plant generation. The eternal Word is at the same time the Germ, the Flower, and the Fruit of the Divinity: the Germ, because He is the original manifestation of the Divine power; the Flower, as manifesting the Divine beauty and glory; and the Fruit, as concentrating the whole fecundity and the wealth of Divinity, through which all other Divine productions go forth, so that all being, form, and perfection in creation are virtually contained in it. As that which first springs from the root, viz. the stem, produces and supports all the other products, and therefore is called in Latin robur, we understand why the Son is so often called the “Strength (virtus) of the Father.” The analogy of the blossom or flower further illustrates why Holy Scripture represents the Son as the “Figure” or “Face” of the Father, and the analogy of the fruit explains why the Son, and the Son alone, is represented as the “Food” or “Bread of life” of created spirits. Cf. Ecclus. 24:17–24.

VII. The dogmatic name “Procession” (ἐκπόρευσις) is not considered by the Latin doctors as the specific name for the second production in God: they use it for want of another expressing a more definite character. In order to determine its signification they combine it with the term “Spiration,” in the sense of animal breathing, in as far as this indicates partly the mode of operation of the second production (processio sive impulsus amoris, motus ab anima) partly the nature of the act by which it is effected, viz. the transitive mutual love of two Persons (Patris in Filium, Filii in Patrem). The Greek Fathers, on the other hand, use the term ἐκπόρευσις to designate a special form of substantial emanation, analogous to the emanation which takes place in plants side by side with generation, and is effected by the plants themselves and their products, viz. the emission of the vital sap or spirit of life in the form of fluid, oily substances in a liquid or ethereal state, such as balsam and incense, wine and oil, and especially the odour or perfume of the plant which is at the same time an ethereal oil and the breath of the plant. Hence, to designate the active production of the Holy Ghost, the Greek doctors seldom use the name πνίειν (spirare, to breathe); they prefer the expressions προβάλλειν, ἐκπέμπειν, προχέειν, with the corresponding intransitive expressions ἐκφοιτᾶν, ἀναβλύζειν, πηγάζειν. The two conceptions complete and illustrate each other: they show that the procession in God is an emission in the highest sense of the word, viz. the emission of an affection and of a gift, not, however, of a mere affection and an empty gift, but the most perfect and most real outpouring of the substantial love of God, which is at once Substantial Goodness, Holiness, and Happiness, and the crown and complement of the entire Divine Life.

From its analogy with the emission from plants, the name “Procession” (ἐκπόρευσις), besides its principal meaning which refers to the form of the procession as a motion directed outward, receives a twofold secondary meaning, the one relating to the principle, the other to the terminus or object of the motion. This secondary meaning shows the emission as a transmission, and is also applicable to the Holy Ghost. For, as the fluids emitted by a plant proceed immediately from the product of generation (the stem, flower, and fruit), but originally from the principle of generation (the seed or root), and consequently pass through the product of generation; so also in God, the effusion of His Substantial Holiness essentially flows through His Substantial Truth from the principle of the latter. This the Greek doctors convey by the terms προβάλλειν, ἐκπέμπειν and ἐκπορεύεσθαι. And just as the fluids emitted by plants have a particular facility and tendency to spread and diffuse themselves outward, so also the Holy Ghost, in His quality of Effusion and Gift of the Divine Love, and as the completing act of the Divine fecundity within, bears a particular relation to the outward diffusion of Divine Love and donation of Divine gifts, and especially represents the all-filling and all-penetrating power of the Divine Love (Rom. 5:5).

SECT. 105.—THE SPECIAL NAMES OF THE DIVINE PRODUCTIONS AS COMMUNICATIONS OF LIFE IN ANALOGY WITH GENERATION AND SPIRATION IN THE ANIMAL KINGDOM—THE PERSONAL NAMES FATHER, SON, AND HOLY GHOST—THE ECONOMY (ΟἰΚΟΝΟΜΊΑ) OF THE DIVINE PERSONS

I. The name “generation,” is given to the first production in God, because it is “a true communication of intellectual life to another subject, or a production of one person from another,” whence also its Principle is termed “Father” and its Product “Son.” In mankind, the father, and not the mother, is the proper active principle of generation; and the son, not the daughter, is the product of generation perfectly like the father. The paternity in the Divine generation is not only real but is paternity in the highest sense. The Divine Father transfers His life into His Son, exclusively by His own power, whereas the human father only prepares a communication of life, which, in reality, is accomplished through the influence of a higher vital principle. Moreover, the Divine Father does not require the cooperation of a maternal principle in order to perfect His Product: His generation is absolutely virginal. In short: God the Father, as such, is the sole and adequate principle of the perfect Son. Thus the Eternal Father is, in the strictest sense, the “own” Father (Pater proprius) of His Son, and the eternal Son, the “own” Son (Filius proprius) of the Father. For the same reason the Paternity of the Eternal Father is the ideal and type of “all paternity in heaven and on earth” (Eph. 3:15)—that is, of any paternity of God respecting creatures and of all paternity among creatures. And the Sonship of the Eternal Son is the ideal and type of all sonship, but particularly of the sonship of adoption, which consists in the creature being made by grace partaker of the life which belongs to the Son by nature.

II. The second production in God, as far as it is a real communication of life to another person, has no analogue in human nature. It has, however, an analogue in the tendency to communicate one’s own life to another person, and this is “the emission of the breath from the heart.” which, notably in the act of kissing, gives a most real expression to the tendency of love towards intimate and real communion of life. More than this is not required to show that the corresponding act in God is a real communication of life, and that its Product is a real Person. What in the creature is a powerless tendency or striving, is in God an efficacious operation; wherefore, as the Spirit or Breath of God not only awakens and fosters, but gives life when emitted and imparted to creatures, so also the internal emission of this Spirit is necessarily a real communication of life. This becomes still more evident if we consider that the emission of the Divine Spirit of life is not destined to bring about a union of love between two loving hearts existing separately, but flows from one heart, common to two Persons, to manifest and enact their absolute unity of life, and consequently must tend to communicate life to a Third Person, distinct from the First and Second. The emission of the human breath is inferior to generation as an analogue for a Divine communication of life, because it does not produce a new person; but, on the other hand, it has the double advantage of being more apparent and visible, and of standing in closer connection with the higher life of the human soul, notably with love.

By reason of this analogy of origin there can be no human personal name designating the Third Person in the Trinity as the name “Son” designates the Second. On the other hand, however, the name “Spirit,” or “Ghost,” in the sense of immaterial being, cannot be His proper name, because in this sense it is common to the Three Persons. The proper name of the Third Person is taken from the impersonal emission of breath (πνεῦμα spiritus) in man, and receives its personal signification in God by being conceived as “Spiritus de Spiritu,” the life-breath of the purest Spirit. Where the spirating subject is a pure spirit, its whole substance and life are necessarily contained in the substantial breath (spirit) which it emits; and thus this breath is not only something spiritual, but is a Spiritual Hypostasis or Person. The relation of the Spirit of God to the spiritual Nature of its Principle and its Essence is expressed by the name “Holy Ghost,” because the purest spirituality of God culminates in the Substantial Holiness of the Divine Life.

The connection of the name “Ghost” or “Spirit” with the human breath is generally taught by the Fathers. Its relation to the spirituality of the spirating (breathing) person is especially pointed out by the Greek doctors, although they do not describe the origin as spiration as often as the Latin writers; it corresponds with their organic conception of the Holy Ghost as the “Perfume” and “Oil” of the Godhead. The Latin Fathers, on the other hand, although they more frequently use the term spiratio, do not lay much stress on the original meaning of spirit, but give great prominence to the idea of the osculum (kiss) as a bond of union. They used to say, following St. Augustine, that the Third Person is properly called “Spirit,” because the other Two, whose communion He is, are commonly so called. By both Greeks and Latins, however, it is always noted that the name Spirit, applied to the Third Person, ought, like the name Son, to be taken relatively, that is as the Spirit of Somebody. The Greeks lay more stress on the genitive of origin (viz. origo per emanationem substantialem ex principio), whereas the Latin doctors rather point out the genitive of possession, considering, as it were, the Holy Ghost as the common soul of the two Persons united in love.

III. Although no human person furnishes an adequate analogue for the Third Person in the Blessed Trinity, still we can point to one who approaches as near as the diversity between Divine and human nature allows. This human person is no other than the bride, who as spouse and mother, stands between father and son in the communication and representation of human nature, and is as essentially the third member of the human community, or the connecting link between father and son, as the Holy Ghost is the Third Person in the Divinity.

I. The analogy is easily understood if the bride be considered in her ideal, ethical position in the human family, as wife and mother. Here she stands out as the representative of the union of father and son; as the focus in which the mutual love of father and son centres; as love personified and as the soul of the family. The differences arising from the diversity of Divine and human nature are: (a) In the Trinity the Personified Love is only a bond—not a mediator—between Father and Son, and, consequently, is not the mother of the Son. (b) The Person of Love cannot be considered as the wife of the Father, because this Person is not a co-principle with Him, but only proceeds from Him. (c) The Person of Love stands in the same relation to the Son as to the Father; hence, as regards origin, the Son comes between the Father and the Substantial Love of Both. The intermediate position of the human mother between principle and product; her function of nourishing, fostering, cherishing and quickening, and of being the centre where the love of father and child meet, find their analogue in the relations of the Holy Ghost to the external products of Father and Son, viz. to created natures.

2. Considering the wide differences between the “Person of Love” in God and in mankind, human names cannot be unreservedly applied to the Holy Ghost. The names “mother” or “wife” must be excluded altogether; the name “bride” might be applied in the restricted sense that the Holy Ghost is the original and bridal partner of Father and Son. He is a bridal partner, because in virtue of their love He constitutes a substantial unity with them; He is a virginal partner, because He is with Father and Son, not as supplying a want of their nature, but as a Gift; He is the bridal partner of Both, because He bears the same relationship of origin to the Father and to the Son.

3. The constituents of the analogy in question are sufficiently expressed by the name “Holy Ghost” (which in Hebrew is of the feminine gender רוּחַ, ruach, like anima in Latin), inasmuch as it designates the Third Person of the Trinity precisely as the focus of a mutual love that is purely spiritual, chaste, and virginal. We may further remark that the name Holy Ghost is derived from the name Ghost common to the other Two Persons, just as the name Eve, with respect to her relationship of origin, was derived from that of man (Gen. 2:23). Moreover, the proper name which Adam gave to the wife taken from his side to signify her maternal character, is not only analogous in construction, but quite synonymous with the name Ghost; for Eve (חַוָה) signifies life, or, more properly, the outflowing life, the breath, i.e. that which, in analogy with the breath, quickens and fosters by its warmth. And as herein is expressed the ideal essence of the universal mothership of the first woman (“And Adam called the name of his wife Eve, because she was the mother of all the living”), so also it expresses the characteristic of the Holy Ghost as principle of all the life of creation; wherefore also the Holy Ghost in this respect is called the “Fostering Spirit.”

This analogy is completed by the origin of the first woman, an origin different from generation but similar to the origin of the Holy Ghost, and symbolizing the origin of the mystic bride of God. For the “taking” of Eve from the side of Adam, that is, from his heart, can only signify an origin by loving donation on the part of Adam, although this donation only gave the matter which, by the supernatural intervention of God, was endowed with life. Now, according to all the Fathers, the origin of Eve was the type of the origin of the Church, the virginal bride of Christ, from the side of her Bridegroom, nay, from His very Heart, and by virtue of His own vital force through the effusion of His life’s Blood. But, on the other hand, the effusion of the Blood of Christ being the vehicle and the symbol of the effusion of the Holy Ghost, and the Church, by reason of her moral union with the Holy Ghost, being the bride of Christ, we have here an illustration of the character of the eternal procession of the Holy Ghost Himself, which bears the closest relation to the emission of the breath from the heart.

IV. In order to preserve all the force of this human analogy, and, at the same time, to do away with its inherent imperfections and to point out the elements which do not appear in it, Revelation itself represents the Holy Ghost, with regard to this origin and position, under the symbol of an animal being, viz. the Dove. He appeared in the form of a dove on the Jordan (Matt. 3:16), but already in the narrative of creation (Gen. 1:2) this form is hinted at. The dove, in general, is the symbol of love and fidelity, especially of chaste, meek, patient, and innocent love, and so it illustrates nearly all the attributes of the Spirit of Wisdom, described in Wisd. 7, that is, in one word, His Holiness. But the Divine Dove represents also the Holy Ghost as the Spirit of God—that is, as the Spirit proceeding from Father and Son and uniting Them. Like a dove, the Holy Ghost ascends from the heart of Father and Son, whilst in Him they breathe their Love and Life or Soul; and, like a dove, with outspread wings and quiescent motion, He hovers over them, crowning and completing their union, and manifesting by His sigh the infinite felicity and holiness of Their love. In short, this image shows the Holy Ghost as the hypostatic “Kiss,” “Embrace,” and “Sigh” of the Father and the Son, that is, in His character of Their virginal Bride.

The same image also represents the Holy Ghost in His relation of “Virginal Mother” to creatures. As a dove He descends from the heart of God upon the creature, bringing down with Him the Divine Love and its gifts, penetrating creatures with His warming, quickening, and refreshing fire, establishing the most intimate relations between God and them, and being Himself the pledge of the Love which sends Him and of the love which He inspires; and lastly, in the supernatural order, penetrating into the creature as into His temple to such a degree that the creature in its turn becomes the virginal bride of God and the virginal mother of life in others, and thus receives itself the name of dove—a name applied especially to the Blessed Virgin Mary, the Church, and the virgins of Christ, and generally to all pious souls (Cant. 2:10).

SECT. 106.—COMPLETE UNITY OF THE PRODUCED PERSONS WITH THEIR PRINCIPLE, RESULTING FROM THEIR IMMANENT ORIGIN: SIMILARITY, EQUALITY, IDENTITY, INSEPARABILITY AND COINHERENCE (ΠΕΡΙΧΏΡΗΣΙΣ)

I. The intellectual origin of the Divine Persons accounts not only for their personal characters but also for their perfect unity, which is commonly considered under the five different forms mentioned in the title of this section, and comprehends their Essence, Life and external operations their Dignity, Power, and Perfection. The unity of identity in Essence—that is, the absolutely simple unity of the Divine Essence itself—contains the germ of the other forms, and gives to these other forms of unity in God a perfection which they have nowhere else. Similarity and equality, inseparability and interpenetration, are but so many inadequate conceptions of one and the same essential identity. The several forms of unity express certain relations between the Divine Persons. But these relations are of a different kind from the relations of origin, of which they result. Theologians term them relationes rationis, in contradistinction to the relationes reales,—that is, the relation of origin.

II. In detail the several forms of unity of the Divine Persons are originated and formed as follows:—

1. From the fact that in God the produced Persons are the innermost manifestation of His Nature and Life, there follows, first of all, a similarity entailing more than a mere agreement of qualities, viz. a similarity extending to the very Essence; and, as there are no accidents in the Divine Nature, but all perfections are contained in its Essence, the similarity is perfect in all and excludes all dissimilarity (ὁμοιότης κατὰ οὐσίαν ἀπαράλλακτος. Cf. Card. Newman, Athan., ii. 370).

2. As the produced Persons are, further, an exhaustive manifestation of their Principle, which completely expresses and diffuses Itself in Them, we have as a consequence the equality (identity of quantity) between the Divine Persons. Quantity in God is not a material quantitative greatness, but the virtual internal greatness of perfection and power, which is infinite (cf. § 64).

3. Similarity in kind, combined with equality of quantity, or, generally speaking, intrinsic and universal agreement, is sufficient, even in creatures, to justify the expression, “The one is what the other is,” viz. they are something more than similar and equal. In this sense the Greeks apply to creatures the term ταυτότης, which, in etymology, though not quite in sense, is equivalent to identity. The identity, however, of creatures, e.g. of the members of the same family, is but partial and very imperfect. In God, on the contrary, the identity of the Three Persons is absolutely perfect. For the internal and exhaustive manifestation of the Divine Nature is not a multiplication but a communication of It to the produced Persons, and is therefore present in all and is identical with each of Them; consequently, as to what They are, the Persons are not only similar, equal, and related, but are purely and simply the same. The notion of identity, without destroying the distinction of the Persons, completes the notions of similarity and equality, at the same time presenting them under a form peculiar to God. The Divine Persons are similar and equal, not by reason of like qualities and quantities possessed by Them, but by reason of the possession—in all alike essential, perfect, eternal, and legitimate—of the quality and quantity of one Substance. On the other hand, the identity of Essence adds to simple similarity, which may exist between separate things, the notion of intimate connection; and to simple equality in quantity, the notion of intrinsic penetration. Further, it completes the notion of this connection and penetration by representing them as effected, not by some combination or union, but by the Essence of the Three Persons being one and undivided.

4. The inseparable connection of the Divine Persons with one another is brought about in the most perfect manner by Their relations of origin. The produced Persons cannot even be conceived otherwise than in connection with their Principle, and, being the immanent manifestation of a substantial cognition and volition, They remain within the Divine Substance and are one with It. The producing Principle, likewise, cannot be conceived as such, and as a distinct Person, except inasmuch as He produces the other Persons; and These, being the immanent Product of His Life, are as inseparable from their Principle as His life itself.

5. The intimate unity of the Divine Persons appears at its highest perfection when conceived as interpenetration and mutual comprehension. The Greek περιχώρησις, and the Latin circuminsessio (better circumincessio), are the technical terms for the Divine interpenetration. Περιχωρεῖν has a fourfold construction: περιχωρεῖν εἰς ἄλληλα, ἐν ἀλλήλοις, διʼ ἀλλήλων, and ἄλληλα; the first three correspond with the meanings “invade,” “pervade,” of χωρεῖν, the last with its meaning of “hold” or “comprehend.” The circumincession, or comprehensive interpenetration, implies the following notions. Each Person penetrates and pervades each other Person inasmuch as each Person is in each other Person with His whole Essence, and possesses the Essence of each other Person as His own; and again, inasmuch as each Person comprehends each other Person in the most intimate and adequate manner by knowledge and love, and as each Person finds in each other Person His own Essence, it follows that it is one and the same act of knowledge and love by which one Divine Person comprehends and embraces the other Persons. “Each of the Three Who speak to us from heaven is simply, and in the full sense of the word, God, yet there is but one God; this truth, as a statement, is enunciated most intelligibly when we say Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, being one and the same Spirit and Being, are in each other, which is the doctrine of the περιχώρησις” (Card. Newman, Athan., ii., p. 72; cf. Franzelin, th. xiv.).

By reason of these several forms of unity arising from the unity of Essence, the Divine Persons constitute a society unique in its kind: a society whose Members are in the most perfect manner equal, related, and connected, and which, therefore, is the unattainable, eternal, and essential ideal of all other societies.

III. The unity of the Divine Persons, in all its forms, embraces as subject-matter Their inner Being and Life, and also Their operations ad extra. As regards the power necessary to these operations, and the various elements concurring in its exercise (viz. idea, decree, execution), the activity of each Person is in the most perfect manner similar, equal, and identical with that of the other Persons, and consequently is exercised so that all the Persons operate together, inseparately and inseparably, not only in external union, but intrinsically, in each other, so as to be but one absolutely simple activity.

The absolute simplicity of the Divine activity is not impaired by the scriptural and traditional expression “that the Divine operation proceeds from the Father through the Son in the Holy Ghost.” This expression is intended to convey the meaning that the Divine operation or activity is perfectly common to the Three Persons, but is possessed by each of Them in a particular manner, viz. in the same manner in which they possess the principium quo of action—that is, the Divine Nature. Another signification of the same formula will be explained in the following section.

SECT. 107.—THE APPROPRIATION OF THE COMMON NAMES, ATTRIBUTES, AND OPERATIONS TO PARTICULAR PERSONS

I. Although all the names, attributes, and operations which do not refer to the personal relations of the Divine Persons are, by reason of the unity of Substance, common to them all, it is, nevertheless, the constant style of Holy Scripture and Tradition to ascribe certain names, attributes, and operations to particular Persons so as to serve to distinguish one Person from another. The process by which something common to all the Persons is attributed as peculiar to one of Them, is called Appropriation (κόλλησις). Such appropriation, of course, does not exclude the other Persons from the possession of what is appropriated to one. Whatever is appropriated is not even more the property of one Person than of another. The only object of appropriation is to lay special stress on, or to bring out more distinctly, the possession of some of the common attributes by one Person, so as to illustrate either this particular Person or the attributes in question, by showing their connection. For this purpose it is sufficient that the Person in question, by reason of His personal character, bears a special relationship to the attribute, and is, therefore, not only its owner but also its representative.

The appropriations are so indispensable that without them it would be impossible to give a vivid picture of the Trinity. They are useful and indispensable to represent each Person as distinguished from the other Persons, since we always associate separate persons with separate properties and operations; they are especially useful and necessary to bring out the Persons of the Father and the Holy Ghost as distinct from the Son Who appeared among us in a human nature with properties and operations exclusively His own; they further serve to distinguish the Divine Persons from other and imperfect beings bearing the same names; this is notably the case in the appellations “Pater æternus,” “Filius sapiens,” “Spiritus sanctus.” The appropriations also help to illustrate and represent the Divine attributes and operations in life-like form, and especially to represent the Divine Unity as essentially living and working in distinct Persons.

II. The appropriations in use in Holy Scripture and in the language of the Church, may be grouped under the following categories:—

1. Of the substantive names, “God” is appropriated to the Father as the “Principle of Divinity;” “Lord” to the Son, as the natural heir of the Father, Who, in the Incarnation, has received from the Father a peculiar dominion over creatures. Hence the Son is commonly called “Son of God,” and the Holy Ghost “Spirit of God,” or “Spirit of the Lord.” The Holy Ghost bears no other appropriated Divine name, because His proper name (Spirit), if not considered as expressing His relationship to Father and Son, is in itself a substantive Divine name, and, in a certain sense, only becomes a proper name by appropriation, viz. inasmuch as, like the air in the wind, the Divine Substance reveals in its spiration the full energy of its Spiritual Nature. In 1 Cor. 12:4, however, “Spirit” may be taken as an appropriation on a line with “God” and “Lord.”

2. The names designating properties of the Divine Being and Life are distributed among the Three Persons either in the form of adjectives (“one,” “true,” “good,”) or of nouns (“unity,” “truth,” “goodness”), so as to correspond with their active or passive relations of origin. The Second and Third Persons receive only positive predicates, because the special nature of Their origin is always taken into account, whereas to the Father, as Ingenerate or Unbegotten, negative predicates are likewise appropriated, e.g. eternity. To the Father are appropriated, in this respect, essential being, then eternity and simplicity, also power and goodness in the sense of productive and radical fecundity, because these attributes shine forth with more splendour in the Unbegotten Principle of the Trinity. To the Son, as the Word and intellectual Image of the Father, is appropriated Truth (objective and formal, § 73) and resplendent Beauty. To the Holy Ghost, as the Aspiration, Pledge, and Gift of the eternal Love, is appropriated Goodness, as well in its objective sense of what is perfect, amiable, and beatifying (§ 74), as in the formal sense of holiness, bounty, and felicity. As, however, unity may be considered under many respects, unity pure and simple is ascribed to the Father, unity of equality to the Son, and unity of connection to the Holy Ghost.

3. With regard to the Divine operations ad extra, the appropriations receive various forms and directions. As regards the power, wisdom, and goodness manifest in all Divine operations, power, as efficient cause, is appropriated to the Father; wisdom, as exemplar cause, to the Son; and goodness, as final cause, to the Holy Ghost. Considering, in analogy with created activity, the order or evolution of the Divine operations, the decree (= resolution, will) to operate is appropriated to the Father; the plan of the work to the Son; the execution and preservation to the Holy Ghost. With regard to the hypostatic character of the individual Persons, the Father is said, by appropriation, to produce the substantial being (= the substance) and the unity of all things by creation, and to perform works of power, such as miracles; the Son is said to give all things their form and to enlighten all minds, likewise to confer dignities and functions; the Holy Ghost vivifies, moves, and guides all things, sanctifies spirits and distributes the charismata.

4. In connection with these, there are other appropriations founded upon the general relation of the creature to God, and especially on the relations of intellectual creatures with their Creator. As all things exist of the Father through the Son in the Holy Ghost, so intellectual creatures are made the children of the Father through the Son to Whom they are likened, in the Holy Ghost with Whom they are filled. Thus they also can direct their worship to God the Father through the Son in the Holy Ghost, the Son and Holy Ghost being not only the object of worship, but, at the same time, mediators of the worship offered to the Father from Whom They originate and Whose glory They reveal, and with Whom They receive the same worship because They are one with Him. The Father especially is represented as receiving the Divine worship offered to God by the Incarnate Son as High-priest, although the sacrifice of Christ is offered to Himself and to the Holy Ghost as well as to the Father. Here, however, we go beyond simple appropriations, and enter the domain of the mission of the Divine Persons, of which we shall speak in the following section.

A beautiful exposition of appropriations is found at the end of St. Augustine’s De Vera Religione, “Religet ergo nos religio, etc.” See also St. Thom., I., q. 39, arts. 7, 8.

SECT. 108.—THE TEMPORAL MISSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS

I. Revelation often speaks in general terms of a coming of God to and into His creatures, and of a manifesting Himself to, and dwelling in, them. This coming and indwelling is especially set forth in connection with the two Divine Persons Who have Their eternal origin from another Person, and it is represented so as to make this temporal procession appear as a continuation of Their eternal procession. In consequence of this, the Person from Whom another proceeds assumes towards the One Who proceeds the same position as exists between a human sender and his envoy; and for this reason the procession ad extra of a Divine Person is spoken of as a “Mission.”

II. The external mission of Divine Persons admits of none of the imperfections inherent in human missions. The perfect equality of the Divine Persons excludes the notion of authority in the Sender, and, in general, any influence of the Sender on the Sent other than the relation of origin. Again, the perfect coinherence or interpenetration (περιχώρησις) of the Divine Persons excludes the idea of any separation of the Person sent from His Sender, and of any separate activity or operation in the mission. Lastly, the immensity and omnipresence of the Trinity exclude the possibility of any local change caused by the temporal mission of one of the Persons. The procession ad extra can be brought about only by a new manifestation of the substantial presence of the Person sent, and consequently by a new operation taking place in the creature, whereby the Divine Person reveals Himself externally or enters into union with the creature.

III. To lay too great stress on what we have just said might lead to a false notion of the missions of Divine Persons. It must not be thought that the whole mission consists in a Divine Person coming down to the creature merely as representative of an operation appropriated to Him but common to the Three Persons, thus infusing not Himself but merely His operation into the creature, and consequently not proceeding ad extra in the character of a Person distinct from His Principle as well as from His operations. As a matter of fact, in many texts of Holy Scripture the mission of Divine Persons implies no more than that They reveal themselves in creatures as bearers of an activity appropriated to Them and as Principle of an operation in the creature. Such is the case, for instance, where, in the spiritual order, every supernatural influence of God on the soul is ascribed to a coming of the Son or the Holy Ghost. But the theologians of all times agree in considering this kind of mission as an improper one, and assert the existence of another, to which the name of mission properly belongs.

IV. The manifestation ad extra of a Divine Person, in a mission properly so called, takes place in a twofold manner. Either the Divine Person appears in a sensible form or image really distinct from Himself, which makes the Person Himself and His presence in the creature apparent,—this is called a Visible or External Mission; or the Divine Person really enters into an intellectual creature, uniting Himself with it in such intimate, real, and vivid manner, that He dwells in it, gives Himself to it, and takes special possession of it,—this is called an Invisible or Internal Mission.

Both forms are found in their greatest possible perfection in the Incarnation of the Son of God. In His Incarnation the Son of God contracts with a created nature, at the same time intellectual and visible, a union which is proper to Himself alone, exclusively of the other Divine Persons, and by reason of which the visible body in which He appears is not only a symbol of His Person, but is His own body. Besides, the Incarnation was at the same time a mission of the Son of God in His own human nature and to all men, among whom He dwelt visibly. The Incarnation stands alone as a pre-eminent mission. In other missions the visible and invisible are not necessarily connected, nor do they exist in the same perfection. A visible mission, indeed, never takes place without an invisible one, but invisible missions are not always accompanied by visible manifestations. Besides, excepting the Incarnation, visible missions are not real but symbolical; the invisible ones are real: but whilst in the Incarnation we have an hypostatic union with the substance of a created nature, here we have the hypostatic presence of the Divine Person in the life of the creature, which presence includes an intimate relation between the Divine and the created person, making them, as it were, belong to each other; wherefore this kind of mission is termed “Missio secundum gratiam” or, better, “secundum gratiam gratum facientem.”

V. The invisible mission of God the Son and God the Holy Ghost, especially the latter, to the souls of the just, being such a consoling mystery, it is of the utmost importance to gain a clear conception of it; viz. to understand as far as possible, how in this mission a Divine Person enters the soul, not figuratively but really, in the proper and strict sense of the word.

In order that the coming of a Divine Person to the soul may be really personal, two things are required. It is not enough that the Person should come as principle of a new operation; it is necessary that His Substance should become present to the soul in a new manner, otherwise the mission or coming would be personal only in a figurative sense. As, however, the Divine Substance and activity are common to all the Persons, the presence of the Substance of a Divine Person is not sufficient to enable us to say that He is present as a distinct Person, or as distinct from His Sender. If the hypostatic character of the Person sent is not brought to the fore, His mission is not strictly personal, but must be considered as an appropriation. Moreover, the coming of a Divine Person into the soul must be conceived from the point of view of a living union of the Person with the soul, or of an intimate presence of the Divine Person in the supernatural life of the soul, in virtue of which the Divine Person gives Himself to the soul and at the same time takes possession of it. Holy Scripture constantly speaks of an intimate, holy, and beatifying union as the consequence of the coming of a Divine Person into the soul; the Person is given to the soul and the soul becomes His temple (cf. Rom. 5:5; 1 Cor. 3:16). Hence, the personal mission of the Divine Persons consists in a donation of themselves to the soul and in a taking possession of the soul; their personal presence in the soul implies a relation of most intimate and mutual appurtenance between the Divine and the human person.

VI. We have, then, to show how, in the communication of supernatural life by means of sanctifying grace (gratia gratum faciens), a personal presence in the soul, and a personal relationship of the Divine Person to the soul, is to be conceived. The demonstration may be effected in two directions, considering, on the basis of Holy Writ, the relation of the Divine Person to the supernatural life of the soul: (1) as its exemplar principle, or (2) as its final object. Both relations, however, are closely connected, and ought to be considered together in order to arrive at an adequate conception of the personal presence and relationship.

1. The supernatural life of the soul consists, in its inmost essence, in a participation in the Divine Life—that is, in a knowledge and love of such an exalted kind as is proper only to the Divine Nature; it has, therefore, its root and ideal (= exemplar) in God Himself. Hence, God, when communicating supernatural life, must approach the soul in His Substance in a more special manner, distinct from every other Divine influence; so that, if He were not already substantially present as Creator, He would become so present as Giver of supernatural life. Moreover, this communication of God’s own life to the soul appears as an imitation, a continuation, and an extension of that manifestation and communication of life which produces the Son and the Holy Ghost. The irradiation of supernatural knowledge into the soul is essentially an imitation and an extension of the internal radiation of Divine knowledge terminating in the Eternal Word and Image, and so implies a speaking of His Divine Word into, and impression of this Divine Image upon, the soul. The infusion or inspiration of supernatural love is an imitation and an extension of the internal effusion of Divine Love terminating in the Holy Eternal Spirit, and thus implies an effusion of the Divine Spirit into the soul. Hence, just as the supernatural life results from an internal and permanent impression of the Divine Substance on the soul—as from the impression of a seal,—so also the Products of the Divine Life impress themselves on the soul in an innermost presence. Consequently, the Persons proceeding ad extra, enter into a living relationship with the soul, not only as to their Substance, but also as to their personal characters. They are personally united to the soul, inasmuch as They permeate the life of the soul, manifest Their personal glory in it, and live in it.

This view of the Divine missions is alluded to in the following texts:

(a) The mission of the Son: “My little children, of whom I am in labour again, until Christ be formed in you” (Gal. 4:19); “That Christ may dwell by faith in your hearts” (Eph. 3:17).

(b) The mission of the Holy Ghost: “The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us” (Rom. 5:5); “In this we know that we abide in Him and He in us, because He has given us of His Spirit” (1 John 4:13). To these must be added all the texts which represent the Holy Ghost as living in us, or us as living in Him, as if He were the breath of our life. Thus: “But you are not in the flesh, but in the spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you. Now, if any man have not the Spirit of Christ [= the Spirit of Love], he is none of His” (Rom. 8:9); “For whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God. For you have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear; but you have received the spirit of adoption of sons [= in filial love], whereby we cry, Abba, Father” (ibid., 14, 15); “We have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God” (1 Cor. 2:12).

2. The knowledge and love which constitute supernatural life (like the Divine knowledge and love of which they are a copy), have for their proper object God Himself, as He is in Himself. As in the Divine Life, so in the supernatural life of the soul, the Divine Essence is the object of possession and fruition, and must therefore be substantially present to the soul in a manner not required by the natural life of the soul. This presence attains its perfection only in the Beatific Vision and in beatific charity, but it already exists in an obscure and imperfect manner in our present state of cognition and charity (cognitio et caritas viœ). For if the Divine Substance becomes an object of intimate possession and fruition to the soul, the Divine Persons Themselves, each with His original characters, likewise become the object of the soul’s possession and fruition by knowledge and love, and They enter the soul as such object. The Son is given to the soul as the Radiance and Image of the glory of the Father, in order that in Him and through Him, the soul may know and possess the Father. And the Holy Ghost is given as the Effusion and the Pledge of the infinite Love that unites Father and Son, and of God’s Fatherly love for His creatures; as the Blossom of the Divine sweetness and loveliness, as the personal “osculum Dei,” which the soul receives as the adopted daughter of the Father and bride of the Son, and which is the food and the fuel of the soul’s love to God. This is the deeper sense of the words, “That the love wherewith Thou hast loved Me may be in them, and I in them” (John 17:26). Consequently, both Persons are given to the soul as an uncreated Gift, and the created gift of sanctifying grace has precisely this object—to enable the soul to receive and to enjoy the uncreated Gift.

As the object of supernatural knowledge and love, the Divine Persons are also the final object, or the end, of the soul, in which the soul finds rest and beatitude, but which likewise claims from the soul honour and glorification. Now, each Divine Person, in His hypostatical character, can claim an honour especially directed to Himself, and a special manner of dominion over creatures; hence, although the Three Persons always enter the soul together, and take possession of it and live in it as in Their consecrated temple, nevertheless each of Them does so in a manner peculiar to Himself. This indwelling is especially proper to the Holy Ghost, because He is the representative of the Divine sanctity and the model of the sanctity of the soul; and further because, being pre-eminently the personal Gift of the Divine Love, He naturally receives and accepts the love by which the soul gives itself to God. The Holy Ghost being pre-eminently the “Sweet Host” of the soul, is also the Holy Lord and Master Who transforms it into His temple and takes possession of it in the name of the Father and of the Son. (See Scheeben’s Mysteries, § 30; and Card. Manning’s two works on the Holy Ghost).

SECT. 109.—THE TRINITY A MYSTERY BUT NOT A CONTRADICTION

I. We have shown (in § 57) that the real existence of the Three Persons in one God cannot be demonstrated by created reason. From this it follows that our conceptions of the Trinity of Persons can be but analogical and imperfect, and even more obscure and imperfect than our conceptions of the Divine Essence and Nature. It is, consequently, a matter of course that our reason should find it always difficult, and sometimes impossible, to comprehend the possibility of the several Divine attributes and of their coexistence in God. However, correct and accurate conceptions of the analogical notions enable us not only to see the necessary connection between several attributes, but also to show that no evident contradiction exists between them. Most of the contradictions which the Arians, the Socinians, and the modern Rationalists pretend to detect in the mystery of the Trinity, present hardly any difficulty, because they are based either upon misrepresentation or misconception of the dogma.

Our modern Rationalists are far more superficial than their predecessors. They think they raise a serious objection when they say that one cannot be equal to three! As if the dogma stated that one God is three Gods or one Person three Persons! Most of the difficulties of detail may be met by an accurate statement of the dogma, such as we have been attempting to give. We only touch here upon the chief difficulties which may still remain.

II. These difficulties are in reality but two—viz. (1) the real distinction of the Persons, notwithstanding their identity with one and the same absolutely simple Essence; and (2) their perfect equality in every perfection, notwithstanding the origin of one Person from another. The first difficulty rests on the axiom: Things identical with the same thing are identical with each other; and the second on the principle that origin implies inferiority.

1. The first difficulty is solved thus: Although Person and Essence in God are “One Supreme Thing, altogether simple,” still, Person and Essence no more represent the same side of this “Supreme Thing” than cognition and volition. “Person” is the Supreme Thing as possessing itself; “Essence” is It as object of possession. Hence it is not absolutely inconceivable that a substance as wealthy as the Divine should possess Itself in several ways; and if so, It must also be able to manifest Itself in several Possessors, Who, as such, are no more identical among Themselves than the forms of possession are identical. If, further, each Person is identical with the Essence, He is only identical as a special form of possession of the Essence, and thus, from the axiom, “Things which are identical with the same thing are identical with each other,” it only follows that They all possess the same Essence through identity with the same; and not that They are also identical in the form of possession.

2. The second difficulty is solved thus: An origin in God is the result, not of an accidental, but of an essential act—that is, of an act identical with its principle as well as with the Divine Essence, and essential to both principle and Essence; but this being admitted, it is not at all evident that the produced possession ought not to be likewise essential, but merely accidental, or merely by connection and not by identity with the Divine Essence. Moreover, the communication of the Nature by the Father does not result from a power and wealth founded on His personality, but from the power of the common Nature, which essentially tends to subsist not in one but in three Persons, and manifests this power equally in the Three Persons, although in a different form in each.

SECT. 110.—THE POSITION AND IMPORTANCE OF THE MYSTERY OF THE TRINITY IN REVELATION

I. Considered in relation to our natural knowledge of God, the dogma of the Trinity has a certain philosophical importance, inasmuch as it adds clearness and precision to our notions of a living and personal God, perfect and self-sufficient, operating ad extra with supreme freedom, power, and wisdom. The dogma thus prevents pantheistic and superficial deistic theories on God and the world. Still, however useful it may be from this point of view, its revelation cannot be said to be necessary, as such necessity would destroy the transcendental (supernatural) character of the dogma.

II. The revelation of the Trinity has its proper and essential significance in relation to our supernatural knowledge of God (1) as object of beatific fruition, (2) as object of glorification (objectum fruitionis beatificans, objectum glorificationis).

1. The beatitude of intellectual creatures consists in their knowledge of God and in the love of God consequent upon such knowledge. Wherefore, the greater the knowledge the greater the beatitude, and vice versâ. Hence the revelation of the Trinity has, in general, a substantial value inasmuch as it essentially increases our knowledge of God. It has also a special value, because, unlike natural knowledge, it shows God as He is in Himself, and discloses His internal life and activity, thus making the knowledge by Faith an anticipation of and introduction to the immediate vision of the Divine Essence and a pledge of its reality. The revelation of the Trinity further leads us into the knowledge of an internal manifestation of God’s greatness and power, goodness and love, beatitude and glory, which represents God as the highest Good in quite a new light, far above anything that external manifestations could teach us, and therefore producing, even in this life, a love full of delight, unknown to natural man. In the trinitary origins especially, the Divine fecundity and tendency to communication appear as objectively infinite, whereas the unity of the Three Persons reveals the beatitude of God as possessing in a wonderful manner the element which is the flower and condiment even of created happiness—that is, the delight of sharing one’s happiness with others.

2. The knowledge of God, coupled with the admiring love which it begets, constitutes also the external glorification of God by His intellectual creatures; the glorification increases in perfection with the perfection of the knowledge. The influence which the knowledge of the Trinity exercises on the perfection of God’s glorification by creatures affects its very essence. It discloses the internal greatness and glory of God as an object of our admiration and adoration; it proposes for our worship not only the Divinity as a whole, but each of the Holders and Possessors of the Godhead, and so enables us to worship the Divine Persons separately; it reveals in God an infinite, real, self-glorification, the Divine Persons as Principle or Product glorifying each other in the most sublime manner—the Father glorified in the Son as His perfect Word and Image, and Both in the Holy Ghost as the infinite Effusion of their Love—infinitely more than in any external manifestation. The revelation of the internal Divine self-glorification renders it possible to creatures to join in the honours which the Divine Persons receive from each other, and thus to complete their finite worship by referring it to an infinite worship. This is done especially in the formula: “Glory be to the Father, through the Son, in the Holy Ghost.”

III. The revelation of the Trinity is of great importance for the right understanding of the supernatural works of God in the world. These works bear such a close and essential relation to the internal productions in God, that their essence, reason, and object can be understood only when they are considered as an external reproduction, and a real revelation ad extra, of the internal productions and relations of God. The supernatural works which here come under consideration are the union of God with His creatures (1) by Grace, (2) by the Incarnation.

1. Grace elevates the creature to be the adoptive son of God. The adopted son, as such, is admitted by grace to a participation in the dignity and glory of the natural Son. As in human relationships we cannot conceive adoptive sonship without referring to natural sonship, so likewise in the supernatural order the adoptive sonship of the children of God cannot be rightly understood without referring to the Sonship of the only-begotten Son of God. Hence the natural Sonship in God is the ideal of all adoptive sonship on the part of God. It is also the foundation of the possibility of adoptive filiation; for only from the fact that in God there exists a substantial communication of His Nature, and not from His creative power, we gather the possibility of a participation in the Divine Nature. The natural filiation in God must likewise be considered as the proper motive and object of the adoptive filiation. It is God’s love of His only-begotten Son, and the delight He finds in His possession, that urge Him to multiply His Son’s image ad extra. Thus He intends to bring into existence His adoptive children in order that they may glorify His paternity and His only-begotten Son. In the adoptive filiation we must consider also the manner in which it is brought about, viz. by gratuitous love. From this point of view, adoptive sonship has its ideal, the ground of its possibility, its motive, and its final object in the procession of the Holy Ghost, as a communication by means of the purest love and liberality. Further, it bears to the Person of the Holy Ghost this essential relation, that the Holy Ghost is the Pledge and Seal of the communion of God with His adoptive sons, just as in God He is the Pledge and Seal of the Love between Father and Son. As the grace of adoptive sonship, considered in its origin, is a reflex of the Trinitarian productions and relations, so it has the effect of introducing the creature into the most intimate communion and fellowship with the Divine Persons: “That our fellowship may be with the Father and with His Son Jesus Christ” (1 John 1:3).

From this it follows that the triune God is the God of the life of grace, and that a full and perfect development of the life of grace is impossible without the knowledge of the Trinity. Hence in the New Testament, where the life of grace first appears in its fulness, the relations of man to God and man’s communication with God are always attributed to one or other of the Divine Persons. For the same reason, the naming of the Three Persons is as essential in the Sacrament of regeneration and adoption as the faith and confession of the Trinity are the normal condition of its reception. Hence also the Fathers pointed out that the faith of Christians in God the Father transcends reason and opens the way to adoptive sonship. Cf. St. Hilary, De Trin., l. i., c. x. sqq.; St. Peter Chrysol., Serm. 68 (in Orat. Dom.): “Behold how soon thy profession of faith has been rewarded: as soon as thou hast confessed God to be the Father of His only Son, thou thyself hast been adopted as a son of God the Father.”

2. Whereas in grace we have first an invitation and then, secondarily, a continuation of the Trinitarian productions and relations, the Incarnation is first of all and in the strictest sense a continuation ad extra of the eternal origin of the Son of God and of His relation to the Father and the Holy Ghost. The Incarnation must not be conceived merely as God or any one of the Divine Persons taking flesh, but as the incorporation of a Person gone forth from God, and precisely of that Person Who, as Word and Image of God, is the living testimony by which He reveals Himself internally and externally; Who, as Son of God, is the born heir of His kingdom; through Whom God reigns over and governs the world; Who, as the First-born of all creatures, is naturally called to be, in His humanity, the head of the whole universe; Who, lastly, through His hypostatic mission ad extra, can bring the Holy Ghost, Who proceeds from Him, in special connection with His mystical body, and thus make the “seal and bond of the Trinity” the seal and bond of transfigured creation.

BOOK III

CREATION AND THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER

GOD, One in Substance and Three in Person, infinitely perfect and infinitely happy in Himself—of His own goodness and almighty power, not to increase His happiness, not to acquire but to manifest His perfection—freely made out of nothing spiritual and material beings, and man composed of both matter and spirit. These creatures He endowed with every perfection required by their various natures. Angels and men, however, received gifts far surpassing all that their nature could claim. God raised them to a supernatural order of existence, making them not merely creatures but His adopted children, and destining them to a supernatural union with Him. Hence this book will be divided into two parts. In the first part, entitled Creation, we shall speak of the origin and the natural end and endowments of creatures. In the second part we shall speak of the Supernatural Order to which angels and men were raised.

PART I

CREATION

ALL things outside God have God for their origin and end. They may be grouped, as already noticed, under three heads: spiritual, material, and composite. We shall therefore divide this part into five chapters: The Universe created by God (ch. i.) and for God (ch. ii.); Angels (ch. iii.), the Material World (ch. iv.), and Man (ch. v.).

CHAPTER I

THE UNIVERSE CREATED BY GOD

THE Fathers treat of Creation in their writings against the pagans and Manichæans. Among the Schoolmen, see St. Anselm, Monol., cc. 5–9; Peter Lomb., ii., Dist. 1, and the commentaries thereon by Ægidius and Estius; St. Thorn., I., q. 45, and Contra Gentes, ii., I sqq.; Suarez, Metaph., disp. 20; Kleutgen, Phil., diss. ix., chap. 3.

SECT. 111.—THE ORIGIN OF ALL THINGS BY CREATION OUT OF NOTHING

I. Our conception of God as the only Being existing necessarily, implies that all other beings must, in some way or other, owe their existence to Him. It also implies that these other beings owe their whole substance, with all its accidents and modifications, mediately or immediately, to God. Again, the Divine Substance being simple and indivisible, things outside God cannot be produced from or made out of it: they can only be called into existence out of their nothingness, by the power of God. “God exists of Himself” is the fundamental dogma concerning God; the fundamental dogma concerning all things else is that “they are produced out of nothing by God.” Thus the Vatican Council, following the Fourth Lateran Council, says, “This one God, of His own goodness and almighty power, … at the very beginning of time made out of nothing both kinds of creatures, spiritual and corporal” (sess. iii., c. 1). And again, “If any one doth not confess that the world and all things contained therein, both spiritual and material, have been, as to their whole substance, produced out of nothing by God: let him be anathema” (can. 5). This definition is merely an explanation of the first words of the Apostles’ Creed, by which, from the very earliest ages, the Church confessed the Almighty God to be the Maker, ποιητής, of heaven and earth, of all things visible and invisible. The Latin Church has always attached to the verb creare the meaning of “production out of nothing;” the Greek Church possessed no such specific name, whereas in Hebrew the verb בָרָא already had the fixed signification which the Latin creare afterwards acquired.

When Creation is described as a production from, or out of, nothing (de nihilo or ex nihilo, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων), the “nothing” is not, of course, the matter out of which things are made. It means, “out of no matter,” or, “not out of anything,” or, starting from absolute non-being and replacing it by being. The formula is also amplified into, Productio rei ex nihilo sui et subjecti; by the Greek Fathers, often, ἐκ μηδαμοῦ καὶ μηδαμῶς ὄντων.

II. Holy Scripture, both in the Old and in the New Testament, gives abundant and decisive testimony to the dogma of the creation of all things out of nothing.

1. This dogma is implicitly contained in the scriptural descriptions of the Divine Essence, of the Divine Power, and of God’s absolute dominion over the world. If God in His external works were dependent on pre-existing matter, He could not be described as Being pure and simple, as Almighty pure and simple, as entirely self-sufficient; God would not be “the First and the Last,” “the Beginning and the End,” pure and simple—that is, of all things—if outside of Him anything existed independently of Him.

2. Over and over again Holy Writ represents God as the Principle of all that is, never mentioning any exception. He is the Founder (e.g. Ps. 77:69, 88:12, 102:22), the Supporter, and Conservator of heaven and earth; He is the Author of the spiritual as well as of the material world (Col. 1:16). Pre-existing matter, which, indeed, in the case of simple beings like spirits, would be impossible, is nowhere spoken of. Many scriptural expressions, e.g. Heb. 11:3, can be understood of the fashioning of unformed matter already existing; yet this operation is described as entering into the very substance, so that it supposes a dominion over matter which can belong to none but its Creator.

3. Creation is further clearly contained in the narrative of the first chapter of Genesis. The narrative purposes to give a full account of the origin of the world; had any matter existed previously to the Divine operation, it ought certainly to have been mentioned. Yet the production of heaven and earth is given as the first creative action, as the foundation of the subsequent operations, and, besides, we are told that the earth “was void and empty.” This clearly indicates that before the creation of heaven and earth no finite thing whatever existed. Again, the Hebrew verb בָרָא, although not necessarily designating a production out of nothing, is never used except to express an action proper to God alone, notably the operations of His sovereignty, absolute independence, and infinity. In the narrative of Gen. 1 this verb is used to describe the first production; it does not occur again in the account of the subsequent operations except at the creation of man, ver. 27, because the soul of man is produced out of nothing, and in ver. 21, possibly to indicate that the animals are not the product of water and air but of the almighty Word of God. If we compare the first words of Genesis, “In the beginning God created,” with the first words of the Gospel of St. John, “In the beginning was the Word,” and also with Prov. 8:22 sqq., we are forced to conclude that time itself began with the creation of heaven and earth, and consequently that, before this creative act, nothing whatsoever existed outside of God. Hence the sense of Gen. 1:1, is undoubtedly expressed correctly by the mother of the Machabees when speaking to her son: “Look upon heaven and earth, and all that is in them: and consider that God made them out of nothing (ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, 2 Mach. 7:28).

III. To the unprejudiced mind the dogma of creation is as plain as the dogma of a self-existing, personal God. The two notions are correlative. Things outside of God must, from the fact that they do not exist necessarily, depend for their existence on some other being, which can be no other than the self-existing God. The notion of creation, or production out of nothing, is free from even a shadow of contradiction, whereas every other notion concerning the origin of things involves a contradiction. It is, we admit, quite a peculiar conception, without any analogy in the operations of creatures; yet our reason plainly tells us that creative power is a necessary attribute of God. Cf. Book II., § 76.

The axiom, Ex nihilo nihil fit (Out of nothing, nothing is made), cannot be urged against the dogma of creation. It is true, indeed, that by nature or art nothing can be made out of nothing, but it is certainly not proved that no being whatever can produce things out of nothing. Scientists who reject the true axiom, Omne vivum ex vivo, and hold that matter endows itself with life, ought to be the last to raise such an objection.

IV. Active creation, implying, as it does, infinite power, is an attribute of God alone. Consequently, all beings outside of God are created directly by Him and by Him alone, without the intervention of any other creature. That no creature, even acting as an instrument of God, has ever actually created anything, was defined by the Fourth Council of the Lateran: “There is one true God, … the Creator of all things visible and invisible.” It is also theologically certain that no creature has the power to create, because this power has ever been asserted by the Church and by the Fathers to be an exclusive attribute of God, in the same way as eternity and omnipresence. The question “whether a creature could be used as an instrument in the act of creation” is answered differently by different theologians. The best authorities and the best arguments are in favour of the negative. See Bannez, in I., q. 45; St. Thomas, De Pot., q. 3, a. 4.

SECT. 112.—SIMULTANEOUS BEGINNING OF THE WORLD AND OF TIME

I. Holy Scripture implies throughout, and explicitly states over and over again, that all things created have a beginning in time. When the world was first called into being time was not yet, because there existed nothing capable of undergoing change. Hence time and the world began at the same moment; or, “the world was created in the beginning of time,” as it is usually expressed in the language of the Church; “God, at the very beginning of time, made both kinds of creatures” (Vat. Council, sess. iii., c. 1). Thus the formula “production out of nothing” has the twofold meaning, “Things not existing of themselves receive existence,” and “things not yet existing or not existing before, begin to be.” Holy Scripture points out the temporal beginning of the world, especially in order to contrast it with the eternity of God, of the Word of God, and of the election by grace. E.g. Ps. 89:9; John 17:5; Eph. 1:4. “In the beginning was the Word” (John 1:1); that is, the Word was before things began to be (cf. Prov. 8:22). In the narrative of Creation, Gen. 1:1, the words “in the beginning” evidently mean the very beginning of time. This meaning is an obvious one; it fits in with the context; it is admissible and is often insinuated in other texts, e.g. John 1:1.

II. If the World came into being with time, the external efficacy of the Divine act which caused it to be, had likewise a beginning. From this, however, it does not follow that the creative act itself, as it is in God, had a beginning. The creative act, considered as existing in God, is nothing but the Divine decree to call the world into existence. This act is necessarily eternal, because it is part of the Divine Life; but it is also an act of the free Will of God, and therefore God is absolutely free to fix a time for its realization.

III. To defend the Catholic dogma that, as a matter of fact, the world had a beginning, it is certainly not necessary to demonstrate the impossibility of the opposite opinion. It is enough to show that a beginning in time is possible, and that the necessity of eternal existence cannot be proved. These two propositions are evident; for, if a thing does not exist necessarily, still less does it necessarily exist always; and God, in Whose power it is to determine all the conditions under which His works are to exist, can evidently determine a time for the beginning of their existence.

IV. Can our reason conceive a creation from all eternity? As the Catholic dogma just stated remains intact whichever way this vexed question be answered, we leave it to the disputations of philosophers. The reader will find it amply debated in St. Thomas, I., q. 46, art. 1, Contra Gentes, l. ii., c. 31, sqq.; De Pot., q. iii., a. 17; Capreolus in I Sent., d. i.; Cajetan in I., q. 46, a. 2; Estius in 2 Sent., d. i., § 11. These maintain the possibility of eternal creation. The following deny it: Albertus Magnus, Henry of Ghent, and most modern theologians. Greg, of Valentia, in I., disp. iii., q. 2, proposes an intermediate opinion.

SECT. 113.—GOD THE CONSERVATOR OF ALL THINGS

I. No created beings can continue to exist unless God sustains and preserves them. The Divine Conservation required for the continuance of created existence, is not merely negative, but positive: that is to say, it is not enough for God not to destroy creatures; He must exercise some active influence on them. Again, this positive conservation is not indirect—i.e. a mere protection against destructive agencies—but a direct Divine influence on the very being of the creature, such that, if this influence were withdrawn, the creature at once would return into nothing. Hence the Divine Conservation affects even the incorruptible substances of spirits; it affects matter and form, and the connection of both: in short, it is co-extensive with the creative act. Conservation, like creation, implies a direct action of the Divine Power and the immediate presence of God in all things that He conserves. The Catechism of the Council of Trent, and the generality of theologians explain the dogma by two familiar analogies: things depend for their continued existence on the preserving influence of God in the same manner as a non-luminous body depends for its light on the source of light, and as the life of the body depends on the influence of the soul.

We must not believe that God is the Creator and Maker of all things in such a way as to consider that, when the work was completed, all things made by Him could continue to exist without the action of His infinite power. For, just as it is by His supreme power, wisdom, and goodness that all things have been brought into being: in like manner, unless His continuous providence aided and conserved them with that same force whereby they were originally produced, they would at once fall back into nothing. And this Scripture declares when it says (Wisd. 11:26), “How can anything endure, if Thou wouldst not? or be preserved, if not called by Thee?” (See also Roman Catechism, or Catechism of the Council of Trent, pt. i., chap. 2, n. 21.) Other passages of Holy Scripture bearing on the question are the following. “But if Thou turn away Thy face they shall be troubled; Thou shalt take away their breath, and they shall fail, and shall return to their dust” (Ps. 103:29); “Last of all hath spoken to us by His Son, … by Whom He made the world, … upholding all things by the word of His power” (Heb. 1:2, 3); “My Father worketh until now, and I work” (John 5:17). St. Paul refers to the passive relation, the being upheld, in the words, “In Him we live, and move, and be” (Acts 17:28).

II. The necessity of positive Conservation and its peculiar character of a preserving activity result from the fact that the existence of creatures can in no way be due to the creatures themselves: what is not, cannot give itself being. The fact that a creature actually exists, does not change its contingent character; although it exists, it does not exist necessarily, but depends on an external cause as much for its continuous as for its initial existence. The “derivative existence” of creatures stands to the “self-existence” of God in the same relation of dependence as the rays of light to the source of light, and as the acts of the soul to the substance of the soul. From this point of view, the preserving influence of God on His creatures at once appears as a continuous creation.

III. From the necessity and nature of this Divine influence, it follows that God, absolutely speaking, can destroy His creatures by simply suspending His creative action (cf. Ps. 103:29). A creature, on the contrary, cannot destroy itself or any other creature as to its whole substance: neither by suspending a positive conserving influence, which the creature does not possess, at least as regards the substance of things; nor by a positive action opposed to and more powerful than the Divine conserving action. Created forces can only change the conditions upon which the preservation of substantial forms depends: when these conditions cease, God ceases His conserving influence. Cf. St. Thomas, I., q. 104, a. 3, and De Potentia, q. 5, art. 3.

Although, speaking absolutely, God could annihilate His creatures, it is most probable that He never will destroy any of the direct and immediate products of His creative power. Of spiritual creatures, it can be demonstrated that their eternal conservation by God is a moral necessity; as to material things, however, our reason only leads us to presume that the Divine Will, which gave them existence and conserved them until now, will never change: no reason being known why it should. “God made not death, neither hath He pleasure in the destruction of the living; for He created all things that they might be; and He made the nations of the earth for health; and there is no poison of destruction in them” (Wisd. 1:13, 14)

SECT. 114.—GOD THE PRINCIPLE OF ALL CREATED ACTION

The absolute and universal dependence of creatures on God implies that they can no more act as causes without a positive Divine influence than, without such influence, they can begin or continue to exist. God, Who conserves their substance, also concurs in their operations, so that all positive reality caused by the activity of creatures owes its being directly to the action of God co-operating and co-producing with the created cause.

I. Some notion of this Divine co-operation may be gathered from an explanation of the technical terms in which the Schoolmen describe it. They call it “Concurrence” (concursus) to signify a participation in the motion (cursus) of another being; “physical” co-operation, to distinguish it from moral co-operation, which consists in inducing another person to perform an action; “natural” or “general,” as opposed to the supernatural and special concurrence required to elevate our actions to the supernatural order; “immediate” or “direct,” because the Concurrence in question directly bears upon the energy and action of creatures, and not merely upon their substance and faculties. It is further described as “a Concurrence in the operations and effects of the secondary causes,” because it embraces both the act and the effect of the cause, God working at the same time through and with the creature. The expression “the action of God in every thing that acts” conveys the idea that God intrinsically animates the created cause, working with and by it as the soul animates the body. The Divine Concurrence must not, however, be thought of as a force added to, or operating side by side with the creature, but as the animating, Divine soul of its own powers and faculties.

1. Upon the whole, the above notion of the Divine Concurrence is admitted by all theologians, however much they may differ as to its further development. The Fathers find it in Holy Scripture; and it is a necessary consequence of the relation of dependence of the creature on God. “Not only does God watch over and administer every thing that exists: the things that are moved and that act He also impels by intrinsic power to motion and action in such a way that, without hindering the operation of secondary causes, He (as it were) goes before it (præveniat), since His hidden might belongs to each thing, and, as the Wise Man testifies, ‘He reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly.’ Wherefore it was said by the Apostle, when preaching to the Athenians the God Whom they worshipped unwittingly: ‘He is not far from every one of us, for in Him we live and move and be’ “ (Catechism of the Council of Trent, pt. i., ch. ii., n. 22). Holy Scripture refers to the Divine Concurrence in the texts which ascribe to God the operations of creatures, or which directly attribute to Him the effects of created activity. “There are diversities of operations, but the same God Who worketh all in all” (ὁ ἐνεργῶν τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν, 1 Cor. 12:6); “My Father worketh until now, and I work” (John 5:17); “It is He Who giveth to all life, and breath, and all things.… Although He be not far from every one of us; for in Him we live and move and be” (Acts 17:25, 28); “Of Him, and by Him, and in Him are all things” (ἐξ αὐτοῖ καὶ διʼ αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα, Rom. 11:36).

2. The intrinsic reason for the necessity of the Divine co-operation with secondary causes lies, speaking generally, in the absolute dependence of all derivative being on the Essential Being. Nothing in the creature that deserves the name of being can possibly be independent of the Creator. But if the effects of created activity were not directly and immediately attributable to God, they would, to some extent, be independent of Him. This appears most clearly in the generation of living things. Here new and substantial beings receive an existence, the commencement and continuation of which are so peculiarly and eminently the work of God, that they cannot be conceived independently of Him.

II. The principle which proves the necessity of the Divine Concurrence, defines also its measure and its extent.

I. Everything that exists, all positive and real being, all manifestations of a power good in itself, are dependent for existence on the direct operation or co-operation of God. But whatever is defective, inordinate, or morally wrong—in other words, whatever is not-being connected with the effects produced or with the action of the created cause—is not attributable to the Divine Concurrence: the defect or deficiency in either the act or its effect must be ascribed to some defect or deficiency in the secondary cause which God does not prevent or remove. In the production of effects physically or morally defective, God co-operates somewhat in the way that the soul co-operates in the imperfect motion of a lame foot. The motion, not the lameness, is the work of the soul; in like manner, the positive being or reality to which an imperfection attaches, is the work of God, but not the imperfection. Thus, sin comes from God in as far as it is a positive act and a real being, but not in as far as it is a deviation from justice. Cf. St. Thomas, De Malo, q. iii., a. 2; and the commentators on 2 Sent. dist. 37.

2. As to the nature of the Divine Concurrence and the manner in which God influences the activity of creatures, great controversies exist among Theologians. The burning question is how God influences free will. According to the followers of Molina, the Divine Concurrence is a mere co-operation, or an influence acting side by side with the created cause. The school of St. Thomas holds that it is a true moving of the creature—that is, an impulse given to the creature before it acts (impulsus ad agendum). St. Thomas himself resolves the Divine Concurrence into these four elements: “God is the cause of all and every action (1) inasmuch as He gives the power to act; (2) inasmuch as He conserves this power; (3) inasmuch as He applies it to the action; and (4) inasmuch as by His power all other powers act” (De Pot., q. iii., a. 7). He borrows the notion of applying the power to act to the action, from the application of a tool to its work (“as the carpenter applies his saw to divide a log”). The application by God of the created power to its object differs greatly, however, from the application of a tool to its work. The latter action is merely external and accomplished by local motion, whereas the former is internal and proceeds from God as its life and its energizing principle. A better analogy is afforded by the impulse which the root gives to the life of the plant.

The theory of St. Thomas, as originally proposed by him, appears at first sight more in harmony with the language of Revelation and of the Church, and expresses better the dependence of the Creature on God. The mystical depth of the Thomistic theory and the difficulty of expounding its innermost nature in set sentences tell in its favour rather than against it, for the same difficulty and mystery are met with when we pass from a mere machine to a living organism. The only serious objection against the theory is that it seems to destroy the self-determining and self-acting power of creatures. But this objection draws all its force from a misconception. The Divine motion is not external and mechanical, like the motion of a tool; but organic, like the motion imparted to a living plant by the action of its root. Such an organic action, far from destroying the self-acting power of the being to which it gives an impulse, is really the foundation and necessary condition of this power.

To enter into a detailed discussion of the two conflicting systems would be beyond the scope of the present work. Further information may be found in the commentaries on I., q. 105.

CHAPTER II

THE UNIVERSE CREATED FOR GOD

SECT. 115.—ESSENTIAL RELATION OF CREATURES TO GOD AS THE FINAL OBJECT OF THEIR BEING, ACTIVITY, AND TENDENCIES

I. WE may here take it for granted that every creature has, in a way, its end in itself. Creatures are either good already or tend to be good; they possess and enjoy the good which is in them, and find the fulfilment of their tendencies in the union with the good to which they tend.

At the same time, however, dogma and reason alike show that the highest and final object of creatures as such is not in themselves, but in the glorification of the Creator. “If any one shall say that the world was not created for the glory of God, let him be anathema” (Vat. Council, sess. iii., c. I, can. 5). The council, indeed, does not expressly define that the glory of God is the final object; but this is self-evident. For if the “world” purely and simply—that is, with all its component parts and elements—is made for the glory of God, all its particular ends and objects must be subordinate to this one great end. Besides, God cannot be other than the highest and final object.

If we consider in detail the essential relation of creatures to God as their final object, we find, first, that they are ordained to represent, by means of their own goodness and beauty, the supreme goodness and beauty of the Creator; secondly, that they exist for the service of God, Whose property they are, and on Whom they depend; thirdly, that God is the good to which they ultimately tend, and in which they find their rest. In each of these three respects the manifestation of the Divine glory appears in a particular form: the majesty of God’s inner perfection and beauty is reflected in the being of creatures; the majesty of His power and dominion is manifested in their submission to Him; and the majesty and glory which accrue to Him from His being the good of all that is good and the centre of all being, shine forth in the union of creatures with Him as the resting-place of all their tendencies.

This doctrine is abundantly set forth in Holy Scripture. “I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, saith the Lord God” (Apoc. 1:8); “Of Him, and by Him, and in (unto) Him, are all things” (Rom. 11:36); “For Whom are all things, and by Whom all things” (διʼ ὁν τὰ πάντα καὶ διʼ οὗ τὰ πάντα, Heb. 2:10). God’s actual destination of everything for His own purpose is expressed in Prov. 16:4: “The Lord hath made all things for Himself.” The accomplishment and fulfilment of His purpose is that all should be most intimately united to Him: “Afterwards the end, … and when all things shall be subdued unto Him, then the Son also Himself shall be subject unto Him that put all things under Him, that God may be all in all” (τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν, 1 Cor. 15:24–28).

II. What we have said of the relation of creatures generally to God as their Final Object, applies with greater force to rational creatures. These, even more than irrational creatures, have in themselves a final object; they cannot be used as mere means for the benefit of other creatures, but have a dignity of their own, and are, therefore, entitled to everlasting duration. They, as it were, belong to themselves, and they use for their own purposes what they are and possess; the beatitude towards which they tend is a perfection connatural to them. The salient point of their perfection consists in the fact that they cannot be subjected purely and simply to any other creature, so as to be used for its sole benefit. Their final or highest object, however, is in God. Without some relation to Him rational life would necessarily be imperfect, and, besides, the possession of God constitutes the beatitude of rational beings. Their whole being, their life and activity, and even their own beatitude, must be referred to the glory of God. Creatures endowed with reason ought, more than others, to publish, by means of their natural and supernatural likeness to God, the beauty of their Prototype. Their whole life should be spent in the service of their Master, and all their aspirations ought to tend to union with Him. They alone are able to give Him true honour and worship, based upon true knowledge and love.

The supreme felicity of rational creatures consists in the possession of God. This does not, however, imply that the felicity of the creature is the highest object, and that the fruition of God is a means thereto. The beatitude to be attained by the rational creature really consists in a perfect union with God by means of knowledge and love, which union contains at the same time the highest felicity of the creature and the most perfect glorification of the Creator; the highest happiness of the blessed is afforded precisely by the consciousness that their knowledge and love of the internal beauty of God are the means of His external glorification.

This doctrine also is expressed in countless passages of Holy Scripture. “The Lord hath chosen thee … to make thee higher than all nations which He hath created to His own praise, and name, and glory” (Deut. 26:18, 19); “Filled with the fruit of justice, through Jesus Christ, unto the glory and praise of God” (Phil. 1:11); “Who hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ unto Himself, according to the purpose of His will, unto the praise of the glory of His grace” (Eph. 1:5, 6); “Thou art worthy, O Lord our God, to receive glory and honour and power, because Thou hast created all things, and for Thy will they were and have been created” (Apoc. 4:11).

Nothing shows better that the felicity of creatures is an object subordinate to the glory of God, than the fact that those who, through their own fault, fail to glorify Him by obtaining eternal felicity for themselves, are compelled to glorify Him by manifesting His justice. The glory of God is, then, the final object of all things, and to this end all others are subservient.

III. Besides glorifying God in their imperfect way, material things have also to serve rational creatures in the attainment of their perfection and final felicity. They belong not only to the kingdom of God, but also to the kingdom of man. “The world is made for man,” that man may use it for the glory of his Creator. The expression “All things in creation are made to reveal or manifest the glory of God,” must not be understood of rational creatures only. Creatures reflect in themselves and represent the Divine perfections just as a work of art itself represents and reveals the ideal of the artist, whether it be taken notice of by men or not. Hence worlds unknown to man and angels would still manifest the glory of their Maker and attain the final object of all things, the glorification of God. “The heavens show forth the glory of God, and the firmament declareth the work of His hands” (Ps. 18:2).

The hierarchy of creation, and of the ends of man in particular, is beautifully expressed by Lactantius. “The world was made,” he says, “that we might be born. We were born that we might know God. We know Him that we may worship Him. We worship Him that we may earn immortality. We are rewarded with immortality that, being made like unto the angels, we may serve our Father and Lord for ever and be the eternal kingdom of God” (Instit. vii. 6).

SECT. 116.—THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD

I. A necessary consequence of the absolute dependence of the world on its Maker is that the world must be governed by God, and conducted by Him to its final destination. He owes it to His wisdom so to govern the world as to attain the end which He Himself has ordained for it. (Supra, pp. 219, 224.)

The government of the world by God is the function of Divine Providence, inasmuch as it consists in conducting all things to their end by providing for each and all of them the good to which they ultimately tend.

II. The existence of an all-governing Providence is a fundamental article of Faith. Our reason, our conscience, cannot separate the idea of an all-penetrating Providence from the idea of God. Holy Writ speaks of Providence almost on every page. (Cf., e.g., Ps. 138 and Matt. 6:25 sqq.) The Vatican Council has also defined it in outline: “God watcheth over and governeth by His Providence all things that He hath made, reaching from end to end mightily and ordering all things sweetly” (sess. iii., c. 1).

III. We subjoin some characteristics of the Divine Government of the World, in its bearing upon the natural order of things.

1. The government of the world by God is both general and special; that is to say, it affects the world as a whole as well as every creature in particular. It is not carried out by intermediate agents: God Himself directly watches over, leads, and controls every single thing and its every motion. He takes a special care of personal beings whose end is supreme felicity and whose duration is everlasting. In virtue of His Wisdom and Infinite Power, He not only establishes general laws and provides the means for obeying them, but also regulates and arranges the particular circumstances and conditions under which every creature is to act. Thus no creature can be placed in a position or subjected to circumstances not foreseen, preordained, or at least permitted, by Divine Providence, or not in harmony with the general plan of the universe. Hence God’s government of the world attains its end unerringly, with perfect certainty, in general as well as in particular: all things and events ultimately procure the glory of God, and nothing of what He absolutely intends fails to happen, nor does anything happen which He absolutely intends to prevent. This, however, does not interfere with the free will of rational creatures, because their freedom is itself part of the Divine plan and is governed by God in harmony with its nature.

2. Although God, in the government of the world, wills and promotes the good of every single creature, still, in order to attain the great final object of all, He permits and even intends individual creatures not to attain their own particular object, and thus to suffer for the general good. Even the greatest of evils, sin, which is in direct opposition to the glory of God, can be permitted by Him, because He is able to make it subservient to His ends and to glorify Himself by punishing it.

3. The action of God’s Providence appears most strikingly in the organization and harmonious working of material nature. It is not so well seen in the government of personal beings, because free will is a disturbing element which prevents us from discerning uniform laws of conduct.

4. The greatest difficulty arises from the permission of evil, for which, in our limited sphere of knowledge, we can hardly account. We know, however, that all events are in the hand of God and that nothing happens without His knowledge and permission. Although, therefore, in particular cases we fail to see the reason of God’s government, we must none the less bow down before His infinite Wisdom, Goodness, and Justice. Such humble submission and filial confidence are, in rational creatures, the best disposition for receiving the full benefit of God’s loving Providence.

SECT. 117.—THE WORLD THE REALIZATION OF THE DIVINE IDEAL

I. The world is the realization of an artistic ideal, because God created it according to a well-conceived plan, with the intention, not of deriving profit from it, but of producing a work good and beautiful in itself. But the Divine ideal is God Himself; its external representation is, therefore, the representation and image of the Divine Majesty and Beauty.

II. Hence all things bear some likeness to God, and possess some degree of goodness and beauty. In as far as they come from God, they must be good and beautiful; but as they also come from nothing, their goodness and beauty are necessarily imperfect; they are perfect only as far as God has endowed them with being.

III. No single creature can adequately express the Divine Ideal. Hence the almost infinite variety and multiplicity of created forms, each of which reproduces and manifests something of the infinite perfection of God. Of the fundamental forms of being known to us, viz. the spiritual and the material, the former are a real image of their ideal, whilst the latter only contain obscure vestiges of it. Moreover, spiritual creatures, unlike material ones, are conscious of their likeness to God. In man the two forms of likeness to the Divine ideal are combined and concentrated in such a manner that the lower is completed and perfected by the higher, and offers it a wide field for the display of its activities. The soul of man animating the body is an image of the action of God on the world; the fecundity of man, resulting in the construction of a new being like unto himself, represents the inner fecundity of God. In pure spirits the likeness to God is purer and more sublime, but in man it is more complete and comprehensive.

IV. Notwithstanding their immense multiplicity and variety, all created beings are bound up into one whole, tending as it were in a mass to the one final object of all, and together representing a harmonious picture of the Divine Ideal.

V. Is this world, taken as a whole, the best of possible worlds? In the treatise on God, we have already shown that God was not bound to create the best of possible worlds, and that a world than which no other could be more perfect is an absurdity. Still we may safely say that this world is better than any which a creature could excogitate; that, by means of the Incarnation, it affords God the highest possible glorification, and thus attains its end better than any other; and, lastly, that, given the final object preordained by God and the component parts of the world, the arrangement of things and their government by God are the best conceivable.

CHAPTER III

THE ANGELS

NONE of the Fathers has written a complete treatise on the Angels. The work De Cælesti Hierarchia, attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite, is the only one which deals with the subject, and it is the source and the model of all the speculations of the Schoolmen. Of these may be consulted with advantage Petr. Lomb., 2 Sent., dist. 2 sqq.; William of Paris, De Universo, par. ii. (very complete and deep); Alex, of Hales, 2. p., qq. 19–40, and St. Bonaventure on the Lombard, l.c.; St. Thomas, the Angelic doctor, I., qq. 50–64; Qq. Dispp. De Spirit. Creaturis; Contra Gentes, l. ii., cc. 46–55, 91–101; and Opusc. xv., De Substantiis Separatis. Suarez, De Angelis, is the most comprehensive work on the subject. The doctrine of the Fathers is summarized by Petavius, De Angelis (Dogm., tom. iii.).

SECT. 118.—THE NATURE, EXISTENCE, AND ORIGIN OF THE ANGELS

I. The name “Angel,” ἄγγελος,—that is, messenger or envoy,—designates an office rather than a nature; and this office is not peculiar to the beings usually called Angels. Holy Scripture, however, and the Church have appropriated this name to them, because it represents them as standing between God and the rest of the universe, above man and nearer to God on account of their spiritual nature, and taking a share in the government of this world, although absolutely dependent on God. In this way the term “Angel” is even more expressive of their nature than the terms “spirit,” or “pure spirit,” because these latter, if not further determined, are applicable also to God. In order to prevent the belief that all superhuman beings are gods, the documents of Revelation, when speaking of these higher beings, always style them Angels, or Zebaoth—that is, the army of God. Evil spirits, being sufficiently distinguished from God by their wickedness, are often called “spirits,” “bad and wicked spirits,” and sometimes also “angels.” The Greek name δαίμων (“the knowing or knowledge-giving”) is applied, in Holy Writ, exclusively to the spirits of wickedness, because they resemble God only in knowledge, and only offer knowledge to men in order to seduce them.

II. We conceive the Angels as spiritual beings of a higher kind than man, and more like to God; not belonging to this visible world, but composing an invisible world, ethereal and heavenly, from which they exercise, with and under God, a certain influence on our world.

III. The existence of Angels is an article of Faith, set forth alike in innumerable passages of Holy Scripture and in the Symbols of the Church. Scripture does not expressly mention the Angels in its narrative of Creation, but St. Paul (Col. 1:16) enumerates them among the things created through the Logos, and divides these “invisible beings” into Thrones, Dominations, Principalities and Powers. From Genesis to the Apocalypse the sacred pages everywhere bear witness to the existence and activity of the Angels. It is most probable that their existence was part of the primitive revelation, the distorted remains of which are found in polytheism. Unaided reason can neither prove nor disprove the existence of pure spirits; but it can show the fittingness of their existence. Cf. St. Thomas, I., q. 50, a. 1; C. Gentes, l. ii., c. 46.

IV. It is likewise an article of Faith that the Angels were created by God. They are not emanations from His Substance, or the result of any act of generation or formation, but were made out of nothing. All other modes of origin are inconsistent with the spiritual nature of God and of the Angels themselves. Nor can they be eternal or without origin, because this is the privilege of the Infinite. Cf. Ps. 148:2 sqq.; Col. 1:16; Matt. 22:30. However, inasmuch as the real reason why Angels are not procreated by generation is their immateriality, and inasmuch as this immateriality is an article of Faith, it follows that we are bound to believe that no Angel has been generated.

V. The Fourth Lateran and the Vatican Councils have defined that Angels were not created from all eternity, but that they had a beginning. “God … at the very beginning of time made out of nothing both kinds of creatures, spiritual and corporal, angelic and mundane” (sess. iii., C. I).

That the creation of the Angels was contemporaneous with the creation of the world, is not defined so clearly, and, therefore, is not a matter of Faith. The words “simul ab initio temporis,” according to St. Thomas (Opusc. xxiii.), admit of another interpretation, and the definition of the Lateran Council was directed against errors not bearing directly on the time of the creation of the Angels. The probabilities, however, point in the direction of a simultaneous creation: the universe being the realization of one vast plan for the glory of God, it might be expected that all its parts were created together.

VI. It is not easy to decide where the Angels were created. Although their spiritual substance requires no bodily (corporeal) room, still, considering that they are part and parcel of the universe, it is probable that they were created within the limits of the space in which the material world is contained. As they are not bound or tied to any place, it is vain to imagine where they dwell. When Scripture makes heaven their abode, this only implies that they are not tied to the earth, like man, but that the whole of the universe is open to them.

SECT. 119.—ATTRIBUTES OF THE ANGELS—INCORRUPTIBILITY AND RELATION TO SPACE

The attributes of the Angels, like the nature of their substance, are to be determined by a comparison with the attributes of God on the one hand, and with the attributes of man on the other. As creatures, the Angels partake of the imperfections of man; as pure spirits, they partake of the perfections of God.

I. The angelic substance is physically simple—that is, not composed of different parts; but it is not metaphysically simple, because it admits of potentiality and actuality, and also of accidents (§ 63). It is, moreover, essentially immutable or incorruptible; Angels cannot perish by dissolution of their substance, nor can any created cause destroy them. For this reason they are essentially immortal, not, indeed, that their destruction is in itself an impossibility, but because their substance and nature are such that, when once created, perpetual conservation is to them natural. As to accidental perfections, Angels can acquire and lose them. Observe, however, that the knowledge they once possess always remains, and that a loss of perfection can only consist in a deviation from goodness.

Angels differ from the human soul in this, that they neither are nor can be substantial forms informing a body. When they assume a body, their union with it is neither like that of soul and body, nor like the hypostatic union of the two natures in Christ. The assumed body is, as it were, only an outer garment, or an instrument for a transitory purpose. Cf. St. Thomas, I., q. 51; Suarez, 1. iv., 33 sqq.

II. As regards relation to space, Angels, having like God no extended parts, cannot occupy a place so that the different portions of space correspond with different portions of their substance, nor do they require a corporal space to live in, nor can any such space enclose them. On the other hand, they differ from God in this, that they can be present in only one place at a time, and thus can move from place to place. Their motion is, however, unlike that of man; probably it is as swift as thought, or even instantaneous.

SECT. 120.—THE NATURAL LIFE AND WORK OF THE ANGELS

I. The life of the Angels is purely intellectual, without any animal or vegetative functions, and therefore more like the Divine Life than the life of the human soul. The whole substance of an Angel is alive, whereas, in man, one part is life-giving and another life-receiving. The angelic life is inferior to the Divine in this, that the Angel’s life is not identical with its substance; and also in this, that it is susceptible of increase and decrease in perfection. So far all Theologians agree. But they differ very considerably as to how Angels live—that is, how and what they think and will. Leaving aside the abstruse speculations on this subject, we shall here only touch on the few points in which anything like certitude is attainable.

II. It is certain from Revelation that the natural intellect of Angels is essentially more perfect than the human, and essentially less perfect than the Divine Intellect. Thus Scripture makes the knowledge of Angels the measure of human knowledge, e.g. 2 Kings 14:20; and in Mark 13:32, Christ says that even the Angels—much less man—do not know the time of the last judgment The Fathers call the angels νόας, intelligentias,—that is, beings possessed of immediate intuitive knowledge; but man they call λογικός, rationalis—that is, a being whose knowledge is for the most part inferential: whence the superiority of angelic knowledge is manifest. Compared to the Divine Knowledge, the imperfection of the angelic, according to Scripture and the Fathers, consists in this, that the Angels cannot naturally see God as He is, by immediate, direct vision; that they cannot penetrate the secrets either of the Divine decrees, or of the hearts of man, or of each other; much less do they know future free actions. Cf. §§ 69 and 80.

III. As to the will of the Angels, we can only gather from Revelation that it naturally possesses the perfection of the human will, but at the same time also shares to some extent in the imperfections of the latter. The angelic will is free as to the choice of its acts, and is able to perform moral actions and to enjoy true happiness. But it is not, by virtue of its nature, directed to what is morally good; its choice may fall on evil. This much can be gathered from what is revealed on the fall of the Angels.

IV. It is evident that the Angels are able to perform all the actions of man, except those which are peculiar to man on account of his composite nature. Revelation, moreover, introduces Angels acting in various ways: they speak, exhort, enlighten, protect, move, and so forth. It is also beyond doubt that the power of Angels is superior to that of man, both as regards influence on material things, and on man himself. As to the mode of action, we know but little with certainty. The Angel acts by means of his will, like God; but he neither creates out of nothing, nor generates like man. The only immediate effect an Angel can produce by an act of his will, is to move bodies or forces so as to bring them into contact or separate them, and thus to influence their action. Bodies are moved from place to place locally; spirits or minds are only moved “intentionally;” that is, the Angel who wishes to act upon our souls or upon other spirits, puts an object before them and directs their attention towards it. The power of Angels over matter exceeds that of man as regards the greater masses they are able to move and the velocity and exactness or appropriateness of the motion. These advantages enable them to produce effects supernatural in appearance, although entirely owing to a higher knowledge of the laws of nature and to superior force. As this power belongs to the angelic nature it is common to both good and bad Angels.

Angelic speech would seem to consist simply in this, that the speaker allows the listener to read so much of his thoughts as he wishes to communicate. Hence Angels can converse at any distance; the listener sees the thought of the speaker, and thus all possibility of error or deception is excluded.

V. Angels have over the body of man the same power as over other material bodies. Over the human mind, however, their power is circumscribed within narrow limits. They cannot speak to man as they speak to each other, because the mind of man is unable to grasp things purely spiritual. But, by their power over matter, they can exercise a great influence on the lower life of the soul, and thus indirectly on its intellectual life also. They can propose various objects to the senses, and also move the sense-organs internally; they can act on the imagination, and feed it with various fancies; and lastly, as the intellect takes its ideas from the imagination, Angels are enabled to guide and direct the noblest faculty of man either for better or for worse.

SECT. 121.—NUMBER AND HIERARCHY OF THE ANGELS

I. We are certain, from Revelation, that the number of Angels is exceedingly great, forming an army worthy of the greatness of God. This army of the King of heaven is mention in Deut. 30:2 (cf. Ps. 67:18); then in the vision of Daniel (7:10), and in many other places.

II. If the Angels can be numbered, there must exist between them at least personal differences; that is to say, each angel has his own personality. But whether they are all of the same kind, like man, or constitute several kinds, or are each of a different kind or species, is a question upon which Theologians differ.

III. The Fathers have divided the Angels into nine Orders or Choirs, the names of which are taken from Scripture. They are: Seraphim, Cherubim, Thrones, Dominations (κυριότητες), Virtues (δυνάμεις), Powers (ἐξουσίαι), Principalities (ἀρχαί), Archangels and Angels. The first two and the last two orders are often named in Holy Writ; the five others are taken from Ephes. 1:21 and Col. 1:16. It seems clear enough, especially if we take into account the all but unanimous testimony of the Fathers, that these names designate various Orders of Angels; whence it follows that there are at least nine such Orders—not, however, that there are only nine. Considering, however, that for the last thirteen centuries the number nine has been accepted as the exact number of angelical Choirs, we are justified in accepting it as correct.

It is impossible to determine the differences between the several Orders of Angels with anything like precision. The three highest Orders bear names which seem to point to constant relations with God, as if these Angels formed especially the heavenly court; the three lowest express relations to man; the three middle ones only point to might and power generally.

The fallen angels probably retain the same distinctions as the good ones, because these distinctions are, in all likelihood, founded upon differences in natural perfections. Scripture speaks of “the prince of demons” (Matt. 12:24), and applies some of the names of angelic Orders to bad angels (Eph. 6:12).

On the supernatural life of the Angels, see infra, § 153.

CHAPTER IV

THE MATERIAL UNIVERSE

SECT. 122.—THEOLOGICAL DOCTRINES CONCERNING THE MATERIAL WORLD GENERALLY

THE things of this world come within the domain of Theology only in as far as they are the work of God, and have relations with Him and with man. The general truths bearing on this matter may be found out even by natural reason; but they have also been revealed to us, and have thus become the subject-matter of Theology. But Theology is concerned with the natural truths in question only in as far as they have a religious significance—that is, in as far as they express the relations of natural things to God or to man as their end and object. The general truths revealed, especially in Genesis, refer to the origin, the nature, and the end or final object of the material world.

I. The Material world owes its existence to a creative act of God; the several species of things, their differences, their position and functions in the universe, are, upon the whole, the direct work of God, Who has made them according to a well-defined plan. Neither the angels nor mere natural evolution made the world what it is. Organic beings, which now propagate themselves by means of generation, owe their existence neither to spontaneous generation nor to unconscious evolution of inorganic matter and forces; each species has been created to represent a Divine exemplar, and has received the power to perpetuate itself by producing individuals of the same species. This doctrine is most expressly contained in the narrative of creation in Genesis.

II. The material beings composing the universe are good in substance and nature, and are perfectly adapted to the ends for which they were created. This is the Catholic dogma opposed to Manichæism, which held the things of the material world to be not only imperfect, but even bad. On this point the words of Genesis are plain enough: “God saw all things that He had made, and they were very good” (1:31).

III. The end or object of material beings is the glory of God and the service of man. Man is in no wise the servant of the inferior world; his will is not deprived of freedom and ruled by the laws of nature.

That God created the world, made it good, and made it for the service of man, is contained in the narrative of the origin of the world in the Book of Genesis. But the Church has never defined, and consequently has left open to discussion, how far the Mosaic narrative, besides these three points, is of a doctrinal character, and how far it is simply rhetorical or poetical. The scope of the present work forbids us to enter into a detailed discussion of this subject. In the following section we shall state briefly what appears to us to be the better opinion.

SECT. 123.—THE DOCTRINAL PORTIONS OF THE MOSAIC HEXAHEMERON

I. The work of the six days, the Hexahemeron, lies between the creation of the chaos, or first creation, and the commencement of the regular government of the world by God. It is the work of formation, or second creation described as “the making of the world out of formless matter” (κτίζειν τὸν κόσμον ἐξ ὑλῆς ἀμόρφου, Wisd. 11:18), and alluded to by St. Paul: “By faith we understand that the world was framed by the word of God: that from invisible things visible things might be made” (πίστει νοοῦμεν κατηρτίσθαι τοὺς αἰῶνας ῥήματι Θεου, εἰς τὸ μὴ ἐν φαινομένων τὸ βλεπόμενον γεγονέναι, Heb. 11:3). In this sense the Hexahemeron is properly a “Cosmogony,” in the ancient meaning of the word, viz. the history of the formation and ornamentation of this visible universe, of which the earth is the centre and man the king. It is not a cosmogony in the modern sense, because it does not deal with the formation and ornamentation of other worlds than ours; nor a Geogony, because it deals only with the external aspect of the earth.

II. The object of the Mosaic narrative being to represent the Cosmos as a Divine work of art,—made not with hands, but by the Word of God, Who is the expression and image of the Divine Power and Wisdom,—we must expect to find the particular productions represented as parts devised for the perfection of the whole work. And, in fact, in the order observed by Moses, the work of each day appears as part of a magnificent picture in which all the things of this visible world find their place. The first half of the narrative describes the formation and placing of the chief components of the Cosmos, which lay latent in the fluid chaotic mass. They are disposed in concentric spheres, beginning with the outermost: light, the atmosphere, and the solid earth. Then follows, in the second half, the adorning and filling in of this framework: the heavenly bodies shed their light on it; living things appear, beginning with the lowest and closing with man. The production of plants forms the transition between the work of formation and the work of ornamentation. The division of the six days’ work into the work of separation during the first three days, and the work of ornamentation during the three last days, has been in favour since the Middle Ages.

The general plan of the Cosmos centres in the idea that the world is a dwelling-place for man. The Divine Architect first produces the raw material in an obscure and formless mass; He afterwards creates light, and spans the roof of the house, and gives it a solid floor; here He places the vegetable kingdom as an ornament and as a storehouse for the food of living creatures; then an inexhaustible supply of light is shed abroad; next come the beings destined for the service of man, having their abode in the waters and in the air; and lastly, the animals which dwell in the same house as man himself. The beauty of a work of art combined with the usefulness of a dwelling-place—such is the character of the Cosmos.

III. The narrative is a genetic explanation of the work of creation—that is, an enumeration of its parts in the order in which they necessarily or naturally succeeded one another. Whether we consider the work of the six days as six separate creations or as six tableaux of one instantaneous creative act, the order of nature must be observed. If God made things successively, He could not make them otherwise than in the order which their nature requires; if He made them in one moment of time, the Sacred Writer had no other foundation for a successive narrative than this same order of nature. The more we study the separate parts of the Divine work, the better we see how they fit into each other, and how exactly the narrative gives to each the place it holds in nature.

IV. The best Catholic authorities on the present question are so persuaded that the intention of the writer of Genesis was to give a genetic account of the architectonic order of the world, that they deem it admissible that the whole act of creation occupied only one instant of time, and that the division of it into six days is but a way of presenting to the reader “the order according to the connection of causes” rather than the order “according to the intervals of time” (St. Aug., De Gen. ad Lit., 1. v.). Such is the opinion of St. Augustine, and St. Thomas thinks it highly probable (I., q. 66, a. 1). Without examining what may be said for or against it, we may notice that St. Augustine has, until lately, found few followers. See Reusch, The Bible and Nature; Bp. Clifford, Dublin Review, April, 1883; Dr. Molloy, Geology and Revelation; Zahm, Bible, Science, and Faith, chap. iv.

V. It is quite possible and even probable that the Mosaic narrative is of a highly poetical character. In language simple and true, it puts before the reader a vivid and sublime picture of the artistic work of the Creator. Then according to Heb. 11:3, its aim is to show how the component parts of the cosmos were brought by the Creator from darkness to light, i.e. made visible. This poetical conception finds expression in the “evening and morning” of which the days are composed. The Hebrew words for evening and morning are etymologically equivalent to confusio and apertio. At the very beginning of the narrative the opposition between darkness and light appears, and seems to point out that in all other works the same idea is adhered to. Again, the writer’s intention of making the Creation week the model of the human week may have led him to give to the periods of the former the same number and name as those borne by the periods of the latter. Lastly, it is possible that the writer received his inspiration by means of a prophetic vision, in which the several phases of Creation were pictured before his mind. If so, his narrative would naturally be of a poetical character: the divisions he adopts and the name of days which he applies to them may be no more than a means of conveying to the reader the number and splendour of the visions of his mind. These and similar considerations, quite independently of natural science, have induced the theologians of all times to allow a very free interpretation of the six days’ duration. See Dublin Review, April, 1883.

VI. Natural Science has also undertaken to give an account of the origin of things. The interest which Theology takes in this natural history of Creation is purely apologetic, and consequently does not come within our province.

Elaborate attempts have been made to reconcile the two accounts. Veith and Bosizio held that the six days were days of twenty-four hours; the destructions of flora and fauna, the remains of which are now found in the crust of the earth, are placed by them in the times between Adam and the Flood. Buckland, Wiseman, Westermaier, Vosen, and Molloy admit the destruction of a world before the Hexahemeron. Others, as Pianciani, Hettinger, Holzammer, and Reusch, place the catastrophes within the six days of creation, but take the “days” to be long periods. Reusch, however, in the third edition of his work, acknowledges the impossibility of thus establishing a harmony between natural and supernatural cosmogony, because natural science admits the simultaneous origin of plants and animals, and their continued simultaneous existence. Bishop Clifford and other Catholic writers cut the knot by considering the so-called Mosaic cosmogony, not as a narrative, but as a hymn in which various portions of creation are commemorated on the days of the week. See the Dublin Review, l.c. On this question, see also Proteus and Amadeus, letter viii.

It is best, however, to state frankly that it is not the object of Revelation to teach natural science. In the words of St. Augustine (quoted by Leo XIII., in the Encyc. Providentissimus Deus), “The Holy Ghost, speaking through the Sacred Writers, did not wish to teach men matters which in no way concerned their salvation” (De Gen. ad Litt., II. ix. 20). St. Jerome, too, declares that many things are related in Scripture according to the opinions prevalent at the time, and not according to actual fact (In Jerem. Proph. xxviii.). And St. Thomas distinctly states that Moses suited his narrative to the capacity of his readers, and therefore followed what seemed to be true (I q. 70, a. I). See supra, p. 56. Lagrange, Historical Criticism and the Old Testament, 3 Lect.

CHAPTER V

MAN

THE commentaries of the Fathers on the Hexahemeron, especially St. Ambrose and St. Gregory of Nyssa. St. Aug., De Gen. ad Lit., op. perf., 1. vi. sqq., and in his writings against the Manichæans, esp. De Duabus Animabus Petr. Lomb., 2 Sent., dist. 16 sqq., with comm. of St. Bonav., Ægidius, and Estius; William of Paris, De Anima; St. Thom., I., qq. 75–93; Cont. Gent., l. ii. 56 sqq. Suarez, De Opif., l. iii. sqq., and De Anima; Benedict Pereyra, in Genesim, l. iv. sqq.; Kleutgen, Philos., diss. viii.

The theological doctrine on Man may be treated under three heads:—

A.—Man as the image and likeness of God.

B.—The origin and substantial character of man’s nature.

C.—The characteristics of man’s life.

SECT. 124.—INTERPRETATION OF GEN. 1:26: “LET US MAKE MAN TO OUR IMAGE AND LIKENESS.”

I. The change of phrase from “Let there be” to “Let Us make,” when God is about to create man, and the description of man as the image of the Creator, give to this last and crowning creation a special solemnity. The notion of man as the image of God is the perfect theological idea of man. God Himself looks upon man, not like philosophers, as an animal endowed with reason, but as His own likeness. This idea exhibits man’s essence and destiny in direct relation to God. It affords a basis for a deeper conception of human nature in itself, and also as regards its natural and supernatural evolution and final perfection in short, it describes the ideal man, as realized by Divine institution in Adam.

The text (Gen. 1:26) is so full of meaning that many explanations of it are given by the Fathers and by Theologians, each seeming to view the text under a different aspect and to find in it a new meaning. The text runs: “Let Us make man to Our image (בְצַלְמֵני) and likeness (בִדְמוּתֵני—Sept. κατʼ εἰκόνα καὶ καθʼ ὁμοίωσιν): and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and over the fowls of the air, and the beasts, and the whole earth, and over every creeping creature that moveth upon the earth. And God created man to His own image, and to the image of God created He him; male and female created He them.”

The Hebrew Zelem is, like our word image, something concrete, originally meaning a shadow; it is also used to designate the idols of false divinities. Demuth, on the contrary, is something abstract, well-rendered by ὁμοίωσις in the Septuagint—a similitude or likeness. The conjunction of the terms “image” and “likeness” is found nowhere else in Holy Scripture, except Gen. 5:3. Wherever the same idea is expressed in other passages, only one of the two terms is employed—a clear proof that they are considered as synonymous by the sacred writers. “God created man to His own image, to the image of God (Elohim) created He him” (Gen. 1:27). “God created man; He made him to the likeness of God (B’Demuth) (Gen. 5:1). “Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, his blood shall be shed: for man was made to the image of God” (Gen. 9:6). The Hebrew text evidently shows that man is the image of God, and not merely has this image in him.

II. From this we are enabled to determine the precise sense of the text in the following manner:—

1. It is evident that the expression “image and likeness of God” signifies a distinct perfection belonging to the nature of man, or rather constituting man’s specific essence as distinguished from all other visible beings, and therefore not capable of being lost by sin. Indeed, man is described in the same terms before and after his fall, The literal sense of the text contains no more than this. It must, however, be granted that, in their fullest meaning, the words “image” and “likeness,” especially the latter, also refer to the supernatural likeness of man to God. Those Fathers who expound the “likeness” in the sense of a supernatural similitude to God, speak from the standpoint of the New Testament. The first readers of Genesis, for whom the book was primarily written, certainly were unable to detect in it any but the natural and literal sense given above.

2. The expression, “to make to the image,” may also be understood of a destination of man to become similar to God either by following the good inclinations of his nature or by yielding to a supernatural influence. But such is not the literal and proper sense; the text declares what man is, not what he ought to become. His higher destiny is a necessary consequence of his being an image of God. His power to attain his natural destination—that is, his aptitude to lead a moral life—is part of the nature which God has created in him; and, inasmuch as it is neither acquired nor freely accepted, it is not lost by sin, but remains as long as human nature itself. Sin, however, may suspend or impair man’s moral faculty.

3. Although man is really the image of God, and not merely destined to become such, still he is an image only in a relative and analogical sense. The Son of God alone is God’s absolute and perfect Image; and also the Ideal, or Exemplar, after which man is made (Heb. 1:3; 2 Cor. 4:4).

The words of Gen. 1:26, give a definition of man as a whole; for they apply to the compound of body and soul afterwards described, Gen. 2:7: “And the Lord God formed man of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life; and man became a living soul.” Thus, by his body, which is the organ and temple of the soul, man is an image, a shadow (Zelem, simulacrum) of God; by his spiritual soul he bears a real likeness to Him; and as animated body, he is the living image and likeness, or the living effigy of the living God. As visible and living image of God, man is the crown of visible creation (the Cosmos of the Cosmos, Const. Apost., vii. 3, 4; viii. 7), and, as such, even animals must revere and fear him.

III. The ante-Nicene Fathers considered man’s body as the image of God. In the fourth century, however, when anthropomorphic heresies arose, the custom prevailed of insisting almost exclusively on the likeness which the soul bears to God. The reasons for this change are obvious. The body is the image of God only in as far as it is informed, animated, and worked by the soul; besides, there was danger of conceiving the Ideal after whose likeness man is made, as being itself a body. Again, in the Arian controversies, the terms εἰκών and imago, as applied to the Son of God, the Image of the Father, had received a fixed meaning, viz. a likeness such as exists only between the Persons of the Trinity.

SECT. 125.—MAN THE IMAGE OF GOD

I. The definition of man given in Genesis shows better than any other the excellence and dignity of his essence, position, and destiny among and above the rest of creation.

1. The image of God is seen in man from the fact that man is able and is destined to rule the whole visible world and to turn it to his service. His dominion is an imitation of Divine Providence, with the limitations that necessarily distinguish the rule of a creature from that of the Creator (Ps. 8) This attribute of regal dignity and dominion essentially implies Personality in man. None but a personal being can be the end of other beings, can possess itself, enjoy happiness, and use other things for its own ends. The excellence of personality is founded upon intellect and will. For this reason, the Fathers find the likeness of man to God expressed most vividly in these two faculties. Holy Scripture itself points out in several places the dignity which accrues to man from his being the image of God (cf. Gen. 9:6 and James 3:9).

2. The human soul bears a further likeness to God in the spirituality of its substance; and this is the principal point of similarity, from which all others spring. The soul is created a spirit in order to be like to God; its spirituality implies incorruptibility and immortality, by which it is placed above all things material and perishable, and partakes of the Divine immutability and eternity (see Wisd. 2:23). The same attribute is the reason why the soul cannot be procreated by generation, but is the direct product of an act of creation. Hence the Apostle said, “Being, then, the offspring of God” (Acts 17:29)—to point out the substantial likeness of the soul to God.

3. Lastly, the intellectual life of man has the same contents (= subject-matter), the same direction, and the same final object as the life of God Himself. In fact, the soul is enabled and destined to know and to love God Himself, and so to apprehend its Divine prototype and to be united with Him. “Man is after God’s image,” says St. Augustine (De Trin., xiv. 8), “by the very fact that he is capable of God and can be a partaker of Him.” As the soul receives immediately from God its being and life, so also it has in God alone its direct final object and its rule of life; that is to say, no fruition except the fruition of God can fill the soul; no one but God can claim the possession of the human soul; no will, except the will of God, can bind the free will of the soul.

II. A comparison of man with the Angels as to the perfection of representing the image and likeness of God, shows that, in several respects, man is a more perfect likeness of his Maker than even the Angels. The latter, of course, represent the Divine Substance and the Divine intellectual life in greater perfection; but man has several points in his favour.

1. Just as God, intrinsically present in all things, gives being and activity to all things by a continuous act of creation, so does the soul of man, intrinsically present in his body, hold together and develop its organization, and generate new human organisms, thus possessing a plastic activity not given to the Angels.

2. As the All-present Creator breathes life into His creatures, the human soul communicates life to the vegetative and animal organs of the body, and disposes the new organisms for the reception of life; a privilege also denied to the Angels.

3. The beauty of the world manifests the beauty and grandeur of God: so the noble form and beauty of the human body reproduce and manifest the beauty of the soul The works of the Angels, on the contrary, are only works of art: they are not their own in the same way as the body is the soul’s own, and they bear no intrinsic relation to the internal beauty of their authors.

4. The Divine Concurrence, in virtue of which God is the Author of all that is done by His creatures, and especially of their moral actions, is imaged in the concursus or co-operation of the soul with the body: most actions of the body are so intimately bound up with those of the soul that they form but one action attributable to the soul. Angels, on the contrary, have but the power to move bodies from without as something distinct from themselves.

5. Lastly, as God is the final object of all that is, so the soul of man is the final object of man’s body: the body exists entirely for the soul, and has no dignity or worth except in as far as it is subservient to the soul. But the human body is the highest and most perfect organism of the material world, a microcosm, containing in itself a compendium of all other organisms: hence the whole material world, in and through the human body, bears a relation to the human soul, and through the medium of the human soul is, as it were, consecrated and brought into relation with God. Thus the spirit of man is not only the king, but also the priest of the world. The relation of the material world to the Angels is merely external; they have no other point in common than that they are created by, and for the glory of, the same God.

Man is, therefore, more than the Angels, the image and likeness of God. To man alone this title is given purely and simply in Holy Writ. In the later books of the Old Testament (Wisd. 7:26), and in the New Testament, Christ, as the Son of God, is also called the Image of God (2 Cor. 4:4), in order to place Him in dignity above all creatures whatever, just as the same title places man above all visible creatures. The Son of God, however, is the Image of the Father in a deeper sense than man: the Son is an absolute, man a relative, likeness. Notwithstanding this essential difference, the external image, man, corresponds so perfectly with the internal image, the Word, that man is, as it were, a reproduction of the Word. In the Incarnation the Internal Image entered the external and the external image was drawn into the Internal by hypostatic union, thus achieving the most astonishing of Divine Works.

SECT. 126.—THE LIKENESS TO GOD IN MAN AND WOMAN

From what has been said, it is clear that man is the image of God by reason of his peculiar nature. Holy Scripture suggests two further questions on this subject, viz. Are man and woman in the same degree the image of God? Is the distinction of Persons in God reproduced in His created Image?

I. As to the first question, it is evident that both man and woman are the image of God in as far as both possess the same human nature. The text Gen. 1:27, affirms this explicitly; and in Gen. 2:18–20, the woman is distinguished from the animals as being a help like unto or meet for man—that is, of the same nature.

It is, nevertheless, true that of man alone Scripture says, directly and formally, that he is made to the likeness of God. Hence St. Paul teaches: “The man indeed ought not to cover his head, because he is the image and glory of God; but the woman is the glory of the man. For the man is not of the woman, but the woman of the man. For the man was not created for the woman, but the woman for the man” (1 Cor. 11:7–9). Woman, then, having received human nature only mediately through man, and to be a helpmate to man, is not an image of God in the same full sense as man. Woman, considered as wife—that is, in a position of subjection and dependence,—is in no wise an image of God, but rather a type of the relation which the creature bears to the Creator and Lord.

II. The question whether the Trinity is copied in man originates from the text Gen. 1:26: “Let Us make man to Our image,” which is commonly understood as having been spoken between the Three Divine Persons. This form of speech certainly does not exclude a likeness of man to the one nature of God, for it admits the sense, “Let Us make man to Our image by giving him a nature like unto Our own.” As a matter of fact, Scripture adds directly, “In the image of God created He them.” The post-Nicene Fathers have found no other sense in this text; on the contrary, from the fact that one man is the copy of a nature common to three persons, they conclude the unity of substance and nature in God. But does the human image of the Divine Nature bear also a likeness to the Trinity? As the Divine Persons are not distinct substances but only distinct relations, they can be represented only by some analogous relation in man. The text of Genesis is silent on the existence of such relations. If, however, on theological grounds we can show that they do exist, it is safe to say that, in the intention of God, the text Gen. 1:26, 27, has this meaning. Man’s likeness to the Trinity cannot be of such perfection that a single human nature is common to three distinct persons. On the other hand, the three so-called faculties of the soul—memory, understanding, and will—do not present a sufficient likeness, because the three corresponding attributes in God are not each of them peculiar to a Person, but are merely appropriated. The likeness must be found in some productions of human nature. Now, here man offers a twofold similarity to the Trinity. First, in common with the Angels, his mind produces acts of knowledge and love which, especially when they are concerned with God, represent the origins and relations of the Divine Persons as to their spiritual and immanent, but not as to their hypostatic, character. Secondly, the production of sons by generation, and the production of the first woman out of the side of man, afford a likeness to the origins and relationships in the Trinity, as considered in their hypostatic character. In other words, man’s mental acts show forth the identity of Nature in the Trinity, while his generative act shows forth the distinction of Persons. This twofold likeness to the Trinity once more shows man in the centre of creation as the complete image of God.

SECT. 127.—ESSENTIAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN

The words of Gen. 2:7, in which the creation of the first man is described, contain the essential constitution of human nature: “And the Lord God formed man from the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul.” Man is composed of a body taken from the earth, and of a spiritual soul breathed into the body by God. The body is made for the soul and the soul for the animation of the body: from the union of both results a living nature, akin alike to the living things on earth and to the living God.

I. As to the body of man, the Church, basing her doctrine on its revealed origin, teaches that it is composed of earthy or material elements; that its organization as a human body is not the result of either chance or the combined action of physical forces, but is formed after a clearly defined Divine Idea, either directly by Divine action, as in the case of the first man, or indirectly through the plastic force of generation. Hence we cannot admit the descent of man from ape-like ancestors by a process of gradual organic modification, even supposing that God directly created the soul when the organism had acquired a sufficient degree of perfection. Even apart from Revelation, sound philosophy will never admit that such a transformation of the types of organic beings is possible as would be required to arrive at the human organism. The astonishing unity in the immense variety of organisms is conclusive evidence of the Divine Wisdom of the Creator, but it is no evidence whatsoever of a successive transformation of the lower into higher organisms.

II. As to the other component part of man, the soul, Revelation confirms the teaching of natural reason, viz. that the soul of man essentially differs from the vital principles of animals in its acts, its faculties, and its substance. It is neither a body nor matter composed of extended parts; its existence and activity are not, like the life-principles of animals, dependent on union with an organism. Over and above the life which it imparts to the body, the soul, as νοῦς, or mens, possesses a spiritual life of its own, independent of, and different from, the life of the body. Its substance, unlike that of other vital principles, is entirely incorporeal and immaterial. The soul is a spirit. The spirituality of its substance causes it to be naturally immortal: it cannot perish, either by decomposition, because it has no parts, or by separation from a substratum necessary to its existence, because it is independent of such substratum. Compared to lower vital principles, the human soul is more independent or self-sufficient, more simple or refined in substance, and altogether more perfect.

The immortality of the soul, being easily conceived, and being of immediate practical importance, is the popular characteristic of its substantial character. The spirituality of the soul has been defined in the Fourth Lateran Council and repeated in that of the Vatican; the immortality of the soul is asserted in a definition of the Fifth Lateran Council. The soul, in the two first-mentioned Councils, is called “spirit” and “spiritual creature,” even as in the Vatican Council God is called a “spiritual substance,” in opposition to “corporal creatures.” The word “spirit” is not explained by the Councils, and consequently it is to be taken in its ordinary sense. The Fifth Council of the Lateran condemned as heretical the doctrines of Averroes and his school concerning the mortality of the soul.

III. The spiritual substance, which is the life-giving principle of the body, is also the sole principle of all life in the body; besides the soul, there is no other principle of life whatever in man. The Church has upheld the unity of the vital principle in man against the Apollinarists, who, in order to defend their doctrine that in Christ the Logos took the place of the rational soul, pretended that the life of the flesh was dependent on another principle distinct from the rational soul. “Whoever shall presume to assert that the rational or intellectual soul is not directly and essentially (per se et essentialiter) the form [that is, the life-giving principle] of the body, shall be deemed a heretic” (Council of Vienne against the errors of Peter of Oliva).

IV. The soul, being the principle of animal and vegetative life in the body, constitutes with the body one nature. Soul and body are, at least in a certain respect, the common and direct principle, or subject, of the functions of the animal and vegetative life of man, and therein consists the unity of nature. This unity, however, presupposes a union of both substances by which they become real parts of one whole, become dependent on each other, belong to the complete and entire essence of which they are the parts, and lose, when separated, the perfection they had when united. Soul and body united form one complete nature in which the soul is the vivifying, active, determining principle, and the body the passive element. In the language of the Schoolmen this doctrine is expressed by the formula, “The soul is the substantial form of the body.” See the definition of the Council of Vienne, quoted above.

Holy Scripture clearly indicates the unity of nature in man when it calls the soul and body together a “living soul”—that is, a living thing or animal; and, at the same time, it frequently applies the term “flesh” (caro, σὰρξ) to the whole man, which could not be done unless body and soul together constituted one nature and essence.

V. Body and soul, united so as to form one nature, also constitute one hypostasis, or person. All the attributes of man which give him the dignity of personality spring from and reside in his soul; besides, the soul can exist and live independently of the body, whereas the organization and life of the body are entirely dependent on the soul. Whence it may be said that, although man as a whole is a person, yet personality belongs more properly to the soul. In the human person, not less than in the human nature, the soul is the dominating principle. The prominent position of the soul in the human person ought not, however, to be urged to the extent of destroying or endangering the unity of the human nature, as Bishop Butler has done in his Analogy; for it is precisely to its place in the nature of man that the soul owes its dignity in the human hypostasis.

SECT. 128.—PRODUCTION OF THE FIRST WOMAN—THE ESSENCE OF MARRIAGE

I. The words in Gen. 1:27, “Male and female He created them,” are sufficient proof that the distinction of sexes and the corresponding organization of the human body were, from the very beginning, intended by the Creator as belonging to the concrete constitution of human nature. This further implies that the distinction of sexes is a natural good, given by God as means to the end expressed in Gen. 1:28: “Increase, and multiply, and fill the earth.” It is not, therefore, as some heretics have asserted, the lesser of two evils, permitted or ordained by the Creator in order to avoid a greater one. Again, from the text (Gen. 1:27), “To the image of God He created them; male and female He created them,” it clearly appears that the sexual distinction constitutes merely a difference in the nature of man and not a difference of nature.

II. Considered externally and materially, the distinction of sexes is common to man and animals. The sexual relations of man, however, are of a much higher order than those of animals. Their object in man is the production, with a special Divine co-operation, of a new “image of God.” This higher consideration is, according to the sense of Holy Writ and generally received opinion, the reason why man and woman were not, like the animals of different sexes, created at the same time and from the same earth. The creation of Eve, so fully and solemnly described (Gen. 2), evidently has a far-reaching significance, acknowledged by Adam himself and confirmed by the explanations given in the New Testament (Matt. 19:4); yet, in the first and primary sense, it refers to the sexual relations of man.

III. The formation of the first woman out of a rib of the first man, indicates that God intended to give to the union of man and woman a higher unity than that of the male and female of animals, a unity in keeping with the Divine images existing in the parents and in their offspring. Thus the production of Eve founded the diversity of sexes, but also laid down the constitution of the ordinary principle of propagation. We arrive at this conclusion (1) from the effects of the Divine act itself, and (2) from the Divine command expressed in the act, a law which determines the moral essence of the first and of all other marriages.

Before we proceed to demonstrate this, we give the full text upon which the demonstration is based. “And the Lord God said: It is not good for man to be alone: let Us make him a help like unto [meet for or answering to] himself. And the Lord God having formed out of the ground all the beasts of the earth, and all the fowls of the air, brought them to Adam to see what he would call them: for whatsoever Adam called any living creature, the same is its name. And Adam called all the beasts by their names, and all the fowls of the air, and all the cattle of the field: but for Adam there was not found a helper like himself. Then the Lord God cast a deep sleep upon Adam: and when he was fast asleep, He took one of his ribs, and filled up flesh for it. And the Lord God built the rib which he took from Adam into a woman [“And He took one of his ribs and closed up the flesh instead thereof; and the rib which the Lord God had taken from the man builded He into a woman,” R.V.]: and brought her to Adam. And Adam said: This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called woman, because she was taken out of man. Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife: and they shall be two in one flesh” (Gen. 2:18–24).

1. The fact that Eve was formed out of Adam, instead of being produced independently, establishes between the parents of mankind a substantial and radical unity, befitting man as the image and representative of the one God in the dominion over material nature. Again, the origin of Eve shows that in man, who is the likeness of the triune God, the communication of nature proceeds from one principle; just as in the Trinity, the communication of the Divine Nature proceeds from the Father. Both these considerations acquire more force from the fact that Eve was formed from the bone, not simply from the flesh, of Adam,—that is, from his inmost self. The Fathers, commenting on this, point out that it proves the identity of nature in man and woman, and ought to urge us to fraternal love as being all of the same kindred.

2. The Divine Law, expressed in the fact, by which the union of the sexes is consecrated as a conjugal union and by which the essence of marriage is determined, contains the following elements:—

(a) The idea and will of the Creator, as manifested by the peculiar production of Eve, is that the physical union of the sexes in the act of generation should be preceded by and founded upon a moral, juridical, and holy union of the bodies of the progenitors; a union, that is, which is sanctioned by God as the sovereign ruler of nature, and gives to each of the parties an exclusive and inviolable right over the body of the other, so that, during their union, neither can dispose of his body in favour of a third person. The Divine idea of such an union is sufficiently expressed in the act of producing Eve from the substance of Adam—as it were, a new member of the same body. The will of God that such union should exist is manifested by the fact that He Himself planned and executed the formation of Eve and handed her over to Adam as flesh of his flesh, or rather as united to him by Divine act and will. The inmost essence of marriage consists, therefore, in the moral union of man and woman. The relation between this ideal and spiritual bond on one side, and man’s dignity as image of God on the other side; and, further, the possibility and necessity of this bond, will appear from the following considerations.

(α) The parties are themselves images of God, and, as such, possess moral liberty and dominion over the members of their bodies. Hence, each of them can acquire a right of disposing of the other’s body, and can make it morally his own. In this manner the two bodies belong to one mind, just as though they were naturally members of the same body. This mutual transfer and appropriation of bodies, rendered possible by the power of disposal which their owners have over them, is seen to be necessary if we consider that a moral being like man can dispose and make use of nothing but what belongs to him by some right: especially in the present case, where the appropriation must be a lasting one.

From this moral and juridical point of view alone, however, we cannot perceive how the conjugal union of man and woman possesses that inviolable solidity which makes it unlawful for the contractors to break their contract even by mutual consent. The human will cannot impart to the conjugal union a solidity which almost puts it on a level with the union of members of one and the same body. The intervention of God is needed, Who, as He established the natural union of members in the body, so also established the indivisible, spiritual union of man and woman in matrimony. He intervenes as the absolute master of both bodies, and disposes of them as His own property, making each of them an organ of the spirit of the other. In the case of Adam and Eve He intervened directly, previous to any act on their part; He intervenes indirectly or mediately in subsequent marriages, acting through the will of the contracting parties. The Divine intervention gives sanctity as well as inviolability to the contract.

(β) The reason why marriage must be considered in this fuller and higher sense is that the object of marriage is the production of an “image and likeness” of God. This entails, on the one hand, that the product of generation should come into existence as the property of God alone, and consequently as something consecrated to Him; and, on the other hand, that the carnal action of the parents cannot attain its object without a special creative co-operation on God’s part, the parents acting as the instrumental cause, subordinated to Him. The two bodies united act as one organ of the Divine Spirit. Hence the progenitors, when giving each other power over their bodies, ought to consider them as the special property of God, and ought to dispose of them in His name and by His power. In this manner the moral and juridical transfer of the bodies receives, in its very essence, a religious consecration; and the unity of members resulting therefrom is endowed with the character of holiness and inviolability. It is, in a way, like the natural unity of the members of the same body, and cannot be dissolved by the mere will of the parties.

(b) It is evident that the procreation of children and carnal pleasure are not the sole objects of marriage. The fact that Eve was formed out of a rib of Adam, points to the formation of a society of personal beings, founded upon mutual respect and love, or upon the union of minds and hearts. The society of husband and wife, being the root of all other societies, is the most natural and the most intimate of all, and consequently the most complete and indissoluble. The spiritual or social aspect of the union of the sexes, as ordained by the Creator, appertains to its essence to such an extent that it can exist, not indeed without the possibility of carnal connection, but without its actual realization. Such a virginal union fulfils at least the social ends of marriage. It may even correspond with the intentions of the Creator in an eminent degree, if the parties regard their union as consecrated by and to God, and make it the means of mutual assistance for leading a holy life.

(c) Lastly, the way in which God produced the first woman points out the respective rank of husband and wife. Adam is the principle of Eve; Eve is given him as a help: hence the woman is a member and a companion of man, who, according to the Apostle, is the head of the wife (Eph. 5:23). Yet the wife is no slave or handmaid. Adam became the principle of Eve only by giving up a portion of his own substance, and Eve was made by God a help like unto Adam himself. There is, therefore, a co-ordination of interests and rights in the conjugal union: the husband is the owner of the body of the wife, and the wife is the owner of the body of her husband; respect and love are due on both sides; and the wife shares in the husband’s dominion over all things that are his (See Leo XIII.’s Encycl. Arcanum).

SECT. 129.—REPRODUCTION OF HUMAN NATURE

I. Immediately after the creation of the first man and woman, God blessed them as before He had blessed the beasts: “Increase (Heb. bear fruit, i.e. generate), and multiply, and fill the earth” (Gen. 1:28). These words imply that the multiplication of mankind was to take place by generation—that is, by the reproduction of human nature by its first possessors. Moreover the blessing points to a special Divine co-operation in the multiplication of mankind, especially as after the creation of the plants neither blessing nor command to multiply is mentioned.

Although the blessing given to man and the blessing given to the beasts are expressed in the same terms, still there is a difference in their import. The blessing on man is followed by the commandment to subdue and rule the earth, a commandment not given to the beasts. Hence the product of human generation possesses, by virtue of the Divine blessing, an excellence, an essential perfection, not granted to the beasts. But if there is an essential difference in the product of the two generations, a similar difference necessarily exists in the two principles. In other words: God’s blessing on the generation of man implies a Divine co-operation, promised neither to the beasts nor to the plants.

This conclusion is confirmed and further illustrated if we consider it in connection (1) with the Divine Idea of man (God’s image and likeness) and (2) with the description given of the origin of the first man.

1. In Gen. 5:1 we read: “God created man, and made him to the likeness of God,” and 5:3: “Adam begot a son to his own image and likeness;” from which it appears that, just as Adam had been made to the image of God, so, by generation, he produced offspring to his own image. In other words, the images of God were multiplied by way of generation, whence the proper object of generation is the production of an image of God. But an image of God cannot be made without a special Divine co-operation. Human generation results in an image of the progenitor and an image of God: the two are inseparable. That, however, which makes the image of the progenitor into an image of God, that whereby the nature of man is like unto the nature of God, viz. his spiritual soul, must be referred to a special, creative co-operation on God’s part.

2. The preceding consideration acquires new force from the manner in which the first man was created. As the creation of Adam was different from that of lower animals, so the reproduction of Adam’s nature is different from that of the beasts. The body alone of the first man was taken from the earth, and made a fit dwelling for his spiritual soul: whereas the soul was breathed into him by the Creator. In like manner, the procreative action of man only prepares a fit dwelling for the soul, which is the immediate work of God.

Holy Scripture teaches the same doctrine: “Adam knew his wife, who conceived and brought forth Cain, saying: I have gotten a man through God” (Gen. 4:1.) And again: “(Before) the dust return into its earth, from whence it was, and the spirit return to God Who gave it” (Eccles. 12:7.)

From the close connection of the words “increase” (be fruitful, generate) and “multiply,” it further appears that the multiplication of human nature in its entirety, viz. of material body and spiritual soul, by the command of God, shall take place in connection with the generative act of man. The act of human generation, therefore, is not intended merely to prepare a habitation for a soul already existing, nor does God create the soul independently of the act of generation. He produces it only for and in the body organized by human generation. The manner in which the first man was created throws an additional light on these propositions.

II. The question of the origin of the human soul is of great theological importance, because of its bearing on the dogmas of Original Justice, Original Sin, and Redemption. It must be solved in such a way as not to clash with the propositions just established, viz. (1) that the product of generation is the image and likeness of God, enjoying personal dignity and personal individuality; (2) that generation is a real and true reproduction and communication of the whole nature of the progenitor; and (3) that between parent and offspring there exists a relation of unity and dependence. The difficulty of a solution in harmony with so many other points of doctrine has always been recognized by the Fathers, which may account for their indecision and vagueness when dealing with it. Part of the difficulty, however,, arose from an incorrect statement of the question. What we have really to inquire is the origin of man as a whole, rather than how the soul—that is, a part of the whole—comes into being; and next, how far God concurs in the act of generation. As, however, the origin of the soul is the burning point of the question, and as the errors opposed to the Catholic doctrine are mainly connected with and named after it, we shall deal first with the origin of the soul.

1. False notions concerning the origin of the soul have been due chiefly to the neglect of the Divine idea of man and of the origin of the first man. These errors may be divided into two opposite classes, the truth being the mean between them.

(a) The first class contains the various opinions comprised under the general term of Generationism. This doctrine lays stress upon the fact that human generation is a real and true reproduction of the whole human nature. Starting from this, it goes on to assert that in man, as in all other living beings on earth, the generating principle ought to produce, out of and by means of itself, the spiritual soul, which is consequently as much the product of generation as the bodily organism.

(b) The second class goes by the general name of This system insists on the spiritual independence or self-subsistent character of the soul, and consequently asserts that the origin of the soul must be entirely independent of human generation, and that, like the angels, the soul is created by God alone before the bodily organism is generated by man.

Both these systems are equally injurious to the doctrine of the Church. Generationism destroys the image of God in the soul, supposing, as it does, or at least logically leading to the conclusion, that the soul is not an independent, purely spiritual substance. At any rate, this system deprives the human soul of a privilege essential to the “image of God,” viz. that of dependence on God alone as its Cause. Pre-existentianism, on the other hand, destroys the unity of human nature: first, in the individual, by estranging the two component parts from each other; secondly, in mankind as a whole, by cutting off the individuals from a common stem. In this system, generation is not really the means of propagating mankind; it makes the origin of the image of God something distinct from the origin of man as such.

2. The doctrine opposed to the above-named errors is commonly called Creationism, although “Concreationism” might be a better name for it, since Pre-existentianism likewise implies a kind of creation. Creationism takes as its basis the independent, spiritual substantiality of the soul, from which it argues that the soul can be produced only by creation. Human generation, in as far as it must be distinguished from creation, cannot produce anything simple. The system further affirms that God gives existence to the soul at the very moment when it is to be united to the body produced by generation, because it is primarily designed to form with that body one human nature. Creationism is neither more nor less than an explanation of the contents of two Catholic dogmas: the spirituality of the soul and the unity of nature in man. The fact that Creationism has not always been universally held in the Church, must be ascribed to the difficulty of harmonizing it with other dogmas, e.g. the transmission of sin, and also with certain expressions of Holy Scripture, e.g. that God rested on the seventh day. We find it questioned only in those times and places in which the controversies on Original Sin against the Pelagians were carried on. Doubts began to arise in the West, in the time of St. Augustine; two centuries later, when the struggle with Pelagianism was at an end, we hear of them no more.

III. Creationism solves the question of the origin of the human soul, but not that of the origin of human nature by generation, at least not completely. On the contrary, it introduces a new difficulty, inasmuch as the creation of the soul by God divides the production of man into two acts, and makes it more difficult to see how human generation is a reproduction and communication of the whole nature and especially of life, and how there is a relation of dependence between the souls of children and those of their parents. This difficulty, much insisted upon by the Generationists, can only be removed by maintaining, not indeed the production of one soul by another through emanation or creation, but a certain relation of causality whereby the souls of the parents are, in a certain sense, the principle of the souls of the children. Here, as in the co-existence of grace and free will, we have two principles combined for the production of one effect. In order to understand the combined action of God and of man in the production of the human soul, we must bear in mind that the creation of the soul, although a true creation, is not the creation of a being complete in itself: on the contrary, its tendency is to produce that part of the human nature which is destined to give form and life to the body and to constitute with it one human nature. But as this also applies to the creation of the first soul, which was not the product of generation, we must add this other circumstance—that the soul is created in an organic body because of the action of the human generative principle. So far we have two principles and two activities standing side by side and meeting in one common product, but we have not yet that unity of the principles, whereby not only a part, but even the whole, of the product may be ascribed to each of them. Such a unity is established by the fact that each of the principles, although producing by its own power only part of the product, tends, nevertheless, to produce the whole product as a whole: the generative principle producing the organism solely for the purpose of being animated by the soul; the creative principle creating the soul merely for the purpose of animating the organism.

The following considerations will help to illustrate the unity of the combined Divine and human actions. Each of the two actions requires the co-operation of the other in order to attain its object: they thus complete one another and are intrinsically co-ordained for common action. As man has received his procreative power and its direction from God, and exercises it with the Divine concurrence, in the act of generation he stands to God as a subordinate and dependent instrument; not, however, as a mere tool, because man’s generative power and tendency are natural to him, and are exercised spontaneously. Whence it appears that the common action begins with man, but is supported throughout and completed by God. This Divine co-operation might be called supernatural in as far as it is distinct from and superior to the Divine concurrence granted to all created causes; but, strictly speaking, it is only natural, because it is exercised in accordance with a law of nature. The production of the soul is due not to a miraculous interference with the course of nature, but to the natural Providence of God, carrying out the laws which He Himself has framed for the regular course of nature.

We can now easily understand (1) how human generation is a true generation not only of the flesh but of man as a whole; (2) how a relation of causality exists between the progenitor and the soul of his offspring; (3) how the creation of the soul by God is not a creation in the same absolute sense as the original creation of things; (4) how the natural consequences of generation are safe-guarded.

IV. The Divine co-operation in human generation elevates human paternity to the highest degree of dignity, for the human father is admitted to participate in the Divine paternity; like God, “the Father of spirits” (Heb. 12:9), he gives origin to and has authority over a personal and immortal being, the image of God. Paternal authority thus receives a religious and sacred character, possessed by no other authority on earth except that of the Church, which is founded upon similar principles. Again, the children belong not so much to the parents as to God, Who gives them to the parents as a sacred pledge. Practically, then, as well as theoretically, the Divine origin of the soul is a doctrine of the greatest importance. The gravity of the sins against chastity becomes more apparent when considered in the light of this doctrine: they imply a sacrilegious abuse of members and actions which are destined exclusively to the service of God. See 1 Cor. 6:15, 16.

SECT. 130.—DESCENT OF ALL MANKIND FROM ONE PAIR OF PROGENITORS, AND THE CONSEQUENT UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE

I. The blessing of multiplication, bestowed by God on Adam and Eve, shows not only that the human race was to be propagated by way of generation, but also that it was to spring from the pair who received the blessing. No mention whatever is made of any other progenitors, and it is distinctly stated that by multiplying their kind Adam and Eve were to “fill the earth,” and exercise over the earth that dominion which is implied in the Divine Idea of man. Eve is called “the mother of all the living” (Gen. 3:20), and Adam “the father of the world,” who “was created alone” (Wisd. 10:1). St. Paul told the Athenians on Mars’ Hill that “God hath made of one all mankind, to dwell upon the whole face of the earth” (Acts 17:26). Upon this doctrine the Apostle bases his teaching on Original Sin and Redemption (Rom. 5).

It is the province of Apologetics to deal with the difficulties raised against this dogma by modern unbelievers. To overthrow the historical evidence in favour of the descent of all mankind from one pair, science must demonstrate the impossibility of such descent. But the fact that marriages between members of the most different races are prolific, proves that they all belong to the same species and that their origin from a single pair of progenitors is possible.

II. In the Divine Plan of Creation the unity of origin In mankind is intended, first of all, to secure and manifest the perfect unity of the human species. A specific unity is, indeed, conceivable even without unity of origin; but, considering the great diversity existing among the several races of men, their specific unity would not be so manifest without the unity of origin. Again, the unity of origin gives to all individuals of the human species a sameness of nature which forms them into a species ultima—that is to say, into a species not further divisible. As a matter of fact, when the heathens lost the idea of the common origin of mankind, they took up false notions of human society. With them male and female, Greek and barbarian, bond and free, were beings of different natures. It is easily seen why, according to the Divine Idea of man as the visible image of God on earth, human nature must possess the strictest specific unity. Set over all visible things and made only a little lower than the angels, man is the connecting link between the double cosmos, a position which he could not hold if his nature was sub-divided into several species like the lower animals and the angels.

III. The full significance of the unity of origin lies, however, less in the unity of nature and species consequent upon it, than in the fact that it unites mankind into one family with one head, thus establishing between all men an organic or living unity. Specific unity by itself renders possible only a society of equals, whereas the unity existing in a family constitutes a natural bond between its members, which bond is the natural foundation of the unity of destiny, of the duty of mutual assistance, and of the possibility of solidarity between humanity as a whole on one side, and God on the other. The family union of men strengthens the ties of universal brotherhood which exists between them as like creatures of the same God; it is also the essential condition of the solidarity in grace and sin which exists between the first parent and all his descendants, and likewise of the solidarity in the merits of Redemption which exists between all mankind and Christ, the Second Adam and Head of the Supernatural Order.

SECT. 131.—DIVISION AND ORDER OF THE VITAL FORCES IN MAN

I. As man is a microcosmos, we can distinguish in his nature three different degrees of life. The first is vegetative life, which performs the functions of nutrition, growth, and propagation, and is common to man, animal, and plant. Next comes sensitive life, made up of the knowledge obtained through the senses and of the tendencies or appetites connected therewith; this life is common to man and animal. Lastly, we have the intellectual or spiritual life, consisting in intellectual knowledge and volitions directed by the intellect. This life man has in common with God and with the angels; it is the highest order of life in man, the object and the rule of the other vital functions.

II. Qualities or privileges which Divine liberality freely gave to man at his creation, or which Divine justice had bound itself to confer upon him by reason of his supernatural end, do not belong to human nature: because they do not necessarily flow from the human essence, or constituent principles. On the other hand, the nature of man contains not only the vital perfections which elevate him above the brute creation and make him the image of God, but also the imperfections inherent in the lower degrees of life. Human Nature, considered apart from the elevating influence of God and the deteriorating influence of sin, but with the perfections and imperfections necessarily connected with the human substance, is called by the Schoolmen nature pure and simple. Even after the Fall, the nature of man is still what it was when first created; all the essential perfections of the original nature continue to be transmitted, and all the imperfections of nature in its present state already existed, at least radically, in the original nature. This doctrine was denied by the Reformers, who held an essential and intrinsic difference between human nature as it was before, and as it is after, the Fall.

SECT. 132.—THE SPIRITUAL SIDE OF HUMAN NATURE

I. The Catholic Church teaches that the human soul possesses, by reason of the act of creation, an active force and tendency to lead a moral and religious life, in accordance with the soul’s essential character of image of God. Catholics consider the moral and religious life of the soul as the exercise of a faculty essential to the soul, or as a natural result of its constituent principles; whereas the Reformers held that the soul was merely a subject capable of receiving from outside the imprint of the Divine image. The Catholic sees the image of God in natural man, independently of supernatural influence; the Protestant sees in natural man only a subject intended to be made an image of God by a further Divine action. The Catholic doctrine is plainly founded upon reason. Every substance, and especially every living substance, is itself the active principle of the activity natural to its species; hence the spiritual soul must be the radical principle of its entire natural activity. The life of the soul, being rooted in its essence and substance, cannot be lost while the substance is not destroyed; and since all human souls have the same essence and are similarly created by God, what is true of the souls of our first parents likewise applies to the souls of all their posterity. The perfect development, however, of the religious and moral faculty, may be impeded through the absence of external aid or of self-exertion, or by positive hindrances, and thus the image of God in the soul may be deprived of its perfection and disfigured by unnatural stains.

We may appeal also to Holy Scripture. “The image and likeness of God” is the result of the creation of man; and even after the Fall, he is still defined as the image and likeness of God. The likeness being the perfection of the image, it is evident that, before and after the Fall, the substance and essence and the nature of man remained the same. In other words, man is the image of God and is able to live the life of an image of God by virtue of the constituent principles of his nature, and not merely by virtue of qualities or faculties which may be added to and taken from his nature.

II. The above general principle includes the following special conclusions.

1. The human soul possesses, as an essential constituent principle of its reasonable nature, power to acquire by itself the knowledge of God, of the relations between Creator and Creature, and consequently of the moral order as based upon Divine Law (Rom. 1:20; 2:14, 15). This living force develops itself, to a certain degree, spontaneously, so that a knowledge of God is gained as soon as the mind develops itself.

2. The human soul likewise possesses, as an essential constituent of its will, a living force and tendency to love and worship spiritual beings, and, above all, God. As the knowledge of God is the natural perfection of reason, so the love and worship of Him is the natural perfection of the will; without the innate power to love God, the soul would be mutilated. Again, the soul, the image of God, has a natural relationship with Him; consequently a tendency to love Him is as natural to the soul as the tendency to love itself and other reasonable beings. The soul would be unnatural indeed if by nature it had the power to love only itself and other creatures. This power is first felt in involuntary emotions of complacency and esteem which follow the knowledge of God and influence the voluntary acts of love; it is most manifest in the sense of the duty to love and serve God. This sense of duty is but a sense of love and reverence for God and His ordinances, which forces itself upon the soul even against its free will. The development, however, of this root can be hindered still more than the development of the knowledge of God. It has to contend with free will and with many other tendencies of human nature; it may be stunted to such a degree that it becomes morally unable to produce an act of love effectively placing God above all other things. Yet in itself it is indestructible, because it is part of the soul’s nature; and even the most hardened sinner feels the unrest caused by the consciousness that he acts against the natural rectitude of his will. See below, the treatises on Original Sin and Grace.

3. The faculty and tendency of the human will to love and respect rational beings, and especially God, implies that the freedom of the will is not only physical but also moral; that is to say, man has not only the power to determine his own and other forces, and to direct them to an end (physical liberty), but also the power of willing them for the sake of their own goodness and of directing them to a moral end, and consequently the power of rejecting and avoiding sin as such (moral liberty). The human will is thus an image of the Divine Will in a twofold manner: first, in as far as the Divine Will disposes its external acts and works with consciousness and with a plan; secondly, in as far as God is Himself the ultimate object of all His actions and volitions. Of course, the exercise of moral liberty is not as essential to man as to God. By abusing his physical liberty man is able to suspend the exercise of his moral liberty, and even to render its further use almost impossible. The moral energy of man is the foundation of every further influence in the form of illumination and assistance coming from God; without such foundation in the soul itself, man could not personally co-operate with the Divine influence.

(a) In its general idea, moral liberty does not at all imply the faculty of choosing between good and evil. It simply consists in the radical power to will the morally good as such, for the sake of its dignity and worth, and to consciously direct the acts of the will to their moral end. In the concise language of the Schoolmen, it is the power of willing what is right because it is right. The greater this power, the greater is moral liberty. It is greatest in God, where it manifests itself as the immutable power to will the morally good immutably; where, consequently, the will is necessarily inclined to what is good only. God possesses this attribute essentially, so that He is as essentially holy as He is essentially free. But creatures also should attain such liberty by the means of grace, which clarifies their will through the caritas gloriæ, and elevates them to the “freedom of the sons of God.”

(b) Moral liberty, in the above general sense, is essential to the human will, and is part of the natural image of God. But the positive power to will what is morally good, if not clarified by grace or fixed by a previous persevering determination, is essentially coupled with the power not to will what is good and to will evil instead; it is “a power to will what is right, together with the power not to will what is right” or “to turn away from what is right.” This power, then, in man, is affected by a deficiency in determination for what is good, and by the possibility of willing evil. The human will, belonging to a being created out of nothing, does not possess by reason of its essence all the perfection of which it is capable. Again, as it is the will of a being distinct from God, it may have special interests, by which it may be led to refuse God the respect due to Him.

(c) If, notwithstanding its inherent imperfection, the positive power to will what is morally good is to be a true and real power, it must be conceived as “a power of the will to elect the good and to reject the evil by its own free determination,” which stamps it as “a moral elective faculty.” In as far as moral liberty in man exerts itself only as an elective faculty, requiring to be determined, it is imperfect and implies a dissimilarity to God, Whose will is essentially inclined to the supreme good. But, in as far as it is still able to exert itself in this manner, and has the power to annul its indetermination by its own decision, it has a peculiar similarity to Divine liberty. This power enables man not only to acquire, possess, and preserve moral goodness, but also to make it his own by his own exertions, just as it is God’s own by His essence, and thus to deserve for it praise and reward, just as God, for His goodness, deserves the highest honour. Moral liberty, in this same sense, is also the condition—not the principle—of moral guilt, placing, as it does, face to face with the faculty of electing evil, the power of resisting and avoiding it, so that evil cannot be chosen except on condition that the will renounces the use of its power of resistance.

(d) The likeness of moral liberty in man to God’s liberty, according to what has been said, consists, not in man’s power of doing evil, but his power of avoiding the evil proposed to his choice.

(e) The power to choose what is morally good is not given to man in such a way that, before the choice takes place, there is in him no inclination or direction towards what is good, and, consequently, no goodness bestowed on him by the Creator independently of man’s free election. On the contrary, such choice would be impossible unless man already possessed a tendency to good. The actual goodness of the will is but the fruit of the habitual goodness received from God; the object of the choice is not the first production of moral goodness, but the development and the exercise of the goodness already bestowed on the soul by the Creator.

Man’s free will, being founded upon a tendency granted by God, can only operate dependently on God; it has an essential tendency to view all moral good as willed and commanded by God, and to seek after it as such, for the sake of the high respect due to God and His law, and especially to direct the will on God as its ultimate object. From this point of view, moral liberty is “a power to will what is right, according to God and for God’s own sake.” Considered specially as an elective faculty, it consists in this, that man, by his own election, gives to God that homage which is due to Him as to the Giver of moral liberty and the Author of the fruits springing from its root.

SECT. 133.—THE ANIMAL SIDE OF MAN’S NATURE

I. Although the soul which animates the human body differs essentially from the principle which gives life to the lower animals, and although the soul, by means of its spiritual functions, exercises control over the body and its life: still, the animal and vegetative life of the body of man is subject to physical laws. Man and animal have in common not only the abstract concept of “animal life,” but also its concrete mode of existence, its status and conditions. The imperfections which Holy Scripture sums up under the name of “infirmity of the flesh” have their origin in the animal part of man. The spiritual soul informs the body in the same manner as the vital principle informs the bodies of mere animals, viz. in such a way as to endow the body with a life in keeping with its nature. The soul does not spiritualize the body, or give it the impassibility and incorruptibility proper to spirits; it does not even absolutely control all the bodily motions and tendencies. By the mere fact of creation, then, and not on account of any subsequent derangement, the animal life of man is naturally subject to the imperfections of animal life in general.

Holy Scripture offers a foundation for this doctrine when it teaches that the body, taken from the earth, was, through the inbreathing of a spiritual soul, made into “a living soul”—that is, received the life proper to its own earthly nature. This is the argument of St. Paul (1 Cor. 15:44 sqq.), who further deduces from the earthly origin of man his infirmities and corruptibility.

II. The general principle just laid down contains the following special propositions:—

1. The constitution of the human body subjects it to the laws and conditions of existence and development which rule the life of plants and animals, viz. the laws of nutrition, growth, and reproduction. The first characteristic, then, which distinguishes the animal body from the pure spirit is this very necessity of taking something from without for its sustenance, a necessity which appears most clearly in the functions of respiration

2. The fact that life is dependent on a continual supply of external nourishment, shows that increase, decrease, and extinction are natural to it. The tree of life, provided by God for our first parents, bore indeed a food which would have prevented the extinction of life. But to partake of the fruit of life would only have averted the natural necessity of decay and death. Left to its natural resources, the immortal soul of man would not have been able to secure immortality for the body. Again, the words of the Divine curse, “Dust thou art, and unto dust thou shalt return,” point clearly to the fact that death was due to the Fall only inasmuch as man, by reason of his sin, was left to his natural corruptibility. The possibility and necessity of death are, therefore, natural attributes, flowing from the very constitution of human nature. By a positive Divine disposition they were suspended until the first sin was committed.

3. The spiritual essence of the soul in like manner cannot prevent the internal and external disturbances of the vital functions which lead to pain and suffering. The possibility of suffering was certainly the same in our first parents as in us; God alone, by supernatural intervention, was able to prevent this possibility from passing into actuality.

4. Vegetative life in plants and animals is subject to a passibility which, in the former, appears as corruption of their substance, in the latter as pain and suffering. On a level with these phenomena the Fathers place that possibility which is peculiar to the sensitive life of man and animals. It consists in the sensitive faculties being affected in anticipation or even in spite of reason. Such motions are rightly called “passions,” because they result from an impulse received on the ground of some subjective want, and are more or less dependent on the excitability of the bodily organism. Of course, a positive force is required for action at the reception of the objective impulse; the imperfection of the sensitive faculty lies both in the inability to act without such impulse, and in the necessity to act in accordance with it. This passive excitability of the appetitive faculties of animal life is described by St. Augustine as a weakness and idleness of nature, or as a morbid quality of nature.

Catholic doctrine and sound philosophy alike demand that the appetitive faculties of sensitive life in man should occupy an inferior position. Reason should rule over passion as far as possible by controlling inordinate desires, and by refusing the use of the body for wrong purposes. This refusal is always in the power of rational will, for the power of man over the external motions of his body is despotic, whereas his power over his desires is only politic, or, as we now say, constitutional. Although the motions of concupiscence are due to the infirmity of human nature, the soul cannot get rid of this infirmity, because the influence of the soul, as form of the body, is like the influence of non-spiritual forms; the life it gives is animal life with all its concomitant perfections and imperfections.

5. It is thus evident that, by the very constitution of his nature, man is liable to spontaneous motions in his sensitive tendencies, over which the will has, at best, but little control. In other words, concupiscence is an attribute of human nature. In animals which have no reason, concupiscence is the mainspring of activity; it is in harmony with their whole nature, whereas in man it is a disturbing element in the higher life of the soul. The subjection to concupiscence in man belongs to the same order as the possibility and necessity of death and of physical pain, viz. to passibility and corruptibility in animal life.

6. The nature of the animal body asserts itself most in the manifestations of the sexual instinct. These are the most impetuous; they are accompanied by spontaneous motions of the flesh, and are the least controllable by reason. This peculiarity is accounted for on the ground that the functions of vegetative life, to which the sexual instinct belongs, are carried out independently of the will. Another and better ground is, that the object of this instinct is the preservation, rather than the multiplication, of the race, so that by satisfying it the mortal individual secures to itself the only immortality it can attain, viz. a continued existence in individuals of its own kind. Inasmuch, then, as the human body shared with other earthly beings the faculty of propagation as well as the necessity of death, it was but natural that it should also share with them the morbid excitability of the most natural of instincts. Again, no other domain of life brings out better the contrast between the spiritual and the animal faculties of the soul. The “law of death” in the manifestations of the sexual instinct is so strong that in their presence the soul loses command over the motions, and almost over the very use, of the body. The imperfection and lowness of its animal life is thus strongly brought home to the soul, and the contrast with its nobler spiritual life may account for the sense of shame inseparable from sexual excitement.

III. Thus all the imperfections and defects to be found in the animal part of man are not the result of the destruction and perversion of man’s original state, but the necessary natural result of the constitution of human nature. The objections raised against the Catholic doctrine are based upon misconception or misrepresentation. To answer them in detail would lead to a needless repetition of the propositions contained in this chapter.

SECT. 134.—THE NATURAL IMPERFECTIONS OR THE ANIMAL CHARACTER OF THE SPIRITUAL LIFE (“RATIO INFERIOR”) IN MAN, AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

I. The union with a passible and corruptible body entails upon the spiritual soul a certain imperfection and weakness, in consequence of which the soul’s own life is subject to gradual increase, and is dependent on external influences; and, unlike the life of pure spirits, is in many ways hindered in its free and full development. “The corruptible body is a load upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind that museth upon many things” (Wisd. 9:15). The chief cause of this is, that the animal life and the animal side of the spiritual life both exercise a disturbing influence upon the higher reason. The imperfection of man’s spiritual life, arising from its dependence on animal life, may fitly be styled an “animal quality” of the spiritual life. In fact, St. Paul (1 Cor. 2:14) sums up all the imperfections of natural man in the term “animal man” (ἄνθρωπος ψυχικός). In the mind of the Apostle, this is intended to explain why man, on the whole, (i.e. with his spiritual as well as his animal nature), has no sense of the supernatural, and is even, to a certain extent, opposed to it. Now this expression is connected with the argument in chap. 15, ver. 45, of the same epistle, where it is stated that the first man was created as “living soul” (εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν). Hence, as the argument in chap. 15 is evidently taken from the account of man’s creation in Genesis, so also is the argument in chap. 2; from which it further follows that, according to St. Paul, the imperfections of our spiritual life flow from the original constitution of our nature.

II. Intellectual knowledge, the noblest function of the soul, is derived from and supported by the knowledge acquired through the senses. Hence it is less clear and its attainment is more difficult than in the case of pure spirits; and its indistinctness and difficulty increase the more it is removed from the domain of the senses. Thus the difficulty of acquiring and retaining distinct notions is greater in the higher reason than in the lower, because in the latter the subject-matter of knowledge is always either directly afforded by the senses or is at least illustrated by mental images of the imagination. Consequently, although the soul possesses a spiritual light enabling it to know moral and religious truths, yet the acquisition of a full and certain knowledge of such truths is beset with many difficulties, so that many moral precepts may be either unknown or misunderstood (§ 3). This imperfection constitutes what theologians call “malum ignorantiæ.” The knowledge even when acquired by the superior reason, is exposed to the disturbing influence of the lower orders of cognition. In case of conflict, the lower knowledge and the motions of concupiscence accompanying it are apt to obscure and disturb the intellect.

III. The will is naturally inclined to the good and the beautiful, and, therefore, to the love and esteem of God; but it is also naturally inclined to seek its own good, and, therefore, is greatly moved by love of self. Self-love is no disturbing element in the will of pure spirits, because their superior and accurate knowledge enables them to esteem everything at its exact moral value; hence, in the conflict between self-love and love of God, the former never can be an inducement to wrong. In man, on the contrary, self-love is handicapped with the weakness and passibility of the human organism; the human will is attracted and affected by its own good, before reason has a chance to estimate the moral value of such good, and the attraction and affection persist even when condemned by higher reason. This state of things has its explanation in the mode of working of our organism. The sensitive faculties are moved before the intellectual, and, by reason of the sympathy between the various faculties, anticipating the judgment of the intellect, they awaken in the will the so-called condelectation—that is, they incline the will towards their own sensible object. Again, the lower reason, preceding the action of the higher intellect and supported by the imagination, directly excites in the will affections and desires for sensible goods, regardless of their moral value. In both cases the will is moved passively, just as the sensitive appetites are moved in all their acts. In both cases, also, a conflict between such motions of the will and the judgment of the higher reason is possible; and the act of the will, dictated by such judgment, is not always able to repress or subdue the sensual allurements. Thus the passibility of the will, which results from the very fact of its union with a corruptible body, establishes between the higher and lower regions of mental life the same antagonism which exists between the rational and the sensitive appetitive faculties.

The natural inclination for good is the spring which moves moral liberty. Hence the weakness of the will, as just described, constitutes a weakness in our moral liberty, inasmuch as it places obstacles in the way of its free exercise. Compared to that of angels, man’s free will is “attenuated and bent,” and not only defective in its action, but likewise subject to corruption. If Divine aid does not suspend its weakness, it is under a certain moral necessity of sinning, in as far as it is morally impossible for it always to resist the inclination to evil. Nay, more, if with St. Augustine we take the “perfection of justice” to consist in the avoidance of, and freedom from, all evil inclinations, involuntary as well as voluntary, man is under a physical necessity of sinning; but then “sin” must be taken in the very general sense of imperfection or moral shortcoming.

IV. All the imperfections hitherto set down as resulting from the constitution of human nature, or from the union of a spiritual soul with a corruptible body, are defects in the realization of the Divine idea of man as the visible image of God; or rather, are defects of the likeness to God in His visible image.

That human nature should imperfectly represent the Divine Ideal is not to be wondered at. The idea of a visible image of God is realized in a being partly spiritual, partly material, which, on account of its animal nature, cannot be as like to God as a pure spirit (see, however, § 125). Hence the perfect likeness of man to God can only be attained by spiritualizing the animal part—that is, by converting the “animal man” into a “spiritual man.” Neither is it a matter of wonder that man, the centre of creation and the connecting link between the higher and lower orders of creatures, is, by virtue of that nature alone, less able than the pure spirits above him and the pure animals below him to comply with the exigencies of his position and to reach his ultimate destination. It would be highly unwarrantable to require that man should have been so constituted as to be able, by his natural constitution alone, to perfectly realize the Divine Ideal. On the contrary, the natural imperfection of man’s nature, as well as its wonderful composition, offer the Creator an opportunity of glorifying Himself in man in quite a peculiar manner, viz. partly by supernaturally correcting the defects of human nature, partly by assisting man in his conflict against them. The disproportion, therefore, between God’s work and the Divine ideal is not due to a defect in the Divine wisdom, power, and goodness, but is meant to give occasion for a special manifestation of these attributes.

SECT. 135.—NATURAL DESTINY OF RATIONAL CREATURES—THEIR POSITION IN THE UNIVERSE

I. The qualities of rational beings sufficiently indicate that they are destined to a higher end than irrational creatures. Made to the image and likeness of God, they are able and are destined to glorify God and to work out their own happiness. In as far as this destination is made possible and is required by their nature, and in as far as its attainment realizes only the minimum of the idea which God was bound to have when creating rational beings, it is called “the natural destination or end of rational creatures.” In the same way, the dispositions necessarily made by God for the attainment of this end are called “the natural order of rational creatures.”

The supernatural order, which is the object of theology, cannot be rightly understood without an exact and well-defined notion of the natural order upon which the supernatural is based.

1. The natural final destiny of rational creatures involves, first of all, that they are necessarily called to an eternal, personal, and individual life, and, consequently, to everlasting existence, at least in their spiritual part. Their spiritual substance is in itself incorruptible and indestructible, and this natural excellence makes them essentially worthy of eternal conservation on the part of God. The immortality of the soul has been defined by the Fifth Council of Lateran. Reason alone, however, can also prove it. The destination of rational creatures to glorify God is in itself an eternal object; moreover, a happiness corresponding with the natural aspirations of rational beings could not be realized for one moment if its perpetual duration was not guaranteed.

2. The second element in the final destination natural to rational creatures is that they should not remain for ever in a state of motion and unrest, but should, unless they make themselves unworthy of it, enter into a state of definitive, everlasting perfection, in which they are made like to God, and thus secure perfect rest and complete satisfaction of all their natural aspirations—in one word, their salvation. To make salvation secure, it is also necessary that the will of the saved should be exempt from the danger of sinning.

3. The measure and the kind of final perfection naturally attainable by rational creatures must be determined in accordance with their essential active forces, because their final perfection is a complete and permanent development of these forces. Nothing can be naturally intended for a state which it cannot attain by the forces of its own nature. But everything that tends to its perfection by exercising its forces and thus developing itself, is dependent partly on a supply of external nourishment, partly on the fostering influence of God. Hence it is not impossible that the final perfecting of rational creatures, whose intellectual life is under a direct Divine influence, should require a special intervention on the part of God. This intervention, however, can only consist in help given to the positive development of the forces existing in nature, which may take place by the simple removal of all the obstacles by which their working is now impeded. Consequently the knowledge, and love of God, which make up the substance of natural blessedness, are only such as the created intellect and will can attain without the aid of supernatural illumination and elevation.

4. The attainment of final perfection is proposed by God to His rational creatures as a reward for their own exertions. Nevertheless, except in the case of a special promise on the part of God, the creature has no strict right to a reward. The creature’s title to a reward is founded upon the right which they who live up to the excellence of their nature have to the attainment of such perfection as their nature is able and is destined to attain. The claim is natural in so far, and only in so far, as God, by giving a rational nature, gives or promises everything necessary to its development.

II. These considerations lead us to the concept of the “natural order,” in which rational creatures are placed by the very fact of creation. The root, or fundamental principle, of the natural order is, that creatures endowed with reason are destined to receive their final perfection in God and through God to the extent required by their character of rational creatures and creatures of God. Formally, the order consists in the dispositions or ordinances made by God for the attainment by creatures of their natural end, i.e. the laws which govern the operations of creatures, and those which God Himself observes in leading them to their final perfection. Materially, the order consists in the goods either bestowed by God on creatures as means to their final complement, or acquired, produced, or utilized by them in carrying out the laws of their order. It should be noted, however, that, within the limits of the natural order, some scope is left as to the use of means to the end, so that God, without going against the established order, can intervene positively and even supernaturally.

It is an error, unhappily widespread in recent times, to hold that the order of rational creatures actually in force is nothing but the natural order. Such, however, is not the fact. In the beginning God set before His rational creatures a supernatural end, and placed them in a supernatural relation to Himself, and thus founded the supernatural order. This order, after being disturbed by sin, could only be restored by the still greater mystery of the elevation of human nature to a personal union with the Son of God.

PART II

THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER

THE erroneous doctrines of Baius and Jansenius (which, like those of the Reformers, had their root in an erroneous conception of the natural and the supernatural in original man), and the rationalistic tendencies of more recent times, have necessitated a deeper study of the supernatural, as compared with the natural, order of things. Dominic Soto gave to his treatise on the Tridentine doctrine of grace, the title De Natura et Gratia, and took his starting-point from the general relation of nature to grace. Ripalda also, the chief opponent of Baius, wrote a great work, De Ente Super naturali,, which Kilber imitated in the Theologia Wirceburgensis. Suarez continued in the same track. In imitation of his Prolegomena ad tractatum de Gratia, we find in most dogmatic works of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries a treatise “On the Various States of Human Nature.” Our own times have produced a great number of monographs on this subject: Kleutgen, Theology, vol. ii., diss. on the Supernatural and on Grace; Schäzler, Nature and Grace, and The Dogma of Grace, both in German; Glossner, The Doctrine of St. Thomas on Grace, also in German; Schrader, De Triplici Ordine Naturali, Supernaturali et Præternaturali; Matignon, Le Surnaturel; Cros, Étude sur l’Ordre Naturel et l’Ordre Surnaturel; Borgianelli, Il sopranaturale; lastly, the works of Scheeben, Nature and Grace, and the Glories of Divine Grace.

We shall divide this part into four chapters: I. The Supernatural in General. II. The Absolutely Supernatural. III. The Relatively Supernatural. IV. The Concrete realization of the Supernatural.

It may be useful to give here a short summary of the different states of nature and supernature. Their full import will be seen in the course of the present portion of this Third Book. The states of human nature in relation to the supernatural order are five in number.

1. The state of Pure nature—that is, without any sort of endowment beyond what is required by nature.

2. The state of Perfect nature (naturæ integræ)—that is, endowed with preternatural, but not supernatural, gifts.

3. The state of Elevated nature—that is, endowed with supernatural gifts, and destined to a supernatural end.

4. The state of Fallen nature—that is, deprived of preternatural and supernatural gifts.

5. The state of Restored nature—that is, re-endowed with supernatural but not with preternatural gifts.

CHAPTER I

GENERAL THEORY OF THE SUPERNATURAL AND OF GRACE

SECT. 136.—NOTION OF THE SUPERNATURAL AND OF SUPERNATURE

I. The term “nature” is derived from nasci (like the Greek φύσις from φύειν, φύεσθαι) to be born. Its primary meaning refers to the origin of a being by way of generation; then it applies to that which is communicated in generation and by which the progeny bears a likeness to the progenitor; consequently to the specific essence of both progeny and progenitor. Technically the word “nature” designates the essence considered as principle of motion or change (i.e. action and passion), especially as principle of a certain immanent motion or activity, viz. of vital functions. In this sense, the term is also applied to beings which do not owe their origin to generation, but to direct creation, e.g. the angels. And lastly, it is applied to the uncreated Being of God, connoting in this case the communicability by immanent intellectual generation.

Besides the above abstract meaning, the term nature may be used in the concrete. Thus it expresses the sum total of material beings, especially of organic beings which are the subject-matter of physical science; and also, from another point of view, all things created, which, as such, are the subject-matter of theology.

The word “natural” is used in a great variety of meanings. In general, it is applied to all that belongs to nature, or proceeds from nature, or is in keeping with nature. Opposed to the natural are the “non-natural,” the “unnatural,” and especially the “supernatural.” It is, however, clear, that the same thing may be natural under one aspect, and non-natural or supernatural under another, and vice versâ. This ought to be kept well in mind in order to prevent mistakes, because the use of the terms nature and natural has varied at different times, and the same author often uses them in different senses, according to the point of view from which he writes.

II. The Supernatural, in general, is what is above nature. In this sense, God is a supernatural being or substance, inasmuch as He is infinitely above all created nature. The conception of God as a supernatural being is supposed in the conception of the supernatural in all natural beings; in these, the supernatural only exists in as far as God elevates them above their nature by assimilating them to, and uniting them with Himself.

1. The supernatural in created nature always implies a Divine gift to the creature. It is neither a component part of a particular nature, nor can it proceed from such nature as a quality or product; it is not required by the nature for the attainment of its essential destination; and it is such that no creature of a higher order can produce it: God, as absolute supernatural Cause, acting freely above and beyond all natural laws, can alone be its author. Taken in this strict sense, the supernatural is called the “essentially supernatural” (quoad essentiam). The “accidentally supernatural” (quoad modun or per accidens) is something which, as a matter of fact, God directly intervenes in producing, although, under other circumstances, a created force might have been its cause; or it is some Divine action the object of which is simply to assist a creature in the fulfilment or attainment of its essential destiny. The essentially supernatural in angels and man comprises qualities and perfections, forces and energies, dignities and rights, destinations to final objects, of which the essential constitution of angels and men is not the principle, which are not required for the attainment of the final perfection of their natural order, and which can only be communicated by the free operation of Divine goodness and power.

2. This description of the supernatural is mainly negative. A positive conception is drawn from the consideration that, whatever is supernatural to an inferior nature, must be, at least virtually, natural to a being of a higher order, Hence the supernatural is the participation by a lower being in the natural perfection of one that is higher.

3. From the twofold point of view, negative and positive, the supernatural may be divided into two classes—the absolutely supernatural, and the relatively supernatural; which, as far as man is concerned, may also be termed the supernatural pure and simple, and the preternatural.

(a) The absolutely, supernatural, negatively, is beyond the reach of all created nature, and, positively, elevates created nature to a dignity and perfection natural to God alone—the Absolutely Supernatural Being. Considered as a general and complete order embracing all rational creatures, the absolutely supernatural has its centre in the beatific vision and the Hypostatic Union, each of which contains in a different manner a marvellous union of the creature with God. In the beatific vision the blessed are assimilated to God so as to have God Himself as the immediate object of possession and fruition; in the Hypostatic Union the creature is admitted to the unity of His Being and personal dignity. These two fundamental forms of the supernatural are closely connected, for the assumption of human nature by Christ is the root and the crown of the beatific vision, not only of the human nature of Christ, but, by means of the incorporation of mankind into Christ, of all human nature. Hence the two forms are bound up into one supernatural order, at least after the Fall. The beatific vision, as supernatural end of rational creatures, necessitates a supernatural order of things, because in order to attain a supernatural end supernatural means must be at hand. In this order, theology distinguishes (1) the beatifying or glorifying supernatural, viz. the beatific vision considered both as principle and as act, or as the light of glory (lumen gloriæ); (2) the sanctifying supernatural, which consists in a godlike life preparatory to and deserving of the beatific vision; (3) the supernatural “as to sanctifying energy” (secundum vim sanctificatricem, καθʼ ἁγιαστικήν δύναμιν), which consists in the gifts and acts destined to introduce and to perfect a state and life of sanctity. In the latter respect, viz. as perfecting a godlike life, this kind of supernatural is, in fact, partly identical with (2); but, as preparatory to a life of holiness, it comprises a distinct kind of gifts and acts.

(b) The relatively supernatural, negatively, is supernatural to human nature only; positively, it elevates human nature to that state of higher perfection which is natural to the angels. It comprises the gifts which free the nature of man from the imperfections inherent in his animal life and his inferior reason, imperfections from which the angels are free by their very nature.

The difference between the two kinds of supernatural is not merely one of degree; their operation in the natures which they affect also greatly differ. The absolutely supernatural elevates the nature of angel and man above themselves; it adds a positive perfection to them, and implants in them the root of an entirely new and godlike life. The relatively supernatural, on the other hand, only perfects human nature within its own sphere, by subjecting its lower faculties to the higher, and by freeing the higher from the disturbing influences of the lower. It gives no new life but adds to the existing life perfect soundness, consisting in freedom from corruption and perturbation, from sin and evil. The Greek Fathers call it ἀφθαρσία, the Schoolmen “integrity of nature.”

The difference, then, between the absolutely and relatively supernatural is so great that the Schoolmen often designate the latter as a “natural good,” in the sense of something perfectly in harmony with the requirements of rational nature. As, however, such designation is apt to lead to an underrating of the supernatural character of the relatively supernatural, later theologians have applied to it the term “preternatural,” thus pointing out that it is something beyond and above nature, although it acts side by side with nature and on the domain of nature. In order duly to maintain the supernatural character of the relatively supernatural, it is necessary to consider it not merely as perfect soundness of human nature, but as a heavenly and spiritual soundness, brought about by a marvelous purification and spiritualization of human nature, thus effecting in the visible image of God a perfect likeness to its Author.

III. A careful analysis of the supernatural conceived as the elevation of a lower to the participation in the perfections of a higher nature has led to the notion of “Supernature.” This term designates a participation in the higher nature to such a degree that not only privileges, faculties, and acts are shared, but also the higher nature itself; i.e. the lower nature participates in that fundamental quality of the higher being’s substance which to him makes such privileges, etc., natural perfections. For if the community of perfections, especially of vital actions, is to be a living and perfect one, it must include the equalization of the lower with the higher nature, and consequently it must give the former a higher status and rank, a higher existence, or an intrinsic ennobling and clarification of its substance. In this way the supernatural becomes to a certain extent natural to the holder of the favoured nature, in as far as it is consonant with his new rank and substantial perfection. The concept of Supernature finds its principal realization in the perfect possession of the Absolutely Supernatural, by which the creature is raised to be “partaker of the Divine nature” (2 Pet. 1:4). It might, however, also serve to give a deeper foundation to the relatively supernatural, by attributing the gifts and perfections of this order to an innermost transfiguration of the spiritual substance of the soul, enabling it to preserve the freedom of the pure spirit, although united with a material body, and to assimilate its animal to its spiritual life.

SECT. 137.—GENERAL NOTION OF DIVINE GRACE

The Supernatural and Grace are very closely connected. The first is incomplete without the second, and the second has no specific meaning except when connected with the first; in many respects the two notions are identical.

I. In common language, the term Grace, χάρις, gratia, designates, in the first place, the benevolent disposition of one person towards another; more exactly, benevolent feelings founded on love and freely bestowed by a person of rank on one of lower station. In this primary sense, grace is synonymous with favour. Further, the term grace is applied to the effects of benevolent feelings or favour, viz. to free love-gifts, donum gratis datum, χάρισμα, δωρέα; and also to the dignity which accrues to a person of lower rank from being the favourite of one who is above him. Lastly, grace signifies the qualities which contribute to make a person the favourite of another, e.g. natural or acquired excellence, beauty and amiability generally.

II. In each and all of these meanings the term grace can be applied to the relations between God and creatures. God is infinitely above His creatures, and His love of them is absolutely free, whereas, on the other hand, creatures possess nothing worthy of the Divine favour: their lovableness itself is the work of God. Hence we must consider as graces (1) that love of God by which He gives to His creatures their natural existence; (2) all the gifts bestowed upon creatures; (3) the relation to God which the creature holds by nature as long as, by sin, it does not fall into “disgrace;” (4) the spiritual qualities and states of the mind which, by the working of natural faculties, make the creature pleasing to God. Notably, the term may be applied to the gifts granted to rational natures for the attainment of their ultimate end, although, in the hypothesis of their creation, such gifts are granted necessarily. Again, and even more properly, the dispositions of Divine Providence in the government of rational creatures are called graces. They are indeed included in the general scheme of creation, and so far are necessary gifts; yet their application to particular individuals depends on many free acts; the creature has no strict right to them, and God dispenses them with the love, tenderness, and goodness of a father, i.e. with liberality rather than according to strict justice or even equity.

III. The strict theological usage of the word grace has a more special meaning. Considered subjectively (as a disposition of the mind on God’s part), Grace is a Divine well-wishing which is the source of the supernatural gifts of God to His creatures. The supernatural gift itself is called Grace, inasmuch as it is beyond and above all natural acquirements of the creature, and is, on the part of God, a perfectly free gift (donum indebitum). In its most special theological sense, the term Grace is applied to the benevolent affection by which God gives the highest and best He can give, viz. Himself in the beatific vision. This act of Divine love eminently possesses the character of gracious condescension of the Creator to the creature, and of a gracious assumption of the creature into communion with the Creator. As St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure say, it is a love which not only gives liberally, but also liberally accepts—a love which so favours the creature as to make it the friend, the son, and the bride of the Creator. This same love is also specially called “Grace of the Holy Ghost,” because it extends to the creature the Love by which God loves His only begotten Son, and from which the Holy Ghost proceeds; and because it infuses into the creature a new life, of which the Holy Ghost is the breath. The term “Grace of the Holy Ghost” is also extended to all gifts absolutely supernatural, and even to gifts relatively supernatural, because all alike spring from the same Divine Benevolent Love.

IV. Although all free gifts from Divine Benevolence receive in theology the name of Graces, the name should, nevertheless, be primarily applied to those gifts which not only have their principle in the Divine lovingkindness, but are themselves, in creatures, the principle enabling them to attain their supernatural destination; in other words, it should be applied to gifts which are supernatural aids to a supernatural end. From this point of view, eternal life is not so much a Grace as the final aim and object of Grace. Strictly speaking, this view of grace embraces only the gifts which positively, directly, and in themselves lead to the attainment of supernatural beatitude by making the creature worthy of it; viz. Salutary Graces, or Graces of salvation (gratiæ salutares). This worthiness, and the supernatural sanctity essentially connected therewith, make the creature “pleasing to God” (Deo gratum); whence comes the other name, “Sanctifying Grace” (gratia gratum faciens). The full meaning of these terms is realized in “Habitual Grace,” which properly and formally constitutes the “finding favour in God’s sight” (gratum esse Deo), and is identical with the state above described as super-nature, because nothing but a participation in the Divine Nature can be the basis of a title to Divine Beatitude and can make the participating creature an object of God’s paternal complaisance. Around this Grace are grouped all other salutary Graces especially “Actual Graces.” These are not permanent forms, like Habitual Grace, but forces destined either to introduce or to increase the state of Habitual Grace or supernature. Besides, they are able to produce works deserving of salvation only in connection with Habitual Grace, and by virtue of the dignity or worth which it confers upon the person.

V. All supernatural gifts which do not directly and immediately tend to the attainment of the creature’s supernatural destiny, but merely assist in this attainment, as it were, from without,—which, consequently have not the specific character of the Graces described,—are termed gratia gratis datæ, χαρίσματα, i.e. Graces given out of undeserved love. They are commonly described as graces given to a person less for his own benefit than for the benefit of others.

SECT. 138.—THE CHIEF ERRORS CONCERNING THE SUPERNATURAL

The modern opponents of the Catholic doctrine of Grace have tried to identify it with the errors condemned in former times by the Church. This accusation is easily repelled by confronting the condemned errors with the unvarying Catholic teaching.

I. In patristic times the chief opponents of the supernatural were the Manichæans and the Pelagians, who, as St. Augustine says, in different ways and for different reasons, agreed in attacking the grace of Christ (Contra Epist. Pelag., l. ii., c. 1). Both founded their opposition on a false conception of human nature.

1. The Manichæans held the soul to be an emanation from the Divine Substance, a member of God, to which, by reason of its good nature, God was bound to give whatsoever belonged to its highest beatitude and perfection. In their system, an elevation to a perfection higher than that given by nature is impossible; the Spiritual Substance can only be freed from the external and violent influence of the Evil Principle.

2. The Pelagians, on the contrary, looked upon man as a creature, and the gifts bestowed on him in creation as graces. They even praised human nature and the natural faculty of the will for good as a Divine grace. Besides this “grace,” which, according to them, still exists unimpaired in man, they admitted no other. They held that the original destination of man to the beatific vision was natural to him, and that his natural power for good was sufficient to merit supreme beatitude. In like manner, they considered a life altogether free from sin and faults to be within the natural power of man. They completely rejected the Catholic doctrine concerning Original Sin, as incompatible with their own doctrine on the naturalness of the original state of man. In fact, if man before the Fall had nothing in the shape of grace to distinguish him from fallen man, if in both there is the same unimpaired power of attaining eternal life, then no depravation of human nature was caused by the sin of our First Parents.

The dogmatical point of view from which the controversy with the Pelagians was conducted lies in the doctrine of Original Sin, considered as a distortion and corruption of the original institution and integrity of man, unfitting him for the attainment of that end to which, as a matter of fact, God had destined him. As the Pelagians admitted the ideal perfection of the actual destination of man, viz. eternal life with God, we should expect, and in fact we find, that their Catholic opponents compared the higher perfection of original man with man’s present depraved condition, rather than with his nature pure and simple. Hence they had to describe the privileges of the original state, not so much as free gifts added to nature, but rather as goods belonging to the first man as a matter of fact. In this sense, such goods and privileges may be represented as innate and connatural as regards man before the Fall. The Pelagians thought that freedom from ignorance, concupiscence, and death was not required for the perfection of man either before or after the Fall, and consequently denied it altogether; Now, when the Catholic doctors asserted the existence of this privilege, they had not to point out its gratuitous character: their point was to show that ignorance, concupiscence, and death were evils of our present state, incompatible with the perfection of human nature as actually endowed by God. The Fathers were bound to take up this line of defence because their adversaries conceded in principle the perfection of the original state, and only admitted the evils of ignorance, concupiscence, and death in that state on the plea that they were not evils of such a kind as to interfere with its perfection.

II. The peculiar nature of the heresy opposed by the Fathers caused them, as may be inferred from what we have said, (1) to speak of the actual destination of original man to a supernatural end, and of the integrity of his nature, as being man’s natural state, taking natural as equivalent to original; (2) to point out the supernatural character of the original state in comparison with the present depraved state of man, but to leave almost untouched its supernatural character as compared with the first man’s pure nature. The Reformers, and, after them, Baius and Jansenius, would have us believe that these peculiarities are tantamount to a denial of the supernatural character of the original state, and that, consequently, the doctrine of the Schoolmen, affirming the supernaturality of the same, is in direct opposition to the teaching of the Fathers. They further pretended to find the Pelagian doctrine of “the indestructible, ideal goodness of our present nature,” in the scholastic doctrine that the nature of the first man, considered in itself, (apart from supernatural elevation, or as nature pure and simple), was identical with human nature as it is at present, when deprived of the graces and privileges of the original state. They went so far as to assert that the ancient Church was at one with the Pelagians as to the natural character of the original state! In reality, the Reformers’ own doctrine, which they falsely attribute to the Church, is, at least on this last point, very clearly connected with Pelagianism; it is the old heresy with an infusion of Manichaeism and Averroism added. Starting from false notions concerning human nature and the supernatural, Reformers and Pelagians alike arrive at false conclusions concerning the present state of man. The Reformers exaggerate the essence and the consequences of Original Sin in the same measure as the Pelagians denied them. For this reason the Church had to defend against the Reformers the supernatural character of the original state. The Council of Trent did not, indeed, strike at the very root of their errors, because the first Reformers had not gone far enough. But the Holy See intervened most decidedly as soon as Baius and Jansenius reproduced the old error in a more refined form. St. Pius V. censured the propositions of Baius in the Bull Ex omnibus afflictionibus, 1567; so too did Gregory XIII. in the Bull Provisionis nostræ, 1579; and Urban VIII., in the Bull In eminenti, 1641, which contains the first condemnation of the Augustinus of Jansenius. Several more Jansenistic propositions were censured in the Bulls Unigenitus of Clement XI. and Auctorem fidei of Pius VI.

1. The doctrine of Baius concerning the absolutely supernatural starts from this principle: The destination to beatitude in God and to a moral life, which, in some form or other, God has decreed for all rational creatures, must be a destination to “eternal life,” consisting in the Beatific Vision of God, and to that morality by which man merits eternal life. From this principle Baius draws the following inferences:—

(a) The vocation to eternal life cannot be a gratuitous adoption, and the bestowal of the means necessary for the attainment of this end cannot be a gratuitous elevation of the creature, but is rather an endowment due to nature.

(b) To merit eternal life it is not necessary that the creature should possess a higher status, in keeping with the excellence of the reward to be merited, since the merit depends only on the moral value of the works done—that is, on their being performed in obedience to the law.

(c) Hence meritorious works are not, either in themselves or as to their moral goodness, the fruits of a freely bestowed Divine grace. Although the power and means necessary for performing such works are the gift of the Holy Ghost, still the works are due to nature, and are nature’s own. Further, meritorious works have their merit by a natural law, not by Divine condescension; consequently, eternal life is only a reward, and not at the same time a grace.

(d) There is no other moral goodness but that which merits eternal life; there is no love of the Creator but the love of charity, which tends to eternal life in the vision of God; the worship of God by faith, hope, and charity is not the object of a special, supernatural vocation, but is the essential form of all morality. Lastly, Baius stated that all morality essentially consists in the love of God, so that no act is a moral act if not animated by love for God. In a word, Baius denied any elevation of the creature above its necessary status or rank, and above its natural powers.

In the condemnation of the above errors and of Jansenius’s elaborate exposition of them, we have a formal and detailed approval of the doctrine which they attacked, viz. that the actual destination and endowment of rational creatures are really supernatural, and that habitual grace is a supernatural status, in which the creature, being adopted by God, Who condescends to live in His creature as in His temple, is made to partake of the Divine Nature, and is thus elevated to Divine dignity, glory, and sanctity; whereas, by reason of its nature alone, the creature would indeed be called to and enabled to attain a certain beatitude and morality, but far inferior to the beatitude and morality which are the fruit of elevating grace.

2. Concerning the relatively supernatural in man, Baius teaches that God was bound to create innocent man free from all evils and defects which disturb the order of human nature and interfere with its full beatitude, because otherwise man would have been bad and unhappy without any fault of his. Notably in the fourth chapter of his book, De Prima Hominis Justitia, he says that perfect subordination of man’s animal tendencies and of the motions of his body to the mind belonged to the absolutely necessary integrity of the first man. The Bull of St. Pius V. attributes to him also the proposition that immortality was not in Adam’s case a gratuitous endowment. As far as immortality is concerned, the above doctrine was especially rejected in the condemnation of prop. lxxviii., and, later, in the Bull Auctorem Fidei, n. xvii. Moreover the following proposition (n. lv.) was condemned by St. Pius V.: “God could not, in the beginning, have created man such as he is born now.” The words “as he is born now” of course refer to the nature of man as it is after the Fall, without the integrity of the original estate. If, then, the quoted proposition is false, the contradictory is true, viz. “God could have created man, in the beginning, such as he is born now;” in other words, without any of the gifts lost by the sin of Adam. Therefore none of these privileges were due to human nature. The proposition, although condemned without any restriction of its meaning, is applied by Baius to concupiscence, wherefore its condemnation especially implies the possibility of the first man being created subject to concupiscence.

III. Recent theologians have evolved a notion of the supernatural which, while not quite identical with that of Baius, is a combination of Baianism and Pelagianism. The chief points of this modern system are the following. It admits the existence and the natural origin of the relatively supernatural gifts, but denies the absolutely supernatural—that is, the adoption to eternal life, the partaking of the Divine Nature, and a higher moral life essentially different from natural moral life. Man is the child of God by nature, not by adoption, and the destination to which man is actually called is natural to him. The new system starts from a true principle, viz. that moral life is essential to spiritual nature; but it then falsely infers that the morality evolved from the principles of human nature can merit the beatific vision.

The transition from the older errors to this new system took place almost unnoticed during the eighteenth century. Stattler, Hermes, Günther, Hirscher, and Kuhn popularized it in Germany, where it found general favour until Kleutgen successfully opposed it (Theol., vol. ii.). In the progress of this treatise we shall give it due attention.

CHAPTER II

THEORY OF THE ABSOLUTELY SUPERNATURAL

SECT. 139.—DOCTRINE OF HOLY SCRIPTURE ON THE SUPERNATURAL COMMUNION WITH GOD, CONSIDERED ESPECIALLY AS COMMUNION BY ADOPTIVE SONSHIP

IT is in the New Testament, rather than in the Old, that we must look for the revealed doctrine on the supernatural destiny of man. Although, from the very beginning, man’s ultimate end was supernatural, still in the Old Testament he is considered as a servant rather than as a son to God. “As long as the heir is a child he differeth nothing from a servant” (Gal. 4:1). The relation of the Israelites to God, which St. Paul’s describes as an “adoption of children” (Rom. 9:4), was a type of the Sonship established by Christ. In the Sapiential books and in the Prophets who form the transition from the Law to the Gospel, there are so many indications of a most intimate and familiar union between man and God, that they can only apply to the supernatural sonship set forth in the New Testament. (See on this point the profound remarks of Card. Wiseman in his essay on The Miracles of the Gospel.) The supernatural life with God, to which man was destined from the beginning, but to which he received a new title through the Incarnation, is referred to in countless texts of the New Testament. The principal passages are the discourses of our Lord (John 6 and 14 to 17); the Prologue of St. John’s Gospel, compared with his First Epistle (chaps. 1 and 3); the introductions to many of the other Epistles which set forth the excellence and exaltedness of the Christian’s vocation, e.g. 1 Cor. 1, 2; Eph. 1; Col. 1; 1 Pet. 1, and 2:1: and Rom. 8 and Gal. 4. The whole doctrine may be conveniently expounded under the following heads.

I. The actual vocation of man to communion with God is spoken of in Scripture as a great mystery, hidden in God, and surpassing all human conception, revealed by the Spirit who searcheth even the deep things of God. But this destiny cannot be man’s natural destiny, because his natural destiny is not beyond his ken: it is found in the depths of human nature, and requires no searching of the depths of God. “We speak the Wisdom of God in a mystery, which is hidden, which God ordained before the world, unto our glory: which none of the princes of this world knew: for if they had known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory. But, as it is written: Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him. But to us God hath revealed them by His Spirit: for the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God. For what man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him? So also the things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God. Now, we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God, that we may know the things that are given us (freely χαρισθέντα) from God” (1 Cor. 2:7–12).

II. The supernatural character of man’s present vocation appears even more in the emphatic expressions with which the Apostles extol its grandeur and exaltedness above all human conceptions, and see in its realization in the Incarnation a marvellous manifestation of the power, majesty, and love of God. “I cease not to give thanks for you, making commemoration of you in my prayers, that the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of glory, may give to you the Spirit of wisdom and of revelation in the knowledge of Him: having the eyes of your heart enlightened that you may know what is the hope of His calling, and what are the riches of the glory of His inheritance in the saints, and what is the exceeding greatness of His power to us who believe, according to the operation of the might of His power” (Eph. 1:16–19). “For this cause I bow my knees to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, … that He would grant you, according to the riches of His glory, to be strengthened with power by His Spirit unto the inward man; … that you may be able to comprehend with all the saints what is the breadth, and length, and height, and depth; to know also the charity of Christ which surpasseth knowledge, that you may be filled unto all the fulness of God. Now to Him Who is able to do all things more abundantly than we ask or understand, according to the power which worketh in us, to Him be glory, etc.” (Eph. 3:14–21. See also Col. 1:10 sqq.; 26 sqq.; 2 Pet. 1:4).

III. The status, the life, and the goods to which God has called man, are designated in Scripture as an elevation from slavery to adoptive sonship of God. This designation itself, and the explanations given in Holy Writ, make it evident that the sonship is not merely a natural relation of man to God founded upon sinlessness, but a peculiar, thoroughly intimate relation, raising the creature from its humble estate and making it the object of a peculiar Divine benevolence and complaisance, admitting it to filial love, and enabling it to become the heir of God—that is, a partaker of God’s own beatitude. The adopted creature is described also as the friend of God and the bride of the Holy Ghost.

The gift of sonship is declared by St. John to be the object of the Incarnation: “He gave them power to be made the sons of God, to them … who are born of God” (1:12), and it is further explained in 1 John 3:1, 2: “Behold, what manner of charity the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called and should be the sons of God.… Dearly beloved, we are now the sons of God, and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be. We know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is.” St. Paul speaks four times expressly of “the adoption of sons” (υἱοθεσία), thus making this term the technical expression for the union with God to which man is called, just as in ordinary language it is the technical term for the admission of a stranger or a subject to the rights and privileges of a son. The following texts leave no doubt as to the strict and technical meaning of the adoption. “Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, Who hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ.… Who has predestinated us unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ unto Himself, according to the purpose of His will (κατʼ εὐδοκίαν τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ), to the praise of the glory of His grace, in which He hath graced us in His beloved Son” (Eph. 1:3–6). “When the fulness of time was come, God sent His Son, made of a woman, made under the law; that He might redeem those who were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons. And because you are sons, God hath sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father. Therefore now he is [thou art] no more a servant, but a son, and if a son, an heir also through God” (Gal. 4:4–7). Compare the parallel text Rom. 8:14–17; and John 15:14, 15; 1 Cor. 6:16, 17.

IV. Holy Scripture further points out the supernatural exaltedness of the sonship of God, by describing it as a communication or partnership with the only begotten Son of God, as a participation in the privileges which are properly His own in opposition to creatures, and in virtue of His Divine Sonship. Such a communication includes a union between God and the creature analogous to the union between God the Father and God the Son. The absolutely supernatural character of our vocation could not be stated more forcibly.

The most important text bearing on this point is John 17:20–26: “I pray for them also who through their word shall believe in Me; that they all may be one; as Thou, Father, in Me, and I in Thee, that they also may be one in Us: that the world may believe that Thou hast sent Me. And the glory which Thou hast given Me I have given to them: that they may be one, as We also are One. I in them, and Thou in Me, that they may be made perfect in one; and that the world may know that Thou hast sent Me, and hast loved them, as Thou also hast loved Me. Father, I will that where I am, they also whom Thou hast given Me may be with Me: that they may see My glory, which Thou hast given Me, because Thou hast loved Me before the creation of the world.… And I have made known Thy Name to them, and will make it known; that the love wherewith Thou hast loved Me may be in them, and I in them.” From this text we gather—

1. God’s love for His adopted children is an extension and communication of His paternal love for His Divine Son.

2. By means of God’s love, the creature enters into a communion with Him analogous to the communion between God the Father and God the Son, whence Christ also calls His Father our Father (John 20:17), and condescends to call men His brethren (Heb. 2:11), so that we are admitted into the family of God as members (1 John 1:3).

3. As a pledge and seal of this closer union with Father and Son, our Lord promises, in the same discourse, the same Holy Ghost Who is the eternal pledge and seal of the unity of Father and Son. As St. Paul further explains: “God hath sealed us, and given the pledge of the Spirit in our hearts” (2 Cor. 1:22); and again: “That we might receive the adoption of sons. And because you are sons, God hath sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts, saying, Abba, Father” (Gal. 4:5, 6). The strongest and most pregnant expression for the “fellowship (κοινωνία), with the Father and His Son” (1 John 1:3), is “the communication (κοινωνία, co-fruition or co-possession) of the Holy Ghost” (2 Cor. 13:13).

4. The consequence of our union with the Father and the Son, is that we shall become partakers of the same glory which the Son has received from the Father, and that we shall be where the Son is, viz. in the house and in the bosom of the Father (John 14:2, 3), and shall have a share in His royal power and sit at His table: “I dispose unto you a kingdom, as My Father has disposed to Me, that you may eat and drink at My table in My kingdom, and may sit upon thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel” (Luke 22:29, 30).

5. The fellowship in the possession of heavenly goods is further described as being a co-heirship with the Son, and the Holy Ghost Himself is designated as the pledge and guarantee of the inheritance. “In Whom (Christ) believing you were sealed with the Holy Spirit of promise, Who is the pledge (arrha, ἀῤῥαβών) of our inheritance” (Eph. 1:13, 14).

6. The intimacy of our union with Him is likened by our Lord to that of the branch with the vine (John 15); it is such that, as He lives for the Father, so we should live for Him (John 6:58).

All this can only mean that the life which He communicates to us is of the same kind as the life which the Father communicates to Him. St. Paul expresses this idea when he says: “And I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me” (Gal. 2:20). And, again (Rom. 8), the same Apostle in many ways speaks of God’s own Spirit as being the principle of life in the adopted children of God, the soul, as it were, of the supernatural life.

It is evident that the union of the creature with God does not consist in the oneness of substance or in the communication of the Divine Substance itself to the creature; it is only a unity of relation (ἕνωσις σχετική). It is, however, equally clear that it is more than a moral union. It must be conceived as a physical union, ἕνωσις φυσική, based upon the fact that the united patties live a life of the same kind, and that this similarity of life proceeds from the intimate character of the union: God being the principle and the object of the creature’s supernatural life. St. Paul points out clearly enough that the union of adoption is more than the moral union of friendship, when he compares it to the union of the bodies in carnal connection (1 Cor. 6:16, 17).

V. The adoption to Divine Sonship is essentially superior to human adoption. Human adoption is but an external community of life, whereas Divine adoption affects the life of the creature intrinsically, consisting, as it does, in a true regeneration or new birth of the soul, whereby it is intrinsically likened to the only begotten Son of God, and transformed into His image.

At the very beginning of his Gospel, St. John mentions this new birth: “As many as received Him, He gave them power to be made the sons of God, to them who believe in His name: who are born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God” (1:12, 13). To be born of God stands here as the condition for becoming children of God. Again, “Unless a man be born again of water and of the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God” (3:5). Christ Himself here sets down the regeneration by God as the title to Divine inheritance. As these words are an answer to the question of Nicodemus, “How can a man be born when he is old?” they show sufficiently that Christ does not conceive the regeneration as a mere change of moral dispositions, but as the mysterious operation of the Holy Ghost. In his First Epistle St. John speaks again of this birth from God, and connects it with a Divine generation in God and a Divine seed in man: “Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God: and every one that loveth Him that begot, loveth Him also Who is born of Him” (5:1); “Every one that is born of God committeth not sin; for His seed abideth in him” (ibid., 3:9). This also fully explains the words, “That we should be called and should be the sons of God” (ibid., 3:1). The same notion is found in the other epistles, e.g. 1 Pet. 1:3, and 1:23; James 1:18; Tit. 3:5, and Eph. 2:10, where St. Paul calls the regeneration a creation, because it is a complete renewal of our nature (Gal. 6:15; 2 Cor. 5:17). Taken by itself, the term regeneration, or new birth, might imply no more than a relative and moral renewal of life. But in the passages quoted above, it evidently implies the foundation of a higher state of being and life, resulting from a special Divine influence, and admitting man to the dignity and inheritance of the sons of God. We must, therefore, take it in the fullest sense admissible, viz. as far as the limits imposed by the essential difference between God and His creatures will allow. Hence, it cannot mean generation from the Substance of God, but can be a communication of Divine Life by the power of God, and by means of a most intimate indwelling of the Divine Substance in the creature. The reality and sublimity of the creature’s new birth out of God are marvellously described in the following texts: “Whom He foreknew He also predestinated to be made conformable (συμμόρφους) to the image of His Son, that He might be the first-born among many brethren” (Rom. 8:29). “But we all, beholding the glory of the Lord with open face, are transformed into the same image from glory to glory, as by the Spirit of the Lord” (2 Cor. 3:18). “My little children, of whom I am in labour again until Christ be formed (μορφωθῇ) in you” (Gal. 4:19; see also Gal. 3:26, 27; Rom. 13:14).

VI. The inheritance of the adopted sons of God is not confined to finite and external goods. It includes the perfect transfiguration of their innermost life, which enables them to share in that possession and fruition of the highest good which peculiarly belongs to God the Son as the natural heir of God. For the eternal life of the adopted sons is the immediate vision of God, face to face, as He is. But such intuition of God, as Scripture teaches, is not within the power of man; it is the privilege of the Son Who is in the bosom of the Father. The proof that the vision of God is the object of our vocation is contained in 1 John 3:1–3. The natural impossibility of this vision is set forth by St. Paul: “Who is the Blessed and only Mighty, the King of Kings and Lord of Lords, Who only hath immortality and dwelleth in light inaccessible, Whom no man hath seen nor can see” (1 Tim. 6:15, 16). The same vision is claimed as a privilege of the Son by St. John: “No man hath seen God at any time: the only begotten Son Who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him” (1:18).

VII. St. Peter, at the beginning of his farewell Epistle, reveals to us the inmost essence of God’s great and precious promises in grace and adoption, when he tells us that we shall be made “partakers of the Divine Nature” (θείας κοινωνοὶ φύσεως). This expression admirably describes that new being and new estate which the adopted children receive through their birth from God, so that not only they are called, but are really, sons of God. It further contains the great reason why they are called to the vision of God, and why this vision is “a manifestation of the glory due to them.” Lastly, it shows that the destiny of the adopted creatures is essentially above every claim and power of their nature, for nothing is more above and beyond nature than that which it can attain only by being raised to a level with God.

The sublime text to which we refer runs as follows: “Grace to you and peace be fulfilled in the knowledge of God and of Christ Jesus our Lord, according as all things of His Divine power, which appertain to life and godliness, are given to us, through the knowledge of Him Who hath called us by His own proper glory and virtue: by Whom He hath given us most great and precious promises; that by these you may be made partakers of the Divine Nature, flying from the corruption of that concupiscence which is in the world. And you, giving all diligence, minister in your faith, virtue.…” (2 Pet. 1:2–5). In the original text the flight from concupiscence is given rather as a consequence than as a condition of the partnership with God (ἀποφυγόντες, “after having fled”); at any rate, the flight cannot be taken as an explanation of its nature, as Baius contended. The whole sublime tenor of this text and the scriptural teaching just expounded, force us to give the “partaking of the Divine Nature” the most literal meaning of which it admits.

VIII. We are now able to understand why, especially in the New Testament, the estate, calling, and life of the Children of God are called “Sanctity,” and the adopted sons “Saints.” They are saints, not merely because they are free from guilt and lead a moral life according to the measure of their natural perfection, but because, by reason of their sublime union with God, they partake of the Divine Dignity and have the power and the duty to lead a life similar to the holy life of God. This holiness is described as something directly given by God, rather than obtained by man’s exertion; it is represented as an outpouring of the Holy Ghost and of His Holiness, and is attributed to His indwelling in the saints as in His temple (1 Cor. 3:16, 17, and often in other places). Holiness implies the same as the partaking of the Divine Nature: hence, first, the ennobling, transfiguration, and consecration of created nature; then the vocation to a life in harmony with this dignity; and, lastly, the actual holy disposition—that is, the charity or Divine Love resulting from the union with God.

SECT. 140.—THE TEACHING OF TRADITION ON SUPERNATURAL UNION WITH GOD: ESPECIALLY ON THE “DEIFICATION” OF THE CREATURE

The supernatural union of the adopted creature with God is commonly called by the Fathers the “deification” of the creature. The frequent and constant use of this appellation is in itself sufficient to prove that they saw, in the adoptive sonship, something higher than the necessary complement of man’s natural faculties. They saw in it the “likeness” which gives to the created “image” of God a share in the supernatural privileges of His “Uncreated Image.” The sense of the Fathers on this point is evident from the manifold explanations they give of it and from the manner in which they connect the adoptive sonship with other dogmas. We can, however, only give a general outline of their doctrine: for quotations we must refer the student to Petavius, De Trin., l. viii., and Thomassin, De Incarn., l. vi., or to the Fathers themselves.

I. The doctrine in question forms the central point of the whole of the theology of St. Irenæus. He calls the adoptive sonship deification, and finds in this deification the likeness which, in a supernatural manner, perfects the “image” of God in the creature. He points out as final object of the deification, the beatific vision—that is, an elevation unto the bosom of God; as its principle, the closest union with the Holy Ghost; and, according to him, the deification itself is the proportionate object of the Incarnation of God the Son (Adv. Hær., l. iii., c. 17 and 19; l. iv., c. 20; l. v., c. 6, 12 et 16, etc.).

II. In the fourth century, the doctrine concerning the elevation of the creature by means of a gratuitous communication of the Divine Nature, came to the fore in the Arian controversies. The Fathers used it to illustrate and to defend the essential communication of the Divine Nature to the Son and to the Holy Ghost.

I. They proved the Divinity of the Son and the Holy Ghost from Their being the principle of the deification of the creature.

2. In defending the Divinity of the Son, they compare His natural Sonship to the adoptive sonship of creatures, and describe the latter as standing midway between the status of servant natural to creatures and the Sonship natural to the Second Person of the Trinity: high in dignity above the first, and participating, by grace, in the dignity of the second. And when explaining how human attributes are predicated of the Incarnate Son of God, they draw attention to the Divine attributes predicated of man elevated by adoption, stating that man is entitled to the double predicates by the deification of his nature, whereas the Logos owes them to His Incarnation. See Card. Newman, Athanasius, ii., p. 88.

3. When defending the Divinity of the Holy Ghost, the Fathers establish this difference between the holiness of the Holy Ghost and that of creatures: the Holy Ghost is essentially holy, or His essence is holiness, whereas the holiness of creatures is from without, consisting in a transfiguration of their nature by the communication and indwelling of the Holy Ghost. In connection with this point, the Fathers represent sanctity as something specifically Divine, or purely and simply as a participation of the Divine Nature, whence they look upon sanctification (= being pervaded by the Holy Ghost) as the same as deification, and in Ps. 81:6, “I have said: Ye are gods, and all of you the sons of the Most High,” they take “gods” to be the same as “children or sons of God.”

III. Still more stress was laid on the supernatural character of the vocation of rational creatures, in the controversies with the Nestorians. Here the aim of the Fathers was (1) to show that the Divine gifts to the children of adoption were of such exalted excellence as to require Incarnation; (2) to find in the Incarnation something corresponding with the humbling of the Son of God, viz. the elevation of the creature to a participation in the Divine Nature; (3) to represent the Incarnation as the root and the ideal of a supernatural union of all mankind with God. Hence we find the champion of the Catholic doctrine on the Incarnation, St. Cyril of Alexandria (Comm. on St. John, l. i., cc. 13, 14), constantly extolling the sublimity of adoptive sonship and of the privileges connected therewith. Considering how intimately he connects the two doctrines of the Incarnation of the Logos and the deification of the creature, we are bound to see in him the organ and mouthpiece of the Church on the latter as well as on the former dogma. The doctrine of St. Cyril is also found in the Latin Fathers, chiefly in St. Peter Chrysologus, who points out that the adoptive sonship is almost as marvellous as the hypostatic union of the two natures in Christ (Serm., 68 and 72).

IV. At first sight it may appear strange that, whilst in the East the controversies with the Nestorians called forth such a splendid affirmation of the absolutely supernatural character of our adoptive sonship; in the West, St. Augustine and the Church herself seem to claim the actual destiny of man as natural to him, not indeed due to fallen man, but due to the integrity of innocent man, although obtainable only by grace. That this is not a real, but merely an apparent contradiction, may be presumed à priori. If it were real, there would have been a serious difference between the public teaching of the Eastern and the Western Church, whereas no such difference was noticed at the time. Again, we cannot suppose that St. Augustine, who is honoured with the title of “Doctor of Grace,” had a less sublime notion of grace than that generally held in the Church and affected even by the Pelagians. Lastly, the teaching of St. Augustine contains many elements which prove his consent with the Eastern Church. The special form which he gave to his doctrine, and which was adopted by the Holy See, arose from the nature of the heresy which he opposed, as we have shown in the preceding section.

V. The doctrine of the older Greek Fathers concerning: the vocation of rational creatures to a union with God implying deification—a doctrine which they taught in connection with the dogmas of the Trinity and of the Incarnation—was retained and logically evolved by the representatives of the Eastern scholastic theology, especially by the author of the books commonly ascribed to Dionysius the Areopagite, and by Maximus Confessor. In the West, on the contrary, the same doctrine kept the form given to it by St. Augustine.

VI. During the Middle Ages the schools of theology submitted St. Augustine’s treatment to a searching analysis, and brought it into harmony with the conception always predominant in the East. This result was arrived at in consequence of more accurate notions of “nature” and of “man as the natural image of God.” The concept of nature was evolved in the controversy with the Monophysites; the concept of the natural image of God in man, in the struggle against Averroism. From these notions the Schoolmen inferred that the nature of the created spirit, as such, possesses the power and the destiny to a sort of beatitude and to a union of some kind with God. Further, comparing created nature with the supernatural excellence of the beatific vision, to which, as a revealed fact, man is actually called, they concluded that the actual destiny of the creature surpasses all the powers, and is beyond all the claims of nature, and contains a union with God by which the creature is raised to fellowship with God’s own beatitude.

This twofold consideration necessarily led to another conclusion. In order to be made worthy of such beatitude and to be able to tend towards it, the creature must, even in the present life, be elevated to a higher dignity and furnished with new powers, and must be united with God in closer fellowship. Thus the creature becomes the friend, the child, the bride of God, and is consecrated as a temple of God. From this point of view a more general bearing was given to the question between St. Augustine and the Pelagians concerning grace as the principle of salutary actions in fallen man. The question was now, “Which are, in general, the conditions necessary to enable rational creatures to merit eternal life?” to which the answer can be no other than this: “Every operation tending, in any way whatsoever, towards the acquisition of eternal life, must be considered as a rising above the sphere of nature and, consequently, as a good of a higher kind than natural good; every operation properly and perfectly meritorious supposes, besides, that the person acting must be of a rank or position raised above nature.” The principle of merit being once found in an elevation of the status and of the powers of the creature, grace itself was looked upon as the principle giving to human actions a supernatural merit. Now, grace is the principle of merit, because, by means of grace, nature is made worthy of eternal life. Thus the scriptural notion of adoptive Divine sonship was followed out to its last consequences: the supernatural vocation of man became the foundation upon which the whole doctrine concerning God’s operation in man, and man’s operation to attain his end, is built up. Since St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, the doctrine of grace has been generally drawn out on the above lines, and the Church sanctioned this system as her own in the condemnation of Baius. See St. Thom., Quæst. Disp., De Veritate, q. 27, a. 1; St. Bonav., in 2 Dist. 29, and Breviloq., v. 1.

SECT. 141.—ETERNAL LIFE IN THE BEATIFIC VISION

I. It has been defined by Benedict XII. (Constit. Benedictus Deus, A.D. 1336) that the substance of the beatitude to which rational creatures are called, consists in the immediate vision of God, face to face, in His essence. This dogma is clearly expressed in Holy Scripture. “Their angels in heaven always see the face of My Father Who is in heaven” (Matt. 18:10). “We see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then, face to face. Now I know in part; but then I shall know even as I am known” (1 Cor. 13:12). “We know that when He shall appear, we shall be like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is” (1 John 3:2).

II. Reason and Faith alike tell us that to see God face to face is (1) supernatural, at least inasmuch as it cannot be arrived at by the natural forces of the created mind, and is only possible to nature elevated and clarified by a supernatural light; (2) that it implies a participation in the Divine Nature, and a deification of the created nature. To gaze upon the Divine essence is, naturally, possible to God alone; at the same time it constitutes the highest possible kind of knowledge and life, the gift of which to the creature endows the creature with a likeness to God, analogous to the likeness between the Divine Son and His Father. This supernatural likeness to God may be resolved into the following elements: (a) the act and the object of vision are of the same kind in God and in the creature, in as far as, in both, the vision is an act of direct knowledge whose formal and material object is the Divine essence; (b) the likening of the created intellect to the Divine is brought about by the infusion of a light proceeding from, and homogeneous with, the Divine Intellect. The connection between the created intellect and its Divine object is not indeed, as is the case with God, a union by identity, but is produced by the intrinsic presence of the object in the intellect, the Divine Substance fertilizing and informing, as it were, the intellect of the glorified creature. As a consequence of the vision, the blessed spirits enjoy a beatitude similar to the Divine beatitude or participate in God’s own happiness. They also have a share in the eternal duration of the Divine Life, because the contemplation of the Eternal God, by His most proper power and most intimate presence, naturally entails simplicity and immutability of Life.

III. The absolute exaltedness of the beatific vision, and of its glory and beatitude above the powers of rational nature, likewise places it above all the claims or requirements of nature, and makes it supernatural in the sense of absolute gratuity. The creature can only claim for its happiness whatever contributes to or achieves the development of its natural faculties. Besides, the gratuity of the beatific vision and kindred privileges is attested so often in various doctrines of faith, that we are bound to receive it as a fundamental dogma. Thus, the vocation to the beatific vision supposes a real and true adoption; it can only be known by a supernatural revelation. Nature, by its own power, cannot merit it, nor even elicit a positive desire of it worthy of being taken into consideration by God. All these points have been defined against Baius, and dealt with in former sections. It is, moreover, evident, at first sight, that no creature can have a claim to what is God’s most personal property.

IV. The complete gratuity of the beatific vision supposes that, apart from it, some other beatitude, viz. a natural one, is conceivable. A final beatitude of some kind is necessarily the destination of rational beings. Since, however, as a matter of fact, angels and man are destined to supernatural felicity, it is not to be wondered at that Revelation is silent about natural felicity, and that the Fathers have not dealt with it more at length. On theological and philosophical principles, the natural destiny of rational creatures can only be described in general outlines: it consists in that knowledge and love of God which can be obtained by merely natural means. See also § 135.

V. The supernatural life of the blessed would be incomplete if their possession of God did not include a participation in the Divine Love and Holiness, as well as in the Divine Wisdom. The fruition of God, arising from the beatific vision, cannot be conceived without an accompanying love equal in excellence to the beatific knowledge, and of the same kind as the Love with which God loves Himself. The sublimity of this love, exalted as it is above the faculties of nature, necessarily requires that the will of the blessed should be raised above its nature just as the intellect is raised by the Light of glory. In this there are three factors: (1) The subject-matter of the act of love, directly, materially, and formally, is the Supreme Good; (2) the power of the will is raised and clarified so as to partake of the power for love of the Divine Will; (3) the will is brought into the most intimate contact with the Highest Good in the same way as the intellect is pervaded by the Highest Truth—a union analogous to the union of identity between the Divine Will and its object. The union of love between God and the blessed is thus, according to Holy Scripture, analogous to the union between the Father and the Son; the blessed are made “one spirit with God” (1 Cor. 6:17); a “deification” of the will takes place, of which St. Bernard rightly says that it gives the creature another form, another glory, and another power; and, lastly, the divinized will is endowed with an immutability excluding all possibility of sin.

SECT. 142.—THE SUPERNATURAL IN OUR LIFE ON EARTH (“IN STATU VIŒ”)

I. The supernatural character of the final destiny of rational creatures implies the equally supernatural character of all the acts which, in one way or another, contribute to its acquisition. In other words, the vocation to the beatific vision contains the vocation to a supernatural life here on earth, made up of acts preparatory to and meritorious of eternal life in heaven. Hence the mark or note to distinguish the natural from the supernatural acts of this life, is whether or not these acts tend to the acquisition of eternal life. In the language of theology they are termed, “acts meritorious of eternal life,” taking meritorious in its widest meaning; “salutary acts,” i.e. acts leading, in any way whatsoever, to salvation. As, however, these acts have the same material object as the corresponding natural acts (e.g. natural love of God, justice, chastity), and are designated by the same names, they are commonly distinguished from the latter by the qualification that they are “conducive to eternal life.” Thus, the supernatural act of Faith is distinguished from a similar natural act by styling it “an act of faith capable of meriting eternal life” (sicut expedit, or sicut oportet, ad vitam æternam consequendam). Other expressions, easily understood, are: “acts of justice before God (coram Deo), “of spiritual justice,” “of the justice of sanctity.” They are best characterized as acts making up the life of the adopted sons of God, and consequently as a participation in the Divine Life.

II. The supernatural character of salutary acts lies in their inner and substantial exaltedness above all natural acts. Their worth is not extrinsic, as is, for instance, the value of paper money, but intrinsic, like the value of a gold coin; otherwise they would not really and truly merit supernatural life. This intrinsic value can accrue to them only from the proportion and relationship which they bear to the acts of eternal life themselves; the doer of salutary acts moves towards God and approaches Him in the same way as the blessed are united with Him and possess Him. Only from this position is it possible to defend scientifically the absolute necessity of grace for all salutary acts, even for the very first. The soul performing salutary acts may fitly be compared to a bird on the wing, easily reaching a height which it would never be able to attain by using its feet.

The intrinsic and substantial exaltedness of salutary acts, and of the life which they constitute, must further be determined in relation to their object and end. The best way to arrive at a satisfactory solution of the question is to consider the several classes of salutary acts. We may look at the supernatural life here on earth from three points of view: (1) as a striving after life eternal; (2) as a beginning and anticipation of life eternal by acts of supernatural union with God; (3) as the fulfilment of the moral duties incumbent on the vocation of sons of God.

1. Striving after the possession of God in eternal life—that is, wishing, trusting, and resolving to do whatever is required to such end—to be efficacious must necessarily be above the powers of nature. A natural striving, although possible, is entirely out of proportion to that supernatural end. In order to be efficacious and salutary, the striving must be infused and inspired by God Himself, because the object striven after is entirely and solely His own free gift. The acts of the striving will are thus, as it were, borne up towards God by God Himself, and thus endowed by a supernatural excellence. The striving in question is the root of all works and virtues which tend to God; hence it is clear that all such works and virtues must be supernatural, at least in so far as their root and mainspring is supernatural. The supernatural character of salutary acts, as it appears from this point of view, is most insisted on by St. Augustine; with him, every act of good will for which grace is necessary, is an act of Charity (caritas), and by Charity he understands all efficacious striving of the soul after the vision and fruition of God.

2. The supernatural life here on earth is not only a striving after eternal life, it is an introduction to, a beginning, and an anticipation of that life. Even here below, spiritual life consists in a union with God as He is in Himself, and also in a participation in God’s own Life analogous to the union and participation realized in heaven. The acts of theological virtues—Faith, Hope, and Charity—which form the substance of all supernatural life, should be considered from this point of view. They have this advantage, that their supernatural character can be shown in two ways: indirectly, as being salutary acts; and directly, from the manner in which they seize and grasp their Divine Object. For this purpose it is sufficient to consider theological Faith as a supernatural thinking, and theological Love as a supernatural volition. Hope draws its supernatural character from Faith and Charity, and rather tends to a future union with God than expresses a present union.

The supernatural character of Faith and Charity lies in this, that they apprehend and embrace God as He is in Himself, directly and in a manner corresponding with the Divine exaltedness, in the same way as in the beatific vision, though here on earth the apprehension is but obscure. Nothing short of a Divine influence, essentially raising the powers of the created mind, can enable it so to apprehend and embrace God. In the sphere of natural knowledge and love, each creature is itself its own proximate object, and the centre from which it extends itself to other objects. If, then, created nature is to know and love God, not merely as its own principle, but is to take God in Himself as the direct and most intrinsic object and motive of its life, then the creature must be raised into the proper sphere of Divine Life, and be empowered, by a communication of that same life, to apprehend the Divine Essence.

We have already (§ 42) pointed out the supernatural elements in theological Faith, wherefore here we deal only with theological Love, i.e. Charity.

The supernatural relations of Charity to God may be illustrated in a twofold direction: (a) as compared with the Love of God to Himself as the Highest Good; (b) as compared with the mutual Love which unites the Three Divine Persons—that is, as a “participation of the Holy Ghost” either in the sense of the Latin or the Greek Fathers (cf. Book II., § 98).

(a) In the first direction, the supernatural relation of Charity to God appears in this, that by charity the creature loves God in Himself and for His own sake, in such a way that the creature’s love for self and for its fellow-creatures is caused by its love for God. Natural love starts from itself, loving all things for its own sake; Charity starts from God and loves all things for His sake. Charity here on earth is, in essence, identical with the Charity of the blessed in heaven: as the clear vision of the Divine essence moves the blessed to love, so supernatural Faith moves the love of the believer; in both cases God is the moving principle. According to Scripture, Charity is an outpouring of the Holy Ghost and a participation of His own sanctity; God lives in the loving soul as in His property, so that the two are one spirit (Rom. 5:5; 1 Cor. 6:17). Thus, in conclusion, theological Love is similar in kind to the love wherewith God loves Himself as the Highest Good; it is a Divine love because of a Divine kind, and therefore also divinely holy and blessed because filled with the holiness and lovableness of the Highest Good.

(b) Charity may also be conceived as tending to God, inasmuch as, in loving condescension, He calls us to share in His own beatitude and offers Himself as the object of our beatitude. In this respect charity appears as a return, on our part, of God’s supernatural love to us, or as mutual love, the ideal of which is the Love between Father and Son in the Trinity, and similar to the love of children for their father, of the bride for the bridegroom, and of one friend for another. Such love is above the faculties of created nature. The creature, as such, can only love God as a servant loves his master, or a subject his king; whereas the love of the sons of God is not servile, but filial, bridal, and friendly, and therefore specifically distinct from the former. Among men no higher power of love is required when their love is given to a person of higher rank, because, although different in rank, all men are equal in nature.

3. The essentially supernatural character of the acts constituting the moral order is not so evident as that of the theological virtues. By moral order we mean the practice of the so-called moral virtues, e.g. justice, prudence, temperance, etc., all of which St. Augustine includes under the name of “the love of justice.” The difficulty here arises from the fact that the will seems to have a natural power sufficient to love order even of the highest kind; and besides, there seems to be no supernatural moral order different in its subject-matter from the natural moral order. As a matter of fact, all theologians, following the lead of St. Augustine, attribute the supernatural value of moral actions to their connection with Charity.

IV. The whole doctrine concerning the supernatural character of the life of the adoptive sons of God here on earth centres in the supernatural character of theological love or Charity, just as the doctrine concerning the life of the blessed in heaven centres in the supernatural character of the Beatific Vision. It is, therefore, a serious mistake to gather the three theological virtues under the one head of religion, which is a moral virtue.

SECT. 143.—THE ELEVATING GRACE NECESSARY FOR SALUTARY ACTS

I. From what has been hitherto laid down concerning the supernatural character of the acts which either lead up to or constitute the life of the adopted sons of God, it follows that these acts require for their production a special Divine co-operation. Neither the ordinary Divine concurrence, nor that more special help required by man to overcome the difficulties of his natural moral life, is sufficient. A salutary act has effects entirely above nature, and must therefore proceed from a principle above nature. Hence the Divine co-operation must consist in a communication of Divine power to the creature, enabling it to produce acts of supernatural value. Theologians call it “a co-operation giving the very power to act,” a fecundating motion, an aid, or a grace physically raising and completing the natural power. They all understand in this sense the dogma of the absolute necessity of grace for salutary works, and the origin of these acts from God, and more especially from the Holy Ghost.

The fundamental principle of this doctrine is clearly expressed in two of our Lord’s sayings: “No man can come to Me, except the Father, Who hath sent Me, draw him” (John 6:44); and “Abide in Me and I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, unless it abide in the vine, so neither can you unless you abide in Me” (John 15:4).

II. The communication of Divine power must necessarily affect the created faculty intrinsically so as to raise it to a higher kind of energy and efficacy. The reason for this necessity lies in the nature of the acts to be produced. These acts are a free and voluntary motion of the creature towards God; although a gift of God, they are at the same time a meritorious work of the creature itself; in short, they are vital acts of the creature. Hence the co-operation or concurrence of God with the creature is not like that of the artisan with his tool, nor can it be like that of the human soul with the body. In the former case, the salutary acts would not be vital acts of the creature; in the latter, God and the creature would be one nature. The Divine power must go out of God and be handed over to the creature. Now, it is always possible to conceive the Divine influence as only an inner application of the Power of the all-pervading God; still, it is at least more in harmony with the usual course of nature that a power should be produced in the created faculty itself, giving it a higher intrinsic perfection. This “intrinsic form” must affect and modify the faculty after the manner of a physical quality (e.g. as heat affects and modifies water)—that is, of a quality accompanying its actual motions.

III. All approved theologians admit this elevation of nature wherever it can be supposed to exist already as a permanent habit before particular salutary acts take place. They also unanimously connect it with the full possession of supernatural life in the state of adoption, although they grant that it is not the only conceivable form of elevation. But there are other supernatural acts, preparatory and introductory to the state of sonship, on the existence of which depends the acquisition of sonship. The Council of Trent calls them “motions towards habitual justice;” the older Schoolmen term them “preparation for grace,” in contradistinction to works performed in the state of grace and by grace; the Fathers look upon them as the “first conversion to God.” There is some difficulty in explaining how the elevating influence of God can be intrinsic to these acts. We are certain that the Divine co-operation in them holds an intermediate position between the natural or general Divine concurrence and the supernatural co-operation proper. St. Bonaventure calls it “a gratuitous gift, which is, as it were, a mean between the habits of virtues and the natural freedom of the will” (In 2 Dist., 28, a. 2, q. 1). In fact, the ordinary Divine concurrence is not sufficient, because, according to defined dogma, the acts are strictly supernatural, necessarily proceeding from the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. Hence “a specially qualified motion” must be admitted on the part of God for the production of the acts which introduce the creature to supernatural life. On the other hand, it is clear that this elevating motion is but an integrating element of the actual aid (viz. grace) by which the act really takes place; it has an analogy with the “elevation” received by the tool at the moment when the artisan begins to use it. So far nearly all theologians are agreed, but the greatest divergence of opinion prevails as to the further determination of the motion in question.

SECT. 144.—ELEVATING GRACE CONSIDERED AS A SUPERNATURAL HABIT OF THE MENTAL FACULTIES—THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES

I. The life of adoptive sons of God, the fruit of a new birth, is evidently destined to be permanent, like the fruit of natural generation. Hence the grace which elevates rational creatures to this higher life, must likewise be permanent. At the moment when the adoption takes place, if not sooner, the higher faculties of the mind required for the acts of supernatural life must be endowed with a permanent supernatural power. In other words, the intellect and the will receive new qualities or habits. Considered as an inner vigour perfecting the life of the mental faculties, these habits or qualities belong to the order of mental virtues (ἀρετή). In as far as they specially perfect the will and endow it with habitual rectitude, they are moral virtues. Again, in common with acquired virtues, they are not inborn, but are acquired and superadded to the natural faculties. On the other hand, they considerably differ from virtues acquired by the exertion of our own faculties. They are infused from above as a gift pure and simple; they not merely temper and improve an existing power, but they transform it into a power of a higher order. This, however, applies only to virtues which are “essentially infused,” i.e. which can be obtained only by way of infusion from above; not to virtues “accidentally infused,” ie. to virtues which God infuses, although they may be acquired by personal exertion. Peter Lombard, summarizing the teaching of St. Augustine, defines supernatural virtue as “a good quality of the mind, by which we live rightly, which no one uses badly” (2 Sent., dist. 27).

II. Infused virtues, in as far as they are inherent in the created mind, are indeed distinct from the Holy Ghost Who causes them, but, at the same time, they can neither exist nor exert themselves without the conserving and moving influence of God. Nor is their dependence on Divine conservation limited to that common to all created powers; it acquires a special character from the circumstance that the created mind is not the principle but merely the subject of the infused virtue, and that it is a participation in the Divine Life. Hence the acts proceeding from infused virtues are, in quite a special manner, the acts of the Holy Ghost working in the created mind: just as the rays proceeding from a body illuminated by the sun are the rays of the sun, and the fruit borne by the branch is the fruit of the root (cf. Council of Trent, sess. vi., c. 16). By the infused virtues, especially by Charity, the Holy Ghost dwells, lives, and works in the created soul as the soul lives and works in the body; He is, as ft were, the soul of the soul’s supernatural life.

The natural living faculties of the soul are the subjects of the infused virtues. The conjunction of the infused virtues with the natural faculties is so complete and perfect that the supernatural acts proceed from both, as if they were but one principle of action. So far all theologians are agreed. But they differ as to the explanation of this conjunction. The Molinists (Ripalda, De Ente Supern., disp. 118, sect. 5) hold that the natural faculties cause the act to be vital and free, and that the infused virtues cause it to have a supernatural character. The work done by the faculties is like that done by the eye in the act of seeing; and the work of the virtues is like that of the external light in the same act. Or they compare the conjunction to that of tree and graft: the tree produces the fruit which the graft ennobles. The Thomists, on the other hand, think that it is the infused virtue itself which causes the supernatural act to be vital and free, by pervading and ennobling the innermost root of the natural faculties. They liken the infused virtue to the power of sight itself in the act of vision, or to the influence of the root on the branches, or, better still, to the influence of a noble olive tree on the wild olive branch grafted on it. The Thomistic view is certainly deeper, and explains better how grace is really the mainspring and the inner vital principle of supernatural life.

III. That the three theological virtues—Faith, Hope, and Charity—are infused is beyond doubt (Council of Trent, sess. vi., c. 7). It is, moreover, certain that they are three distinct virtues. Faith can exist without Hope and Hope without Charity; each of them has its own peculiar external manifestation and internal constitution. But it is not so certain whether there are any infused moral virtues. Many theologians admit that the acts of moral virtues performed by the sons of adoption either have no particular supernatural character, or that whatever is supernatural in them is sufficiently accounted for by their connection with the theological virtues. At any rate, supernatural moral virtues are but branches springing from the theological virtues. Their acts consisting rather in a direction or disposition of the will than in a supernatural union with God, they do not distinctly and directly require a physical elevation of the faculties of the soul. Hence, Faith, Hope, and Charity, the marrow and the soul of supernatural life, are pre-eminently the supernatural virtues. On them primarily and directly depends the meritoriousness of all acts of virtue, and they contain the beginnings of eternal life and the participation in, or conformation to, the Divine Life. In the language of the Schoolmen, they are purely and simply “gratuitous virtues”—that is, given freely and for our sanctification and salvation (gratis datæ et gratum facientes), and working freely, i.e. for no other motive than God. Their excellence is, however, best expressed by the term “theological” or “godlike” virtues. The import of this term is, that Faith, Hope, and Charity have a peculiar excellence beyond that of other virtues. They come necessarily from God; they are known by means of Divine Revelation only; they liken the creature to God; above all, they make the life of the created soul like unto the life of God, as it is in itself, because they effect a union with God as He is in Himself, and imply a permanent indwelling of God in the soul.

IV. Faith, Hope, and Charity, taken together, constitute the whole principle of the supernatural life, in such a way as to work into one another like the parts of an organism. Faith is the root and foundation; Charity, the crown and summit; Hope stands midway between them. The organic connection of Faith and Charity is described by the Apostle (Gal. 5:6): Faith is actuated, perfected, animated (ἐνεργουμένη) by Charity, so that he who possesses Charity lives a supernatural life. This implies that Charity ranks highest in perfection, because it completes the union with God in this life, and enables us to perform salutary acts. Supernatural life, therefore, consists purely and simply in Charity, or, better, Charity is the root of it all. Between Faith and Charity, too, there exists an organic relation. Charity presupposes Faith, in the same way as the animation of the body presupposes its organization. The child of God “lives of (ex) Faith in Charity;” that is, the Charity which informs Faith is the fulness and substantial perfection of supernatural life, and all perfect acts of virtue are rooted in Charity.

SECT. 145.—THE STATE OF GRACE THE NOBILITY OF THE CHILDREN OF GOD

I. The infused virtues give the created soul the physical power and the inclination to perform works proportioned in dignity to life eternal. To make these works perfectly worthy of reward, it is necessary that they should proceed from a person of Divine nobility—that is, of such high dignity and rank that the Divine inheritance is in keeping with it. Thus, among men, the most excellent services rendered by a subject to his king cannot merit the succession to the throne, whereas the king’s own or adopted children may succeed him on account of their personal dignity. The intrinsic supernatural value, then, which salutary acts draw from the infused virtues, attains its full force from the fact that the person acting is already worthy of eternal life on account of the dignity accruing to him from his union with God, the Owner and Giver of that life.

The Apostle points to such an elevation in dignity when he speaks of the grace of adoption, by which we are made the children of God, and, being children, heirs also, and coheirs of God’s only begotten Son (Gal. 4). The Church has decidedly defended against Baius the necessity of the “deifying state” for meriting eternal life (propp. xv., xvii.; also xviii. and xix.). The possession of this high state of dignity is described by theologians as specially and formally the state of grace making one acceptable to God (status gratiæ gratum facientis), and as “the state of sanctifying grace.” The latter appellation is given to it because it implies a Divine consecration of the person. Lastly, as man, deprived of Divine nobility, would be unable to attain that eternal life to which, as a matter of fact, God has called him, it follows that the dignity of adopted sons of God is an essential element of the state of justification.

II. The necessity of a higher personal dignity and rank in order to entitle and to fit the adopted sons of God to eternal life, is a defined dogma. All Catholic theologians are therefore bound to agree that Charity, whether considered as an act, disposition, habit, or virtue, does not contain in itself alone and entirely that personal dignity which is necessary for the attainment of eternal life. Charity can no more have this effect in the supernatural order than, in the order of nature, filial, friendly, or conjugal love can, by itself, transform the lover into a child, friend, or spouse, or claim in return the love due to child, friend, or spouse. The analogy, however, is not quite perfect. In the supernatural order the dignity of son of God cannot exist without filial love, and, on the other hand, it is acquired as soon as filial love begins. Yet this never-failing connection does not destroy the formal distinction between personal dignity and infused virtue: it is accounted for by the fact that God at the same time raises to the dignity of adoptive sons, and gives the habit of Charity as a connatural endowment. The connection only lasts as long as the adopted sons live according to their rank—that is, as long as they do not cast off Charity by acting against it.

Charity, then, is not the cause of the dignity of adoption. The acts of Charity and of other virtues lead up to and ask for this dignity, but do not give a formal right to it. On the contrary, supernatural virtues must be looked upon as a consequence of the adoption. In the same way as in natural adoption the new son receives all that is in keeping with his new position, and begins at once to live the same life as his father; so the new-born son of God is endowed with Charity, and begins at once to lead the supernatural life possible on this earth. Charity, then, is an attribute of Sonship. “Because you are sons, God hath sent the Spirit of His Son into your heart, crying: Abba, Father” (Gal. 4:6).

From this way of conceiving the relation between Sonship and Charity, it becomes at once clear how the dignity of sonship bears upon the meritoriousness of salutary acts. To merit eternal life, an act, besides being good in itself, must be performed by a person entitled to eternal life, and must belong to him as his own property. This latter element requires that the actions should be free, and that the powers from which they proceed should be the lawful property of the person acting, which they are only if their possession is based upon a dignity logically anterior.

III. We must touch on the famous question whether the grace of adoption is identical with infused Charity. The reader who has accepted our view that adoption by elevation to a higher personal status logically precedes the infusion of Charity, will find no difficulty in admitting a distinction between adoption and Charity. The distinction is not necessarily real, yet it must be such that the grace of adoption should not appear as an attribute of Charity, but as something fuller and deeper, round which, as a centre, are gathered the free gifts of Charity and all other infused virtues. Thus the real or ontological foundation of the life of grace is a something higher given to the soul in the act of adoption, that is, in the assimilation to God’s own life. Now the distinctive character of the Divine Life is its supreme spirituality, or more exactly its immateriality, which is spoken of in Scripture as “life of light.” Hence the higher being given to God’s adoptive children must likewise be conceived as a more refined spirituality, as a greater independence of matter, wrought in the created spirit by the indwelling Spirit of God. “That which is born of the Spirit, is spirit” (John 3:6); “You were heretofore darkness, but now light in the Lord: walk then as children of the light” (Eph. 5:8).

The supernatural being of the sons of God bears to Charity and the other infused virtues the relation which the natural substance of the soul bears to its faculties. It is their root, their end, their measure. Charity is the most perfect manifestation and the surest sign of the Divine life rooted in the supernatural being of the children of God. We cannot, indeed, give demonstrative proof for our opinion on this subject, because it is always possible to interpret the texts in a laxer sense. We give it as the only adequate and consistent development of the revealed doctrine concerning the dignity of the sons of God, the new birth out of God, and the participation in the Divine Nature. The language of the Church in the Councils of Vienne and of Trent, and in the condemnation of the forty-second proposition of Baius, is entirely in accordance with our view. The Roman Catechism is especially explicit: “Grace … is a Divine quality inhering in the soul, and, as it were, a sort of brightness and light which removes all the stains of our souls, and makes our souls more beautiful and bright.… To this is added a most noble company of virtues which are divinely infused into the soul together with grace” (part ii., c. 2, n. 50, 51).

Further information may be found in Gonet, Clypeus, De Gr., disp. 2.; and Goudin, De Gr., q. 4.; and also Comp. Salmant, tr. xiii., disp. iii., dub. 3, (strongly Thomistic).

SECT. 146.—THE STATE OF GRACE, CONTINUED—THE HOLY GHOST, THE SUBSTANTIAL COMPLEMENT OF ACCIDENTAL GRACE

Elevation to the state of grace implies an indwelling of God in the soul which is peculiar to this state and essentially differs from the presence of God in all things created. The question then arises whether, and if so, how far, the Divine indwelling is a constituent element of the state of grace. The Theologians of the West, especially the Schoolmen, have adopted a view on this point which, at first sight, seems entirely opposed to that of the Eastern Theologians. The two systems are in close connection with the different ways of conceiving the doctrine concerning the Trinity followed by the same writers (see supra, Book II., § 98). We shall set forth the two theories separately, and then show how they can be harmonized.

I. The indwelling of God is conceived as a relation of intimate friendship between Him and His adoptive children, the whole intimacy and force of which appears in this, that the same Holy Ghost, Who in the Trinity represents the union of Love between Father and Son, is here also the mediator of the love which unites God and His adopted sons. The indwelling of the Holy Ghost is not considered as a factor of the sonship: the latter is formally and exclusively constituted by created grace inhering in the soul. The communication of elevating grace, or the constant infusion of Charity, is attributed to the Holy Ghost by appropriation, because He represents the Divine Love by which grace is given; He is the Exemplar of created charity and its Pledge or guarantee that the possession of God by Charity in this life will be continued and made perfect in the next. The leading idea of the Western theory is that God gives Himself in possession to His creatures, and is thus bound to them as a father to his children or as a bridegroom to his bride. In the language of the Schools the whole theory may be expressed in a few words: God, or more particularly the Holy Ghost, is the exemplar, the efficient principle, and the final object of the grace of sonship; whereas its formal or constituent principle is created grace.

This latter point was especially urged against the view set forth by Peter Lombard, “that the sonship was quite independent of created or inherent grace; that all the effects ascribed to such grace were the immediate work of the Holy Ghost himself.” When the Council of Trent defined, (against the Protestant theory of Justification by imputation), that “the sole formal cause of justification is the justice of God, not that by which He Himself is just, but that by which He makes us just” (sess. vi., c. 7), Theologians saw in this definition a new motive for excluding the indwelling of the Holy Ghost from the constituent elements of sonship. The intention of the Council, however, was but to secure to justification its character of an inherent quality. The essential constitution of the state of grace, or the higher personal dignity of the adopted sons of God, was not dealt with by the Council. But when Baius afterwards attacked the “deiform state” of the children of God, the Church explained its dignity by insisting, not merely upon infused grace, but likewise on the indwelling of the Holy Ghost (prop. xiii., and xv.). This gave occasion to several theologians of note, especially Lessius, Petavius, and Thomassin, to further consider and develop the indwelling of the Holy Ghost as a constituent element of the state of grace.

II. The Greek Fathers held that the indwelling of the Holy Ghost was a substantial union with God and a constituent factor of adoptive sonship. This theory is found in St. Irenaeus, and is quite familiar to the Fathers who opposed the Arians, Macedonians and Nestorians, especially St. Athanasius, St. Basil, and St. Cyril of Alexandria. To them the indwelling of the Holy Ghost is the most important of the elements which constitute adoptive sonship. They look upon it as containing a participation in the substance of the Divine Nature, a substantial union or cohesion with God, whereby the Spirit of God in a certain sense becomes by His substance a form informing the soul, a form constituting Divine being, thus establishing in the adopted sons of God a likeness to Him analogous to that of His own Son. The new birth out of God is conceived as a generation, in as far as it implies a communication of the Divine substance, whereas, in the other theory, it implies only a likeness of nature.

By the words “substantial union” (ἕνωσις φυσική), the Fathers understand a union of independent substances intermediate between the simply moral union of persons and the union of substances as parts of one whole. The union of father and son, of husband and wife, are instances of such union, which is perhaps better designated by the term cohesion, or tying together (συνάφεια), or welding together (κόλλησις). To bring out the fact that the two united substances, at least to a certain extent, belong to each other, the union is also called communion, communication (κοινωνία), and participation (μετοχή). The Fathers point out the union with the Body and Blood of Christ in Holy Eucharist as an analogy of the union of the Holy Ghost with the soul (cf. Card. Newman, St. Athan., ii. 88, 193, 257).

We now proceed to give a deeper analysis of this theory, feeling confident that it will be preferred by the student.

1. The manner in which Scripture describes the communication of the Holy Ghost to the sons of adoption, clearly implies a communication of Divine substance. It is spoken of as a being generated (γεννᾶσθαι); a “seed” of God is given to and remains in the adopted sons; the expressions used, especially by St. John, to convey an idea of the substantial union of God the Son with the Father, are repeated, in the same context, as descriptive of the union between God and His adopted children (John 1:13; 3:5–6; 17:22; 1 John 3:9; 1 Pet. 1:23). The necessary difference between the communication of Divine Substance in the life of grace, and the same communication in the eternal generation of God the Son, is that the adopted sons are first created and then generated; they do not receive their essence and being by Divine generation, but only are made to participate in the generation of God’s own Son. The Divine progenitor does not form a new physical being, but only effects a union between the Creator and the creature. This union, however, is more perfect than the union of father and son, because it is a cohesion (συνάφεια) of the whole Divine Substance with the creature, whereas a son is physically separate from his father.

2. As, then, the generation in the order of grace is intended to raise an existing life to a higher perfection, it must be conceived as the welding together (κόλλησις) of the Divine Substance with the creature, or as an insertion of the Divine seed into a being already in existence. From this point of view the substantial union of God and creature bears a striking analogy with the union of the sexes in generation. St. Paul uses this very illustration (1 Cor. 6:16, 17). The “mutual possession” is more intimate in the supernatural union of God with the soul than in the union which makes the two one flesh. To preserve the spiritual character of the union, the names of “bride” and “bridegroom” are commonly used. The analogy under consideration, if fully carried out, explains at the same time the difference and the organic connection between the eternal and adoptive sonship. The latter is intended to raise the creature to the dignity of God’s own Son. This is effected by the Son contracting a spiritual marriage with the creature; viz. by communicating the Divine Substance in the manner described. Further, the dignity of the Only begotten Son comes out more strikingly when, as Bridegroom, He communicates His Sonship to His bride, than when He is spoken of as the “First-born among many brethren” (Rom. 8:29).

3. Another analogy illustrating the communication of the Divine Substance to the sons of adoption is found in the union between the spiritual soul and the body. The Divine Substance cannot enter the creature so as to form part of it; it is necessarily communicated as a living, substantial principle, the possession of which by the creature represents a substantial conjunction, and moreover a substantial similarity between the progenitor and the progeny. The Holy Ghost is sent to the soul to inform it with supernatural life in the same manner as the soul itself is sent by God into the body to inform it with natural life. St. Paul points to this character of the union in 1 Cor. 6:17–19, where, after speaking of the “joining” with God (κόλλησις), He compares the sanctified creature to a temple filled with and possessed by the Holy Ghost. The text quoted, and its parallels (1 Cor. 3:16, 17, and 2 Cor. 6:16), are the classical texts in proof of the substantial union with God. From the indwelling of the Holy Ghost the Apostle infers that we are not our own but God’s, which shows that the indwelling establishes between the Holy Ghost and man a union equivalent to the union of the human soul with the body. We may, therefore, call it “an informing;” not, however, in a literal sense, because the Divine and the created substances cannot be parts of one nature, and also because the human soul, not being matter, cannot be the bearer of a higher form. It is best described as an informing by conjunction and penetration or inhabitation, similar in its effects to the natural information whereby matter and form constitute one nature. In this respect the relation between the Holy Ghost and the soul is perfectly similar to that between the body of the faithful and the Body of Christ received in Holy Communion. Again, as the Fathers point out, it is analogous to the relation which exists in Christ between His Divine Nature and Substance and His human nature and substance; with this difference, however, that in Christ one Person has two natures, whereas, in the order of grace, two persons are united for one purpose. The latter analogy is fully borne out by the language of Scripture. Both indwellings of the Divinity in humanity (viz. in Christ and in sanctified souls) are designated by the same terms and represented as a sealing and anointing of the flesh with the Holy Ghost or with God’s own Spirit (2 Cor. 1:22, et passim). The sealing and anointing convey the idea of communication by insertion, as, e.g., the insertion of a jewel in a ring, and of filling, as e.g. a vessel with precious balm. As the sealing and anointing are done by the Spirit, they point to a communication of life; and as this Spirit is God’s own Spirit, they imply a participation in the Divine Life, a dignity, a holiness, and a likeness to God best expressed as a communication or fellowship of and with the Holy Ghost (2 Cor. 13:13).

4. Starting from the notion that the Holy Ghost, by communicating the Divine Substance to the sanctified, establishes between Him and them a relation analogous to that between spirit and flesh in man, or between Divinity and humanity in Christ, we can easily determine the connection of the Indwelling with the constitution of the state of grace. Speaking generally, the connection consists in this, that the possession of the Holy Ghost, the Substantial Uncreated Grace, conjoined to and dwelling in the creature, concurs with created grace, inherent in and affecting the creature, so as to give a higher lustre to adoptive sonship and a deeper foundation to its privileges than created grace alone could give. Thus, to give a few details, in the Greek theory the sonship is more than an accidental likeness of the creature to the Divine Nature; it entails the joint possession of God’s own Spirit and of the Substance of the Divine Nature; it implies a substantial relationship and a substantial likeness to God, and, lastly, a substantial welding together of God and the creature and of the creature and God. The holiness of the adopted sons is also more than a quality or accident of the soul; it is like a seal and an unction—that is, an ornament and a refreshment—of which the Holy Ghost is not only the author but the substance. Again, the possession of the Holy Ghost gives to the sanctified that personal dignity which makes them pleasing to God and enables them to perform salutary works; it causes God to extend to them the Love He bears to Himself, and to admit them to Divine privileges.

III. When the Greek theory explains the union of the Holy Ghost with the sanctified as a union into one organic whole, it certainly introduces an element not contained in the Latin theory, which admits only the moral union of friendship. There is, however, no contradiction between the two. The organic union of the Greek Fathers is, after all, only equivalent to physical union, as the name Indwelling itself sufficiently shows. Such a union does not interfere with the distinction of persons and natures, nor, consequently, with the union of friendship. On the other hand, the friendly union of God with the sanctified acquires, by reason of the presence and influence of the Divine Substance, the character of simultaneous organic life and of fusion into one being.

The main point, however, is to show that, in the Greek theory, the indwelling of the Holy Ghost does not make the infusion of created grace superfluous or unimportant.

1. In order to transform the soul into His living temple, the Holy Ghost must endow it with a new principle of life, and adorn it in a manner becoming its exalted dignity. The infused virtues are the principle of Divine life, and elevating grace gives the temple of the Holy Ghost the required sanctity and glory. The Fathers compare the indwelling Spirit of God to a living fire which absorbs and assimilates all the powers of the soul. Again, created grace is required to act as a disposition for the reception of the Holy Ghost and as a bond of union between Him and the sanctified soul. The disposition for the reception of the Holy Ghost lies in Charity (John 14:23), and in elevating grace, which prepare the innermost soul for the coming of its Divine Guest. The transformation of the soul by elevating grace may be considered as the special link binding it to the Holy Ghost. In fact, this link or bond is analogous to that which unites child and father, wife and husband, body and soul: it implies, therefore, an active and plastic influence from one substance on the other, and a dependence of the formed or transformed substance on the substance which communicates itself. Although these two elements may be found also in infused Charity, they stand out more strikingly in the elevation of the soul to a supernatural state; for in this case the very substance of the soul is affected and is made like unto the Divine Substance, whereas Charity is but an accidental quality of the soul, and cannot be the foundation of a substantial relation. Thus, then, the infusion of grace, as a quality affecting the very being of the soul, represents also the entrance of the Holy Ghost into the soul. By virtue of this grace He takes root in the soul’s innermost depths (Ecclus. 24:16), and establishes there His throne, from which He pours out the Divine gifts on the sanctified soul. This grace gives the Holy Ghost Himself to the soul; all other graces are but operations of the Holy Ghost either consequent upon or preparatory to His coming.

2. The importance of created grace is not diminished by the introduction of Uncreated Grace as a constituent element of the state of grace. The latter is not introduced in order to make up for what is wanting in created grace, but in order to place Uncreated Grace, the substantial principle, side by side with created grace, the accidental principle of the state of grace, thus introducing an element which the creature, even in its highest possible perfection, cannot contain, viz. substantial union with God. The substantial principle exercises in union with the accidental one, but in quite a different manner, the functions of sanctifying grace. Created grace preserves all its power and importance, and, moreover, assumes the character of a “grace of union” similar to the hypostatic union in Christ, inasmuch as it is the bond of union between the soul and the Holy Ghost.

SECT. 147.—THE STATE OF GRACE (CONCLUDED)—ITS CHARACTER OF NEW CREATION—GRACE AND FREE WILL

I. As grace gives the creature a new and higher state of being, its bestowal by God is analogous and equivalent to the generation or creation of a new living being; and since this new being is of a kind which no created power can either produce or claim by any title, the production of it must be placed side by side with the creation of nature as a “supernatural creation.” This notion is familiar to Scripture, to the Fathers, and the Theologians. The parallelism, however, is only perfect between the gift of grace and the “second creation”—that is, the formation of the cosmos out of the chaos already created—inasmuch as the communication of grace builds up in the soul a supernatural cosmos. Nay, the communication of grace is even more a creation than the second natural creation. The things formed in the second creation can be reproduced by generation, and are, one and all, dependent on created causes. Grace, on the contrary, cannot be reproduced by generation, and is not dependent for its being on the natural powers of its subject. God alone produces and reproduces it. He may, indeed, use created forces as external instruments for its communication, but the subject of grace can itself co-operate only indirectly and negatively, viz. by putting no obstacles in the way. From this point of view, the bestowal of grace has an analogon in the production of the human soul, which is at once dependent on God and independent of the body. But the soul is produced as a substance not essentially dependent on the body, and consequently its production is like the “first creation.” Grace, on the other hand, is essentially produced as an accidental form of a subject.

1. From the point of view of “second creation,” Holy Scripture speaks of the higher life given in grace as regeneration (ἀναγέννησις), transformation (μεταμόρφωσις), new creation or reformation. In the language of Scripture and of the Church, all these designations convey the secondary meaning of “restoration to a higher state of perfection destroyed by sin.” The direct and proximate sense, however, is that a second being, higher and more godlike, is added to the purely natural, and that the creature who receives it is brought back to that perfect likeness to God which it possessed at the beginning. The renovation (ἀνακαίνωσις) of the soul by grace has an analogon in the renovation of heaven and earth at the end of time (2 Pet. 3:13 sqq.), so much the more as this renovation, according to Rom. 8:19, is but a consequence and a reflection of the glory of the children of God to be made manifest at the end of time.

2. The gift of grace is often described by the Greek Fathers as τελείωσις—that is, final perfection pure and simple. The creature endowed with grace has a perfection beyond all the requirements of its nature, and, as this “superabundant” perfection implies the possession of the Highest Good, it is final. By it the image of God, formless and lifeless in natural man, acquires a specific likeness to its Divine prototype.

3. To answer to the notion of a second birth and second creation, grace must introduce into nature a “new nature,” or principle of activity. This need not be a substantial principle, like the human soul, but it must be equivalent to a substantial principle in its effects. Grace fulfils this condition by making the sanctified participate in the Divine Nature. Hence the complement and final perfection given by grace, consists in the “supernature” with which grace endows the soul. Nature and supernature are organically bound into one whole: together they constitute a complete nature of a higher order, after the manner of body and soul, plant and graft, viz. the nature of sons of God. Sin, being inconsistent with grace, is really the “death of the soul,” driving out, as it does, the supernatural principle of its higher life.

4. Grace also gives to the soul a higher order of life, viz. a godlike life. The excellence of the Divine Life in the Holy Ghost, and through Him communicated to the creature, consists in the purest spirituality and sanctity; hence grace manifests its Divine character as principle of supernatural life in enabling nature to lead a spiritual and holy life of a supernatural order. From this point of view, grace is always conceived in connection with the Holy Ghost, Whose breath or emanation it is, and the life it inspires is called “spiritual” life. The spirituality and holiness of grace, as contrasted with the inferior spirituality and holiness to which unendowed nature can attain, manifest themselves in many ways. Nature can be the principle and the subject of both a holy and an unholy life, of virtuous actions as well as of error and sin. Grace, on the contrary, being the pure radiance of God’s truth and goodness, remains pure and holy whatever may happen in the soul where it resides, just as the light of the sun does not lose its purity by contact with unclean things. Grace cannot, like nature, exist side by side with sin; God withdraws it as soon as the creature turns away from Him as the highest Truth and Goodness. This quality of grace is seen best in the state of glory, when it excludes not only sin but even the possibility of sinning. The text “Every one that is born of God committeth not sin; for His seed abideth in him: and he cannot sin, because he is born of God” (1 John 3:9), is commonly understood to refer to the incompatibility of sin and grace: it is impossible to be at the same time a child of God and a sinner.

II. The elevating influence of grace must specially affect free will. Not only must it strengthen natural liberty, but raise it to a supernatural order, and transform it into the “freedom of the children of God,” the freedom of the Spirit or of grace. This freedom consists in a power given to the created will of moving in a higher sphere—that is, of aiming at supernatural objects, and of producing supernatural works. In this sphere, the creature ceases to be the servant of God; it is His child, it loves and serves Him as a child, and enjoys the rights and privileges of a child. The Greek Fathers love to contrast the perfect and holy liberty of the sons of God with the servitude proper to the creature as such. The Latin Fathers, on the other hand, look upon it as the perfect liberty of original man in opposition to liberty impaired by sin. All, however, agree in including in the perfect freedom of the sons of God the freedom from sin and misery, or “from the servitude of corruption” (Rom. 8:21), in as far as these imperfections are an obstacle to the attainment of perfect beatitude, and especially to the exercise of free will. In this sense the Schoolmen describe freedom in the order of grace as “freedom from all evil”—that is, power to avoid or to overcome all evil, and freedom for all good—that is, power to perform works supernaturally good, and to attain a supernatural end.

III. The infusion of grace does not destroy the substance and the natural perfections of the soul; neither does it remove the soul’s natural imperfections, at least not until the state of glory is reached. The possibility of error and of sin exists side by side with grace, because the proper effect of grace is but to give higher possibilities to the soul. It is, however, clear that, thanks to these higher powers, error and sin are avoided with less difficulty. As sin is still possible, whereas the coexistence of sin and grace is impossible, it follows that grace can be lost, although intended by God to be everlasting. Again, as grace cannot exist without existing in a subject, it further follows that grace is destructible and perishable. The sinner who causes its destruction commits an assault on the living temple of God.

SECT. 148.—RELATION OF NATURE AND NATURAL FREE WILL TO GRACE—THE “OBEDIENTIAL” FACULTY—THE ABSOLUTE GRATUITY OF GRACE

1. The endowment of nature with grace must first of all be possible. But this supposes in nature a “receptivity” for grace, an aptitude or capacity for receiving it. Intellectual creatures alone possess this capacity, which is one of their specific perfections. Grace presupposes nature as a free and active principle which it endows with an activity of a higher order. Hence nature’s receptivity appears as an aptitude and capacity for the reception of superior activity and freedom, and, in this respect, implies the existence of natural activity as necessarily as the receptivity for a graft presupposes the life of the branch.

2. The receptivity for grace, as compared with other faculties (potentiæ) of the creature, is a natural faculty in as far as it is essentially given with rational nature; but it greatly differs from all other passive or active natural faculties. All these imply a possibility of realization in and by the natural order of things; just as a germ is developed and attains its final perfection in and by its environment. But the natural receptivity for grace and supernatural life is of a totally different character: its realization and development entirely depend on a free decree and on a fresh intervention of the creative power of God. Hence its “naturalness” must be reduced to this, that the creature is, by its nature, adapted, and, under certain circumstances, in duty bound, to obey the command of the Creator raising it to a higher estate. The receptivity in question, then, is an “obediential faculty” (potentia obedientalis), as St. Thomas, following St. Augustine, has styled it—that is, a power or faculty to obey God when He is working above nature, yet in and through nature; or, in other words, a capacity of receiving from God the power to produce effects beyond the receiver’s natural powers (see 3, q. 11, a. 1). Obediential capacity of some kind is common to all creatures, yet rational creatures alone have been transformed from simple images of God into His supernatural likeness.

Without entering into the subtle distinctions of the Schoolmen, we may say that when the possibility of supernatural life is once known, the mind, which naturally aspires to its highest possible happiness, desires such life. But the desire is not of a kind that requires fulfilment; it is merely a high aspiration. Supposing, however, that the creature has been actually called to supernatural life and has missed it, the non-fulfilment of these aspirations would cause positive unhappiness, which is in fact the greatest punishment of the damned. The obediential power, then, is an indifferent or neutral power—that is, a power by which something is possible but is not necessary. Yet it is not a cold indifference; it meets grace with an ardent desire; it makes the introduction of grace smooth and easy, and makes free opposition to grace to be an offence against God and against self.

II. 1. Free will is the chief faculty to be submitted to the elevating influence of grace. Although we cannot conceive grace as acting in a nature deprived of free will, still the exercise of unendowed free will is not essential to the acquisition or the working of grace. The efficacy of infant Baptism shows that grace is communicated even where the exercise of natural free will is physically impossible. When, however, the subject which receives grace is able to exercise its faculties, certain free acts may be admissible and even required, in order to dispose it to receive grace in a manner fitting the intellectual nature of the subject and the dignity of grace. But these free acts are not of necessity merely natural. Natural acts, as we shall see, cannot constitute a positive and direct preparation for the reception of grace, and, on the other hand, before bestowing habitual grace, God grants the “grace of internal vocation,” which is an actual grace, directly intended as a preparation and enabling free will to act supernaturally.

The denial of nature’s immediate receptivity for actual grace was one of the fundamental errors of the Semi-pelagians. They held that the congruous and fruitful acceptance of grace required a favourable disposition of the will, which they compared with the opening of the eye to catch the light, or with the setting of the sails to catch the wind. Hence their other error, that “grace is not entirely gratuitous,” because there is some merit in the natural preparatory disposition. The root of the whole heresy lies in a false conception of free will. Both Semi-pelagians and Pelagians held that an act which depended on a previous Divine influence could not be a free act. It is, however, evident that man’s free will, like all else in creation, is under Divine control, and, therefore, can be moved by God to act according to its own free nature.

2. Grace cannot be obtained, nor its acquisition be made easier, nor nature’s receptivity for grace be increased by the exercise of free will. It is first of all evident that no act of the natural will can obtain the destiny or vocation to eternal life, in the way that the services of a subject to his king might move the king to adopt the subject, or as the merits of Christ have obtained for man the vocation to grace. If such were the case, free will would naturally possess a power denied to it in the order of grace itself: for in this order the acts of free will are not meritorious of the vocation to eternal life—their meritoriousness presupposes the vocation. The personal dignity conferred upon the adopted sons enables them to perform acts worthy of eternal life. But such personal dignity is entirely wanting before the adoption; hence natural free will cannot produce an act proportionate in value to a supernatural good—in other words, cannot merit grace. The same argument proves that unendowed acts cannot even “positively” prepare or dispose the creature for the communication of grace. In fact, a disposition making the bestowal of grace, if not due, at least congruous, would imply between the disposing natural acts and the supernatural gifts a proportion which does not exist. Again, free will is unable to prepare, dispose, or move itself in such a manner that the infusion of grace should follow in a natural way, as the creation of the soul follows the organization of the matter to be informed by it. The natural disposition would be “a beginning of salvation,” whereas this beginning must be supernatural. In fact, such a disposition would constitute a positive participation in the acquisition of grace, either as inducing God to grant it, or as being a striving on the part of the creature in proportion with it.

All, then, that the creature is able to do is to keep and to perfect the capacity for grace. This preserving and perfecting of the “obediential power” is a purely negative preparation and disposition, as it consists entirely in removing the obstacles which the abuse of free will might put in the way. Considered in relation to the “smoother working” of grace, it is also a positive preparation, but as regards the first acquisition of grace, it is entirely negative and indirect, like the preparation of the soil for the reception of the seed, or the cutting of the branch for the insertion of the graft. No intrinsic connection exists between the acts of free will and the bestowal of grace. God may or may not give it to a well-disposed subject, just as He pleases. That He does usually give it is not in consequence of any law or rule, but of His own Divine pleasure. “To them that do what in them lies God does not deny His grace” and “God does not forsake unless He is forsaken” are axioms which apply to the will aided by grace, and only on that understanding express the ordinary way in which grace is communicated.

The above doctrine is laid down in the Second Council of Orange, can. 6, 7, quoting the texts, “What hast thou that thou hast not received?” (1 Cor. 4:7); and, “By the grace of God I am what I am” (1 Cor. 15:10).

SECT. 149.—RELATION OF NATURE TO GRACE (CONTINUED)—THE PROCESS BY WHICH NATURE IS RAISED TO THE STATE OF GRACE

I. The vocation of the creature to the state of grace, being an entirely free act of God, need not necessarily take place at the time of creation. The vocation itself, its mode, and its time, are all equally in the hand of God. Hence we can conceive the vocation to grace as taking the form of an offer or an invitation from God to the creature; and the reception of grace as a free act of the creature. An analogy to this may be found in an invitation addressed by a prince to a person of lowly rank to become his adoptive child or his bride. In our case, however, the vocation includes a new birth and a new creation, and consequently its acceptance requires something more than an external, objective call, viz. an internal drawing or elevating influence which enables the creature to answer the call in a fitting manner. In other words, the creature’s action is itself the result of a supernatural grace, which receives different names. Viewed as preceding any operation on the part of the creature, it is called “prevenient” grace; as instrument of the Divine call, it is termed “grace of vocation or inspiration.” It is also a “moving grace” (gr. excitans) and a “helping grace.” The part played by free will in the motion to grace may be described as “a supernatural function of natural freedom.”

The Church teaches the possibility and necessity of the creature’s self-motion towards grace, only as regards the grace of justification granted to sinners, in which case the “turning to God” is at the same time “a turning away from sin.” But this implies also the possibility of a turning to God in creatures not guilty of sin. In their case, the conversion is simply a desire to be raised to the high estate of adopted sons. The question, then, arises as to the necessity and importance of the conversion to God for the admission into the state of grace, both on the part of the just and of sinners.

II. The striving of the creature after grace (motus ad gratiam) consists in a free desire of grace and in the willingness to act in accordance with it, accompanied by a firm hope that grace will be given. Faith comes in as leading to the desire and the willingness, and as the foundation of the hope. The motion or striving is perfect in its kind as soon as the willingness extends to the performance of all the acts of supernatural life, including Charity.

The import of the motion towards grace is that it is a disposition and a preparation of the subject for the reception of grace. To the creature’s natural receptivity, which implies merely the possibility of admitting grace, it adds a direct and positive receptivity or aptitude, enabling the creature not only to receive grace passively, but to actively and freely accept it. These acts modify the natural receptivity, inasmuch as they show due respect to grace, and assure its free working in the subject. Although such disposition and preparation are something purely moral, yet they have an analogy with the physical disposition of matter for the reception of its form, especially with the organic disposition of the body for the admission of the soul. The difference is, that the preparation is supernatural. As, according to a law of nature, the soul is regularly infused as soon as the body is fit to receive it, in like manner, according to the supernatural law, grace is regularly infused as soon as the soul is properly disposed.

Further, we must consider the motion towards grace as a conversion to God, since He is the Bestower of grace, of Whom grace is expected as a free gift and as the bond of friendship. In this respect, also, the motion is no more than a disposition and preparation, inasmuch as it is not strictly meritorious. Yet, by reason of prevenient grace and of the call to sanctifying grace implied in it, the motion has all the significance of the dispositions of a person of humble station with regard to the prince who offers to confer on him the dignity of adopted son. Hence it can, to a certain extent, procure the gift of sanctifying grace, and act as a link connecting the creature in friendship with God, so that the gift of grace, on the part of God, may be considered as an acknowledgment and as a return of the friendly dispositions of the creature. Thus, between the aspiration of the creature and the condescension of God, there can exist an intrinsic congruence and correspondence; as Scripture says, “Turn ye unto Me and I will turn unto you” (Zach. 1:3), and “He that loveth Me shall be loved of My Father, and I will love him” (John 14:21). When the conversion to God is perfect—that is, when it includes Charity—the relation is so close that the gift of grace and Divine friendship is infallibly granted on the part of God.

III. The bestowal of grace consequent upon the dispositions of free will seems so completely in harmony with the nature of grace and the nature of man and of angels, that this form recommends itself as the more likely to be adopted by God. As far as the justification of sinners is concerned, it is certain that God does not justify them without their co-operation, according to the axiom, “He Who created thee without thy aid will not justify thee without it.”

From these considerations, most of the Schoolmen have been of opinion that even in the state of innocence a motion of the free will is presumably required before grace is given, so that angels and men before the Fall, and all infants and sinners alike come under the above law. The difficulty that infants are unable to do free acts is met in this way: when infants receive grace through Baptism, the faith and promises of the Church take the place of the free acts of the infants; if the state of original innocence had continued, the children born in it would have received grace by reason of the free acts by which Adam disposed himself to receive it, just as they are now born in sin by reason of his fall. The presumed generality of the law led the Franciscan school of theology to infer that grace was not given to our first parents and to the angels “in the very instant” of their creation. St. Thomas, however, and the greater part of his school do not come to this conclusion. They think it possible that, as the first man and woman and the angels were created with the full use of their free will, they were able to perform the required supernatural act of free motion in the very instant of their creation, and, consequently, at the same moment, to be endowed with grace.

It must, however, be acknowledged that the law in question rests only on presumptions and reasons of fittingness, and is not so certain that on its account the simultaneousness of creation and elevation to grace ought to be denied. Grace and nature were undoubtedly produced at the same time. Moreover, we can give as good reasons against the law as in its favour. For instance, supernatural life must be exercised by a supernatural principle: hence this principle must be possessed before any supernatural activity can take place. Again, nature and supernature constitute one perfect image of the Creator; it is therefore fitting that they should coexist from their first beginning.

The notion that the state of grace is a mystical marriage with God may be upheld by both schools, provided that the consent be taken in the sense required by the nature of this mystical union. Its type is the union of Adam and Eve. God created an individual bride for an individual bridegroom; He decreed their union and obliged the bride to accept it. Hence the creature’s acceptance of grace is an act of conjugal fidelity, and its refusal would be like unto adultery against God, even without any previous acceptance. The proof that grace was given in the act of creation will be given below.

SECT. 150.—NATURE’S VOCATION TO GRACE BY A LAW OF THE CREATOR

I. It is a fundamental truth of Christianity that the vocation to grace and supernatural life is given as a strict commandment to every intellectual creature from the very beginning of its existence. It is, therefore, equivalent to a law of nature, strictly binding and universal in its application, although not essential to created nature. St. Augustine calls it a natural law, because it is based upon the essential dependence of the creature on the Creator, by reason of which the Creator is free to destine His creatures to any end He pleases.

Contempt or transgression of this law, or even indifference to it, is a violation of natural law proper, because natural law binds creatures not only to carry out the Divine ordinances founded on their essence, but also to accept from the Creator their ultimate destiny. Resisting the Divine vocation to grace is, then, a sin against nature and against God, the Author of nature. And it is a grievous sin because it deprives nature of its highest good and frustrates its ideal perfection; it is a deep ingratitude to God and an attack upon God’s dominion over His creatures; and, lastly, it prevents the carrying out of a whole system of commandments, nay, it perverts the whole order of divinely instituted worship.

The binding power, the universality and origin of the vocation to grace are implied in the whole teaching of the Church, especially in the dogmas of Original Sin and Redemption. Christ compares the kingdom of heaven to a wedding feast, and declares that the invited guests deserve great punishment simply for not accepting the invitation (Matt. 22), and He orders the Gospel to be preached to all creatures, threatening with condemnation those who refuse to believe (Mark 16:15).

II. If, as a matter of fact, all rational creatures are called to a supernatural end, it follows that their natural end, viz. happiness by the fulfilment of their natural aspirations by natural means, is no longer attainable as a distinct, separate end. Hence God is not bound to grant natural happiness to any one who, through his own fault, fails to attain supernatural happiness. There are not now two eternal lives, one of the natural, the other of the supernatural order; the former can only be attained in the latter. All moral actions must therefore be directed towards the supernatural end, and all actions not so directed have no eternal, but only a temporal, value. Again, the Divine institutions in the order of nature, such as society and matrimony, are, in the Divine plan, subordinate to the supernatural destination of things; and the gifts and helps given by God to creatures in connection with their natural end, are really given towards the supernatural end, and are made dependent on the creatures’ striving after it. Hence those who, through their fault, despise their supernatural vocation, have no hope of any true temporal felicity.

The final state of children who die unbaptized, and therefore in original sin, is certainly not the supernatural happiness to which they were destined; nor is it exactly that state of natural felicity to which man would have had a natural title had he not been called to a higher state.

III. A further consequence of the call to grace is that all moral actions of creatures are valued according to the supernatural standard. In general, the measure of the goodness or righteousness of moral actions is their conformity with the will of God, or their proportion with the final perfection of their authors. But it is God’s will that all rational creatures should attain supernatural final perfection. Hence, only those actions are simply and truly good and just and pleasing to God by which we serve Him as He desires to be served in the order of grace. The difference between natural and supernatural actions is an essential one, affecting their very goodness and righteousness. The latter alone fulfil the Divine Law as God wishes it to be fulfilled, and are, therefore, alone good and right, purely and simply. Actions which are only naturally good are not what they ought to be in the existing order, and, so far, may be called bad or defective. St. Augustine describes them as “a running along outside the right road” (cursus præter viam), which implies on the one hand that they are defective, and on the other that they are not positively a turning away from God. He also calls them “bad actions and sins (peccata),” on the principle that what is not completely and entirely good is bad (Bonum ex integrâ causâ, malum ex quocunque defectu).

IV. Since supernatural actions are alone good, purely and simply, in the sense described, à fortiori nature is good, right, and pleasing to God only when adorned with supernatural sanctity, and thus brought into harmony with its supernatural end. Nature deprived of grace by sin is not merely less pleasing to God, less good, and less just, but it is bad, wrong, and displeasing to God; it is a bad tree which cannot bring forth good fruit. Sanctifying grace is an essential element, or rather the substance, of that goodness and righteousness without which nature itself cannot be called good and right; it is necessary to the completness (integritas) of the justice demanded of nature.

V. Nature, then, is so bound up with grace that it only exists for grace, and is entirely subordinate to it. God created it only as a basis for and an organ of supernatural life. Nature, therefore, does not belong to the creature, nor is it some common, ordinary property of God; it is a specially reserved and appropriated Divine possession, the sanctuary of His own Spirit, on Whom its whole life and being depend in the same manner as the life and being of the body depend on the soul. Hence the creature is bound to acknowledge and to honour this proprietary right of the Holy Ghost, and to submit its whole internal and external, individual and social life to the Holy Ghost and to the law of His grace (cf. 1 Cor. 6:19)

VI. The conjunction or marriage of nature and grace appears in its full light in the unity of nature and grace which existed in the idea of the Creator and was realized in the creation of man and angels. The Fathers look upon grace as an integral part of a created rational being; and, conversely, they look upon nature as intended by God to be endowed by grace: nature and grace are parts of one organic whole. The Greek Fathers, following St. Irenæus, derive their notion from Gen. 1:26, “Let Us make man to Our image and likeness,” which they take to mean that “image” expresses the natural relation and “likeness,” the supernatural relation of man to God. They consider the “breathing in” of the living soul (Gen. 2:7) to be the infusion of grace, so that the soul and the Holy Ghost were given at the same time. Although St. Augustine disputes this interpretation, he nevertheless admits the doctrine of the Greek Fathers. If possible, he even lays more stress on it when he reckons grace as an integral element of nature as by God constituted.

SECT. 151.—FUNCTION OF THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER IN THE DIVINE PLAN OF THE UNIVERSE

I. The ultimate end of all things created is the glory of the Creator. This is attained in three ways: by the manifestation of the Divine Power and Love, by the worship paid by creatures, and by the creatures’ eternal happiness in the possession of God. In the natural order this threefold glory would be very imperfectly obtained. In the supernatural order, on the contrary, it is brought about with such perfection that nothing short of a hypostatic union of the creature with God could surpass it. The reader who has followed the present treatise will find no difficulty in this statement. In the elevation of the creature to the participation of God’s own life, the Divine Power and Love assert themselves to a degree far beyond their manifestation in the creation of nature. The supernatural worship given by the sons of God is far more perfect than the servile worship of mere creatures. As St. Gregory of Nazianzum says, “God is united to gods, and known by them;” He is properly the God of gods and the Lord of lords. Lastly, the beatific vision is a mode of possessing God, the perfection of which essentially surpasses the perfection of the possession by natural knowledge and love. In this manner, then, the end of all things, that God should be “All in all” (1 Cor. 15:28), is completely fulfilled: creatures are united to God as intimately as if they were one with Him; God, as the principle, the subject-matter, and the final object of all their spiritual life, replenishes, penetrates, and pervades them. The creature is “called back to Him from Whom it sprang,” the infinite distance between it and the Creator being bridged over by the beatific vision. Although the creature and God cannot be “one being,” yet they become one through the most intimate union and fellowship.

II. The supernatural order contributes, in quite a special manner, to the attainment of the highest and final object of the universe by externally manifesting the internal productions in the Blessed Trinity and the communion and fellowship of the Divine Persons.

1. The elevation of creatures to the godlike state of adoptive sons is an imitation and, therefore, a manifestation of the eternal generation of God the Son. Considered as a communication of Divine Nature by love, it is also an image and, as it were, an extension or ramification of the eternal procession of the Holy Ghost.

2. The development of godlike life, through the knowledge and love of God as He is in Himself, is a reflection of the eternal productions of the Logos and the Holy Ghost.

3. Through grace the creature participates in the Divine Nature, and thus enters into fellowship with the Divine Persons (1 John 1:3). This Divine fellowship is subject to the law which also rules human friendship: “Friendship either finds the friends equal or makes them so; all that they have becomes each other’s.” The position which this fellowship secures to the creature is best expressed by the formula generally adopted since Alexander of Hales: the creature is made the Daughter of the Father, the Spouse of the Son, and the Temple of the Holy Ghost.

III. The Glory of God must be attained by intellectual creatures considered as a whole as well as by each of them. The adopted sons are a community of saints, a Church and Kingdom of God. “You are a chosen generation, a kingly priesthood, a holy nation, a purchased people” (1 Pet. 2:9; cf. Exod. 19:6, 7). “You are no more strangers and foreigners, but you are fellow-citizens with the saints, and domestics of God” (Ephes. 2:19). The dignity of the chosen people of God is such that God dwells in them and walks among them (2 Cor. 6:16) as in His own heavenly city. Cf. Heb. 12:22; Apoc. 21 and 22, etc.

The union of the “saints” with God leads farther to a most intimate union among the saints themselves, “that they may be one as we also are one” (John 17:22; cf. Ephes. 2:19–22).

The supernatural order of the world culminates in this, that God builds unto Himself, out of His creatures, a Church founded on His Son and filled with the Holy Ghost—a Church which is the body and the bride of our Lord Jesus Christ, and “the fulness of Him Who is filled all in all” (Eph. 1:23).

CHAPTER III

THEORY OF THE RELATIVELY SUPERNATURAL

SECT. 152.—THE SUPERNATURAL ENDOWMENT OF MANS NATURE AS DISTINCT FROM THE ANGELS

I. The relatively supernatural consists in goods and privileges which are above the requirements of human nature, but are natural to the angels. Man endowed with these gifts is raised, to some extent, to the nature of the angels (cf. § 136).

II. The final perfection to which man is called includes the salvation of his entire nature—that is, of his body as well as of his soul. Man is to be transfigured and his whole nature renewed; his earthy and animal elements are to be transformed into heavenly and spiritual elements, and his whole nature raised to the level of pure spirits (1 Cor. 15:42 sqq.). The change is wrought by the Spirit of God, Who dwells in the soul and enables it so to subdue and assimilate to itself the earthy and animal elements that they cease to be of a different kind from it, and compose, with the soul, one homogeneous whole. Dissolution and corruption are then no longer possible, and all the conditions of bodily life cease to exist; all disturbing influences, all motions of concupiscence are excluded. In this state man “shall be as the angels of God” (Matt. 22:30), elevated above his own nature to that likeness with God which is natural to the angels.

In the very beginning, God exempted human nature from its inherent weakness, viz. the infirmity of the flesh and the consequent infirmity of the spirit, so that man, unless he willed otherwise, was free from the consequences of his weakness or had the power to prevent them.

The elevation of the first man comprised the following privileges (cf. § 133):—

1. Immortality.

2. Impassibility—that is, freedom from all bodily sufferings.

3. Immunity from a rebellious concupiscence—that is, the power either to prevent or to control all inordinate motions of the senses.

4. Immunity from ignorance and error, or the power to prevent all disturbing influences of the senses on the operations of the mind.

5. Immunity from sin and from difficulties in doing good; in other words, the power of being morally perfect by preventing all sensual influences from moving the will in a wrong direction.

6. Perfect control over external nature, especially over animals and hurtful natural influences.

As these privileges are beyond the power of pure nature, and as none of them is essential to man’s natural perfection, they are relatively supernatural. The Fathers, following Holy Scripture, describe the bestowal of them as a gracious glorification of nature, and as a clothing and crowning of man with heavenly honour and glory.

The fact that the first man was endowed with the aforesaid immunities and powers is a matter of faith. The granting of several of them, e.g. the immunity from death and rebel concupiscence, is expressly mentioned in the history of creation, and has been defined by Councils. All of them are presupposed in the Catholic doctrine concerning Original Sin, and are universally taught by Fathers and Theologians, especially by the Fathers in the controversy with the Pelagians.

IV. An essential difference exists between man’s original and his final perfection. The latter is a real transformation of all the elements of his nature which destroys even the root and possibility of his natural infirmities. The former, on the contrary, left the possibility of death, suffering, sin, etc., because it did not alter man’s nature. The only supernatural influence required for the privileges of the original state was an intrinsic strengthening, elevation, and clarification of man’s intellectual faculties—in the words of St. Thomas, “the removal of the infirmity of the mind by the vigour of reason.” A higher intrinsic quality of intellect and will is indeed necessary to account for the intellectual and moral perfection of the original state, but no intrinsic elevation of any faculty is required to account for the other privileges. The vigour of reason holds sway over the lower faculties, subdues the motions of the flesh, avoids the hurtful and utilizes the useful forces of nature for man’s own well-being and his dominion over lower creation.

V. The special effects of the original endowment of man with privileges raising him to almost angelic perfection, in as far as they are distinct from the effects of grace, are described as:

1. Incorruption (ἀφθαρσία);

2. Integrity;

3. Justice, or perfect Rectitude;

4. Innocence.

These four designations complete each other. The term incorruption, applicable also to man’s final perfection, is more frequently used by the Greek Fathers, who insist chiefly on the supernatural character of the original state. The same remark applies to the terms glory and beatitude (δόξα, μακαριότης) in connection with man’s original estate. The three other designations are more in favour with the Latin Fathers, who chiefly consider the original state in comparison with the state of Original Sin. The vagueness of the terms is determined by qualifying adjectives, such as perfect, full, original.

VI. Original justice might be lost, because it was not due to or required by nature, and, as it did not produce a radical change of nature, the fact that it was once granted did not imply that it would always last. Besides, original perfection, like sanctifying grace, was incompatible with grievous sin: the commission of sin entailed the loss of the privileges (Gen. 3:7, sqq.) Perfect justice implies perfect submission of reason and will to God; grievous sin implies an aversion of reason and will from God; justice and sin are therefore incompatible. But if sin destroys the principle upon which all the other privileges depend, it must also destroy the entire structure of original perfection. The same conclusion may be drawn from the close connection between original integrity and sanctifying grace, of which we shall speak further on.

VII. The absolutely supernatural is clearly not due to human nature, and is a free gift of grace. But there is some question as to whether the relatively supernatural is likewise not due (indebitum). Many Theologians who own that it is supernatural and gratuitous, say that God was bound “in decency” to grant it to man. The Church has not decided the matter, even after the controversies with Baius.

VIII. The gifts constituting the integrity of original nature—that is, the relatively supernatural on the one hand, and grace, or the absolutely supernatural, on the other—are gifts neither identical nor essentially bound together. Their essential difference is evident from the effects they produce externally and internally. Integrity raises and clarifies only the inferior side of the soul so as to bring man nearer to the nature of the Angels, whereas grace elevates and transforms the superior side of the soul into a perfect likeness of God Himself. The separability of the two gifts is likewise evident. We can easily conceive man raised to angelic perfection without being at the same time admitted to a participation in the Divine Life; and, vice versâ, we can conceive man in a state of grace without being freed from the imperfections inherent in his nature. The latter is, in fact, the present state of man when justified. In the beatific vision, however, the light of glory will consume all the weaknesses of human nature and raise it to a perfection higher even than that which is natural to the angels.

Although distinct and separable, yet integrity and grace, when bestowed together, unite into one harmonious organic whole. The Fathers look upon this union in the original state of man as an anticipation of his state of final beatitude in the vision of God, so that grace bears to integrity the same relation which the future glory of the soul bears to the future glory of the body. Integrity and grace, when combined, elevate man to the most perfect likeness with God attainable in this life; they dispose and prepare him for the still more complete likeness of eternal life.

To sum up: In the existing order of the universe the relatively supernatural does not constitute an independent, self-sufficient order. It is completely and thoroughly dependent on the order of grace—nay, it is but a ramification of the supernatural order. This dependence is not merely speculative; it is a truth of great theological and practical importance on account of its bearing on the fact that human nature itself is created for the supernatural order, and is entirely incorporated with it by the Creator. Cf. § 148.

CHAPTER IV

CONCRETE REALIZATION OF THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER

SECT. 153.—THE SUPERNATURAL IN THE ANGELIC WORLD

I. HOLY Scripture hints that all the angels were called to the vision of God, when it represents the good angels as actually seeing His Face, and only excludes the fallen ones from that privilege. Such is also the common tradition embodied in the opinion that man was called to fill the places left vacant by the fallen angels. At any rate, the supernatural vocation of man affords the strongest presumption for a similar vocation of the angels. The fact that many of them did fall supposes that they had to go through a trial, and to merit salvation. Like man, they were unable to attain supernatural life without the aid of actual and habitual grace. (Supra, p. 376.)

1. It is morally certain that all the angels once possessed sanctifying grace. Holy Scripture alludes to this fact, while patristic tradition is unanimous about it. The Fathers generally apply to the angels the texts Ezech. 28:12 sqq., and Isai. 14:12, which, however, taken literally, only refer to the kings of Tyre and Babylon. A better, though by no means a cogent proof is afforded by John 8:44, combined with Jude 1:6: “The devil stood not in the truth,” “the angels who kept not their principality.” Truth, in the language of the New Testament, means truth founded on grace and justice; and principality implies a dignity so high that we can hardly conceive it to have been unadorned with grace.

The tradition of the Fathers is unanimous that the angels also received grace in the moment of their creation (see St. Aug., De Civ. Dei, l. xi., c. 9). Theologians generally admit that the diversity of rank among the angels is an indication of diversity of grace received, because, on account of his unimpaired free will, every angel attained at once all the perfection possible to him. It may further be supposed that God created the angels with an amount of natural perfection proportionate to the measure of grace predestined to each of them, and also that the measure of grace given to the angels surpasses that given to men. Yet it is quite possible that some human beings attain to a higher degree of perfection than angels. That the Queen of Angels did so is taught expressly by the Church.

Grace was necessarily accompanied by the virtue of Faith and the knowledge of the supernatural order, culminating in the clear vision of God; because, without these, supernatural life in the state of probation is impossible. Most probably the knowledge of the supernatural order included a knowledge of the Trinity, and of the future Incarnation of the Logos, as these dogmas are so intimately connected with the order of grace.

2. The meritorious acts performed by the angels in consequence of the grace received, consisted in the free fulfilling of the supernatural law of God, or in the full subjection to God as the Author of grace and glory. The angels who persevered must have performed at least this one act of submission. But as regards the circumstances of this act, we have only more or less probable opinions. E.g., it may be that a special law of probation, analogous to that given to Adam, was given to the angels, and that it consisted in a restriction of their natural exaltedness above human nature, just as the commandment given to man consisted in a restriction of his dominion over visible nature.

3. From the words of Christ, “Their angels in heaven always see the Face of My Father Who is in heaven” (Matt. 18:10), we learn that, unlike the Patriarchs, the angels were admitted to the immediate vision of God as soon as they merited it. There is no reason why there should have been any interval.

II. The angels hold the first rank in the order of grace as well as in the order of nature. They actually possess the supernatural perfection to which man is but tending, and are therefore his model in the service and praise of God.

1. As the first-born of creation, they are called to co-operate in the Divine government of the world, and especially in carrying out the supernatural order in mankind. The nature of their co-operation results from the fellowship of all rational creatures, by reason of which they are one city of the saints, one temple of God, offering to God by Charity one great sacrifice. Men are fellow-citizens of the angels, or, rather, members of the same family of which God is the Father, and in which the perfect members are the born protectors and helpers of the yet imperfect members. St. Paul expresses this idea when he calls the heavenly Jerusalem “our mother” (Gal. 4:26). Man requires the protection of the good angels, not only because of his natural weakness, but also in order to resist the onslaught of the fallen angels, the princes and powers of darkness.

2. It is an article of faith that the angels are “ministering spirits, sent to minister for those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation” (Heb. 1:14). As Divine ambassadors and messengers they minister to man, not indeed as servants of man, but as servants of God. They act as guardians, guides, pedagogues, tutors, pastors, set over their weaker brethren by the common Father: “He hath given His angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways” (Ps. 90:11). At times they also execute the decrees of Divine justice, eg. Gen. 3:24; Exod. 22, 27 sqq.; 1 Paral. 21:16.

From many indications in Holy Writ, and from constant tradition, the guardianship of man is divided among the angels according to a fixed order, so that different spheres of action are assigned to different angels. Thus different nations and greater corporations, especially the several parts of the Church of God, are committed to the permanent charge of particular angels. The guardian angels of the Jews, Persians, and Greeks are mentioned Dan. 10:13, 20, 21, and 12:1: “Now I will return to fight against the prince of the Persians. When I went forth, there appeared the prince of the Greeks coming, and none is my helper in all these things but Michael your prince” (Dan. 10:20, 21). The title of prince given to the guardian angel implies a permanent office among the same people. The proof that the care of individual men is entrusted to angels is found in Matt. 18:10: “Take heed that you despise not one of these little ones; for I say to you that their angels in heaven always see the face of My Father Who is in heaven.” The first Christians testified to this doctrine when they thought it was not St. Peter but “his angel” who stood in their presence (Acts 12:6; cf. Psalm 33:8, and Heb. 1:14). The doctrine that “every one of the faithful is guarded by one or more angels,” although not exactly a matter of faith, is yet theologically certain, and to deny it would be rash. It is simply a consequence of the fellowship which Baptism establishes between man and angels. It is less certain, but still highly probable, that even the unbaptized are under the special custody of angels, on account of their supernatural vocation.

The common belief that each individual has his own guardian angel, or that there are as many guardian angels as men, is not so certain as the more general doctrine that all men are guarded by angels. It is quite possible for one angel to guard and protect several individuals.

(a). The functions of the guardian angels have chiefly to do with the eternal salvation of their charges, but, like Divine Providence and neighbourly love, they extend also to assistance in matters temporal. In matters spiritual the guardian angels behave towards us as tender and conscientious parents towards their children. They protect us against our invisible enemies, either by preventing the attack or by helping us to resist. They pray for us, and offer our prayers and good works to God. Lastly, they conduct the souls to the judgment seat of God, and introduce them into eternal glory (Luke 16:22).

The communication of the dead with the living, e.g. apparitions and death-warnings, are probably the work of guardian angels, as may also be the bilocation related of several saints.

(b). The position of the angels with regard to man entitles them to a worship consisting of love, respect, and reverence. Our fellowship with the family of God requires mutual love between the members; the excellent dignity of the angels demands grateful and submissive homage, but neither adoration nor slavish submission (Apoc. 22:8, 9). See St. Bernard, In Psalm. Qui habitat.

SECT. 154.—THE SUPERNATURAL IN MANKIND

I. The vocation to the supernatural end given to the first man and all his descendants is the basis of the whole Christian doctrine concerning sin and Redemption. The loss of the claim to heaven was a punishment of sin, and the restoration of that claim was the effect of Redemption. The Council of Trent defines that “Adam, the first man, having transgressed in Paradise the commandment of God, immediately lost that holiness and justice wherein he had been constituted” (sess. v., can. 1). This implies that Adam, before his sin, possessed the principle of eternal life, viz. sanctifying grace. The loss of grace was the primary effect of sin, and the essential effect of Redemption by Christ is a restoration of lost grace. The Fathers are unanimous on this point.

1. Although the Council of Trent has left the question undecided, there is no doubt that the first man received sanctifying grace in the instant of his creation, simultaneously with his nature; and that grace was part of that Divine likeness and of that rectitude and justice in which, according to Scripture, man was created. The Fathers were so thoroughly imbued with this notion that they held the bestowal of grace to be as important an element in the realization of the Divine Idea of man as the constitution of nature itself. Their frequent expressions “a new creature,” “nature instituted or fitted out,” “natural good,” signify nature as originally endowed with grace. From the same point of view they designate original grace as “natural” dignity, possibility, and rectitude. The texts of Scripture bearing on this question are conclusive only when taken in the sense given them by the Fathers. Such texts are, Eph. 4:23, 24, with Col. 3:9, 10; Gen. 1:27; Eccles. 7:30. But the real proof lies in the testimony of the Fathers, which is so strong that Baius, after collecting it (De Prima Hominis Justitia, c. i.) concludes that the Fathers taught the actual conjunction of nature and grace, not merely as a fact, but also as a natural necessity.

That the relatively supernatural (the gift of integrity) was given simultaneously with nature and dependently on sanctifying grace has been shown in § 152. Here we only note that the term “Original Justice” is never used by the Fathers, in the restricted sense of some Theologians, for “justice or original integrity”—that is, the integrity without sanctifying grace.

2. Although the supernatural endowment of man does not require that he should have the full use of his mental and bodily faculties from the beginning of his existence, yet it was fitting that those who were the source of the whole race, in the order both of nature and grace, should not begin life as undeveloped children. Like the first beings created of other species, they were perfect in body, and, like the angels, they were perfect in mind. Hence, at the very origin, the supernatural vocation and its necessary elements must have been revealed to them as they were to the angels. According to Scripture, Adam gave their names to the beasts of the field and to all living creatures (Gen. 2:20). In this fact Theologians see a proof that the mind of Adam was fully developed, and possessed a deep knowledge of nature.

3. Among the things revealed to Adam was his trial, viz. the commandment not to eat of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. This Divine precept contained a restriction of man’s dominion over nature, and required of him self-denial and obedience. The continuance of the state of integrity was dependent on his keeping the command. This we gather from the penalty of death attached to transgression. The loss of the privilege of immortality entails the loss of all the privileges of the original state. But if death was to happen only in the case of transgression, immortality and the other privileges were to last as long as the commandment was observed, or until man’s final consummation in heaven.

On account of the promise of continuance of privileges implied in the sanction of the law of probation, Theologians call this law a Testament or a pact (fædus). It is not properly a “contract,” because a contract requires the free consent of the two parties, whereas in this case consent was not freely given, but was imposed. The reasonableness of the precept is clear. Man having been exalted to a dignity to which he had no claim, it was only right that, by an act of obedience, he should acknowledge the absolute dominion of God over nature and the absolute gratuity of the graces and privileges received; and, on the other hand, it was reasonable that refusal of obedience should entail the loss of the gratuitous gifts.

II. In and with the first man all mankind were called to a supernatural end. Consequently, the endowment with supernatural grace was intended as an endowment of the nature common to all. Human nature is propagated by way of generation, God infusing the soul into the prepared organism. From this we can easily see how grace was to be handed down according to the design of God. At each generation a soul was to be infused endowed with grace and integrity. Thus the transmission of grace would be akin to an hereditary transmission, based upon the unity of nature, and bestowed upon all who derive their nature from Adam. This doctrine underlies the teaching of the Council of Trent (sess. v., c. 2), in condemning the proposition that “the holiness and justice which Adam received from God, he lost for himself only, not for us also.”

1. The transmission of grace to all mankind supposes the propagation and the unity of human nature as its foundation and condition; but the converse is not true. Although all men inherit the same nature from Adam, it is still conceivable and even reasonable that grace should be communicated to each individual according to and dependently on his own personal conduct. That the descendants of Adam were to receive grace only by reason of the obedience of their progenitor, was a positive disposition of the free will of God, dealing with mankind as one great whole. Nor had Adam necessarily the power by his own will to transmit grace to his progeny, any more than parents can now communicate the grace or even the natural qualities which they possess. The position of Adam as regards the transmission of grace consisted in this: he was chosen by God as the starting-point from which grace was to be spread among the human race through the channel of natural generation; and his good or bad conduct was made by God the condition of the communication or non-communication of grace to mankind.

2. What has been said will account for the participation of mankind in Adam’s punishment, i.e. in his degradation from the supernatural order. It does not, however, explain sufficiently the participation of mankind in Adam’s guilt; i.e. how the “death of the soul” is not only a penalty but also a sin. This explanation is arrived at by admitting, conjointly with the solidary right of the whole human race to original justice, an equally solidary obligation of fulfilling the law of probation. Neither of these two solidarities is essentially connected with the unity of mankind; both alike are positive Divine ordinances. God enacted that the will of the first representative of the race should represent the will of all his posterity; hence Adam’s prevarication is the prevarication of the entire race. Posterity was not, however, made responsible for its progenitor’s sin in the same degree as the progenitor himself, which will be further explained in the next book.

BOOK IV

THE FALL

THE supernatural dignity of adoptive sonship conferred by the Creator upon His creatures was lost to a portion of the angels by their revolt, and to the whole of mankind by Adam’s disobedience. We shall therefore divide this book into three chapters: I. Sin; II. The Fall of the Angels; III. The Fall of Man.

Alex, of Hales, Summa, p. ii. q. 94 sq.; St. Bonav. In ii. Sent.; St. Thom. 1 2, qq. 71–89 and Qq. Dispp. De Malo, with the commentaries of Suarez, Tanner, the Salmanticenses, Gonet, and Gotti; Bellarmine, Controv. De Amissione Gratiæ et Statu Peccati; Kilber, De Peccatis; Kleutgen, vol. ii.; Scheeben, book iv.

CHAPTER I

SIN

SECT. 155.—GENERAL NOTIONS OF EVIL AND SIN

I. 1. EVERY substance is in itself good; it becomes bad only when it is itself deprived of some perfection or when it deprives another substance of some perfection. Hence evil is the privation of some good, or a corruption of good. It is nothing positive, but the negation of a positive perfection. However, evil mostly consists of some positive disposition opposed to the perfection of the subject, which disposition is then evil in as far as it implies the negatives of perfection. As evil is only an accident, it must exist in a substance as its subject. Again, since it connotes a deficiency in perfection, it can only exist in finite and changeable beings. In these, however, the possibility of evil is connatural with the changeableness consequent upon their origin out of nothing; as no definite grade of perfection is essential to them, so the amount they actually receive is capable of decrease or increase. In the case of man, his composition of mind and matter necessarily exposes him to certain evils or imperfections.

2. The cause of evil is not something evil in itself. On the contrary, evil can only be produced accidentally by a cause which is itself good, and aims at some good object. In bodily evils this is manifest; the causes which inflict bodily suffering do so in the exercise of forces which are good in themselves, but which come into conflict with other forces. The evils arising from free actions are due to a good but misapplied principle. Sin, in particular, is possible only because it appears to the sinner as a subjective good. Hence the axiom: Evil is caused by good (causa mali bonum). Evil has, however, no efficient but rather a deficient cause; it owes its existence either to the defective action of a positive cause or to defective resistance to opposing influences.

3. From a theological point of view, evils may be divided into two classes: Voluntary evils (Sins) and Involuntary evils (Pain and Suffering). The evils of the first class are really “the” evil, that is, objects to be avoided and hated. They are also the greatest evils, because they injure at the same time their own author and the Author of nature. God cannot cause, but only permit and oppose them. The evils of the second class are only evils of the subject which naturally abhors them, yet they are not so detestable as to be avoided in all cases. God may cause them and use them as means to His ends; notably, as a penalty for sin. In the original order established by Him, there was no room for evils of this class. They came into the world with sin. As a matter of fact, then, all evils existing in this world spring from sin, the greatest and original evil. Hence the above division is equivalent to another which distinguishes “Evils of Guilt” and “Evils of Penalty” (mala culpæ, mala pænæ). Many evils may, however, be at the same time a guilt and a penalty.

II. Sin, in its theological and proper sense, consists in the conscious and voluntary transgression, lesion, or denial of the moral order imposed upon the creature by Divine Law. The philosophical notion of sin does not contain the element of Divine command. What to the theologian is a voluntary transgression of the law of God is looked upon by the philosopher as a transgression of the rational and natural order. Yet even in sound philosophy the notion of sin ought not to be dissociated from disobedience to the Lawgiver, for sin is always an action against the dictates of conscience, and these are but the commanding voice of God (Rom. 2:14–16).

I. Hence the essence of sin consists in the more or less express opposition of the human will against the Divine Will, an opposition which implies a certain neglect or contempt of the Divine Will itself. This contempt involves an “aversion from God as the ultimate End,” that is, a refusal of the submission and love which are His due. Sin averts or turns away the creature from God as the Highest Good in Himself, and from God as the Highest Good of the creature itself, in Whom alone it can find perfect beatitude. It seeks outside God a satisfaction or pleasure incompatible with the possession and fruition of God. On God’s side, the contempt of His will by the creature constitutes an offence and an insult, according to the saying, “The lawbreaker offends the lawmaker.” And this offence always includes an “injury;” that is, it injures or damages the external glory of God. For this reason, Holy Scripture describes sin as injustice and iniquity. Again, sin being always committed under the very eyes or in the face of God, it must needs excite His displeasure, abhorrence, indignation, and anger. These affections in God are not accompanied by the same feelings as in man (sect. 65), yet they exist in Him eminently; and it is not the defect of malice in sin, but God’s own immutability, which prevents Him from being affected with infinite pain by the sinner. In sins against the theological virtues, and against the virtue of religion, the aversion and offence assume a direct character, because God is the immediate object of these virtues.

2. Sin is clearly the greatest of evils—and an absolute evil, because it deprives the Greatest and Absolute Good of the honour due to Him. It is, however, infinite only in a restricted sense, viz. inasmuch as being directed against the Infinite Good, it deserves to be detested with a hatred as great as the love due to God; and inasmuch as it surpasses in greatness any quantity of other evils, and cannot be fully compensated for by any number of finite good works.

3. Sin acquires a special theological character, from its being a violation of the order of grace which establishes between God and His creatures relations essentially higher than any natural relations. In the order of grace, God reveals Himself to man as his supernatural end, and offers him supernatural means for arriving at his supernatural destination. The sinful action which destroys these relations is therefore far more wicked than a sin against the natural order; it is no longer the disobedience of a servant, but the revolt of a son against his Father, the infidelity of the bride to the Bridegroom, an insult to the Holy Ghost, Who is the bond of union between the Creator and His sanctified creature, an attack upon the sanctity of the soul. This special theological character exists subjectively only when the sinner knows his supernatural vocation, as in the case of the fallen angels, of our first parents, and of Christians generally. Sins committed before Baptism are free from this particular malice, unless sanctifying grace has been infused by God in one of the two ways which supply temporarily the actual administration of the sacrament. See St. Thomas, 1 qq. 48, 49; 1 2, q. 71.

SECT. 156.—MORTAL SIN AND VENIAL SIN

I. Some sins cause the loss of eternal life, and so entail eternal punishment; they are immediately followed by the loss of grace and by positive disgrace, and thus cause the spiritual death of the soul. Others do not entail these consequences; they can coexist with grace and with the supernatural life of holiness and justice, of which grace is the principle. The former are called mortal, because they deprive the soul of supernatural life; the latter are called venial, because of their comparatively trivial character, and because they are more easily pardoned.

The existence of mortal sins is manifest from the dogma of eternal punishment. The existence of venial sins was defined in the Second Council of Milevis, can. 8, 9, and again in the Council of Trent (Sess. vi., chap. 11, and can. 23, 25). These definitions are founded upon 1 John 1:8, “If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves;” and James 3:2, “In many things we all offend,” which texts are certainly to be applied to the just. The text Prov. 24:16 (“A just man shall fall seven times, and shall rise again”), so often quoted in support of this doctrine, does not refer to falls into sin, but into temporal misfortunes, as St. Augustine has noted. See the classical text 1 Cor. 3:8, sqq., with the commentary of St. Thomas, 1 2, q. 89, a. 2.

II. The difference between mortal and venial sin is not merely accidental or external, but affects their very essence, and determines the great difference in their punishment. Speaking generally, it consists in this: mortal sin is a fully voluntary transgression of a Divine command gravely binding; whereas, if the act is not fully voluntary, or if the command only lightly binds, the sin is venial. A command is said to be gravely binding (that is, binding under heavy penalties) when its transgression carries with it the loss of Divine friendship and of the delinquent’s claim on eternal life. This is the case when the object of the command is the attainment of an important end or the securing of an important good, which, by the Will of God, must be attained or secured as necessary means of salvation. A commandment is said to be lightly binding when it binds indeed, but not in so stringent a manner. The difference between heavy and light obligations, although apparently only one of degree, is, in fact, an essential difference. The opposition against the Divine Will manifested in the breaking of a grave obligation shows in the sinner a malice of disposition essentially different from that shown by disobedience in light matters. In mortal sin, the opposition to God is formal disrespect, and contempt of His Sovereignty and Supreme Goodness; whereas in venial sin the opposition to God amounts merely to neglect, the Divine attributes being not so much despised as insufficiently acknowledged. In mortal sin the creature turns away from God as its last end, and seeks felicity in another end; whereas in venial sin the creature only loses sight of God, the last end; it walks outside the road, but not in an opposite direction. In other words: in mortal sin, the sinner prefers himself or some creature to God, because, for the love of a creature, he despises the Majesty of the Divine Lawgiver, and sacrifices the felicity of possessing God; he acts as if he, and not God, were the Highest Good. In venial sin the sinner does not prefer himself or any created good to God; he has no wish entirely to despise the rights of God as Lawgiver and as Highest Good of the creature; his disposition is such that, if God prohibited the disorderly action under grave penalties, he would not commit it. Holy Scripture always represents sins of the first class as hostility between man and God; whereas venial sin is never so described.

Again, just as all sins have in common that they are opposed to the great Law of Charity, so also the two classes of sins draw their essential difference from their different degree of opposition to the same law. Mortal sin turns the heart of the sinner away from God towards the creature; venial sin coexists with the love of God, but falls short of the perfect compliance with it. Since grave sin and charity are incompatible metaphysically, as soon as sin enters the soul, charity and its principle, grace, must quit it; the supernatural beauty of the soul is extinguished by “mortal” sin, and the creature cannot of himself recall the spiritual life thus lost. St. Thomas, 1 2, q. 72, a. 5; qq. 88, 89.

SECT. 157.—THE EFFECTS OF SIN ON THE SINNER

I. The first effect of sin on the soul is to inflict upon it a stain, in the same manner as contact with unclean things defiles the body. Another effect is to make the sinner guilty and liable to punishment (reatus culpæ et pænæ). These effects are inseparable. Holy Scripture describes them as unrighteousness or injustice. They entail, as a consequence, that the sinner becomes, in the eyes of God, an object of displeasure and disgust; an object of hatred, at least in the sense of being unworthy of God’s continued benevolence; an object of anger, which Divine justice must visit with punishment.

The stain and guilt of sin, with the concomitant Divine displeasure, hatred, and anger, may fitly be considered as the first punishment of sin, for they are incurred against the will of the sinner, and make themselves felt as uneasiness, shame, and remorse. “Thou hast decreed it, and so it comes to pass, that every disordered soul shall be to itself its own punishment” (St. Aug., Confess. i. 12). They belong to mortal sin in their entirety; venial sin produces them only in a very partial sense.

II. Sin leaves behind it certain real and permanent effects which are commonly designated as “an impairing of natural goodness” (diminutio, corruptio, vitiatio boni naturæ). Sin cannot destroy either the substance or the faculties of the soul in themselves; its baneful influence only affects the perfection of their exercise and their supernatural endowment. An effect common to mortal and venial sin, in the natural and supernatural order, is the production of an inclination of the will towards evil. The frequent repetition of sinful acts bends the will in a wrong direction, and hampers it in avoiding evil and doing good. From the will the difficulty extends to the intellect, inclining it to judge falsely of things moral; and in man it even affects the sensitive appetites. The perversity thus engendered may render the difficulty of doing good insuperable, and may, for all practical purposes, extinguish free will. Such blinding or hardening (Isa. 6:9; Acts 28:26; Rom. 11:8; Matt. 13:14, etc.) is seldom, if ever, absolute in man; usually it extends only to certain kinds of actions, and even as to these, the freedom of the will is not radically extinct. Considered in relation to grace, which is the normal life of the soul, the incapacity for good becomes an inaptitude for receiving the effective operation of grace, or a diminution of the natural receptivity for the action of grace, together with a difficulty in co-operating with it.

III. In the supernatural order, mortal sin causes the loss of all the supernatural goodness of the soul, and extinguishes its supernatural life (§ 156). The withdrawal of supernatural grace is a punishment inflicted by God on the sinner; it is also a direct and logical consequence of sin itself. Sin unfits the soul for the indwelling of grace, just as disorganization unfits the body for the indwelling of the soul. The exclusion of grace is due to, and co-extensive with, its formal opposition to sin—grace being love, and sin contempt, of God. Hence all mortal sins cause the immediate loss of charity and of sanctifying grace (gratia gratum faciens), whereas faith and hope are only excluded by the sins directly opposed to them. Yet every mortal sin deserves the loss of all supernatural virtues and of all gifts of grace, because the sinner renders himself unworthy of Divine favours, and because all such favours are connected with sanctifying grace. If sins be not cancelled, this punishment is sure to follow in time—at least at the day of judgment. It need not follow immediately; wherefore, if it pleases God to allow the sinner still to tend towards his supernatural end, He does not withdraw the necessary graces except when the sinner makes himself not only unworthy but also unfit for them.

IV. Theologians generally hold that venial sin does not diminish sanctifying grace or infused virtues. These gifts participate in the incorruptibility of spiritual substances; they are not imperishable, yet they are beyond the reach of corrupting created action. Unlike acquired virtues, they are incapable of decrease or increase by the exertions of the subject. Hence venial sin could only cause their loss by completely destroying them; but from its nature venial sin is compatible with grace. Nor can it be said that each venial sin is punished by the withdrawal of a certain degree of grace; because this would entail the loss of a corresponding degree of eternal glory, and so inflict eternal punishment for an offence whose commensurate punishment is merely the keeping back of certain special favours and the postponement of the final reward. Venial sin only impairs the natural disposition for good, while mortal sin destroys the temple of the Holy Ghost (1 Cor. 6:19), and changes man from spiritual into animal (1 Cor. 2:14); it infects the whole nature, and thus becomes the cause of new sins or of acts deficient in goodness. The absence of sanctifying grace makes further meritorious acts impossible, and weakens the sinner for future temptations.

V. The moral effects of an act are those which the act causes another person to produce; hence the moral effects of a sinful act are the pains and penalties which it causes God to inflict upon the sinner. The object of these penalties is manifold. The chief object is to avenge the injury done to God’s dignity and holiness by afflicting the sinner with evils affecting his own dignity and well-being. Other penalties aim at the atonement or satisfaction for the sins committed, and others again are purely medicinal. The Schoolmen call these several penalties, pæna vindicativa, satisfactoria, medicinalis.

1. Each sin, without exception, has affixed to it a proportionate penalty; or, in other words, each sin makes its author liable to commensurate punishment. The liability lasts as long as the sin.

2. Only sin properly so called can deserve punishment; or, at least, the liability to punishment varies exactly in the same degree as the guilt of sin. Hence one person can only be punished for the sins of another if, and in as far as, he participates in the other person’s guilt.

3. To the penalties of sin belong first the stain and guilt of sin and the liability to punishment (reatus culpæ et pænæ) contracted by the sinner. The punishment itself consists in the withdrawal or keeping back of gifts which, but for his sin, were destined to the sinner. Thus, in mortal sin, sanctifying grace and eternal life are lost; in venial sin the grant of the final reward is delayed for a time, and the superabundant communication of actual graces is reduced to those necessary for the increase of merit and the avoidance of sin. Other penalties are the withdrawal of temporal goods and the infliction of temporal evils, intended to punish the selfishness and pride which lie at the bottom of every sin.

4. The penalty attaching to mortal sin is infinite inasmuch as it deprives the sinner of an infinite good; the beatific vision of God for all eternity. This penalty is exactly commensurate to the greatness of the sin, which consists in the contempt of that same infinite and eternal good, and deprives the sinner of the power to make good his loss. See St. Bonaventure, In II. Sent. Dist. 35; St. Thomas, 1 2 , qq. 85, 87.

SECT. 158.—HABITUAL SIN; ITS IRREPARABILITY AND PERPETUITY

I. The stain and guilt of sin and the sinner’s liability to punishment remain after the sinful act itself has ended, and constitute “the state of sin,” or “habitual sin.” It is most important to have an exact conception of habitual sin, because of its bearing on the doctrine of justification. We should note that habitual sin is not here used in the sense of sin into which one habitually falls.

1. Habitual sin, being a real sin, must contain the elements of guilt and imputability, and as these can only be conceived in connection with a free act of the will, habitual sin implies, necessarily, a relation to the free act by which sin was first committed. This act influences the sinful state in the same manner as the seed influences the whole growth of the plant. The derangement caused by sin in the sinner himself and in the permanent order by God established, is an evil which the sinner is bound not only to prevent, but also to repair when committed. It is this very obligation “to remove the disorder of sin” which connects the free sinful act with the subsequent state of habitual sin; as long as the sinner does not comply with the obligation, and is not otherwise dispensed from it, he must be considered as still freely adhering to his sin. Thus, from a passing act, results a permanent guilt. The connection cannot be severed by retractation of the former will, because such retractation, by itself, cannot destroy the effects of sin. Nor is the permanence of guilt prevented by the fact that the sinner is unable, at least to a certain extent, to comply with the obligation of removing the evil; for the guilt of habitual sin depends not on the present, but on the past use of free will, and the inability in question is itself an effect of the first sinful act.

2. Habitual sin, then, in its totality, contains two elements: the disorder (stain, guilt, hatefulness) in the soul of the sinner, which is the material element; and the imputability of this disorder to the sinner by reason of the unfulfilled obligation to remove it, and this is the formal element of habitual sin.

II. 1. The habitual state of grievous or mortal sin is, from its nature, everlasting, because it can only be taken away by a special merciful interference on the part of God. The injury done to God remains, even if the sinner repents of it. In the supernatural order, another cause of irreparability exists, viz. mortal sin extinguishes the principle of supernatural life, that is grace, which the sinner cannot gain back, as it is a free gift of God. Again, in this case, not even a proportionate retractation or penance is possible, because sanctifying grace, the ordinary principle of supernatural acts, is lost, and the sinner has made himself unworthy of actual grace which could act as extraordinary principle.

2. The formal effects of habitual sin are, of course, likewise everlasting. For this reason, the punishment is also eternal, albeit another reason for the eternity of punishment is found in the intrinsic greatness of the guilt.

3. Venial sin, at least when not coexisting with mortal sin in the same subject, is from its nature only temporary; it is not the death of the soul, but a temporary disease, which can be removed by acts of charity on the part of the sinner. A time must necessarily come when the venial sinner is moved efficaciously to retract his sin, and so to obtain remission; otherwise he would never be able to enter eternal life. Where venial sin coexists with mortal sin, the subject being incapable of acts of supernatural charity, the separation of venial faults is made impossible, and its guilt remains as long as that of mortal sin, but these effects are due to the mortal sin.

III. The perpetuity of habitual sin does not necessarily imply a continuation of actual sin, or even the impossibility of a conversion of some kind. Yet, if such conversion be wanting, a continuation of actual sin is naturally to be expected, and, with it, a stronger inclination towards sin and a greater unworthiness of Divine grace, until a stage may be reached in which conversion is all but impossible, except by miracle. Such is particularly the case with “sins against the Holy Ghost,” i.e. direct and formal contempt of God’s truth and grace, which blind the sinner’s intellect and harden his heart. See St. Thomas, 1 2, q. 86, a. 2; q. 89, a. 1.

SECT. 159.—POSSIBILITY AND PERMISSION OF SIN

I. Sin is possible to creatures only, and its possibility arises from the necessary imperfection of finite free will. This is such that the creatures do not necessarily will even their own good as pointed out by reason; much less are they under physical necessity to will the good of God as prescribed by Divine Law. A creature naturally impeccable is just as much an impossibility as a creature naturally possessing supernatural grace. By supernatural means, the possibility is, as a matter of fact, excluded from the Blessed in heaven. By the special grace, called confirmation in grace,” it can be so paralyzed and subdued that its passing into acts is completely prevented. Sanctifying grace alone, however, leaves the power of sinning intact, because it merely gives to free will a higher power without disabling its natural powers.

II. The possibility of sin is attributable to God only inasmuch as He has not destroyed free will, or made good the deficiencies naturally arising from its finiteness. God is not the direct cause; He directly wills neither sin nor its possibility, but He “permits” both. Human nature is so constituted that desires are often excited in man which cannot be satisfied without sin. Yet this inclination to sin is not a direct and positive tendency like the inclination to good; we can only will evil under the false appearance of good. Hence the evil inclination does not make the Author of nature to be also the author of sin. As a matter of fact, He suppressed the evil inclination in the angels and the first man in a supernatural manner, leaving only the bare possibility of sin with fullest liberty to avoid it. The inclination now existing is a penalty of the first sin committed with absolute liberty. God cannot positively lead His creatures into sin as He leads them into good works; to do so would be against His Holiness (supra, § 89; cf. §§ 85, 116; James 1:13).

When God permits sin, this permission is an act of Divine Sovereignty, and consequently entirely different from a similar permission given by creatures. The Sovereign of the Universe is not bound to prevent every sin, because He can make every sin subservient to the general order of the Universe; yet, although not so bound, He could prevent sin if He so willed, and hence no sin happens without His permission. He may permit new sins as a punishment for previous ones, or particular sins as contributing to the realization of certain ends. And, lastly, the rebellious will of the sinner can be so turned to account as to become a means towards the wise ends of His Sovereign Master.

The creature is the first and principal cause of sin as such—for God in nowise moves the creature to sin—and by committing sin the creature turns itself away from the law of God and from the Divine influence for good. Between the sins actually committed by the “second causes assuming the right of the First Cause,” there exists a most remarkable concatenation. The sins of man all originate in the sin of the first man; the sin of the first man originated in the sin of the angels, and this again in the sin of one superior angel. Wherefore, in order fully to fathom the sins of this world, it is necessary to ascend to the very beginning and to the very summit of creation. This “first cause of evil,” establishing a realm against the realm of the All-good God, is at the bottom of the heathen fiction of Ahriman, the principle of Evil, and of the summum malum of the Manichæans. See Stapleton, De Justificatione, lib. xi.; Bellarmine, De Amissione Gratiæ, lib. ii.; St. Thomas, l 2. q. 79.

CHAPTER II

THE FALL OF THE ANGELS

SECT. 160.—THE SIN OF THE ANGELS

I. THE teaching of the Church and of Holy Scripture leaves no possible doubt as to the existence of a great number of wicked or unclean spirits, hardened in sin and waging war against God and men, under the command of Satan or the Devil (Matt. 12:24; John 12:31; 1 Cor. 2:6–8; Eph. 2:2, and 6:12; 1 John 3:13–14, etc.). “The great dragon was cast out, the old serpent who is called the devil and satan, who seduceth the whole world … the accuser (ὁ κατήγωρ) of our brethren who accused them before God day and night” (Apoc. 12:9, 10).

II. Although the devil and his demons are the very personification of sin, they were originally good angels. “The devil and other demons were created by God good by nature, but they became bad through their own behaviour”; cf. John 8:44, and Jude v. 6 (Fourth Council of Lateran, Cap. Firmiter). The fall of the angels probably happened soon after they were created; certainly before the fall of man.

III. From the fact that Holy Scripture describes Satan as the chief and representative of all wicked spirits, it may be inferred that the sin of the angels originated in one of them, and passed on to the remainder by example or inducement. If this be so, we must further admit that, before the fall, Satan was by nature and grace exalted high above all those angels who followed his example or his bidding. Hints are not wanting in Scripture as to Satan having been the highest of all angels, so that sin would have originated at the very summit of creation. Such hints are found in the picture of the pride and fall of earthly kings, which the Fathers mystically apply to the pride and fall of the prince of heaven (Isaias 14:12; Ezech. 28:1.sq., and 31:3 sq.). The temptation of pride may certainly have been very great in a creature of such perfection.

IV. The Church has never defined the kind of sin committed by the angels, and the early Fathers are not quite agreed upon the point. Yet following up the hints given in Scripture and the common doctrine of later Fathers and of all theologians, it must be held as theologically certain that pride was the cause of their fall. The contemplation of their natural excellence and their great likeness to God gave rise to presumption and ambition, which are but forms of pride. Most likely these angels wanted to be independent of God, and to receive honours due to God alone. St. Thomas (1, q. 63, a. 3) thinks they refused the tribute of absolutely unselfish love required by God in the supernatural order; Suarez (De Angelis, lib. vii.) is of opinion that they refused to acknowledge and to adore the Son of God in His human nature. Cf. Ecclus. 10:15; Tobias 4:14; Luke 10:18, and the above-quoted texts from Isaias and Ezechias with the interpretation of the Fathers.

V. From the nature of things, as well as from the teaching of the Fathers, the sin of the fallen angels is manifestly sin in its worst form. It proceeded from pure malice; not, as in the case of man, from ignorance and weakness. It is a direct insult to God and an open contempt of the order of grace, and hence it has the character of sin against the Holy Ghost. It is an open rebellion against God, carried out and unrelentingly persisted in with all the energy of which a pure spirit is capable. It is, lastly, an uninterrupted sin, a perpetual act, thanks to the spiritual and ever vigilant nature of the angels. For all these reasons, the pride of the angels was a sin unto death—far more than mortal sin in man, more even than final impenitence in man.

VI. The great sin of the angels was immediately punished with eternal damnation. God, granted them neither the time nor the means of repentance. Holy Writ and the formulated teaching of the Church do not directly express this doctrine; they only state the fact that at present the fallen angels are in a state of damnation, and without hope of salvation. But from 2 Pet. 2:4, and Jude 6, we understand that all the angels who prevaricated were damned; and, on the other hand, the redemption by Christ is available to man only; whence theologians rightly conclude that no hope of salvation was ever held out to these spirits, and, consequently, no time for repentance allowed them. The reason why God showed to the angels none of that mercy which He so abundantly dispenses to man must be sought in the grievous nature of their sin.

VII. The sin of the angels was immediately followed by the complete depravation and corruption of their spiritual life. The demons’ depravity consists in the obscuration of their intellect and the hardening of their will, so that mendacity and wickedness become their second nature; they are “powers of darkness and spirits of wickedness.” Their intellect is darkened by the withdrawal of all supernatural light as principle of supernatural knowledge, albeit they retain the bare knowledge of the truths revealed to them before their fall, or which they may learn by some external revelation. Then the perversity of their will influences their judgment, so as to make evil appear to them as good. The hardening of the will of the evil spirits consists in this, that the hatred of God is the impelling motive of all their actions. As the good spirits do all they do for the love of God, so the evil spirits are moved in all their actions by hatred of Him. This hatred is partly the result of the original perversity of their will, partly an effect of their resenting the punishment inflicted upon them.

VIII. Together with complete depravity, the demons received at once afflictive punishment. They were cast down into the place of torments, delivered into the chains of hell, to be reserved unto judgment (2 Pet. 2:4). The nature of this punishment will be discussed in the treatise on the Last Things. Here we only point out its two stages, viz. the ejection from heaven and the reservation for the general judgment at the end of the world. The difference between the two stages lies in this, that before the last judgment the external movements and operations of the demons are not completely impeded; just as the souls of damned men are not tied to their bodies until the day of judgment. Thus the demons still are free to find some satisfaction in the carrying out of their wicked plans against God and man, although even for this their punishment will be increased on the last day. Again: before the final judgment they are not confined to “the place of torments,” wherever that may be, but they are at liberty to move about among men on earth, or, as Scripture says in view of their spiritual nature, in the air above the earth (cf. 1 Pet. 5:8; Eph. 6:12; 2:2). Yet, wherever they are, they suffer the same torments.

IX. Revelation teaches us that God has allowed the evil spirits to carry on against Himself and His elect a war of hatred, lasting as long as the present state of the world. As God Himself and the Blessed in heaven are unassailable, man is the only object on which the demons may wreak their vengeance, by destroying in him the image and likeness of God. This war has been permitted by God in order that man may prove his fidelity to his Maker, and that the devil, overcome by weaker creatures, may be covered with greater shame. The victory of man is rendered possible and easy since he is incorporated in the mystical body of God-made-Man.

The first man was able to sin without the instigation of the devil; yet, as a matter of fact, it was to the seduction of the enemy that he gave way. Hence the sin of man is the “seed of the devil” sown in lies, and sinful men are “the sons of the devil, who is the father of lies.” With the devil as their head, all sinners constitute one moral body. The power he has over them is chiefly due to their wilful submission to his influence. On man, in the original state, the devil had but very limited power; he could only tempt man, and even that temptation was limited to external suggestions. See Suarez, De Angelis, ll. vii., viii.; St. Thomas, i. qq. 63, 64; Contra Gentes, iii. 107–109.

CHAPTER III

THE FALL OF MAN

SECT. 161.—THE SIN OF ADAM AND EVE

I. THE tempter, called serpent in the history of the fall (Gen. 3), was not that reptile itself, but the devil speaking through its mouth, although the narrative does not expressly say so. The devil is so often spoken of as the tempter of our first parents, that it might almost be doubted whether the serpent was not an assumed form, rather than the real animal (Wisd. 2:24; John 8:44).

II. The temptation was directed to Eve as the weaker party, and against the law of probation, as the most momentous. The tempter begins with a question of double meaning: Is there such a commandment, and why should it be given? (Gen. 3:1), and goes on denying the punishment threatened by God, and promising likeness to gods as a reward for the evil deed. Almost every word of the devil’s speech is ambiguous, admitting of a true and of a false interpretation, a circumstance entirely in keeping with the character of the tempter. From Gen. 3:6, some superficial minds have inferred that Eve was seduced by the goodness and beauty of the fruit, forgetting that, before the fall, she had perfect control over all the motions of her senses. No more did she believe in the serpent’s words: such blindness was incompatible with the state of original perfection. Fathers and Theologians commonly teach that Eve was misled by pride, according to Ecclus. 10:15: “Pride is the beginning of all sin” (also Tobias 4:14). Movements of pride and vainglory could be excited without a formal belief in the serpent’s words; on the contrary, such belief could only spring from a heart infected with pride. Eve, then, moved by pride, saw “that the tree was good to eat,” and, flattering herself that she would not die, but be made like unto God, “took of the fruit and did eat,” thus committing a formal disobedience to the Divine command.

III. The sin of Adam also had its root in pride, as we may safely infer from the above-quoted texts, and still more from the ironical words of God, Behold, Adam is become like one of us, knowing good and evil” (Gen. 3:22). Adam’s connivance with Eve was but an effect of his sympathy with her own pride. The terms of the Divine judgment seem to indicate that Adam believed the suggestions of Eve, and thus sinned through disbelief of God’s word. Yet, if this be admitted, the reason of his disbelief cannot be laid to the utterances of the serpent, but may be attributed to the fact that Eve had not died after eating the forbidden fruit. “Adam was not seduced; but the woman, being seduced, was in the transgression” (1 Tim. 2:14; cf. 2 Cor. 11:3).

IV. Objectively, the sin of our first parents was formal disobedience to God and to the law of probation. The sins of pride, curiosity, sensuality, disbelief, and diffidence were subjective factors, all subordinate to that disobedience in which they terminated, and helping to make it a most grievous sin, notwithstanding the apparent slightness of its subject-matter. Other aggravating circumstances were the great facility of avoiding it, as in Adam there was neither ignorance nor concupiscence; the black ingratitude it implies, and the terrible consequences it was to have upon the whole of mankind.

Albeit, the sin of man, like that of the angels, was a formal aversion from God; it was, nevertheless, not so decisive and obstinate. Immediately after the sin, a salutary sense of shame and fear came over its authors, and God mitigated His sentence of condemnation. The serpent alone was condemned without mercy; Adam and Eve, according to Scripture and tradition, made good use of the time allotted them for penance, and are both saved (cf. Wisd. 10:1 sqq.).

V. The first sin was fraught with peculiar consequences by reason of the singularly privileged state of its authors. The Second Council of Orange, can. I, and the Council of Trent have defined these consequences. “The first man Adam, having transgressed the mandate of God in Paradise, at once lost the sanctity and justice in which he had been constituted; and incurred, through the offence of his prevarication, the anger and indignation of God, and, therefore, the death with which God had previously threatened him, and together with death, captivity under the power of him who thenceforth had the empire of death, that is of the devil; Adam, through the offence of that prevarication, underwent a complete change for the worse in body and soul” (Council of Trent, sess. v. can. 1). In a word: Adam lost all his absolute and relative supernatural endowments. He became subject to the power of the devil, inasmuch as, having been overcome and despoiled of his strength and of his claim on heaven, he was henceforth at the mercy of his conqueror.

Although the complete deterioration of man was brought about by the loss of supernatural endowments, it must not be conceived as a merely external change, such e.g. as would arise from the loss of a garment. The loss of sanctifying grace and of all the privileges of original integrity affects the inmost powers of the soul, intellect, and will, and the command of the soul over the body, and leaves man in a state of languor and disease. Not only is man disabled for salutary works; his higher aims are taken away from him, and his natural inclination for selfish pleasures is allowed free play.

VI. The corruption consequent upon Adam’s sin had a twofold bearing, viz. upon his person arid upon his nature. His personal deterioration immediately affected only his will; it was caused by the will, and its permanence was more or less dependent upon the disposition of the will. The corruption of his nature, on the contrary, affected all the faculties rooted in the substance of the soul, and the will itself, in as far as the will is part of human nature. Again, the personal corruption attacks the mind (or soul) only in itself, whereas the corruption of nature attacks the mind in its relations to the body, and leaves no part of the whole compound unharmed. It appears, however, most strikingly in the insubordination of the generative appetite, which is the means of its transmission to all mankind.

VII. Holy Scripture applies the significant name “reign of death” to nature corrupted by sin (Rom. 5:14). The supernatural life and glory of “the image of God” being lost through the envy of the devil, human nature remained naked, disfigured, and disabled; the soul was spiritually dead, and the body doomed to death. In that state, the soul, like a corpse, was prone to further corruption, and liable to become every day more unfit for the reception of new life.

VIII. We need not insist upon the penal character of the corruption of nature, which is self-evident; but it is important to fix its guiltiness. Original justice, with all its privileges, was not a gift without a concomitant obligation. Man was not at liberty to accept or to refuse it, or, having accepted it, to cast it off at his own pleasure. It was a gift entrusted to the keeping of man, and man’s perfection in the eyes of God was made dependent upon its possession. Hence, when by his own free will Adam cast off the trust held under such obligation, that is when he despoiled himself of his supernatural glory, he was answerable for, and guilty of, the consequent deterioration of his nature.

A difficulty here presents itself: “Culpability results from a personal act; but the withdrawal of the supernatural gifts was not a personal act of Adam, hence their loss cannot be imputed to him.” As regards the loss of sanctity, the answer has been given already, viz. mortal sin makes the soul unfit for sanctifying grace, so that the author of mortal sin excludes and expels grace from his soul by his own act. As regards the loss of integrity another explanation is required. St. Thomas and his disciples say that sanctity and integrity formed one solidary whole, wherefore Adam, by willingly excluding sanctity, also willingly expelled integrity. The early Franciscan school views this matter in another light: the possession of both sanctity and integrity depended upon the keeping of the Divine mandate; wherefore Adam, by transgressing this, voluntarily forfeited both. These two views do not exclude one another. The Thomistic conception accounts better for the loss of justice as a personal fault of Adam; the other shows better why the fault and guilt of Adam can be inherited by his posterity. See for this and the following sections, St. Thomas, 1 2, qq. 81–83; Stapleton, De Justif., ll. i.–iii.; Bellarmine, De Amiss. Gratiæ, ll. iv.–vi.

SECT. 162.—ORIGINAL SIN

I. The transmission of the sin of Adam and its deteriorating effects on all mankind is a fundamental dogma, because on it is founded the necessity of redemption for all men. The early Church defended and defined it against the Pelagians (Council of Orange, ii. can. 2); the Council of Trent formulated it anew and made it the basis of its doctrine of Justification. The words of the definition are: “If any one assert that the prevarication of Adam was hurtful to himself only, and not to his progeny; and that he lost for himself only, and not also for us, the sanctity and justice received from God; or that, being himself defiled by the sin of disobedience, he transmitted to all mankind only death and the sufferings (pænas) of the body, but not the sin which is the death of the soul, let him be anathema, for he contradicts the apostle who says, “Through one man sin entered the world,” etc. (Sess. v. can. 2).

II. That the loss of original integrity, the deterioration of nature and the evils connected therewith, passed from Adam to his progeny is distinctly revealed in Scripture. Death and suffering entered the world as a punishment of the first sin (Gen. 3:16–20); concupiscence, in its present form, has the same origin (Gen. 3:7). The state of unredeemed man is often represented in Holy Writ as one of spiritual death, necessitating a new birth in holiness and justice (John 3:5, etc.). No reason for such degradation can be given other than the transmission of the first sin to the whole progeny of the first sinner. The classical text is Rom. 5:12, of which later.

III. All individual members of the human race are descended from Adam; his nature contained the seed and the root from which mankind grows. But Adam vitiated his nature in all its constituent parts, down to the parts specially intended for its propagation; hence the fruit of propagation can but be a vitiated human nature. The standard of Divine Likeness which God had set up for all men was lowered by the first sin; the progeny of Adam are born less like God than God originally willed them to be. Yet the “personal” sin of our first parents could not be propagated, because it would involve personal acts which cannot be transmitted by generation. But for the element of sinfulness which stains the souls of Adam’s progeny, we might compare his fall and its universal consequences to a spiritual bankruptcy, involving the impoverishment in things spiritual of all mankind. As, however, that spiritual poverty is described in Scripture and Tradition as sin and injustice, and as a punishment for sin, which it would not be if merely the consequence of spiritual bankruptcy, another element must be introduced, viz. the progeny’s “share” in the progenitor’s guilt.

St. Paul teaches this doctrine in the famous text, Rom. 5:12–19. For the sake of clearness, we quote the Apostle’s words in their logical order. His proposition is, “As by one man (διʼ ἑνὸς) sin entered into this world, and by sin (διὰ τῆς ἁμαρτίας) death (v. 12); … as by the offence of one (the judgment came) unto all men to condemnation (v. 18); … as by the disobedience of one man the many (οἱ πολλοί) were made sinners (v. 19), even so by the justice of one (διʼ ἑνὸς δικαιωμάτος) (the free gift came) unto all men to justification of life (v. 18); even so, by the obedience of one, shall the many be made just” (v. 19). In the latter part of v. 12, and vv. 13, 14, the extension of Adam’s sin to all men is proved from the universality of the reign of death: “Death passed upon all men in whom (ἐφʼ ᾧ) all have sinned: for until the law, sin was in the world; but sin was not imputed when the law was not. But death reigned from Adam unto Moses, even over them who have not sinned after the likeness of Adam’s transgression, who is a figure of Him who was to come.” In other words: The pain of death was not first inflicted for sin by the law of Moses; before Moses men died, although not in punishment of their “personal” sins, for, there being no law, personal sins were not imputed; and even they died who had not committed personal sin like Adam, whence to them death was the pain for their participation in the first sin. In vv. 15–17, the Apostle shows that Christ had greater power for good than Adam for evil; and then, in v. 18, he continues the comparison begun in v. 12, and concludes it in v. 19.

IV. The universal deterioration of human nature in its material aspect may be sufficiently accounted for by considering the sin of Adam only as a personal act of the physical author of our nature. Not so its formal depravity, viz. the guilt which makes the progeny of Adam sinful and liable to punishment. Guilt supposes a voluntary act of the guilty person. And, in fact, St. Paul says, “that all have sinned in the first man,” and all are guilty of disobedience. This means that the one act of disobedience of the first man is morally not only his own personal act, but a solidary act of all mankind, for which all are answerable. The dogmatic bearing of the words, Rom. 5:12 (ἐφʼ ᾧ in quo omnes peccaverunt), is quite independent of the meaning attached to ἐφʼ ᾧ. Whether it be translated “seeing that,” “for that,” “inasmuch as,” “because,” all have sinned, or “in whom” all have sinned, the context and the parallelism between Christ and Adam, evidently give the sense that all men participated in the sin of disobedience committed by the first parent (cf. 1 Cor. 15:21, 22). Technically speaking, Adam acted as the juridical and moral representative of mankind, or as head of the whole human race existing in him in germ, and he transgressed a law binding mankind as a whole. His sin, therefore, was the sin of all mankind, because and in as far as the actions and the will of the head are the actions and the will of the whole body. The physical existence of the whole race in its head affords a basis for its moral existence in the same, that is, for its being made answerable for the sins of the head. We have then to consider but one will and one act, the will and the act of Adam, which, by a positive disposition of God, were made at the same time will and act of the whole human race.

V. From this point of view it is easy to determine how far the sin of Adam was universal, that is, the sin of all mankind. The transgression was the act of the whole race precisely and only in as far as it was a culpable violation of the duty to fulfil the condition set by God for the maintenance of supernatural justice, and thus represented a wanton destruction of that justice. The personal motives of pride and the other motives which induced Adam to break the covenant, are not imputed to his descendants, but only the objective breach of the Law of Probation, upon which the covenant rested. Thus, when a king transgresses the clauses of a treaty made with another king, it is not his personal motives, but the objective breach of the treaty which is imputed to the nation whose head he is, and the whole nation is made to bear the consequences of the broken treaty.

VI. The universal or original sin has some characters peculiar to itself, which we shall here merely indicate. 1. It is the only sin which passes from the perpetrator to his progeny, because no other sin is or can be committed under the same circumstances. 2. It is of faith (Rom. 5:13, and 1 Cor. 15:21) that the sin of Adam only, not also that of Eve, was a universal act. Adam, not Eve, represented mankind. If Eve alone had sinned, the sin would not have been transmitted. 3. No other sin of Adam would have had the same universal bearing, because the covenant or bond of God with man was founded on the observance of one clearly determined precept.

VII. Adam’s repentance was of no avail to his progeny. A special Divine grace was required to make it salutary even to himself. By God’s ordination Adam was empowered to act for all mankind to the effect of preserving supernatural justice; but he did not enter into the Divine ordination for repairing its loss. Although he obtained his personal pardon, still “the sin of mankind” and its effects were not affected thereby.

SECT. 163.—THE SIN OF ADAM IN HIS DESCENDANTS

I. An adequate, positive definition of original sin has not been given by the Church. The definitions, however, concerning the existence of original sin, and the necessity and efficacy of Baptism, give the theologian sufficient elements for determining the real nature of original sin in fallen man. We quote the Council of Trent (sess. v. can. 5): “If any one deny that through the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ which is given in baptism, the guilt (reatus) of original sin is remitted; or if he assert that not all that is taken away which has the true and proper nature (rationem) of sin, but that it is only erased or not imputed, let him be anathema. For in the regenerated there is nothing hateful to God: … That, however, in the baptized there remains concupiscence or the fomes, is the sense of this Holy Synod. Concupiscence is left for our warfare (ad agonem); it cannot injure those who do not consent to it.… This concupiscence, which the Apostle sometimes calls sin, the Holy Synod declares that the Catholic Church never understood it to be called sin as being a true and properly so-called sin in the regenerated, but as being caused by sin and as inclining to sin. If any one holdeth the contrary, let him be anathema.”

II. The many erroneous notions of the nature of inherited sin arise, in general, from not giving due attention to the organic unity of its two elements, viz. the guilt contracted by the whole race in Adam, and the internal disorder of our nature which is the subject-matter of that guilt. By separating the formal from the material element, or by giving undue prominence to either of them, many notions of original sin have been formed, some quite heretical, some doubtful, some reconcilable with Catholic teaching. The space at our disposal only allows us to sketch out what appears to us the deepest, most complete, and most Catholic theory. We follow, in the main, St. Thomas (1 2, q. 82).

III. The mean between the two extreme theories conceives original sin so that its subject-matter is the internal disorder arising in the soul from the privation of due sanctity and justice, and its formal element the guilt or culpability contracted by man in Adam, for which man is still held responsible. Thus we can define original sin as “the culpable privation of original justice.” This definition distinguishes it from every other habitual sin, and points out, in its subject-matter, that element which accounts for all internal disorders consequent upon it. All theologians are bound to admit, with the Church, that the loss of sanctifying grace, or the death of the soul, is a constituent element of original sin; yet, as this loss of grace is an effect common to all mortal sins, it cannot be the “specific” subject-matter of original sin; something more must be added in order to distinguish this sin from all other sins. At this point theologians cease to agree. They shape their opinions in accordance with their notions of original justice.

IV. The Thomistic theory starts from the patristic view that sanctifying grace is the essential element of original (or hereditary) justice, and the root of the integrity of natural, as well as of supernatural, life. Hence (1) the radical element of injustice in original sin is to be sought in the essence of the soul, viz. in the culpable privation of sanctifying grace as root of the whole justice required of man by God. (2) In the second place, and effectively (with regard to its effects), the element of injustice appears in all the faculties of the soul bearing upon morality, as privation of the order willed and originally instituted by God. Hence original injustice, as opposed to original justice, comprises the absence of sanctity from the superior will, the want of subordination of the inferior will and sensuality to the superior will or reason. These, again, entail in the superior will an absolute impossibility to serve God supernaturally; a moral impossibility of observing even natural law in its entirety and permanently, and lastly another absolute impossibility of preventing all unholy God-displeasing motions. (3) Comparing original with actual sin, we find the “aversion from God” in the want of sanctity, especially of charity, and the “conversion to the creature” in the motions of concupiscence caused by the loss of original integrity. There is, however, a difference: in original sin the aversion from God is not, as in actual sin, essentially connected with the conversion to the creature. (4) Lastly, compared to a fully formed and developed actual sin in man, original sin consists in a tendency to inordinate motions, extending from the highest faculties of the soul to the organism of the body; all such motions participating in the character of formal sin as being the consequence of a culpable disorder in the innermost part of nature.

V. Original sin is exactly the same in all men, though the effects arising out of it, especially the infirmity of reason and the fervour of concupiscence, vary greatly in different individuals on account of the diversity of individual organization. Original sin in Adam’s posterity essentially differs from Adam’s own sin, because it does not include the same personal responsibility for an actual offence and contempt of God. Hence its peculiar position midway between mortal and venial sin. As it includes no personal act of free will it is, subjectively, the least of all sins, smaller even than semi-voluntary venial sins; but, objectively, or as regards its subject-matter, and especially the evils caused by it, it is a greater sin than most mortal sins. Again, original sin is free from that continued contempt or neglect of God which keeps the guilt of actual sin alive in the soul, and therefore, in this respect also, it is less than the least personal venial sin. These differences are summed up in the formula: “Original sin does not, like personal sins, imply an aversion from God as man’s natural end, but only an aversion from God as man’s supernatural end.”

VI. As all the individual members of the human race descend from Adam by way of generation, it is also by way of generation that they contract original sin. Christ, not being “born of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man” (John 1:12), even had He not been the Son of God, would not have been stained by original sin. The act of generation, however, is only instrumental in propagating sin. The principal cause is “the originating sin of Adam.” The act of generation prepares and determines the subject upon which the sin of nature exercises its deteriorating influence, and its connection with the transmission of original sin extends no farther. The personal sanctity of the parent does not prevent his offspring from contracting the stain of sin: for it is nature as corrupted in Adam that he propagates, and not his own nature as modified by his personal acts. The dispensation under which personal justice was hereditary came to an end in Adam himself; in the present dispensation, Christ alone possesses grace and the power of communicating it.

VII. Many Theologians explain the transmission of original sin by generation without taking into account the present inner condition of the parent. They establish between parent and offspring a merely moral and juridical relation, so that the progeny contracts certain obligations and liabilities of the progenitor by the fact of being born of him; in their system the transmission bears no inner analogy to the natural transmission of physical evils. St. Augustine, however, and the earlier Schoolmen, constantly make use of physical analogies to explain the propagation of original sin, and expressly describe it as caused by an imperfection (vitium) in the act of generation and in the progenitor, viz. the “ardour of concupiscence.” The explanation given by the best Schoolmen may be summarized as follows: the progenitor, according to the original Divine dispensation, ought to possess the power of generating a nature endowed with sanctity and justice. The absence of this power constitutes an imperfection of, or vitiates, the generative principles. Further, in the original state, the power to generate, in co-operation with the Holy Ghost, a perfect child of God, was specially bound up with the integrity of human nature; the perfect subjection of the members to the mind gave to the generative organism a purity fitting it for the co-operation of the Holy Ghost. Hence, e converso, the incapacity of generating a perfect child of God is likewise bound up with the loss of integrity, and more especially with the insubordination of the generative appetite, the Holy Ghost not having, since the Fall, co-operated with the generative act to the extent of remitting original sin in the offspring. Thus the imperfection (vitium) of the power and act of generation is not accidental or external, but internal, and in a certain sense natural; and it can be said with truth that “the concupiscence of the progenitor causes the progeny to be deprived of sanctity and justice.” The concupiscence in question is habitual concupiscence, of which the actual disorders accompanying the act of generation are but a sign. And habitual concupiscence itself produces original sin as a “deficient,” rather than as an “efficient” cause, much in the same way as free will causes sin, through the “deficiency” of its intention.

VIII. To complete the theory on the propagation of original sin by generation, we must show how the soul, though directly created by God, becomes infected with sin. St. Augustine hesitates between two explanations: either, he says, both body and soul are produced in a vitiated condition by the progenitor, or the soul is vitiated by its conjunction with a vitiated body (Contra Jul., 1. v. c. iv.). Since Creationism (cf. § 129) is now generally held, the first of these alternatives must be rejected. The second, if rightly understood, explains the difficulty in a way which is neither too grossly physical nor too superficially moral. The body inflicts no physical damage on the soul, but merely entangles it in the guiltiness of the seed of Adam. The flesh, disordered by the loss of original justice, being the recipient of the soul, the soul is received in a disordered manner, and becomes guilty by implication or infection. The corruption or aggravation of the soul by the body, on which St. Augustine and others so often insist, must be reduced to signify “that the union of body and soul into one nature makes the quality of the soul dependent on the quality of the body.” As shown in Book III., § 133, the soul, without a counteracting Divine influence, is subject to be impeded in its spiritual operations by the influence of the animal life of the body. But that Divine influence is now excluded from the beginning, because, as explained above, in the act of generation the Holy Ghost does not co-operate to the remission of original sin. Hence the soul, through its conjunction with the body, is deprived of a perfection, viz. the free development of its spiritual energy, which it would enjoy if it existed separately, or in the state of original integrity; in other words, it is “corrupted and weighed down” by the body. Let us here point out the different progress of corruption in Adam and in his posterity. In Adam the person corrupted the nature; first he lost sanctifying grace; then this loss entailed the loss of integrity, and infected his whole nature. In his descendants, on the contrary, nature infects the person; the corruption begins with the act of c generation, reaches the privileges of integrity, and ends in depriving the soul of sanctifying grace.

Another and more direct solution of the same difficulty may be based upon “the relation of principle between the soul of the progenitor and the soul of the progeny” (Book III., § 129, III.), which consists in this, that the father determines the production of the son as an image of himself in an organism derived from his own. This metaphysical relation of soul to soul is the foundation of all juridical and moral relations between father and son; and as a relation of soul to soul, it is particularly well adapted to serve as a foundation for the transmission of supernatural life, or of the nobility of adoptive sonship. Having forfeited his nobility, Adam could procreate only an ignoble image of himself—a child deprived of sanctifying grace and integrity, and the prey of concupiscence. The Council of Trent seems to hint at this notion when it makes the loss of sanctity the fundamental element of the loss of due justice not only in Adam, but also in his progeny (Sess. v. can. 2).

IX. The Pelagians used to urge that either God or the parents, or both, commit a sin if they give existence to a sinful soul. But the creative act of God, and the procreative act of the parents, directly intend the production of a new person, which is a good object, although the new being is accidentally subject to sin. Generation would be unlawful, indeed, if sin consisted in an inclination to evil, or if the inclination was irresistible; but such is not the case, especially since God has provided sufficient means of resistance.

SECT. 164.—PENALTIES OF ORIGINAL SIN

I. Penalties are measured out according to the degree of imputability, and to the gravity of subject-matter of sin. Original sin being a real sin, deserves punishment; its peculiar character, however, requires a peculiar punishment, different from that meted out to actual sin.

II. 1. Original sin deserves the loss of the beatific vision, that is, of the inheritance of the sons of God or the happiness of eternal life. On this proposition rests the whole doctrine concerning original sin. Scripture and Tradition always connect the remission of sin, and the acquisition of eternal life, as the joint object of the redemption by Christ.

2. It is neither of faith, nor even probable that, over and above the eternal pain of loss, original sin is punished with eternal pain of the senses, viz. the fire of hell. This proposition results from the almost unanimous consent of the Schoolmen, notably since Innocent III. formulated the axiom that “the pain of original sin is privation (carentia) of the vision of God; the pain of actual sin is the torment of perpetual hell” (cap. Majores de bapt.; Denzinger, Enchir., li.). It stands to reason that a sin which involves no personal contempt of God, cannot justly be visited by vindictive or reactive punishment, except such punishment be at the same time propitiatory or medicinal, two qualities incompatible with eternal punishment. The sentence passed by Christ (Matt. 25) on the last day, which mentions no intermediate punishment between heaven and hell, applies only to personal sinners, nay, speaking strictly, only to those who had the opportunity of knowing Christ in His Church. We shall deal with this subject in Book VIII.

3. It is highly probable that those who die guilty of original sin only, are free from pain and sorrow, and even enjoy a certain inward peace and happiness, so that they attain at least a minimum of that felicity which would have been their natural end if human nature had not been elevated to a supernatural order. This proposition is not so commonly admitted as the preceding. The reasons which support it are very forcible. If, in the soul stained with original sin, no evil disposition is evolved either before or after its separation from the body, and if, after death, when there is no stage of probation, its natural tendencies towards good evolve themselves unhindered, no sorrow need arise from the loss of the beatific vision, because nature does not of its own account desire it, and as it has been lost without personal fault the loss will not be felt by a well-ordained will. Nor can any suffering be inflicted by the withholding of goods necessary to the natural peace and satisfaction of a rational creature, because this would be equal to inflicting the pæna sensus. If no satisfaction was afforded to the natural tendencies of these souls, that is, if they did not in a certain sense attain their natural end, God would have created beings without any attainable end.

III. The penalties of original sin here on earth are the incapacity of performing salutary works, and the loss of all the privileges of original integrity. This incapacity for salutary works and the disordered tendencies which incline man to new sins, hold him in the bondage of sin and death.

SECT. 165.—THE POWER OF THE DEVIL FOUNDED UPON SIN

I. The Council of Trent points out that original sin brought man under the power of the devil; earlier decisions, and the Fathers, find a strong argument for original sin in the “exorcisms” used in the administration of Baptism, and Holy Scripture in many places represents redemption from the captivity of the devil, and destruction of his empire as the special object of Christ’s Redemption (cf. Epist. Cælestini, cap. xii.). The chief texts bearing on this doctrine, are: “Who (God) hath delivered us from the power of darkness (= the prince of darkness), and hath translated us into the kingdom of the Son of His love” (Col. 1:13; see also 2:14, 15; John 12:31, and 14:30, “… that through death He might destroy him who had the empire of death, that is to say, the devil,” Heb. 2:14).

II. Satan has no just right to the empire of death: he is a tyrant in title as well as in fact. His title is entirely on the side of man, who for his sin deserved to be abandoned by God (Whom he had forsaken) to the devil by whom he allowed himself to be seduced. St. Peter, in his Second Epistle (2:19), quotes the ancient law of war, “by whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is a slave,” as illustrating the relation of the sinner to Satan. St. Paul says, “Know you not that to whom you yield yourselves servants to obey, his servants you are whom you obey, whether it be of sin unto death, or of obedience unto justice?” (Rom. 6:16.) From this text, it is clear that man’s slavery to Satan is the result of man’s voluntary adhesion to his tyrant.

III. The evils which follow sin were introduced into the world by the malice of the devil, and they are, besides, part of his own punishment. Hence, Satan, by involving man in sin, made him a captive and slave in his empire—a captive, because the sinner is deprived of the power freely to move towards his perfection; a slave, because he is, to a great extent, compelled to serve the devil in his war against God, and to satisfy his hatred of God and man. Of course, the empire, or power, of Satan is not the same over all sinners alike. It attains its highest degree in the hardened sinner; is less in the sinner guilty of mortal sin, but not a hardened sinner; and least in those guilty of original sin only. The formula of exorcism in the rite of Baptism addresses the devil as dwelling in the infant after the manner of the indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the saints. This satanic indwelling, however, is not a substantial indwelling in the body, much less in the soul, of the child, but only a relation of dependence and influence, such as exists between men,—strengthened, maybe, by the permanent company of a wicked spirit. The very analogy with the influence of the Holy Ghost shows that the devil does not and cannot force his victim to commit sin; for as the Holy Ghost leaves to the soul its power for evil, so does the devil leave to it the power for good.

The empire of sin and death may be considered either as a continuation of the material part of sin, or as a continuation of sin itself and of its guilt. From this point of view, it is conceivable that even the justified may be exposed to a considerable extent to the influences of the devil, and may even be bodily possessed by him; in the same manner as concupiscence remains after justification, that is, as a continuation of the material part of sin. Such persecution, however, does not imply any captivity or slavery of the just under the devil, because the devil has no longer any “right” against those who belong to God, and because he can only influence them after the manner of natural concupiscence; his obsession is merely a trial of the sanctity of the children of God.

IV. The devil is called by St. Paul “the god of this world” (2 Cor. 4:4). “This world” is here taken as the world such as it became through the fall of Adam, in opposition to what it will be when the Redemption of Christ will have had its full effect. Yet these and similar expressions, and the expressions used by the Church in the blessings of so many material things, indicate that the power of Satan extends over the whole visible world, in as far as it comes into immediate contact with man, or is at man’s service. This is but a consequence of the loss by Adam of his dominion over material creation. It is among the spoils which his conqueror has carried off. In direct antagonism with the life-giving influences from above, the king of death wages his war against God from below; through the visible things of this world he tempts the lower appetites of man, and strives to ascend until he reaches the root of the soul where the work of God commences.

V. Satan exercises, or manifests, his power in a twofold manner: he tempts man to sin, and inflicts on him other evils, yet always with the object of leading him into sin. The first point is clearly laid down in Scripture: “Be sober and watch, because your adversary, the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour; whom resist ye, strong in faith” (1 Pet 5:8, 9; see also Eph. 6:11). The only open question is whether the devil is the author of “all” temptations. It is certain that the flesh and the world, viz. man’s own concupiscence and inducements from without, in many cases sufficiently account for temptation, without the intervention of Satan. Still, it is very probable that Satan does not remain idle when those agencies of his are at work; nay, it seems most likely that he never, or, at most, very seldom, assails the soul except by means of “the flesh and the world.” Nor is it unlikely that the “ape of God” deputes wicked spirits to counteract the part of the Guardian Angels. As to the infliction of physical evils, we have proof for its existence in the formulæ of the various blessings given by the Church to material things. These formulæ, however, lay especial stress on the spiritual damage to be feared from the devil, whence we infer that whatever use the wicked one makes of material evils against man, it is always with intent to damage his soul.

VI. The “god of the world” carries out his government on much the same lines as the God Whose Empire he seeks to destroy. His religion is in every particular a caricature of Divine Religion. According to 1 Cor. 10:18–19, idolatry was, and still is, a working of devils in which almost every human vice and degrading practice has been elevated to the rank of virtues and sacrifices. When Christianity has destroyed idolatry, the religion of Satan embodies itself in a diabolical hatred of the religion of Christ, and especially of Catholicism, without, however, even giving up attempts to set up a positive diabolical cultus. Such attempts are attested by the whole religious history of mankind, from the earliest idolaters to the modern “spiritualists.” False wonders and prophecies are resorted to with the object of deterring men from God, and enlisting them in the service of the devil. The superior power and knowledge of Satan enable him to perform works above the power of man, and to predict future contingent events with a greater chance of success. Scripture and Tradition attest the fact that Satan uses his power and knowledge for his wicked purposes (see Matt. 24:24, and compare 2 Thess. 2:7–9). In imitation of God’s prophets and priests, the devil has his “mediums,” that is, persons chosen and accepted as channels of communication between him and the world. Antichrist will be such a medium, and the girl of Philippi “having a pythonical spirit, who brought to her masters much gain by divining,” was another (Acts 16:16 sqq.). The possibility of sorcery, witchcraft, necromancy, and the like, is evident à priori; their actual existence is dogmatically and historically certain. When, however, the practical question has to be decided whether some extraordinary performance is the work of the devil or not, the same care and precautions must be taken as in deciding whether or not an extraordinary occurrence is the work of God. Magical (“art,” in the sense of practices and manipulations governed by set rules, and producing constant diabolical effects, is an imitation of the Sacraments and Sacramentals of the Church. It must nevertheless be granted that the imitation is but very imperfect, for the devil can only operate with the permission of God; his power and knowledge, though great, are yet limited, and his deceitfulness prevents him from keeping his promises even to his adherents.

Thus the belief in preternatural diabolical influences is no superstition, but sound faith. Satan’s most daring attempt at aping his Divine Master appears in “possession of men by the devil.” It is an attempt at imitating the indwelling of the Holy Ghost and the Hypostatic Union. Demoniacal possession was most frequent during Christ’s stay on earth, and for a certain time afterwards, as if Satan wished to manifest the height of his power in the face of his Antagonist. The casting out of the devils afforded also one of the most striking proofs of Christ’s power. Real possession ought to be carefully distinguished from the sinner’s voluntary surrender to the devil, as recorded of Judas (John 13:27), and likewise from “obsession,” viz. from that state of siege in which the devil holds persons inaccessible to his ordinary seductions. In real possession the devil disputes man’s control over his body, and, for a length of time, acts as if he were the soul, or if the body were his own. The soul itself he cannot possess in the same way; but, in this state, he acts on it through the lower faculties of human nature, especially through the imagination. The Scriptural name ἐνεργούμενοι describes accurately the state of possession as “worked by the devil.” A person possessed by the evil spirit is violently and despotically turned into a tool or instrument of the devil. Possession, as a fact, is so clearly maintained in Holy Writ and in Tradition, that, without heresy, its existence cannot be denied. See the Commentaries on the Sentences, II. Dist. 8; Perrone, De Vrrtute Religionis.

COROLLARY AND CONCLUSION: THE MYSTERY OF INIQUITY AND THE MYSTERY OF GRACE

I. In the present order of the Universe, sin is as much a mystery of faith as the supernatural order of grace and sanctity of which it is the counterpart. Its full malice and bearing can only be appreciated in the light of the mystery of grace. The mysterious character of sin is found especially in original sin; with our experimental knowledge alone, and in the hypothesis of a merely natural order, the existence of original sin could not be proved, and its nature would be absolutely inconceivable. But in the light of revelation and in connection with the mystery of grace, original sin presents no insuperable difficulty to the mind, and in its turn, it throws almost all the light obtainable on the existence of evil in the world.

II. Holy Scripture speaks of the mystery of iniquity but once, “The mystery of iniquity already worketh” (τὸ μυστήριον τῆς ἀνομίας, 2 Thess. 2:7). The Apostle here seems to oppose the mystery of iniquity to the mystery of God: the work of Anti-christ to the work of Christ. Christ’s work is the mysterious operation of grace for the salvation of mankind; the work of His adversary is the operation of sin for the destruction of souls.

BOOK V

REDEMPTION

THE universal ruin brought on mankind by sin was not suffered by Almighty God to be permanent. His goodness and mercy provided an equally universal remedy whereby man might be freed (redeemed) from the slavery of sin, and whereby the Supernatural Order which had been destroyed might be restored in a new and more perfect form. This restoration forms the subject of the succeeding portion of Dogmatic Theology.

FIRST we have to treat of the Person and work of Him Who was the means of bringing about this new order of things. We shall divide the present book into four parts:—I. The Preparation for the Redeemer; II. The Person of the Redeemer (Christology); III. His Work; IV. His Mother.

The Fathers treat expressly of the Person of Christ rather than of His work; but they do so always with reference to that work. St. Athanasius, St. Leo, and St. John Damascene should be especially consulted. It was St. Anselm, in his treatise, Cur Deus Homo, and Hugh of St. Victor (De Sacram. Christ. Fidei), who laid the foundation of the systematic teaching on Redemption. The Master of the Sentences deals with Christology in lib. iii., dist. i.–xxii., of which the best commentators are St. Bonaventure, Scotus, Denis the Carthusian, Franciscus a Christo and Estius. St. Thomas has given Christology its most perfect form. See his commentary on the Master of Sentences; also, Qq. Dispp. De Unione Verbi Incarnati; De Scientia Christi, and De Gratia Christi; Opusc. III. Contra Græcos, Armenos, etc.; Compend. Theol. cc. 199–241; Summa Contra Gentes, l. iv., and Summa Theol. 3, qq. 1–51. Commentaries on St. Thomas: Medina, Sylvius, Gonet, and especially the Salmanticenses; the Jesuits Valentia, Tanner, Vasquez, Lugo, Ragusa, and especially Suarez. For the Scotist views see Frassen, De Rada, Henno. Also the important works of Petavius, Thomassin, and Theophilus Reynaud, in the seventeenth century; the magnificent treatise of Cardinal Bérulle, Des Grandeurs de Jésus-Christ. Of modern authors: Munier and Holzklau (Wirceburgenses), Legrand (Migne Theol., tom. ix.); Franzelin (De Verbo Incarnato), Kleutgen, vol. iii.; Newman’s St. Athanasius, Arians of the Fourth Century, and Tracts Theological and Ecclesiastical; Scheeben, book v.; Billot, De Verbo Incarnato; Card. Satolli, De Incarnatione.

PART I

PRELIMINARY CONDITIONS AND PREPARATION FOR REDEMPTION

CHAPTER I

THE CONDITIONS OF REDEMPTION

SECT. 166.—POSSIBILITY AND CONGRUENCY OF REDEMPTION

I. THE restoration of fallen man is called, in the language of Scripture, Salvation and Redemption: salvation from death through the restitution of grace which is the root of life; redemption from the captivity of sin and death under Satan, through the restitution of the freedom of the sons of God. Such salvation and redemption mean something more than mere remission of sin: they include the restoration of the sinner to supernatural friendship with God. As man, by his own power, is unable to raise himself to the supernatural state, it follows that his salvation is entirely the work of God (Council of Trent, sess. vi. c. 1).

II. Though man is unworthy of Redemption, yet his unworthiness is not so great as that of the fallen angels, because his natural receptivity for grace has not been impaired to the same degree as theirs. The very perfection of their nature increased the enormity of their sins: they did not repent, they turned away from God in open rebellion, and were guilty, each of them, of a personal sin. Man, on the contrary, felt ashamed of his sin; and even now he has as great a desire for Redemption as he has an inclination for new sins, and his guilt is personal only in Adam.

III. Man, then, being less unworthy of Redemption than the fallen angels, it was fitting that the Divine mercy should redeem him in preference to them. So much more was this the case, as the Lord of the Universe owed it to His honour and glory, not to allow the whole species of creatures which are in a unique manner His image and likeness to miss the end for which He created them. Had the whole human race remained unredeemed, Satan could have boasted of the conquest of the best part of creation, and set up a kingdom, not over stray individuals, but over a distinct portion of God’s creatures. It was the Divine anger against the infernal tyrant, and the Divine mercy for his victims, that combined to make Redemption “fitting.” We say fitting, not necessary. The gratuitousness of grace and the manifold testimony of Scripture are opposed to all notion of necessity arising from any duty on the part of God towards the sinner, or from any restriction of His right to leave the sinner unredeemed. The congruency of Redemption arising from what God owes to Himself is neither restrictive of His freedom, nor does it support the assertion that the present fallen race ought to have been redeemed: for God might have attained the same object by creating a new human race.

IV. As a matter of fact, Redemption was accomplished by the Incarnation of God the Son, and by no other means (Acts 4:12). But, speaking absolutely, it was possible for God to redeem mankind otherwise: for His infinite wisdom, power, and goodness, cannot be restricted to the choice of any one means to His ends. When the Fathers speak of the Incarnation as the sole means of Redemption, what they mean is that, as a matter of fact, it is the only means, and that it is the only one by which God obtains full satisfaction, without renouncing any of His rights on the sinner. His justice does not prevent God from pardoning the sinner without claiming any satisfaction. The Divine Justice has a twofold object: the safeguarding of the Divine right injured by the sinner, and the safeguarding of the moral order. If the sinner by repentance acknowledges the Divine right, and is willing to comply with all its claims as far as in him lies, God certainly is not “bound” to exact more, though He is entitled to more, viz. to full reparation. The moral order is sufficiently safeguarded against the sinner’s contempt, if God, when forgiving the sin, does not also remit all the penalties due to it. The preservation of the moral order certainly does not require that no sin be forgiven except on full satisfaction; for this object is attained rather by the pain felt by the sinner than by the objective value of the punishment. It is still more evident that God, out of pure mercy, can give the sinner the means necessary to penance, and in the case of original sin, remit it out of pure grace without penance.

V. In the hypothesis that God claimed complete satisfaction for the injury done to Him by sin, the Incarnation of a Divine Person was necessary.

1. Grievous sin, being contempt of the infinite God, inflicts an injury objectively infinite (see Book. IV., §§ 155, 156), the full reparation for which requires the rendering to God of an honour of infinite value. But only a person of infinite dignity, and therefore of Divine nature, can render such an honour.

2. Mortal sin, by destroying the supernatural sanctity of the living temple of God, inflicts on God an external injury which is, in its way, likewise infinite, and which, in our hypothesis, requires full reparation. Now, injury is repaired either by full restoration or by adequate compensation. But, considering the supernatural character and nature of sanctity, compensation for its destruction by adequate meritorious satisfaction, or restoration of it by proper intrinsic power, can only be accomplished by an agent of Divine dignity and power.

3. If the Redemption has to be as universal as sin and its attendant evils, it must counterbalance original sin, considered as sin of the whole human race, and all other actual sins, and also the loss of original integrity; that is to say, it must be infinite in extension or equivalent to all possible sins of all possible children of Adam; hence, again, the principle of Redemption must possess infinite power and dignity.

VI. If the Incarnation is only necessary in the hypothesis of God claiming full satisfaction, the ground for its actually taking place must be sought not in that hypothetical necessity, but rather in its congruency or appropriateness as means to that end. The Incarnation attains the object of Redemption not only adequately but superabundantly (Rom. 5:17), and therein consists its appropriateness. The superabundance of Redemption by the Incarnation is manifest: to God it gives the greatest glory, as most perfect manifestation of His wisdom, mercy, and justice combined; to man it offers the means of obtaining the most complete remission of sin and restoration of lost grace, and at the same time, it exercises on him the most effective “pedagogic” influence, by giving him in Christ a perfect teacher in word and deed (cf. Thomassin, l. i.). Again, the superabundance of Redemption through the Incarnation appears in this, that it not only restores, but completes and perfects the original order, and thus founds a new and higher order. The union with God, as established by the Incarnation, is higher and more intimate than that of the original state; the dignity of mankind is raised; grace, instead of being a simple free gift, is acquired by the merits of the new Adam, and settled on mankind as a permanent possession; and worship is raised to infinite value and dignity.

However appropriate a means of Redemption the Incarnation may be, God would not have adopted it but for the exaltedness of the ends to which it leads. Remission of sins alone, or the moral education of natural man, would certainly not be objects proportionate to such a means. The real object of that Divine abasement is the elevation of man to Divine life; the supernatural and infinite glory which God wishes to obtain through the supernatural glorification of the creature is alone sufficient to account for the Incarnation. “Christ became man that we might be made gods (Αὐτὸς ἐνηνθρώπησεν ἵνα ἡμεῖς θεοποιηθῶμεν)” (St. Athanasius, De Incarn., n. 54). And it accounts so completely for this, that even in the hypothesis of the original order not having been disturbed by sin, the Incarnation would still be justified as its complement and final perfection. It would even be justified if the God-Man were not the means of bringing mankind so near to God, for in Himself He is of such perfection that in Him God is infinitely more pleased than in all the rest of Creation.

VII. Although human reason may comprehend the appropriateness of Redemption through the Incarnation of a Divine Person, yet human reason, left to itself, could neither suspect nor expect its realization. It is the freest act of Divine Love and the greatest wonder of Divine Power and Wisdom, and therefore the mystery “unsearchable … which hath been hidden from eternity in God” (Eph. 3:8–12). It can only be shown negatively that, as presented to our acceptance in Revelation, the great mystery contains no evident contradictions.

CHAPTER II

THE PREPARATION FOR REDEMPTION

SECT. 167.—THE PERSON AND WORK OF THE REDEEMER PORTRAYED IN THE PROPHECIES OF THE OLD TESTAMENT

I. THE Redemption of fallen man, decreed from all eternity, was announced immediately after the Fall, but its execution was delayed for a long time, during which its fruits were applied by anticipation to those who deserved it. The delay may be taken as a punishment for the pride of man, inasmuch as it brought home to him his utter helplessness and entire dependence on God. It thus served as a stage of preparation for the coming Redeemer. God, Who distributes His grace according to His own Will, selected the Jewish nation for special preparation; before the advent of the Saviour, the Jews stood out in the eyes of the rest of the world as a living prophecy of Him; and in their subsequent dispersion they are a living monument of the reality of His coming.

II. During the period of preparation, the Redemption was announced in prophecies gradually increasing in distinctness and precision. According to time and subject-matter, they comprise seven groups: (1) the Proto-evangelium, or the prophecy of Paradise; (2) the prophecies made to the Patriarchs; (3) to Moses; (4) to David; prophecies made by the Prophets (5) before, (6) during, and (7) after the Exile.

1. The first and fundamental promise of a Redeemer was made to our first parents immediately after their fall: “I will put enmities between thee (the serpent) and the woman, and thy seed and her seed; she shall crush thy head, and thou shalt lie in wait for her heel” (Gen. 3:15). The liberation from the tyranny of Satan, founded on his victory over Adam, is to be accomplished by the crushing of the head of the serpent by a woman and her Son. The Hebrew text, in its present form, uses the same word (שׁוּפ) for “crushing” and “lying in wait.” As, however, the object of God’s curse on the serpent is to inflict a punishment on it, it must be admitted that the “crushing of the head” implies a final victory over the enemy, and the “crushing of, or lying in wait for, the heel” implies but an unsuccessful resistance; the devil’s power was destroyed when death befell the human body of the Saviour. Again, the present Hebrew text, instead of “she” (shall crush thy head) has “he,” or “it,” thus pointing out the seed of the woman as Redeemer. Yet, as the enmity to the serpent is common to Mother and Son, so also the victory must be common. A woman will be instrumental in the defeat of Satan, just as a woman was instrumental in the defeat of Adam. The “seed of the woman” is to be understood of “one man,” as by analogy we gather from Gal. 3:16. (Cf. Pius IX., Bull Ineffabilis Deus [defining the Immaculate Conception].)

2. The original promise takes a concrete form in the age of the Patriarchs. The “seed of the woman” is here determined as the seed of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; his action is described as the blessing of all the nations of the earth, that is, as removing the curse of sin from all mankind. The last of the Patriarchs, Jacob, points out his son Juda (and his seed) as the lion-like bearer of dominion and victory, until the advent of the Conqueror, who is the expectation of nations. The time of the coming is thus also indicated. See Gen. 12:3; 22:18. Jacob’s prophecy to Juda is as follows: “Juda, thee shall thy brethren praise; thy hands shall be on the necks of thy enemies; the sons of thy father shall bow down to thee. Juda is a lion’s whelp … the sceptre shall not be taken away from Juda, nor a ruler from his thigh, till He come that is to be sent, and He shall be the expectation of nations” (Gen. 49:8–10; cf. Apoc. 5:5).

3. When Moses, as prophet of God, gave to the children of Israel the constitution and the legal institutions becoming the chosen people of God, God made this promise: “I will raise them up a prophet out of the midst of their brethren, like to thee (Moses), and I will put My words in His mouth, and He shall speak to them all I shall command Him, and he that will not hear His words which He shall speak in My Name, I will be the avenger” (Deut. 18:18, 19). Here the Redeemer is promised as a mediator of the testament between God and man, but a better mediator than Moses (Heb. 3:3). At the same time, when the chosen people was making its first appearance among the nations, the voice of Balaam is heard to this effect: “The hearer of the words of God hath said, who knoweth the doctrine of the Highest, and seeth the visions of the Almighty, who falling hath his eyes opened. I shall see Him, but not now; I shall behold Him, but not near. A star shall rise out of Jacob, and a sceptre shall spring up from Israel, and shall strike the chiefs of Moab, and shall waste all the children of Seth” (Num. 24:16, 17). This prophecy in the first instance probably refers to David, but its solemnity, the fourfold blessing which precedes it, the mention of the last days and of the star, extend its bearing beyond the kingdom of David.

4. The Messianic prophecies acquire greater distinctness in the time of King David. The Messias, the Anointed of the Lord, as He is henceforth called, will be of the family of David; the glory of the kingdom of David and Solomon is the germ and the type of His future universal kingdom; His nature, His origin, His functions, and the events of His life, are portrayed in outline. The Anointed appears as the Son of God by generation, and as God; as a priest-king after the manner of Melchisedech, Who will offer Himself in sacrifice, but shall not see corruption, and Who after His passion will gather all nations unto God, and be Himself the object of their adoration (2 Kings 7:11–16 [Nathan’s prophecy]; the Messianic Psalms, 88 and 131; 71, 2, and 109; 44).

5. The prophets between the time of David and the Captivity add new touches to the portrait of the Messias drawn in the Psalms. When the local and earthly glory of David’s empire was dwindling away, they announced the future rise of a nobler and a universal kingdom; they foretold the deliverance from the impending captivity through Cyrus, sent by God as an omen and a type of the coming spiritual deliverance from the captivity of sin and hell through God’s Anointed: they represent the promise of the Messias as a pledge and guarantee for the perpetuity of the house of David, and for the liberation of his people from temporal captivity. The principal bearer of these prophecies is Isaias (ישעיה, Jehova’s salvation), the Evangelist among the Prophets. In many passages of the first part, and in the whole of the second part of his Book, he describes expressly and in order the heavenly origin of the “Bud of the Lord,” or the “Orient;” the Divine nature and exalted attributes of the Anointed; His teaching, His vicarious suffering as just servant of God, and the glory of His universal kingdom, the Church (2:2, 3, and 4:2, with parallel Mich. 5:2; also Jeremias 23:5 sqq. and 33:15 sqq. “I will raise up to David a just branch … the name that they shall call Him is: The Lord [Jehovah] our just one;” Zacharias 3:8, and 6:12; Isa. 45:8). The origin and nature of the Bud of God are characterized in 14:7, 9:3–7, 11:7 sqq.; and in the second part passim, esp. 49–66.

6. The Prophets of the Captivity, with the exception of Daniel, add but little to the description of the Anointed given by their predecessors. Jeremias and Ezechiel lay stress upon the spiritual kingdom of Christ, teaching expressly that the earthly throne of David will not be filled again (Jer. 30:23; Ezech. 21:25–27). Jeremias, in the most important Messianic parts of his prophecy (23, 31, and 33), in contrast with the prevailing injustice and guiltiness of the Chosen People, and with the external destruction of the Old Covenant, introduces the Messias as the bud, or branch (צמח), whose name is “Jehovah our just one,” and promises the institution of a new and eternal Testament (31:31 sqq., and 32:39). Ezechiel, on the other hand, treats the Messias, whom he calls “God’s servant David” (34:23–31, and 37:21–28), as Shepherd and Prince. Baruch (3:36–38) represents the apparition of the Eternal Wisdom on earth and His dwelling among men, as the completion of the education of Israel by God. Lastly, Daniel announces, in a more concrete form than any other prophet, the historical events which prepared the coming of Christ; His solemn taking possession of His universal and eternal sovereignty; the exact time of His appearance; the institution of a new alliance, and the destruction of the old: and thus his prophecy is the sealing and fulfilment of all preceding prophecies (Dan. 7:13, 14; 9:24–27). The best Catholic commentary on this last prophecy is by Rohling, The Book of the Prophet Daniel (in German).

7. After the return from the Captivity, the Prophets speak of the Messias in connection with the second temple, as God and as Priest. Aggeus calls him “the Desired of all nations,” Who will glorify the temple with His presence, and announce therein the peace of God. Zacharias announces Him to the first High Priest of the new temple as the Orient Who taketh away the sins of the world, and the High Priest himself is set down as a type of the Messias’ royal priesthood. The “Orient” is here the foundation stone and the builder of the new spiritual temple, uniting in Himself the functions of king and priest. When He is again spoken of as Shepherd, He becomes “the man that cleaveth to God,” and who is violently put to death. In fine, Malachias prophesies the founder of a new and universal sacrificial worship, and the rising sun of justice (Aggeus 2:7–10; Zach. 3:8; 6:11–13; 9:9; 13:7. Malachias 1:11; 3:1; 4:2, 5, 6). The natural sequel to this latter prophecy (announcing the Precursor of Christ) is the message of the Angel Gabriel to Zachary, the father of the Baptist (Luke 1:16, 17).

III. Side by side with the verbal prophecies of the Old Testament run the types or figures of the Messias, which are a kind of real or substantial prophecy. Repeated assertions of Christ and the Apostles place the existence of such types beyond all doubt The Fathers and Theologians, however, considering as types whatever bears a similarity to Christ, point out a great number of types which are not positively mentioned as such in the New Testament. It must be conceded that, before the Gospel shed its light upon them, the typical character of many true figures or types was not easy to recognize. Many others, on the other hand, were brought out by the Prophets themselves in connection with verbal prophecies, e.g. Moses, Melchisedech, David, Solomon, Cyrus. The typical character of others, e.g. religious sacrifices and ceremonies, is self-evident. In dogmatic theology a twofold use is made of those ancient types: they furnish a proof that Jesus is really the Messias prepared from the beginning, and they offer useful illustrations, by analogy, of many points revealed in the New Testament. The Gospels use them chiefly as proofs; St. Paul, in his Epistles, more as illustrations. To obtain a comprehensive grasp of all the types of Christ, it is best to group them according to epochs, as we did the prophecies: to each group of prophecies corresponds a group of types, and they help to explain one another. As examples we refer the reader to the following: in group i., Adam (Rom. 5:14) and Eve (Eph. 5); in group ii., Melchisedech (Psalm 110, Heb. 7), Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph. Thus Moses was sent by God as Prophet, endowed with miraculous powers, as Shepherd and Legislator, as Founder of a new form of worship, and a new alliance between God and His people, etc. Again the Paschal Lamb, the Manna (John 6:30, 48), the water from the rock (1 Cor. 10:4), the Brazen Serpent (John 3:14, and 12:32, etc.). With the more important figures we shall deal extensively when we come to treat of the corresponding antitypes.

PART II

THE REDEEMER

WE shall here adopt the same division as in the treatise on the Holy Trinity (Book II., Part II.). We shall first lay down the fundamental lines of the dogma according to Scripture and Tradition; and afterwards explain the dogma according to the principles of theological science.

CHAPTER I

THE DOGMA

SECT. 168.—PERSONAL NAMES OF THE REDEEMER: SUMMARY OF THE CREEDS AND DECREES OF THE CHURCH

I. THE personal names of the Saviour directly characterize Him either as man or as God. As man He received at His birth the name of Jesus (,יֵשּׁוּעַ Jehovah is Salvation, Matt. 1:21), which is taken from His function of Redeemer. Jesus Himself has a predilection for the name “Son of Man.” This designation implies that He is pre-eminently the son of man, the second Adam far above the first in excellence; or also that He is not so much the son of one man as the son of all mankind, the desired of all nations. Neither of these names expresses that intrinsic excellence of His Person which places Him above all men, and fits Him (makes Him worthy) to effect the Redemption of all; this is done by the name Christ, “the Anointed” with Divinity. This name, as will be explained in its place, if fully understood, contains in a nutshell the whole subject-matter of “Christology.” The Saviour is called by Isaias (7) “Emmanuel,” that is, “God with us.” The manner in which He is with us is expressed in the language of the Church by the term “Word Incarnate,” or “the Word made flesh.” We shall show farther on that this term contains an explanation of the name Christ, and expresses directly and without figure of speech the constitution of the Person of the Saviour: hence Christology is appropriately described as the treatise on the Incarnate Word of God.

II. The Rule of Faith concerning the Person of the Saviour is laid down in the Apostles’ Creed or the Symbol of Baptism: upon this all subsequent definitions are founded. They, one and all, formulate the constitution of Christ in connection with His origin.

1. The original simple form of the symbol of the Apostles, as used in the West, runs thus: “I believe … in Jesus Christ His (the Father’s) only Son, our Lord, Who was born of the Holy Ghost and the Virgin Mary.” Here, Jesus, the Son of Mary, and Jesus, the only Son of God, Who shares with His Father the dominion of the world, is said to be one and the same person. Directly His birth from Mary is alone set forth; but the mention of the influence of the Holy Ghost on this birth points to the essential holiness of its product, viz. Christ, the Anointed; and the words “only Son of God the Father”; suppose His eternal origin, so that His birth in time appears as a second birth. Most of the Eastern forms run: “I believe in one God … and in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God,” thus laying more stress on the indivisible unity, manifested by common Lordship, of God the Redeemer with God the Father.

2. The heresies of the first centuries, especially the Arian negation of the Divinity of Christ, which caused the definition of Christ’s “Eternal Lordship,” naturally led up to a closer determination of the relation which His second birth (of Mary) bears to His first birth (of the eternal Father); and also to an assertion of the reality of the second birth against the Gnostics. Thus the Council of Nicæa, after defining the Divine Sonship, continues: “Who for us men and for our salvation, came down from heaven and took flesh [by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary] and was made Man.” The bracketed words, which belong to the Apostles’ Creed, were introduced into the Nicene formula by the First Council of Constantinople. It is worthy of remark that, whereas the symbol of the Apostles is formulated more on the line of the Synoptic Gospels, the Nicene Creed follows exactly the exposition of St. John 1:1–14.

3. The symbol of Nicæa did not speak with the same distinctness of the temporal birth of Christ as of His eternal birth. The terms “descending from heaven” (κατελθεῖν), “taking flesh” (σαρκοῦσθαι), and especially “being made man” (ἐνανθρωπεῖν), were misinterpreted by Nestorius to imply only a moral and accidental union of the Son of God with the man Jesus, the Son of Mary; he divided Christ into two distinct persons, the Divine and the human. Against this heresy the Council of Ephesus did not set up a new definition, finding the existing ones sufficient; but it approved the explanation of the Nicene symbol given by St. Cyril of Alexandria, and also his twelve anathematisms against Nestorius. According to St. Cyril, the three above expressions signify: a substantial or physical union of the Logos with the flesh or with humanity—by which the human flesh, becomes as truly His own flesh as the human flesh is the own flesh of the human soul—whence it further follows that the taking flesh out of the Virgin Mary on the part of the Logos, makes the Logos Himself, and no other, the Son of Mary. So that Christ is not the union of two persons (the Logos and Jesus), but one substantial being, the subject at the same time of the Divine and the human attributes (cf. Second Epistle of St. Cyril to Nestorius, and the Anath appended to the same). By this declaration the Council of Ephesus established the formal unity of the Nicene with the Apostles’ Creed, and gave the true sense of the κατελθεῖν and ἐνανθρωπεῖν used in the former. The second anathematism contains a formal definition of the essential constitution of Christ, giving its principle, its form, and its consequences: that the Word of God the Father unites Himself substantially (καθʼ ὑπόστασιν) to the flesh, and thus constitutes one Christ by making the flesh His own, and is consequently in one Person God and Man. Another remarkable formulation of the same doctrine is to be found in the Libellus Leporii, probably drawn up by St. Augustine, A.D. 424 or 425; it contains a retractation of the errors of the Pelagian priest Leporius. The “substantial union” of St. Cyril is here described as mixtio inconfusa (see the text in Hardouin, i. 1263.)

4. The Council of Chalcedon was specially directed against the Eutychians who understood the “taking flesh,” σάρκωσις, as implying a fusion of the two natures into one. Hence it lays stress upon the “being made man,” ἐνανθρώπησις, as the union of the Logos in His unaltered Divine nature with a perfect and unaltered human nature, and places the two natures side by side under the threefold aspect of perfection, consubstantiality, and origin by generation: “We confess and teach that our Lord is perfect in deity and perfect in humanity … consubstantial with the Father as to His deity, and consubstantial with us as to His humanity … born of the Father before all time as to His deity, born in recent times … of the Virgin Mary as to His humanity.” Further, the same Council lays down the technical term for the unity of Christ: “One and the same Christ, Son and Lord unbegotten, must be acknowledged in two natures not confused, changed, divided, or separated; the union nowhere taking away the difference of the natures, but rather safeguarding the properties of each, so that they concur in one person and hypostasis.” The symbol of Chalcedon (except for the formula relating to hypostatic unity) is nothing but a compendium of the famous Epistle of Pope Leo I. to Flavian, which, in its turn, is no more than a commentary on the symbol of the Apostles.

5. The symbol of Chalcedon, confirmed and in some parts proposed more distinctly by the Fifth Ecumenical Council (Second of Constantinople, A.D. 553), received a further development in the Sixth Ecumenical Council, which defined against Monothelitism, that the two natures united in one subject are, in most intimate conjunction and subordination, the principles of a twofold mental life and operation; in other words, that Christ has two wills and two operations: the Divine will, by which He acts as God; the human will, by which He acts as man, this latter entirely distinct from, but entirely subject to, the former.

6. The most important formulary of the constitution of Christ originated in the West is contained in the so-called symbol of St. Athanasius. With the exception of the clauses comparing the union of the natures in Christ with the union of body and soul in man, it is formed upon the symbol of Chalcedon (see St. Augustine, In Joan. tr. 19). The Eleventh Council of Toledo, AD. 675, gives another very complete exposition of the doctrine of Incarnation. Lastly, the Bull of Eugenius IV. (Decretum pro Jacobitis) sums up all previous definitions on the subject in question.

III. The chief points of the Catholic dogma concerning the Person of Christ are the following:—

1. Christ is not a merely human Being: He is a Divine Person,—the Logos, or only-begotten Son of God,—and as such has an eternal existence. 2. But this same Person, besides His Divine nature, has a human nature taken unto Him in time; He possesses this nature as really as His Divine nature, and as really as man possesses human nature: hence, the Divine Person of the Word is really man, and as Divine Person incarnate, He is the Person of Christ 3. The Person named Christ is not merely an ideal or moral whole, but a Being one and indivisible in the strictest sense; in Him the Divine and the human nature are united into one substantial whole, like body and soul are united into one substantial human person. 4. But the unity of Christ, being the unity of two complete living natures, has an advantage over the unity of mind and matter in man; it is not a unity of nature in the proper sense, that is such an one in which the mixed elements complete and influence each other so as to lose the qualities they possessed before the union, and to form together a new principle of action and passion. In Christ the two natures remain strictly distinct; the lower does not in any way influence the higher, and the higher only influences the lower as it would do even if separated. 5. Hence the substantial union of the human nature with the Divine Person is a truly, but at the same time, a purely, personal and hypostatic union. It is personal and hypostatic because one Person possesses the two natures, and it is purely and only such, because the two natures remain entirely unaltered and distinct. Thus the Christ of Revelation appears as a unique and peculiar Being; no other being is constituted in the same marvellous way or of such elements.

SECT. 169.—THE NEW TESTAMENT ON THE CONSTITUTION OF CHRIST

The doctrine of the New Testament concerning the Person of Christ is contained partly in the several accounts of His origin, partly in the descriptions of His concrete reality.

I. His origin is told in a threefold form.

1. The first form is exhibited in the narrative of the Synoptic Gospels, and corresponds with the form of the Apostles’ Creed. St. Matthew and St. Luke describe the origin of the man Jesus from Mary, pointing out the influence of the Holy Ghost and of the power of the Most High, and deducing from this influence that Jesus is more than man, viz. a holy being, the true Son of God, and therefore the promised Christ, Emmanuel and Lord of Mankind. The principal text (Luke 1:31 sqq.) is the message of the Angel to the Virgin: “Behold, thou shalt conceive in thy womb, and bring forth a Son, and thou shalt call His name Jesus. He shall be great, and shall be called (acknowledged and honoured as) the Son of the Most High; and the Lord God shall give unto Him the throne of David His father (= the kingdom promised to David): and He shall reign in the house of Jacob (to whom’ He was promised) for ever, and of His kingdom there shall be no end.… The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee. And therefore also the Holy (Sanctum, τὸ ἅγιον) which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God” (cf. Isa. 7:14, as regards birth from a virgin; and 45:8, in connection with the overshadowing).

2. The second form describes the origin of Christ as a descent of the Son of Man from heaven where He was before; as a coming into the world by going forth (proceeding) from the Father or from God; and lastly, as a mission of the Son of God into the world or into the flesh: His temporal birth is represented as a secondary and relative origin. This form is used by St. John the Baptist (John 1:15, and 3:31 sqq.); by Christ Himself (John 3:13; 6:52; 17:5; 8:42, and 16:28); and by the Apostle (Rom. 8:3; Gal. 4:5; Rom. 1:3, and 9:6).

3. The manner in which the eternal Son of God came down from heaven in the temporal birth of the man Jesus is explained ex professo in the prologue of the Fourth Gospel, and in other places by St. John, and similarly by St. Paul (Phil. 2:7). Starting from the eternal and Divine existence of the uncreated Word, and God-like Image of God, they teach that the Word (ὁ Λόγος) of God, in Itself invisible, was made flesh, and thus appeared visibly among us as man; and that the God-like Image (εἰκὼν) of God took to Himself the form of a servant, and flesh and blood, and made them His own, and so became in essence equal to man. The first of these two conceptions is peculiar to St. John, and pervades all his writings; the second is proper to St. Paul: both are the basis of all later symbols of faith concerning the constitution of Christ. Their significance extends beyond the statement that the Son of God, descending from heaven, became man by taking unto Him human nature in Mary, and is thus one Person with the Son of Mary. They further imply (1) that the Incarnation was effected through the substantial union of a human nature with the Divine Son, Who is described as Word and Image of God; (2) that the Son of God, becoming man in the twofold character of Word and Image, manifests Himself to man in the most perfect manner as the Living Word of God, and, being the consubstantial Image of God, contracts an essential likeness with man, the external image of God; (3) that the humanity of Christ, as compared to His Divinity, represents only the accessory, secondary, lower, and external element of His Being. Read St. John 1:1–17, and the beginning of his First Epistle, which probably was written as an introduction to his Gospel; St. Paul, Phil. 2:6–7; cf. Col. 1:15 sqq.; Heb. 1 and 2.

II. The portrait of the Saviour, as made up from the various accounts of His origin, is completed by the Scriptural statements concerning His Person in real existence.

1. Holy Writ asserts and declares in many ways that the historical Person known as Jesus and Christ, is as really and truly man as other men are. Christ calls Himself “Son of Man” as often as “Son of God;” St. Paul compares Him to Adam (Rom. 5:17 sqq.; 1 Cor. 15:22, and 45–47), and sets forth His humanity as the condition of His mediatorship. If Christ is called “heavenly man,” (1 Cor. 15:47), this does not imply a difference of nature, but only of excellence, between the God-Man and the earthly man. Again, Scripture attributes to Christ all that belongs to a real man: human descent, birth, component parts, qualities and powers, actions and passions; “tempted in all things like as we are” (Heb. 4:15). Lastly, the Apostle repeatedly insists on the circumstance that, as our brother, Christ not only possesses the perfections of human nature, but also its “lowliness and weakness,” and shares with us the conditions of “servant” (Phil. 2:7 sqq.; Heb. 2:11 sqq., and 4:14–16).

2. Jesus, true Man, Son and Brother of man, is yet distinguished from all men, not only by the dignity of Saviour, but as a Person essentially superhuman and Divine.

(a) His Divine character is particularly set forth in the three names (embodied also in the symbol of the Apostles) under which He is proposed in the Gospels and Epistles as object of faith and adoration, viz. “Christ,” that is the Anointed, the Holy or Hallowed of God; “the Son of God;” “the Lord,” or “our Lord.” These three names express personal dignity and excellence; they are parallel and opposed to the three human names: Man, Son of Man, and Brother. Scripture uses them either conjointly or separately; like the human names, they complete and explain one another. The name Christ, in opposition to “man,” expresses the higher essence or personal constitution of Jesus; “Son of God,” as opposed to “Son of Man,” points out His Divine origin and rank; in fine, the name “Lord,” parallel to “Brother of man,” sets forth His exaltedness over men and all other creatures.

(α) The name Christ—which in the unfigured language of angels and demons is replaced by “the Holy” (sanctum, τὸ ἅγιον), or “the Holy of God” (Luke 1:35; Mark 1:24, and Luke 4:34), or “the Christ, and the Hallowed,” purely and simply—designates the man Jesus as sanctified by God in an eminent manner, or invested with God’s own dignity and sanctity; or, again, as a Being to Whom the plenitude of God’s infinite and immutable goodness is communicated, and Who is thereby made as absolutely holy and adorable as God Himself. The “Anointing” of Jesus implies more than the elevation to the dignity of king or priest in the service of God: His kingdom and priesthood are but a part and the offshoot of the hallowing of His whole being, which is such that it confers upon Him a priesthood of which the Priest Himself deserves Divine Worship, and a kingdom which gives Him the sovereign dominion over all creatures.

(β) The name “Son of God” accounts for the deep meaning of the name Christ, inasmuch as it connects the anointing or hallowing of Jesus with His generation from the Eternal Father. The Jews, however, did not give to the term Christ alone this deep signification—hence, as a rule, Scripture connects the two names: Christ, the Son of God; and Jesus Himself calls attention to the fact that the former name (Christ) includes the latter (Son of God). See Supra, § 93.

(γ) The third name, “the Lord,” or “Our Lord,” when applied to Jesus, implies Divine dignity and absolute sovereignty over all creatures; for such sovereignty is an attribute of God the Son as Saviour of mankind. Many prophecies of the Old Testament identify Christ with “the Lord,” and the faithful adore Him as “our Lord.” Moses was a servant in the house of God, Christ was in His own house (Heb. 3:2 sqq.), and He is the heir of all things because all things were made by Him (Heb. 1:2 and Col. 1).

The name “Son of God” alone is used in the Divine revelation concerning the higher character of Jesus: “This is My beloved Son” (Matt. 3:17, and 17:5). These two revelations are confirmed by their witnesses: John 1:34, and 2 Peter 1:17. In the professions of faith demanded and accepted by Jesus, the two names are usually joined: “Christ, the Son of God” (Matt. 16:17; John 6:70; John 11:27). St. Mark (7:29; cf. Matt. 16:17) has, “Thou art Christ,” and St. Luke (9:20), “the Christ of God,” instead of “Christ the Son of God”; which proves that the name Christ includes that of Son of God. In the utterances of the demons, we find instead of Christ, “the Holy one of God,” and “Son of God” (Mark 1:24; 3:11, 12; Luke 4:34). The teaching of the Apostles on the point in question is clearly set forth in Acts 9:20, 22; John 20:31; 1 John 4:15, and 5:1, 5; Acts 2:35. As to how Jesus claimed the Name, “Son of God,” see Matt. 22:41–46 and Luke 20:41–45; John 10:24 sqq. with Acts 4:27; and Heb. 5:7.

(b) The names “Christ,” “the Son of God,” and “the Lord,” predicated of Jesus in the sense just explained, clearly proclaim His Divinity. In five other places, He is expressly called God, and in three of these, with the apposition “true God, great God, God above all” (see Book II., § 93). Attributes exclusively Divine, and the most intimate and comprehensive unity and communion, are predicated of Him. “Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God” (Χριστὸν Θεοῦ δύναμιν καὶ Θεοῦ σαφίαν; 1 Cor. 1:24). If Jesus Himself and the Apostles often ascribe His works to the Father and to the Holy Ghost, they do so to point out the source from which His power is derived, and to witness to the unity of the man Jesus with God the Father. “Amen, amen, I say unto you: The Son cannot do anything of Himself, but what He seeth the Father doing: for what things soever He doth, these the Son also doth in like manner” (John 5:19). It is thus evident that the same Jesus who appears as man among men is also by essence and nature true God. The evidence is corroborated still more by the fact that Divine attributes are predicated of Jesus as man, and human attributes of the same Jesus as God (cf. Book II., § 93); e.g. “God spared not even His own Son, but hath given Him up for us all” (Rom. 8:32; cf. 1 Cor. 2:8; Acts 20:28; Col. 1:17, 18; and Heb. 1 and 2).

3. The simultaneous existence of the Divine and human natures in the same subject supposes that the essence of Christ is composed of two natures, and that these stand to one another in the closest relationship. Scripture illustrates this relationship in two ways: either as the bodily indwelling of the whole plenitude of the Divinity in Christ, or as analogical to the union of body and soul in man. From the latter point of view, the Godhead is conceived as the most pure Spirit in relation to man as flesh, or imperfect compound of mind and matter. “In Him [Christ] dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead corporally (σωματικῶς), and you are filled in Him who is the Head of all principality and power” (Col. 2:9, 10; cf. 1:19). “Christ died once for our sins, being put to death, indeed, in the flesh (σαρκί), but brought to life by the Spirit” (Πνεύματι; 1 Peter 3:18; cf. John 6:24, etc.).

The invisible Divinity of Jesus is witnessed to by God the Father, either speaking from heaven or confirming Jesus’ own testimony by miracles. To this heavenly testimony the Saviour appeals in corroboration of His own human testimony, and this He further corroborated by giving His life to support it: He was sentenced to death because He called Himself the Son of God. His death on that account gives to His evidence the greatest degree of credibility; for not even His enemies deny that He was a wise and holy man. But if He had been deceived Himself or contrived to deceive others on this point, He would be neither wise nor holy. The full and final confirmation of the evidence in favour of His Divinity is ascribed by Jesus to the promised Holy Ghost, inasmuch as the Holy Ghost, at His coming, should show innumerable miracles in the spiritual and in the physical order. St. John, in his First Epistle, sums up the testimony for the Divinity of Christ by placing side by side with the three heavenly witnesses three witnesses on earth: the water, the blood, and the Spirit (5:6–8). See St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, iv. 27–38; Bellarmine, De Christo, lib. i.; Franzelin, De Verb. Incarn., thes. ii. sqq.

SECT. 170.—THE HUMAN ELEMENT IN CHRIST, ACCORDING TO THE TRADITION OF THE FIRST FOUR CENTURIES

1. The heresies against the constitution of Christ succeeded one another in perfect logical order. During the first four centuries the Arians impugned the Divine nature, the Apollinarists the human nature: the form of the union was not called in question until the Church had defined the reality of the two natures. We dealt with the Divinity of Christ in our Treatise on the Trinity; here we notice only the heresies against His humanity.

1. The heresy of the Gnostics, starting from the false principle that human nature is essentially bad, refused to acknowledge it in Christ. Marcion, the author of Docetism, denied the reality of the body of Christ, asserting it to be a mere phantasma; while Valentinus admitted a real body but of celestial nature, and entirely unlike the human body.

2. The Arians taught that in Christ the Logos acted as human soul, and was subject to all the imperfections natural to the soul of man, especially to passibility.

3. This doctrine, which entirely destroyed the Divinity of Christ, was modified by the Apollinarists, who held that the Logos took the place of the human soul only in as far as this could be done without debasing His Divinity. Hence they ascribed to the Logos the intellectual functions of the soul. Arius had lowered the Divine Nature to the level of humanity; the Apollinarists raised Christ’s humanity to the level of His Divinity, thus once more falling back into the errors of the Gnostics.

II. The earliest Fathers, Ignatius, Irenæus, and Tertullian, opposed Docetism; Athanasius, Gregory of Nazianzum, and Gregory of Nyssa, the Valentinian heresies. Their arguments for the reality of the body of Christ and its similarity in substance with ours, may be summed up as follows: If the body and soul of Christ had only been apparent, and not real, like every other human body and soul, the Gospels would be reduced to a set of fables; the whole public life of the Saviour would have been a deception practised by God and by Christ as God, on mankind: whence Christ would no more be really God than really man; Redemption itself would be real no longer, because the whole economy of salvation is dependent on the Redeemer’s real humanity (1 Tim. 2:5, and 1 Cor. 15:14). These arguments are strengthened by the fact that the human nature which was made subject to sin by the first Adam, had to be redeemed, and therefore assumed by the second. The acts of obedience and sacrifice through which the redemption was accomplished, could only be performed by a Being endowed with a human soul and body. Apollinarism was first condemned in the Council of Alexandria (A.D. 362) in the Epistola Synodalis of St. Athanasius (Hardouin, i. 731). Pope Damasus (Anath. vii.) condemns it thus: “We anathematize those who say that the Word of God was in the human flesh in the room of a human, rational, and intellectual soul: for the Divine Word was not in His body as its rational and intellectual soul, but He took unto Him our intellectual (intelligibilis) soul without sin and saved it.”

III. The Son of God, having assumed our humanity, is consubstantial with us in the sense that He has our essence. The fact that Christ was born of a human mother not only proves His consubstantiality with man, but also His membership of the human race. His consubstantiality with man thus assumes the same form as His consubstantiality with God, both being founded upon origin by generation. The Council of Chalcedon, in the first part of its definition, expressly puts both consubstantialities side by side, thus showing that it conceives them both as equally perfect. Holy Scripture insists upon Christ’s kinship with man: He is promised as the seed of the woman, as the seed of Abraham and of David; He calls Himself by preference the Son of Man; Evangelists and Apostles continually speak of His human origin. In the corporate and organic unity of the human race, with the God-Man as second and higher Head, the Fathers see the foundation and the pledge of the union of mankind with God in supernatural life. By reason of this kinship the flesh of Christ is the property of mankind, and when offered in sacrifice, it has the nature of a gift from man to God. Lastly, only by reason of His kinship with man, Christ, as Mediator and Priest, is the natural and perfect representative of man before God. That the Saviour was born without a human father does not destroy His consubstantiality with man: it has only the effect of freeing the bodily organization of Christ from all defects incidental to generation by man, and to give Him a body at least as perfect as that of Adam issuing from the hands of God. The relation of dependence between progeny and progenitor, in virtue of which the progeny becomes a branch of, and is subordinate to, mankind as a whole, is indeed limited and modified; but this is necessary in order that Christ, as the second and more excellent Father of mankind, may be superior to the first Adam. See Petavius, De Incarn., lib. i.; Thomassin, l. iv., c. 1–11.

SECT. 171.—POSITION OF THE HUMAN ELEMENT IN CHRIST: ITS UNION WITH THE DIVINE PERSON INTO ONE BEING—AS TAUGHT AGAINST THE HERESIES OF THE FIRST FOUR CENTURIES

Although the controversies of the first four centuries mainly bore on the reality of the two natures of Christ, they yet gave occasion not only for the assertion of the union of these into one person, but also for the explanation of the mode of the union. In the present chapter we attempt to give an outline of this earliest evolution of the dogma “that the Son of God and the Son of Mary are one and the same Person.”

I. From the beginning the identity of the Son of Mary with the Son of God, expressed in the symbol of the Apostles, was universally understood and professed as meaning that the same subject is both God and man; and consequently, that the human nature of this subject must not be considered as a being independent in itself, but as appertaining to the Person of the Son of God. Such was the profession of faith for which the earliest martyrs shed their blood: the Apostle St. Andrew, St. Ignatius of Antioch, St. Polycarp, and many others whose “Acta” have come down to us, died for their faith in “a crucified God.”

II. Cerinthus the Gnostic “divided Jesus” into a heavenly being called Christ, and a human being born of Mary, the former dwelling with the latter. St. Irenæus upheld against this heresy the Catholic doctrine that Jesus Christ, the Son of God, and the Word of God, is one and the same subject, Who, on account of His double birth, and of the mixture of the human with the Divine substance, possesses two natures, and so unites in Himself the attributes of both (Lib. iii., esp. cc. 16–19). Other Gnostics denied the reality of human nature in Christ, because they thought its inherent imperfections incompatible with His Divinity. The Fathers who refute them never solve the difficulty by conceding the non-reality of the human body, but argue that the assumption of a real human body was congruous or necessary for the redemption of man, and therefore not incompatible with God’s dignity (Tertull. De Carne Christi, c. 5). The same Tertullian, writing against Praxeas, who made Jesus a person filled with the power of God but not God, most appropriately explains how the human substance was assumed into the Divine Person without any confusion of the Divine and human substances (Contra Praxeam, c. 27).

III. The Arians admitted one person with one nature in Christ, and, from His human attributes, they inferred that He was but a created being. Against this heresy the Fathers taught the concrete (substantial) Divinity of Jesus, maintaining that God not only dwelt in Him as in the Prophets and Saints, but was really made man. They acknowledged that the infirmities of human nature really and truly belonged to the subject whose Divinity they defended, and to whom Scripture unmistakably attributes Divine properties. They accounted for the application of human attributes to a Divine Person by establishing that the whole humanity, essence, and nature are owned by that Person, and are “the flesh of the Logos” (σὰρξ λογωθεῖσα). Again, in opposition to the Arians, the Fathers declared that, although human passibility is attributable to the Logos, still the Logos himself is not subject to suffering: He remains unchanged and unchangeable in the union with human nature, for He is not, as Arius held, the soul of the man Jesus. On the contrary, by reason of the union, the human flesh is no longer necessarily subject to suffering; the sufferings of Christ were voluntary. The effect of the union of the Logos with our nature is in no respect an abasement of the Divine nature, but an exaltation of the human, which becomes the born organ of Divine operations. The favourite expression for this elevation is θέωσις, the deification of human nature (cf. St. Athan. De Incarnatione and Contra Arianos, especially Or. iii. n. 29 sqq.).

IV. Whilst the Arians denied Christ’s Divinity on account of His human nature, the Apollinarists denied His humanity on account of His Divine nature. Against this absorption of the humanity by the Divinity of Christ, the Fathers teach that the unity of Christ is not effected by the fusion of both substances into one, but by the uncreated substance of the Logos making the created substance physically His own, so that the two constitute one Being but not one essence. Further, they contrast the unity of Christ with the unity of the Persons of the Trinity. In Christ, one Person has two different natures; in the Trinity, one identical nature is possessed by three distinct Persons. In the controversy with the Apollinarists, as in that with the Arians, the attribution of human and Divine predicates to the same subject is explained on the ground of two natures being really possessed by the same person, and the “theosis,” or deification of the human nature, is equally insisted upon.

V. Arians and Apollinarists alike objected that the Catholic doctrine would give God two Sons, the Logos and Christ. Pope Damasus (Anath. vi.) “anathematizes those who assert two Sons, one before all ages, the other after the assumption of flesh from the Virgin.” The Fathers meet the objection by establishing that the assumption of the human nature by the Logos deprives that nature of the independence necessary to personality. Here again the theosis of the lower nature is the leading feature of the defence; the human compound, and the command which the soul possesses over the body, are not of such perfection as to exclude the union of body and soul to a higher principle (the Logos), and after this “commixtion” the command (hegemony) passes to the Logos, and thus the human body and soul are left without independent personality.

VI. The unity of subject resulting from the union of the human nature with the Son of God, was treated by Greeks and Latins as Unity of Person (πρόσωπον). Previous to the Council of Ephesus the metaphysical terms used to describe this unity are mostly very abstract and general; Christ is one (unum, ἕν); one unity (μία ἑνότης); one whole (ἕν τέλειον, μία τελειότης); one thing (una res); in short, one Being. St. Epiphanius and St. Athanasius, however, already use the concrete “one hypostasis,” or one substantial being. The union of the two natures, the basis of the unity of Person, is described by the same Fathers in a threefold manner.

1. Considering the Divine Person as the object of the union, they express the union by the terms “assumption, susception, πρόσληψις, ἀνάληψις,” which convey the idea of a physical union, brought about by the Divine Person “taking unto Him and appropriating” humanity. The putting on of a garment or the taking up of a tool are used as analogies, whence the further expressions, καταρτισμός, coaptation, συμφυία, coalescence, ἀνάπλασις εἰς μίαν ὑπόστασιν, the building up of humanity into the Divine Person. In all these expressions the Son of God is considered as adding to His Being the nature of man.

2. The second series of descriptive terms considers the nature of man as receiving its highest perfection through the union, that is, through the infusion of Divinity. Hence, again, the terms ἀνάπλασις, and ἀναμόρφωσις = taking of a higher form, viz. the infused Divine form of the Logos; admixtio and permixtio; insertion and root-taking.

3. Lastly, the Fathers view the two united substances side by side, as constituting one whole. From this point of view they describe the union as “the entering of one substance into the other (περιχωρεῖν εἰς ἄλληλα).” They illustrate this mutual penetration by the analogy of a mixture (commixtio) or commingling of the various parts of one tissue, e.g. the parts of a plant or the threads of a cloth, and the term συμφυία (concretion, growing together) is also used as expressing the meaning. Most of the above designations and analogies are found in St. Augustine, who also was the first to treat at length of the unity of man as a type of the unity of Christ. The same Father points out that the union ought to be conceived simultaneously as the putting on of a garment (induere habitum) by a Divine Person, and as a commingling of the Divine Person with human nature; the commingling showing that the putting on of humanity as a vesture implies a physical union, and the dressing as with a vesture showing that the commixtion does not alter the united natures. As a garment when put on receives a nobler form than it has when off, so the humanity of Christ, through its union with the Logos, receives a much nobler existence; the ennobling being accomplished by the infusion or commingling of the Logos, in the same manner as the human body, through the infusion of the soul, is formed into the garment of the soul (Petavius, lib. iii. cc. 1, 2; Thomassin, lib. iii. c. 1 sqq.; lib. iv. cc. 15, 16).

VII. The much-used term commixtio, or mingling of the two substances in Christ, led to misinterpretation on the part of the Nestorians and Eutychians. Hence the Fathers of later times either reject the expression, or use it only with great caution. Yet the meaning which underlies this term is that expressed in the name Christ, and is therefore of the utmost importance in Theology. As, however, it is only an analogical expression, its force should be exactly determined. The Fathers, before as well as after the Council of Ephesus, speak of “a composition without confusion,” as well as “of a mixture without confusion,” the latter being termed mixtio nova, ineffabilis, stupenda. They illustrate their idea by analogies taken from a certain class of mixtures, viz. such in which one ingredient imparts to the other a kind of anointment without either losing its own properties. The name Christ, the Anointed, probably suggested these analogies. We must here limit ourselves to a mere indication of the most common: the mixture of wine and water (wine being considered of an oily nature); the mixture of gold and wood in the ark of the covenant; cloth steeped in balsam; glowing coal or red-hot iron (a mixture of fire and coal or iron). In the light of these analogies, understood as indicated, many doubtful expressions of the Fathers not only admit of an orthodox explanation, but actually throw new light upon the subject. Thus, for instance, we easily understand in what sense they speak of the human nature being “absorbed, transformed, or taken over” by the Divine nature. Franzelin, thes. 17–21.

SECT. 172.—THE WORD INCARNATE AS ONE PHYSICAL PERSON, ACCORDING TO THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH AGAINST NESTORIUS

I. After the Church had defined the consubstantiality of the Logos with the Eternal Father against the Arians, and His consubstantiality with man against the Apollinarists, Nestorius arose to impugn the nature of the union of the Divine Logos with human nature. In his opinion, the two dogmas, that Christ is really God and really man, could only be upheld if in Christ there were two persons, one Divine, the other human, but neither of them God and man at the same time. Between these two persons he divided the Divine and human attributes of Christ The identity of the Son of God with the Son of Mary, set forth in the Apostles’ Creed and generally in the teaching of the Church, was reduced by Nestorius to a moral union: the Son of God dwelling in the Son of Mary as in His temple; Jesus not being God, but only a God-bearing man (ἄνθρωπος θεοφόρος), participating to a certain degree in the dignity, authority, and power of the Logos, and being designated by the same names as the Logos, provided these did not expressly signify the physical essence of the Logos. Thus Jesus was not to be called Logos, nor vice versâ, but both might be termed Christ, Son of God, Lord, and even God (in the sense in which Moses was the God of Pharaoh). The disciples of Nestorius compared the union of the Logos with Jesus to the union between husband and wife, which makes them two in one flesh.

II. St. Cyril of Alexandria, whose doctrine was accepted by the Council of Ephesus, formulated the Catholic dogma against Nestorius. He found the duality of persons sufficiently refuted in the Symbols of the Apostles and of Nicæa, which attribute to “one subject” the eternal birth from the Father and the temporal birth from the Virgin, thus establishing the unity of Person and precluding the possibility of predicating the human and Divine attributes of two distinct subjects. See the second Epist. of St. Cyril to Nestorius, and the Anathematisms of the Fifth General Council, can. 2, 3, 6.

1. If the Logos and the human substance are really one subject, the union of the two substances is necessarily more than moral, relative, or accidental: it must be conceived as a true composition, resulting in one indivisible Being, and involving a true appropriation of the human substance by the Person of the Logos, and, as a consequence, the loss of independence or personality in the human substance. This substantial union was expressed in the formula, ἕνωσις καθʼ ὑπόστασιν, secundum substantiam; but this term had not then the classical and well-defined meaning which it afterwards acquired: it did not exclude the unity of nature, as clearly appears from the expressions used as its equivalents, e.g. ἕνωσις κατὰ φύσιν (unio secundum naturam), etc. On the other hand, the formula ἕνωσις φυσική) did not then imply a “unity of nature” in the sense which later on became classical, for it was used in dogmatic definitions against the Monophysites and Monothelites. The tendency of both these formulas was merely to affirm a substantial union against the moral union upheld by Nestorius; they did not claim to define exactly the specific difference of this union from all other substantial unions. That difference was pointed out by describing the union as admirable, ineffable, and incomprehensible. St. Cyril avoided the analogical illustrations, so frequent among earlier Fathers, of κρᾶσις and συμφυία (mixture, concretion), on account of Nestorian misinterpretation; he preferred more abstract expressions, but he constantly illustrated them by the analogy of the union of the flesh with the rational soul in man; an illustration also used by St. Augustine, and now become classical.

2. In the union of body and soul we have, as in the union of the Logos with “the flesh”: (1) A true, substantial, physical, and metaphysical union of a higher with a lower substance, resulting in one total substance, in consequence of the infusion or ingrafting of the higher in the lower. (2) The distinction of the two substances remains intact after the union: the soul retains its own spiritual life, and is not affected in its essence by the passions of the body; the body also retains its properties, although the union raises it to a much higher perfection. (3) The lower substance is subordinated to and dependent on the higher in both the physical and ethical order. (4) The union is based entirely on the power of the higher element; it consists in this, that the soul holds, possesses, and rules the corporeal element as its own. This analogy had the advantage of reducing to their exact signification the analogies misused by Nestorius. The humanity of Christ is indeed the temple and the throne of the Divinity, but the temple and throne appertain to and are connected with the Divinity after the manner in which the human body appertains to and is connected with the informing soul. Again, the humanity of Christ is the organ and instrument by which the Logos operates, but it is “His” organ, as much as the members of the body are the organs by which the soul operates. Lastly, the humanity of Christ is an image and a vesture of the Logos, not, however, distinct and separate from Him, but united as our body is to the soul.

As special effect, and therefore as a manifest sign of the substantial and physical union, St. Cyril points out that through it the flesh of Christ becomes itself a life-giving flesh, the Bread of life, the source of all the marvellous operations of the Holy Eucharist. This Sacrament, if the doctrine of Nestorius were true, would be degraded to an act of anthropophagy, the communicant receiving the flesh of man and not the flesh of God. But the substantial union of the Logos with the flesh not only endows this latter with an immanent principle of a most perfect life, but also with the power to diffuse light and life around it. When creatures not physically united with God, e.g. the saints and sacraments, are made the vehicle of supernatural life, they do not possess the life-giving power in themselves; in Christ, on the contrary, this power is as substantially inherent as the life-sustaining power in bread. There is, however, a difference: it is the proper nature of bread to support life; the vivifying power of the Body of Christ is not connatural to it, but is derived from its union with the Logos.

III. The proofs for the substantial union of the two natures in Christ were primarily taken from the texts of Scripture which represent the origin of Christ as the incarnation of the Logos, or as the assumption by the Logos of the form of servant, and from the texts in which human and Divine attributes are predicated of the same subject. Further, it was urged that, if the union were but moral, there would be no real incarnation, no more than if God had not assumed a true human body and soul. Again, if God is not truly man, then the man Jesus is not truly God, and the worship granted to Him and demanded for Him in Scripture is idolatry. Moreover, the purpose of the Incarnation cannot be attained except by a God-Man, for only a God-Man can be a priest of sufficient dignity and a victim of sufficient value to cancel the guilt of sin and merit grace; only by virtue of the power communicated to human nature by its substantial union with a Divine Person can be accomplished the thorough healing of the corruptibility of that nature and the infusion into it of Divine Life. The Redeemer of mankind can be no other than its Creator, because redemption is as much a Divine work as creation: God, therefore, can no more confer upon another the honour of redeeming the world than that of creating it See Petavius, lib. iii. and vi.; Thomassin, lib. iii.; Franzelin, thes. 22–25.

SECT. 173.—THE EXISTENCE OF ONE DIVINE PERSON OR HYPOSTASIS IN TWO PERFECT NATURES, AS TAUGHT BY THE CHURCH AGAINST MONOPHYSITISM

I. The substantial and physical union of the human with the Divine Substance in Christ, so clearly defined by the Church against Nestorius, was misinterpreted by Eutyches as implying confusion of the two natures into one, after the manner of natural compounds, in which two elements are combined into a third, different from each of the components. The original form of this heresy compared the effect of the union of the two natures to a mixture in which one element, inferior in quantity or quality, is absorbed by the other superior element so as to lose its own essence, e.g. a drop of honey thrown into the sea, or a drop of water poured into a great quantity of wine. A later form was less crude. Its authors illustrated their idea by the analogy of gold and silver turned into amber (electrum) by mixture (σύγχυσις, con-fusio). The last and more refined form of Monophysitism conceived the unity of nature in Christ as similar to the unity of nature in man, that is, as a compound nature in which both component elements retain their proper essence, yet so as mutually to modify their essential properties. But in this form, as well as in the first and second, an alteration of the combined elements must necessarily be conceded, and this is the fundamental error of the whole system. Its consequences chiefly appear in determining the share of the Divine and human substances in the Passion. According to some, human nature lost all passibility through the unions; according to others, the Divine nature became passible.

II. Pope St. Leo I. (Epist. ad Flavianum), and afterwards the Council of Chalcedon, defined against Eutyches and his followers that the human substance, after its union with the Divine, retained its nature and essence as, of course, does the Divine substance; whence Christ is not the product of two natures, but exists in two distinct natures. This dogma was inferred from the fact that Christ is really and truly man as well as God, consubstantial with both God and man, which He could not be if, in the union, the human substance had lost its essence or nature. St. Leo appeals to the text Phil. 2:6, 7: “Who, being in the form of God … took the form of servant,” in order to be perfectly like unto man; and repeatedly insists upon the Divine and human attributes being predicated of Christ as one subject: a fictitious human nature in Christ is consistent neither with the truth of these attributes nor with the reality of the work of Redemption. He takes the terms “form” or “nature” in the sense of principles of action, viz. that which in a substance causes it to act as it acts. The influence of the unity of Person on the activity of the natures he limits to this: that neither nature can act or suffer except in union with the other.

III. The Council of Chalcedon, following St. Leo, declared that Christ exists in two indivisible and inseparable, but, at the same time, unchanged and unconfused natures, the indivisible and inseparable unity of Person in no wise destroying the distinction or properties of the natures. It was easy to prove that no essential change had taken place in the natures by the union, not only from the fact that both remained perfect in their kind after the union, but also from scientific principles. The Divine Nature evidently admits of no intrinsic change whatsoever. Human nature, taken as a body informed by a spiritual soul, is, speaking absolutely, destructible, but not miscible with another substance so as to lose essential form or properties. Again, how could God destroy the very nature He came to redeem? Its imperfections could be removed without injuring its essence, but even some of these, e.g. passibility, were necessary for the accomplishment of Redemption. The possibility of the two natures being so closely united without abasement of the Divine Nature or essential alteration of the human, is explained on the ground of God’s absolute power, and of His absolute freedom to manifest the power ad extra. On account of His absolute power, the Divinity can contract no union through which that power would be damaged in any way; on account of His absolute freedom in the use of His power, the influence of the Divine on the human element is not exerted with physical necessity, like that of the soul on the body, but according to the decrees of the Divine Wisdom and Will (Leo I., Ep. ad Jul. Coensem).

IV. The analogy of the substantial union of body and soul—used by St. Cyril against Nestorius to illustrate how two essentially different substances can coalesce into one total substance—was again made use of by the Fathers, and even in the Athanasian Symbol against Mono-physitism; in order to show how, notwithstanding this most intimate union, two substances can retain their own, though opposite, qualities. The analogy carried sufficient weight against the first and grosser forms of the heresy, but, at the same time, it gave rise to the last and more refined form: accepting the comparison, the adversaries inferred from it that in Christ, as in other men, the union of the two substances resulted in “one nature.” Hence the necessity of a deeper study of the human compound of soul and body. The line of defence set up on the Catholic side may be traced as follows: In a certain sense, there are two natures in man, the spiritual and the animal. Granting that these two are merged into one compound nature, it does not follow that in Christ likewise the Divine and human natures are merged into one compound, different from either of the components. There is no similarity in the result of the union, because there is none in the component elements. Christ is the Logos, the uncreated Spirit, with His flesh animated by a rational soul; man is a created spirit, with his flesh animated by that spirit. On both sides, the term “spirit and his flesh” indicates a personal union. Whereas, however, in man the fact that his own spirit informs his flesh leads to unity of nature as well as to personal unity, in Christ the fact that not the Logos, but a created soul, informs His flesh, prevents the unity of nature, and the union stops at the unity of Person. For a similar reason, there are virtually two natures even in man: the entire life of the spirit is not absorbed in its union with the body; it retains its peculiarities side by side and above the animal life (Rom. 7). But in Christ the distinction of natures is real, because the Divine Spirit is not the principle of the life of the body. If in His case there was a unity or fusion of natures, two spirits ought to coalesce in one like two material bodies: this, however, is absurd, because it implies the possibility of a spirit being degraded to the rank of matter. The reason, then, why the union in Christ is purely personal (whereas in man it is personal and material) is the different perfection of the united substances: the lower substance is an incomplete nature in man, a complete one in Christ; in man the higher substance is not perfectly independent or self-sufficient, because as principle of life it depends on the co-operation of the lower substance; in Christ, on the contrary, it is absolutely independent and self-sufficient, and has even the power to appropriate to itself another spiritual substance.

V. The Monophysites appealed to the phrase of St. Cyril: “One, incarnate, nature of the word” (μία φύσις σεσαρκωμένη) as favouring their heresy. But St. Cyril himself (Ep. ad Acacium Melit.) shows that he takes the term “nature” as equivalent to “hypostasis,” and the Fifth Council, in its eighth canon, explains the phrase as meaning “that (out) of the Divine nature and the human, being united hypostatically, one Christ was constituted.” Against Nestorius the Fathers had to show that the inferior substance passes on to the superior and becomes His own, so that God, on this account, is also man. But this could be shown without distinguishing in the Divine substance the hypostasis or Person from His essence or nature: there was then no reason for avoiding the promiscuous use of the term Person and nature to designate the Divine Substance as existing concretely in the Logos. Against Eutyches, however, it was necessary to insist upon the existence of Christ in two coexisting forms, according to Phil. 2:6, 7. Hence the Person or Hypostasis had to be distinguished from the essence or nature of the Logos as its Holder and Bearer, Who, in the Incarnation, became the Holder and Bearer of a second essence and nature. See Petavius, De Incar., iv. 6; Newman, Tracts Theological and Ecclesiastical, p. 285 sqq.

SECT. 174.—THE TWO WILLS AND TWO OPERATIONS IN CHRIST, AND THE ORGANIC RELATION OF THE HUMAN TO THE DIVINE PRINCIPLE: AS DEFINED AGAINST MONOTHELITISM

I. The existence of two natures in Christ, as defined against Nestorianism, implied the coexistence of two free wills, or, speaking more generally, of two distinct principles of operation. Yet, as these two principles are united in one Person, the question arises whether a proper and distinct activity can be attributed to the human principle without elevating it to the dignity of personality and thus destroying the unity of person. Eutyches and his followers answered in the negative, and consequently admitted in Christ only the Divine will; the Church, on the contrary, maintained the two wills and operations consistently with the unity of person. The definitions on this point complete the Catholic doctrine concerning the constitution of Christ.

The notion “that two wills and two corresponding operations are inconsistent with the unity of person” is the leading principle of all the Monothelites; but in its application they differ. The more strict and logical attribute to the Logos one and all the functions of the human soul; the more moderate but less logical only claim for the Logos the acts of free will and their execution, thus depriving the human soul of all power of self-determination and of all control over the body.

This latter doctrine is cleverly veiled in the letter addressed by the Patriarch Sergius to Pope Honorius. Sergius does not draw the consequence that there is only one will-power or one sort of operation in Christ, but merely purports to point out possible wrong interpretations of the phrases “one operation or two operations (energies) of Christ.” He is strong on the unity of Person and the duality of natures, and rightly deprecates two “contrary” will-powers. In his mind, two will-powers would necessarily be opposed to one another, and therefore he admitted but one; yet the expressions he uses are ambiguous, and may be taken to merely imply that in Christ the human will always acted in accordance with the Divine. Honorius was deceived, and did not oppose the Patriarch with as much energy as might have been expected from the Holy See. His error lay in this, that he thought more stress ought to be laid on the moral unity (=absence of contradiction) of the two wills than on their physical duality, and that, under the circumstances, the term “two operations” ought to be avoided, because it was liable to be misunderstood, in the same way as the term “one operation.” The Catholic dogma is, however, sharply defined by the Pope at the end of his second letter, where he asserts in Christ two natures each with its own activities and operations (propria operantes et operatrices).

II. The Catholic doctrine was first defined by Martin I. in a Lateran Council (649), then by the Sixth General Council (680). Christ, having two natures, has also two physical wills and two physical operations, existing side by side unchanged and unmixed, yet inseparably and physically united in one physical Person, in the same manner as the two natures; these natures, therefore, will and operate conjointly, but in both kinds of volitions and operations, He Who wills and operates is physically one and the same, willing and operating in two different manners. The difference of the two wills does not involve either a contradiction between them or the independence of the human from the Divine; the human will is so subordinated to and influenced by the Divine that it follows this latter in all things (Denzinger, Enchir., xxv. and xxvii.).

Theologians of the time laid particular stress on the duality of “physical” wills. They did not wish to exclude a unity of harmony or co-ordination; their object was to assert the real existence of a human principle of immanent volitions and of operations flowing therefrom, equal in perfection to the same principle and operations in man. We shall consider first the human will and its operations, as resulting from the human nature of Christ; secondly, the relation of the human to the Divine will and operations, as resulting from the substantial union of the two natures.

III. The human nature, through its union with the Logos, loses none of its essential properties or faculties; intellect and will and all the lower powers of the soul remain unimpaired, because without them the human nature in Christ would not be a real human nature. Besides, special reasons require the existence and functions of an unimpaired human will in the Redeemer. The act of Redemption is a great act of obedience; but obedience, that is free submission of one will to another, cannot be conceived where there is only a Divine will. Again, if Christ has no distinct human will, all His volitions and operations must be attributed to the Divine Will, which is one and the same in the three Divine Persons, and thus all the human operations of Christ would no longer belong to the second Person, but would be common to the three Persons of the Trinity. Moreover, if from the unity of Person in Christ, the unity of will could be inferred, then, for a similar reason, a distinction of wills ought to be admitted in the Trinity. But the number of wills follows the number of natures, not of persons; hence there is one will in the Blessed Trinity and two in Christ. Scriptural proof for our dogma is found in all the texts which attribute to Christ human affections, and especially in His agony and prayer, where the two wills appear not only as distinct but also as materially opposed.

The acts of the two wills are so essentially distinct that they cannot even be conceived as fused into one. For a volition is an immanent act: it originates and terminates in the same spiritual principle, it is a “self-motion.”

Immanent acts are necessarily complete in themselves. Besides, in this special case, a fusion of the Divine and the human wills into one, would make the Divine Will dependent on the human in their common activity. The two wills can only concur into one common action after the manner of two distinct persons agreeing to do the same thing or to pursue the same object; with this difference, however, that in Christ the bearer of the two wills is physically one, and that consequently the wills are physically united. The unity of pursuit constitutes only a moral unity of the persons willing the same object.

IV. The first consequence of the substantial union of the two natures, is that the operations of both must be attributed to the same operator, viz. to the Divine Person, to Whom the operations of His human nature appertain not less than that nature itself. Another consequence is, as St. Leo I. expresses it, that each nature performs its own operations, yet in communion with the other. The two sets of operations are, however, affected very differently by this communion; the human principle operates dependently on the Divine, but this very dependence gives a greater perfection to its operations. The actions of the human principle, in order to be actions of the Logos, must be caused by the Logos, in the same manner as the acts of man are only attributable to him when they proceed from his free will, i.e. from the supreme principle of action. The causation in question is similar to the concurrence of the First Cause in the working of all other causes, with this difference, that in Christ the Divine influence is exercised on a nature hypostatically (personally) united to the influencing Logos, and that thus the actions of that nature are the actions of the Logos, whereas in the general Divine concurrence the actions of creatures do not become actions of God. The influence of the Logos on His human nature extends, however, beyond the general concurrence of God with all created causes. The Fathers analyze it into three factors: permission (ἔνδοσις), motion (κίνησις), and co-operation (συνέργεια). The Logos “permits” the human principle to remain subject to all passibility which involves nothing unworthy of the Divine Person; He “moves or inspires” the human will so as to bring it always into harmony with His own; He “co-operates” with His lower nature so as to add perfection to its ordinary acts, and, under certain circumstances, to enable it to perform supernatural actions. The perfection accruing to the human actions from the Divine influence is pregnantly expressed in the classical phrase: “Christ does human things in a divine manner” (humana agit divine).

V. The Divine Principle in Christ is entirely independent of the co-operation of the human: His “acting in communion” is limited to this, that in external operations in which the co-operation of the human principle is possible, admissible, or congruous, He uses it as His own instrument for carrying out His will. Such co-operation is impossible in creative acts, but not in the natural or supernatural government of creation; it is necessary, hypothetically, in the works which the Logos had undertaken to perform in the flesh; as a matter of fact, it exists in all operations specially ascribed to Christ—that is, not simply to God. It is to these latter operations the Fathers apply the phrase, “Christ does divine things in a human manner” (divina agit humane).

VI. The peculiar constitution of Christ the God-Man gives to His operations a peculiar and unique character. They are “theandric;” that is, belonging to the God-Man. This term was first introduced by Dionysius the Areopagite, and later on was much exploited by the Monothelites in favour of their heresy. Its real meaning, as explained by the Areopagite himself, and defined in the Council of Lateran (A.D. 649), can. 15, is that in Christ the human operations are performed under the influence of the Divine Principle, or that the external Divine operations are performed with the co-operation of the human principle. In this sense, all human actions of Christ are theandric; but not all His Divine operations, many of these admitting of no human co-operation. In a more special or eminent sense, the Fathers reserved the term theandric to “Divine operations wrought with human co-operation,” and to “human operations intended to produce, with Divine co-operation, a supernatural or Divine effect.” These latter operations, e.g. the healing of the sick by touch, are eminently theandric, because in them both natures act simultaneously, in communion and subordination, and for the same object, thus clearly manifesting the Divine-human constitution of Christ.

VII. The peculiar harmony between the two kinds of operations in Christ results from the manner in which the human soul operates. The human soul knows and loves itself as soul of the Logos, and its one intention is to conform in all things to the will of the Logos. The soul is no blind instrument when co-operating with the Logos: it knows and wills and works for the same ends. And the Divine inspiration of the Logos so assists and influences the immanent actions of the soul as to enable it to rule and regulate all its operations in conformity with the Divine Will.

SECT. 175.—COROLLARIES TO THE DOGMA CONCERNING THE CONSTITUTION OF CHRIST

I. The composition of Christ, considered as a whole, presents a threefold aspect. Against Nestorius it was described as the composition of a human nature with the entirely distinct Divine Hypostasis or Person; against the Monothelites as the composition of two essentially different and complete natures into one Hypostasis or Person common to both; against the Apollinarists as the composition into one Hypostasis or Person of three substances different in essence, viz. the Logos, the soul, and the body. These three forms represent the same composition, because the binding principle in every one of them is the same, viz. the unity of Person. Distinct from the hypostatic composition is that of Christ’s body and soul into one nature—not into one person; without this composition there would be in Christ three substances indeed, but not two natures. The unique character of the hypostatic compound forbids us to apply to it the terms applicable to natural compounds, at least without some qualification: Christ is really and truly a composite being, yet in a higher and more perfect manner than natural compounds; the composition of Christ is a “pure” composition—that is, the component elements retain their own nature unaltered.

If Christ is a composite being, He is also a composite Hypostasis or Person, and “the Person of Christ” is a compound, viz. it is the Person of the Logos together with His human nature. Christ may be called “human person,” in the sense of Person having humanity (persona humanitatis), as He is called Divine Person as having Divinity. Yet that designation is not commonly used, because misleading.

II. Although unique in its kind, the compound of Christ (Compositum Christi) has a great analogy with man, the most perfect of all natural compounds; its unique perfection is even best illustrated by a comparison with Adam, who was a type of Christ. The first man offers a double type of Christ: one as naturally, the other as supernaturally, perfect man. Considered as natural man, Adam was a compound of spirit and flesh; he was thus the substantial link between the world of spirits and the world of matter, and was the natural head of this latter. Christ is a personal compound of Spirit and flesh in a higher sense: His Spirit is God, and His flesh is animated by a rational soul. He is the link between God and the whole world, and the natural head of the latter. As endowed with grace, Adam had the Spirit of God in him, and thus represented not only the unity of the spiritual and the material world, but to a certain degree also the union of these worlds with God. From this point of view, Adam was, like Christ, composed of three substances—the Spirit, the soul, the flesh; and he was not an animal, but a celestial man. All this we find in an eminent degree in Christ. Christ possesses as His own the Divine substance which merely dwelt in Adam; He is not merely vivified by the Spirit, but is Himself the vivifying Spirit (1 Cor. 15:45). Whereas in Adam the flesh is the first element of the compound to which the soul and the Spirit are successively joined, in Christ the Spirit is the first and fundamental element. Again, in Adam the union of soul and body is more intimate and more consistent than the union of both with the Spirit: sin may undo the latter without injuring the former. In Christ, on the contrary, the union of the Spirit with the animated flesh is stronger than that of His soul and body, for this latter is not a personal union, and may be destroyed by death without injuring the hypostatic union. Moreover, Christ is the principle of that supernatural unity of which Adam was only the representative. Finally, Christ realizes the idea of man as “the visible image of God” infinitely better than Adam, for He includes the uncreated and consubstantial Image of God, and in taking unto Him human nature and raising it to participation in His own being, He manifests the Divine Power over creation far better than does the soul of Adam by animating and governing a body.

III. The Word Incarnate having two natures, His essence can only be expressed by compound names, e.g. God-Man, Word Incarnate. Yet the name Christ, although figurative, also describes His essential constitution in a most pregnant manner, and summarizes the whole doctrine concerning His Person. That name designates the God-Man as eminently the “Anointed.” Hence the ointment with which He is anointed is neither a common substance nor a moral consecration or spiritual quality, but a substantial spiritual ointment, viz. the Divine Substance itself, which alone among spiritual substances can act as ointment. In the order of grace, creatures also are anointed with the Divine Substance, but only in a certain sense. “The” Anointed, on the contrary, receives an anointment formally substantial. He is constituted by the anointing of a created nature by the infusion of the Substance of the Logos; He is Himself the anointing substance, and is thus Anointed by nature and essence: “Oil poured out is Thy name” (Cant. 1:2). Hence the name Christ implies Divinity, for God alone is by His nature and essence self-anointed with Divinity. It also implies humanity, because in Scripture the anointed subject is the flesh or the spirit anointed with the Holy Ghost. Further, the notion of anointment indicates that both ointment and anointed nature remain unaltered in their essential qualities, the anointed nature alone being raised in perfection. Whence, in our case, although the anointment is substantial, its result cannot be union into one nature, but only union into one hypostasis, the hypostasis of the self-existing Logos. And lastly, the notion of humanity anointed with Divinity conveys an idea of the mutual relations between the two natures: the Divine nature filling, penetrating, and perfecting the human, as the balm does the embalmed object.

The name Christ, understood in this way, contains and explains all the other names of the Saviour set forth in the Creeds. Christ, the Anointed with the Divine Substance, is “the only-begotten Son of God, our Lord;” all perfection and power of Jesus is founded on this anointment: by this He is Prophet, Priest, and King, and the principle and source of all salvation: “He is made to us wisdom from God, and justice, and sanctification, and redemption” (1 Cor. 1:30). These words of the Apostle contain a full explanation of the phrase, “Oil poured out is Thy name.”

CHAPTER II

THE CONSTITUTION OF CHRIST; OR, THE HYPOSTATIC UNION IN THE LIGHT OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE

SECT. 176.—THE HYPOSTATIC UNION: ITS ESSENCE; ITS FORMAL FOUNDATION, OR THE “GRATIA UNIONIS;” ITS FIRST FORMAL EFFECT, OR THE COMMUNITY OF BEING; ITS PROPERTIES

I. THE Hypostatic Union, considered in its essence, is the substantial union of the human nature with the Divine Hypostasis or Person: through this union the human nature is made to form One Whole with, or to receive its hypostatic complement from, the Divine Hypostasis; and this latter, by appropriating the human nature, takes the place of a human hypostasis or person.

It is a principle of sound philosophy that when two different elements are combined into one substantial whole, the more perfect intrinsically perfects the other: the lower element bears to the higher the relation of substantial potentiality to substantial actuation; in other words, is able to be made into what the other will make it. This principle applies to the Hypostatic Union as well as to all the other substantial unions, and so we may consider the Hypostatic Union as similar or analogical to the union of matter and form in created substances. There is, however, a difference: the result of the various compositions of matter and form is always one substance and one nature, whereas in Christ the composition results in two natures. For this reason the Schoolmen avoided applying the analogy of matter and form to the union of the human nature with the Logos. More recent theologians substituted for the terms “substantial form and information,” the expressions “substantial termination (= completion) of the humanity by the Hypostasis of the Logos as completing terminus.” Thus the danger of implying a change in the Logos on account of the union was avoided, and the characteristic element which turns a nature into an hypostasis was brought into prominence. However appropriate this description of the Hypostatic Union may be, it can nevertheless be replaced to advantage by the theory of matter and form, provided that this is understood in a wide sense. The only reason for not applying it to the composition of Christ, is that in Christ the two natures remain distinct, whereas in all other compositions the substances mingle into one. But this difference arises from the singular perfection of the informing nature; it is by no means due to a deficiency in informing or forming power. Hence, if from the Aristotelian theory we eliminate the unessential notion of “one nature resulting from the substantial union of matter and form,” we obtain a more general theory, applicable not only to natural compositions, but also to the peculiar composition of Christ. Thus we find that the following general and essential principles apply to the union of the Logos with the flesh: (1) The form is infused into a substratum, and intrinsically united with it so as to complete its being. (2) The form gives to the informed substratum its determined, complete, substantial being. (3) The form is the principle by which the informed being is intrinsically distinguished from all other beings, and holds its proper place among or above them. (4) The form, being the highest and innermost constituent principle, is also the foundation of all specific perfections, properties, and forces of the compound being, and the principle of all its activity. Every one of these points is realized in the information of human nature by the Logos, and the dogmatic name Christ implies them all (§ 175). The illustrative analogies used by the Fathers, especially the anointment of humanity with Divinity, are based upon the same idea.

II. The formal foundation, or the bond of the Hypostatic Union, which theologians call “the Grace of Union,” in the strictest sense of the word, is neither a third substance nor an accident, and much less an abstract relation. According to St. Thomas it lies in the Logos Himself, Who founds the union on this that He directly communicates His personal being to the human nature, in the same way as, in natural compositions, the form immediately raises the matter to its new state of perfection. The fundamental form, then, of the union is the completion or termination of the humanity through the Logos: the two elements are made One in One and through One (διʼ ἑνός: St. Gregory of Nazianzum). Hence, the first formal effect of the union is that the Logos forms, with His humanity, a substantial being, or rather an hypostatic and personal being, the man Christ. Christ being One, has one existence; and as in compounds the formal principle determines the existence of the component elements in a way that these, as parts of the whole, participate in the existence of the form, in like manner the Logos determines the existence of the man Christ by making His humanity participate in His own Divine existence. In other words, the human nature of Christ has neither existence nor subsistence of its own: it obtains and possesses both in the Logos.

III. Among all the works of God the Hypostatic Union is the most supernatural, because it confers upon a created nature the highest conceivable perfection above and beyond its natural requirements and capabilities. Yet, in contradistinction to other supernatural unions, the Hypostatic Union is “natural” to Christ as man, inasmuch as from its origin, and by virtue of its origin through the Holy Ghost, the human nature was intended for, and actually assumed into, the Hypostatic Union. Besides, the principle which effects the union is not external to Christ, but is His own. If, however, the human nature of Christ be considered in its essence, it possesses no claims whatsoever to the union, and from this point of view the union is again supernatural.

IV. The Hypostatic Union may be compared with natural substantial unions in which a higher element informs a lower; and also with the supernatural unions of God with creatures through grace. The perfection of the former is measured by the perfection, independence, and power of the higher elements. Among them the union of soul and body ranks highest. But the Hypostatic Union stands infinitely above the union of body and soul, on account of the absolute excellence of its higher principle and of the relative excellence of the lower element: this latter comprising the spiritual form of the human compound. The supernatural unions by grace and glory have in common with the Hypostatic Union that they unite two spiritual substances, though not into one nature, and that the created spirit is in a sense deified by the Uncreated. Their perfection, however, is again infinitely below that of the Hypostatic Union, in which the human spirit is made not only morally, but physically, one with a Divine Person. In the union by grace God unites Himself to an independent personal being for its beatification and glory; in the Hypostatic Union He makes a spiritual living nature His own for the same purpose: hence that union is, to the humanity of Christ, the absolutely highest measure of grace and glory, and, besides, constitutes it the source of grace and glory for all other creatures. The Hypostatic Union, then, is the most perfect of all natural and supernatural unions, because it results in the most perfect Being which can result from a union, and it bestows upon the lower nature the highest possible benefaction: in technical language, it is the highest ratione entis et ratione beneficii.

V. The Hypostatic Union is the most intimate and solid of all unions. It is the most intimate, because it alone consists in a real union of the Divine Being to a creature, all other supernatural unions being merely external as compared with it. Again, it surpasses in innerness all natural unions by reason of the penetrating or pervading power of the higher principle, and of the penetrability and adaptability of the lower. It is the most solid, for the Logos has in Himself the power to maintain it for ever, and the human soul is indissoluble. A sign of this solidity is that, after the separation of the soul from the body of Christ, the union of the Logos with both remained intact, and it was by His own power that the Logos reunited the separated parts.

VI. Being supernatural, the Hypostatic Union is necessarily incomprehensible and ineffable. In the sphere of natural thought there is no perfect analogy for it, and the nearest, viz. the union of body and soul, is itself very difficult to comprehend. Yet a judicious use of analogies leads to a sufficient understanding of the possibility of the mystery, and offers the means of dispelling the objections against it. These arise from the infinite distance between the two elements, and from the completeness of each of them. We answer the first here, reserving the others for the next section.

VII. The infinite distance between the two members of the Hypostatic Union only proves the impossibility of uniting them naturally into one nature: it is an essential condition for the union into one person. Such personal union involves the perfect appropriation of a created spiritual nature by a higher spirit; but this can only be accomplished by a spirit whose power surpasses that of the soul at least as much as the soul surpasses its body. In like manner the perfecting of a created spirit by a higher being, supposes a principle absolutely simple and perfect. In fact, it seems easier, from the point of view under consideration, to comprehend the Hypostatic Union than to conceive the union of spirit and matter in man. The Hypostatic Union does not become unnatural or monstrous on account of the distance between its members: their union is indeed a miracle of Divine Power, but they are bound together in such harmony that their union is also a miracle of Divine Wisdom and Goodness. For the Hypostatic Union unites the uncreated with the created image of God in such a manner that the first is externally manifested by the second, and the second is filled and perfected by the first, so that the most perfect revelation and communication of God ad extra is brought about. See St. Thomas, 3 q. 2, a. 6, sqq.; the commentaries of Suarez and the Salmanticenses; St. Bonaventure in 3, dist. 6.

SECT. 177.—THE HYPOSTATIC UNION, FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE ASSUMING PRINCIPLE

I. The notion of a union purely hypostatic implies that a Divine Person, as distinct from the Divine Nature, is the subject and the terminus of the assumption of humanity. It is wrong to say that “the Divine Nature” was made man, except the term “nature” be taken for self-subsisting nature or person, as is often done by the Fathers. The possibility of the Person—with exclusion of His nature—being the formal terminus of the hypostatic union, is founded upon the virtual distinction between the Divine Nature and the Divine Persons: we can conceive that a Person took flesh, or that flesh was assumed by the Person and not by the nature, if we bear in mind that “to be” a Person really identical with the Divine Nature and “to act” as a Person are not formally the same thing. The real identity of Person and Nature entails, however, as a consequence, that the human and Divine Natures become intimately united in the Hypostatic Union.

II. It is an express article of faith that only one Person was made man, viz. the Second. The possibility of such a separate union rests upon the distinction between the Divine Persons. As the Divine substance is possessed in three distinct ways by the distinct Holders, we can understand that One of them may possess the human nature exclusively to Himself by giving it the benefit of His own subsistence. However, the unity of Nature in the three Divine Persons causes “the plenitude of Divinity to dwell corporeally” in the Incarnate Person. Thus, especially, the Holy Ghost is present in Christ as His Spirit; and Christ is in the Holy Ghost as His temple in a manner essentially superior to the indwelling by created grace in the just. Likewise the humanity of Christ is in the bosom of the Father, and the Father in Him as in His image, in a manner infinitely superior to what grace effects in the sanctified. The special indwelling of the Father and the Holy Ghost in Christ is technically called “presence by concomitancy.”

The fact that the Second Person, rather than any other, was incarnate, is to be accounted for by reasons of congruency connected with the hypostatic character of God the Son, and with the object of Incarnation. Cf. St. Thomas, 3 q. 3, a. 8; and St. Bonaventure, Breviloq. l. iv. c. 2.

III. The assumption of a second nature supposes in the assuming person a special perfection. The person, as principle or efficient cause of the Hypostatic Union, requires a special power over the lower nature; as terminus of the union, He requires a special exaltedness in His mode of existence, sufficient to intrinsically perfect, pervade, and rule the assumed nature. It is certain that a Divine Person, by reason of His nature, possesses such power and exaltedness: according to St. Thomas, a Divine person alone can possess them. All theologians agree in requiring “Divine” power to effect a Hypostatic Union; an angel can no more unite to himself another spiritual nature than he can unite soul and body into one human person and nature. The assuming principle must necessarily be of a higher order than the assumed, and, if the lower be a spirit, according to the common teaching of the Church, God alone can penetrate, pervade, control, and govern it in the way supposed in Hypostatic Union: the searching of hearts is the exclusive privilege of God. In the same way, the power of existing in two spiritual natures is the exclusive prerogative of the Divine Persons, just as it is the exclusive prerogative of the Divine Nature to subsist in several distinct Persons. The first prerogative is founded upon the absolute Highness, the second upon the absolute Riches, and both upon the infinite Perfection of the Divine Substance in general, and especially on its self-sufficiency and power.

IV. Considered in relation to the Divine Persons, the Hypostatic Union is made possible by, and is a manifestation of, God’s infinite perfection. Hence it involves no contradiction to any of the Divine perfections. It is not incompatible with the Divine simplicity, because it implies neither an intrinsic composition of the Divine substance, nor does it reduce it to be part of a whole of higher value. It is not against God’s infinity, because it involves no increase of His perfection, but merely an external manifestation of the riches of that perfection. It is not opposed to the Divine immutability, because it is not a new mode of existence affecting the Divine substance intrinsically. In short, these three Divine perfections could only be affected by entering into a relation of dependency or passivity towards the assumed nature; but the fact is exactly the reverse: the relation of God to the assumed nature is one of active completion, possession, and dominion, and in all points analogous to the relation of God to His creatures. See St. Thomas, 3, q. 3; Franzelin, theses xxxii. and xxxiii.

SECT. 178.—THE HYPOSTATIC UNION CONSIDERED ON THE PART OF THE ASSUMED NATURE

I. Whereas the Divine Element in the Hypostatic Union is the Person, the human element is the nature, exclusive of the human person: Christ is one Person with two natures. The possibility of assuming human nature without assuming a human person, supposes in man a real separability of nature and person which does not exist in God. The difference arises from the different perfection of the natures upon which the personalities are founded. In fact, personality connotes the existence as an independent whole of an intellectual being. The Divine Nature is essentially complete and independent, and cannot therefore be conceived without personality—on the contrary, its infinite communicability enables it to exist in three Persons. The human substance, being finite, is not absolutely complete and independent—it is possible for it to be appropriated by a higher substance. Such is the easy and simple explanation given by the Fathers and the early Schoolmen, e.g. St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, and generally accepted by modern theologians in preference to the subtle but confusing theories of later Schoolmen. Franzelin, thesis xxx.

II. The above theory supposes that human nature is susceptible of being assumed by a higher person. Against this supposition it may be urged (1) that a substance complete in its kind, and especially a spiritual substance, cannot become part or quasi-part of another substance; (2) that such assumption would be unnatural and degrading to the assumed substance. As regards the first difficulty, it may be granted that the receptivity of human nature for a higher hypostasis is on a par with the receptivity of spiritual beings in general for supernatural Divine influences; it belongs to the “obediential power,” and is not knowable without the aid of revelation (§ 148). Yet it is natural in another sense. Just as every material substance may be assumed into a living organism, and become dependent on a spiritual soul or other substantial form; so also the created spirit may be assumed by the higher substance of God, and lose its independent existence. Nor does this loss imply a degradation; for although the human nature in Christ is not independent, still its dependency on the Logos is in every sense a greater perfection than the lost human personality. Again, everything increases in perfection by being raised to a higher order of being, and especially all spiritual beings seek their ultimate perfection in their union with God; hence the Hypostatic Union is but the coronation of a tendency universal in nature. Lastly, spiritual substances are particularly well adapted to enter the Divine Personality, because they, and they alone, are able to retain and to increase their spiritual and moral life in the Hypostatic Union, and render possible a twofold consciousness and a twofold free will in one person. It cannot, however, be maintained that the union of a Divine Person with a material substance is impossible; it is even easier of comprehension than the other, and, as a matter of fact, it took place in the union of the Logos with His dead body in the sepulchre.

III. It is of faith that the Hypostatic Union embraces directly and immediately soul and body, or “flesh” (σὰρξ), because this is expressly laid down in the definitions of the Church. The term flesh or body applies directly to the solid parts, and as the Councils describe the assumed flesh as “animated,” it follows that at least all the parts of the body animated by the soul are taken up into the union. To what extent, if at all, certain solids or fluids present in the bodily organism, but not directly animated by the soul, are comprised in the union, is a question of little interest to the theologian. With regard to the immediate union of the blood, doubts have been raised on the ground that it is not expressly mentioned in the definitions, and that—according to ideas once prevalent—the blood is not an integral part of the body, and is not animated by the soul. The teaching of Scripture on this point, however, is decidedly in favour of the union. Christ places His blood on a line with His flesh as having Life-giving power, which supposes the blood as well as the flesh to be in Hypostatic Union with the Logos (John 6:56). In the Blessed Sacrament, the Church gives Divine honour to the Blood separately from the Body. Clement VI., in his Bull Unigenitus, declares that one drop of Christ’s Blood would have been sufficient to redeem the world “because of its union with the Word.” See also Heb. 2:14; Apoc. 20:2.

IV. The Hypostatic Union took place at the very moment the human nature entered into existence. If it had taken place later, Christ, previously to it, would have been purely man, and Mary would not be the Mother of God (Θεοτόκος). If it had taken place sooner—say with a pre-existing soul, or before the animation of the body—the constant teaching of the Church, that the union was contracted through assuming “human nature,” would lose its signification.

V. The dissolution of the human nature of Christ by death did not entail the cessation of the Hypostatic Union with either body or soul. This is contained in the Apostles’ Creed: “The Son of God, Who was buried (as to the body), and descended into hell (as to the soul).” It also stands to reason, for if body and soul were conjointly taken into the union, and intended to remain united to the Logos for ever, their temporary separation from one another could not involve their separation from the Divine Hypostasis. The incorruptibility of the body, and the power of the soul to rejoin the body, are both derived from their continued union with the Divinity. It is not, however, of faith that the blood shed by our Lord during the Passion remained in the union. Pope Pius II. forbade any censure upon those who held the negative opinion. Yet, considering the great probability of the Hypostatic Union extending to the blood before the death and after the Resurrection of Christ, the opinion that it was not united during the time of death loses all probability. The blood, however, which was not taken up again at the Resurrection, the blood of the Circumcision, and likewise the tears and sweat of the Saviour, once they were separated from the body, were dismissed from the Hypostatic Union for ever.

Although hypostatically united to both body and soul during the time of death, Christ during that time was not man, strictly speaking, because His human nature was temporarily destroyed. St. Thomas, 3, q. 50, a. 4.

SECT. 179.—ORIGIN OF THE HYPOSTATIC UNION THROUGH THE SUPERNATURAL ACTION OF GOD

I. The Apostles’ Creed and that of Constantinople ascribe the birth of the Logos as man and His incarnation to the Holy Ghost as principle, and thus set down God, acting in a supernatural manner, as the author of the Hypostatic Union. If the infusion of the soul into the body and the infusion of grace into the soul require Divine Power, much more does the infusion of the Logos into a human nature require such power, and, as it is an external action of God, it is necessarily common to the three Divine Persons. The “unitive action” considered as a sending of the Son by the Father is but an expansion, ad extra, of the “productive action” of God the Father, and, from this point of view, is rather proper, than appropriated, to the first Person. Likewise, if we consider the terminus of the same action, the Second Person alone can claim it. The “unitive action,” as it is technically called, is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, and the participation in it of the other Persons is expressed by saying that the Holy Ghost is the Mediator of the assumption on the part of the Son, or the Executor of the decree of Incarnation appropriated to the Father. The reasons for appropriating the Incarnation to the Holy Ghost may be seen in St. Thomas, Contra Gentes, l. iv. c. 46; or Alexander of Hales, p. iii. q. xi.

II. The Hypostatic Union is a unique work of grace. The Grace of Union is the most precious that can be bestowed upon a creature, and it is less a possible object of merit than any other grace. It communicates the Divine Substance itself; it anticipates all possible merit on the part of the human nature, because human nature derives its subsistence—the first and most essential condition of meritorious acts—from the Logos. Besides, the Grace of Union is superior to all others in this, that it constitutes the personality of Christ, and thus makes all the privileges which it contains Christ’s own personal and natural property. The “unitive action” is also a peculiar work of Divine predestination. Predestination in general is a Divine decree calling and promoting a creature to a state of supernatural perfection; in the case of Christ, however, the decree refers to a created nature, not to a created person. If we apply the general notion of predestination to the Person of Christ, it must be conceived as analogous to the predestination of natural man to his natural perfection as image of God and lord of the visible world: that is, as a Divine decree which establishes Christ, at the moment of His origin and by virtue of His constitution, in His supernatural perfection.

III. The unitive action in Christ is distinguished by its “generative character” from the unitive actions by which God infuses the soul into a body or grace into intellectual creatures. Generation is production by communication of substance, resulting in a similarity of nature in progenitor and progeny. The infusion of the soul is not a generation, because the substance of the soul is not taken from God, but created out of nothing; the communication of grace is but distantly similar to real generation, because it does not result in a strict similarity of nature. But in Christ, the very substance of God is united with a created substratum; it becomes the personal principle of the being thus constituted, and makes Divine nature the nature of Christ. Hence the Divine action which results in the Hypostatic Union has the character of a true generation, and is closely akin to the eternal generation of the Logos. The difference lies in this, that in His eternal generation the Logos, as to His whole substance, is produced from God and in God—as the fruit is produced by and on the tree; Christ, on the other hand, is constituted by the infusion of the Divine Substance into an extraneous substratum,—as the seed combined with the soil produces a plant.

The unitive action stands in organic connection with the eternal generation in more than one way. Considered as assumption of a second, external, and temporal existence on the part of the Son of God, the unitive action is an external manifestation of the eternal generation; a going-out from God as on a mission; the visible birth (partus) of the Son begotten in the bosom of the Father, or the outward continuation and expansion of the eternal generation. In the production of Christ the two actions—unitive and generative—concur into one total or common generative action. St. Thomas, 3, q. 24.

SECT. 180.—SUPERNATURAL ORIGIN OF THE HUMANITY OF CHRIST THROUGH THE HOLY GHOST FROM THE VIRGIN MARY

I. The Creeds attribute the origin of Christ’s humanity to the combined Divine action of the Holy Ghost and the maternal action of Mary: “The Son of God, conceived of or by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary; or born of the Holy Ghost and the Virgin Mary.” Mary, then, is, in subordination to and in co-operation with the Holy Ghost, the principle of Christ as man.

II. The Nicene (Constantinople) formula, Incarnatus est de Spiritu Sancto ex Maria Virgine (Σαρκωθέντα Πνεύματος Ἁγίου καὶ Μαρίας τῆς παρθένου), implies first of all that the body of Christ was not sent down from heaven, or taken from the earth like that of Adam, but that its matter was supplied by Mary. This alone, however, does not constitute Mary the mother of Christ—otherwise Adam, for the same reason, would be the mother of Eve. It is further required that the Virgin did co-operate, like every other mother, in the formation of the body. That co-operation consists in the preparation of a germ, which being fecundated from without, will develop into a human body. After the fecundation, the work of the mother is to minister of her own substance to the growth of the germ until it is able to live a separate life. Hence, in contradistinction to the paternal generation, the maternal is essentially only a co-operation with another principle, on which latter the existence of the progeny is in the first instance dependent. The mother bears the same relation to the person of her progeny as she does to the fecundating principle, viz. a relation of subserviency, consisting in preparing and forming the progeny’s body: she has no direct influence on her child’s existence as a person, but merely contributes to its material or substantial part. For these reasons the Divine generation is paternal, not maternal. The same reasons make it clear that maternal generation may, without difficulty, concur in giving a second bodily existence to a person already subsisting in Himself. If the specific notion of “maternal” generation be well kept in mind, all the difficulties besetting the maternity of Mary find an easy solution.

III. The dogma that Christ “was conceived by the Holy Ghost,” excludes the natural fecundating principle and replaces it by a spiritual principle and a purely spiritual power. From this cause the generation of Christ enjoys the same advantages which the prologue of St. John’s Gospel attributes to the generation of the Children of God: it is not of the will of man, but directly of the will of God; it is not of the will of the flesh—not even on the part of the mother, because the concupiscence of the flesh is only excited by the intervention of man—but of the will of God; it is not of blood, that is, of the commingling of blood as in natural generation, but of a germ animated by Divine influence. On this account the origin of Christ bears a resemblance to the origin “directly from God” of the first Adam, the difference, however, remaining that Christ is also by generation the Son of man.

The fact that the generation of Christ was supernatural in the manner described, also proves that this manner was congruous to such a degree as to render natural generation entirely incongruous. The reasons for this incongruity are many: the honour of the Mother of God is incompatible with the loss of her virginal purity in the very act which raised her to the highest dignity; the Mother of God cannot be made subject to the will of man, and the temple of the Holy Ghost must not be violated. Deeper reasons are found in the sublimity of the product of this generation, and of the generation itself. The product is God, and the generation is an expansion of the eternal generation by the Father; but the existence in time of a Divine Person cannot be made dependent on the will of man; the temporal generation must be the exact image of the eternal, and therefore proceed from a purely spiritual principle, etc. Cf. St. Thomas, 3, q. 28, a. I; Thomassin, 1. ii. c. 3, 4.

IV. The fecundating influence of the Holy Ghost is described as a descent on the Virgin, and as an overshadowing with the power of the Most High: Πνεῦμα Ἁγίον ἐπελεύσεται ἐπὶ σέ καὶ δύναμις ὑψίστου ἐπισκιάσει σοι (Luke 1:35). These images establish a parallel between this supernatural generation and natural generation in general, on the strength of which the Fathers sometimes call the Holy Ghost semen divinum. As the semen materiale points to a human father, so the semen divinum points to the Divine Father. Yet the Holy Ghost Himself is not that Divine Father. For He does not through His substance constitute the flesh of Christ; He does not form in Christ a nature consubstantial to His own; and lastly, as Divine Person distinct from Father and Son, He has no peculiar relation of principle to the flesh of Christ, but acts in union with the other Persons, and especially in the power of the Father.

V. The older form of the Apostles’ Creed says that Christ “was born of the Holy Ghost and of the Virgin Mary.” These words directly apply to the first conception, but, according to universal tradition, they also imply a supernatural influence of the Holy Ghost on the actual birth of the Saviour. The object of this influence was not merely to preserve the integrity of Mary’s virginity in the birth, as it had been preserved in the conception of the Saviour. In the sense of the Creed, it is, moreover, a singular privilege of the origin of Christ, the complement of His supernatural conception: the Eternal Father, having formed and generated Christ in the womb of the Virgin, completed His work by introducing His Son into the world in a manner becoming His Son’s dignity and eternal origin. Thus the birth or external generation of Christ reflected His eternal birth from the Father in this, that “the Light from Light” proceeded from His mother’s womb as a Light shed on the world; that “the Power of the Most High” passed through the barriers of nature unhindered and without injuring them, and that “the body of the Logos” formed by the Holy Ghost passed through another body after the manner of spirits. These privileges constitute what the Fathers call the supernatural, celestial, divine, and spiritual birth of the Redeemer.

The most essential feature in the supernatural birth is that Christ was brought forth utero clauso vel obsignato, the womb remaining closed or sealed, like the sepulchre from which He rose after His death. This privilege naturally includes, on the part of the Mother, exemption from all pain; and on the part of both Mother and Child the absence of all impurities connected with natural birth (Sordes nativitatis naturalis). For these two latter immunities special reasons are to be found in the dignity of Mother and Child. The supernatural character of the birth of Christ does not exclude the natural co-operation of the Mother in the actual parturition (nisus edendi prolem), nor does it require that the child should issue from the mother by any other than the natural way.

The birth of Christ from a womb closed or sealed is an article of faith. It was always considered as such, and based upon the Apostles’ Creed and Isa. 7:14 (“Behold, a virgin shall conceive and bring forth a son”). When Jovinian denied it, he was strenuously opposed, and it is noteworthy that the reason for the denial was not the want of traditional evidence for the miraculous birth, but its miraculous character itself; in other words, Jovinian founded his objections on rationalism (see St. Ambrose, Ep. xlii., n. 4, 5, addressed to Pope Siricius in the name of the Council of Milan; St. Aug., Enchiridion, c. xxxiv.; Ep. Dogm. Leonis I. ad Flavianum; defined under anathema in the third canon of the Lateran Council under Pope Martin I.). The presentation in the Temple (Luke 2:23), in compliance with the laws of Moses (Exod. 13:1, and Levit. 12:2), is no proof that Mary either conceived or gave birth in the same way as the women for whom these laws were made.

The miraculous conception and birth of Christ compel us to admit that during the time of gestation, Mary was likewise under the special influence of the Holy Ghost, although particulars are nowhere exactly defined.

We shall further deal with the Divine Maternity of the Blessed Virgin in Part IV.

CHAPTER III

THE ATTRIBUTES OF CHRIST

A.—ATTRIBUTES OF CHRIST IN GENERAL; SUBSTANTIAL ATTRIBUTES OF HIS PERSON

SECT. 181.—PERICHORESIS OF “THE DIVINE AND THE HUMAN” IN CHRIST; OR, THE COMMUNION OF NATURES, AND THE COMMUNICATION OF IDIOMS

I. THE term “perichoresis,” so familiar to the Fathers, was almost entirely lost sight of by the Schoolmen; Petavius and Thomassin reintroduced it into theology. As a technical term, its Latin equivalent is communio naturarum; etymologically it expresses the “firm grip (χωρεῖν) which each of the united substances holds on the other.” The term was suggested to the Fathers by the name Christ, the Anointed; and illustrated by the analogies of the immersion of a solid body in a liquid or ethereal substance, and of the infusion of the spiritual soul into the flesh. Both analogies represent unions of substances by mutual penetration or permeation (see § 106).

II. The Divine and the Human in Christ may be considered in the abstract or in the concrete, and may accordingly be combined in four different ways, each of which is the foundation of a distinct form of perichoresis. These four combinations are:—

1. Between the abstract human nature or essence and the concrete Divine Nature, that is, the Person of the Logos. In this combination the perichoresis is but another way of viewing the Hypostatic Union; the Divine Person taking hold of and immersing Himself into the human nature, so as to become ὁ Θεὸς λόγος ἐνανθρωπήσας: the God-Word incarnate. Human nature is not immersed in the same way in the Logos, but assumed into His personality, so as to become man subsisting in the God-Word, or receiving personality from Him: ἄνθρωπος λογωθείς, or θεωθείς.

2. Next there is a perichoresis between the Divine and the human natures considered concretely, that is, between man and God. This perichoresis is the first consequence of the Hypostatic Union, and consists in this, that the two concrete natures are made one personal being, Who is at the same time God and man, or in Whom God is man and man is God; the two natures being intimately united and interwoven, each retaining its own peculiarities, and yet communicating them in a sense to one another through the medium of one Person.

3. The third form of perichoresis is between the concrete human nature and the abstract Divine, or between man and Divinity. It is a second consequence of the Hypostatic Union, distinct from the former in this, that here the Divinity is not merely considered as a nature existing side by side with the human, but as the essence of the Principle which gives to the man Christ His Divine Personality. Hence this form of perichoresis causes the man Christ to participate in the Divine rank and dignity which are essential to the Word: it is properly the “anointment of human nature with Divinity.”

4. The fourth and last form of perichoresis exists between the two abstract natures, i.e. between humanity and Divinity. It is the third and last consequence of the Hypostatic Union, and is only a closer definition of the second consequence. It consists in this, that the Divine nature, being substantially united with humanity, becomes the inmost property of the hypostasis of the Man Christ—dwells “corporeally” in Him like the soul of man in his body, and thus “deifies” Him. More will be said of this further on.

III. Christ, the Word Incarnate, on account of His peculiar constitution, is the subject of three kinds of predicates; some being proper to the Word, some to the flesh, and some to both taken together. The first kind, or simple predicates, the Word has in common with the other Divine Persons; the second kind, also simple, He has in common with persons purely human; the third or mixed kind, belong to the Person of Christ alone. Like the composition of Christ, so also the multiplicity and diversity of His attributes have an analogy in the human compound, yet with a twofold difference: Christ subsists in the two component parts of His being as in two complete natures, and has, therefore, two essential names (God and Man), each of which can designate Him as the bearer of both kinds of attributes; besides, the mixed predicates are attributable to Christ by reason of His being one Person, whereas to man such mixed predicates are attributed by reason of His one nature.

IV. 1. In the Hypostatic Union the Word remains unaltered; hence He retains all the attributes proper to the Divine Persons: Christ is God, Creator, eternal, the source of life, the absolute truth and sanctity, etc. Certain Divine predicates, however, can only be attributed to Christ with a qualification, viz. such as are in opposition with His compound being, or which express the position of the Logos in the compound. Thus we cannot say, without restricting the meaning to the Logos, that Christ is simple and immutable, or that Christ inhabits in the flesh, is united to the flesh, etc.

2. The flesh in the Word Incarnate being a complete human nature and His own, we must, speaking generally, give to Christ all the predicates expressing human origin, essence, and activity, not excluding those which are opposed to the Divine predicates. Christ is true man, formed by God, born in time, passible, mortal, etc. But here, as with the Divine predicates, an exception must be made as to predicates denying, directly or indirectly, the composition of Christ’s humanity with a Divine Person, or directly expressing the position of His humanity in the compound; these can only be used with a restrictive qualification, e.g. Christ is not eternal, viz. according to His human nature.

3. The third class of predicates, specifically proper to Christ, comprises those based upon the composition of the Word Incarnate. Thus the name Christ itself denotes His origin and essence; the name God-Man or Man-God, His essence or being; the names Envoy of God, Head of creatures, Mediator between God and creatures, Saviour, etc., understood in their eminent and absolute sense, denote His properties.

V. The Divine and human predicates properly belong to the Subject connoted by the terms “Christ” and “Word Incarnate;” yet, according to a general rule of logic, they may be connected with any other term demonstrating or supposing the same subject, though this other term does not “formally” represent the subject as bearer of the predicate used; e.g. of the Man Christ we predicate Divine attributes, although “formally as man” He is not entitled to them. Vice versâ, of the God Christ we predicate passibility, etc., though as God He is impassible. We have thus a transfer of predicates or attributes from one nature to the other, and an exchange of properties, technically known as “Communication of Idioms.” The Greek Fathers use ἀντίδοσις, ἐναλλαγή (= exchange), and connect it with the second form of Perichoresis (Newman, Athanasius, ii. p. 367). The rules laid down above for the predication of the several kinds of attributes (iv.) apply likewise to the interchange of idioms. In propositions whose predicate is an adjective, special attention is required not to take the subject of the proposition as being also formally the subject of the attribute.

The exchange of idioms in Holy Scripture is the strongest proof for the unity of Person in Christ, and the most prominent manifestation of its wonderful character. The law, however, by which in our speech we interchange the predicates, is not peculiar to Christ; it is a general law of logic, which finds its application in the human compound and in many others, but nowhere so perfectly as in Christ.

VI. From the nature and laws of the communication of idioms, it is manifest that, in general, the term which stands as subject in the proposition does not suggest the reason why the predicate is contained in it; this reason lies in some property which the subject possesses concomitantly with the property actually expressed. For instance, in the proposition, “the Son of Mary is the Word,” the reason why He is the Word is not pointed out by the term “Son of Mary;” it is contained in the Divine nature which the Son of Mary possesses concomitantly with the human. Hence the technical term “predication by concomitancy” is applied to phrases expressing the exchange of idioms. Another technical term, but not so appropriate, is “material and indirect predication.” Predication by concomitancy is based upon the Perichoresis or communion of natures, and is therefore not merely rhetorical or verbal, as it was styled by many Protestant theologians. St. Thomas, 3, qq. 9, 16; Franzelin, thes. xxxvii.

SECT. 182.—CHRIST AS A PERSON RELATIVELY AND VIRTUALLY DISTINCT FROM GOD

I. Notwithstanding that Christ is God, that He subsists and acts in the Divine Nature, and further, that the same, by reason of the exchange of idioms, must be said materially of the “Man” Christ; the language of Scripture and Church represents Him over and over again as a subject of attributions distinct and separate from God. He is the Mediator between God and man; He is “of God,” as “we are of Christ” (ὑμεῖς δὲ Χριστοῦ, Χριστὸς δὲ Θεοῦ, 1 Cor. 3:23), and even where His intimate union with God is set forth, it is spoken of in terms analogous to those expressing the union of creatures with God through grace. In the Old Testament He is “the chosen Servant of God” (Isaias), “the man that cleaveth” to the Lord (Zach. 13:7); in the New Testament He is begotten, sanctified, glorified, protected, and guided by God; He prays to God, and reconciles the world with Him, etc.

II. To account for these apparent anomalies, it is not sufficient to say that in such texts “God” means God the Father exclusively. This is only true where Christ is represented as the Son of God; in all other cases Christ is set forth as a subject distinct from God purely and simply, from the Word as well as from the other Divine Persons. We have to explain how this can be done without destroying the unity of Person in Christ.

The unity of person in man is not injured by speaking of man’s lower nature as distinct and opposed to his higher nature. But our lower nature is deprived of reason, and, therefore, is never spoken of as a person. In Christ, on the contrary, the lower nature is a complete, rational and animal, human nature, receiving its personal complement through the Logos or Word. Hence we may speak of Him as a human person, existing side by side with God or inferior to Him, provided we conceive Him formally as a human personal being, viz. as the Logos “subsisting”—not only dwelling—in “the flesh,” not in the Godhead. This way of conceiving the Word Incarnate is evidently implied in the names “Christ” and “Emmanuel” (God with us). It affords sufficient foundation for mentally distinguishing in Christ two personal beings, and consequently for speaking of the Man-God as relatively independent and virtually distinct from the God-Man. This distinction is not tantamount to abstracting from Christ’s Divinity: He is considered as God, but the mental stress is laid on His subsistence in a human nature. The analogical designations for Christ, taken from all orders of created things—the Anointed or Branch, the limb or member, the image of God—might indeed express no more than a union with God through grace. Yet they likewise may be used as descriptive of the Hypostatic Union, for they all represent a most real and intimate union between some being and a higher principle differing from it in essence. We have dealt with them in former chapters. It is to be remarked that Holy Scripture, and the Church after its example, are most careful to avoid phrases which, by representing Christ as a subject distinct from God, might imply a real distinction of persons or a multiplication of the Divine Nature.

III. The notion of Christ as a subject of attributions distinct from God, has been entirely perverted by Berruyer, and only imperfectly proposed by theologians even of high note. Berruyer, in order to avoid Nestorianism, calls the Man Christ a quasi-suppositum (or quasi-person), but then describes Him as a Person perfect in every respect. St. Alphonsus opposed the new form of the old heresy with holy zeal, and it was condemned by Benedict XIV. and Clement XIII. Yet traces of it are still found in many modern Nestorianizing theologies. Berruyer’s heresy and cognate Catholic opinions fail to understand, or at least to work out, the consequences of the principle that “the Man Christ, however He be considered, is and always remains the personal human compound constituted through the anointment of humanity with the Logos; that in this compound the human essence is the material part, and the Divine Logos the formal principle, of its substantial—subsistential or personal—existence.” In the same way, in whatever manner we consider natural man, he is and remains a body informed by a soul. Christ cannot be considered independently of the personality of the Logos by which He subsists, though, as the Fathers express it, He can take the part of a servant (gerere personam servi), and also can act in the Person of God (esse et agere in persona Dei). In the stage of His life which the Apostle calls “the days of the flesh,” He acted the part of a servant, and “in the day of His power,” He acts as Divine Person. See Franzelin, De Verbo Incarn., p. 366, sqq.

SECT. 183.—REDUNDANCY (OVERFLOW) OF THE DIVINE IDIOMS ON CHRIST AS MAN: HIS DIVINE GLORY AND POWER

I. Having obtained a clear notion of Christ as distinct subject of attributions, we are enabled likewise to gain a deeper insight into the communication of idioms between the Man Christ and the God Christ. Although, in general, the communication is mutual, yet it is not the same on both sides: “the human” is appropriated by God, but has no influence on His Divine Existence, whereas “the Divine” is infused into man and gives him a more perfect existence. Besides, the Divine privileges (axiomata) are more communicable than the human properties, and some of them must be attributed to Christ as man directly and formally, by reason of His formal fellowship or participation in them. From this point of view, the communication of idioms appears as an outpouring of the Divine privileges on Christ as man, and may fitly be termed “communication by redundancy.” This term, then, implies that the Word Incarnate not only retains His Divine privileges in His Divinity, but also transfuses and enforces them in the Man constituted by the Hypostatic Union, and that, consequently, this man, even as man completed in his personality by the Word, has co-possession and co-fruition of these privileges.

II. The Redundancy of privileges is founded upon the general principle that in every substantial compound, the whole, even considered in its material elements, participates in the privileges or excellences of the formal principle, whether this be an inherent form as in natural compounds, or an insubsisting form as in the Incarnate Word. The term “redundancy” itself describes the manner or form in which it takes place—transfusion of Divine privileges into God’s consubsistential image, or into the Anointed and the Bud of God. The subject-matter of this communication is summed up by Scripture and the Fathers as a participation in the Divine Glory and Power (δόξα, δύναμις, gloria et virtus, cf. 2 Peter 1:3, etc.).

III. Holy Scripture describes the essential glory of Christ as of the highest dignity and power, and worthy of the highest honour and worship: He is the God of gods, the Lord of lords, and the Holy of Holies (§ 93). The names “God,” “Lord,” and “Holy” connote here a glory communicable to creatures; but the first, “God,” must be taken in contradistinction to Jehovah, as conveying the idea of the godlike highness and power of some person. Now the fact that Christ is placed above all other gods, lords, and saints, in a manner proper to the true God alone, shows that His participation in the Divine glory is not merely extrinsical and accidental as in other creatures, but intrinsical and substantial: He is not a simple image, but the perfect likeness of God; He is the Lord, sitting at the right hand of the Father, on the same throne, and exercising the same power. Just as in the constitution of Adam—created to the image and likeness of God—the foundation was laid for his natural glory and dominion over the world, so in the constitution of Christ—the consubsistential image of God (that is, who subsists in a Divine Person)—the foundation is laid for His Divine Glory and Power.

1. The Man Christ is God, and shares with God the title of Lord pure and simple, or Lord of glory (2 Cor. 2:8), by reason of His Divine Personality. He is independent of any superior being, and really Sovereign, equal in rank and dignity with God. Again, for the same reason, He has an essential and absolute right to all internal and external goods of the uncreated and self-subsisting God; in the first place, to the Divine Essence and Nature. He has especially the right to enjoy and use these goods in and through His humanity, in as far, of course, as this can be done by a created nature. Lastly, this co-possession of Divine properties entitles the Man Christ to all the honour and worship due to God by virtue of His infinite excellence.

2. The supreme glory of God shines forth most in His Holiness, which is the splendour of His infinite perfection considered as the supreme and absolute God (§ 89). In this absolute Sanctity the Man Christ participates through the fact that His personal Principle is Himself Holy God, and that the Holy Ghost substantially dwells in Him as His own Spirit, and excludes even from His human nature all kind of unholiness. The holiness of Christ differs from that of other creatures, as the substance differs from the accident; it is part of His essence, and can neither be lost nor impaired.

3. Not only the Divinity and Holiness of the Lord are poured out on the Man Christ—the Divine Power is also communicated to Him, inasmuch as Christ “has life in Himself” like God (John 5:26), and is “the prince or author of life” (Acts 3:15), and “vivifier,” that is, giver of eternal life (Heb. 5:9; cf. 1 Cor. 15:45; Heb. 9:14, and 7:16). This third feature of the glory of the Man Christ is, like the two preceding, founded on His being constituted a Person by a Divine Principle, the substance and source of life. Observe, however, that this power is always in Holy Scripture attributed to Christ as a saving, sanctifying, beatifying, but never as a creating or conserving power; thereby indicating that creative power must not be attibuted to the Man Christ formally as man, since creative power admits of no created co-operation.

IV. The participation of the Man Christ in the glory and power of God is specially a participation in the glory and power of the Word: the Divine prerogatives of the Internal and Eternal Image of God flow on to His perfect external Image and Likeness. An intimate analogy exists between the communication of the Father’s Divinity to the Son, and the communication of the privileges of the Logos to His humanity. As the Logos is the “Wisdom and Power of the Father” in this sense, that He is not only the same in essence with the Father, but also the seat, the bearer, and the administrator of the Father’s Wisdom and Power; so likewise the Man Christ is the seat, the bearer, and the administrator of the prerogatives of the Logos. This Christ expressed in the words, “I am the way, the truth, and the life”—that is, I am the perfect Mediator of truth and life. St. Paul teaches the same: “Christ Jesus, who of God is made unto us wisdom, and justice, and sanctification, and redemption” (1 Cor. 1:30).

V. The whole theory of the redundancy of Divine glory and power may be thus summed up: All the glory and the power which by virtue of the eternal generation flow from the Father to the Son, flow over from the Son to the Man Christ, and replenish Him to the utmost of His capacity; Christ, as Son of God, is the born heir of Divine Power; as co-owner of the Holy Ghost, who proceeds from the Father and the Son, He is the Giver of supernatural life.

SECT. 184.—THE MAN CHRIST AS OBJECT OF DIVINE WORSHIP

I. The redundancy of Divine glory on Christ appears most strikingly in His adorability, or right to the worship due to God alone. It being admitted that the humanity of Christ forms with the Logos one personal Being—Christ, the Incarnate Word—it follows that this one Being, in His entirety, is entitled to the same Divine worship as the Logos Himself. Hence the Logos is adorable not only as Logos, but also as Logos Incarnate, or in and with His humanity; and His humanity is likewise adorable in as far as it is the humanity of Christ and the flesh of the Logos, that is, physical part of a Being adorable on account of its formal Principle.

II. The adorability of the Man Christ was so firmly held in the early Church, that even Nestorius could not deny it; and the Eutychians and Apollinarists even argued from it in support of their heresies. Against Nestorius, the Council of Ephesus defined that the Man Christ (assumptus homo) is adored with the Logos (una adoratione); that is, not as a distinct term and object of adoration, but as one with the Word made flesh (Anath. viii.). The ninth canon of the Fifth General Council is worded against the Apollinarists and Eutychians. The flesh or humanity of the Word Incarnate must be included in one adoration with the Word Incarnate, not as being of Divine essence or nature, or changed into the Divine Nature, but as belonging to the adorable Person of the Logos. Holy Scripture frequently relates acts of adoration addressed to Christ, all more or less explicitly bound up with a profession of faith that the Adored was the Son of God and absolute Lord. The right to adoration is formally declared (John 5:23), “that all might honour the Son as they honour the Father,” and (Phil. 2:9) “God … hath given Him a name which is above all names: that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow … and that every tongue should confess that the Lord Jesus Christ is in the glory of God the Father.” (For the Fathers, see Petavius, lib. xv. cc. 1–4; Thomassin lib. xi. cc. 1–3.)

III. The adorability of Christ, including His humanity, may be conceived in a twofold manner, and the adoration itself may be carried out in two corresponding ways. First, we can conceive the Incarnate Word as subsisting in the Divine Nature conjointly with the other Divine Persons, and so accepting adoration by His Divine Will. Thus His humanity is included in the adoration merely as something substantially connected with Him. From this point of view the adoration of Christ’s humanity is analogous to that relative adoration or worship which is exhibited to an object by reason of its close connection with a Person worthy of adoration or worship. Yet there is an essential difference, because in Christ the connection is personal, that is to say, His humanity is embodied in His Divine Personality. Secondly, in the adoration of Christ, we can consider the Word Incarnate as specifically subsisting in the human nature, or as the Man who receives his personal complement through the Person of the Logos, and who in a certain manner is adored side by side with God, and accepts the adoration by His human will. From this point of view Christ appears especially as participator in the Divine glory, as Lord, as Holy, and as the Prince of life; and this redundancy of Divine greatness on Him is here the reason or motive of His adorability. The adoration of Christ in this form is as much an act of Divine Adoration (latria) as in the other form, because here also the ultimate motive of adorability is the Divine excellence of His personal Principle, and because this Principle is actually included in the object of adoration. The first of these two forms is principally useful to explain and defend the inclusion of Christ’s humanity in the adoration of the Logos; the second is more commonly supposed in the practical adoration of Christ.

IV. Christ’s humanity is adorable in itself, though not for its own sake; in other words, it is the material, not the formal, object and terminus of adoration. It is adorable in itself, inasmuch as the action by which the Logos confers upon it His own personality is, like the action of a substantial form on its substratum, eminently intrinsic: the Logos subsists in the human nature, and communicates to it His adorability in the same degree and manner as His Divinity. Hence it is inexact to say that the reason of the adorability of Christ’s humanity is extrinsic or outside the human nature; or that it is only mediately intrinsic as, e.g., the wisdom of the soul is mediately intrinsic to the body. Yet, notwithstanding this, Christ’s humanity is but a “partial” object of adoration, inasmuch as it cannot be adored except as part of the theandric compound. To adore it apart from this connection would be adoring a creature. As defined by the Church, only one adoration of the flesh of Christ is admissible, and that is the “adoration of the Word Incarnate with His flesh.”

V. Although the humanity of Christ (the Man Christ) is entitled to Divine honour by reason of its personal Principle, it is not therefore without a title to such worship as is exhibited to the Saints on the ground of their sanctity: the perfection which grace confers upon Saints is possessed in a much higher degree and much more intimately by that nature to which the Logos gives Divine Personality. Even considered apart from the Logos, or deprived of its personality, the human nature of Christ, though no longer adorable as a person, would still be an object worthy of veneration because of its inherent perfection. Such veneration, however, ought to be limited to acts of admiration and praise: acts of adoration, including subjection of the worshipper to the Worshipped, can only be addressed to a personal being.

Again, the worship termed dulia, or rather hyperdulia, when offered to Christ, is necessarily connected with the worship of adoration. For whatever form the worship takes, it is addressed to the Divine Person, in whom the created excellences appear as merely subordinate and secondary reasons for worship, and cannot be isolated from the Divine root from which they grow.

VI. Christ cannot adore Himself as man any more than God can adore Himself; because submissive adoration supposes at least a relative substantial distinction between the worshipper and the worshipped. As man, Christ can adore Himself as God in union with the Father, because He possesses a nature different from and subordinate to His Divine Nature. His personal dignity, which puts Christ on a level with God, enables Him to offer to God an adoration of infinite value. Furthermore, His adoration of God is itself adorable in as far as an action can be the object of adoration, for it is an act of infinite value. The “Lamb that was slain,” and Christ crucified, are proposed for our adoration because of the infinite value of Christ’s sacrificial act.

VII. The sacred humanity of Christ is an object of adoration in its parts as well as in its totality, because each part is anointed with Divinity. If, therefore, special motives suggest the selection of one part as object of a special devotion, such devotion ought to take the form of adoration (cultus latriæ). Such motives exist as regards the organs which were prominently instrumental in Christ’s great sacrifice of Himself for our redemption. These organs are associated in our minds with the sublime Holiness of the Victim in the redeeming sacrifice, and with the immense charity that prompted Him to sacrifice Himself; their contemplation is most apt to excite our admiration, gratitude, contrition and love. For these reasons the Church proposes for our adoration the wounded Hands, Feet, and Side of our Lord, which bear the external signs of His sacrificial sufferings; and His Sacred Heart, which is the organ of His inner and greater sufferings. Special motives invite to the worship of Christ’s Heart; it is the source of the blood shed through the external wounds, and it was pierced in order to yield the last drop. Thus the heart is the kernel, the most intrinsic and noble part of the victim in Christ’s sacrifice, and, at the same time, the altar on which the sacrifice was performed. Again, the heart is the material seat of inward sufferings and of the love from which these proceed, and it takes over all external sufferings; it is not indeed the principle of love and suffering, but the substratum in which love directly and sensibly manifests itself in the bodily organism. Hence the heart is also the altar on which the sacrifice is burnt, and the living organ of the loving dispositions which prompt the sacrificer to accomplish the sacrifice. In short, the Sacred Heart is the most perfect symbol of Christ’s sacrificial Love, and it is an object of adoration because the Love which it symbolizes dwells in it substantially. See St. Thomas, 3, q. 25; Franzelin, thes. xlv.

SECT. 185.—THE HUMAN SONSHIP OF CHRIST AS ASSUMED SONSHIP OF THE GOD LOGOS; AND THE CORRESPONDING MATERNITY AS DIVINE MATERNITY

I. Christ, and more particularly the Man Christ, is the Son of the Virgin Mary, so that, notwithstanding His Divine Origin, a human sonship must be attributed to Him. And inasmuch as on the part of Mary everything was done that nature requires of a human mother, the human sonship of Christ is natural. But it is supernatural also, inasmuch as it refers to no human father. If Christ is called the “Son of David,” or of any other ancestor of the Virgin, the paternity of these patriarchs implies only that of their race came the matter of Christ’s body; or, in a higher sense, that the Son of God was sent in answer to their desires, and in recompense of their faith in the promised Messias. Human sonship must be predicated of the Divine Person of the Logos as well as of the Man Christ: the Word Incarnate is the Son of Mary by maternal generation as truly and properly as any human person is son of his mother. This truth is evidently contained in the other, viz. that “Christ” is the Son of Mary. For Christ is the Incarnate Word, the Word made flesh, or the Man whose personality is that of the Logos; hence the Mother of Christ is the Mother of the Logos, and reciprocally the Logos is Son of Mary. That Mary is Mother of God (Θεοτόκος, Deipara) has been dogmatically defined in the Council of Ephesus (can. ii.); in the sixth canon of the Fifth Council, and again in the third canon of the Lateran Council, A.D. 649. Holy Scripture nowhere uses the expression “Mother of God;” but its equivalent is found in the prophecy of Isaias, and in the words of the Annunciation, “that the Virgin should conceive and give birth to the Emmanuel (= God with us)” and to “the Son of God.” Again, in Rom. 1:2, and Gal. 4:4, and in the salutation of Elizabeth, “Whence is this that the Mother of my Lord should come to me?” (Luke 1:43.)

The title “Mother of God,” given to Mary long before the Council of Ephesus, sufficiently shows the tradition of the early Church. It is worthy of remark that those who have dropped this title from their Liturgy, or only used it with a kind of reserve, have by degrees lost the idea of the Divinity of Christ Himself. The Fathers often observe that the term Theotokos is dogmatically as important in the doctrine of the constitution of Christ, as the term Homoousios in the doctrine of the Trinity.

II. The terminus, or result of this maternal activity, may be considered as a child, or specially as a son. Considered as Child of Mary, Christ appears as the ἄνθρωπος Θεωθείς, the Man deified, of the Greek Fathers, or as “the Holy that shall be born of thee” in the message of the angel. Viewed as Son, that is, strictly as a Person, Christ appears as the Θεὸς ἐνανθρωπήσας, the God made Man, the Emmanuel of the prophecy.

I. As Child of Mary, Christ appears first and directly as man. But this Man is the fruit of generation, and is truly a child only inasmuch as He is a being independent of the mother, i.e. subsisting separately. Now the principle of His subsistence is Divine; therefore He is Child of Mary only because He subsists in a Divine person. Mary, then, is the Mother of a Divine Child,—of a Child personified by the Logos,—as really and truly as ordinary mothers are mothers of children informed by spiritual souls. Again, the maternal generation of Mary directly and formally went to produce a “Holy Child,” in the same degree as ordinary maternal generation tends to produce an ordinary child. For, in the production of the child, the mother acts only in co-operation with the father, who, being the principal agent, determines and directs her activity. But the supernatural influence of God directed the maternal activity of Mary towards the union of the Logos with the flesh ministered by her; the direct and formal terminus of the Divine action being the personal (hypostatic) completion of the flesh, in the same way as the action of the natural father terminates in the union of a spiritual soul with the maternal flesh. Nay, in the Incarnation the Paternal influence excels the natural action of the father in this, that it is the efficient cause of the union of the flesh with its hypostatic Principle; and again in this, that here the union of the Logos with the flesh is logically prior to the infusion of the soul. In other words, in natural generation God creates the soul in order to complete the action of the father; in the Incarnation the Paternal action itself comprises the infusion of the personal Principle, and the flesh (or human nature) is formed in order to accomplish the previously intended Hypostatic Union.

2. If we consider Christ as a Son given to His Mother by God, this Son is indeed first of all Eternal God and Eternal Son of God, but precisely as such He becomes directly and formally the terminus of Mary’s maternal activity, even more so than a natural son. For here the God Logos Himself is the subject-matter of the maternal conception, inasmuch as He assumes flesh in and of His Mother, and inasmuch as the procreative action of the Mother is from the beginning, and uniquely intended to clothe the Logos with flesh. From this point of view Mary is directly and formally the Mother of the Divine Person of the Logos, because the Logos is the Holder of the flesh taken of her; and even in holding or assuming this flesh He asserts the full extent of His Personality or independence in existing. Whence the title “Mary Mother of the Word” (Mater Verbi) is fully justified: it points out the proper terminus of Mary’s maternity, and correctly characterizes this maternity as “spiritual relation to a Person spiritual by essence.”

The relation between Mary and Christ, viz. the maternity of Mary and the filiation of Christ, receives new light from the above explanations concerning the terminus of the Divine Maternity.

III. In what respect is Christ the Son of Mary? Some theologians reply: Inasmuch as He is man and born of Mary. This answer is at least incomplete, and certainly too shallow, for it considers Christ only as the fruit or the child of a human mother. The complete and only correct answer is, that Christ is the Son of Mary as Divine Person, or as Logos; He is the subject of filiation just as He is the subject assuming and possessing human nature. From this point of view, the human sonship of the Logos no longer implies a dependence on His Mother; it is a relation of reason, the foundation of which lies in the real possession of humanity by the Logos, and in its origin from Mary. Like other relations of God to creatures, it implies a real dependence of the creature on God: Mary is made Mother by the Logos, but the Logos is not made Son by Mary.

The relation between the two filiations or sonships of Christ clearly and fully appears in the above manner of considering His human filiation; by attributing both filiations to the same Divine Person as their immediate subject, they are at the same time sharply distinguished and harmoniously joined. They are sharply distinguished, inasmuch as the Divine Sonship alone is set forth as real relation (i.e. intrinsic and founded on His origin), whereas the human is only a relation of reason; they are harmoniously united, inasmuch as through this very distinction it is impossible to consider the human sonship as attribute of a second person or as complement of the Divine Sonship. For these and other reasons the princes of scholastic theology (St. Thomas, 3, q. 35, a. 4, 5; and St. Bonaventure, In. III., Dist. 8) have most strenuously upheld this doctrine, and the other great Schoolmen of the thirteenth century also seem to have adopted it.

IV. The fact that the Logos is really and truly the Son of Mary, confers upon the Mother the highest dignity to which a created person can attain, viz. a participation in the dignity of her Son. Fully to appreciate this feature of the Divine maternity, it is necessary to consider it from a twofold point of view: as founded upon the natural operations of the Mother, and as the work of the spiritual and free operation of the Son.

I. The natural operation of the Mother results in the production of the absolutely most perfect fruit that can be produced; it “reaches the confines of the Godhead” by furnishing God with a new nature, whereas all other created activity reaches God only by knowledge and love; it is a co-operation with God’s own internal activity, whereas the co-operation of other mothers in the production of the human soul by God, is only a co-operation with God’s external creative activity. Hence the maternity of Mary is the highest ministry to which a creature can be elevated by God.

2. Again, the Mother of Christ is a relation by blood to Christ as man, and a “relation by affinity” to God Himself as pure Spirit. Man is related by affinity to persons who marry his blood relations, because such persons become morally or juridically one with the blood-relations. Now, the humanity of Christ, related by blood to Mary, is united to the Logos more intimately than wife to husband; hence the affinity to God, contracted by Mary, is more intimate and perfect than any affinity among men.

The connection with God, based upon Mary’s maternity, may also be conceived as an eminent and unique Divine filiation. Her title to a share in the good things of God, in His Life and Beatitude, is not merely owing to grace, as in the case of God’s adopted sons: it arises from her substantial relations with the Divine Family. The “Seed of the Word of Truth,” out of which the sons of adoption are born, is itself infused into Mary. The Fathers, from this point of view, speak of Mary as ἡ θεόπαις (the child of God), ἀμνάς and agna Dei (the little ewe-lamb of God), and as the only-beloved and only-begotten daughter of God. See Passaglia, De Immac. Conc. sect. vi. cap. iii. a. 5; and on the whole of this section, Franzelin, thes. xxxix.

SECT. 186.—THE DIVINE SONSHIP OF THE LOGOS AS THE ONLY TRUE SONSHIP OF CHRIST, EXCLUDING ADOPTION AND HUMAN SONSHIP

I. If the Divine Sonship of the Logos be considered not as a relation to God the Father, but as the constituent character of His personality, we must evidently attribute this Divine Sonship to Christ as man or to the Man Christ, because the personality of Christ is identical with the personality of the Logos: Christ is the Word Incarnate; the Word Incarnate is the true and only-begotten Son of God, hence Christ is the true Son of God. Christ considered as this particular man (ut hic homo) is the natural Son of God, and has the personal rank and character of Son of God, in the same way as natural man is the image of God, not only in as far as he has a spiritual soul, but also as this particular corporeal and animal being, whose personality is completed by a soul made to the image of God.

II. Sonship may also be considered as relation from person to person, viz. from son to father. From this point of view arises the question: Is Christ as man, or the Man Christ, Son of God? In other words, is the term Sonship applicable to that relation between Christ and God which is distinct from the eternal Sonship of the Logos, and from the sonship by grace of the just? It cannot be denied that Holy Scripture represents this relation as a sonship. Yet, on the other hand, it differs in four respects from the Eternal Sonship of the Logos: (1) It is not based upon the internal and eternal generations in the bosom of the Father, but on a temporal communication, ad extra, and on a gracious assumption into Divine union. (2) Christ as man is, by nature, inferior to the Father. (3) The principle and terminus of the relation of Christ as man to God, is not the Father as Father, but the whole Trinity, including the Logos. (4) The relation in question would remain unaltered if the incarnate Person were the Father or the Holy Ghost.

These considerations have led the Adoptionists to assert that Christ as man is not truly Son of God, but only an adopted Son; and many theologians build upon the same foundation a second Divine Sonship, analogous to the Sonship by grace.

III. The Adoptionists of the eighth century attributed natural Sonship to the Logos alone, the Man Christ being only son by adoption (filius adoptivus sive nuncupativus). Their doctrine, a badly disguised form of Nestorianism, was at once condemned by Pope Hadrian I. and the Council of Franfort (A.D. 792), defining that Christ as man (secundum humanitatem) is, by reason of His personality, which is the personality of the Word Incarnate, the true and natural, not the adopted, Son of God (Denzinger, Enchiridion, xxxii.). Adoption presupposes that the person to be adopted is not a son but a stranger to the adopting father; and, besides, adoption merely constitutes a moral, external union, entirely different from natural sonship: it rests entirely on an act of the will, whereby the adoptive father admits the adopted son to the rights and privileges of a natural son. Wherefore, Christ cannot be called the adopted Son of God, except it be supposed that He is not one Person with the Logos, or that the Logos, by assuming human nature, lost His natural Sonship and became something foreign to God. The first hypothesis is the Nestorian heresy of two persons in Christ. The second is evidently absurd. The fact that the Man Christ has no other personality but the personality of the Logos, prevents Him from having any sonship but that of the Logos: adoption is rendered impossible by His very essence of Word Incarnate. Holy Scripture attributes to the Man Christ all the predicates which belong to the Eternal Son, so much so that most of the proofs in favour of the eternal sonship of the Logos are deduced from these utterances (see Book II. Part II., especially § 93). Again, Christ is adorable, and He is the principle of the adoption of man, because He is the natural Son of God: an adopted son could neither claim Divine Worship nor confer Divine Sonship upon others.

IV. The Fathers often describe the Sonship of Christ as a work of grace and predestination, and some, even St. Cyril of Alexandria (Dial. III., De Trin.), apply to them the Greek equivalent for adopted son (υἱὸς θετὸς μεθʼ ἡμῖν). Such expressions, however, present no difficulty if it be borne in mind that the grace by which Christ is made the Son of God, makes Him the natural Son of God, and excludes the very possibility of adoption. The Greek term for adoption, υἱὸμ τιθέναι, does not, like the Latin adoptare, imply the negation of natural sonship; it directly conveys the notion of “being constituted or installed as son,” and, therefore, it may rightly be applied to the act of grace by which human nature was united to the Logos, and Christ made the Son of God. The frequent expressions to the effect that Christ was “assumed or admitted into Sonship,” are but another way of presenting the same idea.

V. The Schoolmen of the Middle Ages constructed several systems of adoptionism free from heresy, yet incorrect as theological speculations. No “second Sonship” of Christ is admissible, according to the principle laid down by St. Thomas: “Terms used of a person in their proper and fullest sense (secundum perfectam rationem), cannot be applied to the same person in a figurative or imperfect sense (secundum rationem imperfectam). Thus Socrates, being termed ‘man’ in the full and proper sense of the word, cannot be called man in the improper sense in which a portrait is called man, though Socrates may bear in him the likeness of some other man. But Christ is the Son of God in the full and proper meaning of the term sonship or filiation; wherefore, although created and sanctified as man, He ought not to be called Son of God either by creation or by justification, but only by eternal generation, according to which He is Son of the Father alone” (3, q. 24, a. 3; see also Franzelin, thes. xxxviii.).

VI. The attempts to establish a second filiation in Christ, existing side by side with His eternal Sonship, are either heretical or confusing; they also fail to exhibit in its real light the organic connection between the Man Christ and God. Theologians have been so much bent upon finding analogies for this connection in the relation of natural filiation and of filiation by grace, that none of them has thought of another and far better analogy suggested by St. Paul (1 Cor. 6:17; cf. Gen. 2:24). Christ as man stands to God in a relation similar to that of son-in-law, although the term son-in-law, because implying independent personality, cannot be applied to the Man Christ, Who is constituted a person by the personality of the Logos. The Greek Fathers also use this analogy—kinship by marriage—to illustrate the relations of sonship by grace, and the same is in their mind when they speak of Christ as the assumed or adopted Son of God. They represent the Hypostatic Union as a matrimonial union, accomplished in the original thalamus of Mary, between the Logos and the flesh, whereby the flesh is made “one spirit” with the Logos far more really than the soul sanctified by grace is made one Spirit with God (1 Cor. 6:16). From this point of view they see the human nature as a Bride, without, however, treating it as a hypostasis or quasi-hypostasis, for the notion of bride carries with it an idea of inferiority and dependency similar to the relation of a part to the whole. The function of the bride is passive: she is made a member of a whole whose head is the bridegroom; in the mystical marriage of the Logos with the flesh, this function is carried out with the highest perfection; for the union of the flesh with the Logos results in one physical Person, whereas bride and bridegroom remain physically distinct persons. If, then, we consider the human nature as virtually distinct from the Logos, and united to Him in bridal or matrimonial union, that relation of kinship arises which exists between a father and his daughter-in-law. Yet we cannot designate this affinity by terms denoting personality, e.g. bride, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, but must confine ourselves to impersonal expressions, e.g. Christ as man is the Lamb of God, the Flesh of God (caro Dei), and more strictly, a member under God as Head.

VII. From the above we infer that the relation of the Man Christ to God, if conceived as affinity by espousals—rather than as a second sonship different from the eternal Sonship of the Logos—does not endanger the Hypostatic Union, but formally presupposes it. Further, that this affinity, being real kinship, expresses the relation of Christ as man to God better than sonship by adoption or by grace alone. Again, this mode of considering it does away with the four difficulties mentioned above (n. II.). And lastly, it has the advantage of uniting in one beautiful organism the Eternal Sonship of the Logos and the kinship of Christ as man.

VIII. To sum up this exposition of the Sonship of Christ as man: there is but one Sonship in Christ, and that is the Eternal Sonship. This belongs to the Man Christ by redundancy, so that He participates in it, and so that through it and from it His own specific relation to God receives the form and character of a Sonship. Hence the two different relations of Christ to God—as Logos and as Man—do not merely coexist side by side, but organically work together and into one another, so as to constitute the peculiar Sonship proper to Christ as man. The constitution of Christ being unique, His Sonship must be unique, and no perfect analogy for it can be sought for in heaven or on earth. It is neither the human sonship of a man, nor the Divine Sonship of God as God, but it is the Divine Sonship of a man. Hence the notion of generation, on which Divine and human sonship is founded, must be modified before it can be applied to the present case; the perfect similarity of nature which results from ordinary generation, becomes here an imperfect similarity of nature, but a perfect similarity of person.

IX. The peculiar character of the Divine Sonship in the Man Christ, as distinct from both the Eternal Sonship of the Logos and the adoptive Sonship of the just, is aptly expressed by the Scriptural name, ὁ Παῖς τοῦ Θεοῦ, Puer Dei, = the Boy or Childe of God, applied to Christ. So Matt. 12:18, quoting Isa. 42:1, after the Septuagint; Acts 3:13, 26, and 4:27, 30. The boy bears to his father the double relation of son and child. He is son because in him the person of the father is represented and reproduced; he is child because he is the yet immature product of both father and mother, and is, by reason of his incomplete development, like the mother, a member of the family subordinate to the father. These notions find an easy application in the “Childe” of God. The Man Christ is Son of the Eternal Father in as far as His Personal principle is a Person like unto the Father; He is Child of the Father by reason of the inferiority and impersonality of His human nature: He is a subordinate member of the Divine Family (filius familias). Instead, then, of two sonships in Christ, we have the double relation of Son and Child commingled in the “Boy” of the Father, and both resulting from the same Divine act to which the Man Christ owes His origin. The New Testament but seldom uses the appellation Παῖς τοῦ Θεοῦ; yet whenever the “Son” speaks of Himself as inferior to the Father, or as the object of the Father’s loving care, as also in many texts relating to His origin and final glory, the “Son” is considered as “Child.” At any rate these passages, thus understood, give an easy, harmonious, and beautiful sense, which is not brought out by the common interpretation, “that the Son of God is there considered as man or in the form of servant.” The “Childe of God” is “the First-born amongst many brethren” (Rom. 8:29), viz. God’s children by grace, of whom He is the Exemplar and the Head.

X. There is good reason to think that the meaning of the name “Lamb of God” is identical with that of παῖς (Boy) of God. St. John uses this appellation much in the same way as the Prophets use the term “Bud of God.” Its masculine form, ἀμνός, corresponds with παῖς, the boy; its neuter form, ἀμνίον, with παιδίον, the child. In sacred and even in profane language, the relations between shepherd and flock afford the standard illustrations of the filial or paternal relations between superiors and inferiors; kings and priests are “pastors” of flocks; the newly baptized infants are styled agni or agnelli (the little lambs) of God; God and Christ express their loving care and kindness to man by assuming the title of Shepherd, and mankind is then always represented as a flock of sheep and lambs. There is, then, the possibility that “Lamb of God” may be synonymous with Boy or Childe of God. That it really is so, is made probable by the following considerations. When the Baptist addressed Christ as Lamb of God, he used the Aramaic word Thaljoh (“young one”), which is applied to both lamb and child, and has been retained in the Syriac version of the Gospel. Now the words of the Baptist sound like an echo of the words of God the Father: “This is my beloved Son;” at all events, they have the same signification. Even granting that, in the words of John, Christ is pointed out as the perfect victim of the great redeeming sacrifice, it must still be conceded that the speaker bore in mind the intimate connection of Christ with God which made His sacrifice acceptable. Again, Christ is the Lamb of the Father, as we, the children by grace, are the lambs of Christ (John 10:14, 15). Isaias (16:1) calls the Lamb the Ruler of the earth; and in the Angelic Hymn (Gloria in excelsis) we read: “Lord God, Lamb of God, Son of the Father, who takest away the sins of the world,” etc., whence it appears that the notion of victim is not the only one conveyed by the term “Lamb,” but that it has also the sense of Lord and God.

Among the Fathers, Clement of Alexandria is the only one who draws attention to the connection between παῖς and ἀμνός as names of Christ (Pœdagog., l I. c. 5). Toletus (in Joan i.) first made use of the exposition of Clement, and after Toletus only a few others. See Cornelius à Lapide, in Apoc. 5:7.

SECT. 187.—CHRIST AS CREATURE; HIS SUBORDINATION TO GOD

I. The words of Christ, “I ascend to My Father and to your Father, to My God and to your God” (John 20:17), imply a relation between Him and God analogous to the subordination of creatures to their Creator. The Man Christ is an external work of God, Who “created Him” (Is. 45:8), and “made Him (ποιήσαντι)” (Heb. 3:2). He is, however, a creature only as to His human nature. And even in this respect He stands out above all other created beings: in His created nature subsists a Person increated, eternally begotten from and like to the Father.

II. The human nature of Christ being created, Christ as man is inferior and subject to God like other creatures. St. Thomas (3, q. 20, a. 1) distinguishes in His human nature a threefold inferiority to God, forming the counterpart to the threefold equality which belongs to His Divine nature: (1) Christ as man is inferior to God in substantial and accidental perfection; (2) He is subject to the ruling Power of God; and (3) bound to adore and serve God as His principle and final Object. Even when co-operating with the Divine Power, the human nature acts but as an instrument. Yet this threefold inferiority differs from the inferiority of mere creatures. The infinity of perfection, which is denied to Christ’s humanity, is possessed by His Divine Personality; His subjection is not a subjection to an alien power, but to a Power which is His own as God; His service and ministry are given, not to a stranger, but to the Godhead of which He is a Person and whose supereminent dignity is His own. St. Paul beautifully describes this relation (1 Cor. 11:3) as the subordination of a member to the head of a family: “The head of every man is Christ, … and the head of Christ is God.”

III. With those who possess correct notions of the nature and origin of Christ, the question in how far He can be styled “servant of God,” is but a question of words. The term “servant” (slave, servus, δοῦλος), used without restriction, implies exclusion from the position, dignity, and possessions of the Master: it would be heresy to apply it, in this sense, to Christ, Who is at the same time Servant of the Lord and Lord Himself. True, the Latin Vulgate in the Old Testament often calls the Messias servus Dei. But the Hebrew does not convey the idea of servitude implied by the Latin servus; it means a minister, one of the household of God, οἰκέτης: a true worshipper of God and executor of the Divine will. In a similar sense we call saints “servants of God.”

SECT. 188.—CHRIST AS LORD OF ALL THINGS

I. On account of His humanity, Christ is subordinate to the Creator; on the other hand, by virtue of His Divine Personality, He shares with the Creator the Lordship over all things. He is, with and next to God, our Lord and “the Lord of all” (Acts 10:36; Heb. 1 and 2; Ps. 8 and 109). St. Paul lays down and develops this point of faith in Heb. 1 and 2. The reason he gives for the appointment of Christ as man to be heir of all things, is that by Him God “made the world;” that He is “the brightness of God’s glory and the figure of His substance, upholding all things by the word of His power” (Heb. 1:2, 3; 3:1–6. See also § 183 on the Redundance of Divine Glory on Christ, and § 176 on the Gratia unionis).

II. Christ’s dominium (ownership, lordship) over all things springs from the identity of His Person with the Creator, and is therefore infinitely above any dominium which God may give to a mere creature. This Lordship embraces all things without exception, and extends to their innermost being. Unlike created sovereignty, it includes the right to turn to Christ’s own service and glory all persons and things subjected to it, so that the final object of things is to minister to the glory of Christ as well as to the glory of God.

III. The title “King of kings and Lord of lords” (1 Tim. 6:15; Apoc. 17:14; 19:16) is given equally to Christ and to God. It implies that the lordship of the world belongs to Christ purely and simply, and that His Lordship is the most perfect image and likeness of the Divine Sovereignty. The only difference is that the Sovereignty of God is “essentially” the source of all other sovereignty, whereas the Lordship of Christ is neither essentially nor as a matter of fact the source of all lordship; in other words, all lordship possessed and exercised in the name of God is not also “essentially, or from its very nature,” held in the name of Christ. In all other respects the resemblance is most perfect: the Lordship of Christ eminently and virtually contains all other lordship; no other power can limit His Power, but every power must minister to His ends, submit to His will, and deal with the persons and things over which it rules, as being His property as well as the property of God. “All power is given to me in Heaven and on earth” (Matt. 28:18; cf. Phil. 2:9, 10).

IV. A question much debated among the Schoolmen is whether Christ formally possesses all the political power held by temporal rulers, and whether He is the real (formal) owner of all private property. As to political power, it is evident from John 18:38, “My kingdom is not of this world,” that Christ is not the only and exclusive holder of such power. He never once claimed the exercise of political sovereignty to the exclusion of its natural holders. His “eminent” dominium, like the eminent dominium of God, is perfectly compatible with real ownership in creatures. Christ’s universal Lordship being founded on His substantial and personal relation to the Creator, implies the right of disposing of all created powers and things according to His will: the “Lord of all” is not merely entitled to make things temporal subservient to the ends of His spiritual kingdom; He disposes of everything for what end He pleases. And yet His Sovereignty is not formally “political,” because it does not include the will or the mandate to perform acts purely political. But it contains “supereminently” all political dominium of man, that is, Christ can dispose directly and freely of the possession and exercise of all human sovereignty, for He is King of kings and Lord of lords. See St. Thomas, 3, q. 59, a. 4, ad. I.

V. The principles laid down concerning Christ’s political power, likewise apply to His dominium over private property and actions of individuals. Natural ownership is nowise impaired by Christ’s overlordship: He who created property, also created the owner’s title to hold it. Yet Christ’s overlordship is not simply a right to dispose of things temporal for spiritual ends, after the manner of the right of society to dispose of individual property for the common good; it is a real and direct ownership, in virtue of which Christ can dispose of all property as He chooses. It differs, however, so much in its origin and exaltedness from what we call private ownership, that this appellation does not formally apply to it. As a matter of fact, Christ renounced the exercise of His dominium over private property and chose to be poor. The right itself He could not renounce, because it is connatural to His Divine Personality. See the commentaries of Suarez, Lugo, and the Salmanticanses on St. Thomas, 3, q. 22.

SECT. 189.—CHRIST AS THE NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL HEAD OF ALL CREATURES

I. By His human origin Christ is like and akin to the sons of Adam; He is a member of the great human corporation (Heb. 2:11 sqq.), and occupies a place in the created universe. But, by reason of His Divine Personality, He is “the image and likeness of God” to a degree unapproached by either man or angel. Moreover, men and angels and all things have been created “in,” that is, “by and for” Him. He, then, “is the first-born of every creature … the head of the body” (Col. 1:15–17; cf. § 183, III. 3). His superiority rests upon His belonging to a higher order than His brethren; whence He ranks above them as they rank above the animal and material creation, and not merely as a king ranks above his subjects.

II. The practical object of Christ’s headship is not only to place the universe, and especially mankind, under a Divine king: it is the intention of God and the will of Christ that the Incarnation should establish between the First-born and His brethren a real kinship or affinity, Christ becoming the Head of the human family, and the human family acquiring a title to participate in the supernatural privileges of their Head. “When the fulness of time was come, God sent His Son, made of a woman, that we might receive the adoption of sons” (Gal. 4:4, 5; cf. Rom. 8:29). When, in the virginal womb of Mary, the Word espoused human flesh, all human flesh became akin to Him; all men acquired affinity to the Man-God and fellowship in His exalted privileges: “we are members of His body, of His flesh, and of His bones” (Eph. 5:30). The idea that Christ by taking flesh “espoused” not only the Church, but all mankind, is often dwelt upon by the Fathers. See St. Augustine, In Joan., ar. 1, ch. 2; St. Gregory the Great, Hom. xxxvii. in Ezechielem; St. Leo the Great, Sermo xvi. in Nativ.; St. Cyril of Alexandria, Comm. in Joan., i. 14, etc.

III. The name “Head,” so frequently given by St. Paul to Christ, is, speaking strictly, but a figure of speech; but, like the name Christ, it has a dogmatic significance. The Apostle connects it with our Lord’s Divinity; the Fathers and theologians with the plenitude of Holiness and Grace, of which He is the fountain. Christ is Head in the moral and in the physical sense: head of the human family, head of the mystical body, the Church. Both senses are used by St. Paul. “God hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings … in Christ.… He hath graced us (ἐχαρίτωσεν) in His beloved Son … that He might make known to us the mystery of His will … to re-establish all things in Christ, which are in heaven and on earth, in Him.… Raising Him up from the dead and setting Him at His right hand in the heavenly places, above all principality, and power, and vrtue, and dominion … and He hath put all things under His feet, and hath made Him head over all the Church, which is His body, and the fulness of Him who is filled all in all” (Eph. 1:3–23). “God hath quickened us together in Christ … and hath raised us up together, and hath made us sit together in the heavenly places through (ἐν) Christ Jesus” (Eph. 2:5, 6). “That we may in all things grow up in Him (εἰς αὐτὸν) Who is the head, Christ: from Whom the whole body being compacted and fitly joined together by what every joint supplieth, according to the operation in the measure of every part, maketh increase of the body unto the edifying of itself in charity” (Eph. 4:15, 16. See also Eph. 2:19–21; 5:22 sqq.; Col. 1:13–20, 23, 24; 2:8–10, 18, 19; 1 Cor. 12:12).

Christ is the Head of mankind as man, yet not by reason of some accidental perfection or external appointment: He heads the race by reason of the substantial perfection imparted to Him through the Logos, just as the head—the seat of reason—is the noblest part of the body. Again, Christ’s headship being founded upon His supernatural excellence, He is our “supersubstantial” Head, to whom all the properties and functions of the natural head belong in an eminently equivalent degree. Whatever dignity accrues to the bodily head from its being the seat of the soul’s chief activity—whatever power of influencing, governing, and unifying the other members is possessed by the head—the same dignity and power belong to Christ as Head in relation to mankind. His Divine Principle works on man in general, and especially on the members of the Church, with a power more perfect than that of the soul in the individual man. “In Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead corporally; and you are filled in Him who is the head of all principality and power” (Col. 2:10; cf. Eph. 1:22, 23).

IV. Adam, the first head of mankind, was a type of the Second Head inasmuch as he was the principle of natural life, the intended transmitter of supernatural life; and, in this respect, he acted on behalf of the whole human race. But, whereas Adam is the earthly, animal, and guilty head of the race, Christ is its heavenly, spiritual, and substantially holy Head. Adam is the principle of the material unity of mankind; Christ is much more the principle of its spiritual unity. Adam was a precarious mediator of supernatural life; Christ is its essential and unchangeable mediator. Hence Christ not only supplements the failings of the first head, but completes and perfects the headship. The first head, then, was, as it were, the material root of the race which was to be incorporated in and brought to perfection by Christ, its real principle and final object (τέλος). Cf. 1 Cor. 15:45 sqq.; Peter Lomb., 3, dist 13; St. Thomas, 3, q. 8.

SECT. 190.—CHRIST THE SUBSTANTIAL AND BORN MEDIATOR BETWEEN MAN AND GOD

I. Christ’s Headship over mankind appears in its brightest light in His office of mediator between God and man. The office of mediator in general supposes the mediating person to stand midway between two contending persons or parties. When the parties are of different rank, as God and man, the intermediate position requires rank below the higher and above the lower party. Such a position belongs to the “one mediator of God and man, the Man Christ” (1 Tim. 2:5) by reason of His essential constitution: as true man, He is below God; as the “Man Christ,” He is above all creatures. As God, He is a Person distinct from the Person of the Father; as Man, He represents a Person virtually distinct from the Logos. The Mediator, further, must be connected with both parties. The Man Christ is consubstantial with man and with God: by His humanity He is the born Head of mankind; by His Divinity He is the Only-Begotten of the Father and like unto the Father. “The head of every man is Christ … and the head of Christ is God” (1 Cor. 11:3). His mediatorship, then, is not accidental or delegated: it arises naturally from His personal constitution, which also makes Him the only, the universal and perfect, mediator between man and God.

II. Christ’s function as mediator necessarily proceeds from His human nature as principium quo operandi, yet it obtains its mediating efficacy from the Divine Nature, i.e. from the dignity of the acting Person. Its first object, as commonly stated, is the remission of sin and the granting of grace, whereby the friendship between God and man is restored. This object is attained by the worship of infinite value, which is offered to God by and through Christ. Christ, however, is mediator on the side of God as well as on the side of man: He reveals to man Divine truths and Divine commands; He distributes the Divine gifts of grace and rules the world. St. Paul sums up this two-sided mediation in the words, “Consider the apostle and high priest (pontificem, ἀρχιερέα) of our confession, Jesus” (Heb. 3:1). Jesus is the Apostle sent by God to us, the High Priest leading us on to God.

III. The fact of Christ’s existence is in itself a mediation, a bond, between the Creator and His creatures. By uniting our humanity to His Divinity, He united us to God and God to us. He is of God and in God, but He is also of us and in us. In Him we know, love, and worship God; God, on the other hand, pours out His supernatural gifts on the Head of our race, and through the Head on the members. A substantial—or, as the Fathers prefer to call it, a physical—union is thus effected between man and God. “That they all may be one, as Thou, Father, in Me and I in Thee.… I in them and Thou in Me, that they may be made perfect in one” (John 17:21–22) St. Thomas, 3, q. 26.

B.—THE SUPERNATURAL ATTRIBUTES OF CHRIST’S HUMANITY

SECT. 191.—THE “GRACE OF UNION” THE GROUND OF ALL OTHER PRIVILEGES

I. All supernatural privileges granted to creatures have their ground in a deification, that is, in a union with, and an assimilation to, God (2 Pet. 1:4). Sanctifying grace in general, and the grace of union especially, consist in a participation in the Divine Being. Sanctifying grace, however, is but an accidental assimilation and union with the Godhead, whereas the grace of union, viz. the unction and impregnation of a human nature with the Divine substance, must be termed a substantial deification, or a being Divine substantially: thus the being human of the body, grounded upon its impregnation with the soul, is a being human substantially. The “being Divine” (θεωθεῖσα, deificata) of Christ’s humanity is not a “being God;” yet it is more than a “being of God;” it is a participation in the Divine Life and Being of the Logos. The Fathers describe it as pneumatic, spiritual, and celestial being (esse), analogous to the higher being imparted to the body by the soul. The being Divine of Christ’s humanity includes a substantial participation in the glory and power proper to the Divinity or to the Divine Spirit. The specific glory and power of the Divine Spirit, as distinguished from the glory and power of created spirits, lies in His Holiness. Hence all participation, by union and assimilation, in the Divine glory, is considered as a consecration or sanctification, and especially the deification of Christ’s humanity is set forth as a substantial sanctification. This term expresses the nature, the ground, and the effects of the deification.

II. In the same way as the effect of sanctifying grace on the soul is to give it a holy being, the effect of the grace of union is to give to Christ’s humanity a holy being; with this difference, however, that the soul is but enriched with an accidental quality. The humanity of Christ, on the contrary, is sanctified substantially: not any created quality, but the Substance of the Logos impregnates and pervades it with its own infinite sanctity, and to the utmost of its communicability. The sanctity here in question is the objective sanctity of the Divine Substance, viz. the exaltedness of God founded upon His most pure, infinite, immutable perfection. This Divine Excellence communicates itself, in various degrees, to all things of which God takes possession or sanctifies by His indwelling; the communication attains its highest degree—perfection pure and simple—in the Hypostatic Union. Here the Divine Perfection becomes, through supernatural information (insubsistence), the perfection of Christ’s humanity. That created grace, which as an accident inhering in the substance of the soul operates in an imperfect manner, is here brought to the highest possible perfection by the Godhead inhering substantially in the humanity of Christ The grace of union makes the deified humanity infinitely more pleasing to God and worshipful to man than sanctifying grace does in the souls of the just. The excellence conferred by the grace of union cannot be lost; it excludes all, even the slightest, sins; it secures the possession of all that is necessary to lead the most perfect life, and is in itself a title to the Beatific Vision.

III. The humanity of Christ is deified by the inexistence of the Logos substantially and directly. Other supernatural and Divine privileges, however, being of the nature of accidental qualities, cannot be communicated directly by the inexistence of another substance: their production is due to the assimilating action of the Divinity on the favoured person. The humanity of Christ, then, like other creatures, receives its qualitative sanctity—as distinguished from substantial holiness—through the assimilating influence of the Logos. The influence, however, of the Logos on His own human nature is eminently superior to that of any other creature. The assimilating Principle is immanent in Christ, is part of His substance, and pervades His human nature as fire pervades red-hot iron. By this union Christ’s humanity has a natural right to, and possesses radically and virtually, the highest degree of assimilation to God of which it is capable. By nature, and from the beginning, it possessed not only its spiritual likeness to God and the sanctity of the soul implied therein, but also the immortality of the body, and a participation, though limited, in the Divine omnipresence: the indwelling Divine Power could preserve the body from death, and endow it with spiritual existence. It cannot, however, be said that, from the beginning, the humanity of Christ necessarily possessed the “fulness” of all the privileges rooted in the Hypostatic Union. Its qualitative sanctity is the work of God’s free will, and could therefore be dispensed by degrees. Nor does the dignity of Christ require, with moral necessity, the immediate possession of the plenitude of His privileges; He can, without lowering His dignity, renounce His “external” glory and beatitude for a time. As a matter of fact, Christ’s humanity began its spiritual and Divine Life at the moment of the union, whereas the transfiguration of its bodily life was not completed till later.

IV. The Logos animates His humanity after the manner in which the human soul animates the body. Yet, although He acts as a substantial form on matter, He is not the substantial form of His human nature. This would derogate from the integrity of both the Divine and the human natures. The informing action consists in actively influencing, by transfiguration, elevation, and extension (enrichment), the natural Life-power of the lower nature, thus producing assimilation. The power of assimilation is far greater in the Logos than in the soul of man. The soul cannot assimilate to itself the material body, nor is the soul the direct object of the bodily life. The Logos, on the contrary, can and does give a deified being to His human nature, and Himself is the direct object of its spiritual life. As He is the personal Principle of His humanity, that which in man is self-knowledge and self-love, in Christ is knowledge and love of God. All acts of consciousness in Christ’s soul are founded upon, and centre in, this living union with the Divinity. The heavenly type of His Life is the community of life between the Father and the Son in the Blessed Trinity. See Franzelin, thes. xli.

SECT. 192.—THE FULNESS OF THE SUPERNATURAL PERFECTION OF THE SPIRITUAL LIFE OF CHRIST’S HUMANITY—FULNESS OF CREATED GRACE

I. Although the Hypostatic Union did not destroy the essential likeness of Christ’s human nature to ours, it none the less freed the united nature from all spiritual imperfections. Christ’s lowliness, which is necessary for the ends of the Incarnation, extends to external appearances and internal passibility, but by no means to spiritual imperfection. The twelfth canon of the Fifth General Council lays down as a dogma, against Theodore of Mopsuestia, that Christ’s spiritual perfection was not gradually developed from a state of imperfection like ours, and by a similar process. The same doctrine is stated with more detail in the Confessio Leporii (Hardouin, i. p. 1267). The body of Christ was indeed subject to natural growth, and He submitted to this in order to show His true humanity, and to set us an example of spiritual progress. Yet this only requires that the external manifestation of internal perfection should keep pace with the natural development of His bodily life. The imperfections of this latter, when accepted freely and for a good end, are neither dishonourable nor useless; whereas imperfections in the spiritual order never can be either honourable or useful. In Christ such spiritual shortcomings would be a degradation of His Divine Person, and opposed to the ends of the Incarnation.

The scriptural texts which insist upon Christ’s likeness to us in all things, if read in the context, only refer to His external lowliness and passibility. “Christ, being in the form of God … debased (ἐκένωσεν) Himself,” etc. (Phil. 2:6, 7; see also Heb. 2:17, 18, and 4:15, and context).

II. Holy Scripture describes the perfection of Christ’s humanity as complete from the beginning: as given, ipso facto, with the Hypostatic Union. Christ, on the one hand, appears as full of grace and truth and wisdom; on the other, as the model and fountain-head of all spiritual perfection in creatures. He is the Vine of which we are the branches, the Head of which we are the body. As mediator between God and man, He receives from God the fulness of perfection, and communicates perfection to man. As to the measure of His created perfection, the Fathers—at least since the Nestorian heresy—and the Schoolmen without exception, hold that in intension and extension it surpasses the perfection of all creatures. “And the word was made flesh … and we saw His glory, the glory as of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth, … and of His fulness we all have received, and grace for grace” (John 1:14–16; cf. 3:34, 35). “He is the head of the body, the Church; Who is the Beginning, the First-born from the dead; that in all things He might hold the primacy: because in Him it has well pleased (the Father) that all fulness should dwell …” (Col. 1:18 sqq.). “In Whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge … for in Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead corporally, and you are filled in Him Who is the head of all principality and power” (Col. 2:3, 9, 10). In presence of these dogmatic utterances, the historical text, “Jesus advanced (προέκοπτεν) in wisdom, and age, and grace with God and man” (Luke 2:52), must be understood of the external manifestation of wisdom and grace, such as would be noticed by the historian. The Fifth Council has defined this against Theodore of Mopsuestia.

III. Like the spiritual perfection of other creatures, the perfection of the soul of Christ is due to created grace, which perfects its substance after the manner of an accidental vital quality. Such grace was not required in order to make the soul of Christ holy in itself, pleasing to God, and worthy of eternal life; in fact, it is not so much a grace as a dowry due to the soul of the natural Son of God. It was only required in order that His exalted dignity should be fully endowed with all Divine gifts, should possess the principle of a life perfectly holy, and thus exhibit to God a perfect Divine likeness, and to man a perfect model of sanctity. The uncreated grace of union gives the soul of Christ right and power to hold all the supernatural perfections of its life; yet directly and effectively this perfect life is infused through grace created by the Divinity. Both ought always to be considered as organically connected.

IV. The created grace of Christ is of the same nature as that given to men and angels, and is accompanied by all the gifts ordinarily connected with sanctifying grace, viz. the theological virtues which accomplish the supernatural living union with God, and the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, as expressly foretold by Isaias (11:2). From the theological virtues, however, must be excluded the obscurity of the faith, and also hope, so far as it is the unfulfilled desire of the Beatific vision. Again, among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, Fear must be taken in the sense of Reverence. Besides these ordinary graces, Christ possesses the extraordinary ones gratuitously given (gratis datæ) to the sons of adoption, either for their personal distinction, or for the good of others, e.g. the gift of prophecy and of miracles. The Holy Spirit, from Whom these extraordinary graces come, being the own Spirit of Christ, Christ possesses them as a natural endowment, whereas in the Saints they are but externally, and more or less accidentally, connected with sanctifying grace.

V. The created grace of Christ cannot be properly infinite, because it is created. Yet it possesses a threefold infinity, which may aptly be described as comparative, moral, and virtual infinity. In the existing order of things, the measure of grace given to Christ is such that, com pared to all other graces given to creatures, it surpasses them all beyond comprehension, and no greater measure of grace can be conceived. Again, considered in its organic unity with the grace of union, the created grace of Christ gives to all His actions an infinite moral value, and makes His soul the source from which an infinite number of subjects draw sanctification. In short, created grace in Christ is infinite as possessing infinite moral excellence and infinite power.

VI. Any increase in perfection is impossible in Christ: from the first moment of the Incarnation His perfection was consummata, i.e. brought to the highest possible degree. See St. Thomas, 3, q. 7; and on the text, Luke 2:52, see De Lugo, De Verbo Incarnato, disp. xxi. § 1, and Franzelin, thes. xlii.

SECT. 193.—MENTAL PERFECTION OF THE SOUL OF CHRIST—FULNESS OF WISDOM AND TRUTH—VISION OF GOD

I. The integrity of Christ’s human nature postulates intellectual cognition by acts of the human intellect. The “Man Christ” is indeed wise by the wisdom of God; yet “the humanity of Christ” knows by its own mental act, not by the act of the Divine nature. All theologians, excepting Hugo of St. Victor, teach that the soul of Christ is elevated to participation in the Divine Wisdom by an infusion of Divine Light—in the same way as other creatures.

II. The Light infused into Christ’s soul was given all at once, as in the case of Adam and of the Angels. So Holy Writ expressly teaches: “Coming into the world, He saith: Sacrifice and oblation Thou wouldest not, but a body Thou hast fitted to me … then I said: Behold I come … that I should do Thy will, O God” (Heb. 10:5–7). St. Jerome explains in the same sense (Jer. 31:22): “A woman shall compass a man.” Christ was a new creation more than Adam and the Angels, and, like them, was made perfect from the beginning. The Divine excellence of His Person required, from the beginning, the consciousness of His dignity; and He would not be the Head of all creations if some creatures at any time surpassed Him in mental perfection.

III. The Light shed on Christ’s intellect by the Logos made it the most perfect image of the Divine Wisdom and Omniscience. Its knowledge embraced God, the universe and its laws, the past, the present, and the future. Such is the sense of John 3:34: “He Whom God hath sent speaketh the words of God, for God doth not give the Spirit by measure (ἐκ μέτρου);” cf. Isa. 11:2, “The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon Him, the Spirit of Wisdom,” etc. (see preceding section, n. II.). Knowledge of such perfection was due to the Soul of the Eternal Wisdom, to the Head of all intellectual creatures. Christ manifested it on earth by revealing the secret thoughts of men, and by foretelling future events (Luke 5:7, 8; John 13:11; 2:24, 25, etc.). Christ’s knowledge excludes all and every error and ignorance of fact. Yet it is not infinite. Its limit, however, is only to be found in the “Possibilia,” viz. in the domain of things which are possible to God’s Omnipotence, but are never to be realized: the Divine ideas already realized, or still to be realized, cannot be unknown to the Head of the universe. Nescience of these latter in Christ would amount to positive ignorance, like the ignorance of law in a judge.

The difficulty from Mark 13:32 admits of solution. The Son has no knowledge of the day of judgment which He may communicate, or any knowledge having its source in His human intellect.

IV. The theologians of, at least, the last six centuries, unanimously teach that the fulness of knowledge in the soul of Christ resides in His original and immediate vision of God. The vision of God assimilates to God (deifies) all those who enjoy it: it deifies the soul of Christ to a degree as far superior to any other as the grace of Christ is superior to any other grace.

The fulness of truth and the completeness or consummation of His grace, require that Christ should possess the vision of God. Any knowledge of God inferior to immediate vision is imperfect and unworthy of Christ (1 Cor. 13:9–12). Christ is an eye-witness of things Divine, which the Prophets only knew by revelation (John 1:18; 3:31, 32). He says of Himself: “Amen, amen, I say to thee, We speak what we know, and testify what we have seen” (John 3:11 sqq.) The reason He gives for “having seen” what He testifies, is that He ascended into heaven, which refers to His humanity taken up in the Divinity. Again, Christ’s frequent assertion that He knows the Father and is known by Him, and that He knows what the Father knows, admits of no satisfactory explanation if not understood of the Beatific Vision. Christ’s soul certainly was conscious of its union with the Logos, Whom it knew with perfect, that is, intuitive science; and such science is identical with the Beatific Vision.

It is difficult to reconcile Christ’s life and sufferings on earth with the beatitude demanded by the immediate vision of God. Yet this difficulty has not induced theologians to give up the doctrine in question: their unanimous consent, in spite of the difficulty, is a strong proof of the solidity of the doctrine. The only solution they offer is to the effect that in this greatest of mysteries—the union of the Highest with the lowest in one Person—minor miracles are to be expected as natural concomitants.

V. Although the knowledge possessed by Christ’s human soul in the Beatific Vision comprises eminently all other kinds and degrees of knowledge, it is almost universally admitted that God infused into it a knowledge similar in kind to that of the Angels. The subject-matter of this infused science was the things outside of God, natural and supernatural. These were known in the most perfect manner, intuitively, and, according to some divines, even comprehensively. The existence, however, of infused science in Christ is less certain than His original and continual fruition of the vision of God. It is attributed to Christ on theological grounds only, viz. His soul, the first and most perfect of created Spirits, cannot be deprived of any perfection enjoyed by lower spirits. Besides, a created intellect is simply perfect only when, besides the vision of things in God, it has a vision of things in themselves. God sees all things in Himself comprehensively. Not so the blessed spirits; for these, then, there remains room for another kind of knowledge, and it is meet that Christ should have possessed it. Besides the Divine and the Angelic science, most theologians admit a “science infused per accidens,” similar to that given to our first parents. See, however, St. Thomas, 3, q. 1, a. 2; and on this whole section, 3, qq. 8–12:15, a. 2.

SECT. 194.—HOLINESS OF THE HUMAN WILL OF CHRIST

I. As the outpouring of grace on the human intellect of Christ filled it from the beginning with heavenly light, so the effusion of grace on His human will filled this with heavenly warmth, i.e. with supernatural power and inclination to all that is morally good, and especially with the sublimest and most ardent love of God, immensely above that of all Saints and Angels. His exalted Holiness was complete from the first: not subject to increase, or change, or loss, or interruption. Such is the perfection of the holiness which the Saints acquire through the Beatific Vision; to the soul of Christ the highest degree of the same moral perfection is natural. For the plenitude of all grace (gratia consummata) belongs to it by reason of its substantial union with the Logos: in fact, its Holiness is but the Holiness of a Divine Person in His human nature. Again, the love of self, the most natural of all tendencies, is, in the soul of Christ, the love of God—the love of the Logos for Himself. And as all holiness or moral perfection resolves itself into love of God, it follows that holiness in Christ is not dependent on acts of His free will, but is as necessary and natural as the act by which He loves Himself. All the holy actions of His soul were but manifestations of the natural love which God the Son bears to God the Father.

II. Christ’s holiness shines forth most conspicuously in His sinlessness and impeccability. He is “a high-priest, holy, innocent, undefiled, separated from sinners” (Heb. 7:26; cf. 9:14, and 4:15). He is the “Holy” born of the Holy Ghost, without original sin (Luke 1:35). Holy Scripture repeatedly asserts the fact that Christ is without sin, but it nowhere distinctly sets forth His impeccability or inability to commit sin. Tradition, however, is unanimous on this point, which was settled when the Sixth General Council (Third of Constantinople) defined that the human will of Christ cannot be opposed to His Divine will. Christ cannot sin, because He is God. All His actions are the actions of a Divine Person. The Logos controls all the motions of His human soul: to permit a sin in it would be tantamount to committing sin Himself. Again, the soul of Christ has no independent self; it cannot be conceived as acting away from God: hence it lacks the first condition of sin. It also lacks the fundamental form of all sin, viz. love of self as opposed to love of God, for in Christ self-love is Divine Love. These considerations show that Christ’s impeccability is a “metaphysical impossibility to commit sin,” more perfect, therefore, than the physical impossibility to sin granted by the Beatific Vision, or the moral impossibility granted in this life to Saints “confirmed in grace.” Although Christ’s impeccability is grounded on the Hypostatic Union, it is worked or brought about by means of the fulness of His grace.

III. As Christ cannot commit sin, He cannot be tempted from within. When Scripture speaks of the temptations of Christ, it deals with external occasions of practising some virtue, e.g. patience; or with challenges to sin which were temptations only in the mind of those who proposed them.

IV. The perfection of the human will of Christ may be summed up in its conformity with the Divine will: Christ wills all things that God wills and wishes Him to will; and Christ wills them because such is the will of God: “I do always the things that please Him” (John 8:29). In technical terms, the will of Christ is materially and formally conform to the will of God. The ground of this conformity lies in this, that the two wills belong to the same Person Who effectively rules His human by His Divine will. Then His Self-love implies Love of the Divine Person and pleasure in all the dispositions of the Divine will. As the will of the Logos is conform to that of the Father by identity, so the human will of the Son of God is conform to the same by filial submission. See St. Bonaventure, in 3, dist. 17, a. 1, q. 3.

V. Not only actual sin, but all moral imperfection, and whatever may imply a moral stain, is incompatible with the Holiness of Christ. For this reason alone original sin could not have touched Him, even if He had not been exempted from it by His supernatural origin. The exclusion of original sin from Christ, in the sense of the Church, implies the exclusion of all its evil consequences, the full possession of original justice, and especially freedom from the law of concupiscence (fomes peccati). See St. Thomas, 3. q. 15.

SECT. 195.—FREE WILL OF CHRIST

I. The Holiness which excludes all possibility of sinning, does not extinguish or prevent the exercise of Christ’s moral liberty. The power of sinning or of performing imperfect actions, is not essential to the notion of free will. The freedom of the will is the more perfect the more the will is inclined to and fixed upon what is morally good.

The exercise of Christ’s free will is, however, essentially distinct from that of creatures here on earth (in statu viæ). Creatures exercise their free will in order to acquire, by independent choice, that stability in holiness which is not granted to them by nature: a loving union with God is the fruit and the reward of their exertions. Christ, on the contrary, being by reason of His constitution united to God from the first, can only exercise His free will in order to manifest, ad extra, His perfect union with God. The fruit of His actions is the glorification of God and the Atonement for the sins of the world. Their reward consists partly in the final acquisition of the external glory and dominion which were suspended during His life here on earth, and partly in the reunion of mankind with God. Christ’s human will, then, is like His Divine will in this, that the moral perfection of neither depends on the exercise of freedom. The two wills are also alike in this, that their moral perfection, though not freely acquired, is their own, and is honourable to them, much more than freely acquired perfection is honourable to creatures. For the moral value of acts of the will is derived from the goodness of their object: an act performed with knowledge of and complacency in a good object, is a good act, whether it be free or not. In technical language, essential liberty gives moral value to acts of the will, even when the will lacks the power of choosing between acting and not acting. Christ possesses holiness by reason of His personal constitution, and therefore in a more perfect manner than creatures, who acquire it by exercising free will.

II. The essential difference between Christ’s free will and that of mere creatures does not interfere with His capacity for performing meritorious acts. The Council of Trent (sess. vi. ch. 7) lays down that Christ “merited” our justification. But the notion of merit essentially requires the meritorious action to originate in the agent’s free choice, and to be intended for the benefit of him who is to reward it. External compulsion and internal necessity are incompatible with merit. The fact of Christ’s freedom from compulsion or internal necessity as regards the work of Redemption, is clearly set forth in Scripture: “I lay down My life for My sheep.… Therefore doth the Father love Me because I lay down My life, that I may take it again. No man taketh it away from Me, but I lay it down of myself: and I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it up again. This commandment I have received from My Father” (John 10:15–18; cf. Is. 53:7, and Heb. 12:2).

III. We have now to explain, as far as possible, how the freedom of will displayed in Christ’s meritorious actions is consistent with His Holiness. In consequence of the Beatific Vision, the Love of God is not free, but natural to Christ, whence it would seem that all His actions performed for the Love of God are likewise not free, but a natural and necessary consequence of His union with God. Again, His impeccability seems to imply an intrinsic necessity for carrying out at least all Divine commandments. Lastly, the perfect conformity of His human will with the Divine will seems to make it impossible for Him not to perform even such good actions as are not strictly commanded by God.

1. All theologians admit that Christ’s love of God is not free. How, then, can actions inspired by this necessary love be free and meritorious? Many authors of great weight suggest that, besides the act of love included in the Beatific Vision, other acts of love exist in Christ, regulated by infused science, and therefore free, like the acts of creatures here on earth. St. Thomas (De Verit., q. 29, a. 6, ad. 6) sees no difficulty in taking as principle of merit the same act by which Christ loves God necessarily. The act of Beatific Vision, according to the Saint, was at the same time, in Christ, an act of the wayfarer (viatoris), inasmuch as His Beatific Love moved Him to will and to accomplish freely and willingly, during His mission on earth, the things ordained by God, and thus to gather merit for Himself and others. In fact, it appears quite possible that Christ’s Love of God, although itself necessary, gives to the free acts of His humanity their highest moral perfection by investing them with its own moral excellence, which is independent of freedom.

2. Christ cannot sin: He cannot break the Divine commandments. How, then, does He keep them freely, and merit by so keeping them?

The precepts of the natural law, especially affirmative precepts, are vague and undetermined as to the time and circumstances: they leave a wide field for the exercise of free will, even if the will is irresistibly bent on keeping the whole law. Positive commandments—if we admit that any such were binding upon Christ—are more clearly defined than natural laws. Yet even here there is room for the use of free will. Christ could freely fulfil, e.g., the mandate of redeeming us by His death on the cross, by willing His death not as something commanded and inevitable, but by showing Himself ready to die simply because it was the Divine will and pleasure, or because of some other holy motive.

As regards the mandate of Redemption by death, the majority of modern theologians deny its strict obligatory character. The personal dignity and the perfect sanctity of Christ exclude the idea of a commandment so humiliating and so harsh. The Fathers give such a wide meaning to the mandate (ἐντολή), that they apply it even to Christ’s Divinity. Scripture uses the term to signify not only mandate, but sometimes not more than permission or leave to do something. St. Anselm (Med. xi. c. 5) sums up the question thus: “Human nature in this Man suffered nothing from any necessity, but solely from free choice … no obedience compelled Him; He was led by His wisdom and power. God did not compel Him to die, but He did freely and willingly (sponte) what He knew to be pleasing to the Father and profitable to man. And, as the Father gave Him this good will, although free, we can rightly say that He received it as a precept from the Father.” (Cf. St. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, l. i. cc. 9, 10.)

3. The above solutions do not meet the difficulty arising from the fact that, because of His Holiness, Christ infallibly fulfilled all God’s wishes as well as orders, and that these Divine wishes and ordinances, which extended to every detail of His life, were known to Him. (Cf. Matt. 26:54.)

This very serious difficulty has no better solution than that proposed by the school of St. Thomas. If the will of Christ, independently of the wishes, ordinances, and foreknowledge of God, had the physical power to omit an action, then He retains this same power when under the influence of the said wishes and ordinances; for these do not alter Him intrinsically. It lies in the nature of Divine ordinances addressed to a free will to appeal to its freedom of action, just as the Divine prescience of free actions presupposes their freedom. The external circumstances under consideration cause the free decision to take place without fail. The result, however, is not due to a restriction of the natural power of the will. It is due to the fulness of its perfection which enables it to tend to whatever is good, without being liable to misdirect its choice; or to the readiness of Christ’s most holy will always to conform to the will of God. The certainty that a given choice will be made is not sufficient, by itself, to destroy the intrinsic liberty of the choice; to destroy liberty, the certainty of the choice must be caused by intrinsic impossibility to act otherwise. But does not Christ’s knowledge of God’s will and foreknowledge impose upon His will an antecedent moral necessity to conform to them? It does so, in fact; yet this moral necessity is not such as to impair the freedom required for meritorious actions: it is not an inner moral necessity, such as would lay the will under the irresistible influence of some good, and induce it to act without choice. The impossibility for Christ to act against God’s decrees known to Him must be put on a par with the impossibility for us to act against God’s decrees unknown to us: neither impossibility affects the choice of free will.

IV. Christ’s human will is the will of God-Man: its free operations are unlike those of mere human wills; they are “theandric” or divino-human operations reflecting the peculiarities of the Divine freedom. Holy Scripture at one time speaks of the Son Whom the Father has sent into the world, Who executes the Paternal mandate, and in all things does what pleases the Father; at another time it speaks of the Son equal to the Father, freely debasing Himself to the rank of servant and to a shameful death; again, it represents Him as the good Shepherd, who, having power over life and death, freely chooses to die for His flock. In all this we see the human will of Christ in organic union with the Divine will as in the Logos. The two wills aim at the same objects, and the human will is set forth as acting in union with the Father, and with the same dignity and power as the will of God the Son. An example of the harmonious and organic co-operation of the two wills is given in Phil. 2:6, 7: “Who (Christ) being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal to God, but debased Himself, taking the form of a servant,” etc. Here the act of the Logos taking the form of man is necessarily an act of His Divine will, whereas the subsequent humiliation unto death is primarily the act of His human will. The human will of Christ is as infallibly conformed to His Divine will as this is conformed to the will of the Father through identity of essence. The conformity in both cases results from inspiration and love, rather than from command; in the human will it is a kind of filial submission to the Divine. The obedience of Christ, upon which the Apostle insists, viz. His works in the form of servant were not, as in other creatures, a natural duty towards God, but only claimed by God as a free service of love: such burthens and sacrifices could not be due by Christ because of His innocence, nor could they be imposed on Him without impairing His dignity as Lord of all things. With us merit is acquired by giving to God either what He exacts or might exact from us by right; Christ merits by freely renouncing His rights for the love of God. We pay the lawful tribute of our servitude; Christ freely submits to a servitude not intended for Him (cf. Heb. 10:1 sqq.; 5:7 sqq.). For this reason the time for meriting ceased with the earthly life of Christ: in His glory He cannot offer the services of a servant. See St. Thomas. 3, q. 18; Franzelin, thes. xliv.

SECT. 196.—VALUE OF CHRIST’S ACTIONS AS ACTS OF WORSHIP

I. Theologians distinguish a threefold value in every good work: (a) the “substantial” or essential value arising from its own intrinsic goodness; (b) an “accidental” value accruing to it from the accidental holiness of the agent; and (c) a “personal” value derived from the personal dignity of the same agent. Each and all of the works of Christ were performed in the service of God, directly tending to His honour and glory; they proceeded from the fountain-head of all holiness; and they were the actions of a Divine Person. They were, therefore, the best of works, done with the highest amount of Divine Love, and by the most excellent Being. The infinite worth of their author communicates itself to the works of Christ and gives them infinite value (see § 145, II.).

Closely connected with, yet distinct from, the value of Christ’s actions, is their efficacy for merit and atonement. This value and efficacy are related as cause and effect The intrinsic value of an action may be compared to the intrinsic value of a coin; its efficacy to the coin’s value as money. The Church uses the term valor to express both the intrinsic and the effective value of the Redeemer’s actions.

II. The intrinsic value of moral actions is determined by their relation to the final object of all morality: the honour and glory of God. The character and the measure of the honour and glory of God arising out of an action (obsequium Deo præstitum) determine the action’s intrinsic value. The moral works of Christ, owing to His personal excellence, give to God an honour quite unique in its kind and exaltedness. The acting principle (principium quod), the Man Christ, is a Divine Person subsisting in a human nature. The principle by which (principium quo) the actions are performed is a human nature united to, and, as it were, animated by the Divine Person, whose organ it is. But the greatness of honour rendered is commensurate with the dignity of the person who renders it. Again, the essence of giving honour consists in the submission of self to the person honoured. Hence, if we consider Christ as the honour-giving Subject, we find that the honour He gives acquires a peculiar excellence from the dignity of the Personal Principle who, in His human nature, submits Himself to God. Lastly, Christ is not only the principle and the subject, but also the subject-matter of His honorific actions. The worship of God—if not also other honorific actions—is a reflexive act: its principle and subject offers and subjects itself to God as a tribute of honour. Now, as a rule, the value of the tribute measures the greatness of the honour intended to be conferred: hence the worship of Christ, offering and subjecting Himself to the Father, is of unique, viz. of Divine value.

The specific value of Christ’s worship is most manifest from this last point of view, especially in His abasement and in His death. By His voluntary abasement He renounced the exercise of His rights of Lord of all things, and offered to God a sacrifice immensely superior to the affective sacrifice by which a creature offers to God that which already is God’s own. By His death He renounced and sacrificed His own Self. To sum up—the formal reason of the specific value of the actions of the Man Christ, as distinguished from those of other men, is best expressed thus: The adequate principle of Christ’s actions is a Man who, even as Man, is, owing to His anointment, vested with Divine glory and holiness, and possesses the rank and character of Lord and of natural Son of God.

III. The influence of the Hypostatic Union on the actions of Christ gives them infinite value, in the same manner as it gives infinite dignity to His Body. Their value is not only relatively or comparatively, but absolutely infinite, viz. not only does it surpass any given value, or the value of all other moral actions put together, but it is equal to the infinite glory and holiness which entitle the Man Christ to Divine Worship or Adoration. Their infinitude, then, consists primarily in this, that they adequately contain the full honour to which the Divine Majesty is entitled. Hence their value cannot be equalled by the value of all actual and possible good actions of mere creatures. Especially the honour which Christ gives to God by humbling Himself is at least equivalent to all the dishonour to God arising from the sins, real and possible, of creatures.

The subtle difficulties adduced by Scotists and Nominalists against the infinite value of Christ’s actions fall to the ground if the nature of that infinitude be well kept in mind. It is a participation in the “value for honour” (= honour-value) essential to Divine acts, in the same way as Christ’s adorability is a participation in Divine Dignity. St. Thomas, 3, q. 1, a. 2; Franzelin, thes. xlvii.

SECT. 197.—MERITORIOUSNESS OF CHRIST’S HUMAN ACTIONS

I. The human actions of Christ, in addition to their eminent power for giving honour and glory to God, possess that peculiar efficacy which, in the wayfaring state (in statu viæ), gives the doer of good a claim to supernatural advantages. This efficacy is “impetratory,” inasmuch as impetration (patrando obtinere) connotes successful striving after a thing or fulfilment of a desire. The term “impetratory,” however, does not sufficiently point out that the success of the striving or wishing is consequence and fruit of the successful action itself. In order to express the congruency or necessity of granting to the author of moral tending or acting the good he wishes to acquire, and to grant it on the ground of the worth (worthiness) he displays in his moral action, we must describe the efficacy in question as “impetratory and meritorious.” Each term connotes a particular form of efficacy; impetration points to wishing and praying; merit to actual work in the service of God. Taken in organic connections, the two terms set forth all intermediate forms or means of efficacious striving after supernatural goods.

Later Schoolmen speak of the “moral” efficacy of Christ’s actions, inasmuch as they appeal to the will of another, and as they imply “moral worth” on the part of their Author. But the worth of the doer of good does not, by itself, imply the success of his actions. The notion of a right or title to success must be added. “Moral and juridical, or ethico-juridical efficacy,” is the adequate expression. The title to success may lie in the acceptance or ratification by God, as in the prayers of Saints; or it may lie in the action itself, as in the case of Christ, whose acts, from their very nature, possess infallible efficacy: for in these the human will works with Divine power.

II. 1. Christ being God, and one God with the Father, is physically the same Person Who merits and rewards, Who prays and answers His prayers. The double function is rendered possible by the coexistence of Christ’s two wills: He acts as Man and as God, virtually as a double Person.

2. Christ, even as Man, has the power to grant all that can be prayed or worked for. Yet this power is not inherent in His Humanity, it only belongs to His Humanity as organ of His Divinity (ministerialiter or instrumentaliter). By an ordinance of God and of Christ Himself, the exercise of such instrumental power may be made dependent on prayer or meritorious work on the part of Christ’s humanity. Thus the possibility of prayer and merit remains intact.

3. Christ’s humanity cannot acquire any greater glory and honour or a better title to these than its Hypostatic Union with the Logos. Hence His meritorious actions can add nothing to His perfection or to His title to it. Their effect is simply to make Him worthy of Divine goods “in a new manner.” And, in order to obtain this result, it was necessary that Christ should act in the form of a servant, praying and serving God after the manner of a mere creature.

4. In Christ there was no necessity of prayer and meritorious works. Whatever these can obtain, is Christ’s own by birthright (Ps. 2:7 sqq.). Nay, by birthright also He could claim the distribution of Divine gifts to others for His own external glory. As Head and member of our race, He was entitled, on the sole ground of His personal dignity, and without any further meritorious work, to claim for us a participation in His Divine privileges.

5. Hence a necessity of meritorious works can only be derived from a positive ordinance of God and of Christ Himself, to the effect that Christ should act as Servant of God (in persona et habitu servi). The direct object of this dispensation was that Christ, as servant of God and as representative of man, should by His merits obtain what mankind was bound but unable to obtain by itself. Hence he had to adopt the form of service natural to man: suffering and suppliant prayer. The indirect object of the same economy was the acquisition by personal merit of those gifts and privileges which Christ renounced in His voluntary abasement. The necessity of meriting, then, was “economical” in a twofold sense: it was a positive dispensation in favour of, and a free accommodation to the position of, others. Even when Christ prayed “for Himself,” He did so partly to set us an example, partly to make us benefit implicitly by His prayer.

6. In fine, the meritorious work of Christ tended to pour out His own Holiness on mankind, and to transfigure and glorify the lower part of His own humanity. Thus His merits tend to spread “the Divine Anointment” from the Head to the body: in Himself from His higher to His lower Being; in mankind, from the mystical Head to subordinate personal members.

III. The intrinsic value of Christ’s actions being infinite, their power of meriting is necessarily infinite also: no Divine gift is possible which Christ cannot by His merits purchase at its full value (i.e. merit de condigno); no other merit is possible which is not surpassed by, and virtually contained in, the merit of Christ. No finite reward can adequately remunerate His merit; no amount of other merit, not even that possible to all possible creatures, can equal it. This doctrine was opposed by Scotists and Nominalists, but has been for centuries universally admitted.

1. It is the intrinsic value or power for merit which is infinite: the reward actually obtained is finite.

2. The infinitude of Christ’s merits does not imply that they at once “bind” God to grant them a commensurate reward, or to accept them as title to such reward. God is only bound by His own promise. Yet, independently of the Divine promise, works which Christ wishes to be rewarded, receive their reward infallibly, thanks to the excellence of His personal dignity and to the organic co-operation of His two wills. No opposition is possible between the unconditional intentions of the will which merits and the will which rewards. Christ’s human will cannot unconditionally desire a reward except on the knowledge that God has decreed to grant such reward. We may, then, sum up Christ’s power for merit in the formula: “Christ effectively obtains all that He wishes to obtain and all that God has decreed should be effectively obtained.”

3. Although a reward actually infinite is not necessarily connected with Christ’s infinite merit, yet such infinite reward, specifically commensurate with the merit, is assigned to them. Holy Scripture points out, as reward of the Saviour’s work, His exaltation to Divine honours given Him by God and man (Phil. 2:9 sqq.); a privilege which can only be bought by infinite merit. Again, sanctifying grace, acquired by Christ for others, is of infinite value, because it gives a claim to the immediate possession and fruition of God Himself. No mere creature can merit it adequately (de condigno); even when possessed, it merely entitles its holder to an increase and to the completion of itself. But Christ adequately merits sanctifying grace for creatures entirely unable to merit it themselves, and hence His meritorious work is remunerated by a good of infinite value.

4. The infinitude of Christ’s meritorious actions, being based upon the excellence of their Author, is not restricted either to any one of them or to their sum total; it belongs to each and all. Hence the same reward can be merited by several separate acts. Moreover, as the reward depends upon a Divine ordination and Christ’s own intention, it is possible for the reward to be granted only to a certain number of acts organically connected. As a matter of fact the merit of the whole work of Christ was made dependent on its supreme act, the sacrifice on the Cross.

An almost perfect analogy for the infinite meriting power of Christ and its effects is found in the Divine omnipotence and its creations.

IV. The infinitude of Christ’s merit implies that He can adequately merit all things whatsoever mere creatures, and also Himself, may pray for; and further, that His prayer itself is an act of merit sufficient to obtain whatsoever is prayed for. There is, however, another point of view from which the impetratory power of His prayer appears infinite. The infinite lovableness of the Son of God requires that the Father should not refuse to His prayers any of the gifts which He, to a certain extent, grants to the prayers of the just and even of sinners. Many Greek Fathers corroborate this view from Heb. 5:7, “He was heard for His reverence” (ἀπὸ τῆς εὐλαβείας). They take “His reverence” to mean the esteem which God the Father has for His Son; for prayer is answered in proportion to the esteem which God has for him who prays, whereas merit derives its value from the esteem which he who merits shows to God, and the prayer of creatures only appeals to God’s Love and Mercy. Christ’s unconditional (absolute) prayers are infallibly answered: otherwise the constant assertions of Scripture that Christ’s prayers are certain of success would have no sense; and Christ’s Divine will would oppose His human will. His prayer in the Garden was conditional: “My Father, if it be possible, let this chalice pass from Me” (Matt. 26:39).

V. Another consequence of the infinite value of Christ’s merit is that it can obtain for any number of other persons all the privileges of supernatural grace and glory. In this respect it is “the merit of the Mediator,” inasmuch as Christ obtains privileges for others in His quality of Mediator, and transfers His own rights to His clients. The merit of the Mediator is often described as “Merit of the Head” (meritum capitis), to point out how and why the superabundant merits of the Head of mankind overflow upon the members of His mystical Body.

VI. When Christ acts with a view of meriting for Himself or others, He acts in the person of servant, and His claim to reward is, after all, like that of mere creatures, founded upon the Divine promise of acceptance of His work; technically, on a pactum divinum. Christ, however, acts not only in the person of a servant; He acts also as “minister of God,” and as such in the person of Lord. His position is that of a steward or minister, with special powers to administer his master’s goods, who acts at the same time as representative of the master to the servants, and as representative of the servants to the master. Hence Christ’s meritorious works bear a twofold character: they call for a reward as works of a servant; and their success is guaranteed as works approved and accepted by the Lord. Again, Christ being the representative and organ of the “Lord” in such a way as to be also Lord Himself, His guarantee of success is tantamount to a disposition of His own goods, made by the owner himself. St. Paul insinuates this when he connects the acquisition of heavenly goods by Christ with the idea that Christ’s sacrifice was like the death of the testator, who disposes of his own goods (Heb. 9:16). From this point of view, the “merit of the Mediator and Head” appears in a new light. It is a merit sufficient in itself to obtain supernatural goods, not only because the Mediator, as representative of His clients, makes them perfectly worthy of the said goods, but also because the Mediator and Head, in the name and power of God, grants and gives full legal possession of the acquired goods to His clients and members. It is the substantial anointing of Christ through the Grace of Union which constitutes Him, not merely a Servant holy and pleasing to God, but likewise a participator in the power and lordship of God Himself, a Holy Lord and a Royal High-priest, and thus secures the perfection of His merit as Mediator and Head. We are therefore justified in saying that the efficacy of Christ’s work is not due to the Divine promise or pact alone, but that it has its root and origin in the Hypostatic Union. “Christ did not glorify Himself to be made a high priest, but He that said to Him: Thou art My Son, this day have I begotten Thee” (Heb. 5:5). See St. Thomas, 3, qq. 19, 21.

SECT. 198.—SPECIFIC POWER OF CHRIST’S HUMANITY TO PRODUCE SUPERNATURAL EFFECTS

I. In the preceding section we have dealt with Christ’s power of meriting supernatural goods. A question now arises as to the share of Christ’s humanity in the production of these Divine goods. Does He only procure them in the sense that His merit moves God to confer the goods, or does He participate in the Divine producing power, so as to have a direct part in their production? In technical language: Is Christ’s influence on the production of supernatural goods merely ethico-juridical, or also organico-dynamical? We hold, with the Fathers and St. Thomas, that Christ, besides His ethico-juridical power, possesses a “Divine dynamic power,” viz. that He participates in that supernatural and spiritual power of God from which proceed all Divine benefactions and graces relating to the salvation of creatures; whether they be physical operations, such as miraculous healings and the granting of sanctifying grace, or juridical acts, such as the remission of sins and legislation. In the exercise of this Divine power, the humanity of Christ acts as an instrument of the Divinity, that is, in formal connection with the superior Divine power: as an official acts in the name or by the authority of the king, and as a tool works through the skill of the artist. He is, however, instrumental after the manner of a mystico-physical organ of the Divinity: the “flesh of the Word,” being “eminently” actuated and informed by His Divinity, is the seat, the bearer, the vehicle of the Divine power; this power works through it in the same way as the powers of the human soul work through the organs of the body (supra, p. 86).

II. Christ’s humanity possessed the power of producing supernatural effects, at least in the form of the grace of miracles and of the ministerial power held by the ministers of the Sacraments; and He possessed this power to its fullest extent from the beginning. Such power was necessary for the objects of His mission, and as part of the fulness of His grace. The power of Christ, however, differs in many ways from the analogous power in mere creatures. It is universal, embracing all supernatural effects within the domain of creation; it is transferable to others, and not bound up with fixed forms and ceremonies; it is natural to Christ, inasmuch as the Holy Ghost is His own Spirit by substantial union. For this latter reason the supernatural works of Christ are produced by a power corporally dwelling in Him, although not inherent in His human nature; whereas similar works of creatures are produced by a power external to them.

The Fathers teach the Divine virtue and power of Christ’s humanity, as here described, in connection with the life-giving power of His flesh in Holy Eucharist. They attribute this δύναμις ζωοποιός, vis vivifica, of the Flesh to its impregnation with Divinity, and consider it as an essential element of the θεώσις (deification) and of the spiritualisation (1 Cor. 15:45) of Christ’s humanity. So little do they doubt this power, that they use it against the Nestorians as one of the chief arguments in proof of the physical reality of the Hypostatic Union. (For passages of the Fathers, see Petavius, 1. x. c. 2.)

III. Holy Scripture sets forth the same doctrine in many ways.

1. The principle is laid down that “God anointed Him (Jesus) with the Holy Ghost and with power; Who went about doing good …” (Acts 10:38). The union of Christ with the Holy Ghost is substantial.

2. The working of the power received through the Anointing appears where Christ calls His Flesh as true a food as bread (John 6); but bread is a substance which nourishes by its own physical power. “Virtue went out from Him and healed all” (Luke 6:19, and 8:46), evidently attributes a Divine power to Christ’s body. The Fathers connect this healing “virtue” with the vivifying power of Christ’s Body in the Holy Eucharist.

3. Christ is the principle of our life after the manner in which God is the principle of Christ’s life: “As the living Father has sent Me, and I live by the Father; so he that eateth Me, the same also shall live by Me” (John 6:58). Hence Christ stands between us and the Father as an “organic” mediator.

4. The Scriptural figures of Christ, the true Vine, the Head of the Church, and the comparison “the first man Adam was made a living soul, the last man a quickening spirit” (1 Cor. 15:45), are almost meaningless if Christ’s humanity is not organically active in the granting of supernatural life.

IV. 1. The form in which the power under consideration is exercised, may be stated as follows: Although Christ’s whole humanity is the organ of His Divinity, yet the Divine Union chiefly impregnates the soul, and thence spreads to the flesh. The human will, then, can pronounce the “word of His power” (Heb. 1:3) upon which supernatural effects will follow, on the ground of its mystical and organic relation to the Divine will. As the acts of Christ’s human will essentially belong to the Person of the Logos and proceed from Him, they are intrinsically and essentially impregnated with the co-operating Divine power. The supernatural effect follows upon them, not as the answer to a prayer or the fulfilment of a promise, but in obedience to the “word of power” uttered in the name and authority of God. What is true of Christ’s will, is likewise true of all His human actions, in as far as these are dependent on the will. In order to acknowledge the dependence of His power on Divine co-operation, Christ often accompanies its exercise with prayer and thanksgiving (e.g. Matt. 26:26, et passim). Through such prayer the organic relation becomes also an ethical (moral) relation; the prayer itself is like the spiritual absorption of the influence of the spiritual power to which the soul is connected organically.

2. The Body of Christ, as well as His soul, is invested with Divinity. Christ clearly implies this in His teaching on the Eucharist (John 6, et passim), and the Fathers so much insist upon this point that sometimes they appear to know of no other “vivifying power” in Christ’s humanity.

3. By means of the blood the soul maintains the vegetative life of the body. The blood, as a vehicle of life, represents the life-giving power of God in a special manner: in Christ the Blood is like a stream of Divine power and life. Nay, the Eucharistic Flesh is a life-giving Bread because it contains the vivifying Blood of Christ. For this reason also Christ could speak of the necessity of drinking His Blood without making the chalice obligatory to all: the Blood is taken with the Flesh.

4. The power of Christ as organ of the Divinity, being a participation in the Divine Power, works also under the same external conditions as the Divine Omnipotence. Thus it is not restricted to space. As a matter of fact, in the Holy Eucharist the power is exercised by contact; but this is not as a matter of necessity. Again, according to St. Thomas, Christ can perform acts which will have their effect at a future time. E.g. the institution of the Sacraments, which act virtually contained the future effects of the Sacraments, in analogy to the act of the law-giver which binds future generations.

V. The power of Christ as organ of God is the complement of His ethico-juridical power. These are not two heterogeneous powers, but work together organically. They have the same object, the salvation of man; and the same root, the union of Christ’s humanity with Divinity, which diffuses both the odour of sweetness and the odour of virtue (odor suavitatis et virtutis). The authoritative power of Christ’s will completes to perfection the meritorious efficiency of His acts, and the same is at the foundation of all His physical works of power. The same act, or set of acts, e.g. the Passion, may be and probably is endowed with twofold efficiency: meritorious efficiency on account of Christ’s personal dignity; dynamic efficiency on account of His investment with Divine power. St. Thomas attributes to the Passion an “effective virtue” in addition to its merit; and the Greek Fathers attribute its saving force to the dynamic power of Christ as Divine organ. The same notion seems implied in Heb. 9:13 sqq: “For if the blood of goats and of oxen … sanctify such as are defiled … how much more shall the blood of Christ, Who through the Holy Ghost (Πνεύματος αἰωνίου) offered Himself unspotted to God, cleanse our conscience from dead works …”

VI. The language of the Church attributes a certain efficacy to events in Christ’s life which cannot be classed with meritorious actions. Thus His Resurrection and Ascension, His death and burial, even the opening of His side after death, are styled mysteries of salvation (sacramenta salutis). They have first a certain efficacy as symbols, types, and pledges of similar events ordained to take place in redeemed man. St. Thomas, however, and after him the Catechism of the Council of Trent (Part 1. ch. 6, n. 13), also attribute to them an “efficient” causality, for which no better reason can be found than Christ’s power as organ of the Divinity; e.g. the Resurrection of Christ “virtually” contains ours, because the virtue or power of Christ’s will is such that the act by which He willed His Resurrection to be a type of ours, is also sufficient to warrant our resurrection. See St. Thomas, 3, q. 50, a. 6; q. 56, a. 1.

C.—STATES AND PRINCIPAL MYSTERIES OF CHRIST’S HUMAN LIFE

SECT. 199.—THE VARIOUS STATES OF CHRIST’S LIFE IN GENERAL

I. Christ, being in the form of God (Phil. 2:6), had the right and the power to appear, even in His humanity, as “equal to God,” viz. with the Divine power and glory which He now enjoys sitting at the right hand of the Father. But His mission to man for the service of God made it necessary for Him “to suffer, and so to enter into His glory” (Luke 24:26); as for Him, “the author of salvation,” to be made perfect “by His passion” (Heb. 2:10); as Head and Mediator of mankind, He had to be made like unto His members and His clients (Heb. 2:10; 5:7 sqq.; 7:27, 28). Hence Christ adopted a life similar, in its successive stages, to the life of man here below.

II. The Apostles’ Creed divides the life of Christ into three stages. First, the stage of abasement: “Born of the Virgin Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified and dead.” Second, the stage of transition: “Was buried, and descended into hell.” Third, the stage of exaltation: “He rose from the dead, ascended into heaven and sitteth at the right hand of the Father.” The opposition between the states of abasement and of exaltation is a favourite theme of St. Paul’s (1 Cor. 15; Phil. 2; cf. Heb. 1 and 2; also Ps. 2, 21, and 109).

SECT. 200.—THE STATE OF ABASEMENT (ΚΕΝΏΣΙΣ)—IMPERFECTIONS IN BODY AND SOUL ASSUMED BY CHRIST

I. The state of abasement consists in the assumption of humanity and the simultaneous occultation of Divinity. The assumption of our nature by the Logos, if accompanied by a complete manifestation of His power and glory, would not be an abasement, but an act of gracious condescension. But He, to whom perfect glory was due from the beginning, chose to lower Himself not only to the position of our First Parents before the Fall, but to the condition of “the sons of man.” He began life as an infant, lowly, weak, and dependent on others, and only gradually attained the ripeness of manhood in which Adam was created. Placed by His birth among sinners, He renounced some of the privileges of His original justice and integrity, and submitted—as far as consistent with His dignity and conducive to the salvation of man—to the imperfections of human nature, and to the ordinances and laws to which human nature is subject. He thus did homage to God sufficient to redeem His brethren; He ennobled lowliness, and showed its value in the service of God; He set us a perfect example of all virtues, but especially of humility, patience, and mercy; He acquired a perfect title to our love.

II. The likeness of Christ in His abasement to the fallen sons of Adam does not comprise the actual loss of justice and sanctity, but only the pains and penalties attached to the loss. These pains and penalties fall partly on the body, partly on the soul, and consist in a liability to suffer from internal and external causes.

1. As regards the body, Christ resembled fallen man in that He was subject to most of the pains consequent upon bodily exertion and adverse external influences, e.g. fatigue, hunger, wounds. These sufferings were natural to Christ, inasmuch as they had a sufficient reason in the nature of His body: they could only be avoided by either avoiding their causes, or by suspending the action of these causes. But Christ, unlike His brethren, had a right to be free from actual suffering (because of His holiness), and His human will had the power either to remove or to suspend the action of all causes of pain. Hence in Christ the natural necessity of suffering was entirely subject to His free will: He suffered nothing which He did not choose to suffer (Isa. 53:7; John 10:17, 18).

Some bodily pains or states are not compatible with the dignity of Christ or useful to the objects of His mission: these He did not choose to suffer. Such are corruption (φθορά), disease (not weakness or wounds), and decomposition after death. A body inhabited by the all-preserving power of God could not be given over to corruption; the body of the eminently Holy One could not be submitted to a decomposition which is the image of the destroying power of sin. “Thou wilt not give Thy Holy One to see corruption” (Ps. 15:10). Disease is the beginning of corruption, and was therefore excluded from Christ’s body. Other reasons are given by theologians: diseases are due to particular influences, not to the general weakness of our nature, which is all that Christ assumed; Christ’s body, formed by the Holy Ghost, did not contain the germ of disease any more than did the body of Adam created by God.

2. The natural weaknesses of the soul, the “passions” of the sensitive and rational appetites, were also retained in the soul of Christ, yet with a twofold restriction.

(a) The inordinate and sinful motions to which the soul of fallen man is exposed, found no place in the soul of Christ. They are inconsistent with His perfect holiness, and they cannot be used as means for the ends of His state of abasement. Only passions or affections of the soul, which are morally blameless (πάθη ἀδιάβλητα), and which in fallen man are pains or penalties, inasmuch as they cause the soul to suffer or to be disturbed, are useful to Christ’s ends, and therefore were permitted to coexist with His divinity and spiritual perfection. Such are the feelings of fear and sadness (Matt. 26:37; Mark 14:33, 34), and the share which the soul has in the sufferings of the body.

(b) Although sadness (tristitia) and other painful feelings affected the soul of Christ, they did not originate and act in Christ as they do in man after the Fall. The soul of Christ, like that of Adam before he sinned, possessed the power to prevent all such affects: their origin, intensity, and duration were alike dependent on His free choice. Moreover, He possessed the still greater power to prevent such emotions from having any disturbing effect on the operations of His soul and on His peace of mind. Fear and sadness are indeed a disturbance of the mind; yet they only upset the peace of mind when the mind resists the disturbance, which in Christ was not the case: He freely admitted the emotion, and exactly regulated its working.

The Fathers prove Christ’s power of regulating the emotion of His soul from John 11:33: “Jesus, when He saw her (Mary, the sister of Lazarus) weeping … troubled Himself,” viz. allowed the feeling of compassion to affect Him. See St. Augustine, In Joan. tr. lx.

III. To complete His abasement Christ chose to submit Himself to His Foster-father and His Mother; to the laws of the state, and to the positive laws of God. Yet instances occurred in which Christ by word and deed asserted His independence of all such laws. There was a special abasement in His submitting to the rite of circumcision and to the baptism of John, both of which were intended for sinners. Lastly, He took His social rank among the poor and lowly, and shared their hardships and privations. See St. Thomas, 3, qq. 14, 15.

SECT. 201.—COMBINATION OF VARIOUS HUMAN STATES IN CHRIST

I. The possession of two natures so widely different as the Divine and the human, places Christ simultaneously in widely different states. His soul was united with God and filled with the plenitude of sanctity, like the souls of the Blessed. His will had power over the forces and elements of nature sufficient to render them innocuous, like Adam in the state of integrity. But as He refrained from the use of this power, and willingly submitted to the penalties of sin, He placed Himself in the state of man after the Fall.

II. A considerable difficulty arises here from the natural incompatibility of the highest beatitude implied in the Beatific Vision, with the extreme of wretchedness suffered especially during the Passion (Matt. 26:38). St. Thomas, and after him the majority of theologians, propose the following solution: The highest joy and the deepest misery cannot coexist naturally in the same soul, for they are opposed to one another. They cannot even coexist supernaturally, i.e. by a miracle, if they are to be felt in the same mental faculty, and to bear on exactly the same object. As, however, there are various faculties and, as it were, various regions in the soul; as, again, the same object may be considered under different aspects, and thus appeal differently to our faculties, we can understand that the soul of Christ, in its superior region, was filled with joy at the vision of God, whilst sadness for the sins of man afflicted its inferior region. Likewise His Passion considered as leading to the Redemption of mankind was a source of joy, whilst that same Passion gave intense pain to His body and soul. But as, on account of the unity and simplicity of the soul, the pleasures and pains of one faculty or of one region are felt by all other faculties and in all other regions, it may be asked how the infinite pleasure of the Beatific Vision did not render the soul of Christ inaccessible to sadness or pain of any kind. Or, on the other hand, how did His agony not interfere with His heavenly beatitude? It was a miracle: Christ, by His Divine power, prevented the feelings of one faculty from overflowing into and affecting any other. St. Thomas, 3, q. 46, aa. 7, 8.

SECT. 202.—THE PASSION OF CHRIST

I. The voluntary abasement of Christ attained its lowest depth in His Passion and ignominious death. But He died “according to the Scriptures” (1 Cor. 15:3, 4). viz. as foretold by the Prophets and by Himself, and thus His death impressed the seal of divinity on His whole mission. The prophecies of Christ’s Passion in the Old Testament are expressed in words and in types. The Proto-evangelium itself contains the germ of such a prophecy, but its fullest statement is to be found in the Psalms, especially in Ps. 21, and in Isaias 52:13; 53:12. Daniel (9:26) points out the time of Christ’s death. Zacharias concludes the prophecies of the Old Testament referring to the Passion (11:12 sqq.; 12:10, cf. John 19:39; 13:7, cf. Matt. 26:31). Types of the Passion are the Sacrifice of Isaac, the Brazen Serpent (Num. 21:9; cf. John 3:14), Jonas, the Paschal Lamb and the bloody sacrifices of the Mosaic Law. For Christ’s own predictions, see Matt. 16:21; Luke 18:3; Matt. 26:24; Luke 24:35, 44 sqq.

II. It was not physically necessary for Christ to suffer death. Many other ways were open to Him to effect the salvation of mankind. Yet as this way had actually been chosen by God and foretold by the Prophets, Christ was under a moral necessity of accepting it. “Thus it is written, and thus it behoved Christ to suffer, and to rise again from the dead the third day; and that penance and remission of sins should be preached in His Name unto all nations” (Luke 24:46, 47).

III. Independently of the soldiers who actually crucified Christ, several other efficient causes of His death must be considered, viz. God and Christ Himself, His human persecutors, and the powers of hell.

1. The repeated assertion of Scripture that God gave His Son for us, or handed Him over to His enemies, implies a direct intention on the part of God, and of Christ Himself as God, that the Saviour should suffer death. The Divine intention directly bore on the good arising out of Christ’s sufferings, viz. the glory of God and the salvation of mankind. Hence God caused the sufferings, inasmuch as He gave Christ the mandate to suffer, and inspired Him with the willingness to carry out the mandate, at the same time permitting the immediate authors of the Passion to work unchecked. He intended the Passion as a means to higher ends, and did not prevent it as He might have done.

2. In the same manner Christ Himself caused His own Passion and death. His complying with the Divine mandate is a perfect act of obedience, such as the final object of the Passion (Rom. 5:19) and the perfection of His self-sacrifice required. Directly, the Saviour caused, e.g. His sadness (tristitia) for the sins of man and the Agony in the Garden; indirectly, the persecutions which His open and fearless teaching challenged, and which He did not resist with His Divine power. Hence His sufferings exhibit the most perfect self-sacrifice: He died of His own will, renouncing the use of His Divine power to save Himself, and using His dominion over His own life to lay it down as the perfect victim of His great Sacrifice (Isa. 53:7; John 10:17, 18).

3. Besides the soldiers who crucified Jesus, three moral causes of His death are to be considered: Judas, who delivered Him to the Jews; the Jews who, moved by hatred, gave Him up to the Romans; and the Roman authorities who, to please the Jews, commanded the crucifixion. The co-operation of human causes was necessary if Christ had to die the shameful death of the cross. God permitted this greatest of crimes in order to make sin subservient to its own destruction. The sin of the Jews, taken objectively, differs from all other sins in this, that it directly strikes at a Divine Person, whereas all other sins only affect the Divinity externally. Taken subjectively, the guilt of the deicides was diminished in many by their ignorance, however culpable that ignorance may have been. For these the Saviour implored forgiveness with His last breath, “Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do” (Luke 23:34), although He had said of them, after the Last Supper, “All these things they will do to you for My Name’s sake, because they know not Him that sent Me. If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin; but now they have no excuse for their sin. He that hateth Me, hateth My Father also. If I had not done among them the works that no other man hath done, they would not have sin; but now they have both seen and hated both Me and the Father” (John 15:21–24).

4. The human causes of Christ’s passion were the instruments of Satan, under whose instigation they acted. The hatred of the Jews towards Christ is ascribed by Scripture to the devil, and so, too, is the treason of Judas. The Fathers dwell on this point in connection with the Proto-evangelium, in which they see foretold the great war between Christ and Satan, ending in the crushing of Satan’s head under the heel of Christ. From many passages in Holy Scripture it is certain that the devil, though perhaps not from the beginning, knew of Christ’s divinity, although he may have been ignorant of the mystery of the Redemption and its benefits to mankind (1 Cor. 2:8). In his hatred of God, he did his utmost to put the Man-God to death (St. Thomas, 3, q. 47).

IV. Christ suffered something from all external causes which can inflict pain upon man; but from organic disease He was free: on account of His supernatural perfection. Heathens and Jews, princes and their servants, and His own Apostles, contributed their share to His sufferings. He suffered in all that is dear to man: in His friends, who deserted Him; in His honour and good name through insults and blasphemy; in His possessions, when even His garments were taken from Him; in His soul through sadness and sorrow; in His body through blows and wounds—nay, in all the members of His body, and in all His senses. The pains He suffered exceeded all those which man can suffer in this life: not only because of their bitterness and their number, but also because of the supernatural perfection of the Sufferer’s constitution, and of His voluntary assuming an amount of suffering proportionate to the end for which He suffered, viz. the liberation of man from sin. Read St. Thomas, 3, q. 46, aa. 5, 6; Newman, “On; the Mental Sufferings of Christ” (Sermons to Mixed Congregations).

SECT. 203.—THE STATE OF CHRIST BETWEEN HIS DEATH AND HIS RESURRECTION

I. The Son of man after death “descended into hell,” thus sharing to the end the common lot of His brethren. But although His body and soul were separated from one another, they both remained united to the Divine Person. Even after death Christ possessed a body and a soul, and thus was still man in a fuller sense than the other dead. The Person of Christ was at the same time in Limbo and in the sepulchre; yet all that belongs to His Person was in neither place.

II. The entombment of Christ confirms His death, and so shows the miracle of the Resurrection in a clearer light. It also symbolizes the death of sin in the baptized (Rom. 6:3, 4). Corruption did not contaminate the Divine Body, and His sepulchre was glorious, as prophesied by David and Isaias (Ps. 15:10; Isa. 53:11).

III. The dwelling place of the souls of the departed is called in Scripture שְׁאוֹל, Ἅιδης, infernus, the lower parts of the earth. All these and similar names connote some space outside of, and opposed to, heaven, the dwelling place of God and the Angels. As to its situation, we are completely ignorant, and of its nature we know but little (infra, Book VIII.).

1. The fact that the soul of Christ descended into this place, is set forth in the various creeds, and has expressly been defined in the Fourth Lateran Council. Scripture and Tradition abound in corroborating evidence (Acts 2:24, 31; Eph. 4:8–10; 1 Pet. 3:18). The substantial, as opposed to potential, descent was denied by Abelard, whose doctrine a council of Sens censured, and Pope Innocent III. condemned. The opinion that Christ only stayed an instant in the lower world, either immediately after His death or before His Resurrection, was advanced by Nicephorus, but never found any supporters. According to the common belief, He remained there all the time between His death and Resurrection. It is certain that Christ, having consummated His sufferings on the Cross, did not go down to Sheol in order to partake of the pains of the damned, or of those in Purgatory. He dwelt with the souls of the just detained in “Limbo”—the Border of Hell—so called to distinguish it from Hell and Purgatory. That such a place existed may be gathered from many utterances of the Old Testament. The New Testament clearly mentions it in the parable of Dives and Lazarus. But even the just who rested in the bosom of Abraham, though free from pain and in possession of a certain beatitude, did not enjoy the vision of God. Such is the constant explanation given to Heb. 9:7, 8: “The way into the Holies was not yet made manifest, whilst the former tabernacle was yet standing;” and 9:15–17: “He is the Mediator of the New Testament, that by means of His death … they who are called may receive the promise of eternal inheritance. For where there is a testament, the death of the testator must of necessity come in. For a testament is of force after men are dead.…” Besides, the gospel was preached as the good tidings of the coming kingdom of heaven. As a matter of fact, it was not becoming that those redeemed by Christ should enjoy the full fruits of Redemption before the Redeemer Himself.

2. In the lower world Christ brought to a close His mission to mankind. The Redemption He had preached on earth was now an accomplished fact; the souls of the departed just were to reap its fruit. In all probability the Beatific Vision began for them at the moment when the Saviour appeared in their midst. Limbo then was changed into Paradise, and the promise made to the Penitent Thief was literally fulfilled. It is certain that the Beatific Vision was not delayed beyond the moment the souls left Limbo with Christ. The apparition of the Saviour in Hades was probably made known to all who dwelt therein—to the evil spirits and the souls of the damned, as well as to the souls of the just already purified, or still being purified. To these latter the coming of Christ was no doubt the occasion of a total or partial remission of their pains. The damned and the devils “bowed the knee” to confess “that the Lord Jesus Christ is in the glory of the Father” (Phil. 2:10). By leading away the captive souls (Eph. 4:7) Christ gave Satan a first proof of His victory, and a pledge of future triumphs.

SECT. 204.—CHRISTS GLORIFICATION—HIS RESURRECTION AND ASCENSION

I. The Resurrection of Christ has many points in common with the general resurrection of mankind. Of this we shall treat in the Eighth Book. His Resurrection, however, has the following peculiarities: 1. It is necessarily a glorious Resurrection, implying not only the restoration of life through the reunion of body and soul, but also the glorification or transfiguration of the body and the bodily life: it is a new birth, the beginning of a higher life. 2. It happened very shortly after death, viz. as soon as sufficient time had elapsed to leave no doubt as to the reality of His death. 3. It was the first resurrection unto life immortal (Col. 1:18; 1 Cor. 15:20). 4. Christ rose, or was raised, from the dead by the power of the Father, that is, the power of God. But as the power of God is Christ’s own power, He rose, or raised Himself, from the dead by His own power (John 2:19; 10:7, 18). 5. Lastly, the Resurrection having been predicted and promised as the principal proof of His preaching, it has a greater dogmatic importance than any other fact: “If Christ be not risen again, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain” (1 Cor. 15:14, et passim; see also the Catechism of the Council of Trent, Part I., ch. 6).

II. The transfiguration of Christ’s body and bodily life was of the same kind as that which awaits the Blessed at their resurrection. Both are described in the same words (1 Cor. 15:42–44): “So also is the resurrection of the dead: it (the body) is sown in corruption, it shall rise in incorruption; it is sown in dishonour, it shall rise in glory; it is sown in weakness, it shall rise in power; it is sown an animal body, it shall rise a spiritual body.” Yet there is between the two a specific difference: the very constitution of Christ requires the glorious transfiguration of His body, whereas the constitution of man naturally tends to corruption. The transfiguration of Christ is a manifestation of His own Divine power, and therefore a guarantee of the transfiguration of the Elect, the members of His mystic body. Read St. Thomas, 3, q. 56.

III. According to the clear teaching of Scripture, the Ascension of Christ into heaven must be looked upon as a local change of His glorified humanity from this earth to a place outside of it. The expression “He ascended above all the heavens” (Eph. 4:10), used to be taken literally until astronomy transformed our ideas of the heavens. In St. Paul the “ascension above all the heavens” is identical with an exaltation above all the choirs of Angels and with sitting at the right hand of God: it may therefore not refer to any definite place at all, for the right hand of God is everywhere and nowhere.

Christ “was taken up” into heaven by the same Divine power that raised Him from the dead, to which, however, must be added the power which His glorified soul had over the likewise glorified body. In heaven Christ occupies a place in keeping with His Majesty and Beatitude, and with the functions He continues to perform. He sits enthroned over all creatures as their perfect Head; as perfect Mediator He stands nearest the throne of God; or, rather, as Highest King and plenipotentiary Dispenser of graces, He sits on the right hand of God on the same throne. As the Resurrection is the ground of our faith, so the Ascension of Christ our Head is the foundation of our hope, and a potent incentive to a godly life. The sending of the Holy Ghost was a first and striking proof of Christ’s continued life and work in perfect communion with the Father.

IV. The sitting of Christ on the right hand of God (Ps. 109:1 sqq.; Heb. 1:3, 4), with which is connected the subjection of all things under His feet and an excellence above that of the Angels, implies His equality with God, as the Fathers often point out. Henceforth on His Divine Throne (Ps. 44:7) Christ receives the adoration of mankind, and all due honour from God, with Whom He shares, by nature and by merit, the royal power, the dominion over the Divine treasures, the authority over all creatures, and the juridical power. On Christ’s Death, Descent into Hell, Resurrection, and Ascension, see St. Thomas, 3, qq. 50–58.

PART III

WORK AND FUNCTIONS OF THE REDEEMER

CHAPTER I

HIS WORK

SECT. 205.—THE SALVATION OF MANKIND

I. CHRIST came into this world to work out the salvation of mankind (Matt. 1:21; Heb. 5:9; “Who for our salvation came down from Heaven,” Nicene Creed). His salvation is announced by the Prophets as “life” and “health,” “peace,” “freedom,” and “justice”; in the New Testament it is described as “life eternal,” “grace,” “holiness,” and “heirship of the sons of God.” On its negative side it is spoken of as “redemption,” “ransom,” “deliverance from sin,” and all the consequences of sin (λύτρωσις, ἀπολύτρωσις, redemptio). Its positive side is the reconciliation of the sinner with God (κατάλλαξις, ἀποκατάλλαξις, reconciliatio), or the restitution of man to his original state of friendship with God. “In Whom we have redemption (τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν) through His blood, the remission of sins” (Eph. 1:7; cf. Col. 1:14). “We glory in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, by Whom we have now received reconciliation (τὴν καταλλαγὴν)” (Rom. 5:11 to the end). Daniel (9:24) prophesies the remission of sins and the reconciliation with God conjointly. Salvation, then, as wrought by the Redeemer, is the raising up of mankind from spiritual death unto supernatural life, a translation from sin to sanctity. The infusion of life into the dry bones of the plain in the vision of Ezechiel (37), and the sanctification of the people of Israel into a priestly kingdom (Exod. 19:6), were figures of our spiritual regeneration and sanctification. Mankind, regenerated and sanctified in Christ as its Head and Mediator, is the supernatural kingdom of God: the work of salvation is the perfect restitution of the supernatural order destroyed by sin. The order restored by Christ, according to many texts in the New Testament, is more perfect than the order (economy) of the Old Testament; more perfect even than that of the original state, especially as regards the communion of man with God and the perfection of God’s kingdom. “The dispensation of the fulness of time” in which the God-Man assumes the headship of all things, and gives man a share in the Divine Life, brings man and all things to their ultimate perfection (Eph. 1:10).

II. Christ working with God, or as the organ of God, is the cause, or principle, of Salvation: He “is made to us wisdom from God, and justice, and sanctification, and redemption” (1 Cor. 1:30). The question, however, arises: in what manner or form did He accomplish His work? Only they who deny Christ’s divinity, and the restoration by Him of the supernatural Economy of Salvation, will reduce His work to moral teaching and good example; for if such were the case, man would be his own saviour. Neither is it sufficient to say that Christ announced to man God’s will and willingness to save him, and confirmed the truth of this announcement by His death and Resurrection. This latter was the work entrusted to the Apostles, as St. Paul expressly teaches: “God hath reconciled us to Himself by Christ, and hath given to us the ministry of reconciliation. For God, indeed, was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself, … and He hath placed in us the word of reconciliation” (2 Cor. 5:18, 19). Scripture forces us to regard the work of the Saviour as a real, efficient cause of our salvation. His work partly replaces, partly completes, partly renders possible and efficacious, the saving work of man himself; on the other hand, it is a condition of, and merits, the saving work of God. It thus differs both from the purely human and from the purely Divine influence on our salvation: for it is a “mediation.”

III. Our redemption through Christ being a fundamental dogma of the Christian faith, and seldom directly assailed by heresy, the Church has but rarely formulated it authoritatively, and then only in general outlines. She has defined that Christ is the mediating cause of salvation, inasmuch as through His death, as a sin-offering, He has merited our salvation; and, making satisfaction for us to God, has blotted out sin. In other words, His merits and satisfaction, as being those of our Representative and Mediator, have obtained for us salvation from God. The oldest expression of the dogma is in the Nicene Creed: “crucified also for us” (pro nobis, ὑπερ ἡμῶν). The Council of Ephesus (Anath. x., xi.) speaks of the sacrifice of Christ as of a sin-offering; and the Creed of Toledo formally describes it as such (Denzinger, Enchiridion, n. xxvi.). Pope Eugenius IV. (Decr. pro Jacobitis) expressly mentions the “merit of the Mediator,” Who cancelled sin and opened heaven. The Council of Trent several times insists upon the merit of the Mediator; e.g. by the merit of the one Mediator original sin is taken away (sess. v. can. 3); the meriting cause (causa meritoria) of our justification is Christ, Who for us made satisfaction to God the Father (sess. vi. ch. 7). The terms “vicarious satisfaction,” “vicarious merit,” are not expressly found in the Church’s formularies; but their sense is sufficiently implied in the term “satisfaction for us” (pro nobis).

IV. 1. The dogma, as above formulated, forbids us to ascribe our salvation exclusively to either the power or the intercession of Christ glorified in heaven. It was His work on earth that saved man; in heaven He administers the fruits of His work on earth. “He sitteth at the right hand of God;” “always living to make intercession for us” (Col. 3:1; Heb. 7:25).

2. The work of the Saviour on earth was the obtaining of the good-will of God towards man. The first step was to appease the offended God. This He brought about by employing Himself on behalf of man, by interceding and intervening for him with God, in His quality of Mediator and perfect representative of mankind. Yet His work was more than a mere asking or intercession; it merited what it asked for, i.e. it was of such value before God that the salvation obtained is its rightful equivalent.

3. As Salvation implies remission of sin, the Mediator must take upon Himself the obligations or debt of the sinners, and make satisfaction for them to God. His work thus assumes the form of an Atonement or Expiation, by which He honours and pleases God more than sin had dishonoured and displeased Him.

4. The Atonement (expiation, satisfaction) for our sins, although a most essential part of Christ’s saving work, does not adequately represent this work. The Atonement is subordinate to, and co-ordinate with, the merit that purchases the Divine friendship. Apart from merit, atonement would be a bare punishment, or, at most, an appeasing of the Divine anger. Taken together as one organic whole, atonement and merit come under the general notion of Sacrifice; i.e. any action performed in order to give God the honour due to Him alone, and so to gain the Divine favour (St. Thomas, 3, q. 48, a. 3).

5. Both the satisfactory and the meritorious action must comply with the following three conditions: (a) The agent must be innocent and undefiled (Heb. 7:26), holy and pleasing to God: his holiness must be infinite if his satisfaction is to be perfect, (b) The action itself must be a work of justice (δικαίωμα, Rom. 5:18), as sin is a work of injustice; and a work of obedience opposed to the rebellion of the sinner against God’s will (Rom. 5:18). (c) Lastly, the action must be prompted by reverence for God’s majesty and law and by love for His goodness, in order to compensate for the sinner’s irreverence, lawlessness, and want of love. All of these conditions are fulfilled in Christ’s work. It is peculiar to the work of satisfaction that it should consist in voluntarily accepted suffering. Suffering inflicted on the sinner is the means by which God satisfies His outraged justice and re-establishes the violated order of things; hence, suffering is likewise the natural means of atonement. The sinner deserves death: having unfitted himself for the attainment of the bliss for which he was created, his further existence on earth is purposeless. Hence, Christ accepted death as the chief feature of His atonement. All this is fitly expressed by the technical term satispassio (atoning suffering) applied to the Saviour’s work. Although satisfaction and merit tend in different directions—the former aiming at paying off a debt, the latter at acquiring goods—yet satisfaction, even as such, cannot be adequately conceived without the element of merit. Satisfaction for sin implies, besides the reparation of the Divine Honour, the acquisition for the sinner of the grace of repentance, without which no sin can be remitted, and the reacquisition of supernatural habitual justice, which every man is under obligation to possess. Now, God alone gives grace: therefore Christ’s satisfaction for us would be incomplete and imperfect if it did not merit the graces of repentance and of habitual justice. Like a true sacrifice, the work of the Saviour is expiatory (atoning), because it is at the same time sanctifying.

Christ gave Himself for us, and thus made Himself the objective means, the real price, of our Redemption. In the sacrifice of Himself (a) He willingly suffers the pain of death inflicted on mankind for their sins; (b) He humbles and empties Himself to atone for the sinner’s disobedience, to pay to God the greatest honour, and to merit grace for man; (c) He substitutes His innocent life for the life of man forfeited by sin. In the sacrifices of the Old Testament, animals were indeed substituted for man; but Christ’s substitution is far more perfect, for His life is a human life anointed with Divinity. Thus the Sacrifice of Christ contains vicarious satisfaction (atonement) for our sins, and also the purchase-price (merit) of our salvation.

The word Redemption—the classic term for Christ’s work—expresses the purchase (emptio) of the freedom of man from the captivity of sin, and the repurchase (redemptio) for him of the liberty of the Sons of God; in other words, the transfer of man from the servitude of the devil to the liberty of the kingdom of God. In order not to misunderstand this “purchase from the devil at the price of Christ’s blood,” we must look upon Satan as a tyrant, holding unlawful possession of man, whom the Redeemer conquers by destroying the cause that delivered man into his power. The ransom of the slave is not paid to the unjust tyrant, but to the lawful master, as an indemnity for the injustice he suffered.

V. The various elements of the work of Christ which appear in the above analysis, are an exact reflection of the doctrine of Scripture. Scripture calls the work of Redemption a sacrifice, a sacrifice of propitiation, and generally applies to it the sacrificial terminology of the Old Testament: Christ is the High-priest of the New Testament, Who offers Himself as victim (hostia), and His action is termed oblation. Now the bloody sacrifices of the old law were certainly offered as sacrifices for sin: the sinner acknowledged that his life had been forfeited to God, and begged Him to accept, instead, the blood (“in which is the life”) of the victim (Lev. 17:11). The idea of substitution is especially clear in the laying of hands on the head of the victim, by which rite the victim was made the bearer of the sin of the offerer (Lev. 16:21). This idea of atonement, of which the old sacrifices were but symbols, was truly realized in the sacrifice of Christ (Heb. 10:1 sqq.), the only true priest, who not only symbolized, but effected our reconciliation with God. The Epistle to the Hebrews often insists on Christ’s priesthood (5:10; 6:20; 7:1–21; 9:11, 15, and 24–28; 10:1–22). The victim is Himself (Heb. 9:14–26), His Body and Blood (10:10; 9:14), which He offered on the Cross, where the real sacrificial act was completed (9:25 sqq.). St. Paul, too, says: “Christ hath loved us, and has delivered Himself for us, an oblation and a sacrifice to God, for an odour of sweetness (παρέδωκεν ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν προσφορὰν καὶ θυσίαν τῷ Θεῷ εἰς ὀσμὴν εὐωδίας)” (Eph. 5:2; cf. 1 Cor. 5:7; Rom. 3:25). “Jesus Christ is the propitiation (ἱλασμός) for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world” (1 John 2:2; 4:10). Besides these direct testimonies, we have numerous passages in which to the Blood of Christ (shed in His death) are ascribed all the effects of the blood shed in the ancient sacrifices. The Blood of Christ is our ransom, λύτρον, ἀντίλυτρον (Eph. 1:7; Col. 1:14; 1 Pet. 1:19; Apoc. 5:9); our reconciliation with the Father (Col. 1:20; cf. Eph. 2:13–15); our justification (Rom. 5:9); the remission of our sins (Matt. 26:28); the cleansing of sin (1 John 1:7; Apoc. 1:5; 7:14; 22:14); the blood of a new testament with God (1 Cor. 11:25; 1 Pet. 1:2). In the same manner the death of Christ is given as our reconciliation (Rom. 5:10), and our redemption from sin (Heb. 9:15). The doctrine so clearly set forth in these passages, leaves no doubt as to the sense of the texts where Christ is said to have shed His Blood, or died, “for many,” “for all,” “for sinners,” “for us” (Matt. 26:28; 20:28; 1 Tim. 2:6; Rom. 5:6; 2 Cor. 5:14 sqq.; 1 Thess. 5:10). In most of these places the word ὑπὲρ (for) is used (not ἀντὶ =in the place of), which, adhering to the letter, may be interpreted “on behalf of,” and thus seems to weaken the vicarious import of Christ’s sacrifice. Ἀντὶ, however, is used in Matt. 20:28 (δοῦναι τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν), and 1 Tim. 2:14 (ἀντίλυτρον), and this, in connection with the above distinct doctrine, shows that ὑπὲρ has the sense of ἀντὶ. (See Liddell and Scott, sub voce). Then it is not easy to conceive how Christ died “on our behalf” if He did not die “instead of us.” The idea of vicarious sacrifice is also to the fore in the testimony of the Baptist calling Christ the Lamb that beareth or taketh away the sins of the world (with reference to Isaias 53); in 2 Cor. 5:21: “Christ Who knew no sin, God hath made sin (ἁμαρτίαν) for us,” i.e. treated Him as bearing our sin; and in Gal. 3:13: “Christ being made a curse (κατάρα) for us,” i.e. the object of the Divine anger which we deserved. The term Redemption itself carries with it a sacrificial notion (Lev. 27:27–33; Num. 18:15–17). The prophet Isaias most distinctly shows the vicarious character of the Redeemer’s work: “He hath borne our infirmities and carried our sorrows … He was wounded for our iniquities, He was bruised for our sins: the chastisement of our peace was upon Him, and by His bruises we are healed. The Lord hath laid upon Him the iniquity of us all. He was offered because it was His own will … the Lord was pleased to bruise Him in infirmity: He shall lay down His life for sin [Hebrew, ‘as an offering for sin’] … He hath borne the sins of many, and He hath paid for the transgressors” (Isa. 53, et passim).

VI. The possibility and appropriateness of Christ’s vicarious satisfaction are objected to upon the ground of difficulties as to each of its three actors: God, Christ, Man.

1. Rationalists object to the idea of a God who takes offence at the acts of a being infinitely below Him; a God who gets angry and remains angry until satisfaction is forthcoming. This objection charges God with mutability, and with a certain pettiness of character. We have sufficiently answered the first part in sect. 65. As to the second, it is not below God’s dignity to rule even the minutest actions of His creatures according to His Holiness, Justice, and Mercy. The idea of petty revengefulness is completely excluded by the infinite mercy which God holds out to the sinner in order to facilitate his salvation. The very satisfaction which He requires is His own free gift, the sinner “being justified freely by His grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus” (Rom. 3:24).

2. “Satisfaction must be given by the offender, and not by a third person: vicarious satisfaction implies the punishment of the just for the unjust.” Answer: In the economy of salvation the sinner is bound to give personal satisfaction: if he does not, his lot is damnation. Christ was not punished instead of the sinner, nor against His own will as sinners are punished: by the holiest of free acts He bore the penalties of sin in order to merit for the sinner a means of satisfying which lay beyond human power. His vicarious satisfaction is not the transfer of punishment from the unjust to the just, but the transfer of the merits of the just to the unjust.

On the whole of this section, see St. Thomas, 3, qq. 48 and 49.

SECT. 206.—PERFECTION OF CHRIST’S SATISFACTION

I. St. Paul teaches the “superabundance” of Christ’s satisfaction: “Not as the offence, so also the gift; for if by the offence of one many have died, much more the grace of God, and the gift in the grace of one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded (ἐπερίσσευσεν) unto many … where sin abounded, grace did more abound” (Rom. 5:15–20). The sufficiency of Christ’s merits to give God an honour not only equal, but superior, to the injury caused Him by sin, is founded upon their infinitude. Sin is an infinite injury merely because its external object, the offended God, is infinite; Christ’s actions, on the contrary, are infinite in value because their internal principle, Christ Himself, is infinite. Hence their infinitude belongs to a higher order than that of sin. Again, the sacrificial acts of the God-Man offer to God an infinite homage which He accepts; whereas the insult of sin does not affect God intrinsically. Lastly, the Redemption was accomplished through a whole life of meritorious acts, each one of which was of sufficient value to ransom all mankind.

II. The very idea of man’s Redemption through Christ supposes that God agreed to accept the work of the Redeemer as a sufficient ransom for the sins of mankind. The work, then, having been performed with superabundant perfection, God was bound by His promise and His justice to grant the remission of sins to the extent and in the manner intended by Christ. The acceptableness of the atonement may further be illustrated from the perfection of Christ’s mediatorship. He is a more perfect representative of the race than Adam, for whereas Adam is only its source according to the flesh, Christ is its head according to the spirit, establishing a general solidarity by an act of His all-powerful will. On the other hand, He is God, and as such secures the acceptance of His own work.

SECT. 207.—EFFECTS OF CHRIST’S SATISFACTION ON MANKIND

I. The object or fruit of Christ’s atonement is the freeing of mankind from sin and its consequences, and the imparting of all the supernatural graces necessary to man’s salvation. The work of the Redeemer won back for us the essential prerogative of the state of original justice, i.e. sanctifying grace (Rom. 5:12 sqq.). Restoration of the minor prerogatives will take place at the resurrection. In the meanwhile, by a wise dispensation Christ has ordained that His followers should sanctify themselves by bearing the ills of life as He bore them (Council of Trent, sess. v. can. 5).

II. Christ’s saving work did not at once blot out every individual sin, and transform every sinner into a saint: it only procured the means thereto. The death on the Cross propitiated God, broke the power of the devil, and founded the kingdom of grace; but the reconciliation to God and the sanctification of the individual are effected by special acts, partly Divine, partly human. This is plainly implied in the language of Scripture speaking of a Redemption already accomplished, and of a Redemption still to come. Natural generation makes us participators of the sin of Adam, because it makes us members of a family spiritually ruined, the head of which has no power over the consequences of his act; it does not make us participators of the grace of Christ, because Christ has not willed that it should. To become members of His kingdom it is indeed necessary to be born of man; but this is not sufficient. Admission under the Headship of Christ—i.e. participation in His redeeming work—depends on His will, and is regulated by laws of a freely established supernatural order. Man “puts on” Christ, is incorporated into Christ, by his acts of faith and charity divinely inspired, or by the reception of sacraments divinely instituted, for that purpose. The fact that we must “draw nigh to Christ” (Heb. 7:19) to become His, accounts for the applicability of His merits to those who lived before the Redemption: they approached Him by faith in the coming of “the Lamb that was slain from the beginning of the world” (Apoc. 13:8).

III. As the salvation of individuals depends on conditions which many do not fulfil, a question arises as to the extent of Christ’s saving will. On this point the Church teaches that He intended the salvation of all sinful mankind living on earth, without any exception whatever. Those, however, who die in mortal sin, and of course the fallen angels, reap no actual benefit from the Redemption.

1. It is defined that Christ offered His death for the salvation of those who are joined to Him by faith or baptism, and it is a condemned heresy to say that He died only for the predestinated (Pope Innocent X.’s condemnation of the five propositions of Jansenius). Similar definitions were given against the Predestinarians of the fifth and ninth centuries, and the doctrine is already contained in the Nicene Creed: “Who for us and for our salvation descended from heaven” (cf. John 3:14–18; 6:37–40; Rom. 8:31, etc.). Infra, p. 239.

2. Although not expressly defined by the Church, it is yet of faith—because clearly contained in Scripture, and taught by the Fathers—that Christ died not only for such as actually come to the faith, but for all men without exception, so that at least a distant possibility of salvation is given to all. Further, the Fathers and theologians teach, as fidei proximum, that, as regards adults, this possibility of salvation is such that its non-realization is due solely to their own fault. As regards those who die before attaining the use of reason, God’s will to save them must also be considered sincere; i.e. the common means of salvation are also intended for them, and God wishes and commands that they should be used. Just as the Divine intention of saving adults is not to be deemed devoid of sincerity because God does not remove the obstacles which through their own fault men put in His way, in like manner the Divine will to save infants must not be thought insincere because God does not remove by miraculous interference the natural obstacles to their salvation. Scripture abounds in texts implying the universality of Christ’s saving will: “He is the propitiation for our sins: and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world (περὶ ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου)” (1 John 2:2). The classical text is 1 Tim. 2:1–4: “… God our Saviour, Who will have all men (πάντας ἀνθρώπους) to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth.”

IV. Jansenists and Protestants often accuse Catholics of Semi-Pelagianism on account of the above doctrine. The Semi-Pelagians taught: (a) That God (and Christ) grant the means of Salvation only to such as, on their own account, and previous to any Divine motion, desire to be saved. (b) That the Divine will to save is entirely circumscribed and ruled by the independent behaviour of man: it succeeds or fails according to acts of the human will not coming from God. (c) Hence the Divine will to save all men is absolute, God doing all that is necessary to save every individual: failure is due solely to insuperable resistance on the part of man.

The Catholic doctrine is, and always has been, totally different. (a) God’s saving will is not subordinate to any independent act of man’s will: He is the first mover in the process of salvation. (b) God freely regulates the motions of the human will, assisting it to co-operate with His grace, or permitting it to resist. (c) The will to save all men is not absolute on the part of God, i.e. God does not use all His power to save man, but freely allows obstacles to salvation to remain, although He could overcome them.

V. Another article of faith is that any sin, however great, if duly repented of before death, can be forgiven by the merits of Christ. This is a necessary consequence of the universality of God’s saving will. There are, however, certain sins which, by their own nature, make repentance very difficult, and even impossible, e.g. unbelief in the means of grace, final impenitence, etc. “The blasphemy of the Spirit shall not be forgiven” (Matt. 12:31), not on account of God’s unwillingness, but on account of the nature of the sin which consists in an obstinate resistance to the Light and Grace of God.

VI. The redeeming work of Christ is of no benefit to the devils (defined against Origen in the Second Council of Constantinople, can. 7, 12).

SECT. 208.—THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER IN MANKIND AND IN THE WHOLE OF CREATION RAISED TO HIGHER PERFECTION BY CHRIST AND HIS WORK—POSITION OF CHRIST IN THE PLAN OF THE UNIVERSE

I. The ultimate result of the work of Christ is the restoration of the supernatural order originally instituted for the salvation of mankind. But Scripture also gives as a result the final completion or crowning perfection of man and all things. Thus, Christ not only restored the original order, but raised the whole of creation to a higher standard of perfection.

1. The economy of our salvation received through Christ a new and more powerful basis. What formerly was grace, pure and simple, is now bought at its proper value by the Redeemer’s merits; and these same merits are an effective means for preserving grace when obtained, and for recovering it when lost. Moreover, the Divine Principle of Salvation is engrafted upon mankind and made one with us: His titles to heavenly bliss and glory are ours as His co-heirs (Rom. 8:14–17).

2. The supernatural kingdom of God on earth exists for the glorification of God as the Eternal Father by a people of saints, able to perform that service worthily. In the person of Christ this kingdom possesses a member Who is God, and therefore able to tender to the Father the worship of infinite value due to Him. And as all the saints are one body, whose head is Christ, their worship participates in the perfection of His worship. They constitute not only a kingdom of priests (Ex. 19:6). but “a royal priesthood” (1 Pet. 2:9). They are the Temple consecrated with the Blood of the High Priest, in which, without intermission, the all-holy victim burns for the glory of God, and for the good of the people bought with His Blood. The new covenant, therefore, is more perfect than the old, both in the way it was established and in the way it works.

3. Pre-Christian grace established between God and man a union of friendship, akin to the union between members of the same household. Christ has raised the moral union to the highest type of “matrimonial communion.” When the Logos wedded our flesh and blood, we were made, in a mystic sense, one person with Him, and through Him organically connected with the Father. Hence our sonship participates in a higher degree in the Sonship of the Logos, both as regards our claims to the inheritance and as to the spiritual life we draw from the Father. We also enter into closer communion with the Holy Ghost, who proceeds from the Son and dwells in us as in His temple (1 Cor. 3:16).

II. The supreme perfection of the communion with God. as re-established by Christ, lies in this, that it makes every justified Christian another Christ. “Christianus alter Christus,” is a favourite saying of the Fathers. As the whole body of the faithful form, with Christ as their Head, one mystical body, so each individual saint is built up after the model of the Head: he is anointed with the same Divine Spirit, made a partaker of the Divine Nature, and transformed into the image and likeness of God. The nobility which is natural to the Divine Son becomes his by adoption. In the simple order of grace, the sanctified are, indeed, the anointed of God, but not in the same manner as sanctified Christians. With the former grace as a quality infused into the soul precedes the indwelling of the Holy Ghost. In Christ and His sanctified members the anointing Spirit is the source of created grace. The sacramental character of Baptism stamps us as members of Christ, for in its innermost essence this character is a copy of the anointing and sealing of the humanity of Christ with the Logos. The characters of Confirmation and Order intensify the membership and increase the flow of the Spirit. The three characters give the Christian a share in the royal and holy dignity proper to Christ—a share in His prophetic office in as far as this consists in being a living witness of the glory of God—and lastly, a share in His priestly and kingly functions.

III. The fulness of perfection achieved by Christ in the supernatural order belongs primarily to mankind. But as Christ is Head also of the Angels, and consequently their Mediator, they too participate in the fruits of His work. The glory of their Head reflects upon themselves; their worship is enhanced by being united to His worship; their graces and privileges are more their own since they rest upon His merits. The material world itself is raised in perfection through the greater perfection of man, for whose service it exists. Christ, then, unites the whole of creation into one sanctuary, of which He is the foundation and the keystone; and all rational beings He gathers into one family, or one body, of which He is the Head.

IV. We are now able to understand the full significance of St. Paul’s admirable description of the work of Christ, Eph. 1:9, 10: “That He might make known unto us the mystery of His will, … in the dispensation of the fulness of times, to re-establish all things in Christ, that are in heaven and on earth, in Him.” The sense of this ἀνακεφαλαίωσις (restoration, rejuvenation, summing up) is that the whole of creation, bound up together and perfected in Christ as its Head, is led back in the most perfect manner to God, its first principle, from whom sin had partly led it away. The influence of Christ on the supernatural order appears here as restoring and perfecting; its reason, form, and effects are indicated, and the organic connection between the whole orders of nature and supernature is set forth. Christ is the Crown, the Centre and the Foundation of a new and higher order of things; He is the Lord and King of all things, and, next to God, their highest end, according to 1 Cor. 3:22, 23: “All things are yours … and you are Christ’s; and Christ is God’s.”

Whether the Incarnation would have taken place if Adam had not sinned was much discussed between Thomists and Scotists. St. Thomas (3, q. 1, a. 3) holds that it would not; Scotus (In. 3, dist. 3) that it would. In favour of this latter opinion, see also Suarez, De Incarn., tom. i. disp. 5; St. Francis of Sales, Treatise of the Love of God, bk. ii. chap. iv.

CHAPTER II

FUNCTIONS OF THE REDEEMER

OUR notion of the supernatural kingdom established by Christ corresponds to some extent with our notions of an earthly kingdom. In order to secure the fruits of Redemption, Christ founded a spiritual society, of which He Himself is the Head—Who teaches its members supernatural truth, Who sanctifies them by His Sacrifice and Sacraments, Who rules and leads them on to supernatural happiness: Who is therefore at once Teacher, Priest, and King. Each of these offices or functions has a holy, or hierarchic, or priestly character, for they are ministrations in the kingdom of God which is holy in its origin, in its growth, and in all its objects. To teach holy things, to make and to dispense holy things, and to lead to the fruition of holy things (sacra docere, sacra dare et facere, ad sacra ducere et perducere), is the triple function of the Head of God’s kingdom.

Of the prophetical or teaching office of Christ we have already treated in the first book of this Manual. We here add only a few remarks.

The Prophets announced Christ as a Teacher of Divine truth to all mankind; Christ Himself claimed this title repeatedly, and exercised this office in many ways during His life on earth. “Behold, I have given Him for a witness to the people, for a leader and a master to the Gentiles” (Is. 55:4). “You call me Master and Lord, and you say well, for so I am” (John 13:13; cf. Matt. 23:10; John 3:31). Christ’s excellence as a Teacher is supereminent. Even as man He is an eye-witness of all that He reveals, and His truthfulness is founded upon His Divinity. His authority is not by delegation: His human words are the words of a Divine Person. He has personal power to prove His mission by miracles. His teaching is not merely external: He has power internally to illumine and move the minds of His hearers. He taught by deed as well as by words: His whole life, with all its incidents, natural and supernatural, being a lesson in holiness. See St. Thomas, 3, q. 42 sqq.

A.—CHRIST AS HIGH PRIEST

SECT. 209.—NOTIONS OF PRIEST AND SACRIFICE

I. In Holy Scripture the term “priest” is used in a wide and in a narrow sense. In the wide sense it designates all the members of the chosen people of God, Israelites as well as Christians (Exod. 19:6, and 1 Pet. 2:9), as distinct from other nations. In the narrower sense, priests are men chosen from among the chosen people to act as the officials of the house of God. The former are the lay priesthood; the latter the hierarchical priesthood. Both priesthoods imply in general the same characters (cf. Exod. 9:5 sqq.; Numb. 16:5): Divine vocation or election, special appropriation by God (Heb. 5:1), a consecration or sanctification connected and given with the appropriation (e.g. by the imposition of hands or anointing with oil); a consequent qualification to approach God and to offer gifts in His presence. Election, appropriation, and consecration stamp the priest as “priest of God” (כֹּהֵן ἱερεύς, sacerdos Dei). The offering of gifts to God is his noblest function, from which also is derived his Hebrew name of “approacher” (קָרב “to draw nigh”). The priest approaches God when he enters the temple and deposits gifts on the altar, viz. when as a servant, holy and pleasing to God by his consecration, he offers a worship which is itself made holy and pleasing to God by the dignity of the servant: a dignity derived primarily from his vocation and consecration, rather than from his own moral worth.

The hierarchical priest, then, by his special vocation, consecration, sanctification, and nearness to God, stands between God and the people. Yet his qualification for offering a worship more excellent than that of the people, is given him on behalf of the people, viz. in order to act before God on their behalf, by bringing their gifts, and through their gifts the people themselves, nearer to God. His holiness supplements the deficient holiness of his people. “Every high priest taken from among men is ordained for men in the things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices for sins.” Πᾶς γὰρ ἀρχιερὺς, ἐξ ἀνθρώπων λαμβανόμενος ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων καθίσταται τὰ πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν ἵνα προσφέρη δῶρά τε καὶ θυσίας ὑπὲρ ἁμαρτιῶν (Heb. 5:1). The addition “for sins” expresses a special function of the priesthood among fallen mankind, but by no means the essence of priesthood; the sacrifice for sins being included in the general functions of bringing the people nearer to God by sanctification.

The Hebrew priesthood was little more than a higher degree of lay-priesthood. Originally the people were elected as priests, and then from among the people the family of Aaron was chosen. This is also implied in the Hebrew term כֹּהֵן (see Bähr, Symbolik, ii. 15). The Latin term sacerdos, and the Greek ἱερεύς, connote a priestly dignity found properly only in the priesthood of the Church. Sacerdos connotes a sacred person, who can give holy things (sacra dans) by reason of his consecration. He not only offers to God the gifts of the people, but he also dispenses to man the gifts of God (1 Cor. 4:1). This latter function, however, was not prominent under the Mosaic Law. The chief function of the sacerdos is sacrificare, i.e. to make sacred, to consecrate, conficere rem sacram, to sanctify the gifts of God to man, and of man to God. The Council of Trent (sess. xxiii. ch. 1) sets forth this character of the Christian priesthood when it describes its power as “a power to consecrate, to offer, and to dispense (ministrandi) the Body and Blood of Christ.” Here we have a supernatural power to change a profane thing into a sacred thing, as opposed to the simple power of offering to God anything either profane or sacred. The act of consecrating is intimately connected with that of offering and dispensing or ministering: the priest consecrates in order both to offer and to dispense what he has consecrated. If, then, we give to the term sacrificare its full meaning, we may define the priest as one who has the power to offer sacrifice.

The hierarchical priesthood, the only one which exists under the present dispensation, is essentially different from the priesthood which would have existed under the simple law of nature. In the order of nature the priest would be the public and legitimate representative of society for the public worship of God. But neither his social position nor his election would give him a dignity of higher sanctity and power: he would only be the principle or medium of unity and order in public worship. The representation of the people is by no means the chief element in hierarchic priesthood, not even if the representatives were adorned by God with special holiness and dignity, or empowered to promote through their own sanctity the sanctification of the people with more or less perfection. These and similar elements make up the notion of a sacred (hieratic) servant (διάκονος, minister), possibly of eminent dignity, but after all only a dignitary whose functions are analogous to those of the lay-priesthood. The hierarchic priest is first and foremost rather a representative and plenipotentiary of God. As such he acts formally when consecrating and ministering. When offering he holds up to God a thing which he has appropriated or consecrated for Divine worship; when praying as priest he acts as divinely appointed patron of the people. Thus in all his functions the hierarchic priest, either formally or as a matter of fact, is the representative of God.

II. Sacrifice is an act of worship in which God is honoured as the Beginning and End of man and of all things by the offering up of a visible creature, which, for this purpose, is submitted to an appropriate transformation by a lawful minister. An internal sacrifice is offered whenever man devotes himself to the service of God by either “reforming or giving up” his life for God (Ps. 50:19). No external sacrifice is perfect without an accompanying internal sacrifice, whereby the soul associates itself with the meaning and object of the external rite (infra. Book VII. § 267).

1. The object of sacrifice is that of practical religion in general: to acknowledge God as the Beginning and End of man and of all things; that is, to profess in deed our entire dependence on Him, both for existence and for ultimate happiness. Some post-Tridentine theologians have narrowed the idea of sacrifice to mean the expression of God’s dominion over life and death, or of the Divine power to dispose of all things, or of the Divine majesty as exalted above all; and have restricted its primary object to the atonement for sin.

2. So, too, the external form of sacrifice—an appropriate transformation of the creature offered—has been limited by Vasquez and later theologians to the “transformation by destruction.” Neither historical nor theological grounds can justify such limitations; e.g. the burning of incense, θυσία, which has furnished the Greek name for all sacrifices, is not so much the destruction of the incense as its conversion into “an odour of sweetness,” the symbol of the soul of man transformed by the fire of charity. Similar remarks apply to all sacrifices without exception. In the sacrifice of the Mass, the immutatio, as the Fathers technically call the sacrificial act, is not the destruction, but the production of the victim.

3. A lawfully appointed minister is necessary to offer public sacrifice in the name of the people. If the sacrifice is to have a peculiar dignity and efficacy as oblation and as action,—i.e. if it is to be more than the most expressive act of external worship, and of man’s earnest desire of sanctification—a consecrated minister is required: for as gift and as action, the value of the sacrifice is measured by the personal dignity of him who offers it Accordingly, the symbolical sacrifices of Moses obtain the efficacy of sacrifices of the covenant through the sanctification and lay-priesthood of all the people; in the Christian dispensation, individual self-sacrifice, and the public sacrifice for the people, derive supernatural sanctity and dignity from the supernatural character of the Christian layman or priest. See St. Thomas, 1 2, q 102; 2 2, q. 85.

SECT. 210.—CHRIST’S PRIESTHOOD AND ITS FUNCTIONS

The Priesthood of Christ and its functions are set forth in the Epistle to the Hebrews in order to induce the converted Hebrews to abandon the defective Aaronic priesthood and to cling to Christ, the Great High-Priest Who entered heaven. The treatment of the subject is not, however, exhaustive, because it has only one special object in view, viz. the superiority of Christ’s priesthood over that of Aaron. Hence Protestant theologians are not justified in restricting the attributions of Christ’s priesthood to those mentioned therein.

I. Christ’s priesthood is eminently hierarchical, and perfect in every respect. Christ “draws nigh to” God on behalf of mankind, and His sacrifice has sufficient virtue to take away the sins of the world. No higher priesthood exists; all other priesthoods, of both the Old and the New Testament, depend on it for their existence and efficacy. It is eminently perfect, because (a) it has all the perfections of other priesthoods without any of their imperfections; (b) it has hierarchical power to accomplish in the most perfect manner whatever any priesthood can accomplish.

1. The priest is made “God’s own,” and endowed with the honour and power of his ministry through an act of consecration. When an ordinary man is elevated to the priesthood, he is made God’s own minister by an accidental unction: Christ is constituted God’s Own Son by His substantial unction with the Divine Nature, and so possesses sacerdotal dignity and power by His very Nature. Hence His pre-eminent holiness. The ordinary priest is not made impeccable by his consecration; he requires priestly ministration for his personal sanctification; his personal holiness is not the source of the holiness which he imparts to others. The consecration of Christ, i.e. the Hypostatic Union, makes Him holy, guileless, undefiled, separated from sinners (Heb. 7:26–28), and makes Him the holder and dispenser of God’s own holiness. The ordinary priest “draws nigh to God” in a very imperfect manner; Christ sits at the right hand on the throne of God (Ibid. 8:1). Like other priests. Christ has known the weaknesses and sufferings of our nature (Heb. 5:2), yet without loss to His dignity and holiness: on the contrary, His death was but the road to the never-ending exercise of His priesthood in an eternal life (Ibid. 7:25).

2. As Christ’s priestly powers flow from His hypostatic consecration, they also are eminently perfect. Being Himself consecrated with the fulness of Divinity, He can in His turn consecrate and sanctify everything, and bring it nigh to God; He can dispense all holy things, whether they be sanctified offerings from man to God, or gratuitous gifts from God to man. He has power to perform the holiest of sacrifices by which the Covenant between God and man is established and sealed, and to make the victim of that sacrifice the pledge of the covenant, the bearer and dispenser of the sanctifying power of the Holy Ghost (cf. Heb. 9:14 sqq., and 10:14).

The nature and power of the Divine Priesthood show its excellence over the imperfect, inefficacious, and transitory priesthood of Aaron (see Epistle to the Hebrews, passim). The whole matter may be summed up in a few words: the Levitic priesthood was temporal, earthly, and carnal in its origin, in its relations to God, in its working, and in its power, whereas Christ’s Priesthood, in all these particulars, is eternal, heavenly, and spiritual.

II. 1. The things offered to God by the ancient priests were either lifeless, or at best irrational creatures, distinct from the person of the offerer. In Christ, on the contrary, the gift offered up is included in the Person of the offering Priest: it is His living, human flesh, animated by His rational soul, and therefore, in the language of Scripture, it is a spiritual and rational (πνευματικόν, λογικόν) offering. Hence the sacrificial victim offered by Christ is not a merely symbolical, but a real and equivalent, substitute for mankind, on whose behalf it is sacrificed. Again, it is a “victim of immaculate holiness,” whereas its predecessors were at best but physically spotless or blameless animals. Lastly, the gifts brought to the altar in the Old Testament acquired some consecration by their contact with consecrated persons, altars, and fires. The gift offered by Christ possesses a holiness of its own, before the act of offering, viz. its unction with the Divine Substance of its personal principle. That same unction, by which the Logos anoints His human nature to the highest priesthood, likewise consecrates it as the Altar of the sacrifice, and, moreover, is the spiritual fire which clarifies and vivifies the victim. Hence, at the very moment the Hypostatic Union took place, the High Priest, the Altar of the sacrifice, the victim and the sacrificial fire were consecrated, and the Logos began to offer up a “spiritual and rational oblation” (προσφορά πνευματικὴ καὶ λογική).

2. The power of the Aaronic priests over the victims of their sacrifices was limited to the infliction, by external means, of an irreparable death which their sacrificial intention turned into a religious rite or symbol. The dead victim acquired no new life-giving qualities, and was for ever beyond the power of the sacrificer. In Christ’s sacrifice the immutation of the victim is brought about by an internal act of His will: “I lay down my life that I may take it again” (John 10:17); His death is the source of new life to Himself and mankind. The immutation, therefore, is spiritual, accomplished by the Eternal Spirit of the Sacrificer. This spiritual character is manifest in the glorious resurrection of Christ’s body, and likewise in the Eucharistic sacrifice. But it is of the bloody sacrifice on the cross that the Apostle speaks in this connection. On the cross, death was indeed inflicted by external agents; the immutation, however, was accomplished neither by these agents, nor by Christ’s willing submission to their act: He offered Himself by a direct and positive act of His will which had power to dispose of His own life and death. The inner act of supernatural power allowed the external agencies of death to take effect, to dissolve the animal life of His body—to liquefy, as it were, the inhabiting Divine Life so as to transform the body into food and the blood into drink unto life everlasting.

III. Of Christ as Mediator we have already treated (supra, § 190). The perfection of His mediatorship stands out prominently in His priesthood.

1. His sacrifice, being that of a Divine Person, is not only acceptable to God, but carries its acceptance with it. For the same reason the shedding of His blood in the name of mankind is as much a gift of God to man as a sacrifice of man to God. On the other hand, Christ perfectly represents mankind in His sacrifice. The flesh He offers is a gift from the human race accepted by Him; it is not a symbol or an inadequate substitute, as in the old sacrifices, but the most perfect member of the whole race, and therefore a perfect substitute for His brethren.

2. The sacrifice of the cross is chief amongst the sacerdotal functions of Christ, because it crowned His work on earth, and laid the foundation of His eternal priesthood in heaven. It alone realizes all the aims and objects of the ancient sacrifices. Being at once an offering for sin, a peace offering, and a burnt offering (holocaust), it reconciles man to God by the remission of sins; it establishes and maintains peace between God and man by preserving man in a state of grace; it unites the spirit of man to God, imperfectly on earth, but perfectly in the state of glory, by imparting to him the consuming fire of Divine Charity (St. Thomas, 3, q. 22, a. 2). In other words: the sacrifice of the cross attains the object of the burnt offering or holocaust, which is to arrive at a perfect union with God through acts of worship; and also attains the objects of the offerings for sin and of peace offerings, which were to remove the obstacles to an acceptable worship (sins), and to procure the means thereunto.

3. The sacrifice of the cross is also the central function of Christ’s priesthood, inasmuch as all its other functions are based on this, and are only its consummation or perpetuation. It is virtually continued—not repeated—in heaven, where the sacrificial intention of the Priest and the glorified wounds of the Victim live for ever in the Divine Pontiff. One circumstance alone prevents the heavenly sacrifice from being actually the same as that of the cross: and that is the absence of any real immutation of the victim.

4. In the whole burnt offerings of the Old Testament the smell of the victim is said to ascend to God “as an odour of sweetness,” which expression is also applied to the sacrifice of Christ. The “odour of sweetness” of the Saviour is His glorified Self ascending into heaven, and as the Lamb slain, standing in the midst of the throne before God, as an eternal sacrifice of adoration and thanksgiving (Apoc. 5:6, etc.).

IV. From His heavenly throne Christ, through His priestly ministers on earth, continually consecrates and sacrifices in His Church, making Himself the Sacrifice of the Church, and including the Church in His sacrifice. He thus brings down to earth the perennial sacrifice of heaven in order to apply its merits to mankind, and at the same time enables the Church to offer with Him and through Him a perfect sacrifice of adoration and thanksgiving. The Mass, then, like the Eternal offering in heaven, completes the sacrifice of the cross by accomplishing its ends; viz. the full participation of mankind in its fruits. Although the Eucharistic sacrifice is offered on earth and through human hands, it is none the less the formal act of Christ Himself as heavenly Priest. This idea finds expression in the liturgical prayers before and after the Consecration, in which the Church, here acting in her own name, asks the heavenly Priest and Angel of the Covenant to complete and perfect her sacrifice in heaven. In a similar way the layman in the Old Testament asked the priest to accept his offering, and to lay it on the altar before God. See the prayer “Supplices te rogamus,” in the Canon of the Mass.

V. The final consummation of Christ’s sacrifice is the perfect participation in its fruits, in time and in eternity, by those on whose behalf it was offered. The sanctifying graces thus obtained consecrate the faithful with the Holy Ghost, and transform them into God’s holy servants and priests, and make them members of the mystical body of Christ. With Christ they sacrifice and are sacrificed in the universal offering of the Holy City to God. St. Thomas, 3, q. 22.

B.—SECT. 211.—CHRIST AS KING

I. Christ is hailed by the Prophets, and calls Himself “King of Mankind” (Ps. 2:6; Isa. 9:6, 7; Ezech. 34:23 sq.; 37:24–28; Jer. 23:3–6; Luke 1:32, 33; John 19:37), because, with the power and majesty of God, He procures justice and peace, salvation and beatitude, for his subjects. His kingdom is of a higher order than the kingdoms of this world. It is hierarchic, spiritual, and celestial—in its origin and final object, in its ways and means, and even in its members: for it embraces only such as, through grace, have acquired the title of adopted children of God. The hierarchic character of the kingdom is pointed out by Zacharias (6:12, 13) foretelling that the king would build a temple to God—a prophecy fulfilled by Christ when He built His Church upon Peter. He set forth the heavenly character of His Church when He called it “the kingdom of Heaven,” and called the power to rule it “the keys of the kingdom of Heaven.” The exaltedness of Christ’s Kingship as hierarchical, heavenly, and spiritual, shines forth in its first and most solemn act, viz. the sending of the Holy Ghost, through Whom He now performs all the acts of His royal power.

II. The Kingly functions of Christ are the foundation, expansion, and final consummation of God’s kingdom among men. They are not always performed visibly, as in earthly kingdoms. Christ acts on the inner man, though ordinarily through visible means, because the kingdom of Heaven on earth is a visible and well-ordered society. He can, however, and often does, exercise His influence on the soul independently of external agencies. The first and the last acts of the kingdom—its constitution and its consummation in the final judgment—are personal and visible acts of the King.

The fundamental function is the distribution of salvation. It is carried out: (1) in the form of Legislation regulating the acquisition and use of grace by man, but especially in the constitution and organization of the Church as the continuator of its Founder’s saving work; (2) in the form of administration, government, and development of the kingdom by Christ’s visible organs on earth under His assistance and protection; (3) in the form of judicial functions, meting out rewards or punishment to man according to his right or wrong behaviour in relation to grace and the Law of Christ.

The practical working of the Kingly office of Christ is given in the treatises on the Sources of Revelation, Grace, the Church, the Sacraments, and the Last Things. See Suarez, De Incarn., I., disp. 47 and Knoll, Theol. Dogmat., II., sect. 390 sqq.

PART IV

THE MOTHER OF THE REDEEMER

IN this Part we deal with the personal attributes of the Virgin Mother of the Redeemer, and her participation in the work of Redemption. Other points of doctrine relating to her have been treated of in Part III. of this Book. We shall here speak of: (1) Mary the Virgin; (2) Mary the Mother of God; (3) Mary full of grace; (4) Mary co-operating in the Redemption of Mankind. St. Thomas, 3, qq. 27–29; Suarez, De Incarn., tom. ii., in proem. dist. 1; Petavius, De Incarn., lib. xiv. cc. 1–9; Newman’s Anglican Difficulties, vol. ii.

SECT. 212.—MARY THE VIRGIN

In ordinary women maternity excludes virginity, but the woman chosen to be the Mother of Christ through the overshadowing of the Holy Ghost was necessarily consecrated to God alone, not only a virgin among many, but the virgin of virgins. The prophet Isaias (7:14; Matt. 1:23) announces that “a virgin shall conceive and bring forth Emmanuel;” and in the Apostles’ Creed, Mary “the Virgin” is associated with the Holy Ghost as the source and origin of Christ. She is the spiritual vessel of election set apart for God.

I. The Christian idea of Mary’s virginity postulates its perpetuity, and its extension to her body, her mind, and her feelings: Virgo perpetua virginitate mentis et sensus.

1. Mary, a virgin before, during, and after the birth of her Son: such is the classical phrase for expressing the perpetual integrity of her body.

The Fifth General Council (can. ii.), and the council held in the Lateran under Martin I. (can. iii.), defined the perpetual virginity of the flesh of Mary, which consequently is of faith. In Part II. of this Book we have spoken of Mary’s virginity in the conception and birth of Christ. That she was a virgin before conceiving has never been contested. As to her virginity after bringing forth her first-born, we gather it from her vow (Luke 1:34, of which more below); from the fact that she is always called the Mother of Jesus (never of any other), and that on the cross Christ recommended her to John, there being no son to take His place. Whatever is inadequate in these indications from Scripture, is amply supplied by the unanimous and unbroken tradition of the Church. To all the Fathers and ecclesiastical writers Mary is “The Virgin.” The heretics who impugn this attribute are treated as madmen, blasphemers, criminals, guilty of sacrilege (St. Jerome, Contra Helvidium). The reason why Mary should always remain a virgin is by universal consent given in the words of Ezech. 44:2, “This gate shall be shut, it shall not be opened, and no man shall pass through it; because the Lord, the God of Israel, hath entered in by it, and it shall be shut.” St. Thomas (3, q. 28, a. 3) says that Mary’s perpetual virginity was required: (l) by Christ, whose dignity requires that He should be the only-born as well as the first-born Son of His Mother; (2) by the Holy Ghost, who had to preserve His sanctuary inviolate; (3) by Mary herself, who in sacrificing her virginity would have been guilty of the greatest ingratitude; (4) by Joseph, in whom the violation of the sanctuary of the Holy Ghost would have been most culpable arrogance.

Three exegetical difficulties have, from the earliest times, been urged by heretics against the perpetual virginity of Mary. St. Jerome exhaustively discusses and solves them in his book against Helvidius. They are: 1. Matt. 1:25, “And he knew her not till she brought forth her first born.” But from the words immediately preceding, “Joseph took unto him his wife,” it is manifest that the Evangelist only intended to lay stress upon the virginal birth of Jesus, without a thought of the relations between Joseph and Mary after that birth. The same intention is equally manifest in ver. 18, “Before they came together, she was found with child,” although here the coming together probably simply implies that Joseph “took unto him his wife.” 2. The title of “First-born” is applied to Jesus here; and Luke 2:7 excludes previous children without necessarily including subsequent ones. The First-born in the Bible is the subject of privileges, rights, and duties: he is consecrated to God. The title is given to Jesus for this and for no other reason. 3. The “brothers of Jesus” in biblical language may be His relatives, or members of the same tribe. Abraham says to Lot, “We are brethren” (Gen. 13:8). As a matter of fact, several of the brethren of Jesus are said to be children of another Mary, the sister of the Mother of Jesus, and wife of Klopas (Matt. 27:56, and John 19:25). James, who is especially pointed out as the brother of the Lord (Gal. 1:19), is regularly styled the son of Alphæus in the list of the Apostles. Klopas, Cleophas, and Alphæus, are but different forms of the same Hebrew name.

Some Fathers, on the authority of apocryphal gospels, admit that Joseph had children by a former marriage; this admission, however, is not necessary to account for the brethren of the Lord. Origen and Jerome strenuously reject it.

2. That the virginity of Mary includes “the firm intention perpetually to preserve the integrity of her body for the honour of God,” has always been the conviction of the Church.

After conceiving by the Holy Ghost, without detriment to her virginity, Mary could not entertain the thought of desecrating her sanctified body: such an impious desire could not spring up in a soul “full of grace.” As to the time before the conception, when Mary was yet unaware of her exalted vocation, we may safely presume that God prepared her for it by suggesting to her mind the “vow of virginity,” which she mentioned to the Angel of the Annunciation as an accomplished fact: “How shall this be done, because I know not man?” (Luke 1:34.) This text leaves no doubt as to the existence of a vow of chastity. When was it made? Was it unconditional? Considering the ideal love of purity which the Church attributes to the Virgin of virgins on the ground of her being the bride of the Holy Ghost, we are bound to think of this vow as perfect, without any restrictions as to time or circumstances, and that it was made when the question of her future state of life for the first time arose in Mary’s mind.

3. The third peculiarity of Mary’s perfect virginity is her complete freedom from unchaste feelings and sensations both in mind and body. As, however, this aspect of purity comes under the head of the moral perfection and sanctity of Mary’s will, we deal with it in another place.

Her perfect purity of body, mind, and feelings, makes the Mother of Jesus the Virgin of virgins—that is, the ideal Virgin. Her love of purity was in proportion to her eminent fulness of grace and love of God. Her virtue was protected not by human will alone, as other saints, but by the all-holy will of God, who, by reason of His alliance with her, bound Himself to keep her unspotted.

II. St. Thomas (3, q. 29, a. 1) gives twelve reasons why Mary should have been united in marriage to Joseph. The chief ones are, that her marriage shielded herself and her Son from infamy, secured a protector to both, and gave us, in the person of her husband, a trusty witness of the Divine origin of Christ. But was not Mary’s vow of virginity an obstacle to a true marriage? We must, indeed, admit that her marriage differed from the ordinary union between man and wife, inasmuch as her vow debarred Joseph from the exercise of his right over her body. All other duties and rights of both parties in the matrimonial contract remained unaffected. In virtue of his marriage, Joseph had a right to call Mary’s Son his own, and the duty to act to Him as a father; in fact, God had ordained their union for that very purpose. It thus appears that the union between Joseph and Mary has excellences not attained even by Christian matrimony. The fruit of union is Joseph’s own through his “spiritual” union with Mary. The same fruit is not merely an “adoptive Son of God added to His kingdom,” but the natural Son of God Himself. St. Thomas, 3, q. 28 and 29; Franzelin, thes. xv.

SECT. 213.—MARY THE MOTHER OF GOD

I. In Holy Scripture, and still more in the language of the Church, the title “Mother of Jesus” is given to Mary as the distinctive character of her dignity, as the fountain-head of all her other privileges. Who is Mary? “She is, by Divine election, the Mother of the Saviour.” This description defines her personality, accounts for all her exceptional gifts and graces, and marks her unique position in the economy of salvation (supra, § 185). Stress must be laid on the Divine election by which Mary was made the Mother of Jesus; for, as maternity presupposes matrimony, the act by which the Logos from all eternity decreed that Mary should be His partner in the work of the Incarnation, may be considered as analogous to human marriage: a virgin is chosen to be the Divine Bride, and to become, by Divine operation, the Mother of Him who chose her. The eternal decree is Mary’s eternal title to the dignity of Mother of God. In the fulness of time the Bride is conceived immaculate, and filled with grace in consequence of her eternal predestination; in the Conception of Christ the union is consummated, and Mary is actually invested with a dignity only excelled by that of its prototype, the Hypostatic Union of Christ with the Logos.

II. The grace of Divine Motherhood originates, like all supernatural graces, in election and predestination by God. But, unlike ordinary predestination to glory, it is unconditional and irrevocable. As integral part of the plan of Redemption, the Virgin’s election to Divine Motherhood is antecedent to any act of hers. Her union with God for the purpose of man’s salvation is as indissoluble as God’s purpose itself, and much more so than human marriage. In the Creator’s idea, Mary is “the Mother of the Saviour” as much as Eve, her type, is the “mother of mankind.” Her maternity unites her personally to God after the manner of the Hypostatic Union of Christ with the Logos; not, indeed, so as to constitute one person with God, but so as to elevate her personality to the highest sphere of created perfection and dignity, above and beyond all mere creatures. The gratia unionis in Christ is a substantial grace, viz. the Logos Himself anointing His human nature with Divinity. Similarly, the grace of Divine maternity is substantial, viz. the Divine Being of the Son infused in the Mother. Again, in Mary, as in Christ, the Substantial grace dwells “corporally,” and in both the union is organic. The grace of maternity existed from all eternity in God’s idea of Mary as an element of her being and a condition of her coming into existence, exactly as the gratia unionis in Christ. Lastly, both unions are analogous in their sanctifying effects: both Christ and Mary, although each in a peculiar form, are “consecrated” by the indwelling Divinity. It deifies Christ, it fills Mary with grace, and makes her the κεχαριτωμένη, full of grace, and ἡ Θεόπαις, the Child of God, in an eminent sense. It also perfects in Mary the antitype of Eve, making her the Bride of the new Adam, and to Him a “helper like himself.” For as Eve came from the substance of Adam, and was endowed with a soul like his and a personality of her own, so Mary receives her supernatural life from the substance of her Divine Son, inasmuch as the Holy Ghost, who proceeds from the Logos, and is one with Him, dwells in Mary as in His sanctuary, and so gives her a personality analogous to that of Christ. Again, this indwelling of the Holy Ghost constitutes Mary “the type of the Church,” which is “the spouse of Christ,” inasmuch as its members are sanctified, raised to the rank of adopted sons, by the outpouring on them of the Holy Spirit.

III. As the grace of union secures to the humanity of Christ the highest excellence attainable by a created nature, so the grace of Divine Motherhood secures to Mary the highest excellence possible to a created person. It associates her in the closest manner with the Divine persons; without giving her divinity, it draws her to the Divinity as near as the finite can be drawn to the infinite.

1. She is the Daughter of God the Father: first, in common with every rational being; secondly, in common with, but immensely above, all the adoptive children of God through sanctifying grace; thirdly, in common with the humanity of Christ only, as being jointly conceived and jointly willed in the eternal mind, and organically associated in the temporal manifestation, ad extra, of the Logos. Hence so many titles properly belonging to Christ are bestowed by the Church, in a duly modified sense, upon Mary: she is our Lady (Domina), our Life, our Sweetness and Hope, our Queen, etc.

2. She is, next to Christ, the noblest and most exalted of human beings; through her, mankind is mystically connected with Christ and with God. The Mother of Christ is also, through Him, the Mother of His mystical body, the Church. When she conceived and brought forth Christ, she also conceived and brought forth the Light and Life of the world, wherefore her maternity of the adoptive children of God is not purely mystical, but has an organic foundation in fact.

3. Lastly, having been made a participator in Christ’s eternal generation, and in His Fatherhood (Headship) of mankind, Mary in a manner and degree participates in His office of Mediator between God and man. She is the Mediatrix who leads us on to the true Mediator, Christ; for through her Christ received the existence and the flesh in which He carries out His mediation, and is the Head of mankind. Mary’s mediation, however, essentially differs from that of her Son: He, being God, gives of His own; she, being but a creature, distributes what she receives.

IV. The peculiar exaltedness of the Mother of Jesus above all that is great and holy in creation (except her Son), entitles her to a peculiar worship, differing in degree and in kind from that due to the Saints. The technical name “hyperdulia” given to this worship implies that it is above the dulia (service) offered to ordinary saints.

When we thus honour Mary, we honour in her the gifts of God and Christ. The worship of the Mother implies and completes the worship of the Father and the Son.

SECT. 214.—MARY FULL OF GRACE—HER IMMACULATE CONCEPTION

The “fulness of grace” of the Mother of Jesus began with her Immaculate Conception, defined in the Bull Ineffabilis in these terms: “The most blessed Virgin Mary, in the first instant of her conception, was, by a singular grace and privilege of Almighty God, through the foreseen merits of Jesus Christ, the Saviour of mankind, preserved free from all stain of original sin (ab omni originalis culpœ labe præservatam immunem).”

I. 1. The subject of the definition is the “person” of the Blessed Virgin; hence, “the first instant of her conception” is the moment in which God united the living soul to the body, i.e. the moment Mary began to be a human being; technically, her nativitas in utero.

2. The words, “was preserved from all stain of original sin,” directly express that the habitual sin of Adam, which passed on to all his descendants as an internal stain, did not touch Mary. Indirectly, the same words imply the doctrine taught by the Church of the Virgin’s original sanctity and justice, and the consequent exclusion of the imperfections of our fallen nature. The preservation from sin is but a consequence of a positive infusion of grace.

3. “Through the merits foreseen of the Saviour,” is added to show that Mary, like every other child of Adam, was by nature liable to original sin, and that to her, as to others, Redemption from it through her Son was necessary. But whilst Christ frees us from the sin after it has been actually contracted, He freed His Mother from the necessity of contracting it at all.

4. The last words, “by a singular privilege,” etc., state that the Immaculate Conception was a gracious and unique exception to the general law. The universality of the law is thus no proof against Mary’s immaculateness, nor does her immaculateness create a prejudice against the universality of the law. “This law is not made for thee, but for all others” (Esth. 15:13).

II. 1. The proof of the Immaculate Conception contained in the formula of St. Anselm, Potuit, decuit, ergo fecit (“the Immaculate Conception was possible, it was fitting, therefore God accomplished it”), carries conviction to every faithful mind. When we consider the origin of Mary in the Father’s eternal mind, and her close association with the Divinity as described above, we cannot help feeling that God “was bound” to give His daughter every privilege that was possible and becoming: the ergo fecit follows with almost metaphysical cogency. The “Holy Virgin, the Daughter of God, the true Eve,” must be perfectly stainless.

2. Scripture speaks nowhere in set terms of this dogma. It may, however, be inferred from Gen. 3:3, 15, compared with the salutation of the Angel and of Elizabeth (Luke 1:28, 42): “I will put enmities between thee and the woman, and thy seed and her seed; she shall crush thy head, and thou shalt lie in wait for her heel;” “Hail, full of grace, the Lord is with thee: blessed art thou among women;” “Blessed art thou among women, and blessed is the fruit of thy womb.” The Woman, blessed among women, and her Son are here represented as jointly opposing the power of the father of sin: the victory is a crushing defeat of the enemy which—whether attributed by the text primarily to the Mother or to the Son (cf. supra, p. 51)—is common to both, and implies that neither of them, even for a single instant, was under the power of sin. The words of the angelic salutation are but an echo of the Protoevangelium. The woman full of grace and blessed above all women is she who, with her Son, crushed the serpent’s head and destroyed its seed.

3. It would be unfair to restrict the proof from tradition to such testimonies of the Fathers as directly assert the Immaculate Conception. To get at the sense of the early Church on this point, we must examine its picture of Mary’s general holiness, and of her position in the supernatural order. Two features are prominent and universally pointed out, both of which evidently imply the completest freedom from all stain of sin. They are: (a) Mary’s perfect, unqualified purity; and (b) her position as the “new Eve the mother of regenerate mankind.” St. Anselm, in the words reproduced at the beginning of the Bull Ineffabilis, sums up the Christian tradition with its motives: “It was fitting that Mary should shine with a purity than which none greater can be conceived except in God. For she is the Virgin to whom God the Father ordained to give His only Son—generated from His heart, equal to Himself, and beloved by Him as another Self—so that He should be the one and selfsame Son of God the Father, and of the Virgin. She it is whom the Son chose to be His Mother substantially, and of whom the Holy Ghost willed and effected that He, from Whom He Himself proceeds, should be conceived and born.” The idea of the New Eve is thus introduced by St. Ephrem, “Both (Mary and Eve) were established in the same purity and simplicity, but Eve became the cause of our death, Mary the cause of our life.”

Besides the general and implicit expressions of the Virgin’s Immaculateness—volumes of which can be produced—there exist, from the fourth century onwards, many witnesses testifying to an express knowledge of the dogma in the Church, and even among the common people. In the Eastern Churches the belief constantly existed without any contradiction, and manifested itself in many doctrinal utterances and in the ancient feast of the Conception of St. Anne. In the West we find fewer traces of the doctrine, yet we meet with no contradiction until the twelfth century, when the introduction of the feast of the Immaculate Conception gave rise to controversies closed only by the definition of 1854. (For details, the reader may consult Perrone, Passaglia, or Malou, De Imm. Conc.; Newman, Angl. Diff., vol. ii.)

III. The proofs from reason, Scripture, and Tradition which establish Mary’s freedom from original sin, likewise establish her freedom from concupiscence and from actual sin. As to the fact that Mary never experienced the motions of concupiscence, there exists an almost absolute unanimity among the Fathers, at least since the fifth century. Moreover, concupiscence is but a consequence of that original sin which never had power over the Mother of Jesus; hence her perfect freedom from it, although not expressly defined (de fide), is fidei proximum. The universal doctrine of her complete exemption from actual sin is confirmed by the Council of Trent (sess. vi. can. 23): “If any one say that man once justified can during his whole life avoid all sins, even venial ones, as the Church holds that the Blessed Virgin did by special privilege of God, let him be anathema.” Theologians go a step further, and assert that Mary was “impeccable,” i.e. unable to commit sin; not indeed, like Christ, by the essential perfection of her nature, but by that special Divine privilege which assimilated her as far as possible to her Son.

SECT. 215.—MARY’S DEATH, INCORRUPTIBILITY, AND ASSUMPTION INTO HEAVEN

I. There are two methods of treating of the end of Mary’s life on earth—the historical and the theological. Death, incorruption of the body, and resurrection, are facts observable by eye-witnesses, and therefore matter of history and tradition. But in the case of the Blessed Virgin, as in that of our Lord, these facts may also be studied from theological sources of knowledge. Since the Vatican Council was petitioned to define the bodily assumption of Mary into heaven, a vast amount of literature, historical and theological, has been produced on the question. The outcome of the historical researches has proved unsatisfactory to the defenders of the traditional view; no contemporary evidence, no reliable testimony connecting later traditions with the facts, is forthcoming. From purely historical sources the current belief in Mary’s bodily assumption cannot be proved. This belief, however, has in theological principles so solid a foundation, that many theologians think it ripe for dogmatic definition. “Did Mary in her bodily life share the common lot of mankind, or did she in this, as in her spiritual life, participate in the privileges of her Son?” Such is the question which theology has to solve.

II. That Mary underwent death is a universal belief in the Church. Yet her death is less certain than her glorification. For this latter admits of positive proof from revelation, whereas the former cannot be proved convincingly either from history or revelation. In fact, the law of death as revealed only punishes fallen mankind; but Mary was exempted from original sin, therefore also from its penalty, death. Again, her death cannot be proved as a consequence of her mortal nature, for in her case the claim of nature is superseded by a supernatural claim to immortality. The same would have been true of Adam, had he not sinned. Mary’s claim to a life unbroken by death rests upon her Divine Motherhood; but as she is the Mother of Him who died for us, it was fitting that she should die also, lest her and her Son’s human natures should be thought unreal, and the Mother privileged above the Son. Mary, then, died because Jesus died; but her death was not necessarily the effect of violence—it being undergone neither as an expiation or penalty, nor as the effect of disease from which, like Jesus, she was exempt. Since the Middle Ages the view prevails that she died of Love, her great desire to be united to her Son either dissolving the ties of body and soul, or prevailing on God to dissolve them. Her “passing away” is a sacrifice of Love completing the dolorous sacrifice of her life; it is the death in the kiss of the Lord (in osculo Domini), of which the just die.

III. Death is an evil not degrading in itself; nay, under certain circumstances it is even honourable. Corruption of the body, on the contrary, is of itself associated with ideas of dishonour: even in the body of the just it is looked upon as a result of God’s curse on sin. Hence, corruption of the body is incompatible with the dignity and position of Mary. The body of the Mother of Christ and Bride of the Holy Ghost could not be allowed to fall a prey to vile corruption. To the Virgin, who conceived without knowing man, who brought forth without lesion, whose flesh without concupiscence had encompassed Divinity, the words of the Psalmist may be applied: “Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell; nor wilt Thou give Thy holy one to see corruption” (Ps. 15:10). The Fathers love to connect Mary’s incorruption after death with her virginal integrity during life. No theologian impugns this privilege. Mary’s incorruptibility is theologically so certain that it may be used as an argument for her speedy resurrection.

IV. A lifeless body, however incorrupt, is still under the dominion of death. If, then, Mary’s body was preserved intact because though dead it was not under the law of death, its separation from the soul could only last a short time. The words (Ps. 15:10) quoted by St. Peter (Acts 2:24) to prove the resurrection of Christ, have likewise force to prove the resurrection of Mary, inasmuch as she shared with Him the privilege of incorruptibility. As from the beginning she was associated with her Son in the conflict against sin and evil (Gen. 2:15), so must she also be associated with Him in the final victory and triumph. Further theological considerations, based upon the grace of Motherhood, may help to strengthen this proof. 1. Protracted death would be an unbecoming interruption of Mary’s Motherhood, since she is Mother by her body. 2. The Bride of Christ ought not to be separated from her Bridegroom beyond the term required by the object of the union. If “husbands must love their wives, as Christ loved the Church and delivered Himself up for it” (Eph. 5:25), and if Mary is the type, and the first member of the Church, and if she enjoys the first and greatest love of the Head of the Church, how can her body be dead to Him? 3. The commandment to honour father and mother, the promises made to the Saints of a participation in the Divine nature, the fact that Mary’s substance formed the substance of her Son—all these require the completest honour to the body of Mary. Other proofs from types in the Old Testament are current among the Fathers; especially the incorruptible wood of the Ark of the Covenant.

V. Mary’s corporeal assumption into heaven is so thoroughly implied in the notion of her personality as given by Bible and dogma, that the Church can dispense with strict historical evidence of the fact. Again, whatever traditional evidence there is, e.g. the early celebration of the feast of the Assumption, acquires increased force from the theological arguments, and vice versâ.

SECT. 216.—MARY’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WORK OF REDEMPTION

I. Work necessarily bears the stamp of the worker: its worth or worthlessness, its meritoriousness or demeritoriousness, are commensurate with the qualities of the agent who produces it. Hence, correctly to estimate Mary’s co-operation in the work of Redemption, we must keep before our eyes her personal character, especially its analogy with the personal character of Christ The peculiar dignity and power of her work are derived from the Holy Ghost, Who acts in and through her in a union by grace, as the Logos acts in and through the humanity of Christ in personal union.

II. As Mother of Christ, Mary co-operated “physically” in the Incarnation. This privilege she shares with no other creature. Ministers of the sacraments act as mere vehicles of God’s power; Mary gives to Him of her own substance. Without having the sacramental power of the priest, she in the conception, formation, and birth of the Saviour, presents the most perfect type of the priest’s functions. Moreover, her organic participation in the beginning of Christ’s life, organically connects her with the whole course of that life.

III. Mary’s actions had a singular moral value in themselves as being personal services rendered to God, and tending to further the great object of the Incarnation. But they acquire a special excellence from the personal excellence of their authoress: they flow from the “Bride of the Logos, and Bearer of the Holy Ghost,” and have the stamp of their origin. If the soul of the just is a temple in which the spirit “asketh with unspeakable groanings in order to help our infirmity” (Rom. 8:26), we are justified in assuming that in the sanctuary of Mary’s soul His sanctifying influence attains the highest degree. He inspires acts, moves the will to carry them out, and assists in the work, so as to make it almost wholly His own. From this point of view the actions of the Blessed Virgin are seen to possess, like those of Christ and of the Church, a supernatural, moral, and legal efficacy, benefiting not herself only, but all mankind. There is, however, between the merits of Christ and those of Mary, an essential difference in their manner of benefiting others. The merits of Christ, infinitely perfect in themselves, are applied authoritatively to whom and in what measure He wills. What Mary does for us is neither infinitely perfect nor applied on her own authority; her work, however excellent and pleasing to God, is but “impetratory,” viz. of its kind it is a prayer.

IV. The titles given by the Church to Mary, “the new Eve, the Bride of the new Adam, the Sanctuary and Organ of the Holy Ghost,” clearly contain the idea that her work is associated with the work of Christ by a special ordinance of God; that it enters into the plan of Redemption, and forms a subordinate but integral part of Redemption. Hence the attributes of the Saviour are often bestowed upon His Mother. She is called Salvatrix, Reparatrix, even Redemptrix; the destruction of sin and the victory over the devil are ascribed to her. The meaning of these titles and attributes when applied to Mary is not the same as when applied to Christ; to the former they only apply as to the “Handmaid of the Redeemer in the work of Redemption.” The Fathers find a proof for, and an illustration of, the Divine preordination of Mary’s co-operation with her Son, in the fact that the Redemption was the exact counterpart of the Fall: the subordinate part acted by Eve for evil is counteracted by the subordinate part acted by the new Eve for good (Newman, Angl. Diff., II. p. 31 sqq.).

1. The first act of Mary’s co-operation in the work of Redemption is her consent to become the Mother of the Redeemer. As Eve, through disobedience and disbelief, became the handmaid of the devil in the work of destruction, even so Mary, through obedience and faith, becomes the handmaid of God in the work of restoration. And as Eve’s consent to the temptation became fully co-operative in the fall when Adam added to it his own consent, so Mary’s consent became a full co-operation when Christ united to it His first act of obedience.

2. This initial consent, the fervent prayers which preceded and followed it, the continued maternal services, the offering of Jesus in the Temple and on the Cross, the complete union of her will with His in the work of Redemption, place Mary by the side of her Son as a deaconess by the side of the sacrificing priest. The deacon is both the representative of the people and the consecrated assistant of the priest: in the first capacity he hands to the priest the elements of the sacrifice; in the second he supports him in the oblation of the chalice, and, when the sacrifice is complete, assists him in the distribution of the Sacred Food. In the same manner Mary takes an active and integral part in the sacrifice of Christ, without in the least interfering with His self-sufficiency and supremacy.

3. The association of the Mother of Jesus with her Son in acquiring the redeeming merits, is maintained in their distribution, and is of the same nature, viz. what Christ effects by His own authority and power, Mary obtains by intercession and prayer. She, of all human persons the most excellent and the nearest to God, the organ of the Holy Ghost and the Mother of the Church, received at the foot of the Cross the fulness of salvation in the name of mankind. In the Apostle St. John she beholds the spiritual sons committed to her motherly care; in the upper chamber she sat and prayed with the Princes of the infant Church; in heaven she reigns as a Queen all-powerful because her prayer knows no refusal. May we not say, with some theologians, that God grants no grace except on the intercession of Mary? It would certainly be an anomaly in the Divine dispensation if a work begun and carried on with the co-operation of the Virgin-Mother was concluded without her: “the gifts of God are without repentance.” We must, however, be careful to fix accurately the sense of our statement. It does not imply that we can obtain no grace except by expressly and explicitly praying for it to Mary, or that her intercession is always required in order to dispose her Son in our favour. The true and only defensible meaning is that “in the Dispensation established by God and by Christ, the merits and the intercession of the Saviour Himself are applied to nobody without the concurring intercession of Mary, and consequently, that every grace given is co-impetrated by Mary.”

Scholion. The doctrine of the Invocation of Saints is thus described by the Council of Trent (sess. xxv.): “The Saints, who reign together with Christ, offer up their own prayers to God for men. It is good and useful suppliantly to invoke them, and to have recourse to their prayers, aid, and help for obtaining benefits from God, through His Son Jesus Christ, Who alone is our Redeemer and Saviour. Those persons think impiously who deny that the Saints, who enjoy eternal happiness in heaven, are to be invocated; or who assert either that they do not pray for men; or that the invocation of them to pray for each of us even in particular, is idolatry; or that it is repugnant to the word of God, and is opposed to the honour of the one Mediator of God and men, Christ Jesus.”

“Prayer,” says St. Thomas, “is offered to a person in two ways—one as though to be granted by himself, another as to be obtained through him. In the first way we pray to God alone, because all our prayers ought to be directed to obtaining grace and glory which God alone gives, according to those words of Psalm 83:12: The Lord will give grace and glory. But in the second way we pray to holy angels and men, not that God may learn our petition through them, but that by their prayers and merits our prayers may be efficacious. Wherefore it is said in the Apocalypse (8:4): The smoke of the incense of the prayers of the Saints ascended up before God from the hand of the Angel” (Summ. Theol. 2 2, q. 83, a. 4).

BOOK VI

GRACE

THE subject of this Book is the salvation of mankind as worked out in each of its members by the saving grace of the Redeemer. The Sixth Session of the Council of Trent on justification, the dissertations of the Fathers on the grace by which we are justified, and the theological treatises on the grace of the Saviour, deal with the same subject-matter. In Book III. we have said all that is necessary on the supernatural order and habitual grace; here we are concerned with the actual working of grace unto salvation. The first chapter treats of grace as the principle of regeneration; the second of the order and economy of justification and salvation in man; the third of the order and economy of grace in God’s providence.

Peter Lombard, 1. ii. dist. 26–29, with Comment, of St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and Estius; St. Thomas, 1, 2, qq. 109–114, with Comment of Sylvius, Gonet, Gotti, Billuart, Suarez, Vasquez, etc.; Kleutgen, Theol. der Vorzeit, vol. ii.; Satolli, De Gratia Christi; Einig, De Gratia.

Scheeben’s great work, which we have hitherto mainly followed, was broken off in the middle of the treatise on Grace (book vi.).

CHAPTER I

GRACE THE PRINCIPLE OF REGENERATION

SECT. 217.—SOME GENERAL NOTIONS

I. THE primary object of the saving grace of Christ is to restore and to foster in man that life of holiness and justice which was lost through original sin, and thereby to enable him to secure his supernatural end, the beatific vision of God. Whatever was essential to holiness of life in Adam, must be restored to us by this saving grace of Christ, lest His Incarnation be in vain. From our fallen state we must be raised to a new, higher, and godlike life; our will, weakened and impaired in the fall, must be healed and strengthened, and receive back its supernatural rectitude. Unlike the human physician, whose skill consists in enabling the existing principle of life to accomplish its natural functions, Christ, the heavenly physician, infuses into the soul a new principle of a new life; He removes sin, heals the wounds inflicted by it, and renovates the interior—that is, the spiritual—man. “Even when we were dead, (God) hath quickened us together in Christ, by Whose grace you are saved, and hath raised us up together, and hath made us sit together in the heavenly places through Christ Jesus” (Eph. 2:5–7).

II. The renovation of the “interior man” is not the complete restoration of that state in which God created Adam, but only of a part, viz. supernatural sanctity. Even after the new birth in the “laver of regeneration,” free will remains bent towards the earth and weakened in its power for good. On this infirmity the grace of Christ acts like wholesome medicine on a convalescent; without restoring health altogether and at once, it prevents relapses, and helps the invalid to go through his duties until he reaches his final goal. The power of Christ’s grace is made perfect in this infirmity (2 Cor. 7:9), inasmuch as greater power and efficiency are required to save the weak than the strong. This special power comes to the new-born man through his ingrafting on Christ as a member of His spiritual body, partaking of the life of the Head. The new life is given in the Sacrament of Baptism, the strengthening power is communicated, though in various ways, in Confirmation, Extreme Unction, and Holy Eucharist.

III. Scripture attributes to the Holy Ghost the diffusion or distribution of the graces merited by Christ (Rom. 5:5) The sending of the Holy Ghost was promised by Christ as a fruit of His saving work on earth. The third Person of the Trinity is the principle of our supernatural life, not separately, but conjointly with the Father and the Son, since all external works are common to the three Divine Persons (§ 107). The distribution of grace is specially attributed to the Holy Ghost because He is the Breath of the Divine Love, which Love is the source of all God’s gifts. Again, He is the “vivifying Spirit, proceeding from God,” and thus represents a principle which can be communicated to creatures, and act in them as an immanent principle of higher life. He comes to man as a cloud of light (cf. 1 Cor. 10:2), and as a fountain of water springing up into life everlasting (John 4:14); as the Spirit of Life in the mystical body of Christ, diffusing, from the Head, new life into each member. As the mother is the principle of the life of the child still growing in her womb—or, to use a better analogy, as the spiritual essence of the human soul influences the vital functions of the vegetative life in the body—so does the indwelling Holy Ghost influence man’s spiritual life. As the spiritual essence of the soul supplies its energy to the principle of vegetative life, so the Holy Ghost supplies energy to the principle of man’s sanctified life. viz. to his reason and free will.

IV. Dealing with the saving grace of Christ specifically as the source of the new moral life in man, we consider it chiefly as “actual grace;” differing from “habitual grace” as a passing act differs from an habitual state. This treatment is commonly followed by modern theologians; the Fathers and the Schoolmen, on the contrary, do not emphasize the difference, and frequently speak of habitual and actual grace as of one whole. Controversial reasons account for this discrepancy, which readers of the older theologians should constantly bear in mind.

SECT. 218.—ACTITAL GRACE

I. Actual and habitual grace are the two species of the genus “grace.” Both are free gifts of God to man. But whereas habitual grace connotes an enduring state of the soul, actual grace connotes a passing act produced in it by the gratuitous operation of God. In this wider sense, all supernatural acts, the free acts of our will included, are gifts and acts of God, and may be styled actual graces. In a narrower sense, however, actual grace is a gratuitous Divine operation, entirely or partly different from habitual grace, by which God so influences the moral acts of the soul that they come into existence as His own gifts and operations. Actual grace enables and causes the will to perform salutary acts. Technically, it is defined as gratuitum principium proximum agendi, and donum per quod et in quo præstatur nobis ut agamus, that is, the Divine gift by which we are led to act. Habitual grace, indeed, enables us to perform salutary acts, but the actual impulse, the motive power that determines each particular act, is actual grace.

II. Since the introduction of the term “actual” grace to designate all graces other than habitual grace, it has become customary to use the older designations in the same sense. Thus the terms, “operating,” “co-operating,” “helping,” “assisting,” “moving,” “awakening” graces, all directly and specifically imply certain Divine operations in the soul whereby God furthers its natural activity. Likewise “interior grace” is used for actual grace, as opposed to the external influence of God or other creatures, on the soul. This is a correct theological use of the term. We must, however, bear in mind that the Schoolmen, and especially the Fathers, did not always use these terms as co-extensive with what is now called “actual” grace. With them, oftener than not, the terms serve to describe the working and work of God in the soul as distinct from habitual grace. Thus to the gratia auxilians (helping grace) they ascribe the remission of sins and the regeneration of man, and not unfrequently they speak of it in the same terms as of sanctifying or habitual grace.

III. When the soul receives the touch of helping grace, it answers by moving itself towards the object for which it was bestowed. The reception of the “touch” is a vital act of the soul, which prepares and disposes it to further operation in the order of grace. Theologians say “grace excites (awakens) the act in the soul.” These expressions imply (1) that the impression made by grace is a vital act—cognition or affection—of the soul; (2) that it disposes the soul to exert its own free activity in a given direction. In modern language the grace in question is a God-given vital energy, furthering acts of spiritual life.

IV. The first elements of the “energy” of actual grace are those acts of the intellect which apprehend the object, the motive, and the means of the good deed to be performed by the will. For every voluntary action depends on a judgment of the intellect as to its advisability. The knowledge of the principles, the terms and the consequence which lead to such conclusion, are the illumination of the mind (illustratio mentis), which is the first actual grace. Knowledge, however, only disposes to the good deed without administering the necessary energy. The “energetic” disposition is produced by God in the form of affections, feelings, motions of the will, which fecundate its freedom and lead it to act rightly. These sensations of the soul (motus, affectus, sensus cordis) are not originated by the free will; they are not free or voluntary acts, but instinctive workings of the mind or heart, leanings and inclinations preparing the free will for action. They are inspired or awakened (excitati) by God; they touch and impel the will before it determines on its free action, and are thus the true “actual, helping, disposing grace.” Even when the will has acted under the impulse of an involuntary inclination, e.g. when it has consented to work out the salvation to which it feels attracted—the inclination is, or may be, maintained by God to support and advance the free working of the will. In this case the former indeliberate sense becomes a deliberate act, without losing the character of actual grace.

V. The process by which God’s grace works out the salutary act of the soul may fitly be compared with the process of generation. God is, as it were, the father, our soul the mother, of the fruit of life. God’s fecundating grace enters the soul, stirs up its natural energy, is received and developed by that same energy, i.e. the free will, until the good deed is brought forth, the common product of grace and free will.

VI. Grace acts on the soul both negatively and positively. Its negative action consists in preventing the evil suggestions of the world, the flesh, and the devil from taking effect upon the mind. This gracious protection often implies the strengthening of the soul by positive Divine influence. Positively, grace acts in two ways: (1) it externally proposes to the soul objects the knowledge of which is apt to lead to salutary actions; (2) it internally supplies the necessary spiritual energy for performing such actions. The preaching of the Church, the words and deeds of good men, certain clear manifestations of God’s providence, the suggestions of our Guardian Angels, are examples of the first manner; to which, since the sixteenth century, has been applied the technical term of motio moralis—that is, motion by suggestion, advice, command, persuasion, or any other means in the power of mere creatures to induce a free will to act. The second, or energizing action, is termed motio physica. It is the tactus cordis, the touch of the heart of the creature by the Creator; it is the touch of the inmost spring of life by the indwelling Author of life. It belongs to God alone, and is as incomprehensible as the action of our mind on the body, which is analogous to it In 1 Cor. 3:6, St. Paul compares the factors of spiritual life with those of the growth of a plant: “I have planted, Apollo watered; but God gave the increase.” The planting and watering represent the external or moral motion; the life-power or vital energy of the plant is likened to the internal or physical motion.

VII. 1. Both of these motions act on the mind in order to generate knowledge conducive to moral actions. The former, however, only brings the mind in contact with its object; whereas the latter confers the power by which the object is illumined, and actually seized upon by the mind.

2. The moral motion directly touches the intellect only, and acts on the will only through the intellect. The physical motion, on the contrary, embraces both faculties, giving warmth and energy to the affections of the will as well as light to the intellect.

3. The moral motion is more like an instantaneous impulse; it does not accompany the action which it determines. But the physical motion acts continuously, conferring and upholding the working energy until the act is completed. The first “waters” the good deed; the second gives it life.

4. A last and most important difference between the two motions lies in the extent of their efficacy. God can supply the will with an unlimited amount of energy according to His own pleasure; He can thus enable it to perform acts of the highest moral worth; and, what is more, He can determine what each act shall be. In other words: the moral motion has an uncertain effect; the physical motion has an infallible effect.

VIII. God has not only the power of moving the will after the manner of created agents, i.e. from without; He also possesses, in an eminent way, that same power by which the will moves itself. Hence, when He, as the first cause, co-operates with the created free will, His co-operation is “a willing,” more powerful than the soul’s own. As the strong hand of the rider trains the wild horse to obey all its master’s wishes, so the Divine hand, mightily and sweetly, trains the human will to find pleasure in doing His will.

SECT. 219.—HERESIES CONCERNING GRACE—THE CORRESPONDING DOGMAS

I. 1. Against the Manichæans the Church had upheld the principle that sin, inasmuch as it implies guilt, is avoidable. Starting from this, Pelagius and his disciples taught (1) that the notion of sin excludes every necessity which is not a consequence of former sins, and even this necessity was only admitted in a limited sense (St. Augustine, Contra Julianum, op. imp. vi. 19); (2) that the notion of our free will implies the power of avoiding every infraction of the moral law, and the power of fulfilling the moral law perfectly in its entirety. The power of avoiding all evil and doing all good being inherent in man’s nature, the children of Adam are born as perfect as their first parent; hence there is no original sin, and consequently no need of redemption. The Church had taught, against the Manichæans, that there is but one source of both good and evil deeds, viz. our free will, which is of itself indifferent to good or evil, but becomes the principle of good and meritorious actions when energized with Divine grace. The power for good, which the Church attributed to grace, Pelagius attributed to nature. As St. Augustine pointed out, in the Pelagian system God was no more the author of good than of evil, and was as much the author of evil as of good. Internal grace, habitual or actual, found no place in Pelagianism. In fact, the influence of internal grace on free will was declared impossible, as being contrary to the very essence of the latter. Nothing but external action, such as the devil may have in his power, was allowed to God!

Jansenius indicates four stages in the evolution of Pelagianism: (1) Pure heathenism, when no mention is made of grace; (2) semi-heathenism, when nature is called grace; (3) Judaism, when the positive law and doctrine are added as graces; (4) semi-Christianity, when the teaching and example of Christ, the forgiveness of sins, the adoption obtained through Baptism, are brought forward as auxiliary graces. From first to last, however, its fundamental tenet is the natural and essential power of free will to do good or evil independently of any help or interference.

Hence, if man’s free will is the only principle of good actions, man is able to merit, of himself, whatever reward or favour or grace is promised by God to such actions, e.g. eternal life, the “good will” of the Author of life, the forgiveness of sins, the aid of revealed doctrine and precepts. An exception was made for the regnum cælorum, the kingdom of heaven (distinguished from “life eternal”), which was a special reward for the dignity of children of God conferred in baptism. That dignity was considered as a grace completing the meritorious action of the will.

Again, all the aids (= graces) which free will requires or receives in order better to avoid evil and do good, are granted by God on the initiative taken by man: as God punishes evil, so He rewards good, viz. according to every man’s personal merit or demerit. There is no favour, no election, no predestination. In short, the creature is emancipated from the Creator in all things moral.

2. Between the years 412 and 418 several African Synods examined and condemned the new doctrines of Pelagius and his disciples. Their decrees were submitted to and approved by the reigning Popes, and consequently they contain the authoritative teaching of the Church. From the various canons we gather the following points:—

(a) Through original sin human nature loses its original freedom and power to lead a righteous life (bene et recte vivendi), in the sense of not being able to fulfil the whole moral law. The new birth, new life, and infusion of charity by the Holy Ghost in Baptism are necessary to restore to man his original power of doing good. This power, however, is not an empty possibility like that claimed by Pelagius; it is a new power, a new and nobler faculty to bring forth new and salutary works.

(b) The new-born man still retains his natural weakness, and is subject to internal and external temptations. Hence he constantly requires the assistance of actual Divine grace not to be led into temptation and sin.

(c) Sanctifying grace obtained in baptism, and the actual graces freely bestowed by God or obtained by prayer, as a matter of fact do not enable man to fulfil the law with the perfection possible in the original state. Hence he always remains subject to a sort of necessity of falling into sins or imperfections.

(d) The decrees asserted the necessity of grace for leading a life of righteousness; in other words, the necessity of charity in order to perform acts meritorious of eternal life. They were silent as to the “preparatory acts” of faith and prayer, and thus afforded a pretext for new controversies and the new heresy of Semi-Pelagianism.

(e) Grace was explained as the vivifying and energizing working of the Holy Ghost on the soul, especially on the will, giving man a kind of participation in the Divine nature, and conforming the human will to the Divine, and thus constantly directing it to will and accomplish what is pleasing to God.

(f) Grace is an essential element of the power of performing salutary actions. It gives our will the perfect freedom of the children of God, inasmuch as this freedom consists in the power of doing good. The Pelagian freedom claims the power for evil as well as for good; the true freedom of God and of His children is for good only.

II. 1. Taking a middle course between the Pelagians, who ascribed the whole work of salvation to the powers of human nature, and the Predestinarians, who ascribed it entirely to God alone, the Semi-Pelagians held that the initial or preparatory acts were in the power of man unaided by grace; and further, that these acts merited the subsequent Divine graces. They thus denied the complete gratuity of grace. In the words, “Believe in the Lord Jesus, and thou shalt be saved” (Acts 16:31), they saw a kind of covenant between God and man: “Give Me thy faith, and My salvation shall be thy reward.” The faith required was, however, nothing but a pious willingness to believe, a simple beginning of faith; it was the act of the soul weakened by sin calling in the Divine Physician.

2. St. Augustine and his disciple Prosper took up arms against this new error. It was condemned in the Indiculus Capitulorum, ascribed of old to Pope Celestine I.; by the popes Gelasius and Hormisdas; and lastly, by the Second Council of Orange. The canons of this council set forth the doctrine of the Church as follows: Grace is not given simply because we ask for it—it is really the cause of our asking for it; in order to free us from sin, God does not expect an act of our will, but the desire to be freed is wrought in us by the infusion of the Holy Ghost; the beginning of faith, the pious willingness to believe, is not in us naturally, but is itself a gift of grace; to the inspiration of the Holy Ghost are also due the initial acts of believing, willing, desiring, striving, seeking, asking; by the mere forces of nature nothing positively leading up to eternal life can be thought of or chosen without the illumination of the Holy Spirit; not only a few, but all require Divine mercy to come to the grace of baptism (canons 3–8). See also §§ 142, 143. The Scripture proofs are clear. “Who distinguisheth thee? or what hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received it?” (1 Cor. 4:7). Faith is expressly set down as a gift of grace. “For by grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God; not of works, that no man may glory” (Eph. 2:8). “This is the work of God that you believe in Him Whom He hath sent” (John 6:29).

III. I. The starting-point of the Reformers’ doctrine on grace is the erroneous principle that original sin destroyed man’s free will. According to Luther, free will was altogether destroyed; according to Calvin, it was so thoroughly vitiated that it is utterly incapable of any spiritual act or aspiration, or of receiving any spiritual impressions; original sin is an evil principle in the soul which infects every thought and action of man, and makes them to be sinful and unfit to contribute either to the justification of the sinner or the sanctification of the just. Hence Calvin taught: “God does not move the will in the manner handed down and believed for many centuries, viz. so that it remains with us to either follow or resist the motion” (Inst. ii. 3). And Scharpius: “We say (in opposition to Bellarmine and the Council of Trent) that after the fall God moves and bends the will of man with such efficacy that when He wills man’s conversion, man must needs follow the Divine will, not indeed compulsorily, but spontaneously” (Scharpius, De Lib. Arb., ii. 3). Luther writes: “Free will (liberum arbitrium) is a fiction … for no one has it in his power to think anything good or evil, but all things, as Wyclif’s article condemned at Constance rightly teaches, come to pass by absolute necessity.… There is no doubt that it was by the teaching of Satan that the name of free will was introduced into the Church” (Assert., art. 36). Again, “Man stands as a beast of burden between God and the devil: if God rides it, it goes whither God wills; if Satan rides it, it goes whither Satan wishes it to go. Nor is it in man’s power to choose his rider; the riders, on the contrary, fight for his possession” (De Servo Arbitrio). This doctrine of the original Reformers was afterwards, like so many others, modified, and by degrees completely abandoned. At the present day the orthodox Lutheran teaching differs little, if at all, from the Catholic doctrine.

Working on a will without freedom and totally depraved, grace produces its own fruit without any co-operation on the part of man: it is likened unto a good tree planted in a bad soil. Side by side with it, depraved nature brings forth its own evil fruit. Man is thus half sinner, half saint, unable to fulfil the law and to please God—even when regenerated through grace. The new life is not justice, but only a striving after justice. No difference is made between the two stages of spiritual life, viz. the preparatory stages of faith, and the perfect life of charity; none between venial and mortal sin, or between simple mortal sin and total falling away from God. Man is made responsible for his acts although he is unable to choose. This repulsive doctrine was early abandoned by the followers of Luther; disciples of Calvin, however, seem to uphold it to this very day.

2. The canons appended to the Sixth Session of the Council of Trent frequently reproduce (for condemnation) the heresies of the Reformers in their own wording. The few we translate here serve the double purpose of throwing a clearer light upon the reformed teaching, and of setting forth the Catholic dogma in its most authentic formulas.

“If any one saith that man’s free will, moved and awakened (excitatum) by God, does in no manner (nihil) co-operate when it assents to God, Who excites and calls it, thereby disposing and preparing itself to receive the grace of justification; and (if any one say) that it cannot dissent if it wished, but that, as some inanimate thing, it does nothing whatever and only remains passive, let him be anathema” (can. 4).

“If any one saith that, after the sin of Adam, man’s free will was lost and extinguished, let him be anathema” (can. 5).

“If any one saith that all works done before justification, in whatever way they may be done, are truly sins, or deserve the hatred of God; or that, the more vehemently one strives to dispose himself for grace, the more grievously he sins, let him be anathema” (can. 7).

“If any one saith that the commandments of God are impossible to be observed by man, even when justified and constituted in grace, let him be anathema” (can. 18).

“If any one saith that man, once justified, can sin no more nor lose grace …; or, on the contrary, that he can during his whole life avoid all sins, even venial ones, except by a special privilege of God, as the Church holds of the blessed Virgin, let him be anathema” (can. 23).

“If any one saith that the just, in every good work, sins at least venially, or, what is more intolerable, mortally, and therefore deserves eternal punishment; and that, if he is not damned, it is only because God does not impute to him these works unto damnation, let him be anathema” (can. 25).

“If any one saith that, when grace is lost through sin, faith also is always lost with it; or that the faith which remains is not a true faith, although it be not living; or that he who has faith without charity is not a Christian, let him be anathema” (can. 28).

“If any one saith that the justified man sins when, for the sake of an eternal reward he performs good works, let him be anathema” (can. 31).

IV. The errors of the Reformers were partly reproduced by some Catholic theologians unwilling to break with the Church. Baius (Michael Bay, of Louvain) admitted free will in man, and taught that grace enabled him to perform good and meritorious works. But in many other points he followed the Reformers. We subjoin some of the seventy-nine propositions extracted from his writings and condemned by Pius V. (Bulla, Ex omnibus afflictionibus, Oct. 1, 1567), by Gregory XIII. (1579), and by Urban VIII. (1641).

25. “All the works of infidels are sins, and all the virtues of philosophers are vices.”

27. “Free will (liberum arbitrium), without the help of God’s grace, has only power for sin.”

28. “It is a Pelagian error to say that free will has the power to avoid any sin;”

35. “Every action of the sinner or the slave of sin is a sin.”

46. “A sinful act is not necessarily a voluntary act (Ad rationem peccati non pertinet voluntarium).”

67. “Man sins, even unto damnation, in actions which he performs by necessity.”

70. “Man in the state of mortal sin and under the penalty of eternal damnation, may have true charity; and even perfect charity is consistent with the guilt (reatus) of eternal damnation.”

74. “Concupiscence in the regenerated, who fall back into mortal sin, and in whom it dominates, is a sin, as also are other bad habits.”

V. Jansenius went a step beyond Baius, by trying to introduce Calvin’s errors in a more refined form. We must limit ourselves to giving the famous five propositions taken from the Augustinus of Jansenius, and condemned by Innocent X. (1653), Alexander VII. (1656), and Clement XI. (1705). Supra, p. 190.

1. “Some of God’s precepts are impossible to the just, who wish and strive (to keep them), considering the powers (vires) they actually have; the grace by which they may be made possible is also wanting.”

2. “In the state of fallen nature one never resists interior grace.”

3. “In order to merit or demerit in the state of fallen nature, freedom from necessity (liberty to choose) is not required in man, but freedom from external compulsion (coactio) is sufficient.”

4. “The Semi-Pelagians admitted the necessity of a prevenient (prævenientis) interior grace for each act, even for the beginning of faith; they were heretics because they pretended this grace to be such that the human will could either resist or obey it.”

5. “It is Semi-Pelagian to say that Christ died or shed His blood for all men without exception (omnino omnibus).”

VI. Jansenius had published his doctrines in a strictly scientific form; Quesnel brought them before the public in the attractive garb of popular writings, occasionally reverting to the harsher errors of Baius, which Jansenius had tried to soften down in his system. One hundred and one propositions taken from Quesnel’s works were condemned by Clement XI. in the Bull Unigenitus (1713).

VII. The last manifestation of Jansenism censured by the Church was the pseudo-synod of Pistoja. Eighty-one propositions of the Synod were condemned by Pope Pius VI. in the Bull Auctorem fidei (1794).

SECT. 220.—NECESSITY OF ACTUAL GRACE

I. The sphere in which grace works is the spiritual life of man, whose leading faculties are the intellect and the will. The existence of these powers is a fact testified to by our consciousness, but the determination of their limits is among the difficult problems of philosophy. Can we know anything with certainty? Can we know anything beyond what our senses teach us? Is not even this knowledge an illusion? Is the moral law, or the existence of God, within the grasp of our unaided faculties? These and similar questions have been met by sceptics, agnostics, ontologists, traditionalists, idealists, and others, with contending systems ranging from universal doubt to universal belief. Is our will really free, or are we the playthings of unknown sub-conscious motives which determine our actions, leaving us under the impression that we act from choice? What impels us so often to act against our better knowledge? The teaching of the Church on these points may be expressed in the two following propositions:—

(1) The human intellect is endowed with the physical power to know the truths of the natural order; (2) the free will of man is endowed with the physical power of performing actions morally good, although in the state of fallen nature this power is not sufficient to overcome always and in all things all the difficulties which beset its exercise.

1. That the human mind is able to grasp some truths and to know them with certainty, is an axiom which cannot be demonstrated without begging the question. It must be admitted as a primary and fundamental fact in all teaching. But if the mind is able to know some truths, it is able to know all the truths of the same order, provided they be properly brought to its notice. A knowledge of God, the Author of nature and of the moral law, is within the reach of our natural powers (see Wisd. 3:5; Rom. 1:19 sq.; 2:14, etc.; vol. i. p. 158 sqq.).

2. The physical power of willing and performing good actions in the natural order is also self-evident. We know what is good and what is evil; we instinctively incline to what is, or appears good to us, and likewise decline from evil; lastly, we command the means to give effect to our inclinations. Thus we know, without the aid of revelation, that the Author of nature is worthy of praise, thanksgiving, and love; we feel in our innermost being, that is, in our conscience, an impulse to give God His due, and in word and action to praise, thank, and love Him. Such is the teaching of St. Paul (Rom. 2:14): “When the Gentiles who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law; these, having not the law, are a law to themselves … their conscience bearing witness to them,” etc. (cf. Matt. 5:46). God even rewards such actions of the Gentiles (see Exod. 1:21; Ezech. 29:18). It must, however, be acknowledged that in its exercise the power of doing the right thing is beset with countless difficulties. In the original fall, our will suffered more than our intellect. St. Paul only confirms every one’s own experience when he says (Rom. 7:23), “But I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin, that is in my members.” And (ibid. 25), “I myself with the mind serve the law of God; but with the flesh the law of sin.”

II. Having sufficiently vindicated the powers of man in the sphere of nature, we ought now to consider what these powers are capable of in the sphere of supernature. This task, however, has been performed in our treatise on the Supernatural (§ 143), to which we beg the reader to refer. See also the definitions of the Church against Pelagianism, in § 219.

The necessity of grace for the performance of salutary acts, either before or after justification, is physical, absolute, and unconditional. It is necessary to man while yet in the state of nature, to elevate him to the plane of supernature. It is necessary to the sinner, in order to cancel the guilt of mortal sin, to reconvert his mind and will to God, and to obtain the remission of eternal punishment. It is also necessary to the just in order to perform salutary acts. For although the just is endowed with habitual grace, he remains subject to the general law that no creature can act without the concurrence of God. Hence, when the habit passes into acts, God concurs according to the nature of the habit, viz. supernaturally, or by giving actual grace. Besides, there is a special necessity arising from the weakened condition of human nature, even in the children of adoption. They, too, must pray, “Lead us not into temptation,” for “the spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh weak” (Matt. 26:41).

SECT. 221.—FINAL PERSEVERANCE

I. Final perseverance in grace implies two factors: one internal, viz. the conservation of grace; and the other external, viz. death overtaking the individual when he is in the state of grace (Matt. 10:22; Apoc. 2:10). Such preservation of grace until the moment of death is a special privilege or gift of God, distinct from the Divine concurrence in either the natural or supernatural order, and likewise distinct from the sum total of common graces connected with the state of justice given to all the just. Yet it is not an actual or habitual grace more efficacious than the rest, but a special care of Divine Providence so disposing matters that death shall overtake the just when he is in the state of sanctifying grace. This happy result is attained in various ways: life may be shortened to prevent a fall into mortal sin, or lengthened to afford time for repentance; temptations may be removed, or additional help conferred to overcome them.

II. The Church, in the Second Council of Orange, defined against the Semi-Pelagians the necessity of a special Divine assistance for final perseverance. “The reborn and the sanctified (sancti), in order to come to a good end, and to persevere in goodness, have need always to implore the help of God” (can. 3). The Council of Trent (sess. vi. can. 22) anathematizes any one who says that “the justified is able, without a special help of God, to persevere in the justice received; or that, with such help, he is not able to persevere.” Reason supports the teaching of the Councils. The will of man is unsteady, and constantly wavers between good and evil. The infused habits of virtue, though they add strength to the will, do not limit its inclinations to good alone. In order, therefore, to secure constancy in goodness, a special Divine assistance is necessary. Hence also Scripture admonishes us to “work out our salvation with fear and trembling” (Phil. 2:12); “to watch and pray, lest we fall into temptation,” for “we have this treasure in earthen vessels, that the excellency may be of the power of God, and not of us” (2 Cor. 4:7). But we may be “confident that He who hath begun a good work in us will perfect it unto the day of Christ Jesus” (Phil. 1:6). And He will also fix the right time of our death: “He pleased God and was beloved, and living among sinners he was translated. He was taken away, lest wickedness should alter his understanding, or deceit beguile his soul” (Wisd. 4:10–15). See Vol. I., pp. 219, 372.

SECT. 222.—GRACE AND MAN’S LIABILITY TO VENIAL SIN

I. Another point in connection with the life of grace remains to be elucidated. The Pelagians maintained that a perfect, sinless life was possible by the mere powers of our nature. They considered the “perfection of justice” to consist in impeccancy or sinlessness and freedom from concupiscence. That doctrine was assailed by St. Augustine, and condemned by the Second Council of Milevis, and again by the Council of Trent. “If any one saith that man, being once justified, is able to avoid all sins, even venial, during all his life, without a special Divine privilege such as the Church holds was granted to the Blessed Virgin, let him be anathema” (sess. vi. can. 23).

II. The sins which even the just cannot always avoid, are not those known as mortal, or destructive of the life of grace. They are the slight aberrations of the will from the strait and narrow path of perfection, sufficient to incline the mind for a moment towards the creature, but insufficient to turn it away from the love of God and one’s neighbour, e.g. idle words, vain thoughts, and such-like. Some sins, of themselves mortal, become venial on account of the want of deliberation; for no sin, however grave materially, can be mortal if committed with imperfect knowledge or will. The words “all sins” in the above definition refer to all sins taken collectively. Taken separately, there is no venial sin that cannot be avoided. Again, the impossibility of avoiding all venial sins collectively, is not physical, but moral; in other words, the avoidance is of such difficulty that, knowing the ways (mores) of man, we feel sure that man will fail if left to himself.

1. All sins, mortal and venial, may only be avoided by a “special privilege,” distinct from the forces of nature to which Pelagius attributed such power; distinct from habitual grace, which does not make the just impeccable; distinct from the usual supply of habitual grace and from the grace of perseverance, both of which are compatible with venial sin. What is “special” about this privilege is that it constitutes an exception to the general rule: no man leads a perfectly sinless life.

2. The reason for the moral impossibility of a life entirely free from sin is to be found in the weakness of our nature and in the multitude of occasions of sin which surround us. It certainly passes the power of our mind to be so constantly on the watch against these occasions, as never to be caught unawares. And besides, we cannot help a certain feeling that the result to be obtained by such strained watchfulness is not commensurate with the labour it involves. Venial sins do not entail the loss of habitual grace or eternal punishment, and they are easily forgiven. Einig, De Gratia, thes. 10.

CHAPTER II

JUSTIFICATION

IN the present chapter we shall endeavour to show how grace, the principle of new life, takes possession of the soul of man, and transfers him from the slavery of sin into the kingdom of the adopted sons of God. “Justification” is the term applied to this process by the Council of Trent and by theologians. Its etymological meaning is “making just,” that is, putting man in the right with God and with himself, or re-establishing the order originally established between God and man. Of this primitive order sanctifying grace was the foundation and the life-spring. Hence the question of “How man is justified” resolves itself into this: “How is sanctifying grace conferred upon man?” If the reader has mastered Book III., Part II., and especially § 149, he can solve that question for himself. We have only to add the teaching of the Church (a) on the preparation for justification; (b) on its essential character, as opposed to the innovations of the Reformers; (c) on some of its effects; and (d) on the meritoriousness of the works of the justified. The Sixth Session of the Council of Trent is our guide throughout.

SECT. 223.—ACTS PREPARATORY TO JUSTIFICATION

I. The early Reformers denied the necessity of any disposition on the part of the adult to fit him for the reception of habitual grace. To them the enslaved will is but a lifeless instrument in the hands of God. Faith they require, not as a disposing or preparing act, but as the instrument, or the hand, by which man seizes upon justification. Luther even went so far as to assert the sinfulness of acts intended by man to fit him for the reception of grace. He, as well as Calvin, held that such acts interfered with the essential gratuity of God’s gifts. Against these errors the Council of Trent defined that “they who through sin were turned away from God, through His awakening (excitantem) and helping grace, are disposed to turn themselves to their own justification by freely assenting to and co-operating with that same grace” (sess. vi. chap. 5). “If any one saith that the impious is justified by faith alone, meaning that nothing else is required to co-operate in order to obtain the grace of justification, and that he (the impious, or sinner) need in no way be prepared and disposed by the action (motu) of his own will, let him be anathema” (ibid., can. 9).

II. Free will is the chief faculty to be influenced in the process of justification. But God, acting with or upon His creatures either in the natural or the supernatural order, always acts in harmony with the laws of their nature. A Divine action out of harmony with these laws could only be useless or hurtful. Hence, when God draws unto Him the free will of man, He draws it by its own free motions (§§ 148, 149).

1. Whenever Scripture holds out justification to man, it requires of him some personal acts as a preparation: “But if the wicked do penance for all his sins … and keep all My commandments, and do justice and judgment, living he shall live and shall not die” (Ezech. 18:21). “Behold, I stand at the gate and knock. If any man shall hear My voice, and open to Me the door, I will come in to him” (Apoc. 3:20). “He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved” (Mark 16:16), etc.

2. The tradition of the Church on this point is summed up in the words of St. Augustine: “He Who made thee without thee, does not justify thee without thee” (Serm. 15. 13, De Verb. Apost.).

III. Infants are justified by simple “information” of the soul: grace reaches them, in harmony with their undeveloped nature, without their co-operation, by the virtue of Baptism. The same is true of the insane, who have never had the use of their free will. Such as have lost their freedom profit by the sacraments only if, before the loss, they desired to receive them.

The rule that God acts on free will without diminishing its freedom affords a criterion for testing His influence on persons in the state of ecstasy or hypnotic trance. Whenever the liberty of the subject is suspended, the finger of God is not there.

SECT. 224.—FAITH AS A DISPOSITION FOR JUSTIFICATION

I. The Reformers, distinguishing between (1) historical faith by which we believe the truths revealed in Scripture, (2) faith by which miracles are wrought, and (3) faith in God’s promises by which we “believe that He remits our individual sins,” affirm that this last is the true justifying faith. A firm confidence or trust that our sins are forgiven, would be a better name for it than faith. Further, they say that this faith alone, unassisted and unaccompanied by any other act of the soul, is sufficient to justify man.

II. The Catholic doctrine is contained in sess. vi. chap. 6, cans. 12 and 9 of the Council of Trent: “They (adults) are prepared (or disposed) to (receive) justice when, awakened by Divine grace, and conceiving faith by hearing (ex auditu), they are freely moved (moventur) towards God, believing the truth of what He has revealed and promised,—and chiefly that the sinner is justified by the grace of God, through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus; and when, being conscious of their sins, they turn from the fear of the Divine justice which profitably agitates them to the consideration of God’s mercy, and thus are raised to hope, trusting that God, for Christ’s sake, will be propitious to them; and they begin to love Him as the source of all justice, and are moved (moventur) against sin with a certain hatred and detestation—that is, with that penance which is required before baptism; lastly, when they resolve to receive baptism, to begin a new life and to keep the Divine commands.” “If any one saith that justifying faith is nothing but confidence (fiducia) in the Divine mercy remitting sins for Christ’s sake, or that by this confidence alone we are justified, let him be anathema” (can. 12; can. 9 is given above, § 223).

III. The conversion of the sinner consists in turning his mind and heart away from sin unto God. Now, it is impossible to turn the mind to God if God’s existence is not known, and it is impossible to turn the heart to God if He is not known as good. In the supernatural order this twofold knowledge comes by faith. Hence the Apostle says, “Without faith it is impossible to please God; for he that cometh to God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him” (Heb. 11:6).

1. The “saving faith,” which Luther invented to make salvation easy, is as unknown to Scripture as it was to the Church before the Reformation. Not one of the texts quoted for it implies a faith equivalent to a trust that one’s sins are forgiven. When Christ says to some, “Thy faith hath made thee whole” (Matt. 9:22; Luke 17:19, and 18:42), He evidently alludes to faith in His healing power. In the case of the woman with an issue of blood (Matt. 9:22), Christ Himself makes a distinction between the faith which the woman already possessed and the confidence to which He exhorts her. Of the two blind men (Matt. 9:28–30), He expressly requires faith in His power: “Do you believe that I can do this to you?” The faith which was “reputed unto justice to Abraham” (Rom. 4:3), is that by which “against hope he believed in hope, that he might be made the father of many nations, according to that which was said to him: So shall thy seed be” (Rom. 4:18).

2. The faith which Scripture connects with our salvation is expressed by the Greek word πίστις, which chiefly and generally means “assent of the mind,” although occasionally it may also imply “trust of the heart,” or confidence (fiducia). It implies “assent of the mind” wherever the act of faith is further explained by the verbs “to believe,” “to assent,” “to know,” used with it (cf. Heb. 11:3, πίστει νοοῦμεν, “by faith we understand”); when the faith is founded upon past benefactions (John 4:53. and 9:38); when the object of the faith is such that it cannot be also the object of trust (e.g. Matt. 9:28; John 6:70; 1 Cor. 2:16); lastly, when Scripture expressly describes justifying faith as an assent of the mind to revealed truth. “Preach the Gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved” (Mark 16:15, 16). “God so loved the world as to give His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him … may have life everlasting” (John 3:15; see also John 20:31; Rom. 1:16, and 10:8 sq.; Acts 8:35).

The nature of justifying faith and its necessity are professedly expounded by St. Paul in the classical text (Heb. 11:1–6). We have dealt with this text in § 38 (“Nature of Theological Faith”), and in § 49 we have said all that is needful on the “Necessity of Faith.” We invite the student to read these two sections here.

3. The proofs from Scripture brought forth by Protestants to support their doctrine “most wholesome and very full of comfort” (Art. XI., Church of England), that we are justified by faith alone, may be divided into two classes of texts: (a) texts affirming that we are justified by faith (Rom. 5:1; 1:17; Gal. 3:11; Heb. 10:38; Acts 15:9); (b) texts which apparently exclude the necessity of works distinct from faith (Rom. 3:28; Eph. 2:8; Acts 10:43; 13:39). The famous verse (Rom. 3:28), “We account a man to be justified by faith, without the works of the law,” was strengthened by Luther through the addition of the word “alone” after “faith.” He justified the change in his characteristic way: “Doctor Martin Luther will have it so, and says, ‘Papist and ass are the same thing: hoc volo, sic jubeo, sit pro ratione voluntas.’ “ In the same offhand way he removed the “straw epistle” of St. James from the canon of Scripture. Such tactics are alone sufficient to discredit the system they are meant to uphold. The Council of Trent (sess. vi. chap. 8) gives the “sense of the Church” on the above texts as follows: “When the Apostle says that man is justified by faith and gratuitously, his words must be understood in the sense which the Catholic Church always held and expressed, viz. We are said to be justified by faith because faith is the beginning and the foundation of man’s salvation, and the root of all justification, without which it is impossible to please God, and to come to the society of His sons; we are said to be justified gratuitously, because nothing which precedes justification, be it faith or works, merits the grace of justification.”

IV. Where many partial causes combine to produce an effect, this effect is often spoken of as the result of one or other of them, no mention being made of the rest. This usage is a necessary consequence of the narrowness of our knowledge. We do not know all; we do not think of all we know; we cannot or will not express all we think. The sentences we utter represent our thoughts, as it were, in shreds; the listener must put them together to arrive at a full knowledge of our meaning. This rule is universal. Hence, when Scripture tells us that faith is necessary to salvation, we must not conclude that nothing else is necessary.

1. The dispositions which, besides faith, are set forth by the Council of Trent as either necessary or helpful to justification, are mentioned in various parts of Scripture: the Fear of the Lord (Eccl. 1:27 sq.); Love (John 3:14; Luke 7:47); Penance and its external acts (Acts 2:38; Joel 2:12); Almsgiving (Job 12:9); the Sacrament of Baptism (Tit 3:5).

2. “Come, ye blessed of My Father … for I was hungry, and you gave Me to eat, etc.… Depart from Me, ye cursed, … for I was hungry, and you gave Me not to eat” (Matt. 25:34 sqq.). “By works a man is justified, and not by faith only” (James 2:24). “Faith without works is dead” (ibid. 2:26). “God will render to every man according to his works … for not the hearers of the law are just before God, but the doers of the law shall be justified” (Rom. 2:6–13). “In Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but faith that worketh by charity” (Gal. 5:6).

Questions of supernatural facts are to be settled by the dictates of authority. Scripture and tradition reveal them to us. But Luther vilifies tradition; he corrupts and curtails Scripture, and arrogantly proclaims that the only foundation for his teaching is his own words. Against such an antagonist, logic is of no avail. The Fathers and the Schoolmen, starting from the idea that justification is a change from bad to good, and an elevation from the natural to the supernatural order, argued that the process required two sets of free acts: the one summed up in detestation of sin, the other in putting on the new man. But Luther meets them with a twofold denial: sin is not remitted, but only covered; the “new man” is Christ imputing His own justice to the still sinful man! With such an opponent, controversy on the basis of theological science is impossible. Moreover, it is not necessary. For as the leading Protestant theologian of our time, Al. Ritschl, says of the German Lutherans: “Hardly anywhere, even in the most orthodox sermon (bekenntnistreu = faithful to the confession of faith), do we find a complete agreement with the proposition of the Formula Concordiæ (A.D. 1577). that salvation is dependent on faith alone” (Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung, v. iii. p. 463).

SECT. 225.—WHAT JUSTIFICATION IS

Our treatise on the supernatural order and grace (Book III. Part II.) deals fully with the transforming, elevating, and deifying effect of grace on the justified soul. The sublime depth of the old doctrine of the Church stands in singular contrast to the shallow innovations of the pretended Reformers. The old excels the new as much as the adopted Son of God, the heir of the kingdom and partaker of the Divine nature, excels the prodigal who “is accounted righteous before God; God, overlooking man’s sins and crediting him with the merits of Christ.” We have not the heart, nor do we think it worth our while, to follow the maze of Protestant variations on the intrinsic character of justification. Osiander († 1552) enumerates twenty divergent systems current in his time. We give the Catholic dogma as formulated at Trent. The reader must turn to Book III. Part II. for the speculative theology bearing on the subject.

The seventh chapter of the Sixth Session of the Council of Trent is headed: “What the Justification of the Sinner [impii=lit. ‘a man not in due relation to God’] is, and what are its causes [viz. the several agents which influence its coming into existence].”

“Upon this disposition and preparation follows justification, which is not merely the remission of sin, but, moreover, the sanctification and renovation of the interior man by his voluntary acceptance of graces and gifts; whence the unjust is made just, the enemy a friend, that he may be heir according to hope of life everlasting (Tit. 3:7).

“The final cause of this justification is the glory of God and of Christ, and life everlasting.

“The efficient cause is the merciful God, Who gratuitously washes us and sanctifies us, signing and anointing us with the Holy Spirit of promise (1 Cor. 6:11; Tit. 3:5; Eph. 1:13), Who is the pledge of our inheritance.

“The meritorious cause is the Beloved Only-begotten Son of God, our Lord Jesus Christ, Who, when we were enemies, for the exceeding charity wherewith He loved us, by His most holy passion on the wood of the cross merited justification for us, and atoned for us to His Father (Rom. 5:10; Eph. 2:4).

“The instrumental cause is the sacrament of baptism, which is the sacrament of faith, without which (faith) no man was ever justified.

“Lastly, the only formal cause is the justice of God, not that by which He is Himself just, but that by which He maketh us just, by which, being enriched by Him, we are renewed in the spirit of our mind, and are not only reputed just, but are so in name and in fact, receiving in ourselves, every one according to his measure, the justice which the Holy Ghost divideth to every one according as He will (1 Cor. 12:11), and according to every one’s disposition and co-operation. For although no one can be just unless the merits of the passion of Christ be communicated to him, yet this (communication) takes place in the justification of the sinner when, by the merit of the said most holy passion, the charity of God is diffused by the Holy Ghost in the hearts of those who are justified, and is inherent (inhæret) in them. Whence in the act of justification, with the remission of his sins man receives all at once, through Christ, on Whom he is ingrafted, the infused gifts of faith, hope, and charity. For faith without hope and charity neither unites man perfectly with Christ, nor makes him a living member of His body.…”

SECT. 226.—SOME EFFECTS OF JUSTIFICATION

I. Justification elevates man to the dignity of adopted son of God, and confers upon him a personal nobility and worth which ennoble all his subsequent acts (read §, 145, vol. i. p. 468).

II. Sin, being an aversion from God, is absolutely incompatible with that participation in the Divine Life of Love and Holiness to which the justified are admitted. All, therefore, grant that justification remits sin. But Protestants reduce the remission to non-imputation; the sinner, according to most of them, is credited with the merits of Christ, and his sins are thus covered in some way, and no longer imputed to him; he is “accounted righteous,” or justified only in a legal sense, viz. the Judge considers him righteous without really making him so. The Catholic doctrine is that sin is completely blotted out as to all its effects. Of course, the sinful act cannot be undone; but the stain of guilt and the liability to eternal punishment disappear when grace is infused.

1. The notion that God does not impute a sin which really exists, is a contradiction in terms. We cannot conceive the all-knowing, all-holy, and all-just Being as ignoring or overlooking the rebellious position taken up against Him by a creature; as favouring with His friendship a soul turned away from Him; as allowing moral disorder to exist in the heirs of His kingdom. Whatever guilt there is in man lies bare before the eye of God, and must be dealt with by either His justice or His mercy. And even Divine mercy cannot forgive the punishment without first destroying the guilt, of which the liability to punishment is but a consequence.

2. As Bellarmine remarks (De Justif., ii. 7), Scripture uses all the terms which it is possible to think of in order to express a true remission of sin. Sins are said to be taken away (2 Kings 12:13; and 1 Paral. 21:8); blotted out (Isa. 43:25; Acts 3:19); exhausted (Heb. 9:28); removed from us as far as the east is from the west (Ps. 102:12); to be put away and be cast into the bottom of the sea (Mich. 7:19). Where sin is considered as a stain or an impurity, it is said to be cleansed, washed, made whiter than snow (Ps. 50:9; Isa. 1:16–18; Jer. 33:8; Ezech. 36:25; 1 Cor. 6:11). Where sin is spoken of as a wound or a sore, it is said to be bound up and healed (Isa. 30:26). If sin is mentioned as the death of the soul, justification from it is treated as a resurrection, a new birth, a gift of new life (John 3:5; Rom. 6:4 sq.).

3. “Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven and whose sins are covered. Blessed is the man to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin, and in whose spirit there is no guile” (Ps. 31:1, 2; quoted Rom. 4:7). On the surface, the words of this text are an exact statement of the Protestant theory. But, according to a common rule of interpretation, it must be read in harmony with the other texts bearing on the same subject, and with the “mind of the Church.” The Psalm quoted is David’s thanksgiving for having had his sin “taken away” from him (2 Kings 12:13); it is a poetical effusion of the heart, and not a scientific statement of the process of justification. Of a stain blotted out by the power of God, the poet may well say that it is “covered,” and it is “not imputed.” In fact, the parallelism of the first verse requires that the second half should have the same sense as the first. But in the first hemistich sins are spoken of as “forgiven” (ἀφιέναι, נָשָׂא, ablata), therefore in the second hemistich the word “covered” (כָּסָח, ἐπικαλύπτειν, “to hide,”) has the same sense. Lastly, what is “covered” from the eyes of God does not exist (see above, I.).

III. Grace and mortal sin are opposed as a quality and its privation, e.g. as light and darkness, heat and cold, motion and rest. Hence they cannot coexist in the soul. Again, the remission of sin or the removal of the privation is effected by the very appearance of grace. Thus darkness ceases to be when light appears. Venial sin, however, may coexist with grace, because it is not an aversion from God as our last end, but only an inordinate attachment to the creature (cf. § 147, ii. 4, and iii.).

SECT. 227.—MERITORIOUSNESS OF THE GOOD WORKS OF THE JUSTIFIED

In the kingdom of God on earth the children of God lead that supernatural life which is to terminate in the Beatific Vision. The same Divine Spirit worketh in all, but to every one He divideth His gifts according to His will and to the measure of their receptivity. With Him the justified freely co-operate, and thus works are performed meritorious of eternal life. We have now to inquire into the nature of merit, and to prove the existence of meritorious works.

I. An act is said to be “worthy of praise or of blame” when it comes of free will; “right or wrong” when viewed in connection with its object; “meritorious or demeritorious” in connection with the reward which it deserves. Hence the notion of merit implies a quality of the work by virtue of which some retribution is connected with it; and a meritorious work may be defined as “a work done in the service of another person, and entitled to a retribution of some kind.” If the quality of the work done claims a reward as a matter of strict justice, its merit is termed de condigno; if it only claims a reward as a matter of liberality or fittingness, its merit is de congruo. The soldier who has fought well in battle merits his pay de condigno, and a decoration de congruo.

1. In order to be meritorious, an act must be (a) free, (b) good, (c) supernatural.

(a) We constantly and necessarily associate the notion of meritoriousness with that of freedom: no man is deemed worthy of reward or punishment for acts which he does not perform “knowingly and willingly,” i.e. freely. For only free acts are properly human or man’s own, and these only can he hold out for reward or have imputed to him for punishment.

(b) That only “good actions” can be meritorious is self-evident. To be good, an act must have a good object and a good subject-matter, and must not be vitiated by bad circumstances, according to the axiom: Bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quocunque defectu. To make a good action bad, adverse circumstances must change either its object or its subject-matter; if they are merely concomitant, as e.g., involuntary distractions in prayer, the action remains good, though in a less degree.

(c) Works which aim at a supernatural retribution must belong to the supernatural order; that is, they must be vital acts of the life of grace (cf. § 143).

2. To be able to perform meritorious works, a person must be (a) in the “wayfaring state” (status viæ), that is, here on earth; and (b) to merit de condigno, he must be in the state of grace.

(a) The present, or wayfaring state, is a state of imperfect participation in the Divine Life. “While we are in the body we are absent from the Lord,” ἐνδημοῦντες ἐν τῷ σώματι, ἐκδημοῦμεν ἀπὸ τοῦ Κυρίου (2 Cor. 5:6); whereas in the final state (status termini) the participation perfectly fills the measure of happiness of which each saint is capable. Hence, in the final state merit has no object, and therefore no existence. But to the present state, longing and working for more perfections are natural. The wayfaring state ends with life on earth. Such is the now universal sense of the Church, founded upon Scripture (Ecclus. 14:17; 11, 3; and John 9:4).

(b) A claim in strict justice requires a due proportion between act and reward, and therefore in the agent, as well as in the act, a supernatural dignity is required. The propositions in which Baius denies this were condemned by the Holy See (propp. 12, 13, 17, 18). “As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself unless it abide in the vine, so neither can you unless you abide in Me” (John 15:4). But we abide in Christ by grace. St. Paul argues (Rom. 8:16, 17), “… We are the sons of God, and if sons, heirs also,” thus resting our claim to eternal life on our adoptive sonship, or grace.

3. God must be willing to accept the work as meritorious.

Even from other men we cannot in strict justice claim a reward for services done, unless they have expressly or by implication agreed to remunerate them. So Christ’s saving work owes its sufficiency to God’s acceptation (§ 206, ii.). We cannot benefit God by our service, for our very existence, with all its modes and modifications, is His gift. “We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which we ought to do” (Luke 17:10). In the matter of merit, God is bound to us by His own promises and decrees, which He keeps as faithfully as the laws which He has made for the natural order of the universe.

II. The notion of the total depravity of human nature after the Fall, led the Reformers into many errors concerning good works. With the negation of free will in man Luther removed an essential element of meritorious works; he was driven to ascribe to God alone all the good done in us, and to God working through or with us all our evil deeds. His more moderate followers allow some freedom to the will after the reception of grace. Again, if nature is totally depraved, if the motives and promptings of concupiscence are sins, and if it is impossible to fulfil the law of charity, it follows that no work good in itself can proceed from man—that there is in him no righteousness, and much less any merit before God.

The Reformers’ startling innovations were condemned by the Council of Trent. If any one say “that the Divine commands are impossible of observance, even to man justified and established in grace (can. 18); that in the Gospel nothing is commanded except faith; that all the rest is indifferent, neither commanded nor prohibited, but free; or that the ten commandments do not bind Christians (can. 19); that Christ Jesus was given by God to man as a Redeemer to be trusted, and not also as a Legislator to be obeyed (can. 21); that the justice once received is not preserved, and also increased before God through good works, but that the said good works are only signs of justification obtained, and not causes of its increase (can. 24); that in every good work the just man sins at least venially, or what is more intolerable, mortally, and therefore deserves eternal punishment, and that for this only he is not damned, because God does not impute his sins to damnation (can. 25); that the just, in return for the good works they may have done in God, ought not to expect or to hope for an eternal retribution from God, through His mercy and the merits of Christ, if living well and keeping the Divine commands they persevere to the end (can. 21); that the just sins when he does good in view of an eternal reward (can. 31); that the good works of the justified are the gifts of God in such a way that they are not also the good merits of the just, or that the just by the good works he does through the grace of God and the merits of Christ, whose living member he is, does not truly merit an increase of grace, life everlasting, and, if he die in grace, the possession of life everlasting, and an increase of glory (can. 32), let him be anathema!”

These various definitions may be brought under three heads: Good works are (1) possible; (2) necessary; (3) meritorious of increased grace and of life everlasting.

1. We need not tarry to prove the possibility of good works in the justified. All the conditions required to make a human action good and meritorious before God are present in works done by grace. Besides, God, Who does not command the impossible, commands good works, as will be fully shown below.

2. Motion, exercise, or action is of the very essence of life. Rest means death, and unsuitable motion means disease. The supernatural life, on earth as well as in heaven, must be as active as the natural, under pain of extinction. Evolution or gradual progress is equally essential to life: the life-sap of the tree evolves into leaves, flowers, and fruit; the soul of man gradually builds up his body, and developes by successive stages all his faculties. In like manner the justified man expands the life received in baptism into faith, hope, charity, and the moral virtues into the works of spiritual and corporal mercies. Without these works faith is dead, man is an unprofitable servant who buries the talent entrusted to him, and at last is cast into exterior darkness with the curse of the Judge upon him: “Depart from Me into everlasting fire … for I was hungry, and you gave Me not to eat.… (Matt. 25 passim; cf. Matt. 7:21; 19:17; Apoc. 2:4, 5; 1 Cor. 9:24, 26, 27; Rom. 2:6, 8, 9, etc.). These texts tell us in plain terms that though we may have faith in Jesus Christ, and continually have the Lord Jesus in our mouth, there is no salvation, no kingdom of heaven for us unless we do the will of God and keep His commandments, and keep the works of Christ unto the end (Apoc. 3:5); unless we bring forth worthy fruits of penance; unless we strive in good earnest, like men running or fighting for the prize; and thus, like St. Paul, chastise our bodies and bring them into subjection. For it is only the doers of the law that are justified; and on the day of Judgment Christ will assign no other reason for the condemnation of the reprobate than that they have neglected good works.

3. The meritoriousness of good works is a consequence of their necessity. Life naturally produces vital acts; these naturally add to the perfection of life. Make your intellect, your will, your memory, or your hand do “good work,” and the good work done will add power to these faculties. In the same way the supernatural work of the soul is its own reward in the form of increased supernatural life. For the elevation of our nature to higher life does not alter the laws of its working: it only ennobles them. Faith, hope, and charity are but ennobled knowledge, trust, and love; whether they move on the natural or on the supernatural plane, they gather momentum in moving. There is only one difference—if difference it is: in the natural order the momentum or increase of vital force arises from the essence of things fixed by God from the beginning; in the supernatural order the merit arises from the co-operation of the human with the Divine will. This, however, rather discriminates the two orders than the law of their working. We are, then, entitled to conclude that the practice of the life of grace naturally tends to the increase of grace, and ultimately to the crowning grace, which is the participation in the Divine Life through the Beatific Vision. Does this natural tendency establish a claim in strict justice, is it merit de condigno? Yes, because God owes to Himself the preservation of an order founded upon His gracious promises, even more than the preservation of the natural order founded upon His creatorial decrees.

“Godliness is profitable to all things, having promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come” (1 Tim. 4:8). “For that which is at present momentary and light of our tribulation, worketh for us as above measure exceedingly an eternal weight of glory” (2 Cor. 4:17). “Sell what you possess and give alms; make to yourself bags which grow not old, a treasure in heaven which faileth not” (Luke 12:33; cf. 14:9; and 14:13, 14). “Be thou faithful unto death, and I will give thee a crown of life” (Apoc. 2:10; cf. ibid. 3:5 and 21). “Labour the more that by good works you may make sure your calling and election” (2 Pet. 1:10). “Therefore let us consider one another to provoke to charity and good works. For patience is necessary for you, that, doing the will of God, you may receive the promise: for He is faithful that hath promised” (Heb. 10:23, 24, 36). “And God is not unjust that He should forget your work” (Heb. 4:10).

III. The above-cited passages, and a hundred more quite as explicit, are met with the objections: (1) that eternal life is our inheritance; (2) that it is a grace or free gift; (3) that when we have done all, we are unprofitable servants (Luke 17:10); and (4) that the merit of good works is derogatory to the merit of Christ.

1. Eternal life is indeed the inheritance of the Adopted Sons, but it is also their reward. We enter into it not by the right of natural filiation, but by the right and on the terms of our adoption. These terms, or conditions, are contained in the same title-deed which also contains the deed of our adoption: “You shall receive the reward of inheritance (τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν τῆς κληρονομίας). Serve ye the Lord Jesus Christ” (Col. 3:24).

2. Eternal life is a grace and the crown of all graces. Therefore it is the “natural term,” that is, the term “according to the nature of things,” of the life of grace on earth. As the exercise of our natural powers works out and merits temporal happiness, so the exercise of our supernatural powers works out and merits eternal beatitude. “When God crowns our merits, He but crowns His own gifts” (St. Augustine, Ep., cxciv. 19). In short, the fact that eternal life is a grace, only proves that grace is necessary to merit it, but not that it cannot be merited at all.

3. Those who quote Luke 17:7, against the Catholic doctrine, forget that Christ promises to do the very thing which the master in the parable does not do: “Blessed are those servants whom the Lord, when He cometh, shall find watching. Amen, I say to you: He will gird Himself and make them sit down to meat, and passing will minister unto them” (Luke 12:37).

4. There is something comical, perhaps tragical, in the way the Reformers stand up for the merits of Christ, as if these were endangered or interfered with by our doctrine on the merit of good works and the intercession of the saints. We hold fast that Christ is the vine of which we are the branches: is it derogatory to the vine if the branch bears good and valuable fruit? Not only do we highly value the merits of Christ, but we also recognize in them the property of overflowing into us, and of elevating us to the dignity of adoptive sons. We do not insist upon the necessity of good works as if Christ’s merits were insufficient to save us. On the contrary, we consider His merits so excellent and so efficacious, that they merited for us both eternal life and the power of working up to it from the first moment of our justification (cf. Einig, De Gratia, Pars. III.).

CHAPTER III

ORDER AND ECONOMY OF GRACE IN GOD’S PROVIDENCE

SECT. 228.—THE DISTRIBUTION OF ACTUAL GRACE

I. THE unknown author of the book De Vocatione Gentium, who lived in the fifth century, and was called by Pope Gelasius “an approved teacher of the Church,” puts the question as to the distribution of grace as follows: “As it cannot be denied that God wishes all men to be saved, we inquire why the will of the Almighty is not carried out. If we say it is the fault of man’s free will, we seem to exclude grace; for if grace is given according to merit, it is no longer a gift, but a debt. Hence we ask again: Why is this gift, without which nobody can be saved, not given to all by Him Who wishes to save all?”

The same author solves the problem, as far as it can be solved, by distinguishing between God’s general benevolence and His special mercy. “It pleased God to give His special mercy to many, and to deprive nobody of His general benevolence.” In other words, the solution is to be sought in the inscrutable decrees of God, which lie far beyond human ken, and can only be known darkly by Divine revelation. This “mystery of predestination” neither Augustine nor any other theologian has ever penetrated. The deposit of revelation enlightens us on the following points:—

1. The infinite goodness of God and His revealed word (1 Tim. 2:1–6) leave us no doubt that “God will have all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth … through Christ Jesus, Who gave Himself a redemption for all.” If, then, salvation is impossible without grace, God, Who wills the end, does provide the means, viz. sufficient grace to each and all for the salvation of their souls.

2. Grace barely sufficient for men is not sufficient for God’s benevolence. Hence we are assured by the Apostle (Rom. 5:15) that, “not as the offence (the sin of Adam bringing death to all), so also is the gift. For, if by the offence of one many died, much more the grace of God, and the gift, by the grace of one man, Christ Jesus, has abounded unto many” (= all who sinned in Adam) (cf. John 3:16).

3. “God is the Saviour of all men, especially of the faithful” (1 Tim. 4:10). Some die young that they may die in grace (Wisd. 4:11). Tyre and Sidon did not receive the same graces as the Jews (Matt. 11:21). It can hardly be doubted that people are lost whose sins are not equal to those of Mary Magdalen or the Penitent Thief.

II. Luther, Calvin, and Jansenius held that even the just are unable to keep the whole law of God, which amounts to saying that God withholds His grace from them. The Council of Trent meets this doctrine with an anathema against any who say “that the Divine precepts cannot be observed even by man justified and endowed with grace” (sess. vi. can. 18). And, indeed, what would become of God’s wish to see all men saved, if He withheld the means of salvation even from His adopted sons? and of His justice, if He punished the helpless transgressor of an impossible law? and of His sanctity, if by withholding sufficient grace He led man into sin? No; “God does not forsake those once justified by His grace, unless they first forsake Him” (sess. vi. chap. 11). He does not allow them to be tempted beyond their power: “God is faithful, Who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able; but will make also with temptation issue, that you may be able to bear it” (1 Cor. 10:15). In fact, His yoke is light (Matt. 11:30), and “His commandments are not heavy, for whatsoever is born of God overcometh the world” (1 John 5:3, 4).

But if the sinner’s mind is obscured and his heart hardened so as to offer obstinate resistance to the operation of grace, does God still give him a chance of conversion? Calvin goes so far as to say that God Himself hardens those whom He wishes to damn, and entirely deprives them of grace. Catholics call Calvin’s doctrine blasphemous. The majority of Catholic theologians hold, with good reason, that as long as the sinner lives, be he ever so obstinate, the helping hand of God is stretched out to him, if not constantly, at least at certain times. This doctrine is based upon the Council of Trent, sess. xiv. chap. 1: “Because God, rich in mercy, knoweth our frame (figmentum nostrum). He hath given the remedy of life also to those who afterwards (i.e. after baptism) have given themselves up to the servitude of sin, and to the power of the devil.” The Council only sums up the teaching of Scripture: “Thou hast mercy upon all because Thou canst do all things, and overlookest the sins of men for the sake of repentance. For Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made.… Thou sparest all, because they are Thine, O Lord, Who lovest souls” (Wisd. 11:24–27). “O how good and how sweet is Thy Spirit, O Lord, in all things! And therefore Thou chastisest them that err, little by little; and admonishest them, and speakest to them concerning the things wherein they offend, that leaving their wickedness they may believe in Thee, O Lord!” (Wisd. 12:1, 2; Ezech. 18:23; 33:31; Luke 5:32; 2 Pet. 3:9). All these texts and many more breathe a tenderness of Divine mercy which seems to increase with the wickedness of the sinner. Christ came to save, not the just, but sinners; to leave the ninety-nine and go after the sheep that is lost; and none is too obstinate for His loving-kindness.

III. Infidels, to whom the faith was never preached, are not left without sufficient grace to secure the salvation of their souls. Luther does not hesitate to sentence all infidels—Gentiles, Turks, and Jews—to eternal hell-fire; and Jansenius is not much more lenient. But the Catholic Church condemned their doctrines. Thus Alexander VIII. (7 Dec. 1690) condemned the proposition: “Pagans, Jews, heretics, and others of this kind, receive no influence whatever from Christ; hence their will is entirely bare and unarmed, and entirely without sufficient grace” (see also the propositions 26, 27, and 29, condemned by Clement XI.). Pius IX. sums up the teaching of the Church on this point in his Encyclical of August 10, 1863, to the Italian bishops: “It is known to us and to you that they who labour under invincible ignorance of our holy religion, and yet diligently keep the natural law and its precepts written by God in the hearts of all, and are ready to obey God and to lead an honest and righteous life, are enabled by the power of Divine light and grace to obtain eternal life. For God, who plainly beholds, examines and knows the minds and hearts, the thoughts and habits of all, in His sovereign goodness and clemency will not allow that any one suffer eternal punishment who is without the guilt of a wilful sin.” The teaching of the Popes is not less in accordance with Scripture than with reason. Christ is the Light of the world that enlightens “all men,” and God wills that “all men come into the knowledge of truth” (1 Tim. 2:4). See § 45.

The ways by which grace reaches the soul of the infidel are known to God alone. St. Thomas (De Veritate, q. 14, a. 11, ad. 1) is certain that the untutored savage, who follows the dictates of his conscience, receives from God, either by an internal revelation or an external messenger, the faith necessary to his salvation. As we live in the supernatural order, we may well hold with Ripalda that every effort to do good proceeding from human nature is accompanied and assisted by some supernatural grace, and thus works for salvation.

SECT. 229.—ON PREDESTINATION (AFTER ST. THOMAS, 1 P. Q. 23)

I. Predestination is Divine Providence (cf. § 116), leading rational creatures to their supernatural end, the Beatific Vision. Things in general attain their natural end by the working of the power that is proper to each of them; but man has not in him power sufficient to attain to the vision of God. He is made to reach his destination by a special assistance from his Maker. The way and manner of this special assistance pre-exist in the Divine mind, and constitute predestination. Predestination, then, is not a quality or an accident of the creature, but an idea of the Eternal mind, like Providence. It is carried into effect, in time, by the vocation and glorification of the predestinated. “… And whom He predestinated (προώρισεν), them He also called. And whom He called, them He also justified. And whom He justified, them He also glorified” (Rom. 8:30).

II. Not all rational creatures attain the supernatural end to which they are called. It is in the nature of Providence to allow defects and shortcomings in particular parts of the universe, so as to make them conducive to the perfection, and subservient to the final object, of the whole. When God allows individuals to fall away from Him, He is said to “reprobate” them. Reprobation, therefore, implies, on the part of the Divine Providence, the will—first, to allow some to fall into sin; and secondly, to restore the disturbed order by adequate punishment of the sinner.

III. The two aspects of Providence called predestination and reprobation differ greatly in their way of influencing man. Predestination is the cause both of eternal glory and of the graces which lead to it. Reprobation is not the cause of sin, but this latter causes the sinner to be abandoned by God, and to be eternally punished. The cause of sin is man’s imperfect free will (cf. § 114, ii.).

IV. “He chose us in Him (= God in Christ) before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and unspotted in His sight in charity. Who hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children …” (Eph. 1:4, 5). Here, and in other places, Scripture speaks of choice (election) and of predestination as synonymous. As a matter of fact, all the predestinated are elected, and specially beloved by God, for predestination follows upon election, and election upon love. The act by which God wills the eternal salvation of some is an act of love, for it confers the greatest good upon the creature. It is also an act of election, or choice, because whilst given to some it is withheld from others. To our finite minds it. appears as an act of most gratuitous benevolence (dilectio), choosing some rational creatures, in preference to others, to be made partakers of eternal salvation.

V. This eternal act of the Divine will has no cause but the Divine goodness. But if no cause can be assigned to it in itself, a cause or causes may be assigned to its effects, inasmuch as God wills one effect to be the cause of another. Taking the effects separately—grace, good works, beatific vision—we may say that the volition of the beatific vision causes the volition of good works and grace; and that grace and good works are the meritorious cause of the beatific vision. But if we take the effects of predestination as one whole, they cannot have any cause in ourselves, for whatever in man makes for salvation is itself an effect of his predestination. The whole process has its reason in the Divine will, from which it receives its first impulse and its final completion.

VI. The above doctrine is laid down with great clearness and stress by St. Paul. Having stated that predestination is not “of works, but of Him that calleth,” he raises an objection: “What shall we say then? Is there injustice with God?” And he answers, “God forbid!” and restates the same doctrine and rebukes the objector in these terms: “O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to Him that formed it: Why hast Thou made me thus?” (Rom. 9:12–20). Now, in the Divine goodness itself may be found a reason for the predestination of some and the reprobation of others. God made all things that they should be some expression of His goodness. But a Divine attribute, one and simple in itself, can only be represented by multiple and inadequate expressions: created things do not attain the Divine simplicity. And hence, in the universe there must be creatures of high and of low degree, and to this end God permits some evil in order that much good may come of it. In mankind, from this point of view. God willed that His goodness should be expressed as mercy and pardon in the predestinated, and as justice in the reprobate. This is the reason given by the Apostle: “God, willing to show His wrath (= vindictive justice) and to make His power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, that He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory” (Rom. 9:22, 23; cf. 2 Tim. 2:20). No reason, however, other than the simple Divine will, can be given for the election of the vessels of mercy and the rejection of the vessels of wrath. Nor does this imply an injustice on the part of God. If He was bound to give the same grace to all, grace would not be a free gift. Being a free gift, God distributes it freely, as did the householder of the parable: “Take what is thine, and go thy way: I will also give to this last, even as to thee” (Matt. 20:14).

VII. A large number of Jesuit theologians, known as Congruists, hold, like the Thomists, an absolute predestination to glory, irrespective of merits foreseen. God gives to the predestinate the same grace as to the reprobate; but to the former in circumstances under which He foresees they will accept it, to the latter in those under which He foresees they will not do so. Such was the opinion of Suarez (after his return to Spain), of Bellarmine, Antoine, and many others. Another large number of Jesuits, e.g. Toletus, Maldonatus, Lessius, Vasquez, Valentia, and Suarez (while he taught at Rome), admit that predestination to grace, but deny that predestination to glory, is irrespective of merit foreseen. God decrees, they say, to give grace to all, and predestinates those who, as He foresees, will correspond to it, the rest being reprobate (Cath. Dict., art. “Predestination”). The mind of St. Thomas on this subject is expressed in the passage we are analyzing in this section. “Some have said that the merits consequent upon the effect of predestination are the reason of predestination, meaning that God gives grace, and decrees to give it, to such as He foresees will make good use of it—after the manner of a king who gives a horse to the soldier of whom he knows that he will use it well. But these (theologians) seem to have made a distinction between what comes of grace and what comes of free will, as if the same (act) could not proceed from both grace and free will. It is, however, manifest that whatever is owing to grace is an effect of predestination, and cannot be its reason (or cause). If something of ours be the reason of predestination, this something must not be an effect of the same. But there is no distinction between the work of free will and that of predestination, any more than between the work of the second (created) cause and the first. For Divine Providence produces effects through the operation of second causes. Hence whatever is done through free will is done through predestination” (1 q. 23, a. 5 c.; cf. § 88).

VIII. Predestination infallibly attains its object, viz. the eternal salvation of the predestinated, yet not so as to deprive them of their free will. It is but a department of Divine Providence which rules the world of spirit and matter with an infallible hand, working freely in the free, and on unbending lines in the unfree: always according to the nature of each cause (cf. § 88).

IX. Can predestination be furthered by the prayers of the just? Some have thought that prayers and good works are useless to the predestinate as well as to the reprobate, on account of the infallibility of the Divine decree. But God in the Scriptures constantly exhorts us to prayer and good works. On the other hand, the opinion has been advanced that sacrifices and prayers have the power to change the Divine purpose. Against this, too, we have the authority of Scripture: “The gifts and the calling of God are without repentance” (Rom. 11:29); “the triumpher in Israel will not spare, and will not be moved to repentance: for He is not a man that He should repent” (1 Kings 15:29). Two things must be distinguished in predestination: the Divine decree, and its effects. The Divine decree is not influenced by the prayers of the saints. But its effects, viz. the distribution of grace, good works, eternal glory, are so influenced, because Providence works with and through created causes to which prayers and good works belong. Although many gifts are received that have not been prayed for, yet others are not given except in answer to prayers. Hence we read: “Ask, and it shall be given unto you” (Matt. 7:7); “Brethren, labour the more, that by good works you may make sure your calling and election” (2 Pet. 1:10); and St. Augustine rightly says, “If Stephen had not prayed, the Church would not have Paul.”

SECT. 230.—SYSTEMS ON THE EFFICACY OF ACTUAL GRACE

Free will and grace are, according to Catholic doctrine, the two factors which co-operate in the production of every salutary act. The beginning is made by grace, which enlightens the mind and moves the will. Under its continued influence the will is endowed with supernatural freedom, and freely gives its consent to the Divine inspiration. The adequate principle of salutary acts is, therefore, neither grace alone nor the will alone, but the will supernaturalized by and freely co-operating with grace. “Whenever we perform salutary works, God works in us and with us in order that we may work (Quoties bona agimus, Deus in nobis atque nobiscum, ut operemur, operatur)” (Council of Orange, ii. c. 9). St. Bonaventure says, “The will is so moved by God that it is also moved by itself, and hence every meritorious work is attributed to grace and to free will” (in 2 Dist. 26, q. 6). Such is the dogma. The Church has left it to the wit of theologians to explain how the human will, moved by grace, retains its freedom, and how grace attains its object, the will remaining free.

I. The various theories may ultimately be reduced to two: (1) those which take the efficacy of grace as their starting-point and main principle, and then go on to explain how the will is still free; and (2) those which start with free will, and then explain the efficacy of grace. The former appeal chiefly to the authority of St. Paul; the latter to such passages as Matt. 11:20; 25:34, etc.

1. In the controversies on grace an important part is played by the distinction of grace into “sufficient” and “efficacious.” If the effect of grace is considered, it is clear that the good act is not always performed. Hence the distinction: grace which is followed by the act, is called efficacious; grace which is not so followed, is called sufficient. How it comes to pass that the act is or is not performed—in other words, whether there is an intrinsic difference between efficacious grace and sufficient grace, and, if so, what is the difference—is the great question. Those who insist on our freedom of choice will naturally tend to attribute the performance or non-performance of the action to the determination of our will, and will thus be inclined to deny any intrinsic difference. The other party, who insist on the internal (or ex sese) efficacy of grace, will maintain that there is an intrinsic difference, to which the result (performance or non-performance) is ultimately due. These will find it hard to explain how a grace can be called sufficient without producing any result; whereas the former will have their difficulty in showing wherein the efficacy of grace consists. If the grace is sufficient, why has it no effect? If the grace is efficacious, how can the result be free? The Reformers and Jansenists, who denied man’s power to resist grace, left no room for graces merely sufficient. That these exist is but a corollary of the Catholic doctrine, that all men receive sufficient grace to be saved, but retain their freedom under the influence of grace: as often as they commit sin, the proffered grace remains inefficacious, or merely sufficient.

2. Another point which Catholic theologians admit, is the power of grace to attain its object with certainty. Whatever activity is displayed by second causes, especially in the supernatural order, is directed by Divine decrees, and supported by Divine co-operation (concursus). No creature can frustrate the will of God. If He wills that a salutary act shall follow upon a given grace, He so disposes the free will that the act infallibly follows. The connection between grace and the act exists both in the order of things and in the order of knowledge: viz. the act follows infallibly, and God knows, from all eternity, that it will follow. Yet the Divine foreknowledge does not prevent the liberty of the act, any more than does the after-knowledge which exists in our memories. The free act is the subject-matter of memory as well as of prevision; its nature is affected by neither (§§ 80, 88).

II. St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Bossuet, and the whole Thomistic school, say that God “moves the will to act according to its own nature, that is, freely.” With this single principle St. Thomas meets and solves all objections. God willed that there should be free agents, filling their own place in the universal order of things, and contributing to the perfection of the whole. That free agents exist, is a fact of our consciousness; that their freedom and its exercise are dependent—entirely dependent—on God, is an elementary theological truth; that we are unable to understand how the First Cause moves the free agent without prejudice to its freedom, is to be expected from minds as imperfect as ours. Our knowledge of “force” is very limited. We know but obscurely how created causes produce their effects, e.g. how the mind moves the body. The way in which the First Cause moves second causes lies beyond the sphere of human knowledge.

St. Thomas, or at least the Thomistic school, explains the infallible efficacy of grace by “physical premotion.” The Rev. J. Berthier, O.P. of Fribourg University, thus describes this process in the natural order: “Physical premotion is a Divine action, virtually transient, by which God as First Cause confers in each individual case on the second causes, already endowed by Him with the power of acting, the actual performing—free or necessary, according to the proper nature of each agent—of what He has decreed.”

Dr. Manser, Berthier’s pupil and disciple, expands this definition as follows: “An action virtually transient;” that is, different from the eternal premotion immanent in and identical with the Divine essence. “On second causes already endowed by Him with the power of acting;” these words discriminate premotion from other Divine actions virtually transient, viz. creation and conservation. “By which God confers the actual performing;” these words give the ratio formalis (the essence) of premotion. For the giving the actual performing of an act implies an immediate motion of the will, by virtue of which the will from non-acting becomes acting,—passes from the mere power to act into actual exercise of the act. Again, this immediate Divine motion and application of the will to its proper exercise implies that the motion precedes the act as its cause. Hence it is called “previous” motion, or premotion. And as the Divine motion is an active motion, working as an efficient cause, it is “physical,” and plainly different from moral (or persuasive) motion. All this is contained in the words of the definition, “by which God as First Cause confers on the second causes.” The clause “… performing what He has decreed … in each individual case,” points out the infallibility of the effect, both as to the exercise of the will and as to its specific object; that is, the will acts and does exactly what God moves it to do. Lastly, the terms “free or necessary according to the nature of each agent,” differentiate two species of premotion, the one given to free, the other to necessary, agents (cf. Possibilitas Præmo-tionis Physicæ Thomisticæ, etc., by J. A. Manser, Friburgi Helvetiorum, 1895).

The idea of the First Cause working out His decrees unfailingly, yet in harmony with the nature of each created agent, possesses a sublime grandeur which has commended it to the best intellects, obvious difficulties notwithstanding. Among these, the safeguarding of man’s freedom of will appears as the greatest to those theologians who make the dogma of human liberty the starting-point of their speculations. The Thomists, however, have a ready answer—if answer it be: God moves man to act freely, according to his free nature. To this the reply is: Premotion, as described, is destructive of free will. For, as St. Thomas himself lays down (C. Gentes, iii. 68): “The control which the will has over its acts, and by which it has the power of willing or not willing, excludes the determination (or limitation) of its power to one act or object.” It is the very essence of a free will to be left free to choose; whosoever or whatsoever inclines it to one object or act without choice of another, destroys its freedom. Wherefore, if the will be moved according to its nature, it must be moved without physical predetermination to one thing. To this the Thomists’ rejoinder is the subtle distinction between freedom of will in sensu composito and in sensu diviso. Once the will has acted and chosen its object, its liberty ceases as to the present act and its object; for these are facts which cannot be undone. E.g. I will write, and do write. Now, it is evident that if I actually will, and actually write, I cannot at the same time (in sensu composito) be actually not willing and not writing. As, however, the particular act and its object do not absorb the whole activity of the will or satisfy all its aspirations, the will remains free to turn itself upon other objects, or free in sensu diviso. Technically, “The free agent, in the act which is proper to it, limits (or determines) itself to one thing (act and object) in the composite sense, but it preserves its free power as regards other acts and objects in the divided sense.” The opponents, however, urge that “liberty in the divided sense” is a useless abstraction, since the actual exercise of liberty, according to the Thomists, always implies premotion, and hence implies the “composite sense” in which freedom of choice ceases. This thrust is parried by the Thomistic axiom, “God can and does move the human will according to its free nature;” that is, God moves the will to act, yet so that the created will, under the Divine motion, determines itself to act. Thus the rights of the First Cause as well as those of the free agent are safe: God is the determinant cause and the total cause of all that has positive being in the act; and the created will, although moved by God, is, after its limited manner, viz. under God, likewise the total cause and the master of its operation. It may be well to quote here St. Thomas’s idea of free will: “We say that free will (liberum arbitrium) is the cause of its own motion, because man by free will moves himself to act; but it is not essential (necessarium) to freedom that it be the first cause of the free act, any more than in order to be the cause of something else it is essential to be its first cause. God, then, is the First Cause moving both natural and voluntary causes. And as by moving the natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not prevent them being voluntary; on the contrary, He makes them voluntary; for He works in each cause according to its nature (proprietatem) (Summa, 1, q. 83, a. 1, ad. 3).

III. The theologians who claim that they follow closely in the footsteps of St. Augustine, chief among these being Laurentius Berti, propose the following system for conciliating the efficacy of grace with free will. Grace, they say, chiefly consists in “delectation.” Free will performs no good action if not inclined and determined to act by “victorious” grace (gratia victrix). They only admit such a “sufficient grace” as gives the power but not the actual will, or at most a will so weak and imperfect that it is unable to overcome the flesh and its concupiscence. Now they deem grace “victorious,” and hence efficacious, not on account of the co-operation of free will or of suitable circumstances, but of itself and intrinsically. The necessity of a grace of itself efficacious is derived, not as in the Thomistic system, from the subordination of the creature to God, but from the weakness of the human will induced by the Fall. Free will is safeguarded, in their opinion, because man always retains the power of refusing consent—his judgment remaining indifferent—although, in fact, he never exercises that power. Thus a man has the power of taking his own life, yet as long as he is of sound mind he does not exercise that power. In this point the Augustinian system closely resembles Jansenism. Thomassin adopted the above views with but a slight modification. What the Augustinians attribute to a single grace, he attributes to an aggregate of graces, “of which,” he says, “each taken apart may be frustrated, but which, taken together, wear out the resistance of even the most obstinate, and by their number, co-operation, and untiring attacks, bring about consent.”

It is an unwarranted assumption that the nature of all grace is delectation, delight, or pleasure. Fear is as potent a factor in human acts as pleasure. Nor are we always prompted to do what promises the greatest pleasure; in fact, the practice of most virtues consists in renouncing the more attractive pleasures of the world for motives of fear or love. But, what is more to the point, the system leaves unsolved the very question at issue. For either the victorious delectation acts on the will morally (by way of persuasion), leaving it physically free to resist, or it acts physically, determining the act and action of the will; in the first case the efficacy of grace is not explained; in the second, free will is abolished. The modification introduced by Thomassin labours under exactly the same difficulty.

IV. They who derive the efficacy of grace from the consent of the will, have received the name of Molinists (from Ludovicus Molina, S.J.). These teach that the will is moved by God physically both in the order of nature and of grace; that without this Divine help the will cannot act; that whatever reality is in the act is attributable to God; and that all things happen as God foreknows and decrees. But they do not admit a Divine concursus or grace so efficacious as to be irresistible and infallibly connected with the act. On the contrary, they hold that grace may retain all its intrinsic efficacy, and yet remain without effect for the want of free assent on the part of man. The Molinists further assert that grace has a true intrinsic and physical efficacy, as it is the physical principle of the act. They concede that the motive of grace is “previous” to the act, inasmuch as it is identical with the Divine substance creating the will, decreeing to co-operate with it, and awakening those indeliberate motions of intellect and will which induce us freely to will good deeds. But all this only constitutes an efficacy of power: the effect, i.e. the actual connection of grace and good work is established by the free consent of the will prepared and assisted by grace. The infallibility of the connection is secured by the scientia media, or the knowledge of things that would exist under given conditions; in the present case, the knowledge that man will freely consent if such and such a grace is held out to him. Congruism and Molinism do not differ, at least in the main lines. In both systems grace is apportioned to man in such wise as to be truly sufficient to obtain its effect, and is given under those circumstances in which God foreknows that man will consent.

Molinism owes its origin to the difficulty of defending free will in the Thomistic system. It is an ingenious hypothesis for the conciliation of efficacious grace and free will. But its supporters claim almost theological certitude for it. They quote Matt. 11:20 (“Woe to thee, Corozain …”), and a long array of similar texts, to prove that in the deposit of faith grace is represented as ineffectual without the consent of man. Then the Council of Trent (sess. vi. c. 5) sets forth with unmistakable clearness that man is able to resist and to reject the grace of God; hence the legitimate conclusion that the efficacy of grace is dependent on man’s free co-operation. This being so, we have only to find out how grace may infallibly obtain the consent of free will. Scripture and councils fail to help us here. But theological speculation suggests an easy solution. God knows what each man will do under given circumstances. When, therefore, He wishes a grace to have an infallible effect, He offers it to man at the right moment, i.e. when He knows that man will consent.

The weak point of the system is that it seems to make God dependent on the creature. It lacks the majesty of the Thomistic conception, in which indeed “the heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will, He shall turn it” (Prov. 21:1); and His wisdom “reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly” (Wisd. 8:1). Bossuet criticizes the system in the following words: “A single question put to the authors of this system will show its weak point. Presupposing that God sees what man will do at a certain time and in a certain state, we ask: Does He see it in His decree and because He has so ordained it, or does He see it in the object itself considered outside God and independently of His decree? If you admit the latter alternative, you suppose future things under certain conditions before God has ordained them; and you also suppose that God sees them apart from His eternal decrees—which is an impossibility If you say that the things are to happen under such conditions because God has so decreed, you leave the difficulty intact; you still have to explain how, what God has decreed is done freely. Moreover, conditional knowledge (the scientia media) can only be attributed to God by that figure of speech which attributes to Him what really belongs to man alone; and all exact science reduces conditional propositions to absolute ones” (Traité du Libre Arbitre, ch. vi.).

V. Between the years 1598 and 1607, under Popes Clement VIII. and Paul V., were held the famous Congregationes de Auxiliis Gratæ, in which representative theologians of the two contending parties were invited to propose and defend their views. No positive conclusion was arrived at. The papal decree, which closed the acrimonious controversy without deciding it, forbad the opposing parties to inflict “censures” upon one another. Hence a Catholic is free to adopt either Thomism, or Molinism, or Augustinianism, provided he condemns none of the other systems as heretical, dangerous, rash, offensive to pious ears, and the like. “Grace is grace, despite of all controversy.”

The history of the Congregation de Auxiliis was written, on the Dominican side, by Hyacinthus Serry, O.P., under the name of Augustinus Le Blanc (A.D. 1699); and later, on behalf of the Molinists, by Livinus de Meyer, S.J., under the name of Theodorus Eleutherius.

BOOK VII

THE CHURCH AND THE SACRAMENTS

THE means appointed by the Redeemer for the continuation of His work among men are: (1) the Church, which is His mystical body; and (2) the Sacraments, which are the channels whereby His saving grace is conveyed to our souls.

PART I

THE CHURCH

“THE Eternal Shepherd and Bishop of our souls, for the purpose of perpetuating the saving work of Redemption, decreed to found the Holy Church, in which, as in the house of the living God, all the faithful might be united by the bond of one faith and charity. For this reason He asked the Father, not for the Apostles only, but for them also who through their word should believe in Him, that they all might be one, as He and His Father are one. And just as He Himself was sent by the Father, so sent He His Apostles whom He had chosen out of the world; so again did He will that there should be in His Church pastors and doctors even unto the consummation of the world. In order that the episcopate might be one and undivided, and that by means of a closely united priesthood the whole multitude of believers might be preserved in the unity of faith and communion, He set the Blessed Peter over the other Apostles, and in him He established a perpetual principle of both of these unities, and a visible foundation upon the firmness of which an eternal temple should be raised” (Vatican Council, sess. iv.).

We shall treat of the Preparation for the Church (chap. i); the Institution and Constitution of the Church (chap. ii.); the Primacy of St. Peter (chap. iii.); the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff (chap. iv.); the Properties and Marks of the Church (chap. v.).

Authorities: Franzelin, De Ecclesia Christi; Palmieri, De Eccl. et De Romano Pontifice; Stapleton, De Principiis Fidei Doctrinalibus; Bellarmine, De Controversiis, etc., ii.; Vacant, Études Théol. sur les Constitutions du Concile du Vatican; Turmel, Hist. de la Théol. Positive du Concile de Trent au Concile du Vatican; Billot, De Ecclesia, etc.

CHAPTER I

THE PREPARATION FOR THE CHURCH

OUR English word “church” (A.S. cyrice, cirice; Germ. kirche) is derived from the Greek κυριακός, “belonging to the Lord” (1 Cor. 11:18, 22). It is used to denote: (1) a building set apart for God’s service, and also the service itself; (2) the faithful themselves, “Ye are God’s building” (1 Cor. 3:9); “Ye are the temple of the living God” (2 Cor. 6:16); (3) the clergy as distinguished from the laity (Matt. 18:17). The corresponding word in the New Testament, ἐκκλησία (ecclesia), in its orignal profane use, means “an assembly of the citizens summoned (ἐκκαλέω) by the crier;” and hence it was suited to designate the assembly of the faithful called by God’s grace and His ministers (“To the Church [τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ] that is at Corinth … to them that are called to be saints (κλητοῖς ἁγίοις),” (1 Cor. 1:2). Except, perhaps, in one or two instances, the word συναγωγή (synagoga, “a bringing or driving together,” (συνάγω) is never used for Christ’s Church. “There is a difference,” says St. Augustine, “between synagoga and ecclesia: the former means a gathering together, the latter a calling together; even beasts are said to be gathered together, whereas calling together is properly applied to reasonable beings” (In Ps. lxxxi.; see also Catechism of the Council of Trent, Part I. ch. x. n. 3).

A complete definition of the Church is not possible at this stage of our inquiry. The various elements which go to form it will be gathered as we proceed. At present it will be sufficient to say that by the Church we mean the society or union of all who cleave to God by true supernatural worship.

SECT. 231.—THE CHURCH OF THE OLD TESTAMENT

In the Divine economy of Revelation and Redemption, three stages can be distinguished: the Patriarchal, the Mosaic, and the Christian (supra, § 6). Hence in the Church, too, which is the organ of revelation, and the means of applying the fruits of redemption, the same three stages can be distinguished.

I. We read in the early chapters of Genesis of a religious society, “the sons of God,” distinct and separate from the impious “sons of men.” These “sons of God” possessed a supernatural revelation of God’s existence and attributes, of His law and worship, of the angels and a future life, and especially of a coming Redeemer. So, too, the supernatural gifts of grace, and the theological virtues of Faith, Hope, and Charity, were conferred on those who did what was required on their part. Moreover, they professed their faith not only with the heart, but with the mouth (Rom. 10:10); and not only by word, but also by act—by sacrifices and sacraments (see St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, xvi. 9, 10). But just as Revelation in those primitive times was scanty and vague, so, too, the bond of union among the members of the Church was not close. The functions of sacrificing, ruling, and teaching were indeed carried on; but much was left to be determined by individual Patriarchs or heads of families. It may therefore be said that the union, such as it was, consisted in the profession of the same true faith, and the worship of the same true God. With the call of Abraham we have the promise of a fuller revelation and a closer union, which, although far inferior to the revelation and the society which were ultimately to come, were yet a marked advance upon the Patriarchal stage.

II. Under the Mosaic dispensation God chose a people, the Israelites, to be His own peculiar people, and made to them a revelation gradually increasing in extent as the time went on, and also a more definite form of Church. The worship of God was to be observed by certain determinate sacrifices, sacraments, rites, and solemnities; and the unity of this society was symbolized and secured by permitting only one single tabernacle or temple in which sacrifice could be offered up. The priesthood, too, was restricted to the members of a certain family, the lower ministry to the members of a certain tribe, by whom the whole people were to be governed in all sacred matters. “If thou perceive that there be among you a hard and doubtful matter … arise, and go up to the place which the Lord thy God shall choose, and thou shalt come to the priests of the Levitical race, and to the judge that shall be at that time; and thou shalt ask of them, and they shall show thee the truth of the judgment; and thou shalt do whatsoever they shall say that preside in the place which the Lord shall choose, and what they shall teach thee, according to His Law; and thou shalt follow their sentence: neither shalt thou decline to the right hand nor to the left hand. But he that will be proud and refuse to obey the commandment of the priest, who ministereth at the time to the Lord thy God, and the decree of the judge, that man shall die, and thou shalt take away the evil from Israel” (Deut. 17:8, sqq.). Moreover, the priests possessed teaching authority to preserve and interpret the Divine Law. “The lips of the priest shall keep knowledge, and they shall seek the Law at his mouth, because he is the angel [the minister and messenger] of the Lord of hosts” (Mal. 2:7, cf. Lev. 10:10, 11).

III. Nevertheless, even this Mosaic dispensation was only a preparation for a higher dispensation which was to come. “The Law was our pedagogue in Christ (παιδαγωγὸς εἰς Χριστόν)”—a tutor to bring us unto Christ (Gal. 3:24); “The Law brought nothing to perfection, but was the bringing in of a better hope” (Heb. 7:19); “You have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear, but the spirit of adoption of sons” (Rom. 8:15). It was imperfect in all three of the functions which a Church should fulfil. “The Law having a shadow of the good things to come not the very image of the things, by the self-same sacrifices which they offer continually every year, can never make the comers thereunto perfect.… But Christ, being come a high priest of the good things to come, by a greater and more perfect tabernacle not made with hand … neither by the blood of goats or of calves, but by His own blood entered once into the Holies, having obtained eternal redemption” (Heb. 11:1; 9:11, 12). So, too, their government was concerned with “the works of the Law,” “the law of a carnal commandment” (Heb. 7:16); and their teaching was necessarily meagre and obscure in comparison with the full and definite teaching of the Gospel: “called out of darkness into His marvellous light” (1 Pet. 2:9). Hence the priesthood which exercised these imperfect functions was itself imperfect and preparatory. “If perfection was by the Levitical priesthood … what further need was there that another priest should arise according to the order of Melchisedech, and not be called according to the order of Aaron? For the priesthood being translated, it is necessary that a translation also be made of the Law” (Heb. 7:11, 12). Only in the Church of Christ, “which is the fulness of Him who is filled all in all” (Eph. 1:23), are these functions and this priesthood found perfect. Even while yet militant on earth, she teaches and believes in faith, she rules and obeys in hope, she sanctifies and is sanctified in charity: “a chosen generation, a kingly priesthood, a holy nation, a purchased people” (1 Pet. 2:9). See St. Leo, Serm. lix. (al. 57), c. 7; Serm. lxvi. c. 12; St. Thomas, 1, 2 q. 101; Franzelin, De Ecclesia, thes. iii., iv.

SECT. 232.—THE CHURCH OF CHRIST FORETOLD AND PREFIGURED IN THE OLD TESTAMENT

The Church of the Old Testament was not only itself a preparation for, and a figure of, the Church of Christ; it also announced prophecies, and contained types and figures of this latter and more perfect Church. As Christ’s person and work were foretold and prefigured with ever-increasing distinctness, so too was His Church, which is the mystical prolongation of His existence on earth. We have already (Book V. § 167) traced the course of prophecy concerning our Lord, and in doing so we observed how commonly the Prophets speak at the same time of His Church. Here, instead of following the chronological order, it will be better to consider in turn the various images and expressions used to describe this permanent work of Christ’s hands.

I. The Prophets announced that when Christ came He would found a kingdom, which should be (1) universal, (2) never-ending, and (3) one.

Its universality is contrasted with the narrowness and exclusiveness—its perennial character and unity with the temporariness and divisions—of the older covenant. “All the ends of the earth shall remember and be converted to the Lord, and all the kindreds of the Gentiles shall adore in His sight. For the kingdom is the Lord’s, and He shall have dominion over the nations” (Ps. 21:28, 29). “In His days shall justice spring up, and abundance of peace till the moon be taken away; and He shall rule from sea to sea, and from the river unto the ends of the earth” (Ps. 71:7, 8). “In the days of those kingdoms the God of heaven will set up a kingdom that shall never be destroyed; and His kingdom will not be delivered up to another people, and it shall break in pieces and shall consume all these kingdoms, and itself shall stand for ever” (Dan. 2:44; cf. 7:13, 14, 27; Agg. 2:7. 8, 22, 23). “The Lord hath prepared His holy arm in the sight of all the Gentiles, and all the ends of the earth shall see the salvation of our God” (Is. 55:10; cf. 60:1 sqq.; Ps. 97:3; Mich. 4:1 sqq.). “It shall come to pass in that day that living waters shall go out from Jerusalem: half of them to the east sea, and half of them to the last (west) sea; they shall be in summer and in winter, and the Lord shall be King over all the earth; in that day there shall be one Lord, and His Name shall be one” (Zach. 14:8 sqq.).

II. This new people of Israel, this new Jerusalem, this new city of the Lord, this new Sion, promised by the Prophets, is to receive its ruling power, its teaching authority, and its priesthood from Christ the Supreme King, Teacher, and Priest.

1. Christ is to be the Supreme King in this supernatural kingdom of peace; but as this kingdom is to last visibly on earth as long as the earth shall last, so there are ever to be shepherds and princes to rule God’s people in Christ’s Name and by His power. “I am appointed King by Him over Sion, His holy mountain, preaching His commandment. The Lord hath said to Me: Thou art My Son, this day have I begotten Thee. Ask of Me, and I will give Thee the Gentiles for Thy inheritance, and the utmost parts of the earth for Thy possession” (Ps. 2:6–8). “For a Child is born to us, and a Son is given to us, and the government is upon His shoulder, and His name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, God, Mighty, the Father of the world to come, the Prince of peace; His empire shall be multiplied, and there shall be no end of peace; He shall sit upon the throne of David and upon His kingdom, to establish it and strengthen it with judgment and justice from henceforth and for ever” (Isa. 9:6, 7). “I will set up one Shepherd over them (My sheep), and He shall feed them, even My servant David; He shall feed them, and He shall be their Shepherd. And I the Lord will be their God, and My servant David the prince in the midst of them; I the Lord have spoken it” (Ezech. 34:23, 24). “I will gather the remnant of My flock out of all the lands … and I will set up pastors over them, and they shall feed them.… Behold, the days shall come, saith the Lord, and I will raise up to David a just Branch, and a King shall reign and shall be wise, and shall execute judgment and justice in the earth” (Jer. 23:3–5; Ps. 44:17).

2. This same King and Shepherd is also foretold and promised as a Faithful Prophet; so that His kingdom is to be not only a kingdom of peace, but also a kingdom of truth and justice. “You, O kingdom of Sion, rejoice and be joyful in the Lord your God; because He hath given you a teacher of justice, and He will make the early and the latter rain to come down to you as in the beginning” (Joel 2:23). “The Law shall go forth out of Sion, and the Word of the Lord out of Jerusalem” (Mich. 4:2). “All thy children (Jerusalem) shall be taught of the Lord, and great shall be the peace of thy children; and thou shalt be founded in justice” (Isa. 54:3; 11:12; Jer. 31:33, 34; 32:38–40). “I will give you pastors according to My own heart, and they shall feed you with knowledge and doctrine.… At that time Jerusalem shall be called the throne of the Lord, and all the nations shall be gathered together to it, in the name of the Lord to Jerusalem, and they shall not walk after the perversity of their most wicked heart” (Jer. 3:15–17). Hence, the name of the city shall be “the City of Truth,” and Sion shall be called “the Mount of Holiness.” “I will dwell in the midst of Jerusalem, and Jerusalem shall be called the City of Truth, and the Mountain of the Lord of Hosts, the Sanctified Mountain [Heb. ‘the Mount of Holiness’] … Behold, I will save My people from the land of the east, and from the land of the going down of the sun … they shall be My people, and I will be their God in truth and in justice” (Zach. 8:3, 7, 8).

3. Just as the Church was to be a kingdom of peace and truth, ruled over by Christ as King and Teacher, so was it also to be a priestly kingdom with Christ as its High Priest, and men under Him exercising a ministerial priesthood. The son of Josedec, Jesus the high priest, is distinctly spoken of as a type of the Messias: “Hear, O Jesus, thou high priest, thou and thy friends that dwell before thee, for they are portending men [men who are for a sign, men who by words and deeds are to foreshadow wonders that are to come]; for behold I will bring My Servant the Orient” (Zach. 3:8; supra, p. 53). The Prophet is ordered to unite in this “portending man” the sacerdotal with the royal crown, that there may always be the counsel of peace between them both. “And thou shalt take gold and silver, and shalt make crowns, and thou shalt set them on the head of Jesus the son of Josedec, the high priest, and thou shalt speak to him, saying: Thus saith the Lord of hosts, saying: Behold a man, the Orient is His name … He shall build a temple to the Lord, and He shall bear the glory, and shall sit, and rule upon His throne, and He shall be a Priest upon His throne, and the counsel of peace shall be between them both.… And they that are afar off shall come and shall build in the temple of the Lord” (Zach. 6:11–15; cf. St. Epiph., Heres., xxxix. nn. 2–4). So, too, Christ is promised as a Priest who will acquire His Church by the sacrifice of His own blood. “He was offered because it was His own will, and He opened not His mouth; He shall be led as a sheep to the slaughter … if He shall lay down His life for sin, He shall see a long-lived seed … by His knowledge shall this My Servant justify many, and He shall bear their iniquities. Therefore will I distribute to Him many, and He shall divide the spoils of the strong, because He hath delivered His soul unto death” (Isa. 53). This priesthood is not to be temporary and Levitical, but “for ever, according to the order of Melchisedech” (Ps. 109:4; Gen. 14:18; Heb. 5, 7, 9; see also supra, § 210). Hence it is to continue in Christ’s Church, having, of course, its origin from Him. “I come that I may gather them together with all nations and tongues [Heb. ‘gather together all nations and tongues’], and they shall come, and they shall see My glory. And I will set a sign among them, and I will send of them that shall be saved to the Gentiles into the sea, into Africa, and Lydia them that draw the bow; into Italy and Greece, to the islands afar off, to them that have not heard of Me, and have not seen My glory. And they shall declare My glory unto the Gentiles.… And I will take of them to be priests and Levites, saith the Lord. For as the new heavens and the new earth … so shall your seed stand and your name” (Isa. 66:18–22; cf. Jer. 33:15 sqq.).

These passages are enough to show that a clear promise was made of Christ’s kingdom, which was to last for ever with its own ruling power, teaching authority, and priesthood—a kingdom to be acquired by Christ the Redeemer with His own Precious Blood—a kingdom composed of all the Gentiles, and founded for their eternal salvation. Indeed, the foundation of this eternal and universal kingdom is one of the marks of the Messias who was to come. (Cf. Isa. 11:1, 11, 12; 40:2, 9; 42:6, 10; 51:3–7; 54; 62; 65:16 sqq.; Osee 2:16 sqq.; 3:5; Joel 2:27–32; 3:16–21; Amos 3:15 sqq.; 9:11; Soph. 3:14; Zach. 2:10; 14:8, 9.) How far these various passages refer to Christ and His Church, may be gathered from St. Paul’s manner of citing them (Rom. 15:8–12). See Franzelin, l.c. th. vi.

SECT. 233.—THE CHURCH OF CHRIST DESCRIBED IN THE NEW TESTAMENT

I. When we turn to the New Testament, we are told that Christ came to found a kingdom, which is described as the “Kingdom of God,” the “Kingdom of Heaven,” the “Kingdom of Christ.” These expressions, especially the two former, are used in various meanings. The “Kingdom of God,” “Kingdom of Heaven,” sometimes mean the whole of creation (Ps. 23:1; 49:12; 102:19, 22; 144:11, etc.); but in the New Testament they mean the supernatural kingdom purchased by Christ’s Precious Blood. In this latter sense they denote: (1) Internal gifts and graces (Luke 17:20, 21; cf. 12:31; Rom. 14:17, etc.); (2) Heaven, where God reigns with His Saints, and His Saints reign with Him (Matt. 8:11; Luke 13:28, etc.); (3) the visible kingdom of Christ here on earth among men and composed of men.

1. The Angel Gabriel, when announcing the Incarnation of our Lord, foretold to the Blessed Virgin: “He shall be great, and shall be called the Son of the Most High; and the Lord God shall give unto Him the throne of David His father; and He shall reign in the house of Jacob for ever; and of His kingdom there shall be no end” (Luke 1:32, 33; cf. Dan. 8:14, 27; Mich. 4:7). Here it is clear that Christ was to reign over a visible kingdom on earth—the kingdom prefigured and foretold in the old dispensation. His kingdom was to last on earth as long as the world should last, and was to last absolutely for ever in heaven.

2. The preaching of the Baptist, sent “to prepare the way of the Lord,” was: “Do penance (μετανοεῖτε), for the kingdom of heaven is at hand” (Matt. 3:2). And our Lord Himself declared: “The Law and the Prophets were until John; from that time the kingdom of God is preached” (Luke 16:16).

3. The Jews, whether carnal or spiritual, expected that the Messias would found a kingdom upon earth, as the Prophets had foretold; in their minds the expectation of the Messias coincided with the expectation of His kingdom. One of the marks by which He was to be known was that He should be “the Son of David,” “the King of Israel” (John 1:49; Matt. 2:2, 6; 27:11; John 19:19, 22). Hence, those who recognized that the prophecies had been fulfilled in the person of Jesus of Nazareth, hailed Him as “King of Israel” (John 12:13–16; Luke 19:38), and “Son of David” (Matt. 21:9); they cried out, “Blessed be the kingdom of our father David that cometh” (Mark 11:10).

4. Our Lord Himself, when about to offer the sacrifice of Hisown blood, by which He was to purchase His kingdom, declared that He was a King, and that He had a kingdom in this world. Both the Jews who accused Him, and Pilate who judged Him, spoke of a visible kingdom here on earth. This kingdom which they denied Him He claimed for His own, though at the same time He explained that it was of a supernatural order. “Art thou the king of the Jews?… My kingdom is not of this world (ἐκ τοῖ κόσμου τούτου) … but now My kingdom is not from hence (ἐντεῦθεν)” (John 18:33, 36). “He does not say,” observes St. Augustine, “My kingdom is not in this world, but is not of this world.… He does not say, My kingdom is not here, but is not from hence; for His kingdom is here as long as the world shall last” (In Joan, Tract. 115, n. 2). This expression “of this world” occurs elsewhere in St. John’s record of our Lord’s discourses, and does not exclude the fact of being in this world. “Having loved His own who were in the world (ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ), He loved them unto the end.… If you had been of the world (ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου), the world would love its own; but because you are not of the world, but I have chosen you out of the world (ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου), therefore the world hateth you” (John 13:1; 15:19; 16:11, 12, 16).

II. This kingdom of Christ upon earth is described by Him under various figures.

1. In the Old Testament God’s chosen people are called the flock of His sheep. “The sheep of Thy pasture” (Ps. 73:1); “We Thy people, and the sheep of Thy pasture” (Ps. 78:13); “He is the Lord our God, and we are the people of His pasture and the sheep of His hand” (Ps. 94:7; cf. Ps. 99:3; Jer. 23; Ezech. 34; Mich. 7:14). God rebukes the shepherds of this flock for their neglect to feed the sheep, and promises that He will form a new flock, over which He “will set up one Shepherd, even His servant David,” who “shall feed them and shall be their Shepherd” (Ezech. 34:23; 37:24, 26; Zech. 11:7). And under this Shepherd He will set up pastors over them, “and they shall feed them, they shall fear no more, and they shall not be dismayed” (Jer. 23:4); “I will give you,” He says, “pastors according to My own heart, and they shall feed you with knowledge and doctrine” (ibid. 3:15). Accordingly, in the New Testament He declares that He is this promised Shepherd, and that His sheep are the promised flock. “I am the good Shepherd; the good Shepherd giveth His life for the sheep.… I lay down My life for My sheep.… I give them life everlasting (John 10:11, 15, 28). He gathers them together; He feeds them with His doctrine; He rules them by His authority. “You do not believe, because you are not of My sheep; My sheep hear My voice, and I know them, and they follow Me” (ibid. 26, 27); “I am the good Shepherd, and I know Mine, and Mine know Me” (ibid. 14). And this flock is to be composed not only of the children of Israel, but of all the nations. “Other sheep I have, that are not of this fold, and them also I must bring, and they shall hear My voice, and there shall be one fold [or, ‘flock,’ ποίμνη] and one Shepherd” (ibid. 16). As, however, this fold upon earth is to last till the end of time, He appointed other shepherds under Himself, the one Divine Shepherd, to feed His flock: one chief shepherd, Peter and his successors, “Feed My lambs, feed My sheep” (John 21:15–17); and others, who should be subordinate to this one, and to whom St. Peter says, “Feed the flock of God, which is among you, taking care of it (ποιμάνατε τὸ ἐν ὑμῖν ποίμνιον τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐπισκοποῦντες)” (1 Pet. 5:2).

2. In the Old Testament the kingdom of God is also spoken of as a vineyard. “Thou hast brought a vineyard out of Egypt; Thou hast cast out the Gentiles, and hast planted it … Thou plantedst the roots thereof, and it filled the land” (Ps. 79:9, 10; Isa. 5:1 sqq.; Jer. 2:21; 12:10; Ezech. 19:10 sqq.). This figure is likewise used by our Lord in describing His Church. “There was a man, an householder, who planted a vineyard, and made a hedge about it, and dug in it a press, and built in it a tower, and let it out to husbandmen,” etc. (Matt. 21:33–46; Mark 12:1–12; Luke 20:9, 19; cf. Isa. 5:2).

3. Closely connected with this figure is another, which compares the kingdom of God to a marriage-feast, or wedding (Matt. 22:2–14; cf. Osee 2). The parables of the Grain of Mustard-seed and the Leaven bring out the growth and influence of the Church. The Church as a “building” (“I will build my Church;” “You are God’s building,” 1 Cor. 3:9) will be spoken of when we treat of the primacy of St. Peter. But now we are touching on the constitution of the Church, a subject which belongs to the next chapter.

CHAPTER II

THE INSTITUTION AND CONSTITUTION OF THE CHURCH

ALL through His life on earth our Lord proclaimed Himself to be the Messias foretold by the Prophets and expected by the Jews: sent by His heavenly Father with supreme authority, and exacting complete obedience of faith in His doctrine and precepts (cf. supra, § 211). The exercise of this authority, and the corresponding duty of obedience, were not to be restricted to the short period of His sojourn here below. They were to continue for all days, even to the consummation of the world. Hence no small portion of His teaching and work was devoted to the description and formation of the body which was to be invested with His authority, and to carry on the saving work of Redemption.

This subject has already been dealt with in Book I., Part I. We shall here treat briefly, first, of our Lord’s teaching during His Public Life; next, of His teaching during His Risen Life; and, lastly, we shall speak more particularly of the Visible Headship which He conferred upon St. Peter and his successors, the Bishops of Rome.

SECT. 234.—OUR LORD’S TEACHING ON THE CHURCH DURING HIS PUBLIC LIFE

I. From the very first, as soon as He began to preach “the Kingdom of God,” which He came to found, our Lord called to Himself disciples (μαθηταὶ), who had the privilege of sharing His blessed company, hearing His discourses, and witnessing the wonders which He wrought. From among these, after the Second Passover, He selected twelve to be in a more special manner His associates, and the depositaries of His authority. “And it came to pass in those days that He went out into a mountain to pray, and He passed the whole night in the prayer of God. And when day was come, He called unto Him His disciples (μαθητὰς); and He chose twelve of them, whom also He named apostles (ἀποστόλους)” (Luke 6:12, 13). These twelve are constantly spoken of as constituting a single moral body. They are “The Twelve (οἱ δώδεκα)” (Matt. 10:1; 20:17, 24; 26:14, 20, 47; Mark 3:14; 4:10; 6:7; 9:34; 10:32; 11:11; 14:10, 17, 20, 47; Acts 6:2). They are even so styled when their number was reduced to eleven by the death of the traitor Judas (John 20:24; 1 Cor. 15:5, in the Greek text); and when increased to thirteen by the addition of Matthias and Paul (Matt. 19:28; Apoc. 21:14). That their office was a higher one, is clear not only from the very fact and manner of their election, and from the name “Apostles” (messengers, ambassadors) bestowed upon them, but also from various passages, drawing an express distinction between them and the rest of the disciples and the faithful (e.g. Luke 24:9, 33). Moreover, their special function of being authentic witnesses is expressly pointed out. “Of those men that have companied with us all the time that the Lord Jesus came in and went out among us … one of these must be made a witness with us of His resurrection.… Show whether of these two Thou hast chosen to take the place of the ministry and apostleship (κλῆρον τῆς οἰκονομίας ταύτης καὶ ἀποστολῆς) … and he was numbered with the eleven Apostles” (Acts 1:21–26). Hence our Lord took care to instruct them above all the others in the mysteries of the kingdom of God. They were the chosen companions of His missionary journeys, and were sent by Him, armed with His authority and power, to announce the same message that He announced. “These twelve Jesus sent, commanding them … Going, preach, saying: The kingdom of heaven is at hand. Heal the sick, raise the dead, cleanse the lepers, cast out devils.… And whosoever shall not receive you, nor hear your words.… Amen, I say to you, it shall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom and Gomorrha in the day of judgment, than for that city” (Matt. 10:5–15; Luke 9:1–6; cf. Matt. 11:20 sqq.). In addition to the twelve, “the Lord appointed also other seventy-two; and He sent them two and two before His face into every city and place, whither He Himself was to come” (Luke 10:1). These, however, were in no way equalled to the Apostles, though as they were sent in His Name He could also say to them: “He that heareth you heareth Me” (Luke 10:16).

II. So far confining ourselves to Our Lord’s teaching before His Passion and Death, we observe that He drew a clear distinction between (1) the body of the faithful, (2) the seventy-two disciples, and (3) the twelve Apostles. As long as He remained upon earth, He Himself was the visible Head of this Apostolic College. But as His stay was to be brief, He took care on every occasion to declare that after His departure one of their number was to preside over them and over the whole Church, in His stead; and that that one was to be Simon, whom He surnamed Peter. This privilege of St. Peter will be treated of later on in a separate chapter.

SECT. 235.—OUR LORD’S TEACHING ON THE CHURCH DURING HIS RISEN LIFE

After having completed the work of our Redemption by the Sacrifice of the Cross, having paid the price of the Church, and having risen in triumph from the dead, Our Lord “showed Himself alive,” “to the apostles whom He had chosen,” “for forty days appearing to them and speaking of the kingdom of God” (Acts 1:2, 3). His object in appearing to them so often was not only to strengthen their faith in the fact of His resurrection, but to complete the institution and constitution of His Church. Just as in other periods of His life, so also in this especially, many of His words and deeds are not recorded in Scripture (John 20:30; 21:25); nevertheless, as might be expected, there are striking passages concerning the Church, “the kingdom of God,” clearly proving the mission of the Apostles, and the establishment of the supremacy of Peter.

I. In the first apparition to the Apostolic College recorded by St. John (20:19, 29), our Lord conferred upon them the same authority which He Himself possessed and had exercised: “As the Father sent Me, I also send you.” “As Thou hast sent Me into the world, I also send them into the world” (ibid. 17:18). These words are not a mere statement or promise; they actually constitute the Apostles as Christ’s successors. “Receive ye the Holy Ghost,” He added, for this work to which He appointed them. Hence, in virtue of the powers there and then bestowed upon them, He continued: “Whose sins ye shall forgive, they are forgiven them.” The mission is not, however, restricted to the forgiveness of sins, but is universal, as was His own mission from the Father; and it is confided to the Apostolic College and their successors (cf. “And after that He was seen by the eleven,” 1 Cor. 15:5; cf. “the eleven disciples,” Matt. 28:16). Later on, in Galilee, He renewed this commission, appealing to the supreme authority in virtue of which He sent them, and which was ever to abide with them. “And the eleven disciples went into Galilee unto the mountain where Jesus had appointed them … and Jesus coming, spoke to them, saying: All power is given to Me in heaven and in earth. Going, therefore, teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you, and behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world.” In His last discourse at Jerusalem, before His ascension, He for the third time conferred upon the Apostles the office of continuing His work in His Name and with His authority. “He appeared to the eleven as they were at table (cf. 1 Cor. 15:7) … and He said to them: Go ye into the whole world and preach the gospel to every creature. He that believeth [your preaching] and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be condemned. And these signs shall follow,” etc. (Mark 16:14–20). “You shall receive the power of the Holy Ghost coming upon you: and you shall be witnesses unto Me in Jerusalem, and in all Judæa, and Samaria, and even to the uttermost part of the earth” (Acts 1:8; cf. “and you are witnesses of these things,” Luke 24:48; “one of these must be a witness with us of His resurrection,” Acts 1:22). Thus in St. Mark the mission of the Apostles is endowed with the same evidences of power which accompanied our Lord’s mission (cf. Matt. 11:20, 24; 12:41; Mark 4:40; Luke 4:36; 7:16; John 2:23; 5:36; 10:25, 38; 12:37; 14:12; 15:24).

II. To understand the nature of the mission entrusted to the Apostles and their successors, we must call to mind the nature of our Lord’s own mission.

1. Christ continually declares that His doctrine, His works, His authority and power are derived from His heavenly Father. “I am not come of Myself, but He that sent Me is true … I know Him because I am from Him, and He hath sent Me” (John 7:28, 29). “My doctrine is not Mine, but His Who sent Me” (ibid. 7:16); “He that heareth My word, and believeth Him that sent Me, hath life everlasting.… For as the Father hath life in Himself, so He hath given to the Son also to have life in Himself; and He hath given Him power to do judgment.… I cannot of Myself do anything: as I hear, so I judge; and My judgment is just, because I seek not My own will, but the will of Him that sent Me.… The works which the Father hath given Me to perfect, the works themselves which I do, give testimony of Me, that the Father hath sent Me.… And you have not His word abiding in you, for Whom He hath sent, Him you believe not” (ibid. 5:24–38). The functions or offices of Christ’s mission were threefold: He came to govern, to teach, and to sanctify: to be King, Prophet, and Priest (see Book V., Part II., ch. 2). It was in the exercise of these functions, and to provide for their continuance, that He founded His Church. “I lay down My life for My sheep, My sheep hear My voice, and I give them eternal life;” “I will build My Church;” “to thee will I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven;” “Christ also loved His Church, and delivered Himself up for it, that He might sanctify it … that He might present it to Himself a glorious Church;” “the Church of God which He hath purchased with His own blood.” “Christ is the Head of the Church; He is the Saviour of the body (σῶτηρ τοῦ σωμάτος).” “I have finished the work which Thou hast given Me to do” (John 17:2 sqq., etc.).

2. Hence, in confiding His mission to the Apostles, He expressly refers to His own mission from the Father: “As the Father hath sent Me, I also send you.” And He communicates to them His threefold function of ruling, teaching, and sanctifying. “As the Father hath sent Me, I also send you. By these words our Lord Jesus Christ ordained the rulers of the world, and teachers and dispensers of His Divine mysteries (Κεχειροτονήκε μεν ἐν τουτοίς ὁ Κύριος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς ὁ Χριστός τοῦς τῆς οἱκουμένης καθηγήτας τε καὶ διδασκάλους καὶ τῶν θειῶν αὐτοῦ μυστηριῶν οἰκονόμους).” (St. Cyril Alex., t. iv. pp. 1093–1095; for the continuation of the passage, see Franzelin, l.c. 119). He had already said to His Apostles, “If he will not hear the Church, let him be to thee as the heathen and the publican.” “Whatsoever you shall bind on earth shall be bound also in heaven, and whatsoever you shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven.” Now, after His resurrection, He actually confers this power and authority upon them as the rulers of His kingdom. “All power is given to Me in heaven and in earth. Go ye, therefore,” etc. Hence, St. Paul declares that his jurisdiction derives its authority from the power of Christ, and that he exercises it in virtue of the mission conferred upon him by our Lord. “In the Name of our Lord Jesus Christ, you being gathered together, and my spirit, with the power of our Lord Jesus, to deliver such a one to satan for the destruction of the flesh, that the spirit may be saved” (1 Cor. 5:4, 5). “If I come again, I will not spare. Do you seek a proof of Christ that speaketh in met?” (2 Cor. 13:2, 3). Our Lord’s office as Teacher is even more expressly imposed upon His Apostles. “Teach [μαθητευσάτε, ‘make to yourselves disciples’] all nations;” “Preach the Gospel to every creature;” “Ye shall be witnesses to me” (cf. Vol. I. § 9). His office of Priest He imparts to them in the general mission which He gives them; for He was sent by His Father to save the world by the oblation of His body and blood once for all (ἔφαπαξ) and He in turn sends them to apply His merits by the unbloody Sacrifice of the Mass and the Sacraments. This sacrifice and these sacraments are not theirs, but Christ’s; and their power to perform and administer is His, not theirs. “Let a man so account of us, as the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the mysteries of God” (1 Cor. 4:1). “Was Paul, then, crucified for you? or were you baptized in the name of Paul?… What, then, is Apollo, and what is Paul? The ministers of Him whom you have believed” (ibid. 1:13; 3:4, 5). “All things are of God, Who hath reconciled the world to Himself by Christ, and hath given to us the ministry of reconciliation” (2 Cor. 5:18).

Billot, De Ecclesia, p. 72 sqq.; Atzberger, Kath. Dogmatik (continuation of Scheeben’s work), sect. 327.

CHAPTER III

THE PRIMACY OF ST. PETER

AS long as Christ, “the Master and the Lord (ὁ διδάσκαλος καὶ ὁ Κύριος)” (John 13:13), remained visibly on earth, there was no room or need for any other visible head. But since He willed that His kingdom should be visible, He was obliged, when He ascended into heaven, to designate a vicegerent on earth. “Should any one say that Christ is the one Head and the one Shepherd, the one Spouse of the one Church, he does not give an adequate reply. It is clear, indeed, that Christ is the author of grace in the sacraments of the Church; it is Christ Himself who baptizes; it is He who forgives sins; it is He who is the true Priest, who offered Himself upon the altar of the Cross; and it is by His power that His Body is daily consecrated upon the altar; and, still, because He was not visibly present to all the faithful, He made choice of ministers through whom the aforesaid sacraments should be dispensed to the faithful.… For the same reason, therefore, because He was about to withdraw His visible presence from the Church, it was necessary that He should appoint some one in His place to have the charge of the Universal Church. Hence, before His ascension He said to Peter, ‘Feed My sheep’ “ (St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, lib. iv. cc. 74, 76).

SECT. 236.—THE PRIMACY PROVED FROM SCRIPTURE

I. From the very time when our Lord called St. Peter to follow Him, He indicated the dignity to which the Apostle was afterwards to be raised. “Jesus looking upon him said, Thou art Simon the son of Jona: thou shalt be called Cephas (Κηφᾶς, כֵיפָא), which is interpreted Peter” (John 1:42). In the election of the Apostles, and again in their mission, he is mentioned the first; and this surname is expressly spoken of: “He chose twelve of them, whom also He named Apostles; Simon, whom He surnamed Peter, and Andrew his brother, James and John,” etc. (Luke 6:13, 14). “The names of the twelve Apostles are these: the first, Simon (πρῶτος Σίμων), who is called Peter, and Andrew his brother,” etc. (Matt. 10:2; Mark 3:16). And whenever he is named together with any of the other Apostles, he is always named first. Moreover, our Lord always treats him as the leader and representative of the rest, and he in turn always acts as their spokesman. At the raising of Jairus’ daughter “He admitted not any man to follow Him but Peter, and James, and John” (Mark 5:37; Luke 8:51). When He was to be transfigured “He took Peter, and James, and John.… But Peter and they that were with him [Πέτρος καὶ οἱ σὺν αὐτῷ, cf. ‘Peter and they that were with him,’ Luke 8:45; ‘Peter standing with the eleven,’ Acts 2:14; ‘Tell His disciples and Peter,’ Mark 16:7] were heavy with sleep.… Peter saith to Jesus, Master, it is good for us to be here,” etc. (Luke 9:28–33; Matt. 17:1 sqq.; Mark 9:1 sqq.). So, too, in His agony in the garden, “He taketh Peter, and James, and John with Him.… And He cometh and findeth them sleeping, and He saith to Peter, Simon, sleepest thou? Couldst thou not watch one hour? Watch ye and pray” (Mark 14:33–38; Matt. 26:37–40). “He saw two ships standing by the lake … and going into one of the ships that was Simon’s.… He taught the multitudes out of the ship.… He said to Simon, Launch out into the deep for a draught. And Peter answering, said to Him, Master, we have laboured.… He (Peter) was wholly astonished, and all they that were with him (πάντας τοὺς σὺν αὐτῷ) … and so were also James and John.… And Jesus saith to Simon, Fear not, from henceforth thou shalt catch men” (Luke 5:2–10). When the Apostles, seeing our Lord walking upon the sea, were troubled, “Peter, making answer (to our Lord’s assurance, ‘Be of good heart; it is I; fear not’), said, Lord, if it be Thou, bid me to come to Thee upon the waters. And He said, Come. And Peter, going down out of the boat, walked upon the water to come to Jesus” (Matt. 14:22–33). “They that received the didrachmas came to Peter and said to him, Doth not your Master pay the didrachmas?… Jesus said to him.… Go to the sea and cast in a hook, and that fish which shall first come up, take; and when thou hast opened its mouth, thou shalt find a stater: take that and give it to them for Me and thee (ἀντὶ ἐμοῦ καὶ σοῦ)” (Matt. 17:23–26).

II. Not content with these repeated indications of Peter’s pre-eminence, our Lord on three several occasions spoke of it in such express terms as to leave no possibility of doubt.

1. The first of these is recorded by St. Matthew (16:13–19; cf. Mark 8:27, 28; Luke 9:18–20). It was during the last period of our Lord’s ministry, when He devoted Himself especially to the training of His Apostles. They had now recognized Him as the Messias; but they still had worldly notions of the kingdom which He came to found. Henceforth His aim was to correct their false notions, and to prepare them for His passion and death. Taking occasion of the absence of the multitudes, He asked them, “Whom do men say that the Son of Man is?” And after receiving their various answers, He continued, “Whom do you say that I am?” Peter at once replied, “Thou art Christ, the Son of the Living God” (cf. John 6:67–71). “And Jesus answering, said to him, Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-jona, because flesh and blood hath not revealed it to thee, but My Father Who is in heaven. And I say to thee, That thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build My Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. And I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven. And whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth, it shall be bound also in heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven.”

(a) On this solemn occasion our Lord addresses St. Peter by his own proper name, “Simon, son of John;” as He likewise did when He entrusted to his care the lambs and the sheep of His flock (John 21:15–17). He does so to bring out more clearly the dignity to which the Apostle was to be raised, and which was indicated by the surname imposed upon him. “As My Father hath manifested to thee My Godhead, so do I make known to thee thy pre-eminence (excellentiam)” (St. Leo, Serm. iv. 2). In former times considerable stress was laid by Protestants upon the difference of gender in the words Πέτρος, πέτρα But our Lord spoke Aramaic, and in that language the same word kepha is used in both places. The metaphor which He makes use of is plain enough. Christ, the Master Builder, is about to found His Church, the house of God (“You are God’s building,” 1 Cor. 3:9); and in order that it may be able to withstand the tempests by which it will be assailed, He, like the wise man, determines to found it upon a rock (Matt. 7:24). That rock is Simon, who henceforth is to be called Rock, because on him the Church is to be built. “Thou art Rock, and on this rock (that is, on thee) I will build My Church.” And it is Peter, not the other Apostles, who is to be this Rock: “I say to thee, thou art Peter,” etc. Now, the foundation is that which gives a building its strength and stability; which holds the parts together; outside of which any part will collapse. Hence it is from Peter that the Church derives her strength and stability: he it is who keeps all her members together; and all who cleave not to him will perish. It is not simply Peter’s confession that is the Rock of the Church, but Peter’s authority; for it is authority which is the basis which holds a moral building or society together.

(b) Inasmuch as the Church is to be built upon Simon Peter as a secure foundation, “the gates of hell shall not prevail against it (πύλαι ᾅδου οὐ κατισχύσουσιν αὐτης).” Whether we understand the word “hell” (Αἵδης, שְׁאוֹל) as the abode of the demons and the damned, or simply as the realm of death, the meaning of the passage is much the same (§ 203). The powers of darkness or death shall not be able to destroy the Church built on the rock. Hell may do its worst; death, the conqueror of all else, may strive its utmost; the Church of Christ shall withstand all their attacks, and last for ever.

(c) Simon is to be not only the foundation of the Church; he is also to have complete control and jurisdiction over it: “To thee will I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven.” We have already seen (supra, p. 292) that “the kingdom of heaven” is used to denote the Church, Christ’s spiritual, heavenly kingdom here on earth. “The keys” is a common Oriental expression for control: as “the gates” denote power, so “the keys of the gates” denote control of this power. “I will lay the key of the house of David upon his shoulder; and he shall open, and none shall shut; and he shall shut, and none shall open” (Isa. 22:22), where Eliacim is appointed over the palace in the stead of Sobna. “I am the first and the last … and have the keys of death and of hell” (Apoc. 1:18). “The holy one and the true one, he that hath the key of David: he that openeth, and no man shutteth; shutteth, and no man openeth” (ibid. 3:7). Hence, Christ, by giving Peter the keys, makes him his vicar and representative: delegates to him the power which He Himself possesses.

(d) This jurisdiction is further denoted by the words, “Whatsoever thou shalt bind,” etc. Binding and loosing signify, in Rabbinical language, “prohibition and permission,” with reference to the various questions submitted to the Rabbis for solution. Hence, it here means much the same as the power of the keys, but with special reference to teaching authority; and Christ promises that the exercise of this authority shall be ratified in heaven—a proof that it must be infallible.

2. Among the warnings given to the Apostles at His Last Supper, there was one especially addressed to Peter, but having reference to the others as well: “Simon, Simon, Satan hath desired to have you [ὑμᾶς, plural = you Apostles], that he might sift you as wheat. But I have prayed for thee [σοῦ, singular = thee, Peter], that thy faith fail not; and thou, being once converted, confirm thy brethren” (Luke 22:31, 32). “The danger from the trial of fear was common to all the Apostles, and they stood equally in need of the aid of the Divine protection … and yet of Peter special care is taken by the Lord, and for the faith of Peter in particular does He pray, as though the condition of the rest would be more secure, provided the mind of their chief were not subdued. In Peter, therefore, is the strength of all defended, and the aid of Divine grace is so disposed as that the firmness which is bestowed upon Peter by Christ may be conferred by Peter on the Apostles (Ut firmitas quæ per Christum Petro tribuitur, per Petrum apostolis conferatur).” (St. Leo, Serm. iv., in Natal. Ordin., c. 3)

Our Lord tells St. Peter that Satan has asked and obtained (ἐξῃτήσατο) permission to put the Apostles to trial, as he did of old the patriarch Job. As in that former case, so also here, God will prove and purify those whom Satan intended to vex and destroy. To defeat the machinations of the Evil One, Christ prays, not for all, but for Peter, the Man of Rock, and it is Peter who is then to strengthen the rest of his brethren. “And thou being once converted (ἐπιστρέψας, when thou hast turned to Me from thy sin, or, do thou in thy turn) confirm thy brethren.” “This whole speech of our Lord,” says Bengel, “presupposes that Peter is the first of the Apostles, on whose stability or fall the less or greater danger of the others depended.” Not that Peter’s need was greater than theirs, but that their faith depended upon his. Just as the Church is “the pillar and ground of the truth (στῦλος καὶ ἑδραίωμα τῆς ἀληθείας)” (1 Tim. 3:15); in like manner Peter is the strengthener (ὁ στηρίζων) or foundation (τὸ στήριγμα) of the faith (i.e. the truth) of his brethren (the Church); and so the Church is the pillar of the truth, because it rests upon Peter, its foundation. Hence it is clear that the promise here made to Simon corresponds with that already made to him at Cæsarea Philippi. Here it is Satan who is to attack: there it is “the gates of Hell;” here Simon is the strengthener of his brethren: there he is the rock of the Church; here the brethren shall be safe against Satan, because they are strengthened by Simon: there the gates of Hell shall not prevail against the Church, because it is founded upon the Man of Rock. See Palmieri, l.c, p. 287.

3. After the Resurrection our Lord fulfilled these promises by actually conferring upon Peter the primacy over His Church. “Jesus saith to Simon Peter, Simon. son of John [cf. βαριῶνα, Matt. 16:17], lovest thou (ἀγαπᾳς) Me more than these? He saith to Him, Yea, Lord, Thou knowest that I love (φιλῶ) Thee. He saith to him, Feed My lambs (βόσκε τὰ ἀρνία μου). He saith to him again, Simon, son of John, lovest thou (ἀγαπᾳς) Me? He saith to him, Yea, Lord, Thou knowest that I love (φιλῶ) Thee. He saith to him, Feed My lambs (ποίμαινε τα πρόβατα, al. προβάτια). He said to him the third time, Simon, son of John, lovest thou (φιλεῖς) Me? Peter was grieved because He said to him the third time, Lovest thou Me? And he said to Him, Lord, Thou knowest all things: Thou knowest that I love (φιλῶ) Thee. He said to him, Feed My sheep (βόσκε τὰ προβάτα, al. προβάτια)” (John 21:15–17). Our Lord’s object is not to reinstate St. Peter in the Apostleship; for this, if needed, had already been done to him as well as to the others: “As the Father hath sent Me, I also send you” (John 20:21). Here it is a question of conferring a special charge upon Peter as distinct from his brethren. The threefold question is directed to give him an opportunity of a threefold profession of love to atone for his threefold denial; and the threefold charge is intended to express the plenitude of the charge entrusted to him—he is made to be the shepherd of the whole flock. We have already seen that the flock is the Church, and that Christ is its Chief Shepherd (p. 294). The powers which He possess He here clearly delegates to Peter.

III. To understand more fully that Christ made St. Peter His vicar and representative, we must bear in mind that the above-mentioned titles and offices conferred upon the Apostle are those very titles and offices foretold of the Messiah by the Prophets, claimed by our Lord for Himself, and attributed to Him in the Acts and Epistles.

1. “The rock was Christ” (1 Cor. 10:4). He is “the stone which the builders rejected,” but which “became the head of the corner” (Matt. 21:42; Ps. 117:27; Acts 4:11). “The chief corner-stone, in Whom all the building being framed together, groweth up into a holy temple in the Lord: in Whom also you are built together into a habitation of God in the Spirit” (Eph. 2:20, 22). “Unto Whom (the Lord) coming as to a living stone … be ye also as living stones built up, a spiritual house.… Wherefore it is said in the Scriptures: Behold, I lay in Sion a chief corner-stone, elect, precious. And he that shall believe in Him shall not be confounded, a stone of stumbling, and a rock of scandal (πέτρα σκανδάλου)” (1 Pet. 2:4–8; Isa. 28:16; Rom. 9:33). “Whosoever shall fall upon this stone shall be broken: but upon whomsoever it shall fall, it shall grind him to powder” (Matt. 21:44). “Other foundation no man can lay, but that which is laid, which is Christ Jesus” (1 Cor. 3:10). If it be objected that these texts exclude St. Peter, we reply with St. Leo (Serm, iv., In Nat. Ord., c. 2), “Thou art Peter: that is, whereas I (Christ) am the inviolable Rock; I that chief corner-stone; I Who make both one; I the Foundation besides which no man can lay another; nevertheless, thou also art a rock, because thou art consolidated by My power, that what things belong to Me (or are peculiar to Me) by My power, may be common to thee and Me by participation of them with Me (tu quoque petra es, quia mea virtute solidaris ut quæ mihi potestate sunt propria, sint tibi mecum participatione communia).” And Theophylact calls Peter “the Rock and Foundation after Christ (Σοὶ ὡς μετʼ ἐμὲ ὄντι τῆς ἐκκλησίας πέτρᾳ καὶ στηρίγματι)” (In Lucam, c. xxii.). “The most firm rock, which from that principal Rock received a participation of His virtue and name” (St. Prosper of Acquitaine, De Vocat. Gent., lib. ii. c. 28).

2. So, too, Christ, “the First and the Last,” holds “the keys of life and death” (Apoc. 1:18); He is “the holy one and the true one; He that hath the key of David; He that openeth, and no man shutteth; shutteth, and no man openeth” (ibid. 3:7). “And I will give the key of David upon His shoulder (cf. ‘the government is upon His shoulder,’ Isa. 9:6); and He shall open, and none shall shut; and He shall shut, and none shall open” (Isa. 22:22; cf. Job 12:14).

3. He is “the Good Shepherd” (John 10:11), the Messiah in His best known and most loving office. “I will set up one Shepherd over them, and He shall feed them … and He shall be their Shepherd” (Ezech. 34:23; cf. 11–16; 37:24). “He shall feed His flock like a Shepherd; He shall gather together the lambs with His arm, and shall take them up in His bosom, and He Himself shall carry them that are with young” (Isa. 40:11). “For you were as sheep going astray; but you are now converted to the Shepherd and Bishop of your souls” (1 Pet. 2:25).

IV. After our Lord’s Ascension we find, as might be expected, that St. Peter at once steps into the place and office to which he had been appointed. Where formerly we read of “the twelve,” now we read of “Peter with the eleven (ὁ Πέτρος σὺν τοῖς ἕνδεκα);” “Peter and the rest of the Apostles (τὸν Πέτρον καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἀποστόλους).” He it is who presides at the election of one to take the place of the traitor Judas (Acts 1:15 sqq.); he is the first, and indeed the only one, to preach and instruct on Pentecost Day; he is the first to exercise the miraculous powers promised to the Church: “Peter, with John, fastening his eyes upon him (the lame man), said, Look upon us (ἀτενίσας δὲ Πέτρος εἰς αὐτὸν σὺν τῷ Ἰωάννῃ εἶπεν, κ. τ. λ.) … But he looked earnestly upon them, hoping that he should receive something of them. But Peter said, Silver and gold I have none; but what I have I give thee: In the Name of Jesus,” etc. (ibid. 3:4–6). Again, he alone addresses the people (ibid. 12–26). When he and John are the first to be arrested, it is he who defends the action of the Apostles and preaches the Name of Jesus (ibid. 4:1–22). In the story of Ananias and Saphira, although all the Apostles are concerned, it is Peter alone who examines and delivers judgment on the unhappy couple. Ananias, “bringing a certain part of it [the price], laid it at the feet of the Apostles. But Peter said,” etc. (ibid. 5:1–10). Though afterwards “by the hands of the Apostles were many signs and wonders wrought,” yet “the multitude brought forth the sick into the streets and laid them on beds and couches, that when Peter came his shadow at the least might overshadow any of them, and they might be delivered from their infirmities” (ibid. 12–15). When the High Priest summoned the Apostles before him and forbade them to preach, “Peter and the Apostles answering, said, We ought to obey God rather than men” (5:29). When the Gospel was preached in Samaria, Peter was sent with John to confirm the new converts, and again takes the leading part (8:14–25). Later on, when “the Church had peace throughout all Judæa and Galilee and Samaria … it came to pass that Peter, as he passed through visiting all (διερχόμενον διὰ πάντων), came to the saints who dwelt at Lydda” (ibid. 9:31, 32). “Like a general, he went round surveying the ranks, seeing what portion was well massed together, what in order, what needed his presence. Behold him making his rounds in every direction,” etc. (Chrysost., In Act., Hom. xxi. n. 2). Furthermore, he is the first to take the great step of receiving the Gentiles into the Church (Acts 10). When James, the brother of John, one of the three greater Apostles, was put to death by Herod, and when Paul long afterwards was imprisoned, nothing is said of the Church’s anxiety at their arrest, or prayers for their deliverance. But when Peter “was kept in prison, prayer was made without ceasing by the Church unto God for him (προσευχὴ δὲ ἦν ἐκτενῶς γινομένη ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκκησίας πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν περὶ αὐτοῦ)” (ibid. 12:1–5). When dissension threatened the unity of the Church, and when “the Apostles and ancients assembled to consider of this matter, and when there had been much disputing, Peter, rising up, said to them, Men, brethren, you know that in former days God made choice among us that by my mouth the Gentiles should hear the word of the Gospel,” etc. As soon as he had spoken, “all the multitude held their peace,” and the subsequent decree of the council was in accordance with his decision. “Peter,” says St. Jerome, “spoke with his wonted freedom, and the Apostle James followed his sentence, and all the ancients at once acceded to it” (Ep. 75, Inter August, n. 7).

V. The personal infallibility of each of the Apostles (“When he, the Spirit of truth is come, He will teach you all truth”) and the universality of their jurisdiction (“teach ye all nations”) rendered the exercise of St. Peter’s peculiar prerogatives less manifest, and gave the Apostles a position with regard to him which could not be held by their successors with regard to his successors (see infra, § 239). This was especially so in St. Paul’s case. The attacks made upon his authority on the ground that he was not one of the original Twelve, required him to take every occasion of magnifying his own apostolic office. Nevertheless, we find in his Epistles passages which clearly indicate his recognition of Peter’s supremacy. “I went to Jerusalem to see Peter (ἱστορῆσαι Κηφᾶν, ‘to make the acquaintance of, to interview Cephas’), and I tarried with him fifteen days; but other of the Apostles I saw none, saving James, the brother of the Lord” (Gal. 1:18, 19). “After so many great deeds,” says St. Chrysostom (in h. 1.), “needing nothing of Peter nor of his instruction, but being his equal in rank (ἰσότιμος), for I will say no more here, still he goes up to him as to the greater and elder (πρὸς μείζονα καὶ πρεσβύτερον).… He went but for this alone, to see him and honour him by his presence. He says, I went up to visit Peter. He did not say, to see Peter, but to visit Peter (οὐκ εἶπεν, ἰδεῖν Πέτρον, ἀλλʼ ἱστορῆσαι Πέτρον), as they say in becoming acquainted with great and illustrious cities. So much pains he thought it worth only to see the man.… For he honours the man, and loves him more than all (τιμᾷ τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ φιλεῖ μᾶλλον πάντων): for he says that he came up for none (διὰ οὐδένα) of the Apostles save him.” Four times does he mention St. Peter in his First Epistle to the Corinthians: twice where he gives him the place of honour (Paul, Apollo, Cephas, Christ; 1:12; 3:22, 23); and twice where he singles him out by name, the rest being spoken of in a body (9:5; 15:5). True, in Gal. 2:9 the order is “James, and Cephas, and John;” but here he is speaking of the three as Apostles, and asserting his equality with them as such. And the division of labour which is there spoken of (“To me was committed the gospel of the uncircumcision, as to Peter was that of the circumcision”) is not opposed to Peter’s primacy. “For, as a mark of his excellence, Christ Himself, Who came to save all men, with Whom there is no distinction of Jew and Greek, was yet called ‘Minister of the circumcision’ by Paul (Rom. 15:8), a title of dignity according to Paul’s own words, for theirs was ‘the adoption of children, and the glory and the testament, and the giving of the Law, and the service of God, and the promises,’ while ‘the Gentiles praise God for His mercy.’ But just as Christ our Lord was so called Minister of the circumcision, in such sense as yet to be the Pastor and Saviour of all, so Peter, too, was called the minister of the circumcision, in such sense as yet to be by the Lord constituted (Acts 9:32) pastor and ruler of the whole flock. Whence St. Leo, ‘Out of the whole world Peter alone is chosen to preside over the calling of all the Gentiles, and over all the Apostles, and the collected Fathers of the Church, so that though there be among the people of God many priests and many shepherds, yet Peter rules all by immediate commission, whom Christ also rules by sovereign power’ “ (Baronius, Ann., A.D. 51, sect. 29; St. Leo, Serm. iv.).

There is another famous passage in this same Epistle which is often quoted against St. Peter’s primacy. “When Cephas was come to Antioch, I withstood him to the face, because he was to be blamed (κατὰ πρόσωπον αὐτῷ ἀντέστην, ὅτι κατεγνωσμένος ἦν). For before that some came from James, he did eat with the Gentiles; but when they were come, he withdrew and separated himself, fearing them who were of the circumcision. And to his dissimulation the rest of the Jews consented (συνυπεκρίθησαν αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ Ἰουδαῖοι), so that Barnabas also was led by them into that dissimulation. But when I saw that they walked not uprightly unto the truth of the Gospel, I said to Cephas before them all, If thou, being a Jew, livest after the manner of the Gentiles and not as the Jews do, how dost thou compel the Gentiles to live as do the Jews?” (Gal. 2:11–14). Peter’s conduct was in no way an error against the faith. He had been the first to receive the Gentiles (Acts 10, 11), and he distinctly taught that the Law was no longer binding (ibid. 15:7 sqq.). In his anxiety, however, to conciliate the Jews, whom he had lately taken under his special charge (Gal. 2:9), he lived as a Jew. On the other hand, St. Paul, to whom the Gentiles were entrusted, rightly feared that the example of Cephas (the Man of Rock, on whom Christ had built His Church) might be quoted to prove the necessity of observing the Law, and therefore he strongly protested against such conduct. Nevertheless, we find him shortly afterwards circumcising Timothy “because of the Jews that were in those places” (Acts 16:3). The Fathers who comment on the story of the dissension, however they may differ in their interpretation, are anxious to uphold Peter’s dignity, and admire his humility in submitting to be rebuked, rather than Paul’s freedom in rebuking him. “Peter gave to posterity a rarer and a holier example—that they should not disdain, if perchance they left the right track, to be corrected even by their youngers—than Paul: that even inferiors might confidently venture to resist superiors, maintaining brotherly charity, in the defence of evangelical truth.… Much more wonderful and praiseworthy is it willingly to accept correction than boldly to correct deviation. Paul, then, has the praise of just liberty, and Peter of holy humility” (St. August., Ep. lxxxii. n. 22). See also Estius’s excellent commentary on Galatians ii.

SECT. 237.—THE FATHERS ON THE PRIMACY OF ST. PETER

In the small space at our disposal it will not be possible for us to give more than a few of the passages in which the Fathers speak of the titles and prerogatives of St. Peter. The English reader will find the Patristic evidence given at length in Mr. Allnatt’s excellent work, Cathedra Petri; Waterworth’s The Fathers on St. Peter and his Successors.

I. St. Peter the Prince and Head of the Apostles

St. Clement of Alexandria: “The blessed Peter, the Chosen (ὁ ἐκλεκτός), the Pre-eminent (ὁ ἐξαίρετος), the First (ὁ πρῶτος) of the disciples” (Quis Dives Salvetur. Op., ed. Migne, ii. p. 625).

Origen: “Peter the Prince of the Apostles” (In Lucam, Hom. xvi. tom. iii. p. 952). “Jesus having adjudged him greater than the other disciples (κρίναντος αὐτὸν μείζονα τῶν λοιπῶν γνωρίμων)” (tom. xiii., In Matt., n. 14; tom. iii. p. 588).

Cyprian: “St. Peter, whom the Lord chose to be first, or chief (quem primum Dominus elegit)” (Epist. lxxi., Ad Quintum). “The Primacy is given to Peter (Primatus Petro datur)” (De Unit. Eccl, n. 4).

St. Peter of Alexandria: “Peter, set above the Apostles (Ὁ πρόκριτος τῶν ἀποστόλων Πέτρος)” (Canon. Penitent., n. 9; Galland. iv.; et ap. Hardouin, Concil., tom. i. p. 229).

Eusebius: “That powerful and great one of the Apostles, who on account of his excellence was the leader of the rest (Τὸν καρτερὸν καὶ μέγαν τῶν ἀποστόλων τὸν ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα τῶν λοιπῶν ἁπάντων προήγορον)” (Hist. Eccl., lib. ii. c. 14).

St. Hilary: “The Prince of the Apostolate (Apostolatus princeps)” (In Matt. vii. 6).

St. Athanasius: “Peter the Chief or Leader (ὁ κορυφαῖος)” (In Ps. xv. 8; tom. iii. p. 105, Migne).

St. Cyril of Jerusalem: “Peter the chiefest and foremost leader of the Apostles (ὁ κορυφαιότατος καὶ πρωτοστάτης τῶν ἀποστόλων)” (Catech. ii. n. 19, Migne, p. 31).

St. Ephraem Syrus: “The Prince of the Apostles” (tom, ii., Serm. Syr., lvi., Adv. Hœr., p. 559). “The Chief of the Apostles” (ib. Serm. Gr. in Adv. Dom., p. 203).

St. Gregory of Nyssa: “The Leader and Coryphæus of the Apostolic Choir.… The Head of the Apostles” (Alt. Orat. de S. Steph., tom. iii. pp. 730–733).

St. Gregory of Nazianzum: “Peter the Chief of the Apostles (μαθητῶν ἄκρος)” (Carm. Theol., lib. ii. sect. 1, carm. xii. 222).

St. Basil: “Peter, who was preferred before all the disciples (ὁ πάντων μεν τῶν μαθητῶν προκριθεὶς)” (De Judic. Dei, n. 7, tom. ii. p. 221).

St. Epiphanius: “Peter became a Leader to his own brother. And God sees the dispositions of the heart, and knowing who is worthy to be appointed unto presidency (ἄξιος τάττεσθαι). He also chose Peter to be the Leader (ἀρχηγὸν) of His disciples, as in every way has been clearly shown” (Adv. Hœr., 51, n. 17, tom. i. p. 440).

St. Jerome: “Peter the first Pontiff of the Christians (Primus Pontifex Christianorum)” (Chron. Euseb. ad Ann., 44, tom. viii. p. 578). “The Prince of the Apostles (Princeps Apostolorum)” (Dial. adv. Pelag., n. 14). “Out of the Twelve, One is chosen in order that by the institution of a Head the occasion of schism might be removed” (Adv. Jovin., lib. i. n. 26, tom. ii. p. 279).

St. Chrysostom: “The Chief of the Apostles, the First in the Church (Ἡ κορυφὴ τῶν ἀποστόλων, ὁ πρῶτος ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ)” (Hom. iii. de Pœnit., n. 4). “Peter it was to whom had been entrusted the government (τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐγκεχειρισμένος)” (Hom. xxxiii., In Act., n. 2). “He entrusted into his hands the Primacy over the Universal Church (τὴν ἐπιστασίαν τῆς οἰκουμενῆς ἐκκλησίας ἐνεχείρισε)” (Hom. V. de Pœnit., n. 2).

St. Augustine: “Who can be ignorant that the most blessed Peter is the first (primum) of the Apostles?” (In Joann. tract. lvi. n. 1). “Peter, by reason of the Primacy of his Apostolate, personified the Universal Church” (ib. tract., cxxiv. n. 5). (Cf. Serm. lxxvi. n. 4; De Bapt. cont. Donat., lib. ii. n. 2.)

General Council of Ephesus, 431: “The blessed Peter, the Head of the whole faith, and even of the Apostles (ἡ κεφαλὴ ὅλης τῆς πίστεως, ἡ καὶ τῶν ἀποστόλων)” (Act. ii., Labbe, tom. iii. p. 619). “The Prince (ἔξαρχος) and Head (κεφαλὴ) of the Apostles” (Act. iii., Labbe, p. 625).

St. Cyril of Alexandria: “Set over (προεκκείμενος) the holy disciples;” “the Prince (πρόκριτος) of the holy disciples;” “Prince (πρόκριτος) of the Apostles;” “the Leader (ἡγούμενος)” (In Joann. lib. x. tom. vii. p. 924; ibid., lib. xii. p. 1064; Thesaur., tom. viii. p. 340; Hom, xiii., De Pest. Pasch., tom. x. Pt. ii. p. 105, ed. Migne).

Theodoret: “The Coryphæus of the Apostles” (In Ps. ii.); “the first of the Apostles” (Hist. Relig., c. ii.). “He (Paul) renders due honour to the Head (τὴν πρέπουσαι ἀπονέμει τῷ κορυφαίῳ τιμήν)” (Comm. in Gal., i. 18).

St. Leo: “Peter … not only the Prelate of this see (Rome), but the Primate (primatem) of all Bishops” (Serm. iii., De Natal. Ord., c. 4). “The Prince of the whole Church (totius ecclesiæ principem)” (Serm. iv. c. 4). “The Lord who committed the Primacy (primatum) of the Apostolic dignity to the most blessed Apostle Peter” (Epist. v., Ad Episc. Metrop. per Illyr. Constit., c. 2).

II. St. Peter the Rock of the Church

Tertullian: “Peter, who is called the Rock whereon the Church was to be built, and who obtained the keys of the kingdom of heaven” (De Præscr. Hœret., c. 22).

Origen: “That great foundation of the Church, and most solid Rock upon which Christ founded the Church (Magno Mi ecclesiæ fundamento, et petræ solidissimæ, super quam Christus fundavit ecclesiam)” (In Exod. Com., v. n. 4, Op. tom. ii. p. 145, Migne; cf. In Joann., tom. iv. p. 95; apud Euseb., Hist. Eccl., vi. c. 25). “Peter, against whom the gates of hell shall not prevail” (De Princ., lib. iii. c. 2, n. 5). “Neither against the Rock upon which Christ builds His Church, nor against the Church shall the gates of hell prevail (Οὔτε γὰρ τῆς πέτρας ἐφʼ ἧς ὁ Χριστὸς οἰκοδομεῖ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, οὔτε τῆς ἐκκλησίας πύλαι ᾅδου κατισχύσουσιν)” (In Matt., tom. xii. n. 11).

St. Cyprian: “Peter, whom the Lord chose as first, and upon whom He built His Church” (Epist. lxxi., Ad Quint, n. 3). “There is one Church, founded by the Lord Christ upon Peter, for the origin and purpose of unity (Una ecclesia a Christo Domino super Petrum origine unitatis et ratione fundata)” (Epist. lxx., Ad Januar. Cf. Epist. lxxiii., Ad Jubaian., n. 11; De Bono Patientiœ, n. 9; Epist. lxvi., Ad Pupianum, n. 8; Epist. lix., Ad Cornel., n. 9; Epist. xliii., al. xl. Ad Plebem., n. 5; De Exhort. Martyr., n. 11; De Habitu Virg., n. 10).

Eusebius of Cæsarea: “Peter, on whom the Church of Christ is built (ἐφʼ ᾧ οἰκοδομεῖται ἡ Χριστοῦ ἐκκλησία), against which the gates of hell shall not prevail” (Hist. Eccl., lib. vi. c. 25. Cf. Demonstr. Evang., lib. iii. c. 4).

St. Hilary of Poitiers: “Peter … upon whom He was about to build His Church.… Peter the foundation of the Church” (Tract, in Ps. cxxxi. n. 4). “The firm Rock upon which the Church was to be built (firma superædificandæ in ea ecclesiæ petra)” (In Ps. cxli. n. 8. Cf. De Trin., lib. vi. c. 20).

St. Gregory of Nyssa: “Peter the Head of the Apostles … is in accordance with the prerogative bestowed upon him by the Lord, the unbroken and most firm Rock (ἡ ἀῤῥαγὴς καὶ ὀχυρωτάτη πέτρα), upon which the Lord built His Church” (Alt. Orat. de S. Stephan. Op., tom. iii. p. 734, Migne; cf. Hom. xv. in Cant. Cantic., tom. i. p. 1088).

St. Gregory of Nazianzum: “Of the disciples of Christ, all of whom were great and deserving of the choice, one is called a Rock, and is entrusted with the foundation of the Church (τοὺς θεμελίους τῆς ἐκκλησίας πιστεύεται)” (Orat. xxxii. n. 18. Op., tom. ii. p. 591, Migne; cf. Carmin., sect. 2, Poem. Moral., n. 1, vers. 489, tom. ii. p. 325; Carm. Theol., loc. cit.; Orat. ix., Apol. ad Patr., n. 1, tom. i. p. 235).

St. Epiphanius: “The First of the Apostles, that firm Rock upon which the Church of God is built, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. But the gates of hell are heresies and heresiarchs” (Anchorat., n. 9). “Peter … a firm Rock founding the faith of the Lord, upon which the Church was in every way (κατὰ πάντα τρόπον) built … A firm Rock of the building, and Foundation of the House of God” (Adv. Hœres. 59, nn. 7, 8).

St. Ambrose: “Whom He (Christ) pointed out as the Foundation of the Church, when He called him the Rock” (De Fide, lib. iv. c. 5, n. 56, tom. ii. p. 531, Migne). “It is that same Peter to whom He said, ‘Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build My Church.’ Therefore, where Peter is, there is the Church (ubi ergo Petrus, ibi Ecclesia; ubi Ecclesia ibi nulla mors, sed vita æterna)” (In Ps. xl. n. 30, tom. i. p. 879; cf. In Lucam, lib. iv. nn. 70, 77; De Virginit., c 16, n. 105; De Incarnat., c. iv. n. 33; c. 5, n. 34; De Sp. Sancto, c. xiii. n. 158).

St. Chrysostom: “When I name Peter, I name that unbroken Rock, that firm Foundation, the Great Apostle, the First of the disciples (τὴν Πέτραν, λέγω τὴν ἀῤῥαγή, τὴν κρηπῖδα τὴν ἀσάλευτον, τὸν ἀπόστολον τὸν μέγαν, τὸν πρῶτοι τῶν μαθητῶν)” (Hom. iii., De Pœnit, n. 4; cf. Hom. in illud, Hoc Scitote, n. 4; Ad eos qui scandalizati sunt, n. 17; In illud, Vidi Dom. Hom. iv. n. 3; Hom. De Dec. Mil. Talent, n. 3; Hom. liv. n. 2; Hom, iii., In Matt., n. 5; Hom. xix., In Joann., n. 2.)

St. Jerome: “Peter, upon whom the Lord founded the Church” (Epist. xl., Ad Marcellam). “Peter the Prince of the Apostles, upon whom the Church was founded in stable massiveness (super quem ecclesia Domini stabili mole fundata est)” (Dial. adv. Pelag., lib. i. n. 14). “As Christ Himself gave light to the Apostles, that they might be called the light of the world, and as they obtained other names from the Lord; so to Simon also, who believed on the Rock Christ, He bestowed the name of Peter; and according to the metaphor of a rock, it is rightly said of him, ‘I will build My Church upon thee.’ The gates of hell are vices and sins, or certainly the doctrines of heretics by which men enticed are led to hell (In Matt. xvi. tom. vii. p. 124). “Upon this Rock (the See of Peter) I know that the Church is founded” (Epist. xv., Ad Pap. Damas., tom. i. p. 39).

St. Augustine: “Peter, who had confessed Him the Son of God, and in that confession had been called the Rock upon which the Church should be built (Petrus … in illa confessione appellatus est petra super quam fabricaretur ecclesia)” (In Ps. lxix. n. 4). “Number the bishops from the See itself of Peter, and in that order of Fathers see who succeeded to whom: this is the Rock which the proud gates of hell overcome not (ipsa est petra quam non vincunt superbæ inferorum portæ)” (Ps. in Part. Donat., tom. ix. p. 30; cf. Epist. liii., Generoso, n. 2).

St. Cyril of Alexandria: “Allusively to the name from the rock, He changed his name to Peter; for on him He was about to found His Church (Φερωνύμως δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς πέτρας μετωνόμαζε Πέτρον• ἐπʼ αὐτῷ γὰρ ἔμελλε τὴν αὐτοῦ θεμελιοῦν ἐκκλησίαν)” (In Joann., 1:42, lib. ii. Op., tom. vi. p. 131, Migne). “Calling, I think, the rock the immoveableness in the faith of the disciple” (In Isai., lib. iv. tom. iii. p. 593; cf. In Matt., c. xvi. tom. v. p. 54).

St. Leo the Great: “The Lord willed that the mystery of His gift should so belong to the office of all the Apostles, as to seat it chiefly in the most blessed Peter, highest of all the Apostles; and from him, as it were from the Head, He wills His gifts to flow as into the whole body; that whosoever dares to recede from the solidity of Peter, may know that he has no part in the Divine mystery. For this man, assumed into the participation of His indivisible unity, He willed to be named what He Himself was, by saying, ‘Thou art Peter, and upon this Rock I will build My Church;’ that the rearing of the eternal temple, by the wonderful grace of the gift of God, might consist now in the solidity of Peter, strengthening with his firmness this Church, that neither the rashness of men might attempt it, nor the gates of hell prevail against it” (Epist. ad Episc. per Prov. Vienn. in causa Hilarii, c. 1; cf. Serm, iv. In Natal. Ord., c. 2, quoted above, p. 311). “The Rock of the Catholic Faith, which name the blessed Apostle Peter received from the Lord” (Epist. cxix. n. 2, Ad Maxim. Ep. Antioch). “By the loftiness of his faith he gave so much pleasure as to receive the sacred firmness of an inviolable Rock, upon which the Church being founded, it should prevail over the gates of hell and the laws of death; and that neither in loosing nor in binding should anything be ratified in heaven but what it may have settled by the decision of Peter” (Serm. li., Hom. Sabbat, ante 2 Dom. Quadr., c. 1; cf. Epist. xxviii, Ad Flav.).

Council of Ephesus, 431. In this Council the Legate Philip called Peter “the Pillar of the Faith, the Foundation of the Catholic Church (ὁ κίων τῆς πίστεως, ὁ θεμέλιος τῆς καθολικῆς ἐκκλησίας)” (Act. iii., Labbe, tom. iii. p. 625; ed. Paris, 1671).

Council of Chalcedon, 451. In the sentence against Dioscorus, approved of by all the bishops (mostly Easterns), Peter is called “the Rock and Foundation of the Catholic Church, and support of the orthodox faith (πέτρα καὶ κρηπὶς τῆς καθολικῆς ἐκκλησίας, καὶ τὴς ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως ὁ θεμέλιος)” (Act. iii., Labbe, tom. iv. p. 425).

St. Gregory the Great: “Who is ignorant that the Holy Church is established on the firmness of the Chief of the Apostles, who in his name expressed the firmness of his mind, being called Peter from the Rock?” (lib. vi., Epist. 3, Ad. Eulog. Alexandr.)

St. John Damascene calls Peter “that Coryphæus of the Apostles, the Firm Foundation, the unbroken Rock of the Church (τὴν κρηπῖδα τὴν ἀσάλευτον, τὴν πέτραν τὴν ἀῤῥαγῆ)” (In Sacr. Parallel., tom. ii. p. 591, Migne).

Photius says that “upon Peter rest the foundations of the faith (Πέτρος ἐφʼ ᾧ τὰ τῆς πίστεως κεῖται θεμέλια)” (Epist. ccxliii. al. xcix.).

It may be objected that many of the Fathers (notably St. Augustine) take the Rock to be, not Peter himself, but the confession which Peter made; and that others explain that the Rock was Christ. To this we reply that these interpretations are not opposed to that which we have given, but are rather collateral to it: the three taken together give us an adequate interpretation of the passage. In Christ’s words, ‘Thou art Peter,’ etc., a threefold truth is contained: (1) Peter is the Rock of the Church, i.e. the person of Simon, who is made a Rock or is endowed with the Primacy, is the basis on which the Church rests; (2) Faith is the Rock of the Church, i.e. Peter’s faith is that which constitutes him the foundation of the Church; (3) Christ is the Rock of the Church, i.e. He is the principal, original Rock on which Peter rests. See Palmieri, l.c, 248, sqq.; and on St. Augustine’s interpretation, Franzelin, De Eccl., p. 136 sqq.

III. Peter the Key-bearer

As the Fathers naturally speak of this prerogative of Peter in connection with the foregoing, it will here suffice to quote only two or three passages.

Tertullian: “If thou thinkest heaven is closed, remember that the Lord left here the keys thereof to Peter, and through him to the Church” (Scorpiace, cap. 10; cf. De Præscr. Hœret., n. 22).

Origen: “If we carefully examine the writings of the Evangelists, we may discover much difference and preeminence (ὑπεροχὴν) in the words spoken to Peter (Matt. 16:19), over and above those spoken to the Apostles generally (ibid. 18:19) in the second place. For it is no small difference that Peter received the keys, not of one heaven, but of many, and that whatsoever things he should bind upon earth should be bound, not in one heaven, but in all (the heavens) … for they (the other Apostles) do not transcend in power as Peter, so as to bind and loose in all the heavens” (Comment. in Matt., tom. xiii. n. 31).

St. Ambrose: “What fellowship can these (the Novatians) have with Thee: men who take not up the keys of the kingdom, denying that they ought to forgive sins; which indeed they rightly confess of themselves; for they have not Peter’s inheritance who have not Peter’s chair, which they rend with impious division” (De Pœnit., lib. i. nn. 32, 33).

St. Chrysostom: “Great was God’s consideration towards this city (Antioch), as He manifested by deeds; inasmuch as Peter, who was set over the whole habitable world, into whose hands He put the keys of heaven; to whom He entrusted to do and to support all things (τὸν γοῦν τῆς οἰκουμένης ἐπιστάτην ἁπάσης Πέτρον, ᾦ τὰς κλεῖς ἐνεχείρισε τῶν οὐρανῶν, ᾧ πάντα ἄγειν καὶ φέρειν ἐπέτρεψε)” (Hom, in S. Ign. Mart., n. 4; cf. In Matt. Hom., liv. n. 2; In Matt. Hom, lxxxii. n. 3).

St. Leo the Great: “The right of this power (of the keys) passed also indeed to the other Apostles, and the constitution of this decree has flowed on to all the princes of the Church; but not in vain is that entrusted to one which is intimated to all. For to Peter is this therefore entrusted individually, because the pattern of Peter is set before all the rulers of the Church. The privilege of Peter therefore remains, whatever judgment is passed in accordance with his equity (Non frustra uni commendatar quod omnibus intimatur. Petro enim ideo hoc singulariter creditur, quia cunctis ecclesiæ rectoribus Petri forma prœponitur. Manet ergo Petri privilegium, ubicunque ex ipsius fertur æquitate judicium)” (Serm, iv., In Nat. Ordin., c. 3; cf. Epist. x., Ad Episc. per Prov. Vienn. in causa Hilarii, c. 2, supra, p. 322).

St. Gregory: “Behold he (Peter) receives the keys of the heavenly kingdom; the power of binding and of loosing is given to him; to him the care and government of the whole Church is committed (Ecce claves regni accipit, potestas ei ligandi atque solvendi tribuitur, cura ei totius ecclesiæ et principatus committitur)” (lib. v., Epist. xx., Ad Manric. August).

Venerable Bede: “Blessed Peter in a special manner received the keys of the kingdom of heaven and the Headship of judiciary power, that all believers throughout the world might understand that all those who in any way separate themselves from the unity of his faith and communion, such can neither be absolved from sins, nor enter the gate of the heavenly kingdom” (Hom, xvi., In Die SS. Pet. et Paul, Migne, Patr. Lat., tom. xciv. p. 223).

IV. St. Peter the Confirmer of his Brethren.

St. Ambrose: “Peter, after being tempted by the devil, is set over the Church. The Lord therefore signified beforehand what that is, that He afterwards chose him to be the Pastor of the Lord’s flock. For to him He said, ‘But thou, when thou art once converted,’ etc. (Petrus ecclesiæ præponitur … postea eum pastorem elegit dominici gregis)” (In Ps. xliii. n. 40; cf. De Fide, lib. iv. c. 5, n. 56).

St. Chrysostom: “He (Peter) first acts with authority in the matter (the election of Matthias), as having all put into his hands; for to him Christ said, ‘And thou,’ etc. (πρῶτος τοῦ πράγματος αὐθεντεῖ, ἅτε αὐτὸς πάντας ἐγχειρισθείς)” (Hom. iii., In Act., nn. 1–3; cf. St. Cyril of Alexandria, In Lucam, tom. v. p. 420; Theodoret, Hæret. Fab., lib. v. c. 28).

In the General Council of Ephesus St. Peter is called “the Pillar of the Faith (ὁ κίων τῆς πίστεως)” (Act. iii., Labbe, tom. iii. p. 625). And in the General Council of Chalcedon, “the Foundation (ὁ θεμέλιος) of the orthodox faith” (Act. iii., Labbe, iv. p. 425). For St. Leo, see above, p. 308.

V. St. Peter the Chief Pastor.

Origen: “To Peter was the Supreme Power to feed the sheep delivered, and upon him as on the earth was the Church founded (Petro cum summa rerum de pascendis ovibus traderetur, et super ipsum velut super terram fundaretur ecclesiæ)” (lib. v., In Ep. ad Rom., n. 5).

St. Cyprian: “Peter, to whom the Lord commends His sheep to be fed and guarded, on whom He placed and founded the Church (cui oves suas Dominus pascendas tuendasque commendat)” (De Habitu Virg., n. 10).

St. Ephraem Syrus: “Blessed the flock committed to thy care! How much it has grown!… O thou blessed one, that obtainedst the place of the Head and Tongue in the body of thy brethren,” etc. (Bibl. Orient, ed. Asseman., tom. i. p. 95; cf. Serm. lvi., Adv. Hær., tom. ii., Syr., p. 559).

St. Ambrose: “Chosen to feed the flock by the judgment of the Lord Himself” (De Fide, lib. v. prolog. n. 2; cf. the foregoing heading).

St. Chrysostom on John xxi. 15: “And why, then, passing over the others, does He converse with Peter on these things? He was the chosen one of the Apostles, and the Mouth of the disciples and the Leader of the choir. On this account Paul also went up on a time to see him rather than the others, and withal, to show him that he must have confidence, as the denial was done away with. He puts into his hands the presidency over his brethren (ἐγχειρίζεται τὴν προστασίαν τῶν ἀδελφῶν). And He brings not forward that denial, neither does He reproach him with the past, but says to him, ‘If thou love Me, rule over the brethren (εἰ φιλεῖς με, προΐστασο τῶν ἀδελφῶν)’ (cf. εἰ φιλεῖς με ποίμαινε τὰ πρόβατα μοῦ).… And the third time He gives him the same injunction, showing at what a price He sets the presidency over His own sheep. And if any one should say, ‘How, then, did James receive the throne of Jerusalem?’ I would answer, ‘That He appointed this man (Peter) teacher, not of that throne, but of the world’ “ (In Joann. Hom, lxxxviii.; cf. Hom. v. de Pœnit., n. 2; De Sacerdotio, lib. ii. c. 1).

St. Augustine: “I am held in the communion of the Catholic Church by … the succession of priests from the very chair of the Apostle Peter, to whom the Lord, after His resurrection, committed His sheep to be fed (Tenet me ab ipsa sede Petri Apostoli, cui pascendas oves post resurrectionem Dominus commendavit, successio sacerdotum)” (Contra Ep. Fundam Manich, n. 5). “Peter was made the Pastor of the Church, as Moses was made the Ruler of the Jewish people” (Contra Faust., lib. xxii. c. 70; cf. Serm. xlvi. n. 30; Serm. ccxcv. nn. 2, 4).

St. Cyril of Alexandria: “Over the Church He sets Peter as Shepherd (καὶ ταύτης ποιμένα τὸν Πέτρον ἐφίστησιν)” (In Matt., xvi. tom. v. p. 55, ed. Migne).

St. Leo the Great: “Out of the whole world the one Peter is chosen to be set over both the calling of the nations, and over all the Apostles and all the Fathers of the Church; that, although in the people of God there be many priests and many shepherds, Peter may rule all, as made his, whom Christ also rules by supreme headship (omnes tamen proprie regat Petrus, quos principaliter regit et Christus)” (Serm, iv., In Nat. Ord., c. 1; cf. Ep. x., Ad Episc. per Prov. Vienn. in Causa Hilarii, c. 2; Serm. lxxiii., De Ascens. Dom., n. 2).

St. Gregory the Great: “By the voice of the Lord the care of the whole Church was entrusted to holy Peter, Prince of all the Apostles; for to him it is said, ‘Peter, lovest thou Me? Feed My sheep’ “ (lib. v., Epist. xx., Ad Maurit. August.).

Palmieri, De Rom. Pont., p. 225 sqq.; Billot, De Ecclesia, p. 528 sqq.; Turmel, Hist. de la Théol. Posit., etc., p. 151 sqq.; Atzberger, op. cit., sect. 342; Allies, St. Peter: His Name and Office.

CHAPTER IV

THE PRIMACY OF THE ROMAN PONTIFF

“THAT which the Prince of Shepherds and great Shepherd of the sheep, Christ Jesus our Lord, established in the person of the Blessed Apostle Peter to secure the perpetual welfare and lasting good of the Church, must, by the same institution, necessarily abide unceasingly in the Church; which, being founded upon the Rock, will stand firm to the end of the world. For none can doubt—and it is known to all ages—that the Holy and Blessed Peter, the Prince and Chief of the Apostles, the pillar of the faith and foundation of the Catholic Church, received the keys of the kingdom from our Lord Jesus Christ, the Saviour and Redeemer of mankind, and lives, presides, and judges to this day and always, in his successors the Bishops of the Holy See of Rome, which was founded by him, and consecrated by his blood” (Vatican Council, sess. iv. ch. 2; cf. Acts of the Council of Ephesus, sess. ill., Labbe).

SECT. 238.—THE PERPETUITY OF THE PRIMACY OF PETER IN THE BISHOPS OF ROME

I. The argument for the perpetuity of Peter’s Primacy is briefly this: Christ’s Church will last for all days, therefore the Primacy must be perpetual. Our Lord built His Church upon a rock, that the gates of hell might never prevail against it; the rock must therefore continue for all days. Satan is ever endeavouring to sift the members of it; hence they always stand in need of confirmation in the faith. The sheep and lambs of flock must ever be fed, guided, and defended against their foes. Now, these functions of Rock, Key-bearer, Confirmer, and Shepherd were entrusted to St. Peter, who was, however, a mortal man. They must, therefore, be exercised by other persons acting in his name and invested with his prerogatives. “It is matter of doubt to none, rather, it is a thing known to all ages (πᾶσι τοῖς αἰῶσιν), that the holy and most blessed Peter, the prince and head of the Apostles, the pillar of the laith, the foundation of the Catholic Church, received the keys of the kingdom from Jesus Christ, our Lord and Saviour, and Redeemer of mankind. And to him was given authority to bind and loose sins, who, even till this present, and always, both lives and judges in his successors (ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῦ διαδόχοις καὶ ζῆ καὶ δικάζει); our holy and most blessed Pope Celestine, the bishop, the canonical successor (κατὰ τάξιν ὁ διαδόχος) and vicegerent of this Peter, has sent us as representatives of his person” (Philip, the papal legate at the Council of Ephesus, Act iii, Labbe, tom. iii. col. 625). “The solidity of that faith, which was commended in the Prince of the Apostles, is perpetual; and as what Peter believed in Christ is perpetual, so is what Christ instituted in Peter permanent.… The disposition, therefore, made by the truth remains, and blessed Peter, continuing in his acquired firmness of the rock, has not abandoned the entrusted helms of the Church.… If anything, therefore, is rightly done by us, and rightly ordained; if anything be, by our daily prayers, obtained from the mercy of God, it is his doing and merit, whose power survives, and whose authority excels in his own chair (cujus in sede sua vivit potestas, excellit auctoritas).… That in the person of my lowliness he be acknowledged, be honoured, in whom both the solicitude of all pastors, with the care of the sheep entrusted to them, still continues, and whose dignity fails not, even in his unworthy heir (et cujus dignitas etiam in indigno herede non deficit)” (St. Leo, Serm. iii., De Natal. Ordin., cc. 2–4). “The blessed Peter ceases not to preside over his own see, and he enjoys a never-ceasing fellowship with the everlasting Priest (Christ). For that solidity which Peter, himself also made a rock, received from the rock Christ, has passed onwards to his heirs also; and wheresoever any firmness is exhibited, the constancy of that pastor is undeniably apparent” (St. Leo, Serm. v., De Natal. Ordin., c. 4)

As the Fathers usually speak of the perpetuity of the Primacy in the person of the Bishop of Rome, we shall reserve further extracts for the next paragraph.

II. The perpetuity of the Primacy is contained in the words of the Gospels no less than is the Primacy itself; but the way in which it was to be perpetuated is not precisely determined. Nevertheless, it is evident that there must be some means of indicating the person or persons invested with the powers originally conferred upon Peter. Now, the voice of tradition tells us that one mode of succession, and one alone, has ever been acknowledged in the Church, viz. that the Bishop of Rome is the successor of St. Peter, forming one moral person with him, holding all his prerogatives of ruling and teaching the Church.

I. The Fathers of the Council of Sardica (A.D. 342) “honour the memory of the holy Apostle St. Peter” in the person of Julius, Bishop of Rome (can. 3): “the priests of the Lord from each of the several provinces” are to “refer to the Head, that is, to the See of the Apostle Peter (ad caput, id est, ad Petri Apostoli sedem)” (Epist. Synod, ad Julium, Labbe, tom. ii. p. 661). “I bear the burdens,” says Pope St. Siricius, “of all who are heavily laden; yea, rather, in me that burden is borne by the blessed Peter, who we trust in all things protects and has regard to us, who are the heirs of his government (hæc portat in nobis beatus apostolus Petrus, qui nos in omnibus, ut confidimus, administrationis suæ protegit et tuetur hæredes)” (Ep. i., Ad Himer. Tarrac. Ep. n. i.; Galland, tom, vii. p. 533). And Pope St. Zosimus says, “Canonical antiquity by universal consent willed that so great a power should belong to that Apostle, a power also derived from the actual promise of Christ our God, that it should be his to loose what was bound, and to bind what was loosed, an equal state of power being bestowed upon those who, by his will, should be found worthy to inherit his see, for he has both charge of all the Churches, and especially of this wherein he sate.… You are not ignorant that we rule over his place, and are in possession also of the authority of his name” (Ep. xi. Ad Afros, Galland, tom. ix. pp. 15, 16). “Peter … even till this present and always, both lives and judges in his successors,” etc. (Concil. Eph. act. iii.; see above, p. 329). “Anathema to him who believeth not that Peter hath so spoken by Leo (Petrus per Leonem ita locutus est)” (Council of Chalcedon, Hardouin, tom. ii. p. 306). “Peter spoke by Agatho” (Third Council of Constantinople, Hardouin, tom. iii. p. 1422; cf. pp. 1159, 1287). The, Second Council of Nicæa professed its adherence (“The holy synod so believes, so is convinced, so defines”) to Pope Hadrian I.’s letter, in which he says, “Peter’s See shines forth in Primacy (πρωτεύων διαλάμπει) over the whole Church, and is Head of all the Churches of God. Wherefore the same blessed Peter the Apostle, governing the Church by the command of the Lord, left nothing uncared for, but held everywhere, and holds, supreme authority (ἐκράτησε πάντοτε καὶ κρατεῖ τῆν ἀρχήν)” (Hardouin, tom. iii. p. 103). “We who have taken upon us to rule the Apostolic See in the place of Peter, the Prince of the Apostles” (St. Gregory the Great, Lib. ii., Ep. Ad. Columb.).

2. The Bishop of Rome is declared to be, by the very fact of his succeeding to that See, the successor of St. Peter’s Primacy. That is to say, St. Peter, by taking possession of the See of Rome, thereby made that the supreme See, invested with all his primatial prerogatives; so that when he vacated the See by death, his successor in the See became by that very fact his successor in the Primacy. “Peter, therefore, first filled that individual chair which is the first of the marks (of the Church, cathedram unicam [unique or pre-eminent] qua est prima de dotibus); to him succeeded Linus; to Linus succeeded Clement; to Clement, Anacletus [he gives the whole succession]; … to Liberius, Damasus; to Damasus, Siricius, who is now our colleague, with whom the whole world, by the mutual exchange of circular letters (commercio formatarum) is concordant with us in one fellowship of communion. You who wish to claim to yourselves the holy Church, tell us the origin of your chair” (St. Optatus of Milevis, De Schism. Donat., lib. ii. nn. 2–4). “If the order of bishops succeeding to each other is considered, how much more securely and really beneficially do we reckon from Peter himself, to whom bearing a figure of the Church the Lord says, ‘Upon this rock,’ etc. For to Peter succeeded Linus; to Linus, Clement [he gives the whole succession]; to Damasus, Siricius; to Siricius, Anastasius” (St. Augustine, Ep. liii. nn. 2, 3). “Cornelius was made bishop … when the place of Fabian—that is, when the place of Peter and the rank (gradus) of the sacerdotal chair was vacant” (St. Cyprian, Ep. lii., Ad Anton.). He speaks of “the chair of Peter the principal Church, whence the unity of the priesthood took its rise (ecclesiam principalem, unde unitas sacerdotalis exorta est)” (Ep. iv., Ad Cornel.). Firmilian is indignant with Pope St. Stephen, “who so prides himself on the place of his episcopate and contends that he holds the succession of Peter, upon whom the foundations of the Church were laid” (Ep. lxxv., Inter Cyprianas). St. Ambrose praises his brother Satyrus, who, being in a place of doubtful orthodoxy, “called the bishop unto him, and not accounting any grace true which was not of the true faith, he inquired of him whether he agreed with the Catholic bishops—that is, with the Roman Church (utrtumnam cum episcopis Catholicis, hoc est cum Romana Ecclesia conveniret)” (De Excessu Fratris, n. 46.) “I speak,” says St. Jerome, “with the successor of the Fisherman, and the disciple of the Cross. I, following none as the first, save Christ, am linked in communion with thy blessedness—that is, with the chair of Peter. Upon that Rock I know that the Church is built. Whoso shall eat the Lamb outside this house is profane. If any be not in the ark of Noah, he will perish when the deluge prevails.… I know not Vitalis; Meletius I reject; I am ignorant of Paulinus. Whoso gathereth not with thee (Damasus) scattereth; that is, he who is not of Christ is of Antichrist” (Epist. xv., Ad Damask), “What does he (Rufinus) call his faith? That which is the strength of the Roman Church, or that which is in the volumes of Origen? If he answer, ‘the Roman,’ then are we Catholics (Si Romanam responderit, ergo Catholici sumus)” (Adv. Rufin., ed. i. c. 4). “Blessed (Peter, who lives and presides in his own See, gives the true faith to those who seek it. For we, in our solicitude for truth and faith, cannot, without the consent of the Roman Church, hear causes of faith” (Ep. Ad Eutech).

3. As the succession to the Primacy of Peter is bound up with the succession to the See of Rome, hence the Church of this See holds the Primacy over the Universal Church. “Your faith,” said St. Paul to the Romans (1:8), “is spoken of in the whole world.” “For with this Church (of Rome), because of its more powerful principality, every Church must agree—that is, the faithful everywhere—in which (i.e. in communion with the Roman Church) the tradition of the Apostles has ever been preserved by those on every side (Ad hanc ecclesiam propter potentiorem [al. potiorem] principalitatem necesse est omnem convenire ecclesiam, hoc est, eos qui sunt undique fideles, in qua semper ab his qui sunt undique, conservata est ea quæ est ab Apostolis tradition)” (St. Irenæus, Adv. Hæres., iii. 3). St. Ignatius of Antioch had already before him addressed the Roman Church as the one “which presides (προκάθηται) in the place of the region of the Romans,” and again as the Church “which presides over charity (προκαθημένη τῆς ἀγάπης)” (Epist. ad Rom. Proem.). St. Cyprian calls the Church of Rome “the chair of Peter, and the chief Church, whence the unity of the priesthood took its rise (Petri cathedram atque ecclesiam principalem unde unitas sacerdotalis exorta est)” (Epist. lv., Ad Cornel., n. 14), “the root and matrix of the Catholic Church (ecclesiæ catholicæ radicem et matricem)” (Epist. xlv., Ad Cornel, n. 3). “From this Church (of Rome) the rights of venerable communion flow unto all” (St. Ambrose, Epist. xi. n. 4). But this is abundantly clear from the various passages already cited.

The frequent recourse to the See of Rome, as early as the second century, is a clear proof of the practical acknowledgment of the Primacy of the Popes. St. Justin came there from Grecian Palestine; Hegisippus from Syrian Palestine; Tatian from Assyria; Abercius Marcellus from Phrygia. Asia, especially, sent a large contingent: among whom were St. Polycarp, and St. Irenæus, the future Bishop of Lyons. In the following century Origen undertook the journey, out of his desire to see that very ancient Church. In Africa, Tertullian is continually speaking of the Roman Church: for him, whether as one of the faithful or as a heretic, the centre of Catholic authority is at Rome, and not in Africa (Duchesne, Églises Séparées, P. 135).

The doctrine contained in this section was defined in the General Council of Florence (1439), summoned to bring about the union of the Greek and Latin Churches. “We define that the Holy Apostolic See and the Roman Pontiff hold the Primacy over the world, and that the Roman Pontiff is himself the successor of the blessed Apostle Peter, the Prince of the Apostles; and that he is the true Vicar of Christ, and the Head of the whole Church, and the Father and Teacher of all Christians; and that to him, in the blessed Peter, was delivered by our Lord Jesus Christ the full power of feeding, ruling, and governing the universal Church, as is also contained in the acts of Ecumenical Councils and in the sacred canons” (Denzinger, Enchir., lxxiii.; see also the confession of faith accepted by Michael Paleologus in 1267, and submitted by him in the Second Council of Lyons, 1274; Denzinger, ibid., lix.). Finally, the Vatican Council condemned those who “deny that it is by the institution of Christ, or by Divine right, that blessed Peter should have a perpetual line of successors in the Primacy over the universal Church, or that the Roman Pontiff is the successor of blessed Peter in the Primacy” (sess. iv. ch. 2).

Scholion. That Peter laboured in Rome is now admitted by almost all scholars (see Duchesne, op. cit., p. 124); St. Irenæus, Tertullian, and Eusebius are three of the chief, but by no means the only, ancient authorities in favour of his founding his See there. St. Irenæus speaks of “that greatest, most ancient, and most illustrious Church founded and constituted at Rome by the two most glorious Apostles, Peter and Paul, who, having founded and built up that Church, transmitted the office of the episcopate to Linus. To him succeeded Anencletus, etc.” (Adv. Hær., lib. iii. c. 3; ap. Euseb., Hist., lib. v. c. 6). See Mr. Allnatt’s Was St. Peter Bishop of Rome? Lanciani, Pagan and Christian Rome, p. 123; Mgr. Barnes, St. Peter in Rome; Harnack, PETER, in Encycl. Brit.

SECT. 239.—THE NATURE OF THE PRIMACY OF THE ROMAN PONTIFF

In the present section we shall point out more precisely the nature of the Primacy, the existence of which has already been abundantly proved. To understand this, we must bear in mind the threefold power exercised by our Lord, and transmitted by Him to His Church (supra, p. 288).

I. As regards Order, the Roman Pontiff has all the powers, and no more than the powers, of a bishop. If the newly elected Pope is not already a bishop, he must first be consecrated before being crowned. Nevertheless, even before consecration, he is really and truly the Pope, Supreme Head of the Church, able to decree, rule, name or depose bishops, and exercise every duty of pontifical jurisdiction (to be presently referred to); but he cannot ordain or consecrate till he has himself received the imposition of hands from other bishops, inferior to himself, and holding under and from him their sees and jurisdiction.

II. In the matter of jurisdiction the position of the Roman Pontiff is widely different from that of ordinary bishops, archbishops, or patriarchs. Their jurisdiction is dependent and limited: his is supreme and universal. To him alone the whole of Christ’s flock is entrusted; he holds the keys of the kingdom of Heaven, and the power of binding and loosing; and these functions come to him not from below, but from above—by succession to St. Peter, whom Christ Himself directly appointed. “The Roman Pontiff.” says the Council of Florence, “is the head of the whole Church, Father and Doctor of all Christians: to him [in the person of] blessed Peter was given full power of feeding, ruling, and governing the universal Church, as also (quemadmodum etiam) is contained in the acts of Ecumenical Councils and in the holy canons.” And the Vatican Council: “If any shall say that the Roman Pontiff hath the office merely of inspection or direction, and not full and supreme power of jurisdiction over the universal Church, not only in things which belong to faith and morals, but also in those which relate to the discipline and government of the Church spread through the world; or assert that he possesses merely the principal part (potiores partes), and not all the fulness of this supreme power; or that this power which he enjoys is not ordinary and immediate, both over each and all the Churches, and over each and all the pastors and the faithful: let him be anathema” (sess. iv. ch. 3). This latter Council takes care to note that the Primacy of the Pope in no way derogates from “the ordinary and immediate power of episcopal jurisdiction by which bishops, ‘who have been set by the Holy Ghost to succeed and hold the place of the Apostles,’ feed and govern each his own flock as true pastors.” Nay, rather that the authority is asserted and protected by the Primacy, according to the words of St. Gregory the Great, “My honour is the honour of the whole Church: my honour is the firm strength of my brethren. Then am I truly honoured when the honour due to each and all is not withheld” (Ep. ad Eulog. Alexandrin., lib. viii. ep. 30).

III. Just as his jurisdiction is supreme, so is the Pope’s teaching authority infallible. It will not be necessary, after what has been said in this chapter and vol. i. §§ 30, 31, to develop at any length the proof of this point. As St. Peter is the Rock of the Church, his faith must be the foundation of the Church’s faith: the gates of hell shall not prevail against her faith, because it is founded on his faith; he has the supreme power of binding and loosing, in which is especially contained supreme teaching authority; Christ’s prayer that Peter’s faith might not fail, and the duty imposed of confirming the brethren, show that the faith of the brethren was to depend upon Peter’s faith; the whole of Christ’s flock is entrusted to his care, to be fed by him with the genuine word of doctrine. And, as we have seen, the promises made to Peter and the powers conferred upon him apply equally to his successors, the Roman Pontiffs. The Vatican Council, completing the definitions of the Fourth Council of Constantinople (869), the Second Council of Lyons (1274), and the Council of Florence (1438), and the Profession of Faith of Pope Hormisdas (519), thus defines Papal Infallibility: “The Roman Pontiff, when he speaks ex cathedrâ—that is, when in discharge of the office of Pastor and Doctor of all Christians, by virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, he defines a doctrine regarding Faith or Morals to be held by the Universal Church—by the Divine assistance promised to him in Blessed Peter, is possessed of that infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer willed that His Church should be endowed for defining doctrine regarding Faith or Morals; and therefore such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable of themselves (ex sese), and not from the consent of the Church” (sess. iv. ch. 4).

Two main objections are brought against this doctrine—one negative and one positive—viz: (1) that it was not recognized or exercised in the early ages of the Church; and (2) that certain Popes have actually erred.

(a) In answer to the first of these objections, we may refer to the passages of the Fathers already quoted, and to the frequent appeals to Rome as early as the second century. Moreover, we may observe, with Cardinal Newman: “It is a less difficulty that the Papal supremacy was not formally acknowledged in the second century, than that there was no formal acknowledgment on the part of the Church of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity till the fourth. No doctrine is defined till it is violated. And, in like manner, it was natural for Christians to direct their course in matters of doctrine by the guidance of mere floating and, as it were, endemic tradition, while it was fresh and strong; but in proportion as it languished, or was broken in particular places, did it become necessary to fall back upon its special homes, first the Apostolic Sees, and then the See of St. Peter. Moreover, an international bond and common authority could not be consolidated, were it ever so certainly provided, while persecutions lasted. If the Imperial Power checked the development of the Councils, it availed also for keeping back the power of the Papacy. The Creed, the Canon, in like manner, both remained undefined. The Creed, the Canon, the Papacy, Ecumenical Councils, all began to form as soon as the Empire relaxed its tyrannous oppression of the Church. And as it was natural that her monarchical power should display itself when the Empire became Christian, so was it natural also that further developments of that power should take place when the Empire fell” (Newman, Development, p. 151, 6th ed.).

(b) As regards the Popes who are said to have erred, it may be answered generally that any such erroneous teaching is not ex cathedrâ; that is to say, it does not fulfil the conditions required by the Vatican definition (see § 31). Thus, the conduct of Liberius in purchasing his return from exile by condemning Athanasius and subscribing a semi-Arian creed, cannot be urged against infallibility. He did not “define any doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the Universal Church:” what he did he did under compulsion, and as soon as he was free to speak he confirmed the orthodox Council of Alexandria. As St. Athanasius himself says, “Liberius, being exiled, later on, after a period of two years gave way (ὤκλασε), and in fear of the death with which he was threatened, subscribed. But even this shows their violence, and the hatred of Liberius against the heresy, and his decision for Athanasius when his will was free. For things done through torments contrary to the original judgment—these are not acts of will on the part of those who have been put to fear, but of those who inflict the torture” (Epist. ad Monach. et Hist. Arian., 41). See Card. Newman, Arians, pp. 314, 334; Catholic Dictionary, LIBERIUS; Palmieri, De Rom. Pont., p. 637.

The condemnation of Pope Honorius (625–638) by the Sixth General Council (Third Constantinople, 680), and the confirmatory letter of Leo. II. anathematizing “Honorius, who did not endeavour to sanctify this Apostolic Church by teaching of Apostolic tradition, but permitted the spotless one to be defiled by unholy betrayal,” certainly present some difficulty. We cannot here discuss the question at any length; we must content ourselves with stating what would seem to be the best answer. First, then, the teaching of Honorius was not erroneous. What he held was that there were not two contrary wills in Christ: Our Lord’s action was morally one. St. Maximus, the most determined opponent of Monothelitism, regards him and his expressions as perfectly orthodox. Why, then, was he condemned? Because this doctrine served as a cloak to the Monothelite heresy, especially as he declared that it was foolish to speak of one operation or two operations, and that it was better to leave such subtleties to the grammarians. Leo II., at any rate, condemned him only in this sense. “The crafty Byzantine, Sergius, put the unsuspecting Pope (Honorius) on a false scent, and elicited from him a letter which he was enabled to misuse for his own purpose, and indeed in favour of a heresy advocated by himself, but then totally unknown to the pontiff. These expectations were crowned with success. The expressions of Honorius, as could not fail to happen, were set up by the Greeks in connection with the question then so warmly agitated; and so, as the Byzantines (at the Council of Constantinople) required, to whom the condemnation of so many of their patriarchs was excessively irksome and displeasing, Honorius likewise was condemned” (Hergenröther, Anti-Janus, Eng. trans., p. 80. See supra, p. 83; Franzelin, De Verbo Incarn., p. 396 sqq.; Palmieri, De Rom. Pont., p. 655 sqq.).

On the Primacy of the Pope see Palmieri, op. cit., 319 sqq.; Billot, De Eccl., 586 sqq.; Atzberger, op. cit., sect. 343; Turmel, op. cit., p. 228 sqq.; Histoire du Dogme de la Papauté.

CHAPTER V

THE PROPERTIES AND MARKS OF THE CHURCH

FROM what has been said concerning the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff, it is clear that that Church alone which acknowledges this Primacy is the true Church of Christ. Nevertheless, as Catholics in their discussions with Protestants are accustomed to waive this proof, and to appeal to such marks of the true Church as are admitted by both sides, we shall now proceed to speak of these.

It should be noted that, though the Church possesses many properties, not all of these are marks, in the technical sense of the word. Marks are those properties or signs by which she may be distinguished from other bodies. She alone possesses the marks; other bodies may possess certain of her properties. Thus, visibility is one of her properties; yet this may belong to heretical sects. Unity, Holiness, Catholicity, and Apostolicity are marks, and are found in her alone. On the subjects dealt with in this chapter, see Franzelin, De Ecclesia, sect. iv.; Palmieri, De Ecclesia, p. 27 sqq.; De Rom. Pont., Append., p. 677 sqq.; Murray, De Ecclesia, cap. iv. sqq.; Newman, Angl. Diff., I. p. 229 sqq.; Billot, De Eccl., p. 128 sqq.; Turmel, op. cit., p. 117 sqq.; Atzberger, op. cit., sect. 331 sqq.

SECT. 240.—THE VISIBILITY AND PERPETUITY OF THE CHURCH

I. When we speak of the visibility of the Church, we do not mean simply that her members, her rites, and her ministry can be seen. What we mean is that these can be recognized to constitute the true Church of Christ; so that, in other words, we can point out a certain society, and say of it, “This is Christ’s Church.” As a rule, Protestants do not deny to the Church some sort of visibility; but they hold that in its essence it cannot be seen, because the qualities which make a man a member of it are themselves invisible.

1. In the passages of the Old Testament in which the Church is foretold, she is spoken of as especially conspicuous to all mankind. “In the last days the mountain of the house of the Lord shall be prepared on the top of mountains, and it shall be exalted above the hills; and all nations shall flow unto it. And many people shall go and say, Come, and let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, and the house of the God of Jacob; and He will teach us His ways, and we will walk in His paths” (Isa. 2:2, 3); “It shall come to pass in the last days that the mountain of the Lord shall be prepared in the top of mountains, and high above the hills,” etc. (Mich. 4:1, 2; cf. Matt. 5:14). So, too, the expressions used by our Lord manifestly refer to a body which can be seen and distinguished. His Church is a Kingdom (Matt. 16:19), a Fold or Flock (John 21:15), a tribunal before which the wicked are to be denounced (Matt. 18:17). It is also styled a City by St. John (Apoc. 21:2), and a House by St. Peter (1 Pet. 2:5) and St. Paul (1 Tim. 3:15). And in the Acts of the Apostles its history is narrated as that of a body plainly distinguishable from all false religious bodies.

2. If we turn to the Fathers, we find this doctrine even more explicitly stated. “It is an easier thing for the sun to be quenched than for the Church to be made invisible (τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἀφανισθῆναι)” (St. John Chrysost, Hom, iv., in illud Vidi Dom., n. 2; cf. In Is. ii. n. 2). “There is no safeguard of unity,” says St. Augustine, “save from the Church made known by the promises of Christ—a Church which, being seated on a hill, as has been said, cannot be hid; and for this cause it must needs be known to all parts of the earth. Let us, then, hold it as a thing immovable and firm, that no good men can separate themselves from her; that is, that no good men—wherever those men may dwell, even though they may have to bear with evil men well known to them—will, on account of those evil men, separate themselves by the foolhardy sacrilege of schism, from the good that are at a distance from and unknown to them” (Contra Ep. Parmen., n. 28; see also lib. ii., Contra Lit. Petil., n. 74). “The Church,” says St. Cyprian, “flooded with the light of the Lord, puts forth her rays throughout the whole world; yet the light is one which is spread over every place, while its unity of body is preserved” (De Unitate, n. 5). In fact, the Fathers taught that they who cut themselves off from the visible Church by refusing to believe what she taught and to submit to her rule—that such were none of Christ’s, and were shut out from salvation. See Faith of Catholics, vol. i. p. 189 sqq. And, indeed, it is clear from reason itself that, if our Lord founded a Church at all—if He gave it authority to teach and rule and sanctify—it must be distinguishable from false bodies not founded by Him and not possessed of His authority.

When Christ said to the Pharisees, “The kingdom of God cometh not with observation (μετὰ παρατηρήσεως)” (Luke 17:20), He meant that it did not require prolonged and difficult investigation, for it was in the very midst of them (ἔντος ὑμῶν). Again, when He told the Samaritan woman that “the true adorers shall adore the Father in spirit and in truth” (John 4:23), He contrasted them, on the one hand, with the Jews, whose worship was by means of carnal sacrifices; and, on the other, with the Samaritans, whose worship was false, inasmuch as they adored that which they knew not. Nor can the words of St. Paul, “For you are not come to a mountain that can be touched,” etc. (Heb. 12:18), be urged against the visibility of the Church; for the object of the Apostle is to show the excellence of the New Law by pointing out that, while the Old was given on an earthly mountain amidst terrible signs, the New comes down from heaven and is a covenant of mercy and love.

In order to understand this property of visibility, we must carefully note the distinction between the body and the soul of the Church. The former consists of those external elements which go to make a society, viz. the ministry of the pastors and subordination of the sheep, the profession of the faith and participation in the sacraments; the latter means the internal gifts of sanctifying grace, of faith and charity, and other virtues. The external elements are necessary for the Church’s social existence; the internal elements must be possessed by her members if they would attain the end for which they were called to the Church, i.e. eternal salvation. Hence, not every member of the Church is necessarily saved; and, on the other hand, some who belong only to the soul of the Church are saved. When we maintain, with St. Ignatius, St. Irenæus, St. Cyprian, St. Augustine and his contemporaries, that “out of the Church, out of the Faith, there is no salvation” (Athanasian Creed), we mean that those are not saved who are outside the soul as well as the body of the Church. “We and you know,” said Pius IX. to the bishops of Italy (August 10, 1863), “that those who lie under invincible ignorance as regards our Holy Religion, and who, diligently observing the natural law and its precepts, which are engraven by God on the hearts of all, and prepared to obey God, lead a good and upright life, are able, by the operation of the power of Divine light and grace, to obtain eternal life.”

II. That the Church will last “for all days, even to the consummation of the world (ἕως τῆς συντελείας τοῦ αἰῶνος),” is clear from our Lord’s promises, and also from the very nature and purposes of the Church. It was foretold of Him that “of His kingdom there should be no end” (Luke 1:32). He has promised her His abiding assistance: “Behold, I am with you always” (Matt. 28:20); “The gates of hell shall not prevail against her” (ibid. 16:18); “I will ask the Father, and He shall give you another Paraclete, that He may abide with you for ever” (John 14:16); the end of the world is to come when the Gospel has been preached everywhere (Matt. 24:14); the good seed and the cockle are both to grow until the harvest, which is the end of the world (ibid. 13:24 sqq.). Moreover, as God wills that all men should be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth (1 Tim. 2:4), and as the Church is the means instituted for this purpose, it follows that as long as men shall be, the Church shall be too.

It is not necessary to quote at any length the Fathers, Tradition, where their testimony is so plain and so abundant. “Not for a brief period,” says St. Augustine, “was the Church to exist on this earth, but the Church will be here till the end of the world.… The Church shall not be conquered; shall not be rooted up; nor give way before any trials whatever till the end of this world shall come, and out of this temporal dwelling-place we be received into that eternal one” (Enarr. in Ps. lx. n. 6). “Unbelievers think,” he says elsewhere, “that the Christian religion will last for a certain period in the world, and will then disappear. But it will remain as long as the sun—as long as the sun rises and sets: that is, as long as the ages of time shall roll, the Church of God, the true body of Christ on earth—will not disappear” (In Ps. lxxi. n. 8). And again: “The Church will totter if its foundation shakes; but how can Christ be moved?… Christ remaining immovable, it (the Church) shall never be shaken. Where are they that say that the Church has disappeared from the world, when it cannot even be shaken?” (Enarr. in Ps. ciii. serm. ii. n. 5). “Secede not from the Church,” says St. Chrysostom; “for nothing is stronger than the Church. Thy hope is the Church; thy salvation is the Church; thy refuge is the Church. It is higher than the heavens and wider than the earth. It never grows old, but is ever full of vigour. Wherefore Holy Writ, pointing to its strength and stability, calls it a mountain” (Hom. De Capto Eutropio, n. 6).

Our Lord’s words, “But yet the Son of Man, when He cometh, shall He find, think you, faith on earth?” do not make any direct statement, but allude to the great “revolt” or falling off (ἀποστασία) which is to precede the last days (2 Thess. 2:3). Still even then the false Christs and false prophets shall not be able to deceive the elect (Matt. 24:24).

SECT. 241.—THE UNITY OF THE CHURCH

It is so clear from the Holy Scriptures that the Church of Christ must be one, that no Christian can venture to deny it. The great question is—What sort of unity did our Lord will for His Church? As the Church is a visible society, the union must also be visible and external. Moreover, it must be a union of belief not simply in certain so-called fundamental doctrines, but in all revealed truths. And again, it must be not a loosely confederated union of different Churches, but one single Church, one body and one spirit, one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one fold, and one Shepherd—one, that is, in communion, one in faith, and one in worship. “The Church in respect of its unity,” says St. Clement of Alexandria, “belongs to the category of things indivisible by nature, though heretics try to divide it into many parts. We say, therefore, that the Catholic Church is unique in its essence, in its doctrine, in its origin, and in its excellence.… Furthermore, the eminence of the Church arises from its unity, as the principle of its constitution—a unity surpassing all else, and having nothing like unto it or equal to it” (Strom., lib. vii. c. 17).

I. Our Lord’s prayer at the Last Supper (John 17:11–23) is not merely an ineffectual wish, but an efficacious cause of that for which He asked. “All My things are Thine, and Thine are Mine,” He said to His Father; and He expressly stated that the unity of His followers was to be a sign of the Divinity of His mission. “Holy Father, keep them in Thy Name … that they may be one, as we also are … that they may be one, as thou, Father, in Me, and I in Thee; that they also may be one in us; that the world may believe that Thou hast sent Me.” Again, Christ spoke of His Church as a Kingdom (Matt. 16:17; cf. John 18:36 sqq.), and He said, “If a kingdom be divided against itself, that kingdom cannot stand” (Mark 3:24). He called it also the one Fold under the one Shepherd (John 10:16). By St. Peter it is styled a House (1 Pet. 2:5); “If a house be divided against itself, that house cannot stand” (Mark 3:25). St. Paul says God “hath made Him (Christ) Head over all the Church, which is His mystical body” (Eph. 1:22, 23). Of this body he says, “All the members of the body, whereas they are many, yet are one body, so also is Christ; for in one Spirit we were all baptized into one body” (1 Cor. 12:12, 13); and of this mystical body, “The Head, Christ; from Whom the whole body being compacted and fitly joined together by what every joint supplieth, according to the operation in the measure of every part, maketh increase of the body unto the edifying of itself in charity” (Eph. 4:15, 16). “As in one body we have many members, but all the members have not the same office, so we, being many, are one body in Christ, and every one members one of another” (Rom. 12:4, 5). No stronger language could be used to bring out the compactness, the close union, of the members of Christ’s Church. Anything like a vague agglomeration of different bodies is absolutely excluded. “There is one God and one Christ,” says St. Cyprian, “and His Church is one, and the faith is one, and one the people joined together in the solid unity of the body in the bond of concord. This unity cannot be broken, nor the one body divided by the separation of its constituent parts” (De Unit. Eccl., n. 23). And St. Augustine: “See what you must beware of—see what you must avoid—see what you must dread. It happens that, as in the human body, some member may be cut off—a hand, a finger, a foot. Does the soul follow the amputated member? As long as it was in the body it lived; separated, it forfeits its life. So the Christian is a Catholic so long as he lives in the body; cut off from it, he becomes a heretic—the life of the spirit follows not the amputated member” (Serm. cclxvii. n. 4).

II. 1. “Agreement and union of minds is the necessary foundation of this perfect concord among men, from which concurrence of wills and similarity of action are the natural results. Wherefore in His Divine wisdom He ordained in His Church unity of faith: a virtue which is the first of those bonds which unite man to God, and whence we receive the name of the Faithful” (Leo XIII., Encycl., Satis cognitum)., As the Church is one, and as she is the union of those that believe, it follows that her faith must be one. “One faith,” says St. Paul (Eph. 4:5). And again: “I beseech you, brethren, by the Name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that you all speak the same thing, and that there be no schisms among you, and that you be perfect in the same mind and in the same judgment” (1 Cor. 1:10). He says that Christ “gave … pastors and doctors … for the edifying of the body of Christ, until we all meet together in the unity of the faith … that henceforth we be no more children tossed to and fro by every wind of doctrine” (Eph. 4:11–14). We have already shown that this unity of faith is secured by the teaching authority of the bishops, presided over by their infallible visible head, the Bishop of Rome (Book I. Part L, and supra, p. 303 sqq.). It is a unity of faith in the whole of Revelation, and not in certain parts of it; for to reject even a single revealed doctrine is to reject the authority of God (supra, § 38). “In many things they are with me, in a few things not with me; but in those few things in which they are not with me, the many things in which they are will not profit them” (St. Augustine, In Ps. liv. n. 19).

2. A religious society having one faith must necessary also have unity of worship, which is the outward expression of the faith and social union of the members. Hence the Catholic Church throughout the world has the one same sacrifice of the Mass, and all her members participate in the same sacraments. “For we, being many, are one bread, one body, all that partake of one bread” (1 Cor. 10:17); “One Lord, one faith, one baptism” (Eph. 4:5). “Except you eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink His blood, you shall not have life in you” (John 6:54; cf. Matt. 26:26; 1 Cor. 11:23). “All these were persevering in one mind in prayer.… And they were persevering in the doctrine of the Apostles, and in the communication of the breaking of bread and in prayers” (Acts 1:14; 2:42). “Neither attempt ye,” says St. Ignatius, “anything that seems good to your own judgment; but let there be, in the same place, one prayer, one supplication, one mind, one hope, in love and joy undefiled. There is one Jesus Christ, than whom nothing is better. Wherefore haste ye all together, as unto the temple of God, as unto one altar, as unto one Jesus Christ, Who proceeded from one Father, and is in one, and to one returned” (Ad Magnes., 7). “God is one, and Christ one, and the Church one, and the chair one, founded by the Lord’s word upon a rock. Another altar or a new priesthood, besides the one altar and the one priesthood, cannot be set up. Whosoever gathereth elsewhere, scattereth” (St. Cyprian, Ep. xl., Ad Plebem, De Quinque Presb., n. 5, and De Unitate, passim). “Adoration is necessary, but adoration which is not out of the Church, but is ordered in the very court of God. Invent not, He saith, your own courts and synagogues for Me. One is the holy court of God” (St. Basil, Hom. in Ps. xxviii. n. 3).

3. On the unity of government, necessary to preserve the unity of faith and of worship, we have already spoken when treating of the Primacy of St. Peter. See Leo XIII.’s Encycl., Satis Cognitum.

SECT. 242.—THE HOLINESS OF THE CHURCH

A thing is said to be holy, either because it is itself dedicated to God, e.g. a temple, an altar; or because it has the power of producing personal holiness (i.e. moral righteousness in the sight of God), e.g. sacraments (see § 89). We shall here show that the Church is herself a holy object, and that she contains the means of making her members holy: she is the Holy Catholic Church, the Communion of Saints.

I. The Church is Christ’s Mystical Body: “The Church, which is His body, and the fulness of Him Who is filled all in all” (Eph. 1:22; cf. 1 Cor. 12:27). She is His Bride: “The husband is the head of the wife; as Christ is the Head of the Church.… Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the Church, and delivered Himself up for it, that He might sanctify it, cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life: that He might present it to Himself a glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle, or any such thing, but that it should be holy and without blemish,” etc. (Eph. 5:23–32); “the House, which is the Church of the living God, the pillar and ground of the truth” (1 Tim. 3:15); “the Temple of God is holy, which you are” (1 Cor. 3:17; cf. 6:19); the kingdom of God, the kingdom of Heaven (Matt. 21:43; 25:1, etc.). It is hardly necessary to quote the Fathers on a doctrine so clearly taught in Scripture. The difficulty about evil members of the Church will be dealt with presently.

II. The object for which Christ founded His Church is the salvation of mankind. Hence He endowed her with all the means necessary for the accomplishment of this purpose. Her ministry, her doctrine, her laws (“He that heareth you, heareth Me, etc.”), her sacraments (“He that believeth, and is baptized, shall be saved”)—all are means for sanctifying her members. “He gave … other some pastors and doctors for the perfecting of the saints (τῶν ἁγίων) … for the edifying of the body of Christ … unto the measure of the age of the fulness of Christ” (Eph. 4:11 sqq.).

“It is of her (the Church) that we are born; with her milk are we nourished; her breath is our life. The spouse of Christ cannot become adulterate; she is undefiled and chaste. She owns but one home; with spotless purity she guards the sanctity of one chamber. She keeps us for God; she appoints unto a kingdom the sons that she has borne. Whosoever, having separated from the Church, is joined to an adulteress, he is cut from the promises of the Church. Neither shall he come into the rewards of Christ who leaves the Church of Christ. He is an alien, he is profane, he is an enemy. He can no longer have God for a Father who has not the Church for a mother” (St. Cyprian, De Unitate, nn. 5, 6).

III. Because the Church is holy, and possesses the means of sanctifying her members, we must not thence conclude that as a fact all her members are holy, and that mortal sin shuts them out of her pale. Holy Scripture speaks of the Church as a field in which the cockle grows along with the wheat (Matt. 13:24 sqq.); as a barn containing chaff as well as wheat (ibid. 3:12); as a draw-net cast into the sea and gathering together all kinds of fishes, both bad and good (ibid. 13:47); it tells us that in the Church the goats are mingled with the sheep (ibid. 25:32), foolish virgins with the wise (ibid. 25:1–13), the wicked servants with the good, and that vessels to dishonour are found in the same great house as vessels to honour (2 Tim. 2:20). Hence the Apostles, although they did their utmost for the sanctification of the faithful, nevertheless looked upon sinners as still members of the Church. “If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us” (1 John 1:8). This was the doctrine which St. Augustine and St. Optatus of Milevis urged against the Donatists.

SECT. 243.—THE CATHOLICITY OF THE CHURCH

The word “Catholic” (καθολικός, κάθολος) means “general” or “universal.” When we say that the Church of Christ is Catholic, we maintain that she is universal as regards time, space, and doctrine. That is to say: (1) she has always existed since she was originally founded, and she will continue to exist for all time; (2) she is not confined to any special place or nation, but is spread over the whole earth; and (3) she teaches the whole of the doctrine revealed by Jesus Christ. It is, however, with the second of these meanings that we have here to deal. We should, moreover, carefully note that it is of moral universality, not of physical, that we speak; and that in the beginning the Church was not, of course, actually spread throughout the whole world, but only tended to be so spread, inasmuch as the Apostles received the commission to teach all nations.

I. In the Old Testament universality is expressly foretold as a mark of the Church which the Messiah is to found. “I will give Thee the Gentiles for Thy inheritance, and the utmost parts of the earth for Thy possession” (Ps. 2:8); “He shall rule from sea to sea, and from the river unto the ends of the earth” (ibid. 71:8); “All the kings of the earth shall adore Him, all nations shall serve Him” (ibid. 71:11); “All the ends of the earth shall remember, and shall be converted to the Lord, and all the kindreds of the Gentiles shall adore in His sight” (ibid. 21:8); “Behold, I have given Thee to be the Light of the Gentiles, that Thou mayest be My salvation, even to the furthest part of the earth” (Isa. 49:6); “All nations shall flow into the house of the Lord” (ibid. 2:2). Daniel speaks of the Church as “the stone” which “became a great mountain, and filled the whole earth” (2:35). “I have no pleasure in you [the Jews], saith the Lord of Hosts, and I will not receive a gift of your hands. For from the rising of the sun even to the going down My Name is great among the Gentiles, and in every place there is sacrifice, and there is offered to My Name a clean oblation: for My Name is great among the Gentiles” (Mal. 1:10, 11). Our Lord, when reminding His Apostles that all the prophecies concerning Him must be accomplished, said to them, “Thus it is written, and thus it behoved Christ to suffer and to rise again from the dead the third day, and that penance and remission of sins should be preached in His Name unto all nations.” His commission to them was, “Go ye into the whole world, and preach the gospel to every creature” (Mark 16:15); “Go ye and teach all nations (πάντα τὰ ἔθνη)” (Matt. 28:19); “You shall be witnesses to Me in Jerusalem, and in all Judæa, and Samaria, and even to the uttermost parts of the earth (ἕως ἐσχάτου τῆς γῆς)” (Acts 1:8). Hence, the Apostles “going forth, preached everywhere” (Mark 16:20)—at first, indeed, to those of the Jewish faith, “devout men of every nation under heaven” (Acts 2:5), but afterwards to the Gentiles (Acts 10; 15:7 sqq.). And St. Paul says, “We have received grace and apostleship for obedience to the faith in all nations for His Name” (Rom. 1:5); and that “God will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of truth; for there is one God and one Mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, Who gave Himself a redemption for all” (1 Tim. 2:4, 5).

II. Already as early as the end of the first and the beginning of the second century, the Church of Christ was called “Catholic.” “Where the bishop is,” says St. Ignatius, “there let the multitude of believers be; even as where Jesus Christ is, there is the Catholic Church (ἡ καθολικὴ ἐκκλησία)” (Ad Smyrn., n. 8). And St. Justin, “There is no race of men—whether of barbarians or of Greeks, or in fine, bearing any other name, whether because they live in waggons or without a fixed habitation, or dwell in tents, leading a pastoral life—among whom prayers and eucharists are not offered to the Father and Maker of the universe through the Name of the crucified Jesus” (Dial. cum Tryph, n. 117). “Having received this faith, the Church, though spread over the whole world (ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ κόσμῳ διεσπαρμένη, and elsewhere Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐκκλησία καίπερ καθʼ ὅλης τῆς οἰκουμένης ἕως περάτων τῆς γῆς διεσπαρμένη), guards it sedulously, as though dwelling in one house; and these truths she uniformly holds as having but one soul, and one and the same heart; and these she proclaims and teaches, and hands down uniformly, as though she had but one mouth. For though throughout the world the languages are various, still the force of the tradition is one and the same. And neither do the Churches founded in Germany, nor those in Spain, in Gaul, in the East, in Egypt, in Africa, nor in the regions in the middle of the earth, believe or deliver a different faith; but as God’s handiwork, the sun, is one and the same throughout the universe, so the preaching of the truth shines everywhere, and enlightens all men that wish to come to the knowledge of the truth” (St. Irenæus, Adv. Hæres., l. i. c. 10, n. 2). “You, Parmenianus, have said that the Church is with your party only … consequently, for it to be with you in a small portion in Africa, will it not be with us in another part of Africa? Will it not be in Spain, in Gaul, in Italy, where your party is not?… Where will be the propriety of the name ‘Catholic,’ since the Church is called Catholic from this, that it is according to reason and everywhere diffused? For if you thus at your pleasure narrow the Church into so straitened limits, if you withdraw from it all nations, where will that be which the Son of God merited? Where that which the Father freely of His bounty bestowed on Him, saying, in the second Psalm, ‘I will give thee,’ etc.?” (St. Optatus of Milevis, De Schism. Donat., 1. ii. n. 1.) Many passages might be quoted from St. Augustine: “The question between us undoubtedly is, Where is the Church? whether with us or with them (the Donatists)? That Church assuredly is one, which our ancestors called the Catholic, that they might show by the name itself that it is throughout the whole. For throughout (or according to) the whole is expressed in Greek by καθʼ ὅλον. But this Church is the body of Christ.… Whence assuredly it is manifest that he who is not in the members of Christ cannot have Christian salvation” (De Unit. Eccles., n. 2). “The agreement of peoples and of nations keeps me; an authority begun with miracles, nourished with hope, increased with charity, strengthened by antiquity, keeps me; the succession of priests from the chair itself of the Apostle Peter—unto whom the Lord, after His resurrection, committed His sheep to be fed—down even to the present bishop keeps me; finally, the name itself of the Catholic Church keeps me (tenet postremo ipsum Catholicæ nomen)—a name which, in the midst of so many heresies, this Church alone has, not without cause, so held possession of (obtinuit) as that, though all heretics would fain have themselves called Catholics, yet to the inquiry of any stranger, ‘Where is the assembly of the Catholic Church held?’ no heretic would dare to point out his own basilica or house” (Contra Ep. Manichæi Fundam., n. 5). “If ever thou art sojourning in any city, inquire not simply where the Lord’s house is (for the sects of the profane also attempt to call their own dens houses of the Lord), nor merely where is the Church, but where is the Catholic Church? for this is the peculiar name of this holy (Church) and mother of us all, which is, indeed, the spouse of our Lord Jesus Christ” (St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech., xviii. 25).

SECT. 244.—THE APOSTOLICITY OF THE CHURCH

The fourth mark of the Church is Apostolicity, by which we mean that the true Church must be the same as the Church of the Apostles, holding the same doctrine as the Apostles, and deriving her orders and mission from them. If a Church teaches any doctrine other than that taught by the Apostles, or if she has not a succession of ministers coming down uninterruptedly from them, she cannot be the Church of Christ. We have already dealt with this subject in Book I. (vol. i. p. 16 sqq.).

SECT. 245.—THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH THE TRUE CHURCH OF CHRIST

As we have observed above (p. 341), we have abundantly proved that that Church alone which acknowledges the Primacy of St. Peter is the true Church of Christ. This is, of course, sufficient to convince us that the Roman Catholic Church is the only true Church. Apart, however, from this proof, we can show her Divine origin from the fact of her possessing the four above-mentioned marks—Unity, Holiness, Catholicity, and Apostolicity.

I. Before applying these tests of the true Church, be well to make a few observations which will anticipate certain objections.

1. It is obvious that unity is the most practical of all the marks. Whether a Church is at one with itself is a matter more easy to discover than whether it is holy or apostolic. On the other hand, there may be a sort of unity due to stagnation; and there may be variety and dissensions in matters not essential. Where there is life and vigour, and where differences are adjusted by appeal to an authority recognized by all, there we may safely apply the test of unity.

2. Holiness is a far more difficult test to apply, for it is internal (though manifesting itself outwardly), and it is not essential for membership of the Church. Nevertheless, God’s providence requires that the means of sanctity should not altogether fail of effect, and that extraordinary degrees of holiness should be found only within His visible Church.

3. Catholicity ranks almost with unity as a practical test At the same time, we must not expect anything like physical universality. We are confronted with the profound difficulty of the existence of hundreds of millions of human beings who are outside Christianity (see vol. i. p. 135 sqq.). Hence the test must be applied among the various bodies claiming the name of Christian, and applied to some one as against some other, not as against all the rest which are not joined together in anything like a union. The existence of such bodies is only to be expected after our Lord’s warnings about antichrists and false prophets, and the testimony of St. Paul (2 Tim. 3:12 sqq.; 4:3, etc.), St. John (2:18), and St. Jude (11 sqq.).

4. Apostolicity is sometimes hard to apply, both on account of the scarcity of early documents, and the difficulty of grasping their meaning; and also on account of the development of the Church’s doctrine and practice (vol. i. p. 105 sqq.).

On the various objections connected with the application of these marks of the Church, see Newman’s Anglican Difficulties, vol. i. part ii.

II. 1. The unity of the Roman Catholic Church is a fact of such notoriety that any proof would be superfluous. All her members throughout the whole world have the same faith; they all participate in the same sacrifice of the Mass and the same seven sacraments; and they all acknowledge one supreme ruler and teacher on earth, the Bishop of Rome, the Vicar of Christ.

2. The doctrines which she teaches, and the practices which she enjoins, are eminently holy: she holds out to her members numberless aids to sanctification—from the Mass and the sacraments downwards; and, in spite of many scandals, she has ever been renowned for the sublime degree of holiness of some, and the general worthiness of countless, members of her communion.

3. She is truly Catholic, because she is not restricted to any race, or tongue, or nation. Her numbers greatly surpass those of any heretical or schismatical body—nay, they probably surpass the numbers of all the non-Catholic sects put together.

4. The Roman Catholic Church is Apostolic both in her doctrine and in her ministry. What she believes she has always believed; she has never taught any other truths than those which have been handed down to her by the Apostles by word of mouth or by writing; for every one of her doctrines she is able to produce most ancient authority. The succession of her pastors begins with the Apostles, and comes down uninterruptedly to our own day. “Pointing out that tradition which the greatest and most ancient and universally known Church of Rome—founded and constituted by the two most glorious Apostles, Peter and Paul—derives from the Apostles, and that faith announced to all men, which through the succession of (her) bishops has come down to us, etc. For to this Church, because of its more powerful principality, every Church must agree—that is, the faithful everywhere—in which the tradition of the Apostles has ever been preserved by those on every side” (St. Irenæus, Adv. Hæres., iii. 3). ‘If the order of bishops succeeding each other is to be considered, how much more securely and really beneficially do we reckon from Peter himself.… For to Peter succeeded Linus; to Linus, Clement [he gives the whole succession]; to Damasus, Siricius; to Siricius, Anastasius. In this order of succession no Donatist appears” (St. Augustine, Ep. liii. n. 2, Generoso).

PART II

THE SACRAMENTS

WE have now to consider the Sacraments, “through which all true righteousness (justitia) begins, or being begun is increased, or being lost is repaired” (Council of Trent, sess. vii.). We shall treat, first, of the sacraments generally, and then of each in turn. In connection with the Blessed Eucharist we shall take occasion to speak of the sacrifice of the Mass.

Authorities: Peter Lombard, Sent, iv., dist., 1 sqq.; St. Thom., Summ. Theol., 3 qq. 60–90, with Comm. and Supplem., qq. 1–68; Bellarmine, De Controversies, etc., tom. iii.; Chardon, Histoire des Sacrements; Drouin, De Re Sacramentaria; Franzelin, De Sacramentis in Genere, De Encharistia; De Augustinis, De Re Sacramentaria; Gousset, Théologie Dogmatique, vol. ii.; Schanz, Die Lehre von den heiligen Sacramenten der kath. Kirche; Pourrat, La Théologie Sacramentaire; Billot, De Ecclesiæ Sacramentis; Atzberger, op. cit., book vii. chap. ii.

CHAPTER I

THE SACRAMENTS GENERALLY

THE word “sacrament” is used in many senses, both in profane and in sacred literature. Originally it was a legal technical term, meaning the money staked as a wager by the parties to a suit, so called because the money when forfeited was used for the bronze of the vessels employed in sacred rites, or, according to others, was deposited in a sacred place. Then it came to be applied to the military oath of allegiance, and so to any solemn oath or engagement. The early Latin Fathers frequently use it in these latter meanings, e.g. Tertullian (Lib. ad Martyr., c. iii.). But, like so many other words, it gradually came to have a technical ecclesiastical meaning, viz. any sign or external rite by which man was initiated into the sacred mysteries; and thus it became the equivalent of μυστήριον. In the course of time it became restricted to mean the sacred signs by which man was sanctified, whether in the Old Law or in the New. Lastly, it was still further narrowed in its meaning to denote those efficacious signs of grace by which man is sanctified under the New Law.

SECT. 246.—NATURE OF THE SACRAMENTS

I. Just as God has been pleased to command that men should worship Him by certain external acts which are called sacrifices, so His Divine Son has been pleased to ordain that grace should be applied to our souls by other external acts which are called sacraments. The same principle is the foundation of both. Man is composed of body and soul; both belong to God; both co-operate in virtue and in sin; hence both should take part in Divine worship, and both should be joined in sanctification. The notion of a sacrament as an act, and as an external act should be borne in mind throughout. It is something done, not something made. Sacraments, indeed, are usually styled things (res); but as acts come under the designation of things, and as the word “act” conveys a specific meaning, it is better to use it here. Again, man has a supernatural as well as a natural life, and his supernatural acts have an analogy with those which are natural. He is born, he is nourished, and he dies, both naturally and supernaturally. Our Lord, in instituting the sacraments, took certain natural acts of our everyday life, capable in themselves of producing only a natural effect, and raised them, when performed with certain distinguishing marks, to a supernatural sphere, making them capable of producing a supernatural effect.

II. The terms “matter” and “form” were not applied to the sacraments until the beginning of the thirteenth century. The Fathers, indeed, often speak of the form of a sacrament; but they mean thereby the whole external rite in contradistinction to the inward grace, of which the rite is the sign and cause. Even writers as late as Hugh of St. Victor (†1141), St. Bernard (†1153), and the Lombard (†1164), do not make use of the terms; nor are they found in the decrees of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215). As soon, however, as the Aristotelian metaphysic found its way into the Christian schools, it was but natural that its grand distinction of matter and form should be applied to the things which are eminently the province of theology, viz. the sacraments. Here it seemed easy to distinguish the two elements. The familiar quotation from St. Augustine (Tract., lxxx. in Joan., n. 3) seemed to have been an anticipation of the new terminology: “Quid est aqua nisi aqua? Accedit verbum ad elementum et fit sacramentum.” No wonder, then, that the terms were readily accepted by both the rival schools of Scotists and Thomists, and were used at Constance (Contra Wicl. et Hus.), Florence (Decr, pro Armenis), and Trent (sess. xiv. capp. 2, 3; De Extr. Unct., cap. i).

Much diversity of opinion arose, however, when the distinction came to be applied to each sacrament in turn. These different opinions will be noted in due course. Here it will be enough to observe that when the Schoolmen speak of the matter and form of the sacraments, they cannot mean that the sacraments are material, corporeal things. What they mean is that just as bodies are composed of two constituents, the one indeterminate and the other determining, so too in the sacraments two elements, the one indeterminate and the other determining, can be distinguished; and that these may rightly be called matter and form. The latter term is not likely to mislead us, because there is nothing corresponding with shape or figure in the sacraments; but the English word “matter” unfortunately suggests something tangible; and, as there is something of this kind in several of the sacraments, it has given rise to a false notion of its meaning. The natural acts (e.g. washing, anointing, etc.) are the matter of the sacraments, the distinguishing marks are the form; that is to say, the natural act is the indeterminate element, while the distinguishing mark is that which determines it to be a sacrament (St. Thom. 3, q. 64, a. 8). The sacraments are not, indeed, natural signs; on the other hand, they are not merely arbitrary signs. The natural act has some analogy with some particular kind of grace, and hence is suitable for being selected by Christ to convey that grace; and, as a fact, has been so selected by Him. As St. Augustine says, “If the sacraments had no likeness to the things of which they are the sacraments, they would not be sacraments at all” (Ep. 98, n. 9). And Hugh of St. Victor speaks of them as “representing by likeness, and signifying by institution” (De Sacram., lib. i. part 9, c. 2).

III. The Council of Trent has defined that the sacraments of the New Law are not merely external signs of grace; but actually confer the grace which they signify, and confer it of themselves (ex opere operato) (sess. vii. cann. 6, 8). The minister and the recipient, indeed, play an important part, as will be explained later on (infra, p. 366); but the sacraments themselves are the true causes of the grace.

I. Holy Scripture testifies to this doctrine in many passages. “He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved” (Mark 16:16); “Unless a man be born again of (ἐξ) water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God” (John 3:5); “Do penance and be baptized every one of you in the Name of Jesus Christ for the remission of your sins, and you shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost” (Acts 2:38); “Be baptized and wash away thy sins” (ibid. 22:16); “They laid their hands upon them and they received the Holy Ghost; and when Simon saw that by (διὰ) the imposition of the hands of the Apostles the Holy Ghost was given,” etc. (ibid. 8:17, 18); “Stir up the grace which is in thee by (διὰ) the imposition of my hands” (2 Tim. 1:6); “Not by the works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us by the laver of regeneration and renovation of the Holy Ghost” (Titus 3:5); “Christ also loved the Church, and delivered Himself up for it, that He might sanctify it, cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life (τῷ λουτρῷ τοῦ ὕδατος ἐν ῥήματι)” (Eph. 5:25, 26).

2. Many passages to the same effect may be quoted from the Fathers. Thus Tertullian says, “Happy the sacrament of our water, whereby (qua), being cleansed from the sins of our former blindness, we are made free unto eternal life.… We poor little fishes, following after our ἰχθύς, Jesus Christ, are born in water; nor are we safe except by abiding in the water.… What then? Is it not wonderful that death should be washed away by a bath?” (De Bapt., cc. 1, 2.) And St. Gregory of Nyssa: “Baptism is the cleansing away of sins; the remission of transgressions; the cause of renovation and regeneration.… Should any one ask me how water regenerates, and as to the mystic initiation effected by it, I shall say to him with just reason, ‘Show me the way in which we are born according to the flesh, and I will explain to thee the power of that second birth which is according to the spirit’ “ (In Bapt. Christi). See also St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 25 in Joann.; St. Cyril of Alexandria, Lib. 2 in Joann.; St. Leo, Serm. 4 De Nativ. Domini; St. Augustine, Tract. 80 in Joann., n. 3. In the Nicene Creed, too, we confess “one baptism unto (εἰς) the remission of sins.” Cf. the Council of Milevis, ch. 2; the Second Council of Orange, can. 5.

3. This doctrine is likewise proved by the constant practice of the Church. Unless the sacrament could of itself give grace, it would be useless to confer Baptism on infants, or on those who have lost their reason, or on the unconscious. Formerly it was the custom throughout the whole Church, and is so still in the Eastern Church, to confer not only Baptism but the Holy Eucharist and Confirmation on infants.

On the celebrated scholastic discussion as to whether the sacraments are the physical or moral causes of grace, see Franzelin, De Sacram., thes. x.; Drouin, De Re Sacram., q. iv. cap. 2.

Scholion. Before the coming of Christ there must have been both in the law of nature and in the Mosaic Law some remedy at least for original sin. St. Augustine found this remedy, as far as the Mosaic Law was concerned, in circumcision (De Nupt. et Concup., lib. ii. c. 11; De Bapt., lib. iv. c. 24). The Latin Fathers and Schoolmen, following his views, speak of “sacraments of the Old Law”—an expression adopted by the Councils of Florence and Trent. The latter Council condemns the opinion of Calvin that the sacraments of the Old Law and the sacraments of the New Law differ only in the outward rite (sess. vii., De Sacr., can. 2). The common teaching is that the former could not give grace ex opere operato, whereas the latter can. See St. Thomas, 3, q. 62, a. 6; Drouin, De Re Sacr., q. ii.

SECT. 247.—THE INSTITUTION OF THE SACRAMENTS

I. It follows, from the doctrine laid down in the foregoing section, that the sacraments must have a Divine origin. God alone, the Source of all grace, can give to natural acts the power of producing a supernatural effect; and it is God, the Apostle says, Who justifieth. He is the Author of the sacraments not simply as First Cause, in the same way as He is the Author of all things, but as principal cause, having under Him not secondary, but merely instrumental agents.

II. It is of Faith that all the sacraments were instituted by Christ, our Lord (Council of Trent, sess. viii., De Sacr., can. 1). This institution by Christ was a theandric action (supra, p. 86). As Man He instituted the sacraments, and gave His Apostles instructions for the due ministration of them; but the power of conferring grace was derived from His Divine authority. We may, however, go further and say that Christ as Man had a special power in instituting the sacraments. He merited all grace; He is the Mediator and Founder of the New Testament, and the Head of the Church; on Him depends the application of His merits. “All power is given to Me in heaven and on earth; go ye therefore, teach all nations, baptizing them,” etc. (Matt. 28:18). “As the Father hath sent Me, I also send you.… Receive ye the Holy Ghost; whose sins ye shall forgive, they are forgiven them” (John 20:21). Hence the Fathers commonly say that the sacraments flowed from the side of Christ hanging on the cross (e.g. St. Ambrose, St. Chrysostom, St. Augustine, St. Leo, St. Cyril of Alexandria: see Suarez, in 3 disp. 39, sect. 3; St. Thom. 3, q. 64, a. 3).

As no mention is made in Scripture of the institution of the sacraments of Confirmation, Extreme Unction, and Matrimony, the question has arisen whether Christ instituted these sacraments mediately or immediately; that is to say whether He instituted them Himself, or whether His Apostles instituted them in virtue of powers conferred upon them by Him. We cannot here enter into the discussion; we would, however, point out that the definition of the Council of Trent has by no means decided the question. See Franzelin, De Sacr., thes. xiv. p. 183; Drouin, De Re Sacr., q. vi.

III. The controversy concerning the mediate or immediate institution by Christ must not be confounded with the further question as to how far He determined the matter and form of each sacrament; or, in other words, how far He prescribed the acts and the words to be used in each. The diversity of practice at different times, and indeed at the present time, in the Eastern and Western portions of the Church, is sufficient proof that He left much undetermined. “This power has ever been in the Church, that, in the dispensation of the sacraments, their substance being untouched, it may ordain or change what things soever it may judge most expedient for the profit of those who receive, or for the veneration of the said Sacraments” (Council of Trent, sess. xxi. ch. 2). There are, of course, over and above the matter and form, numerous rites and ceremonies used in the administration of the sacraments, e.g. in Baptism, the anointings, the giving of blessed salt, etc. These are not necessarily of Divine origin, but are not lightly to be omitted or changed (Council of Trent, viii. can. 13; see also St. Thom. 3, q. 64, a. 2).

On the subjects contained in this section, read Franzelin, thes. xiv. and v.; Drouin, q. vi.; Pourrat, ch. vi.

SECT. 248.—THE MINISTER OF THE SACRAMENTS

I. We have seen in a preceding section (§ 232) that the Church, the Mystical Body of Christ, exercises in His name imperial, magisterial, and ministerial functions. To these last belongs the administration of the sacraments. Christ, our Lord, being no longer present on earth in His bodily form, makes use of the agency of men for the performance of those acts which He has raised to the dignity of sacraments. These acts are morally His, and they derive their supernatural value entirely from His merits; the persons who perform the acts being simply His agents acting in His behalf. “So let a man think of us as the ministers of Christ and the dispensers (οἰκονόμους) of the mysteries of God” (1 Cor. 4:1). Though these functions are intended for the good of all, they are not capable of being exercised by all. Christ did not say to all, “Do this in commemoration of Me,” but only to the Apostles and their successors. So, too, He did not say to all, “Whose sins ye shall forgive,” etc. In like manner, St. Paul’s words (1 Tim. 4:14), “Neglect not the grace that is in thee, which was given thee by prophecy, with imposition of the hands of the priesthood,” were meant for Timothy and those who have received similar ordination; and it was to the ancients of the Church that he said, “Take heed to yourselves, and to the whole Church, in which the Holy Ghost hath placed you bishops, to rule the Church of God” (Acts 20:28). Again, the same Apostle says, “God hath set some in the Church, first Apostles, secondly prophets, thirdly doctors.… Are all Apostles? are all prophets? are all doctors?” (1 Cor. 12:28, 29; cf. Eph. 4:2); “Every high priest taken from among men is ordained for men in the things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices for sins.… Neither doth any man take the honour to himself, but he that is called by God, as Aaron was” (Heb. 5:1, 4).

In accordance with this doctrine, the Church has never suffered the sacraments to be administered, whether publicly or privately, by any one who has not received ordination. Baptism alone has been excepted from this rule, because it is necessary for salvation, and an ordained minister cannot always be had. When St. Peter exhorts the faithful to be “living stones built up, a spiritual house, a holy priesthood (ἱεράτευμα) to offer up spiritual (πνευματικὰς) sacrifices” (1 Pet. 2:5), he refers to an internal and spiritual priesthood, which consists in the offering of the sacrifice of a contrite heart (Ps. 1:6), good works, etc. And St. John, in the Apocalypse (1:6), means a heavenly priesthood when he says that “Christ hath loved us … and hath made us a kingdom and priests to God” (cf. 20:6). “All the children of the Church,” says St. Ambrose, “are priests; for we are anointed to a holy priesthood, offering ourselves as spiritual sacrifices to God” (In Cap. vi. Lucæ; cf. De Sac. iv. 1).

II. Granting that the efficacy of the sacraments depends entirely upon the merits of Christ, we may go on to inquire whether heresy or mortal sin incapacitates an otherwise competent person from being the minister of a sacrament; and, further, what is required in order that the person should actually exercise this ministry. In other words, we have now to discuss the difficult questions concerning the faith, the worthiness, and the intention of the minister. To enable us to understand these, we must carefully distinguish between valid and invalid, lawful and unlawful, administration. A sacrament may be really and truly conferred, yet the minister may be acting against the law by conferring it. Thus, a lay person performing without necessity the ceremony of baptism over a child not previously baptized, would really and truly confer the sacrament, but would commit a sin by so doing. In the present discussion we are concerned only with the question of validity.

I. Whether heresy is a bar to valid administration was the root of the famous controversy between St. Cyprian Faith not and Pope St. Stephen. The former maintained that outside the Church there were no true sacraments; and that, consequently, those who had been baptized by heretics should be rebaptized, or, more strictly speaking, baptized, since the previous ceremony had been null and void. The Roman Pontiff, when appealed to, condemned this practice. “In days gone by,” says Vincent of Lerins, “Agrippinus, of blessed memory, Bishop of Carthage, the first of all mortal men against the Divine canon [Holy Scripture], against the rule of the universal Church, against the sense of all his fellow-priests, against the custom and institutes of our forefathers, held that baptism ought to be repeated.… When, therefore, on every side men protested against the novelty of the practice, and all the priests in every direction, each according to his zeal, did oppose, then Pope St. Stephen, of blessed memory, prelate of the Apostolic See, assisted with the rest of his colleagues indeed, but still beyond the rest (præ ceteris); thinking it, I suppose, becoming that he should excel all the rest as much in devotion for the faith as he surpassed them in authority of place (quantum loci auctoritate superabat). In fine, in an epistle which was then sent to Africa, he issued a decree in these words: ‘Nothing is to be innovated [nothing] but what has been handed down (nihil innovandum nisi quod traditum est).’ What, therefore, was the result of the whole matter? What, indeed, but the usual and accustomed one? Antiquity, to wit, was retained; novelty exploded” (Adv. Hæres., n. 6). “Do not object against us the authority of Cyprian in favour of repeating baptism,” says St. Augustine, “but adhere with us to the example of Cyprian in favour of preserving unity. For that question about baptism had not then been as yet thoroughly examined with care; but the Church, notwithstanding, adhered to a most wholesome practice—to amend what was evil in the heretics and schismatics themselves, but not to repeat what had been given; to make whole what was wounded, not to heal what was whole (corrigere quod pravum est, non iterare quod datum est; sanare quod vulneratum est, non curare quod sanum est)” (De Bapt., lib. ii. c. 7). Although St. Stephen’s decree was primarily a disciplinary rule, yet it practically decided the doctrinal question which lay at the root of the controversy. The Council of Aries (314) repeated the rule, and in spite of the sanctity, the learning, and the influence of St. Cyprian’s adherents, the practice of rebaptism of heretics fell into disuse. We shall presently see, however, that the question of rebaptism assumed a new form later on. Any doubts concerning the doctrinal question were set at rest by the decision of the Council of Trent, that baptism given by heretics, with the intention of doing what the Church does, is true baptism (sess. vii., De Bapt., can. 4).

2. While St. Cyprian was contending for the rebaptism of heretics, the Novatians went further, and maintained that baptism conferred by sinners was invalid. Early in the next century this error was taken up by the Donatists, at least as far as notorious sinners were concerned. Long afterwards the Waldenses, Wyclif, and Huss held similar opinions, and were condemned by the Councils of Constance, Florence, and Trent (sess. vii., De Sacr. in Gen., can. 12). The Donatists found a strenuous opponent in St. Augustine, whose writings contain numberless passages against them: “That water over which the Name of God is invoked is not profane and adulterous, even though the invoker is adulterous and profane; for neither the created thing nor the name is adulterous.… The light of the sun, or even of a lamp, when shed abroad through foul places, contracts nothing vile thereby. And can Christ’s baptism be contaminated by any one’s crimes?” (De Bapt., lib. iii. c. 10.) “Baptism takes its quality from the quality of Him in whose power it is given, not from that of him by whose ministry it is conferred (Baptisma tale est qualis est ille in cujus potestate datur; non qualis est ille per cujus ministerium datur).… What was given by Paul and what was given by Peter are both Christ’s; and if it was given by Judas it was Christ’s” (In Joan. tract, v. 6; cf. Contra Cresconium, passim). That is to say, the minister acts like an instrument or channel; and, consequently, the action derives its force and value from the prime mover or principal cause. Just as a medical man, though ill himself, can cure others; just as a pipe, no matter whether it is of silver or of lead, can conduct water; so can the ministers of the Church confer the sacraments, even though they themselves may be sinners (St. Thom., 3, q. 64, a. 5).

3. Without going into details concerning the various kinds of attention and intention, we may state generally that the minister of a sacrament must be aware of what he is doing, and must really and truly intend to do it. Though he is an instrument in Christ’s hands, he is not simply a tool; he is a living instrument, and therefore the action of his will must come in. Moreover, he must at least have “the intention of doing what the Church does” (faciendi quod facit Ecclesia; Council of Trent, sess. vii., De Sacr. in Gen., can. 11). What, however, is the precise import of this formula is a matter of discussion among theologians. All agree that the minister need not have the specific intention of doing what the Roman Catholic Church does; that he need not intend to produce the effect of the sacrament; and that he need not even believe that the rite is a sacrament at all, or know what a sacrament is. They agree, too, that he must intend to perform a ceremony which is held as sacred and religious by the Church of Christ. The reason is plain. What is indeterminate needs to be determined, otherwise its character is not fixed. Now, washing can be performed for various purposes, e.g. cleanliness, health, amusement, or devotion. In order to make it really and truly a sacrament, it needs to be determined by the intention of the minister, which intention is expressed by the words, “I baptize thee in the Name of the Father,” etc. (St. Thom., 3, q. 65, a. 8). But whether it is enough to mean to perform seriously the external rite, while internally having no further intention, or even an opposite intention (e.g. “The Church of Rome holds matrimony to be a sacrament, but I do not; I will go through the ceremony, but I do not intend to confer any sacrament”), is a disputed point. See Drouin, l.c., vii. sect. 2; Franzelin, l.c. thes. xvii.; Pourrat, p. 315.

SECT. 249.—THE RECIPIENT OF THE SACRAMENTS

I. We have seen above that the efficacy of the sacraments is in no way dependent on the merit of the receiver. Nevertheless, as they are not charms, and as they are conferred upon human beings, these latter must receive them in a human way. To understand what is required on the part of the receiver, we must bear in mind the distinctions between valid and invalid, worthy and unworthy, reception; and we must also observe that the sacraments differ so much from each other, that it is difficult to lay down any general principles that will apply to all of them. Some persons are incapable of receiving certain of the sacraments, e.g. a woman cannot be ordained, a healthy person cannot be anointed. Supposing that there is no such incapacity, some sort of intention is required, at least on the part of adults, for valid reception. “From defects of age,” says St. Augustine, “(infants) can neither with the heart believe unto justice, nor with the mouth make confession unto salvation. Hence, when others answer for them, in order that the celebration of the sacrament may be accomplished, it is surely valid for their consecration, seeing that they cannot answer for themselves. But if another answer for one who can do so for himself, it is not valid. Hence the Gospel dictum … he is of age, let him speak for himself” (De Bapt., lib. iv. c. 24).

II. The Council of Trent has defined that the sacraments confer grace on those who place no “obstacle” (obex) in the way (sess. vii. can. 7). That is to say, the receiver does not co-operate positively in the action of the sacrament. He can, indeed, defeat its action; but if he wishes it to produce its effect, his own activity is confined to merely removing obstacles. These vary in the different sacraments. Thus, in some sacraments (called the “Sacraments of the living,” e.g. the Holy Eucharist), the consciousness of being in a state of mortal sin is an obstacle to their action. If this is removed by repentance, these sacraments can then produce their effect. In other Sacraments (called the “Sacraments of the dead,” viz. Baptism and Penance), which were instituted expressly for the forgiveness of sin, it is not the conscious state of sin that is the obstacle, but only impenitence or a wilful abiding in that state. The texts of Scripture quoted above (p. 362) in support of the doctrine that the Sacraments give grace of themselves (ex opere operato), generally make mention of something required on the part of the receiver. For example, “He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved” (Mark 16:16). Here justification is produced by the merits of Christ conveyed through baptism; the faith of the receiver merely removing the obstacle to the action of the sacrament. See Franzelin, thes. vi.; De Augustinis, part iii. art. 3.

SECT. 250.—NUMBER AND DIVISION OF THE SACRAMENTS

I. It is of faith that there are in the New Law neither more nor less than seven sacraments properly so called, and that these are Baptism, Confirmation, Eucharist, Penance, Extreme Unction, Order, and Matrimony (Council of Trent, sess. vii. can. 1). The obvious way of proving this doctrine is to show that each of these sacred rites is really and truly a sacrament (which will be done in the succeeding chapters); and also that no other sacred rite combines all the elements required for a true sacrament. Here, in this section, we shall point out that besides this method we can prove that the sevenfold number was explicitly held by the Church long before the Tridentine definition.

1. Before Luther and his followers began their attempts to divide the Church, it had been admitted on all hands, both in the East and West, that the sacraments were seven in number. Even from an historical point of view, this unanimity is a sufficient proof of antiquity. “Is it likely that so many and such great Churches should have gone astray into one faith? Never is there one result among many chances. The error of the Churches would have taken different directions. Whatever is found to be one and the same among many persons is not an error, but a tradition” (Tertullian, De Præscr., c. 28; cf. vol. i. p. 68).

(a) At the very opening of the Scholastic epoch of theology we find the sevenfold number taught, and taught not as some new discovery, but as handed down from our Lord. Thus, St. Otho of Bamberg: “As I am about to leave you, I deliver to you the things which were delivered to us by the Lord … viz. the seven sacraments of the Church” (Apud. Bolland, tom. i. Julii, pp. 396, 397). Peter Lombard, in the fourth book of the Sentences, distinctly enumerates our seven sacraments; and the Scholastic commentators, though they freely criticize him in other matters, and widely differ among themselves, all unanimously accept this doctrine. The same was decreed by many provincial councils from the twelfth century onwards. The teaching of the old Church of England is abundantly clear from the Constitutions of Richard, Bishop of Salisbury, renewed in the Council of Durham (1217 or 1223); the statutes issued by Cardinal Langton, Archbishop of Canterbury, to be read in the Council of Oxford (1222); the “Chapters of the Council of London,” held under the presidency of the Papal legate (1237); and the English “Synodal Constitutions” of the same year. The sevenfold number was acknowledged at the Council of Constance even by the followers of John Huss, and was mentioned in the Decretum pro Armenis at Florence.

(b) As far as the Greek (schismatic) Church is concerned, it should be noted that in the various disputes with the Western Church there was no dissension as to the number of the sacraments, though there was considerable discussion concerning the rites and ceremonies connected with them. When overtures for union were made by the Protestants at the end of the sixteenth century to the Eastern schismatics, the Patriarch of Constantinople, Jeremias, distinctly pointed out that, contrary to the Augsburg Confession, “the sacred ceremonies and sacraments recognized in the Catholic Church by orthodox Christians are seven in number: viz. Baptism, the Unction of the Divine chrism, the Divine Communion, Ordination, Matrimony, Penance, and Holy Oil (Extreme Unction); just as there are seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, according to Isaias (4:2), so are there seven sacraments which the Holy Ghost works, neither more nor less.” See Perpétuité de la Foi, tom. v. lib. i. ch. 3; Pourrat, p. 262.

2. Though the Fathers treat of the various sacraments in detail, we are not surprised to find that they nowhere expressly state that these are seven in number. It was no part of their method to compose systematic theological treatises unless, indeed, on such subjects as the Incarnation and Blessed Trinity, which were keenly controverted. As soon as theology began to be reduced to a system, we find the number seven immediately accepted by all. Besides, “the discipline of the secret,” to which frequent reference must be made when dealing with the sacraments, would easily account for the silence of the Fathers on many points connected with them. Moreover, the word “sacrament” was not restricted to its technical sense until later.

The answer to the arguments of those who maintain other sacraments besides these seven, notably, the Washing of Feet (John 13:1–15), may be found in Drouin, q. iii. cap. 2, sect. 2; Franzelin, p. 286 sqq.

II. These seven Sacraments may be divided into various classes.

1. We have already spoken of the distinction between “Sacraments of the Living” and “Sacraments of the Dead.”

2. Another important distinction is that the sacrament of Baptism is necessary for salvation, whereas others, however useful, are not necessary (supra, § 45).

3. Again, three of the sacraments (Baptism, Confirmation, and Order) impress a “Character,” and therefore cannot be repeated. This “Character” or mark is defined by the Council of Trent to be “a certain spiritual and indelible sign (signum quoddam spirituale et indelibile)” (sess. vii., De Sacr., can. 9).

(a) That these three sacraments impress a Character was distinctly taught by all the mediæval theologians (St. Thom. In 4 Dist. q. 1, a. 1). There was, indeed, considerable disagreement as to the precise nature of the Character; and some (Scotus, Biel, Cajetan) went so far as to deny that its existence could be proved from Scripture or the Fathers; but even these accepted it on the authority of the Church. This universal consent is sufficient proof that the doctrine is a tradition and not an error (supra, p. 373).

(b) But the Fathers, notably St. Cyprian and St. Augustine, had already maintained the existence of the Character, though not in the exact technical language of the Schoolmen. In the early controversies concerning heretical Baptism and Order, both parties agreed that it had been handed down from the Apostles that these sacraments could not be repeated. The Catholics maintained that the reason of this prohibition was that these sacraments produced an effect quite independent of grace—an effect which could be produced outside the Church, and remained even in those who quitted her fold. This was called a seal (sigillum), or mark (signum, character), impressed upon the soul, and designating the subjects of it as the sheep of Christ’s flock, or as the soldiers and ministers of His kingdom. “The sacrament of Christian Baptism is valid and sufficient for consecration, even though it is not sufficient for the participation of eternal life; and this consecration makes the heretic a culprit (reum facit) who bears the character outside the Lord’s flock; nevertheless, sound doctrine bids that he should be corrected, not consecrated anew” (St. Aug., Ep. xcviii. n. 5). And, again, addressing a Donatist: “Thou art a sheep of my Lord’s flock. Thou hast gone astray with His mark (signum) on thee, and because of that I seek thee the more.… Dost thou not know that the deserter is condemned for having the service mark (character), whereas the fighting soldier is rewarded for it?” (Ad Pleb. Cæsar., n. 4). The Greek Fathers frequently use similar expressions. Thus Clement of Alexandria (De Divite Servando, c. 42) speaks of Baptism as “the seal of the Lord (σφραγῖδα τοῦ Κυρίου);” St. Basil (Bapt., n. 5), “the unassailable seal (σφραγίς ἀνεπιχείρητος);” St. Cyril of Jerusalem (Procatech., n. 16), “a holy and indelible seal (σφραγίς ἅγια καὶ ἄλυτος).” Cf. St. Greg. Naz., Or. 40, In Bapt., n. 4; St. John Chrysost., In 2 Cor., hom. iii. n. 7.

(c) It is clear, then, that the doctrine of the Character must have come down from the Apostles, and hence, even though it could not be proved from the text of Sacred Scripture taken alone, nevertheless such expressions as “sealing” and “signing” must, according to the Catholic rule of interpretation, be taken to refer to the sacramental Character. “He that hath anointed us is God, Who also hath sealed (ὁ σφραγισάμενος) us and given the pledge (ἀραβῶνα) of the Spirit in our hearts” (2 Cor. 1:21, 22); “You were signed (ἐσφραγίσθητε) with the Holy Spirit of promise” (Eph. 1:13); “Grieve not the Holy Spirit of God, whereby (ἐν ᾡ) you are sealed (ἐσφραγίσθητε) unto the day of redemption” (ibid. 4:30). Sec St. Thom., 3, q. 63; Drouin, q. v. c. 2; Franzelin, theses xii., xiii.; Billot, p. 138; Pourrat, p. 185.

On the number of the Sacraments see Billot, p. 191; Pourrat, p. 232; Franzelin, De Sacr. in Gen., cap. vi.; Drouin, De Re Sacramentaria, Qu. iii. cap. ii.

CHAPTER II

BAPTISM

THE verb βαπτίζειν is used by profane authors in a number of different senses: (1) The dipping of an object into water or any other fluid for any purpose whatever; (2) the immersion or sinking of an object; (3) the covering over of any object by the flowing or pouring of a fluid on it, and so, metaphorically (in the passive) being overwhelmed or oppressed; (4) the washing or wetting of an object, whether by aspersion or immersion. Turning to the sacred writings, we find the word used in the Septuagint four times (4 Kings 5:14; Isa. 21:4; Judith 12:7; Ecclus. 34:26). In three of these it means to bathe or wash. The passage of Isaias is metaphorical, as in the third usage above-mentioned. Both the noun (βάπτισμα, βαπτισμὸς) and the verb occur frequently in the New Testament, and are used sometimes in the sense of washing (Mark 7:3, 4, 8; Luke 11:38), sometimes metaphorically (Mark 10:38, 39; Luke 12:50), but especially to designate a rite by which men are spiritually cleansed. The baptism of St. John was not able of itself (ex opere operato) to wash away sin. Like the sacraments of the Old Law, it signified the grace which was conferred by the dispositions of the minister or recipient. Hence St. Paul (Acts 19:5) re-baptized those who had received John’s baptism. The sacred rite which we are here concerned with is the sacrament properly so called, instituted by Christ for the remission of sin.

SECT. 251.—THE NATURE AND INSTITUTION OF BAPTISM

I. That entry into the Church of Christ was to be effected by means of a distinct rite, consisting of washing, accompanied with certain words, is plain from the New Testament and the teaching of the Fathers.

1. Our Lord’s final charge to the Apostles was to teach all nations, “baptizing them in the Name (εἰς τὸ ὄνομα) of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost” (Matt. 28:19); “He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved” (Mark 16:16). And to Nicodemus He said, “Unless a man be born again of water and of the Holy Ghost (ἐὰν μή τις γεννηθῆ ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ πνεύματος), he cannot enter into the kingdom of God” (John 3:5). Accordingly, we find that when the first converts on Pentecost day asked of St. Peter what they were to do, the answer was, “Do penance (μετανοήσατε), and be baptized every one of you in the Name of Jesus Christ for the remission of your sins (βαπτισθήτω ἕκαστος ὑμῶν ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματι Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ εἰς ἄφεσιν τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ὑμῶν), and you shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost.… They, therefore, that received his word were baptized” (Acts 2:37–41). So, too, St. Philip’s Samaritan converts were baptized (Acts 8:12, 16) εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ; and the Eunuch (ibid. 38); St. Paul himself (ibid. 9:18), and Cornelius with his household (ibid. 10:48). Though St. Paul said that he was sent “not to baptize, but to preach the gospel” (1 Cor. 1:17), nevertheless he frequently baptized (Acts 16:33; 18:8; 19:5; 1 Cor. 1:14, 16); and he speaks of baptism in many parts of his Epistles: “All we who are baptized in Christ Jesus (εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν) are baptized in His death (εἰς τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῦ); for we are buried together with Him by baptism unto death, that as Christ is risen from the dead by the glory of the Father, so we also may walk in the newness of life” (Rom. 6:3, 4; cf. Col. 2:12); “In one spirit we are all baptized into one body (ἐν ἑνὶ πνεύματι … εἰς ἓν σῶμα)” (1 Cor. 12:13); “One Lord, one faith, one baptism” (Eph. 4:5); “But when the goodness and kindness of God our Saviour appeared, not by the works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy, He saved us by the laver of regeneration (διὰ λουτροῦ παλινγενεσίας) and renovation (ἀνακαινώσεως) of the Holy Ghost, whom He hath poured forth upon us abundantly through Jesus Christ our Saviour; that being justified by His grace we may be heirs according to hope of life everlasting” (Tit. 3:4–7; cf. Eph. 5:27).

2. It would be superfluous to quote the Fathers at any length. One or two early instances need alone be given. “We will also state in what manner we have dedicated ourselves to God, having been created anew by Christ.… As many as are persuaded that the things which we teach and declare are true, and give assurance that they are able to live accordingly, are instructed to pray and to fast and to entreat from God the remission of their past sins, we praying and fasting with them. They are then conducted by us where there is water, and are regenerated according to the mode of regeneration, by which we were regenerated. For they are then washed in that water in the Name of God, the Father and Lord of the universe, and of our Saviour Jesus Christ, and of the Holy Spirit. For Christ also said, ‘Except ye be born again, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven’ “ (St. Justin, Apol., i. 61). “Happy the sacrament of our water, whereby, being cleansed from the sins of our former blindness, we are made free unto eternal life.… We poor little fishes, following after our ἸΧΘΥʹΣ, Jesus Christ, are born in water; nor are we safe except by abiding in the water.… What then? Is it not wonderful that death should be washed away by a bath? Yea, but if because it is wonderful it be therefore not believed, it ought on that account the rather to be believed. For what else should the works of God be, but above all wonder?” (Tertull., De Bapt., 1, 2.)

II. We have now to inquire more particularly into the nature of this initiatory rite. Man comes into this world devoid of the grace of God and spiritually dead; or, to put it in another way, he has the stain of Adam’s sin upon his soul (supra, p. 24). Both these metaphors, “death” and “stain,” are used in Scripture to describe the fallen state of man. Hence, when our Lord was instituting the sacrament which was to remove this stain and to give new life to the soul, He naturally chose the act of washing. This act does not at first sight seem to have any connection with regeneration; but in the East it was the custom to wash the child as soon as it was born (Ezech. 16:4); and St. Paul speaks of the “laver of regeneration (λουτροῦ παλινγενεσίας)” (Tit. 3:5; cf. Eph. 5:25). Hence Christ said, “Unless a man be born again of water (as the cleansing element) and the Holy Ghost (as the life-giving principle), he cannot enter into the kingdom of God” (John 3:5). Washing, then, is the “matter” of the sacrament; that is to say, washing is the natural act chosen by our Lord as the sign and cause of the removal of the stain of original sin from the soul. But it is not every washing that is capable of producing this effect. The act must be accompanied by some distinguishing mark, determining it to be a baptism in the technical sense. This mark is found in certain words which indicate this, viz. “I baptize thee (or similar words) in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost” (St. Thom., 3, q. 66, a. 5, ad. 1; see also a. 1). It may be objected that water is the matter of the sacrament: “Quid est aqua nisi aqua? Accedit verbum ad elementum et fit sacramentum” (St. Aug.). We answer, in the words of the Council of Trent, that water is necesary for baptism: “Aquam veram et naturalem esse de necessitate baptismi” (sess. vii., De Bapt., can. 2). To say that water is the matter, is likely to make people think that the matter of a sacrament is something material and tangible. Water, indeed, may be said to be the “material” or thing used in baptism; but, as we have already observed, many of the sacraments require no material thing, and yet have “matter.”

I. The act of washing with water, which is essential to the validity of the sacrament, may be performed in various ways. The early practice of the Church was to immerse the recipient, after the example of our Lord’s baptism (Matt. 3:16; Mark 1:10) and the baptism of the eunuch by Philip the deacon (cf. Acts 8:38, 39). This continued to be the common use, even in the West, as late as the end of the thirteenth century (St. Thom., 3, q. 66, a. 7). Nevertheless, circumstances frequently arose when it was not convenient to confer baptism in this way. Dying persons, for example, had to be baptized in their beds. We frequently read, too, of martyrs who baptized their fellow-prisoners or their jailors in the prison itself. Some writers also are of opinion that the first converts on Pentecost day could not have been immersed on account of their great numbers (Acts 2:41). Difficulties, too, would arise in cold countries, and in regard to the immersion of women. Hence baptism by effusion, that is, by pouring water over the body, and especially the head, gradually supplanted the older custom. Immersion, indeed, more fully brings out the meaning of the sacrament. “All we who are baptized in Christ Jesus are baptized in His death; for we are buried together with Him by baptism unto death” (Rom. 6:3, 4; cf. Col. 2:12). It is more like the “bath of regeneration (λουτρόν παλινγενεσίας)” (Tit. 3:5; cf. Eph. 5:27). Nevertheless, inasmuch as effusion and aspersion (sprinkling: “Thou shalt sprinkle me with hyssop, and I shall be cleansed,” Ps. 50:9) are true forms of washing, they are sufficient for validity. As is well known, the Roman Ritual enjoins effusion; and the Council of Trent has defined that there is in the Roman Church true doctrine concerning baptism (sess. vii., De Bapt., can. 3). Threefold washing (whether by immersion, effusion, or aspersion), suggested by the words expressing the doctrine of the Trinity, has at all times been the more common practice, but is not essential. St. Gregory the Great tells Leander that “it cannot be blameworthy to immerse an infant either thrice or once; for the threefold immersion signifies the Trinity of the Persons, and the single immersion the unity of the Divinity” (lib. i., Ep. 43). Hence, at certain times and in certain countries the single immersion has been enjoined, e.g. in order to bring out the unity of baptism against the errors of the various sects of re-baptizers (Fourth Council of Toledo, can. 6). The present discipline of the Church requires threefold washing, though single washing is of course valid.

2. Turning now to the words, “I baptize thee” (or something similar) “in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost,” which are the determining element or form, we have to examine the precise meaning of this formula.

(a) To perform the act, uttering at the same time merely the words, “In the Name of the Father,” etc., is not enough. It must be determined by the words, “I baptize thee,” or “The servant of Christ is baptized,” the latter of which is the Greek formula. “If any one has immersed a child three times in water, ‘In the Name of the Father,’ etc., without saying, ‘I baptize thee,’ the child has not been baptized” (Cap. Si quis 1 Extrav. de Baptismo).

(b) The words, “In the Name of the Father (εἰς τὸ ὅνομα),” etc., do not simply mean that the act is performed by the authority of the Divine Trinity. They signify, rather, that the recipient is consecrated and dedicated to the Trinity as the object of faith, hope, charity, and generally of supernatural worship. “That He might sanctify it (the Church), cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life, that He might present it to Himself (αὐτὴν ἑαυτῷ) a glorious Church” (Eph. 5:26, 27); “We are buried together with Him by baptism unto death … So do you also reckon that you are dead indeed to sin, but alive unto God (ζῶντας δὲ τῷ Θεῷ), in Christ Jesus our Lord” (Rom. 6:3, 11); “For you are all the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus; for as many of you as have been baptized in Christ (εἰς Χριστόν) have put on Christ.… You are all one in Christ Jesus; and if you be Christ’s, then are you the seed of Abraham, the heirs according to the promise” (Gal. 3:26, 29); “Every one of you saith, I indeed am of Paul, and I am of Apollo.… Was Paul, then, crucified for you, or were you baptized in the name of Paul (εἰς τὸ ὄνομα Παύλου)?… I baptized none of you … lest any should say that you were baptized in my name (εἰς τὸ ἐμὸν ὄνομα) … What, then, is Apollo, and what is Paul? The ministers of Him Whom you have believed.… Let no man, therefore, glory in men; for all things are yours, whether it be Paul or Apollo … all are yours, and you are Christ’s, and Christ is God’s” (1 Cor. 1:12 sqq.; 3:4, 5, 21–23). See Franzelin, De Trin., p. 20.

(c) In the Acts of the Apostles we read that many were baptized “in the Name of Christ (ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματι Χριστοῖ)” (2:38; 8:12, 16, etc.). This does not mean that they were baptized under the invocation of Christ, but in the faith and by the authority of Christ, by the baptism instituted by Him. Thus (Acts 19:2–5) baptism “in the Name of Christ” is plainly the baptism of Christ, in opposition to the baptism of John. For, as St. Thomas argues, if anything instituted by Christ be omitted from the administration of the sacraments, such administration is null and void. Now, the invocation of the Three Divine Persons was ordained by Christ, and therefore baptism without this invocation is of no effect. Nevertheless, the Angelic Doctor, moved by the authority of Pope Nicholas I., admits that, when performed according to a special revelation from Christ, the Author and Lord of the sacraments, baptism under the sole invocation of Christ may be valid (q. 66, a. 6). This exception is not now generally recognized. For the answer to the difficulties connected with Nicolas’s decision, see De Augustinis, De Re Sacram., i. p. 352; and Palmieri, De Rom. Pont., p. 638.

SECT. 252.—NECESSITY AND EFFECTS OF BAPTISM

I. The Council of Trent has defined that baptism is necessary for salvation (sess. vii., De Bapt., can. 5). The proof of this doctrine and the various qualifications, or rather explanations, with which it must be understood, have now to be considered.

1. The words of our Lord to Nicodemus are the plainest proof of the necessity of baptism: “Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God” (John 3:5). He commanded His Apostles to baptize all nations, and promised that those who should believe and be baptized should be saved (Matt. 28:19; Mark 16:16). So St. Peter told the first converts that they must be baptized (Acts 2:37), and all the other converts mentioned in the Acts and Epistles submitted to the same rite (supra, p. 379). Hence the early Fathers insist on its necessity. “It is prescribed that no one can obtain salvation without baptism, according to that great saying of the Lord, ‘Unless a man,’ “ etc. (Tertull., De Bapt., c. 12; see also St. Irenæus, Adv. Hæres., lib. iii. cap. 17). We have already (supra, p. 380) quoted a passage from St. Justin, describing how the converts were received into the Church. But it was in the controversies with the Pelagians that the necessity of baptism and the reason thereof were especially insisted on: the necessity of baptism being appealed to as one of the proofs of Original Sin, or Original Sin being assigned as the reason why it was necessary. To these proofs may be added the argument adduced by St. Thomas: No one can be saved but through Christ; now, it is by baptism that we become members of Christ, and put on Christ; therefore baptism is necessary for salvation (q. 68, a. 1).

2. We have, in the first volume (§ 45), distinguished two kinds of necessity: necessity of means (necessitas medii), and necessity of precept (necessitas præcepti).

(a) Baptism is a necessary means of salvation; that is to say, without baptism a person cannot be saved, even though the omission is due to no fault on any one’s part. Those who are capable of receiving God’s commands (that is, all grown-up persons) are bound to seek baptism, and if they neglect to do so, they commit a grievous sin.

(b) The apparent harshness of this doctrine is mitigated when we bear in mind a further distinction recognized by the Council of Trent (sess. vi., De Justif., cap. iv.; sess. vii., De Sacr., can. 4), and thus explained by St. Thomas: “The sacrament of baptism may be wanting to a person in two ways: first, in fact and in desire (re et voto), as in the case of those who are not baptized and refuse to be baptized, which is manifestly a contempt of the sacrament, and therefore those who in this way are without baptism cannot be saved, seeing that they are neither sacramentally nor mentally (in spirit) incorporated in Christ, through Whom alone is salvation. Secondly, the sacrament may be wanting in fact but not in desire, as when a person wishes to be baptized, but is stricken by death before he can receive baptism, and such a one can without actual baptism be saved on account of the desire of baptism proceeding from faith working by love, by means of which God, Whose power is not restricted to visible sacraments, internally (interius) sanctifies him. Hence, Ambrose saith of Valentinian, who died while only a catechumen: ‘I have lost him whom I was about to regenerate; but he has not lost the grace which he asked for’ “ (q. 68, a. 2). This “baptism of desire” (flaminis), as opposed to actual baptism (baptismus fluminis), is treated of at great length by St. Augustine. “I find,” he says (De Bapt., iv. 22), “that not only suffering for the name of Christ can supply the defect of baptism (id quod ex baptismo deerat), but even faith and conversion of heart, if there be no time for celebrating the sacrament (mysterium) of baptism.”

(c) Martyrdom (baptismus sanguinis), also, in the case of those who have not been baptized, can supply the defect of the sacrament. “Whosoever, without having received the laver of regeneration, die for confessing Christ, obtain remission of their sins just as much as if they had been washed in the font of baptism. For He Who said, ‘Except a man be born again,’ etc., made an exception with regard to these when He said, not less universally, ‘Every one therefore that shall confess Me before men, I will also confess him before My Father Who is in heaven,’ and ‘He that shall lose his life for Me shall find it’ (Matt. 10:32, 39)” (St. Aug., De Civ. Dei, xiii. 7; cf. St. Thomas, 3, q. 66, a. 12).

II. In the course of this section and the preceding one we have had occasion to refer frequently to the effects of baptism. A summary treatment will here be sufficient.

1. The first effect is the removal of all sin, whether original or actual, from the soul. This is indicated by the two metaphors of a new “birth” and “washing;” and is more expressly stated in the texts: “Do penance (μετανοήσατε), and be baptized every one of you … for the remission of your sins (εἰς ἄφεσιν τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ὑμῶν)” (Acts 2:38); “Rise up and be baptized, and wash away thy sins” (ibid. 22:16). “From the child just born,” says St. Augustine, “even to the decrepit old man, as none is to be prohibited from baptism, so none is there who does not die to sin in baptism; but infants to original sin only but older persons die also to all sins whatsoever, which by living ill they have added to that which they derived from their birth” (Enchirid. De Fide, n. 13, al. 43; cf. Serm. De Symbolo ad Catechum., c. 10). And the Council of Trent (sess. v. can. 5): “If any one denieth that by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ which is conferred in baptism, the guilt of original sin is remitted; or even asserteth that the whole of that which has the true and proper nature of sin is not taken away, but saith that it is only rased (radi), or not imputed, let him be anathema. For in those who are born again there is nothing that God hateth, because there is no condemnation to those who are truly buried together with Christ by baptism unto death (Rom. 8:1; 6:4), who walk not according to the flesh, but putting off the old man and putting on the new, who is created according to God (Eph. 4:22, 24), are made innocent, immaculate, pure, harmless, and beloved of God; heirs, indeed, of God, and joint-heirs with Christ (Rom. 8:17).”

2. Besides taking away sin, baptism confers supernatural gifts, graces, and virtues upon the soul. “He saved us by the laver of regeneration and renovation of the Holy Ghost, Whom He hath poured forth upon us abundantly” (Tit. 3:5, 6). It does not, however, entirely undo the effect of original sin and restore to man the integrity (supra, § 152) which our first parents possessed before their fall. “In the baptized there remains concupiscence or an incentive to sin (fomitem); which, whereas it is left for our trial, cannot injure those who consent not, but resist manfully by the grace of Jesus Christ; yea, he who shall have striven lawfully shall be crowned (2 Tim. 2:5). This concupiscence, which the Apostle sometimes calls sin (Rom. 6–8), the Catholic Church hath never understood it to be so called as being properly and truly sin in those born again, but because it is of sin and inclines to sin (ex peccato est et ad peccatum inclinat)” (Council of Trent, sess. v. can. 5).

3. It also impresses a character on the soul (supra, p. 375).

4. Finally, it makes the baptized person a member of Christ’s Church, with all the rights and duties of a Christian. “As many of you as have been baptized in Christ have put on Christ” (Gal. 3:27); “Know ye not that your bodies are members of Christ?” (1 Cor. 6:15); “They, therefore, that received his word were baptized, and there were added [to the Church] that day about three thousand souls” (Acts 2:41).

These various effects of the sacrament are beautifully summed up by St. Gregory of Nazianzum: “Baptism is the soul’s brightness; life’s amendment; the questioning of the soul towards God. Baptism is our weakness’s aid; the laying aside of the flesh; the attainment of the spirit; the participation of the word; the rectification of the creature; sin’s deluge; the communication of light; the dispersion of darkness. Baptism is a chariot (to bear us) to God; a pilgrimage with Christ; faith’s support; the mind’s perfection; the key to heaven’s kingdom; life’s change; freedom from bondage; the unloosing of chains; the transformation of our substance into a better. Baptism—what need of further enumeration?—is of God’s gifts the fairest and most excellent” (Or. xl.). See St. Thomas, 3 q. 69; De Augustinis, op. cit., art. viii.

SECT. 253.—THE MINISTER AND THE RECIPIENT

I. To understand the teaching of the Church regarding the minister of baptism, we must carefully bear in mind the distinction between the lawful and unlawful, valid and invalid, reception of a sacrament. Moreover, we should note that, besides the immersion or pouring of the water, there are in solemn baptism a number of ceremonies and prayers which are not essential.

1. Since God wills all men to be saved, and has ordained baptism as a necessary means of salvation, it follows that this means should be at the ready disposal of all. Hence our Lord chose the common element water, and gave every human being, whether priest or layman, man or woman, Christian or pagan, the power of conferring valid baptism (Fourth Lateran Council, cap. Firmiter; Council of Florence, Decr. pro Armenis; Council of Trent sess. vii., De Bapt., c. 4)

2. Nevertheless, this power can only be lawfully used by the laity in case of necessity.

(a) It was to the Apostles and their successors, the bishops, that Christ entrusted this office when He said to them, “Go ye, therefore: teach all nations, baptizing them,” etc. (Matt. 28:19). So we find that the early Fathers, e.g. St. Ignatius (Ep. ad Smyrn.), teach that without a bishop it is not lawful to baptize; and Tertullian says, “The power of baptizing belongs to the chief priest (summus sacerdos); then to the priests and deacons, but not without the authority of the bishop” (Lib. De Bapt., c. 17). And even as late as the sixth century, says Chardon (Bapt., p. ii. ch. 9), it was still the custom for the bishops alone to baptize, or at any rate the priests did not do so without special permission of the bishop.

(b) In the course of time, as the Christian religion extended itself into the country districts, it became impossible for the bishops to be the sole ministers of the sacrament. Simple priests, therefore, were permitted to confer it by virtue of their office and without special authority. The reason why priests possess this power is thus explained by St. Thomas: “By baptism a man is made a participator in the union of the Church, and acquires the right to approach the Lord’s Table, and therefore, as it belongs to the priest to consecrate the Eucharist, so it is his office to baptize; for it belongs to one and the same person to perform the whole, and to arrange the part in the whole (ejusdem enim videtur esse operari totum et partem in toto disponere). Though the office of baptizing,” continues the saint, “was committed to the Apostles and their successors, the bishops, yet it was so entrusted as to be exercised by others; for St. Paul says, ‘Christ sent me not to baptize, but to preach’ (1 Cor. 1:17). And the reason of this is that whereas teaching (likewise entrusted to the Apostles) depends upon the merit and knowledge of the minister, baptism is independent of these” (q. 67, a. 2). Hence, according to the Council of Florence (Decr. pro Arm.), it is said, “The minister of this sacrament is a priest, who by virtue of his office possesses the power of baptizing (cui ex officio competit baptizare).”

(c) The functions of a deacon are, as we shall see (infra, chap. vii.), and as his name implies, to assist those who administer the sacraments. Nevertheless, at his ordination he is told that it is his duty to baptize: “Diaconum oportet ministrare ad altare, baptizare, et prædicare.” This is a further extension of the permission granted to priests. According to present discipline, however, a deacon may not baptize solemnly without special permission from the bishop (St. Liguori, Theol. Mor., lib. vi. n. 116).

The persons who, according to the practice of the Church, assist at the solemn administration of baptism to make profession of Christian faith in the name of the baptized, are called “sponsors,” or “godparents,” and are in no way ministers of the sacrament. They are mentioned by the Fathers under the various names of Sponsores, Fideijussores, Susceptores, or Offerentes (Tertull., Lib. de Bapt.; St. Basil, Epist., cxxviii.; St. Augustine, Serm. clxiii. De Temp.). Concerning these, St. Thomas observes that, just as in carnal birth the nurse receives the child and takes care of it, and later on a teacher has charge of it, so in baptism, which is a spiritual birth, the services of similar persons are required for the newly made Christian.

II. In treating of the necessity of baptism (supra, § 252), we have seen that every human being is bound to be baptized. We have now to consider the conditions required on the part of the recipient of the sacrament; and in connection with this we shall speak of infant baptism.

1. Seeing that by baptism a person dies to the old life of sin, and begins a new life (Rom. 6:4), he must have the will to give up the old life and begin the new; and hence he must have the intention of receiving the sacrament which is the means of entering on this life. So in solemn baptism the catechumen is asked, “Wilt thou be baptized?” and he answers, “I will.” For the valid reception of baptism, however, neither faith nor detestation of sin is required. Hence those who have been baptized without proper dispositions cannot afterwards be rebaptized. See St. Thom., 3, q. 68, aa. 7, 8.

2. In the case of those who are incapable of actually intending to receive the sacrament, their intention to receive it may be presumed. Hence the practice of baptizing children before they come to the use of reason. They have contracted original sin, and, should they die before being cleansed from it, they would be shut out from the bliss of heaven. “He came to save all men through Himself: all, I repeat, who through Him are born again unto God; infants and children, and boys and youths, and elders. Therefore did He pass through every age; to infants made an infant, sanctifying infants; to children a child, sanctifying those of that age” (St. Irenæus, Adv. Hær., lib. ii. c. 22). “Whence is it that, since the baptism of the Church is given for the remission of sins, baptism is, according to the observance of the Church, given even to little children? Since assuredly if there were nothing in little children which must relate to remission and pardon, the grace would seem to be superfluous” (Origen, In Lev., hom. viii. n. 3). The same Father also says, “The Church received from the Apostles the tradition of baptizing even little ones (parvulis)” (In Ep. ad Rom., lib. v. n. 9). St. Cyprian, writing in his own name and in that of the bishops present at the Council of Carthage (253), says to Fidus, “Now, as to the case of infants, who you say ought not to be baptized within the second or third day after birth, and that the law of ancient circumcision ought to be observed, so that in your opinion the child born ought not to be baptized and hallowed within the eighth day, it has seemed far otherwise to all of us in our council. For in what you thought ought not to be done, not one agreed; but we all, on the contrary, gave our judgment that to none born of man was the mercy and grace of God to be denied” (Ep., lix.). Concerning this passage St. Augustine says, “Not forming any new decree, but maintaining the most assured faith of the Church” (Ep., clxvi., ad Hieronym., n. 23; cf. also Serm., ccxciv. n. 19, and Contra Duas Ep., Pelag., l. iv. n. 23, and elsewhere in his writings). “Let the child be sanctified from its infancy; let it be consecrated to the Spirit from its earliest days. Thou fearest the seal on account of the weakness of nature, O mother of mean spirit and of little faith! Ann, before Samuel was born, promised him to God, and when born instantly consecrated him to Him” (St. Greg, of Naz., Orat., xl.). The Second Council of Milevis (416) anathematized those who denied that infants should be baptized (can. 2). This condemnation was repeated by the Councils of Lateran (Fourth), Vienne, Florence, and Trent (sess. vii. cann. 12, 13). The objection drawn from the baptism of Christ at the age of thirty is of no weight. He needed no sanctification; the baptism was merely John’s baptism; and, moreover, He had already been circumcised at the usual time. See St. Thom., q. 68, a. 9.

On the whole of this chapter, see St. Thomas, 3. qq. 66–71; Chardon, liv. i. sect. 1; De Augustinis, i. 325; Billot, p. 205; Dict. de Théol. Catholique, BAPTÊME; Dict. d’Archéologie, BAPTÊME; Catholic Encyclopædia, BAPTISM; Turmel, Hist. de la Théol. Positive, pp. 123, 245, 296, 419.

CHAPTER III

CONFIRMATION

SO many difficulties and various opinions have arisen concerning the sacrament of Confirmation, that the Council of Trent (sess. vii.) contented itself with three short canons on the subject: defining (1) that it is truly and properly a sacrament; (2) that a bishop only is the ordinary minister thereof; and (3) anathematizing any one who says “that they who ascribe any virtue to the sacred chrism of Confirmation offer an outrage to the Holy Ghost.” Elsewhere (sess. vii., De Sacr. in Gen., can. 9) the Council also defined that a character was imprinted by the sacrament.

For the first four centuries the word “Confirmation” was not used to designate this sacrament. Various other terms and phrases, however, quite clearly refer to it; e.g. “imposition of hands,” “unction,” “chrism,” “sealing,” etc.

SECT. 254.—NATURE AND INSTITUTION OF CONFIRMATION

I. After a person has been born again, and cleansed from his original stain, he needs to be spiritually strengthened by the Holy Ghost to enable him to overcome the enemies of his soul; he must be enrolled in Christ’s army, and a mark must be set upon him whereby he may be known to be a Christian soldier. The sacrament instituted for this purpose should therefore, by its outward signs, indicate these effects.

1. To lay the hand on any one is the means of pointing him out; and is often an emblem of setting him apart for any particular office or dignity. Imposition of hands, accordingly, formed a part of the ceremonial observed on the appointment and consecration of persons to high and holy undertakings. “Take Josue, the son of Nun, a man in whom is the spirit, and put thy hand upon him,” etc. (Num. 28:18). Again, anointing with oil was used by the ancients for the purpose of strengthening the limbs, and so enabling the athletes to take part in the contests of the arena. Hence imposition of hands and anointing are made use of in this sacrament. There has been much difference of opinion as to whether the latter is part of the matter of Confirmation. According to the Council of Florence (Decr. pro Armenis), chrism is the matter. We find that the Fathers speak of “the sacrament of anointing,” and attribute to the chrism the power of conferring grace. Thus, Tertullian (De Bapt., c. 7): “After this, having come out of the laver, we are anointed thoroughly with a blessed unction according to the ancient rule.… The unction runs bodily over us, but profits spiritually.” And St. Cyril of Jerusalem: “To you also, after you had come up from the pool of the sacred streams, was given the chrism (unction), the emblem (antitype) of that wherewith Christ was anointed; and this is the Holy Ghost.… After the invocation, this holy ointment is no longer plain ointment, nor, so to say, common, but Christ’s gift, and by the presence of His Godhead it causes in us the Holy Ghost” (Cat. Myst., iii. 3). (Cf. St. Cyril of Alexandria, Comm. in Joel, ii. 23; and St. Augustine, In 1 Ep. Joann., tract. iii. n. 5). So, too, St. Thomas: “Chrism is the appropriate (conveniens) matter of this sacrament; for in this sacrament the fulness of the Holy Ghost is given for the spiritual strength which belongs to perfect age.… Now, the grace of the Holy Ghost is symbolized by oil; wherefore Christ is said to be ‘anointed with the oil of gladness’ (Ps. 44; Heb. 1:9), on account of the fulness of the Holy Ghost which He had” (3, q. 72, a. 2). Moreover, the Eastern Churches have always looked upon the anointing with chrism as the principal part of the sacrament, and to it they attribute the power of impressing upon the soul the seal of the Holy Ghost; so that for many centuries past the sacrament has gone by the name of “the Sacrament of Chrism,” or “Chrism” simply. (Chardon, Confirm., ch. i.). Nevertheless, when the sacrament was conferred by the Apostles, no mention is ever made of anointing. On the other hand, no mention of imposition of hands is made by the Council of Florence; nor is it found in the Greek rituals (see, however, Chardon, l.c.). But the anointing spoken of by St. John (“Let the unction (τὸ χρῖσμα) which you have received abide in you,” 1 Ep. 2:27; cf. 20) and St. Paul (“He that confirmeth us with you in Christ, and that hath anointed us, is God, Who also hath sealed us, and given the pledge of the Spirit in our hearts, ὁ δὲ βεβαιῶν ἡμᾶς σὺν ὑμῖν εἰς Χριστὸν καὶ χρίσας ἡμᾶς Θεός, ὁ καὶ σφραγισάμενος ἡμᾶς καὶ δοὺς τὸν ἀραβῶνα τοῦ Πνεύματος ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν,” 2 Cor. 1:20, 21) may be referred to this sacrament; and as the very act of anointing involves a laying-on of hands, the omission of any express mention of it need not present much difficulty. In practice, however, the general imposition of hands prescribed in the Roman ritual must not be omitted when the sacrament is conferred on those who are subject to the Western rite.

2. The form of Confirmation—that is to say, the distinguishing element which marks off the imposition of hands and anointing from the ordinary profane use of these acts—consists in words suited for this purpose. When the Apostles conferred the sacrament, “they prayed for [the baptized] that they might receive the Holy Ghost.… Then they laid their hands upon them, and they received the Holy Ghost” (Acts 8:15–17). What words were used is not mentioned, and hence considerable variation has prevailed (see Chardon, l.c.). Besides the prayers accompanying the imposition of hands, the Roman rite prescribes the following to accompany the anointing: “I sign thee with the sign of the cross, and I confirm thee with the chrism of salvation, in the name of the Father,” etc. This formula did not come into general use, according to Chardon, until the twelfth century. The formula in the Greek Church is simply, “The seal of the gift of the Holy Ghost (σφραγίς δωρεᾶς Πνεύματος Ἁγίου),” and was prescribed by the First Council of Constantinople (381).

II. The institution of Confirmation by our Lord is nowhere expressly stated in Scripture; nevertheless, there are several texts from which this institution may be inferred.

1. Christ promised that those who believed in Him should receive the Holy Ghost (John 7:37–39); and in the discourse at the Last Supper He made frequent reference to the sending of the same Spirit (ibid. 15, 16). We find the Apostles from the very first making use of a rite to confer this Divine gift (Acts 8:14–17; 19:1–6), and frequently alluding to it in their writings (2 Cor. 1:21, 22; Eph. 1:13; Tit. 3:5; 1 John 1:2, 7). We may be sure that they would not take upon themselves to confer a rite in addition to Baptism (which Christ had expressly enjoined) unless they had received it from Him. The institution probably took place some time during our Lord’s risen life, “when He showed Himself alive after His passion by many proofs, for forty days appearing to them, and speaking of the kingdom of God” (Acts 1:3).

2. The Fathers frequently speak of this sacrament, mentioning it along with Baptism and the Eucharist; e.g Tertullian (supra, p. 394); St. Cyprian, “Anointed also must he of necessity be who is baptized, in order that, having received the chrism, that is, the unction, he may be anointed of God, and have within him the grace of Christ” (Ep. lxx. ad Januarium). (For St. Cyril of Jerusalem, see supra, p. 394). St. Cyril of Alexandria, explaining Isaias 25:6, says, “By the wine he signifies the mystic eulogy and the manner of the unbloody sacrifice which we are wont to celebrate in the holy churches; whilst the ointment admirably points out to us the unction of the Holy Spirit. For the wise John writes, ‘And you have an unction from the Holy One, and you have no need that any man teach you, but as His unction teacheth you of all things;’ for we are anointed with ointment at the time, especially of the holy Baptism, making a symbol of our partaking of the Holy Spirit” (In Esai., 1. iii.). If more frequent mention of Confirmation as a special sacrament is not found among the early Fathers, this arose from the fact that as baptism was usually conferred upon grown-up people, Confirmation immediately followed. Later Fathers speak clearly enough; e.g. St. Pacian: “By the laver sins are cleansed away; by the chrism the Holy Spirit is poured upon us; but both of these we obtain at the hand and mouth of the bishop, and thus the whole man is born again and is renewed in Christ” (Serm. de Bapt., nn. 5, 6). Cf. St. Ambrose, De Mysteriis, c. vii. n. 42; St. John Chrysostom, Hom. xviii. in Act. Apost., n. 3; see also Hom. ix. in Ep. ad Heb., n. 2; St. Augustine, Serm. ccxxvii. ad Infantes; Tract, vi. in Ep. Joan; St. Innocent I., Ep. xxv. ad Decentium, n. 6, etc. They do not speak clearly of its institution by our Lord.

3. Some of the greatest of the Schoolmen were of opinion that the sacrament was instituted by the Holy Ghost through the instrumentality of the Apostles (Peter Lomb. Sent., iv. dist. 7; Hugh of St. Victor, De Sacram., ii.; St. Bonav., in 4 dist. 7, a. 1, q. 1). St. Thomas, however, with the greater number, held the institution by our Lord. “Concerning the institution of this sacrament,” says the Angelic Doctor, “there are two opinions: some say that this sacrament was instituted neither by Christ nor by His Apostles, but later on in the course of time at a certain council. This was the opinion of Alexander of Hales (Summ. iv. q. 9, m. 1), whereas others said that it was instituted by the Apostles. But this cannot be the case, because the institution of a sacrament belongs to the power of excellence which is proper to Christ alone. And therefore we must hold that Christ instituted this sacrament not by showing it (exhibendo), but by promising it, according to the text (John 16:7), ‘If I go not, the Paraclete will not come to you; but if I go, I will send Him to you.’ And this because in this sacrament the fulness of the Holy Ghost is given which was not to be given before Christ’s resurrection and ascension, according to the text (John 7:39), ‘As yet the Spirit was not given, because Jesus was not yet glorified’ “ (3, q. 72, a. 1, ad. 1). Though the Council of Trent refrained from any express canon on the subject, it nevertheless defined of the sacraments generally, that “all were instituted by Christ Jesus our Lord”, (sess. vii., De Sacr. in Gen., can. 1); and hence all the later theologians have held that Confirmation was instituted by Him. This opinion is not, however, strictly of faith. See Franzelin, De Sacr. in Gen., p. 183.

SECT. 255.—THE MINISTER, RECIPIENT, AND EFFECTS OF CONFIRMATION

I. We read in the Acts of the Apostles that, after the Samaritan converts had been baptized by Philip the deacon, the Apostles “sent unto them Peter and John, who, when they were come, prayed for them, that they might receive the Holy Ghost; for He was not yet come upon any of them, but they were only baptized in the Name of the Lord Jesus; then they laid their hands upon them, and they received the Holy Ghost” (8:14–17, cf. also 19:2–6). It is plain from this that the Apostles, and not the deacons, were the ministers of the sacrament. But a celebrated difficulty has arisen as to whether this office can be exercised by simple priests, whose position lies midway between that of the bishops and that of the deacons.

According to present practice, the bishops alone in the Western Church can administer Confirmation; in extraordinary cases, however, with special powers granted by the Pope, simple priests can also administer it. On the other hand, in the Eastern Churches, simple priests are commonly the ministers; and their ministration is accepted by the Western Church as valid. There is no doubt that, though the Eastern use is tolerated, the Western is more in accordance with the Tridentine decree, the teaching of the Fathers, and theological reason. The Council condemns those who say “that the ordinary minister of holy Confirmation is not the bishop alone, but any simple priest soever” (sess. vii., De Conf., can. 3). St. Cyprian says that “they who are baptized in the Church are presented to the bishops (præpositis) of the Church, and by our prayer and imposition of hands they receive the Holy Ghost and are perfected with the seal of the Lord” (Ep. lxxiii. ad Jubajanum). St. Cornelius requires the faithful “to be sealed by the bishop (σφραγισθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐπισκόπου)” Apud Euseb., Hist. Eccl., vi. 43). “As regards the sealing of infants,” says Pope St. Innocent, “it is clear that it is not lawful for it to be done by any one but a bishop (non ab aliis quam ab episcopo fieri licere). For presbyters, though they be priests of the second rank (second priests), have not attained to the summit of the pontificate. That this pontificate is the right of bishops only—to wit, that they may seal or deliver the Spirit, the Paraclete—is demonstrated not merely by ecclesiastical usage, but also by that portion of the Acts of the Apostles wherein it is declared that Peter and John were sent to give the Holy Ghost to those who had already been baptized. For when presbyters baptize, whether with or without the presence of a bishop, they may anoint the baptized with chrism, provided it be previously consecrated by a bishop, but not sign the forehead with that oil, which is a right reserved to bishops (episcopis) only, when they give the Spirit, the Paraclete. The words, however, I cannot name, for fear of seeming to betray rather than to reply to the point on which you have consulted me” (Ep. xxv. ad Decentium, n. 6).

II. Confirmation can be conferred only on those who have already been baptized, and in order to receive it worthily they must already be in a state of grace. “Confirmation is to Baptism what growth is to generation. Now, it is clear that a man cannot advance to a perfect age unless he has first been born; in like manner, unless he has first been baptized he cannot receive the sacrament of Confirmation” (St. Thomas, 3, q. 72, a. 6). Moreover, Baptism is, as we have seen, the gate of the other sacraments (Decr. pro Armenis). If it be objected that the early Christians received the Holy Ghost before they were baptized (Acts 10:44), we reply that by a miracle they received the effect of Confirmation, but not the sacrament itself (St. Thomas, l.c.). Confirmation is not necessary for salvation; nevertheless, so important a means of grace ought not to be lightly neglected. It was formerly administered immediately after baptism, as indeed is still the custom in the Greek Church. The Catechism of the Council of Trent, however, recommends its postponement at least until the candidate is seven years old: “for Confirmation has not been instituted as necessary to salvation, but that by virtue thereof we might be found very well armed and prepared when called upon to fight for the faith of Christ; and for this kind of conflict no one will consider children, who still are without the use of reason, to be qualified” (Part II. chap. 3, q. 17).

III. The effects of Confirmation are: (1) grace, and (2) a character.

1. As Confirmation is “a true and proper sacrament” (Council of Trent, sess. vii., can. 1), it must have the power of conferring grace. This grace is not that by which the sinner is reconciled to God, but that by which we are made more and more pleasing to Him. “Do penance, and be baptized every one of you in the Name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins, and you shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost” (Acts 2:38). In particular we receive the gifts of the Holy Ghost; and of these especially fortitude to profess our faith and to fight against the enemies of our souls. “Stay you in the city till you be endued with power from on high.… You shall receive the power of the Holy Ghost coming upon you, and you shall be witnesses unto Me” (Luke 24:49; Acts 1:8).

2. On the character conferred by Confirmation, see supra, p. 375.

See St. Thomas, 3, q. 72; Chardon, liv. i. sect. ii.; De Augustinis, i. 409; Billot, p. 265; Dict. de Théol. Cath., CONFIRMATION; Cath. Encyclopædia, CONFIRMATION Turmel, pp. 130, 250, 301, 427.

CHAPTER IV

THE SACRAMENT OF THE HOLY EUCHARIST

“THE most Holy Eucharist has, indeed, this in common with the rest of the sacraments, that it is a symbol of a sacred thing, and a visible form of an invisible grace; but it has also this peculiar excellence, that whereas the others have the power of sanctifying when they are administered, in the Eucharist there is present before administration the very Author of sanctity Himself” (Council of Trent, sess. xiii. chap. 3). Moreover, the Holy Eucharist is not only a sacrament, but also a sacrifice: it is an offering made to God, as well as a source of grace given to men. In the present chapter we shall speak of it as a sacrament, reserving the doctrine of the sacrifice of the Mass for the next chapter.

The peculiarity of this sacrament in being a permanent sign, and in being the Real Presence of our Lord, calls for special treatment differing from that given to the other sacraments. We shall first give the proofs of the Real Presence from Scripture and Tradition; next we shall treat of Transubstantiation, or the mode of our Lord’s presence; and, finally, we shall speak of the matter and form, the minister, the recipient, and the effects of the sacrament.

See St. Thomas, 3, qq. 73–83; Franzelin, De SS. Eucharistiæ Sacramento et Sacrificio; De Augustinis, De Re Sacramentaria, lib. ii.; Wiseman, Lectures on the Holy Eucharist; Dalgairns, Holy Communion.

SECT. 256.—THE REAL PRESENCE PROVED FROM HOLY SCRIPTURE

“The holy Synod teacheth … that in the august (almo) sacrament of the Holy Eucharist, after the consecration of the bread and wine, our Lord Jesus Christ, true God and man, is truly, really, and substantially contained under the appearances (species) of those sensible things.… If any one denieth that in the sacrament of the most Holy Eucharist are contained truly, really, and substantially the body and blood, together with the soul and divinity of our Lord Jesus Christ, and consequently the whole Christ (totum Christum); but saith that He is therein only as a sign, or in figure or virtually, let him be anathema” (Council of Trent, sess. xiii. ch. 1, can. 1).

We find the Blessed Sacrament plainly spoken of in three different parts of the New Testament. Our Lord promised to give His flesh as food and His blood as drink (John 6:48 sqq.). At the Last Supper He fulfilled this promise (Matt. 26:26–28; Mark 14:22–24 Luke 22:19, 20; 1 Cor. 11:23–25). And in St. Paul’s First Epistle to the Corinthians (10:16 and 11:27–29) we have an account of the belief and practice of the Apostolic Church concerning the sacrament. Any one of these passages, taken by itself, would be sufficient to prove the doctrine of the Real Presence; taken together, they form an overwhelming argument in its favour.

I. On the day after the feeding of the five thousand in the desert, our Lord delivered a discourse to the multitudes who had followed Him to Capharnaum. As was His wont, His words bore reference to the miracle lately wrought. He bade the Jews not to labour for the meat that perisheth, but for that which endureth unto everlasting life. “I am the Bread of life,” He said; “He that cometh to Me shall not hunger, and he that believeth in Me shall never thirst.” In the first part of the discourse (vv. 26–47) our Lord spoke of belief in Him when He made use of the metaphor of bread from heaven. At verse 48 (or, at least, at verse 51) there is a transition to something suggested, indeed, by what went before, but entirely different from it. A well-known instance of a similar transition is found in St. Matt. 24, where our Lord passes from the prophecy of the destruction of the Temple to the prophecy of the end of the world (v. 43). The passage of St. John is as follows:—

1. (a) “I am the Bread of Life,

(b) “Your fathers did eat manna in the desert,

2. (a) “This is the Bread

(b) “Which cometh down from heaven.

3. (a) “I am the Living Bread

(b) “Which came down from heaven.

“And the bread that I will give is My flesh [Gr., ‘which I will give’] for the life of the world.

“The Jews therefore strove among themselves, saying, How can this man give us His flesh to eat? Jesus therefore said to them, Amen, amen, I say to you, except you eat the flesh of the Son of Man, and drink His blood, you shall not have life in you. He that eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood hath everlasting life, and I will raise him up at the last day. For My flesh is meat indeed, and My blood is drink indeed. He that eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood abideth in Me and I in him. As the living Father hath sent Me, and I live by the Father, so he that eateth Me, the same also shall live by Me” (vv. 48–58).

These words of our Lord, taken in the literal sense, are a plain proof of the Real Presence. Our Lord has spoken, and we believe Him. Difficulties, indeed, there are in believing such a marvel, but “with God all things are possible.” Protestants, on the other hand, are so overwhelmed by these difficulties, that they think that our Lord must have meant something else. Hence they try to show that the passage is figurative. If so, our Lord either made use of a figure already known, or He introduced a new one. Eating a man’s flesh was a familiar figure among the Jews, but it meant to do a person a grievous wrong, especially by calumniating him (see Ps. 26:2; Job 19:22; Mich. 3:3; Eccl. 4:5). This meaning is therefore clearly excluded. And our Lord did not introduce any new figure, because He would not choose a known repulsive figure to convey an entirely new and endearing meaning. This view is strengthened by the fact that drinking blood was peculiarly abominable to the Jews (see Gen. 9:4; Lev. 7:10; 1 Kings 14:31; Judith 11:10, 11). Besides, there is nothing to show that our Lord was inventing a new figure. But the best answer to the Protestant interpretation, is the objection raised by the Jewish hearers, and our Lord’s reply to it. We should bear in mind that our Lord was wont to make two sorts of answers to objections against His teaching. When the objection arose from a difficulty in understanding His meaning, He used to explain. When the difficulty was not in understanding His doctrine, but in accepting it, He did not explain, but insisted all the more. Thus, when our Lord said, “Unless a man be born again he cannot see the kingdom of God,” Nicodemus, not understanding the meaning of our Lord’s words, asked, “How can a man be born when he is old?” Our Lord explained: “Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God” John 3). But on another occasion, when our Lord said to the Jews, “Abraham, your father, rejoiced to see My day; he saw it and was glad,” they objected, “Thou art not yet fifty years old, and hast Thou seen Abraham?” He did not explain, but insisted, “Amen, amen, I say unto you, before Abraham was made, I am” (John 8). In like manner, when the Jews objected, “How can this man give us His flesh to eat?” our Lord did not explain His words, and point out that they were figurative, but He insisted the more, “Except you eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink His blood, ye shall not have life in you.” The Jews therefore rightly understood our Lord as speaking literally; their only difficulty was in accepting what He said. Furthermore, our Lord embodies the doctrine in the form of a precept, which, as all will own, ought to be given in clear language. He makes use of the “Amen, amen,” which adds particular weight to what he says, and shows that His words are to be taken in their obvious meaning. Again, “My flesh is meat indeed (ἀληθῶς), and My blood is drink indeed,”—expressions which certainly do not look figurative. He does not even shrink from saying, “He that eateth Me,” which evidently shows that He meant literally what He said.

No wonder that our Lord’s words should have been the occasion of difficulty to his hearers. Many even of His disciples said, “This saying is hard (σκληρός), and who can hear it?” A word from Him explaining that He spoke figuratively, would have removed their objections. But no such word came, and many of them “went back and walked with Him no more.” The Apostles, however, remained firm. “To whom shall we go?” Peter exclaims; “Thou hast the words of eternal life.” They humbly accepted the doctrine, in spite of its difficulty, just as Catholics do now.

It is sometimes objected that our Lord pointed out the figurative meaning when He said, “It is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing. The words that I have spoken to you are spirit and life” (v. 64). We reply that the words “flesh” and “spirit” in the New Testament never mean “literal” and “figurative,” but the natural and the spiritual man, or human nature as left to its own impulses and human nature as ennobled by grace (Rom. 8) Hence our Lord’s meaning here is, “My words are spirit and life,” or “the spirit of life” (hendiadys); they are such as the mere man cannot receive, but which man endowed with grace can receive (cf. Gal. 5:13–26; 1 Pet. 4:6, etc.).

II. The words of institution.

MATT. 26:26–28.

MARK 14:22–24.

And whilst they were at supper, Jesus took bread, and blessed and broke, and gave to His disciples and said: Take ye and eat; THIS IS MY BODY. And taking the chalice, He gave thanks, and gave to them, saying, Drink ye all of this; for THIS IS MY BLOOD of the New Testament, which shall be shed for many unto remission of sins.

And whilst they were eating, Jesus took bread, and blessing, broke and gave to them, and said: Take ye, THIS IS MY BODY. And having taken the chalice, giving thanks, He gave it to them, and they all drank of it. And He said to them: THIS IS MY BLOOD of the New Testament, which shall be shed for many.

LUKE 22:19, 20.

1 COR. 11:23–25.

And taking bread, He gave thanks, and broke, and gave to them, saying: THIS IS MY BODY which is given for you. Do this for a commemoration of Me. In like manner the chalice also, after He had supped, saying: THIS IS THE CHALICE, THE NEW TESTAMENT IN MY BLOOD, which shall be shed for you.

(Jesus) took bread, and giving thanks, broke and said: Take ye and eat; THIS IS MY BODY, which shall be delivered [Greek, broken] for you; this do for the commemoration of Me. In like manner, also, the chalice, after He had supped, saying: THIS CHALICE IS THE NEW TESTAMENT IN MY BLOOD: this do ye as often as ye shall drink for the commemoration of Me.

It is evident that the important words in these passages are, “This is My body.” We take these words in their plain literal sense. They are the very simplest words in the language. No explanation can make them plainer. Our Lord says that what He holds in His hands is His body, and we humbly believe Him. Those who do not accept the literal sense must show that our Lord did not mean His words to be so taken, and that, in fact, the Apostles did not take them so. The literal sense holds the field until it is driven out. If we can beat off the attacks upon it, it must be held to be the right interpretation. Our adversaries say (1) the word “is” may mean “represents;” and (2) it must have that meaning here.

I. The texts usually quoted to prove that the verb “to be” sometimes means “to represent,” may be grouped in four classes:—

(a) “The seven good kine are seven years” (Gen. 41:26, 27); “The ten horns are ten kingdoms” (Dan. 7:24); “The field is the world” (Matt. 13:38, 39); “The rock was Christ” (1 Cor. 10:4); “These are the two covenants” (Gal. 4:24); “The seven stars are the angels of the seven churches” (Apoc. 1:20).

(b) “I am the door” (John 10:7); “I am the true vine” (John 15:1).

(d) “This is the Lord’s Passover” (Exod. 12:11, Angl. version).

If these texts are carefully examined, it will be seen that the only real difficulty is in group (a). In the others the verb “to be” does not signify “to represent.” E.g. “I am the door” does not mean “I represent, or am the figure of the door.” Again, circumcision, referred to in (c), was not only a sign, but the instrument or record of the covenant. In the last passage the verb “is” must be taken in its literal meaning; the real translation is, “This is the feast, or day of Passover, sacred to the Lord.”

As regards (a), we observe that the passages are parallel to each other, but not to the words of institution. In these passages there is the explanation of some symbol, such as the interpretation of a vision, a parable, or a prophecy; and consequently the verb “to be” is rightly taken in the sense of “to represent.” But in the words of institution there is nothing to show that our Lord was speaking an allegory, and therefore we take the verb “to be” in its natural and literal sense. The force of this argument will be better felt if we examine one of the texts, e.g. “the rock was Christ.” Protestants rightly take this to mean, “the rock was a figure of Christ.” If a Socinian were to argue that the text “the Word was God” must therefore mean “the Word represented, or was a figure of God,” they would point to the difference in the context of the two passages. They would show that St. Paul was speaking allegorically: “All these things were done to them in figure, and they drank of the spiritual rock, and the rock was Christ;” whereas St. John’s context does not contain any allusion to an allegory. This is exactly what Catholics do in defending the literal sense of “this is My body.” This case is really far stronger when we compare the three passages—

“The Word was God.”

“The rock was Christ.”

“This is My body.”

The first two are clearly more like each other than they are like the third, especially when we remember that St. Paul tells us that Christ is “the Image of God” (2 Cor. 4:4; cf. Heb. 1:3). We suppose that no one will now make use of the once popular argument that the language which our Lord spoke contained no word for “to represent” except the verb “to be.” Cardinal Wiseman has shown that the Syriac language is peculiarly rich in such words (Horæ Syriacæ, pp. 18–53).

2. The opponents of the literal sense insist that the words must be taken figuratively on account of the philosophical difficulties involved in the doctrine of the Real Presence. This argument is based upon a principle that would be subversive of all belief in mystery or miracle. Are we to reject all interpretations that present philosophical difficulties? What would become of belief in the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Resurrection? We own that the Real Presence involves a suspension of the laws of nature; but we and our Protestant opponents hold that God who is the Author of these laws, is also Supreme Ruler of them (see Franzelin, De Euch., th. ii.). We must remember that our Lord’s words were spoken not to philosophers, but to Galilæan fishermen. He had shown them that the laws of nature were subject to Him: He had changed water into wine; He had fed five thousand with five loaves and two fishes, and four thousand with seven loaves and a few fishes; disease, and even death, were under His control; the devils obeyed Him; and He disposed of the keys of the kingdom of heaven. All power was given to Him in heaven, on earth, and in hell. Moreover, He had always encouraged unreasoning faith in His words, and had always condemned those who were captious or critical or doubted His power. The Last Supper was surely an occasion when He should have spoken plainly to the twelve chosen ones. Now, the Protestant argument is that the Apostles must have felt the force of the philosophical difficulties so strongly that they said within themselves, “He cannot mean His body, He means the figure of His body!” Our argument is that the Apostles, believing that our Lord could do all things, and that He taught them unreasoning submission to His words, humbly took our Lord’s words in their plain and simple meaning. The Catholic interpretation is based upon an exalted notion, of God’s power, and a lowly estimate of man’s knowledge. The Protestant sets limits to God’s power, making it extend only as far as man’s mind will allow. The pious Christian will not hesitate in his choice between the two.

III. “The chalice of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion (κοινωνία) of the blood of Christ? And the bread which we break, is it not the partaking (κοινωνία) of the body of the Lord?” (1 Cor. 10:16)

“Therefore, whosoever shall eat this bread or drink the chalice of the Lord unworthily, shall be guilty of the body and of the blood of the Lord. But let a man prove (δοκιμαζέτω) himself, and so let him eat of that bread and drink of the chalice. For he that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment (κρίμα) to himself, not discerning (μὴ διακρίνων) the body of the Lord” (1 Cor. 11:27–29).

These two passages are evidence of what was taught and practised by the Apostles. In the former, St. Paul contrasts the Jewish and heathenish sacrifices and rites with those of the Christians. Our cup is a partaking of the blood of Christ, our bread is a partaking of the body of Christ. Now, if this was only figurative, wherein would the Christian have the advantage over the Jew?

But the second text is far more important. The Evangelists (Matthew, Mark, and Luke) have recorded the history of the institution. St. Paul, after narrating the story, goes on to the practical consequences of the Real Presence. If our Lord is truly present under the appearances of bread and wine, then it is clear that “whosoever shall eat this bread or drink the chalice of the Lord unworthily, shall be guilty of the body and of the blood of the Lord.” If our Lord is truly present, a man should “prove himself” before eating “of that bread” and drinking “of the chalice.” If our Lord is truly present, “he that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment to himself.” If our Lord is not there, all this has no meaning. Those who deny His presence are expressly condemned by the Apostle: “He that eateth and drinketh, eateth and drinketh judgment unto himself, if he discern not the body” (Revised Version).

We have said that, taken by themselves, the words of promise, or the words of institution, or the teaching of St. Paul, would be quite enough to prove the Real Presence. We can now see how strong our position is when all the passages are taken together. Let us allow, for the sake of argument, that our Lord might have spoken figuratively at the time of the promise; would He not have let fall some hint about the figurative meaning at the Last Supper? Would not St. Paul, in one or other of the texts quoted, have made some reference to it? On these four different occasions, our Lord and His Apostles, explaining different doctrines, speaking to different assemblies, under quite different circumstances, all agree in using certain words, without ever giving the smallest hint as to any figurative meaning. This is surely an unanswerable argument in our favour.

SECT. 257.—THE REAL PRESENCE PROVED FROM TRADITION

A complete account of the doctrine of the Fathers concerning the Blessed Eucharist cannot be given here. The reader is referred to Card. Franzelin, De Euch., pp. 83–154; Faith of Catholics, ii. pp. 190–374; Batiffol, Études d’Hist. et de Théol. Posit., 2e série, p. 107 sqq.

I. The express teaching of the Fathers may be grouped under four heads:—

1. They hold that in the Blessed Eucharist the very Body of Christ is present.

“They (the Docetæ) abstain from Eucharist and prayer, because they confess not that the Eucharist is flesh of our Saviour Jesus Christ, the flesh which suffered for our sins which the Father in His mercy raised again. They, therefore, who deny the gift of God, perish in their disputing” (St. Ignatius Mart, Ad Smyrn., nn. 7, 8).

“We have been taught that the food over which thanksgiving has been made (or which has been eucharistized) by the prayer of the word which came from Him—by which (food) our blood and flesh are nourished by transmutation—is both flesh and blood of that same incarnate Jesus” (St. Justin, Apol., i. 65, 66).

“How shall they feel assured that that bread over which thanksgiving has been made (i.e. the eucharistized bread) is the body of their Lord, and the chalice of His blood, if they do not declare Him the Son of the world’s Creator?… How, again, do they say that that flesh which is nourished by the body of the Lord and by His blood passes into corruption, and partakes not of the life?” (St. Irenæus, Adv. Hæres., iv. 18).

“If the Word was truly made flesh, and we truly receive the Word (made) flesh in the dominical food (vere verbum carnem cibo Dominico sumimus), how can He be thought not to abide naturally in us—He Who, being born man, hath assumed the nature, now inseparable, of our flesh, and also united the nature of His flesh to the nature of His divinity, under the sacrament of the flesh that was to be communicated to us? (et naturam carnis suæ ad naturam æternitatis [divinitatis] sub sacramento nobis communicandæ carnis admisceat).… He Himself says, ‘My flesh is truly meat, and My blood is truly drink. He that eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood abideth in Me, and I in him. Of the verity of the flesh and blood there is no room left for doubting. For now both by the declaration of the Lord Himself and by our faith it is truly flesh and it is truly blood” (St. Hilary, De Trin., viii. 13 sqq.).

“This food which thou receivest, this living bread that cometh down from heaven, supplies us with the substance of eternal life; and whosoever shall have eaten of this (living bread) shall never die; and it is the body of Christ. Consider now whether the bread of angels (manna) be more excellent, or Christ’s flesh, which is in truth the body of life.… In that sacrament Christ is, because it is Christ’s body, therefore it is not bodily food, but spiritual” (St. Ambrose, De Myster., cc. viii., ix.).

“Being fully persuaded that what seems bread is not bread, even though it seems so to the taste, but Christ’s body; and what seems wine is not wine, even though the taste will have it so, but Christ’s blood” (St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech., iv. 9). And again: “We become Christ-bearers (χριστοφόροι), His body and blood being diffused through our members; thus are we made, according to the blessed Peter, partakers of the Divine nature” (ibid., n. 3).

“We believe the Divine Word that not something like or equal, but that it is properly and truly the Divine body which is sacrificed on the Divine table and is partaken of by the people, altogether, without any division or failing” (St. Cæsarius, brother of St. Greg. Naz. (?) Bibl. Gallandi, tom. vi. p. 127). See also St. Cyril of Alexandria, In Joann., l. x. et l. iv.; and St. John Damascene, De Fide Orthod., iv. 13.

2. The Fathers deny that the Eucharist is a mere figure of Christ’s body.

“Christ said, ‘This is My body;’ for it is not the figure (τύπος) of body or the figure of blood, as some have stupidly repeated, but it is truly the body and blood of Christ” (Macarius Magnes, who flourished at the beginning of the fourth century, Bibl. Gallandi, tom. iii. p. 541).

St. Anastasius of Sinai describes a dispute between a Christian and a Gaianite heretic. Both agree that the Eucharist is not the figure of the body of Christ. The heretic says, “God forbid that we should say that the Holy Communion is only the figure of the body of Christ or simple bread; but we truly receive the very body and blood of Christ, the Son of God.” The Christian answers, “So do we believe and confess, according to the saying of Christ Himself, which He pronounced to the disciples in the mystical supper, giving them the life-giving bread: ‘Take, eat, this is My body;’ in like manner, delivering the chalice to them, He said, ‘This is My blood.’ He did not say,’ This is the figure of My body and blood’ “ (Bibl. Max. Patrum, tom. ix. pp. 840, 855). “Saying, ‘This is My body,’ He showed that the bread sanctified upon the altar is the very body and not a figure; for He did not say, ‘This is a figure,’ but, ‘This is My body’ “ (Theophylact, In Matt., xxvi. 26).

“The bread and wine are not the figure of the body and blood of ‘Christ, God forbid! but the very deified body of the Lord; since the Lord Himself said, not ‘This is the figure of My body,’ but ‘This is My body,’ and not ‘The figure of My blood,’ but ‘My blood’ “ (St. John Damascene, De Fid. Orthod., iv. 13).

3. The Fathers hold that an objective change takes place in the thing itself, and hence that our Lord is not received only by faith, or by virtue of any merely subjective conditions on the part of the receiver: He is received physically and corporally.

“Christ does not say that He will be in us by a kind of habit only—a habit which the mind conceives of as in the affections, but also according to physical participation. For as, if a person joins one piece of wax to another and apply both to the fire, he makes the compound of both one (body), so by means of the participation of the body of Christ and of His precious blood, He is indeed in us, and we also are united together in Him” (St. Cyril of Alex., In Joann., l. x. tom. iv. 862, 863; see also St. Hilary, quoted above).

“Rightly, therefore, do I believe that now also the bread that is sanctified by the Word of God is changed (μεταποιεῖσθαι) into the body of the God-Word.… The bread, as the Apostle says, is sanctified by the Word of God and prayer, passing into the body of the Word, not by being eaten and drunk, but instantly changed into the body of the Word according as was said by the Word, ‘This is My body’ “ (St. Greg. of Nyssa, Catech. Magn., c. 37; cf. St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Cat., v.).

“It is truly the body united to the divinity, the body born of the Holy Virgin, not that the body taken up into heaven comes down on earth (i.e. moves locally, leaves heaven), but that the bread itself and wine are changed into the body and blood of God” (St. John Damasc., De Fid. Orthod., l. iv. c. 13; see also St. Ambrose, De Myster., c. 9).

We wish that we could quote at length the magnificent passages in which St. John Chrysostom speaks of the Real Presence (Hom. 82, In Matt.; Homm. 45, 46, 47, In Joann., explaining the discourse in St. John’s sixth chapter; Hom. 24, In 1 Ep. ad Cor.). The following must suffice: “How many nowadays say, ‘Would that we could gaze upon His form, His figure, His raiment, His shoes! Lo! thou seest Him, touchest Him, eatest Him. And thou desirest to see even His vesture, but He gives Himself to thee, not to look upon only, but even to touch, and eat and receive within thee.… Think how indignant thou art against him that betrayed, against them that crucified Him. See to it, then, lest thou also become guilty of the body and blood of Christ. They slew that most holy body, but thou, after so great benefits, receivest in an unclean soul. For neither was it enough for Him to become man, nor to be scourged and slain, but He also commingles Himself with us, and not by faith only, but also in very deed does He make us His body” (In Matt., l.c., n. 4). “It is not man that makes the things that lie open to view become Christ’s body and blood, but that same Christ who was crucified for us. The priest, fulfilling his office, stands pronouncing those words; but the power and the grace is of God. ‘This is My body,’ He says. This word changes the things that lie open to view (μεταῤῥυθμίζει τὰ προκείμενα). And as that word that said, ‘Increase and multiply, and fill the earth,’ was pronounced indeed but once, but through all time is actually operative on our nature for the procreation of children; so also that word uttered but once operates from that time to this, and till His own advent, the sacrifice perfect at every table in the Churches” (Hom. 1 De Prodit. Judæ, n. 6).

4. How the Fathers made use of the doctrine of the Real Presence to confute the various heresies concerning the Incarnation, may be seen in Franzelin, thes. ix.

II. Although the proof from the Fathers is most convincing, certain passages occur which at first sight present some difficulty. The following remarks will help us to understand these rightly.

1. We have already spoken of the Discipline of the Secret (p. 374). The Blessed Sacrament was especially liable to profanation. The Fathers, therefore, were obliged either to be silent about it, or to speak of it in guarded language intelligible only to the initiated.

2. Our Lord’s presence in the Blessed Sacrament is so wonderful, and may be looked at from so many points of view, that many expressions may be used concerning it which are quite orthodox in one sense and false in another.

(a) There is no sensible change. Hence it might be said that, in a certain sense, no change takes place.

(b) Bread is the terminus a quo, and the phenomena of bread remain after the change. Hence the Blessed Sacrament may be called bread.

(c) Although our Lord’s body underlies the appearances of bread, these appearances themselves are not our Lord’s body. Hence the Blessed Sacrament may be called the sign of His body.

(d) Our Lord’s body is not present in the form which it had on earth, or in the glorified form which it now has in heaven. Hence our Lord is said to be spiritually present in the Blessed Sacrament, whereas He was corporally present when on earth.

(e) The expression “to eat our Lord’s body” may be understood in many senses. There is the Capharnaitic sense, i.e. to eat His body under the form which it had on earth. This is rightly excluded by St. Augustine. Again, there is the sense of eating our Lord’s body in the Blessed Sacrament in such a way that His body is ground down by our teeth and affected by digestion. This also must be excluded. We may also deny that the wicked eat the body of the Lord, i.e. so as to derive any benefit from it.

(f). The Blessed Sacrament is in a certain sense the figure of our Lord’s body (see above, c). His presence under the appearances of bread is a sacrament or figure of His presence when on earth. The Blessed Sacrament is also the antitype or fulfilment (figura adimpleta) of the Old Testament types and figures. See Franzelin, thes. x.

SECT. 258.—TRANSUBSTANTIATION

The Church teaches not only the fact that our Lord is really and truly present in the Blessed Sacrament, but also the way in which He is present. By the words of consecration the whole substance of bread is changed into our Lord’s body, and the whole substance of wine is changed into His blood, the appearances (species) of bread and wine alone remaining. Although the name “Transubstantiation,” which is given to this change, is not older than the eleventh century, the notion itself was clearly taught by the Fathers. Protestants, who object to the introduction of the word, walk in the footsteps of the Arians, who objected to the term ὁμοούσιος, and of the Nestorians, who objected to the term Θεοτόκος. Transubstantiation is no more philosophical than these, and is just as much contained in Scripture. It is founded on the familiar distinction between a substance and its accidents or phenomena. When our Lord changed water into wine, the substance of the water was changed into the substance of wine, and the taste, smell, appearance, etc., of water, gave place to the taste, smell, etc., of wine. In the Blessed Sacrament the substantial change takes place without any accidental change. For such a distinct kind of change there should be a distinct name, and none fitter could be invented than transubstantiation. That the notion conveyed by this word is contained in Holy Scripture, all the Schoolmen agree. Some, however (e.g. Scotus), have held that it could not be proved from Scripture alone. We need hardly say that Scotus was a firm believer in the doctrine itself. But the Council of Trent favours the opposite view: “Forasmuch as Christ our Redeemer declared that which He offered under the species of bread to be truly His own body, therefore hath it ever been a firm belief in the Church of God, and this holy Synod doth now declare it anew, that by the consecration of the bread and of the wine, a conversion is made of the whole substance of the bread,” etc. (sess. xiii. c. 4).

I. The words of institution, “This is My body,” are equivalent to two propositions: (1) “This which I hold in My hand, which is now here before you, is My body;” and (2) “This which I hold in My hand, which is now before you, is no longer bread.” If bread were still present, our Lord could not say, “This is My body;” but only, “Here, or in this, is My body.” To make the words of institution true, it is necessary that they should effect what they signify. That is to say, when our Lord pronounced the words, what He held in His hands must have ceased to be bread, and must have become His body. And as no change took place in the accidents or appearances, the change must have been that which is called transubstantiation.

We have seen that the proper rule for the interpretation of the Scriptures is the teaching of the Church (Book I. part i. ch. 3). If we examine the writings of the Fathers, we see that not only do they teach the doctrine of transubstantiation, but they base their belief in it on the words of institution. Hence we rightly hold that the doctrine can be proved from Scripture, at least with the help of the legitimate means of interpretation.

II. We have already shown that the Fathers teach that the bread and wine are changed into the body and blood of our Lord. We noticed that no difficulty could be urged against the Real Presence, from the fact that the Blessed Sacrament was sometimes called bread, even after the consecration. But the Fathers insist that it is not bread, but only seems to be such; that we are not to believe it to be what our senses tell us; that instead of the bread which was present our Lord’s body is laid upon the altar.

“What seems bread is not bread, though it seems so to the taste, but Christ’s body; what seems wine is not wine, even though the taste will have it so, but Christ’s blood” (St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech. iv. 9).

“The Lord Jesus Himself cries out: ‘This is My body.’ Before the benediction of heavenly words another species (nature) is named; after the consecration (His) body is signified (i.e. is said to be no longer bread, but His body). He Himself declares it His own blood. Before the consecration it is called another thing; after consecration it is called blood. And thou sayest, ‘Amen;’ that is, it is true” (St. Ambrose, De Myster., ix.).

“From that moment when He took bread and called it His body, it was not bread, but His body” (St. James of Sarug, Serm. 66, De Passione Domini).

“It (the bread) is changed by a wonderful operation, though to us it appears bread.… Bread, indeed, it appears to us, but flesh in reality it is (ἄρτος μὲν ἡμῖν φαὶνεται, σὰρξ δὲ τω ὄντι ἔστι)” (Theophylact, In Matt. xxvi. 26).

The Fathers say that the Blessed Sacrament is not common bread. This would not by itself prove their belief in transubstantiation. They take care, however, to say that what was common bread becomes “the bread of life;’ “the living bread which came down from heaven,” “the bread that we break;” “the bread which Christ said was His flesh;” that it is not common bread, but “the body of Christ.” E.g. “We do not receive these things as common bread and common drink, but … the food … is both flesh and blood of that same incarnate Jesus” (St. Justin; see above, p. 410). “Wherefore do not contemplate the bread and wine as bare (elements), for they are, according to the Lord’s declaration, Christ’s body and blood” (St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech. Myst., iv. 6).

They say that the bread itself is changed into our Lord’s body. “The bread itself and wine are changed into the body and blood of God” (St. John Damascene; see above, p. 413).

“He Himself therefore having declared and said concerning the bread, ‘This is My body,’ who shall dare to doubt henceforward? And He Himself having settled and said, ‘This is My blood,’ who shall ever doubt, saying, ‘This is not His blood’? He once, at Cana of Galilee, changed (μεταβέβληκεν) water into wine, which is akin to blood, and is He undeserving of belief when He changed wine into blood?” (St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Cat., iv. 2.) This comparison shows that Cyril held that the substance of bread and wine were changed. (Cf. St. Ambrose and St. Chrysostom, quoted in the foregoing section.)

When the Fathers speak of our Lord’s body and blood as being in bread and wine, they do not mean that the substance of bread and wine remains, out they refer either to that but of which the sacrament is made (e.g. “He consecrated His blood in wine,” Tertullian), or to the appearances under which our Lord is present.

III. When the heresy of Berengarius arose in the eleventh century, the whole Church explicitly professed the doctrine of transubstantiation. The Fourth Lateran Council, held in 1215, defined that “the body and blood (of Christ) are truly contained in the sacrament of the altar under the appearances (sub speciebus) of bread and wine, the bread being transubstantiated into the body, and the wine into the blood, by the power of God.” The Second Council of Lyons (1274), in the profession of Faith proposed to Michael Palæologus, and accepted by him on behalf of the Eastern Church, says, “The said Roman Church believeth and teacheth that in the sacrament the bread is truly transubstantiated (ἀληθῶς μετουσιοῦται) into the body, and the wine into the blood of the Lord Jesus Christ.” The Council of Trent, therefore, only renewed more solemnly and clearly what had long before been defined, and had been explicitly believed by the faithful.

Cor. The Council of Trent has defined that in the Eucharist “the whole Christ is contained under each species (i.e. under the appearances of bread or wine), and under every part of each species when separated” (sess. xiii. can. 3). These two points do not present any difficulty when transubstantiation has once been admitted.

1. Our Lord Himself uses the expression, “He that eateth Me,” thereby showing that he who eats receives the whole Christ So, too, St. Paul, “Whosoever shall eat of this bread, or drink the chalice of the Lord, shall be guilty of the body and blood of the Lord.” It is also clear that the words, “This is My body,” make our Lord’s body to be present, as it actually is, i.e. as a living body containing the blood.

2. As to the other point, Our Lord’s conduct at the Last Supper proves that He is present at least under every portion of the consecrated wine, for every Apostle that drank received Him. The constant and universal practice of breaking the consecrated bread is a proof of belief in this doctrine. It is also theologically certain, though not of Faith, that our Lord is whole and entire in each part even before separation.

Scholion. We need not here enter into the philosophical or scientific bearings of transubstantiation. We may observe that the doctrine is inconsistent only with idealism, and that it is not bound up with any ultra-realistic theories. The Council of Trent, when defining the change of substance, studiously avoids the use of the term “accident,” the usual scholastic correlative of substance, and speaks of “species” (εἶδος), appearances, or phenomena. It is commonly held, however, that these are not merely subjective impressions, but have some sort of corresponding reality. See Franzelin, thes. xi. and xvi.; Dalgairns, part i. chap. 2, and note F.

SECT. 259.—THE MATTER AND FORM OF THE EUCHARIST: MINISTER, RECIPIENT, EFFECTS

I. The Holy Eucharist being a sacrament, it must have matter and form in the sense already explained (§ 246).

1. Just as in the case of Baptism washing is the natural act, so here in the Eucharist eating and drinking are the natural acts chosen by our Lord to be the means of conveying spiritual nourishment to our souls. “Eat,” “drink” (Matt. 26:26, 27). But an important difference should be noted. No change takes place in the water used for Baptism; whereas in the Eucharist the bread and wine are, as we have seen, changed into the body and blood of our Lord. The Blessed Eucharist is therefore a permanent sacrament, our Lord’s body and blood being present not only while the sacrament is being received, but also before and after use (Council of Trent, sess. xiii. can. 4). Bread and wine may be said to be the matter of this permanent sacrament (Decr. pro Armenis), as they are the natural things raised by transubstantiation into the body and blood of our Lord. Wheaten bread (ἄρτος) and wine of the grape must be used, as they are the typical food and drink used by our Lord. Whether the bread should be leavened or unleavened has long been a point of dispute between the Eastern and Western Churches. The Council of Florence (1439) decided that either kind of bread was sufficient for the validity of the sacrament; but that leavened bread should be used in the East, and unleavened bread in the West. “It hath been enjoined by the Church on priests to mix water with the wine that is to be offered in the chalice; as well because it is believed that Christ the Lord did this, as also because from His side there came out blood and water; the memory of which mystery is renewed by this commixture, and whereas in the Apocalypse of blessed John the peoples are called ‘waters,’ the union of that faithful people with Christ their Head is hereby represented” (Council of Trent, sess. xxii. ch. 7).

2. The form of the sacrament, by which the bread and wine are changed into the body and blood of our Lord, consists of the words, “This is My body,” “This is My blood,” or “This is the chalice of My blood.” After what has been said in the preceding sections, no further proof of this is required. We may observe, however, that the Epiclesis after the consecration in the Greek liturgy,—praying “God to send His Holy Spirit upon the gifts set forth, and to change the bread into the body of Christ, and the wine into His blood,”—does not produce the change (which has indeed already been made), but serves to declare what has taken place, and to implore that it may have a salutary effect upon Christ’s mystical body, the Church (see Franzelin, De Euckaristia, thes. vii.).

II. As the Eucharist is a permanent sacrament, we must distinguish between the act of consecration and the act of administration.

I. No one but a bishop or a priest has the power of consecrating. Our Lord Jesus Christ “offered up to God the Father His own body and blood under the appearances of bread and wine, and under the symbols of those same things He delivered (His own body and blood) to be received by His Apostles, whom He then constituted priests of the New Testament; and by those words, ‘Do this in commemoration of Me,’ He commanded them and their successors in the priesthood to offer (them), even as the Catholic Church hath always understood and taught.… If any one saith that by those words, ‘Do this,’ etc., Christ did not institute the Apostles priests, or did not ordain that they and other priests should offer His own body and blood, let him be anathema” (Council of Trent, sess. xxii. ch. 1, can. 2). And the Fourth Lateran Council (ch. 1) had already defined that “no one but a priest (sacerdos) rightly ordained can perform (conficere) this sacrament.” St. Justin, describing the ceremonies of the Mass, says, “To him who presides over the brethren [τῷ προεστῶτι,, i.e. the bishop or priest] bread is brought, and a cup of wine mixed with water, and he, having taken them, sends up praise and glory to the Father of all things, through the Name of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and at much length he makes a Eucharist (Εὐχαριστίαν … ποιεῖται) for that God hath vouchsafed to them these things.… He who presides having given thanks (eucharistized), and all the people having expressed their assent, they who are called among us deacons give to each of those present a portion of the consecrated (eucharistized) bread, and wine and water, and carry away a portion to those who are absent” (Apol., i. n. 65; see also Tertullian, De Præscr., cap. xli.; De Corona Militis, cap. iii.; St. Cyprian, Epist., iv.; Origen, Hom. iv. in Num., n. 3). “Not even deacons,” says St. Epiphanius (Hær., lxxix. n. 4), “are allowed to perform any sacrament in the ecclesiastical order, but merely to be the ministers of those already completed.” St. Jerome says that the heretic Hilarius, when he left the Church as a deacon, “could not perform (perficere) the Eucharist, as he had no bishops or priests” (Adv. Lucif., n. 21; see also St. John Chrysostom, De Sacerdotio, lib. iii. n. 4, etc.). “It hath come to the knowledge of the holy and great synod,” says the Council of Nicæa (can. 18), “that in certain places or cities the deacons give the Eucharist to the presbyters; a thing which neither canon nor custom hath handed down, that they who have not authority to offer, should give the body of Christ to those who do offer (τοὺς ἐξουσίαν μὴ ἔχοντας προσφέρειν, τούτους τοῖς προσφέρουσι διδόνται τὸ σῶμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ).”

2. The administration of the Eucharist to the faithful properly belongs to priests, though under extraordinary circumstances a deacon may administer. “It was always the custom in the Church of God,” says the Council of Trent (sess. xiii. chap. 8), “that laymen should receive the Communion from priests, but that priests when celebrating should communicate themselves.” The passages just cited from the Fathers clearly show who are the ordinary and extraordinary dispensers of the sacrament. We may add the authority of the Fourth Council of Carthage (398), which, in its 38th canon, permits the deacon to administer if necessity requires (si necessitas cogat). So far we have been speaking of solemn administration. In former ages of the Church, clerics in minor orders, and even the laity, were permitted in cases of necessity to carry the Blessed Sacrament and administer it. St. Tarcisius, a young acolyte, was beaten to death by the pagans while he was bearing the Holy Eucharist; and St. Dionysius of Alexandria tells how he gave the Holy Eucharist to a boy to carry to the dying Serapion (see Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, book vi. chap. 44).

III. The dispositions required for the worthy reception of the Eucharist are treated of in moral and ascetical theology. Here it will be sufficient to quote the words of the Council of Trent: “The more the holiness and divinity of this heavenly sacrament are understood by a Christian, the more diligently ought he to give heed that he approach not to receive it but with great reverence and holiness, especially as we read in the Apostle those words full of terror, ‘He that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment to himself.’ Wherefore he who would communicate, ought to recall to mind the precept of the Apostle, ‘Let a man prove himself.’ Now, ecclesiastical usage declareth that necessary proof to be, that no one conscious to himself of mortal sin, how contrite so ever he may seem to himself, ought to approach to the sacred Eucharist without previous sacramental confession” (sess. xiii. chap. 7). We shall now discuss two important questions: (1) the necessity of receiving this sacrament, and (2) communion under one kind.

I. The Holy Eucharist is not absolutely necessary for salvation (necessitate medii); that is to say, it is possible for a person to be saved without ever having received the sacrament. “Little children who have not reached the use of reason,” says the Council of Trent, “are not by any necessity obliged to the sacramental Communion of the Eucharist, forasmuch as having been regenerated by the laver of baptism, and being incorporated with Christ, they cannot at that age lose the grace which they have already acquired of being the sons of God. Not therefore, however, is antiquity to be condemned if in some places at one time it observed that custom; for as those most holy Fathers had a reasonable (probabilem) cause for what they did in respect of their times, so assuredly is it to be believed without controversy that they did this without any necessity thereof unto salvation” (eos nulla salutis necessitate id fecisse; sess xxi. chap. 4). And Scripture teaches that baptism alone is necessary: “He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved” (Mark 16:16); “He saved us by the laver of regeneration” (Tit. 3:5); “Baptism being of the like form now saveth you also” (1 Pet. 3:21). Moreover, theological reasoning tells us that if the Eucharist were necessary, it would be so either for acquiring the state of grace or for preserving it; whereas, on the contrary, it requires us to be already in a state of grace, and that state can be lost only by sin. We have said not absolutely necessary, because the Eucharist is necessary in the sense that we are obliged by our Lord’s express command to receive it: “Except you eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink His blood, you shall not have life in you” (John 6:54); “Do this in commemoration of Me” (Luke 22:19; 1 Cor. 11:23 sqq.). “Our Saviour, when about to depart out of this world to the Father, instituted this sacrament, in which He poured forth, as it were, the riches of His Divine love towards man, making a remembrance of His wonderful works; and He commanded us, in the participation thereof, to venerate His memory, and to show forth His death until He come to judge the world. And He would also that this sacrament should be received as the spiritual food of souls, whereby may be fed and strengthened those who live with His life Who said, ‘He that eateth Me, the same also shall live by Me’ “ (Council of Trent, sess. xiii. chap. 1). The Council, renewing the decree of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), commands the faithful to communicate every year, at least at Easter (can. 9).

2. “Laymen and clerics, when not celebrating,” says the same Council (sess. xxi. chap. 1), “are not obliged by any Divine precept to receive the sacrament of the Eucharist under both kinds (species); neither can it by any means be doubted, without injury to faith, that communion under either kind is sufficient for them unto salvation. For although Christ the Lord in the Last Supper instituted and delivered to the Apostles this venerable sacrament in the species of bread and wine, not therefore do that institution and delivery tend thereunto that all the faithful of the Church are bound by Divine ordinance (statuto) to receive both kinds. But neither is it rightly gathered from that discourse which is in the sixth of St. John … that communion under both kinds (utriusque speciei communionem) was enjoined by the Lord; for He who said, ‘Except you eat,’ etc., also said, ‘He that eateth this bread shall live for ever.… The bread that I will give is My flesh for the life of the world.’ “ We read in the Acts that the faithful “were persevering in the doctrine of the Apostles, and in the communication of the breaking of bread (τῇ κοινωνίᾳ τῇ κλάσει τοῦ ἄρτου), and in prayer” (2:42). St. Luke is here describing what the faithful did. The Apostles, of course, consecrated under both kinds. St. Paul, writing to the Corinthians, alludes to the same practice of receiving under one kind: “Whosoever shall eat this bread, or drink the chalice of the Lord, unworthily, shall be guilty of the body and of the blood of the Lord” (1 Cor. 11:27).

It is commonly objected that the present practice is (a) completely modern, and (b) contrary to the essence of the sacrament.

(a) We grant that for the first twelve centuries it was customary for the faithful to receive under both kinds. Nevertheless we have numerous instances of communion under one kind alone. Thus, to infants the Eucharist was often given under the form of wine, as is still the practice among the Greeks. In times of persecution or under difficulties, the consecrated bread was carried away from the church for private Communion. The sick also often communicated under one kind alone. It may be inferred from St. Leo (Serm. 42, De Quadragesima) and Sozomen (Hist., viii. 5) that both at Rome and at Constantinople, even in public, the Communion was sometimes received by the faithful under the appearances of bread only. So, too, in England in the old Saxon days (see Bede, Hist. Eccl. ii. 5). In the so-called “Masses of the Presanctified” of the Greek Church during Lent, and of the Western Church on Good Friday, both the priests and the people received the consecrated Host alone. Our Good Friday “Mass” is described in the ancient Ordo Romanus (Migne, Patr. Lat., tom, lxxviii. p. 954). Moreover, theological reasoning tells us that if Christ is whole and entire under either kind alone, those who receive under either kind receive the whole of Christ.

(b) But does not communion under one kind destroy the very essence of the sacrament, which consists in eating and drinking? We reply that we do receive both the body and blood of Christ under either kind, and so the essence of the sacrament (partaking of the heavenly banquet) is retained. Those who do not believe in the real objective presence of our Lord in the Host, and who maintain that the essence of the sacrament consists in eating mere bread and drinking mere wine, are of course logically bound to insist on receiving under both kinds. But our doctrine of the Real Presence lays us under no such necessity.

The reasons why the Church has enjoined the use of one species (kind) are thus stated by the Catechism of the Council of Trent: “The greatest caution was necessary to avoid spilling the blood of the Lord on the ground, a thing that seemed not easy to be avoided if the chalice ought to be administered in a large assemblage of the people. Besides, as the Holy Eucharist ought to be in readiness for the sick, it was very much to be apprehended that if the species of wine were long unconsumed it might turn acid. Moreover, there are very many who cannot at all bear the taste or even the smell of wine; lest therefore what is intended for the health of the soul should prove noxious to that of the body, most prudently has it been enacted by the Church that the faithful should receive the species of bread only. It is further to be observed that in several countries they labour under extreme scarcity of wine, nor can it be brought from elsewhere without very heavy expenses, and very tedious and difficult journeys. In the next place, a circumstance most of all to the point, the heresy of those was to be uprooted who denied that Christ, whole and entire, is contained under either species, and asserted that the body only without the blood is contained under the appearances (species) of bread, and the blood only under the appearances of wine” (Part ii. ch. iv. n. 64).

IV. The effects of the Holy Eucharist are described at length by our Lord Himself (John 6:48 sqq.): “I am the bread of life.… If any man eat of this bread he shall live for ever.… He that eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood hath everlasting life, and I will raise him up at the last day … [he] abideth in Me and I in him.… He that eateth Me, the same also shall live by Me.… He that eateth this bread shall live for ever.” The Author and Fount of life becomes the true meat and drink of our souls; He abides in them, gives them life and preserves it in them. The physical union of Christ with us by entering within us, is not strictly the effect, but rather the application, of the sacrament; it is the spiritual union by charity which is the proper effect. See the passages quoted from the Fathers, supra, § 257.

1. The Eucharist, however, is a sacrament of the living (p. 372). It was not instituted to confer the first grace; it cannot properly produce its effects unless the soul is already spiritually alive. “Whosoever shall eat this bread, or drink the chalice of the Lord, unworthily (ἀναξίως), shall be guilty of the body and of the blood of the Lord.” “Let a man prove himself (δοκιμαζέτω … ἑαυτόν, ‘put himself to the test, examine himself’), and so let him eat of that bread and drink of the chalice; for he that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment (κρίμα) to himself” (1 Cor. 11:27–29). So, too, the Fathers and the Liturgies insist that the Eucharist shall not be given to any who are in a state of sin. The very nature of the sacrament—the food and drink of our souls—requires that the recipient should be already alive in order to receive it. “If it is unbeseeming,” says the Council of Trent, “for any one to approach to any of the sacred functions unless he approach holily; assuredly the more the holiness and dignity of this heavenly sacrament are understood by a Christian, the more diligently ought he to give heed that he approach not to receive it but with great reverence and holiness, especially as we read in the Epistle those words full of terror, ‘He that eateth,’ etc. Wherefore he who would communicate ought to recall to mind the precept of the Apostle: ‘Let a man prove himself.’ Now, ecclesiastical usage declares that necessary proof to be, that no one conscious to himself of mortal sin, how contrite soever he may seem to himself, ought to approach to the sacred Eucharist without previous sacramental confession” (sess. xiii. ch. 7, and can. 11). “If any one saith that the principal fruit of the most Holy Eucharist is the remission of sins … let him be anathema” (can. 5).

2. But do not the Fathers and the Liturgies often speak of remission of sins among the effects of the Eucharist? True; but this remission is attributed to the Eucharist as a sacrifice, or else it refers only to daily defects and venial sins. Many theologians also maintain that even mortal sins may be remitted by the Eucharist, though only per accidens; that is to say, if a person, unaware that he is in mortal sin, and having attrition for sin, approaches the sacrament, his sin will be remitted by the action of the sacrament. The remission of venial sins is a consequence of the principal effect of the Eucharist; for the union of charity with God, who is charity itself, removes all obstacles to the perfection of this union. Hence our Saviour “would that this sacrament should be received … as an antidote whereby we may be freed from daily faults, and be preserved from mortal sins” (Council of Trent, sess. xiii. ch. 2).

3. The Fathers frequently speak of the effects of the Eucharist upon our bodies. The intimate union of our bodies with Christ’s body makes us of one body and one blood (σύσσωμοι καὶ σύναιμοι) with Him. And from this union with Him, who cannot see corruption (Ps. 15:10), there results an antidote to that bodily corruption which is the effect of sin. “The body attains … to a participation of, and commixture with, Him Who is life. For as they who from some device have taken poison, quench its deadly potency by some opposite (other) remedy … so we, again, after having tasted of that which dissolves our nature, as a matter of necessity must also stand in need of that which reunites what has been dissolved.… What, then, is this? Nothing else but that very body which was manifested to be more powerful than death, and which was the principle of our life. For as a little leaven, according to the Apostle, leaveneth the whole lump, so when that body which was by God smitten with death is within our body it changes and transfers the whole unto itself” (St. Gregory of Nyssa, Or. Cat., c. 37). This action on our bodies consists partly in allaying concupiscence (St. John Chrysostom, In Joann. Hom., xlvi. n. 4), partly in adapting them for resurrection. “He that eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood hath everlasting life, and I will raise him up at the last day” (John 6:55). See St. Cyril of Alexandria, In Joann., tom. iv. p. 363; St. Irenæus, lib. iv. cap. 18, n. 5. Our Saviour would have the Eucharist “to be a pledge of our glory to come and everlasting happiness, and thus be a symbol of that one body whereof He is the Head, and to which He would fain have us, as members, be united by the closest bond of faith, hope, and charity, that we might all speak the same things, and there might be no schisms among us” (Council of Trent, sess. xiii. ch. 2). See St. Thomas, 3, q. 79; Franzelin, theses xvii.–xix.; De Augustinis, part ii. art. 7; and Bossuet, Traité de la Communion sous les deux espèces.

On the Sacrament of the Eucharist see, in addition to the authors mentioned in the beginning of this chapter: Chardon, Hist. des Sacrements, livre i. sect. iii.; Billot, De Ecclesiæ Sacramentis, p. 287 sqq.; Turmel, Hist. de la Théologie Positive, pp. 132, 306, 432; Batiffol, Etudes d’Histoire et de Théologie Positive, 2e série; Bp. Hedley, The Holy Eucharist; Bridgett, The Holy Eucharist in Great Britain.

CHAPTER V

THE MASS

OUR Lord Jesus Christ, “though He was about to offer Himself once on the altar of the Cross unto God the Father, by means of His death (Heb. 9:5), there to operate an eternal redemption (ib. 12); nevertheless, because His priesthood was not to be extinguished by His death, in the Last Supper on the night in which He was betrayed—that He might leave to His own beloved spouse the Church a visible sacrifice, such as the nature of man requires, whereby that bloody sacrifice, once to be accomplished on the Cross, might be represented, and the memory thereof remain even unto the end of the world, and its salutary virtue be applied to the remission of those sins which we daily commit—declaring Himself constituted a priest for ever, according to the order of Melchisedech, He offered up to God the Father His own body and blood, under the appearances of bread and wine; and under the symbols of those same things He delivered (His own body and blood) to be received by His Apostles, whom He then constituted priests of the New Testament; and by those words, ‘Do this in commemoration of Me,’ He commanded them and their successors in the priesthood to offer.… If any one saith that in the Mass a true and proper sacrifice is not offered to God … let him be anathema” (Council of Trent, sess. xxii. ch. 1, can. 1). See St. Thomas, 3, q. 85, with the commentaries thereon by Vasquez, Suarez, and the Salmanticenses; Bellarmine, De Eucharistia, lib. v.; De Lugo, De Eucharistia; Thomassin, De Incarnatione, lib. x.; Franzelin, De Eucharistiæ Sacrificio; De Augustinis, De Re Sacramentaria, lib. ii. p. 3; Hedley, p. 147 sqq.

SECT. 260.—SACRIFICES AND DIVINE WORSHIP

I. History knows of no religion without some form of sacrifice. Jews and Gentiles, civilized and uncivilized nations, have found in human reason, and in the religious instinct common to all, a natural impulse to communicate with the Supreme Being by means of gifts, called sacrifices on account of the sacred character they receive from being destined for Divine acceptance. As between man and man, so between man and God, gifts of things visible serve to express the invisible feelings of esteem and gratitude, to conciliate benevolence, and to atone for misdeeds. There is, then, in gifts to God, or sacrifices, an innate aptitude to be the external manifestation of all the acts of Divine worship—adoration, thanksgiving, petition, propitiation or expiation.

II. The natural aptitude of a gift to be the subject-matter of acts of worship, receives its final form when, by private intention or authorized institution, certain sacrifices are set apart to express certain acts of worship. Public worship necessarily postulates public institution by lawful authority. This alone can determine the signification of the single acts for the whole community, and impart to the whole system the uniformity required by society considered as a unit. In the supernatural order the lawful authority is God. He alone determines which sacrifices He accepts, for what purposes He accepts them, and by whom they are to be offered. Scripture—at least since the Mosaic legislation—is most explicit in this matter. Nothing essential is left to the arbitrary decision of man: God has revealed the matter and form, and the minister of the sacrifices by which He commands us to worship Him.

III. The whole character of the sacrificial institutions of the Old Testament was temporary, and typical of the great sacrifice of the New Law. The Epistle to the Hebrews is devoted to the demonstration of this proposition. The Levitical priesthood, “who serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly things” (Heb. 8:5), foreshadowed and pointed to the “High Priest who is set on the right hand of the throne of majesty in the heavens, a minister of the holies, and of the true tabernacle, which the Lord hath pitched, and not man” (ibid. 1, 2). The sacrifices and ceremonies and the whole external worship were imperfect and powerless as to the expiation of sins. They produced only legal expiations, “the cleansing of the flesh,” thus expressing the necessity of an internal expiation and of the sacrifice of Christ, by which this true expiation is accomplished. “The Holy Ghost signifying this, that the way into the holies was not yet made manifest, whilst the former tabernacle was yet standing. Which is a parable of the time present; according to which gifts and sacrifices are offered, which cannot, as to the conscience, make him perfect that serveth, only in meats and drinks, and divers washings, and justices of the flesh laid on them until the time of correction (διωρθώσεως). But Christ, being come an High Priest of the good things to come, … by His own blood, entered once into the holies, having obtained eternal redemption” (Heb. 9:8–12 sqq.).

IV. “Entering once (ἐφάπαξ, ‘once for all’) into the holies, Christ obtained eternal redemption;” that is, He acquired merit sufficient to redeem all mankind. His sacrifice has consummated the work of redemption: it need not and cannot be repeated (cf. Book V. § 196). It deprives of their object the ancient sacrifices, which were but “an oblation for sin,” a confession of impotence to give due satisfaction. It also excludes a repetition of itself for the purpose of further merit. But it implies, or at least does not exclude, a representation of itself for the application to individual members of mankind of the infinite treasure of grace gained by Christ. In view of the way in which saving grace is applied to man, viz. by the free use of the means of grace, and in view of the nature of public worship, of which sacrifice is the central and most solemn act, a perennial representation of Onrist’s sacrifice appears as a most fitting element in the organism of the supernatural order. The Council of Trent adopts this view (sess. xxii. ch. 1).

SECT. 261.—THE SACRIFICE OF THE NEW TESTAMENT FORETOLD BY THE PROPHET MALACHIAS

I. The last of the Prophets of the Old Covenant announces the abolition of the Mosaic sacrifices, and the introduction of a new order of public worship: “I have no pleasure in you (the priests), saith the Lord of hosts, and I will not receive a gift of your hand. For from the, rising of the sun even to the going down, My Name is great among the Gentiles; and in every place there is a sacrifice, and there is offered to My Name a clean oblation: for My Name is great among the Gentiles, saith the Lord of hosts” (Mal. 1:10, 11).

1. “I will not receive a gift of your hand.” These words clearly imply the abolition of the Mosaic priesthood, and of the public worship whose ministers they were. They have to give place, as appears from ver. 11, to an order of things in which the Name of God is great, not only among His chosen people and in the chosen land, but among all nations and in all places. The Prophets always characterize the coming of the Messias by this universal acknowledgment and glorification of God (supra, p. 52). Hence the idea underlying ver. 11 is that in the New Testament the particular priesthood and the particular sacrifices of the Jews will be abolished and their place taken by something better.

2. “In every place there is a sacrifice, and there is offered to My Name a clean oblation.” From the text itself and from the context (vers. 5–10) we see that the Prophet deals exclusively with external worship. As the sacrifices to be abolished are real and true sacrifices, so the pure oblation to be substituted for them is a real and true sacrifice. The technical terms used in the Hebrew leave no shadow of doubt on this point. The term מֻקְטָר (muctar), a form of catar (“to burn incense”) is used one hundred and forty-six times in the sacrificial sense; מֻגָשׁ (muggas), from nagas (“to offer”), at least twelve times, and מִנְחָה (mincha), an unbloody sacrifice, about one hundred and fifty-four times. Nowhere are they used in connection with internal worship; nowhere are they applied to oblations other than proper sacrifices. Taking, then, the three expressions together, we have a threefold argument in favour of the true sacrificial nature of the promised new worship.

3. Ch. v. 3: the sons of Levi, cleansed and purified, are said to be the priests of the new order. But Isaias (66:21) has told us that God will take men of all nations and tongues to be priests and Levites. Hence the minister of the new sacrifice is a sacrificing priest as of old, only purer and nobler, as he offers a purer and nobler sacrifice.

II. The consent of the Fathers and theologians in this matter is all but unanimous. Bellarmine (1. v. c. 10) and Petavius (De Incarn., 1., xii. n. 12 sqq.) have collected the interpretations of the Fathers. Cornelius à Lapide is so impressed with their unanimity, that he confidently says, “It is of faith that this clean oblation is the sacrifice of the body and blood of Christ in the Holy Eucharist” (Comm. in Mal., i. 11). Such also is the explicit doctrine of the Council of Trent, sess. xxii. chap. 1.

SECT. 262.—INSTITUTION OF THE EUCHARISTIC SACRIFICE

I. The prophecy of Malachias received its fulfilment at the Last Supper, when Christ instituted the unbloody sacrifice of the New Testament. The four accounts given of the institution by the Evangelists Matthew, Mark, and Luke, and by St. Paul, slightly differ in their terms, but convey the same meaning, viz. what Christ meant when He used those or similar expressions. We subjoin the various texts in the original Greek, and in the Vulgate and Rheims-Douay translations. From an analysis of them we shall prove that they clearly and convincingly express the institution of a true sacrifice.

Luke 22:20: “Τοῦτό το ποτήριον, ἡ καινὴ διαθήκη ἐν τῷ αἳματί μου, τὸ ὑπέρ ὑμῶν ἐκχυνόμενον.”

“Hic est calix novum testamentum in sanguine meo, qui pro vobis fundetur.”

“This is the chalice, the new testament in My blood, which shall be shed for you.”

Mark 14:24: “Τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ αἷμά μου τῆς καινῆς διαθήκης, τὸ περὶ πολλῶν ἐκχυνόμενον.”

“Hic est sanguis meus novi testamenti, qui pro multis effundetur.”

“This is My blood of the new testament, which shall be shed for many.”

Matt. 26:28: “Τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ αἷμά μου τῆς καινῆς διαθήκης, τὸ περὶ πολλῶν ἐκυνόμενον εἰς ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν.”

“Hic est enim sanguis meus novi testamenti, qui pro multis effundetur in remissionem peccatorum.”

“For this is My blood of the new testament, which shall be shed for many unto remission of sins.”

1. St. Luke evidently speaks of the effusion of the blood “as it is in the chalice.” “This chalice is shed,” as the Greek has it, can convey but one meaning: that the blood contained in the chalice is shed, at the present time, for you. The same blood was shed on the Cross, but not as contained in the chalice, in its sacramental state. Matthew and Mark do not use the same figure of speech as Luke. Instead of naming the cup to signify what it contains, they directly name the contents, “My blood.” The meaning, however, must be the same, as the three narratives report one and the same event. Hence they all refer to the blood as it is actually in the chalice, and all state that it is there shed for us, and unto remission of sins. Now, the shedding of blood unto remission of sins is a sacrifice, really and truly (cf. Book V. part iii. chap. 1). Christ commands the Apostles to do this for a commemoration of Him. The celebration of the Holy Eucharist, therefore, was instituted by our Lord as the perennial sacrifice of the New Law.

2. The words “for you, for many, for many unto remission of sins,” make it clear that the consecration of the chalice is a sacrificial action. But they are not the words of consecration. The words used to put the body and blood of Christ into the state of victim are these: “This is My body, this is My blood.” The sacrifice takes place when these words are uttered by the minister; what follows is but a declaration or explanation not essential to the sacrificial form.

3. By a natural association of ideas, “effusion of blood” and “sacrifice” have become, with the sacred writers, interchangeable terms. Instances abound: Acts 20:28; Rom. 3:25; 5:9; Eph. 1:7; 2:13; Col. 1:14; Heb. and Apoc., passim. This usage suggests the question: How is the blood shed in the Eucharistic Sacrifice? Only in a mystical way. The real effusion took place once, upon the Cross, and cannot be repeated. But the bleeding victim of the Cross is made really present on the altar, under the appearances of bread and wine, and with the whole merit of the former sacrifice. The representation is made in a manner most fittingly representing the death of the victim, viz. the body and the blood, although inseparably united, are produced by a separate consecration and under separate species. The sacrificial words, like a spiritual sword, divide the Divine body and blood, and thus recall the memory of Christ’s death on Calvary.

II. The words used in the consecration of the bread afford the same proof of the real sacrificial nature of the Mass as those used in the consecration of the chalice.

1 Cor. 11:24: “Τοῦτό μου ἐστὶ τὸ σωμα, τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν κλώμενον.”

“Hoc est corpus meum, quod pro vobis tradetur.”

“This is My body, which shall be delivered for you.”

Luke 22:19: “Τοῦτό ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμά μου, τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν διδόμενον.”

“Hoc est corpus meum, quod pro vobis datur.”

“This is My body, which is given for you.”

John 6:52: “Ὁ ἄρτος δὲ ὅν ἐγὼ δώσω, ἡ σάρξ μου ἐστὶν, [ἥν ἐγὼ δώσω] ὑπὲρ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου ζωῆς.”

“Et panis, quern ego dabo, caro mea est pro mundi vita.”

“And the bread that I will give is My flesh, for the life of the world.”

In the received Greek text of St. Paul, the body of Christ, made present under the appearance of bread, is said to be “broken for us.” In the language of the Bible, “to break bread” is to give it as food. According to St. Paul, then, in the Eucharistic celebrations Christ is given us as food. The same meaning, therefore, attaches to the words of St. Luke, who reports the same sentence of Christ. Now, the words of Luke, “My body, which is given for you,” are identical in signification with those of Mark and Matthew, “which is given for you, for many unto remission of sins,” and, like these, they directly convey the idea of a sacrifice offered hic et nunc. This idea of an actual and present sacrifice is, however, not so much conveyed by the present tense of the verb (frangitur, “is broken, given”) as by the circumstance of being given “as food,” which only is true of the Eucharistic Sacrifice (cf. Franzelin, th. xi.).

SECT. 263.—NEW TESTAMENT REFERENCES TO THE EUCHARISTIC SACRIFICE

The scantiness of references to the Eucharistic Sacrifice in the New Testament and in the early writings was formerly accounted for by the “Discipline of the Secret”—that is, the custom of concealing from the heathens and the catechumens the more sacred and mysterious rites and doctrines of the Christian religion, either by not mentioning them at all, or by merely alluding to them in enigmatical language. That this custom prevailed to some extent during the period of the catechumenate (from the end of the second to the end of the fifth century) is undoubted. But it does not account for the silence of the earlier writings; and indeed, even in the later period, the restriction had to do with preaching rather than writing (Batiffol, Études d’Histoire, etc., La Discipline de l’Arcane). A better explanation is that the doctrine of the Mass is an instance of the development of doctrine as explained supra, vol. i. p. 105. According to this, we cannot expect to find clear, explicit teaching in the apostolic and sub-apostolic ages. Nevertheless we can produce distinct traces and germs of the doctrine as held in the later ages.

I. “They were persevering in the doctrine of the Apostles, and in the communication of the breaking of bread (τοῦ ἄρτου), and in prayers” (Acts 2:42, 46). The breaking of “the” Bread, coming between the preaching and the praying, cannot refer to a common meal. It is the religious rite instituted at the Last Supper, alluded to in terms perfectly intelligible to the initiated, but telling nothing to the profane.

“As they were ministering to the Lord (λειτουργούντων δὲ αὐτῶν τῷ Κυρίῳ)” (13:2). Here, for the first time, we meet with the term λειτουργέω, which henceforth becomes for all time the Greek technical expression for the sacred functions of the Mass. Erasmus translates it by sacrificantibus. The suggestion that the ministering consisted in preaching, as it does in some sects without sacrifice, mistakes the signification of λειτουργέω, and leaves unexplained how they preached “to God.”

II. In 1 Cor. 10 we read: Ver. 16. “The chalice of benediction which we bless, is it not the Communion of the blood of Christ? And the bread which we break, is it not the partaking of the Body of the Lord? 17. For we, being many, are one bread, one body, all that partake of one bread. 18. Behold Israel according to the flesh: are not they that eat of the sacrifices partakers of the altar?… 20. But the things which the heathen sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils, and not to God: and I would not that you should be made partakers with devils. 21. You cannot drink the chalice of the Lord, and the chalice of devils: you cannot be partakers of the table of the Lord and of the table of devils.”

Verse 16 sets before us the Eucharistic blessing of the bread and wine, and their subsequent transmutation into the Body and Blood of the Lord, as taking place in the Churches of Corinth. The command, “Do this in memory of Me,” is carried into practice. The Christian sacrifice gives to the converts from Judaism and heathenism a more intimate communion with God than the one sought for in their previous sacrifices. Having an altar of their own, they ought not to return to the “tables” of false gods. The sacred tables of the idols are the altars upon which is offered the meat afterwards to be partaken of by the worshippers. St. Paul, therefore, is witness that the Church at Corinth offered a real sacrifice, and that this sacrifice was the one instituted by the Lord on the eve of His Passion (cf. Cornelius à Lapide, in hunc loc.; Council of Trent, sess. xxii. ch. 1).

III. “We have an altar (θυσιαστήριον), whereof they have no power to eat who serve the tabernacle.” Is this altar the Cross, or the altar of the daily sacrifice? Many Fathers, and the majority of commentators, especially since the Reformation, hold the latter opinion. On the other hand, St. Thomas, Nicholas of Lyra, Titelmann, Estius, Oswald, and nearly all the Protestants (except Bähr, Böhme, and others) understand the altar to be the Cross, and the eating thereof to be through faith. The Council and the Catechism of Trent abstained from quoting the text, probably in deference to St. Thomas. Cornelius à Lapide, whose opinion is of great weight, argues in favour of the Christian altar as follows: “ ‘An altar,’ on which we offer the sacrifice of the body and blood of Christ … of which the Jewish Levites do not partake, but the Christian priests and faithful, when they take the Holy Eucharist in order ‘that the heart be established with grace,’ as the Apostle says (ver. 9). Thus Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Anselm, Sedulius, Haymo. That the Apostle does not speak of the altar of the Cross, as the heretics contend, is plain from the words ‘we have.’ For we have not the altar of the Cross, but had it 1600 years ago. Again, from the word ‘to eat;’ for we do not eat of the altar of the cross, but of the altar of the Eucharist. Lastly, from the contrast established by the Apostle between the altar of the tabernacle of old, from which the Jewish priests and worshippers ate the victims as holy meat, and this new altar of the Church, from which the faithful eat not the carnal viands of oxen and sheep, but a Divine and heavenly food, the body of Christ. The Apostle recommends this Eucharistic altar to the Hebrews in order to strengthen their souls during persecution. For nothing gives more strength and comfort to the soul than Holy Communion,” etc. Further, Cornelius remarks that “altar” stands for the food and sacrifice on it, and then continues: “Hence it is plain that the Eucharist and the Mass are a sacrifice. The Eucharist has its altar; where there is an altar there must be a priest, and likewise a sacrifice, for these three are correlative. Hence also the Greek text has for altar θυσιαστήριον, i.e. sacrificatorium, the sacrificial altar” (Comm. in Heb., xiii. 10).

SECT. 264.—THE EUCHARISTIC SACRIFICE AND THE TEACHING OF THE FATHERS AND THE COUNCILS

I. The references to the Sacrifice of the Mass during the first three centuries are, as might be expected, few, but they are unmistakable.

1. In the Didache, or Teaching of the Twelve Apostles (c. 100?) we read (ch. xiv.): “Having assembled together on the Lord’s day, break bread and give thanks (εὐχαριστήσατε) having confessed your sins beforehand in order that your sacrifice (θυσία) may be pure.” The text goes on to refer to Malachy (1:11): “for that (sacrifice) is the same as that spoken of by the Lord. In every place and time to offer to me a pure oblation (θυσίαν καθαράν).” It is clear that the author of the Didache held that the Eucharistic rite was the “pure oblation” foretold by Malachy (supra, p. 434).

2. St. Ignatius († 115) speaks of the Eucharist as “the flesh of our Saviour Jesus Christ.” Who suffered for our sins, and Whom the Father in His mercy raised again (Ad Smyrn., c. 7). The repeated mention of the altar, through which the people are in communion with the bishops, priests, and deacons, and show their adherence to the Church, and the remark that through the Liturgy the power of Satan is broken, connect altar and Liturgy with the Cross, upon which Satan was conquered (Ad Phil., 4; Eph., v. 13; Magn., 7; Trall., 7). Ἄρτος τοῦ Θεοῦ (the bread of God), and ἐντός τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου (within the altar) (Eph., v.), in view of parallel texts, must be understood of the Eucharistic bread and altar. “Hope of salvation and union between the members of the community” are but consequences of the eating of the Divine bread from the same altar. They cannot be read into the text as its literal and primary meaning.

3. Clement of Rome († 102), in his first Epistle to the Corinthians, c. 40–44, compares the bishops and deacons with the priests and Levites, and exhorts them to perform προσφορὰς καὶ λειτουργίας (oblations and liturgical services) according to the prescribed order. Δῶρα προσφέρειν and προσφοραί (“offering gifts and oblations”) are, in Clement’s writings, interchangeable terms; and the new Liturgy is analogous to the old. Hence, in his mind, the new sacrifice is also analogous to the old: his name for it is εὐχαριστεῖν, to celebrate the Eucharist.

4. St. Justin († 160) deals with the Eucharist as a true sacrifice, in a way which leaves no room for controversy. He distinguishes between προσφορά (“oblation”), (Apologia, i. 67; Dial., 41) and θυσία (“sacrifice”), (Dial., 117). The oblation is not only the act of offering, but, at the same time, the bread and wine offered; the sacrifice consists in the λὸγος εὐχῆς καὶ εὐχαριστίας (“the word of prayer and thanksgiving”), which is pronounced by the officiating priest. Προσφέρειν θυσίας, εὐχαριστίαν ποιεῖν, τὸν ἄρτον ποιεῖν, τὸ ποτήριον ποιεῖν (“to offer sacrifice,” “to make the Eucharist,” “to make the bread,” “the chalice”), are expressions constantly used in reference to the public worship of the Christians. They show that the sacrificial character of the Eucharist was uppermost in Justin’s mind (cf. Dial., 116–118).

5. St. Irenæus († 202) also represents the Eucharist as a true sacrifice. He connects προσφορά and θυσία—the oblation and the sacrifice; and he is the first of the Fathers, antecedent to Cyprian, who designates Christ Himself as the victim offered. “And this oblation the Church alone offers pure to its Maker, offering to Him, with thanksgiving, things of His creation (ex creatura ejus). But the Jews do not offer; their hands are full of blood, for they have not received the Word which is offered to God” (Adv. Hær., iv. 18, 4). Irenæus already mentions, as different parts, the offering or oblation; the transmutation through prayer (epiklesis), and the Communion.

6. Tertullian (160–220) describes the Eucharistic sacrifice as a perpetual representation of the Sacrifice of the Cross. St. Cyprian († 258) is still more explicit. He says, “If Christ Jesus our Lord and our God is Himself the High Priest of God the Father, and offered Himself as a sacrifice to the Father, and commanded this to be done unto a commemoration of Him, then truly does that priest perform the functions of Christ who imitates what Christ did, and offers a true and full sacrifice to God in the Church” (Ep., lxiii. 14).

II. From the fourth century onwards, the teaching of the Fathers is so explicit and so complete that no doubt is possible as to their holding the Eucharist to be a real and true sacrifice. The question of fact (an sit) is settled; the inquiry now is as to the explanation (quomodo sit); the dogma enters the domain of theological science. St. Augustine says, “Through this sacrifice He is also priest, Himself offering and Himself being the oblation; the mystery (sacramentum) of which He willed to be the daily sacrifice of the Church” (De Civ. Dei, x. 20). He calls the Eucharist sacramentum memoriæ (C. Faust., xx. 21), and finds in this relation to the sacrifice of the Cross an analogy with the relation of the Jewish sacrifices to the same. Fulgentius, Cæsarius, and others have examined into the identity of both sacrifices, and the difference of the manner in which they are offered. Leo I., commenting on 1 Cor. 5:7, celebrates Christ as the new Paschal Lamb, Who allowed Himself to be crucified outside the camp as the new and true propitiatory sacrifice, in order that, after the old sacrifices had ceased, a new oblation might be laid upon the new altar, and that the Cross of Christ might be made the altar not of the temple, but of the whole world. The place of the manifold sacrifices of the old Law is taken by the one sacrifice of the body and blood of Christ. For Jesus is the true Lamb, which taketh away the sins of the world (Serm. de Pass., viii. 5, 7). Gregory I. has the expressions, “Eucharist,” “sacrifice,” “Mass” (missa), “oblation,” “host” (hostia, “victim”), “sacrament of the Passion,” “Communion.”

III. The theology of the Middle Ages elaborated the teaching of the Fathers, and the Church formulated the dogma on the same lines. The Fourth Council of Lateran teaches: “In the Church the self-same is priest and sacrifice, Jesus Christ, Whose body and blood is truly contained in the sacrament of the altar under the appearances of bread and wine” (Denzinger, Ench., n. 357). In the profession of faith proposed to the Waldenses, belief in the sacrifice of Holy Eucharist is commanded. Martin V. rejected the thesis of Hus, that the institution of the Mass by Christ was not warranted by the gospels (Denzinger, Ench., nn. 370, 481). The Council of Trent, in its twenty-second session, fully sets forth the Catholic doctrine against the innovations of the Reformers. Cf. Schanz, Die Lehre von den h. Sacramenten der Kirche, Freiburg, 1893; Franzelin, th. xi.; Kirchenlexicon, s.v. “Opfer,” “Messe.”

SECT. 265.—THE EUCHARIST A SACRIFICE OF PROPITIATION

I. The root of the word “propitiation” is prope, “near.” Hence its meaning, when applied to the relations between God and man, of “bringing together, making favourable.” A propitiatory sacrifice brings man nearer to God by satisfying for man’s sin, and obtaining for him God’s favour or grace. The law was “a bringing in of a better hope by which we draw nigh (ἠγγίζομεν) to God” (Heb. 7:19). The English word “atonement,” if the etymology “at-one-ment” is correct, beautifully renders the idea of propitiation. Man offers satisfaction for his misdeeds; God forgives, and restores the sinner to the communion of grace.

II. The sacrifice of the Mass has taken the place of all the sacrifices of the Old Testament. Hence it contains in itself alone all the efficacy and attains all the objects of the former institutions. Foremost among these was the sacrifice for sin. Primasius, a sixth century Father, commenting on Heb. 10, says, “Our priests offer daily to commemorate His death. And because we sin daily and require to be cleansed daily, He Who cannot die again gave us this sacrament of His body and blood, in order that, as His Passion was the redemption and absolution of the world, so also this oblation might be the redemption and cleansing of all who offer it in the true faith.” This a priori argument is fully confirmed by the words of the institution: This is My body “which is given for you;” My blood “which is shed for you, for many, unto the remission of sins.” The sense of the Church that the unbloody representation of the sacrifice on the Cross has the same propitiatory character as its prototype, is abundantly declared in all our Christian liturgies. Not one of them is without prayers for the remission of sins on behalf of the living and the dead, or without formulas declaring in set terms the atoning nature of the sacrifice. “In the book of the Machabees,” says St. Augustine, “we read that sacrifice was offered for the dead. But, even if nowhere we read this in the ancient Scriptures, we have for it the great authority of the universal Church which clearly adheres to this custom when, in the prayers, offered by the priest at the altar of God, commemoration is made for the dead” (De Cura pro Mortuis Gerenda, c. I, n. 3). St. Chrysostom refers this custom to the Apostles: “By Apostolic laws it is determined that in the venerable mysteries commemoration of the dead be made” (In Phil. Hom. 3, n. 4). The Council of Trent embodies the universal doctrine in the following canon: “If any one saith that the sacrifice of the Mass is only one of praise and thanksgiving, or the bare commemoration of the sacrifice offered on the Cross, and not also propitiatory; or that it only profiteth him who takes it, and that it ought not to be offered for the living and the dead, for punishments and satisfactions and other needs, let him be anathema” (sess. xxii. can. 3).

SECT. 266.—EFFICACY OF THE HOLY MASS

I. The principal source of the value of the Eucharistic Sacrifice is the opus operatum; that is, the work done by Christ offering Himself to the Father for us. Accidental value accrues to it from the personal worth of those who offer it with Christ; that is, ex opere operantis. These are: the priest, who acts as the minister of Christ; the faithful, who, in one way or another, take part in the celebration; the Church, as the spouse of Christ.

II. 1. Provided the necessary conditions be present, there can be no doubt that the offering priest, and the faithful who assist or serve at Mass, or who have Mass said for them, acquire, ex opere operantis, certain benefits proportionate to their personal dispositions. These fruits of the sacrifice are, of course, finite. In as far as they consist in satisfaction and impetration, they may be applied to others, in virtue of the communion of saints; but the merit proper, being entirely personal, is not transferable.

2. The Church, as the mystical body of Christ, daily offers herself through Him to God. Each priest offers in the name of the whole Church (Heb. 5). From this point of view, God always accepts the sacrifice independently of the personal worth of the priest. The operans here is the immaculate spouse of Christ, whose adoration and praise, thanksgiving, satisfaction, and prayers, ascend to Him as an odour of sweetness. Hence the prayers of the Mass receive a (finite) value from the dignity of the Church (ex opere operantis), and no Mass is “private” in the sense that only one or a few persons share in its fruits.

III. Christ is the Minister of the Eucharistic Sacrifice: (1) as the author of the rite, and as delegating the priest to act in His Name; (2) as actually performing the sacrificial action in each Mass, when, by a present act of His will, He constitutes Himself the victim, and offers Himself to the Father. From this point of view the value of the sacrifice is entirely independent of the human priest, the Church, and the faithful. As far as these are concerned, the value is wholly ex opere operato. But with regard to Christ, the merit and satisfaction are derived from His death on the Cross ex opere operantis; the value accruing to the sacrifice from the dignity and work of the sacrificer and the victim, is derived from Christ Himself offering and offered on the altar. In both respects the value of the Mass is simply infinite; for it is the Sacrifice of the Cross daily renewed until the sanctification of mankind is consummated. This infinite merit, however, is not a newly acquired merit, but only the new presentation of the merit acquired once for all by Christ’s death. The impetration and intercession (Rom. 8:34; Heb. 7:25; 9:24), as distinguished from the merit on which they rely, are new acts of Christ as Priest of the daily sacrifice.

IV. Although the merits presented to God in the Mass are infinite in themselves (in actu primo), their application to individuals can only be finite (in actu secundo), because it cannot exceed the finite capacity of the receiver, and is, moreover, measured by the intention of Christ as man, and by the acceptance of God. The exact measure of the application is determined by the Divine laws ruling the supernatural order. It is, therefore, an idle task to pursue the question further. The curious will find the conflicting opinions of theologians in Suarez, disp. 79, § ii. 12; De Lugo, disp. 19, § 9; Ysambert, in 3, q. 83, disp. 7 a. 1, 8, 10).

V. The Mass is offered “for our needs” (Council of Trent, sess. xxii. can. 3), as distinguished from sins and punishments. This points out its character of “impetration,” otherwise the power to obtain for us Divine assistance in our spiritual wants, and also in natural wants not incompatible with our supernatural end. The intrinsic value of the sacrifice is sufficient to “impetrate” the satisfaction of all possible needs; but in its actual working it is limited as stated above (IV.).

VI. The same canon lays down that the Mass is offered “for punishments and satisfactions,” whereby the character of propitiation is pointed out. These pains and punishments are (1) those which the living members of the Church either have to undergo for their sins, or take upon themselves as spontaneous satisfactions, and (2) the pains suffered by the souls in purgatory. All liturgies are unanimous on this latter point. But if the Mass obtains the remission of the pains of the departed, much more may it be expected to remit the pains and penalties of the living.

VII. Again, in the same canon, we are taught that the Mass is offered “for sins.” The propitiatory bearing of the Eucharistic sacrifice on sin requires a special explanation. The Council’s doctrine on Justification shows that, in the present order of things, there is no other ordinary means of immediate sanctification than the personal acts of the sinner (ex opere operantis) or the efficacy of the sacraments (ex opere operato). Hence the Eucharist, as a sacrifice, is not appointed to be a vehicle of habitual grace; if it were, it would be a sacrament of the new Law. On the other hand, the universal Church proclaims aloud that the Eucharist is a “propitiation for sins.” To reconcile the two statements, the latter must be taken to imply, not that the Mass imparts “immediate” sanctification, but that it propitiates God, Who, favourably looking down upon the sinner, brings him to repentance and justification by the ordinary means. Such is the doctrine of the Council: “The sacred Synod teacheth that this sacrifice is truly propitiatory.… For God, appeased by its oblation, grants grace and the gift of repentance, and remits crimes and even the greatest sins” (sess. xxii. chap. 2). Although mortal sin is here chiefly aimed at, we may apply the same principle to venial sins. These also are remitted, ex opere operato, inasmuch as the Divine Justice, appeased by the sacrifice, does not punish venial sins by a withdrawal of grace, but continues to supply sufficient help to avoid mortal sin and to repent of venial sin.

VIII. The nature of the Eucharistic sacrifice entitles us to distinguish three degrees in the distribution of its fruits.

1. The priest, as minister and delegate of Christ, offers the sacrifice for the Church as a whole, and consequently for all its members, and indirectly also for such as are only members in potentia. The good resulting from this application is aptly termed fructus generalis.

2. According to the universal practice, based upon the general rule that works of satisfaction and prayers may be applied to others, the priest applies the fruit of this sacrifice to certain specified persons, either living or dead. This special intention carries with it the fructus specialis. It confers upon these persons all the fruits of the sacrifice which do not belong either to the Church as a whole or to the person of the sacrificing priest.

3. The personal benefit to the priest is called fructus specialissimus, because it is the most specialized of the three. It arises from the sacred function itself in which the priest acts as another Christ, and partakes of the Sacred Victim. The faithful who take part in the celebration by their presence and intention, likewise gather a special fruit analogous to the fructus specialissimus of the priest (Cf. Suarez, disp. 79).

SECT. 267.—HOW THE MASS IS A TRUE SACRIFICE

So far we have dealt chiefly with the dogmatic question, “Is the Mass a true sacrifice?” (an sit); we now face the theological question, “How is the Mass a true sacrifice?” (quomodo sit). The former point is of faith, and admits of no controversy on the part of Catholics; the latter is left open to discussion, and every Catholic is at liberty to follow his own opinion. When a dogma is defined, the definition necessarily supposes a certain knowledge of its terms. Otherwise it would be unintelligible and to no purpose. The knowledge, however, of the terms, or, to be more accurate, of the things connoted by the terms, must be deemed sufficiently perfect when it contains one or more essential notes, and enables us to give a reasonable assent to the dogmatic statement. To believe that “in God there are three persons,” it is enough to conceive God as the Supreme Being and a person as a reasonable being. That “grace is necessary for salvation,” that “Scripture is inspired,” that “original sin is a true sin,” are propositions to which the assent of faith can be given on the vague knowledge that grace is a gift of God, inspiration a Divine influence, and sin something wrong. In like manner the simple believer, who knows sacrifice only as “a sacred offering to God,” satisfies the claims of faith when he admits that the Mass is truly such an offering The Councils speak the general language of the Church In their decrees and canons they are most careful to avoid terms or expressions favouring particular schools of theology. No scientific definition is usually expected from any Council. That is left to theology. On the other hand, dogmatic definitions are a help to the theologian in search of scientific definitions. E.g. if he strives to define a sacrament by genus and species, he must analyze the several rites defined as sacraments by the Church, and first find an essential note common to all, and then another proper to each. In like manner, the dogma that the Mass is a true sacrifice, compels him to find in it the essential notes of all sacrifices, and another essential note which distinguishes it from all other sacrifices.

I. In the treatise on Redemption (§ 209), we have given the essential elements of sacrifice on the lines laid down by Scheeben, the deepest and most fascinating of modern theologians. As, at the present time, the papal Bull on Anglican Orders, the “Reply” by the Anglican Archbishops, and the “Vindication” by the Catholic Bishops of England, have given a new interest to the question in hand, we shall now put before the reader a summary of what Dr. Paul Schanz wrote on the subject in 1895. See the Freiburg Kirchenlexikon, OPFER.

The inquiry into the idea which underlies the various sacrificial rites is one of the most difficult problems of the philosophy of religion. On the one hand, sacrifices are the symbols of certain feelings, desires, and ideas; on the other, they are types of the future. The first we gather from the rites themselves; the second, from the fulfilment in the Christian dispensation. The notion of offering (oblatio, προσφορά) may be taken as the fundamental notion of all sacrifices. Man gives to the Divinity part of his property in order either to express his veneration and gratitude, or to secure the Divine favour, taking it for granted that God is pleased with such gift and with the dispositions of the giver. The Divine pleasure is supposed to be increased by the fact that the gift implies submission, acknowledgment (= adoration), and veneration on the part of the giver. In this St. Augustine sees the reason why demons desired sacrifices to be offered to them, and why no man has such a desire (Contra Advers. Legis et Proph., 1, 18, 37; cf. Thomassin, De Incarn., 10, 2). The burning or outpouring of the gifts hands them over to God, and through their acceptance God admits the giver to communion with Him. For the essential character of the sacrificial gift is not its destruction, but its handing over and consecration to God. The privation suffered by the giver parting with his property, and the dispositions with which that privation is endured, may have a great moralizing influence on the giver, but they are not essential. The outpouring of the libations and the killing of the animals are but the means for handing over the gift to God, and for bringing the giver into communion with Him. The killing necessarily precedes the burning, but the killing is not the sacrifice. “The victim is killed in order to be offered” (Greg. I., In Ezech. i. 2, Hom. 10, 19); in other words, the killing is preparatory to the sacrifice. More importance attaches to the blood of the victim which is gathered and poured out at the altar. For, according to ancient ideas, the life, or the soul, is in the blood. When, therefore, the blood is offered, the highest that man can give, viz. a soul or a life, is handed over to God. On the received principle of “soul for soul (= life), blood for blood,” the sacrifice of blood was a substitute for the sacrifice of self. Human sacrifices were prompted by the same idea of giving to the Divinity what is best in man, the soul which is in the blood. As milder views came to prevail, the life of domestic animals was offered instead of the life of man. They who see in the killing of the victim the final act of the sacrifice, have no satisfactory explanation for the pouring out of the blood, the offering of the life in it and the burning. These rites cannot mean “that the two essential points of the sacrifice (adoration and propitiation), already expressed in the act of killing by the shedding of blood, are once more clearly and prominently represented.” Against this stands the fact that the pouring out of the blood is the special function of the priest, whereas the killing—which nowhere is set down as a pain or punishment inflicted on the victim—may be performed by a layman. Moreover, the sacrificial eating of the victim is, in this hypothesis, insufficiently accounted for. Hence in the sprinkling with the blood there is more than an act of propitiation, and in the cremation there is more than an act of supreme worship (latria). Both express in the first place, the oblation of self to God and the union of self with God. The sanctifying power of fire is as well known as the rôle it plays in heathen mythologies. God Himself was a fire, “Our God is a consuming fire” (Heb. 12:29), or the fire was a power sent from heaven, and frequently the heavenly fire is said to have consumed the victim. The Persians only offered the soul in the blood, and Philo explains the shedding of blood as an oblation of the soul (839 B, in the Paris edition of 1640). Our Lord Himself says that He will give His soul (ψυχὴν) for our redemption (Matt. 20:28). The independent unbloody sacrifices can only be explained from the same point of view, viz. that they express oblation of self to, and union with, God. In the most ancient sacrifices of incense (and of oil) the sweet odour generated in the burning is the chief object in view. The Fathers (e.g. Theodoret, q. 62, In Exod.; cf. q. 62, In Genes.) remark that burnt bones and flesh produce no sweet odour, and that, consequently, the pleasure God finds in the sacrifice must lie in the pious dispositions of those who offer The sacrificial meal is an element to be considered in the interpretation of sacrifices; but, taken by itself, it affords no explanation for the outpouring of blood (which is no food) and of the incense offering. It is altogether too gross a notion to see in the ancient sacrifices nothing but a banquet in which the gods were supposed to take part. The eating of the victim accepted by God is simply the symbol of the union with God intended by those who offer the sacrifice. This τελείωσις—making perfect (Heb. 9:9; 10:1, 14)—is the end and final object of all sacrifices. St. Irenæus says, “Sacrifices do not sanctify man, for God is not in want of sacrifices; but it is the conscience of him who offers which sanctifies the sacrifice, for when it is pure it causes God to accept the sacrifice as from a friend” (Adv. Hæreses, 4, 18, 3). Sacrifice in general may therefore be defined as “the offering to God, by an authorized minister, of an external gift of something our own [transformed] by the consecration of the minister, and thus passing into the dominion of God, Who accepts the gift for the sanctification of the offerer.” The self-sacrifice which lies in the parting with the gift works for the same ends as the sacrifice itself: acknowledgment of the Deity, thanksgiving, atonement, impetration—in short, for the sanctification of man. The Fathers and Schoolmen laid peculiar stress on the juridical aspect of sacrifices, yet without overlooking the end of sanctification and union with God. St. Augustine sets down as a true sacrifice any work performed in order to unite us with God in holy society. Alexander of Hales follows Augustine: “Sacrificium est oblatio quæ sacra fit offerendo et sanctificat offerentem” (Sum. Theol. 3, q. 55, n. 4, a. 1). St. Thomas has several definitions or quasi-definitions: “In the oblations and sacrifices man offered to God things of his own to acknowledge that he held them from God” (1 2 q. 102, a. 3); “properly speaking, a sacrifice is something done to give God the honour due to Him, and to appease Him” (3 q. 48, a. 3); “in order perfectly to unite the spirit of man with God” (3, q. 22, a. 2); “the term sacrifice expresses that man makes something sacred” (2 2, q. 85, a. 3, ad. 3). Later, the scholastic aliquid facere circa rem oblatam (“doing something to the gift”) was supplanted by conficere rem (“to make the gift”), (Suarez), and this was further explained as conficere per immutationem (“to make by means of a change”). Vasquez again narrowed the notion by describing the confectio as destructio, the immutatio as demutatio (i.e. change for the worse), and the dominium Dei as the Divine dominion over life and death. Franzelin and many modern theologians take the notion of sacrifice to include the following elements: “Sacrifice is an offering made to God by the destruction or quasi-destruction of some sensible object, such offering having been instituted by public authority to acknowledge God’s supreme dominion over all things and man’s absolute dependence on God for life and everything; after the Fall it also expresses a sense of sin for which Divine justice must be satisfied” (Franzelin, De Eucharistiæ Sacrificio, thes. ii.). But, as Schanz justly observes, so far as this definition makes it essential to a sacrifice that it should recognize God’s supreme dominion by the destruction or quasi-destruction of something, it evidently does not correspond to the notion of sacrifice in the old heathen world, for it implies that sacrifice cannot be offered to inferior deities, nor to heroes; nor does it express the meaning of the Jewish sacrifices, for the victim in these sacrifices was not unfrequently killed by the person offering it, and not by the priest. As to the burning on the altar, it was regarded as the means of conveying the victim to God, or, when the fire was kindled from heaven (3 Kings 18:38; 2 Paral. 7:1), it was God’s acceptance of the sacrifice. Many of the Hebrew sacrifices may be described as things given to God to secure His favour, or to appease His wrath, or as thank and tribute offerings; but frequently also they meant an act of communion with God, either by means of a feast, which God was supposed to share with His worshippers, or by the renewal of a life-bond in the blood of a sacred victim.

These reasons justify the elimination of the element of destruction, real or equivalent, from the essential constitution of sacrifice in general. With Scheeben and Schanz we revert to the definitions commonly adopted before the time of Vasquez († 1604).

II. Two more questions lie before us: Does the Mass contain the above generic element of sacrifice? and, What is its specific element? We deal first with the second of these questions, because on its solution depends the solution of the first. It is admitted on all hands that the Mass is a sacrifice “relative to the sacrifice of the Cross.” The relation is founded extrinsically upon the expressed will of Christ: “This do ye as often as you shall drink for the commemoration of Me; for as often as you shall eat this bread and drink the chalice, you shall show the death of the Lord until He come” (1 Cor. 11:25, 26); intrinsically upon the identity of priest and victim in both sacrifices, and upon the similarity between the mystical effusion of blood in the Mass and the real effusion on the Cross. The relation, external by institution, and internal by nature, belongs uniquely to the Eucharistic sacrifice. It is this specific difference which, added to the generic notion of sacrifice, gives us the definition of the Mass: “The sacrifice in which, by the institution of Christ, the sacrifice on the Cross is re-offered in an unbloody manner.” For the better understanding of the relative nature of the Christian sacrifice we add some details.

1. The Last Supper was the celebration of another commemorative sacrifice, the Jewish paschal lamb. “This day shall be for a memorial to you; and you shall keep it a feast of the Lord in your generations with an everlasting observance.… And when your children shall say to you, What is the meaning of this service? you shall say to them, It is the victim of the passage of the Lord, when He passed over the houses of the children of Israel in Egypt, striking the Egyptians, and saving our houses” (Exod. 12:14, 26). Jesus, as head of a house, acted as minister of this most typical of all sacrifices; and when it was over, when He had explained its meaning to the Apostles, He offered Himself as the antitype, “Christ, our Pasch, is sacrificed” (1 Cor. 5:7), and His words, “Do this for the commemoration of Me,” sound like the echo, or the literal repetition of the words by which God instituted this typical sacrifice of the Paschal Lamb (cf. Cornelius à Lapide, In Exod. xii. 14, 26, 47; In Matt. xxvi. 17, etc.).

2. The internal fitness of the yearly sacrifice of a lamb to represent and commemorate the first Pasch celebrated in Egypt is founded upon the identity of the minister, the victim, and the ritual. The minister was not the ordinary priest, but the head of the house, a layman; the victim was a lamb—one year old, male, without blemish; the ritual was the same, with one important exception: the relative sacrifice omitted the sprinkling of the door-posts with blood, because the redemption from the Egyptian slavery had been accomplished, and needed no repetition. The object of the commemoration was to gather the fruit of the model sacrifice: the closer union of the people with God through the grateful acknowledgment of His sovereign power. The Eucharistic sacrifice adapts itself better to the commemoration of its type on the Cross than the Paschal Lamb to the commemoration of the Egyptian sacrifice. In the Mass the real minister and the victim are identically (numero) the same as on the Cross, whereas in the paschal sacrifice they were so only specifically. Both rites differ in a similar way from their types. They both are unbloody, whereas both the types are bloody sacrifices. In the Jewish rite the eating of the victim, symbolizing union with God, is the consummation to which the whole rite leads up; and the same is true of the Mass.

3. We use the term “mystical” in reference to the “mystery” in which the effusion takes place; it is opposed to “real,” and equivalent to “representative, commemorative, or relative.” The mystical effusion consists in placing the Divine body and blood on the altar under distinct and separate species. Of course Christ is wholly present under either species, yet so that the words of consecration which strike our ears, and the species which strike our eyes, convey a first impression (only to be rectified by reason and faith) of a divided presence. Considering the glorified state of the victim on the one hand, and on the other the manner in which the human memory is awakened by sense perceptions, it seems impossible to devise a better commemoration of the death on the Cross. The distinctness and expressiveness of the words of the institution, “This is My blood which is shed; My body which is given (= sacrificed),” leave no doubt that in the mind of Christ the very essence of the commemorative sacrifice lies in the separate presence of body and blood on the altar.

III. This reflection leads us on to the crucial theological question how the Mass is a real sacrifice, and not a mere (nuda) commemoration.

As long as theology was taught from the bishop’s pulpit, rather than from the professor’s chair, the subtle question under consideration received but scant attention. It was only when the Schoolmen began to scrutinize the Scriptures and the Fathers that such pointed questions were mooted and solved according to the principle quot capita tot sensus. The Fathers, who spoke and wrote for the instruction of the faithful at large, when touching on the Eucharistic sacrifice, naturally laid greater emphasis on its objects, chief among which is the sanctification of the people by close communion with God. In the Middle Ages stress was laid upon the notion of commemoration and representation. The Mass is an immolation of Christ, because it is “a certain image representative of the Passion of Christ, which is His true immolation” (St. Thomas, 3, q. 83. a. 1). The further explanation of the sacrificial act differs according to the theories held on the essence of sacrifice. Nobody placed it in the offertory, because there bread and wine, and not the body and blood of Christ, are offered; and the offerer is the priest (with the congregation), not Christ, who is only introduced with the words of consecration. Bread and wine are indeed called oblations, but merely as the matter prepared at the offertory for the sacrificial transformation in the canon. St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and others, see the sacrificial act in the consecration; some in the consecration and the Communion taken together (Bellarmine, the Salmanticenses, Tournely, etc.); others, again, in the breaking of the bread, the dipping of the particle in the consecrated wine and the Communion (e.g. Canus). This latter opinion found but few followers, because the breaking and dipping affect the species only, and not the body of Christ; and even at the Communion, the transformation is but the destruction of the species. At the consecration itself, the commemoration and representation of the scene on the Cross are not effected by the transformation of the substance (Suarez), or by the mystical killing of the celestial body in the separation of body and blood on the altar (Lessius), but by the presence of separate species. In this separation may be traced an immutation of the victim, inasmuch as Christ is wholly present under each separate species only per concomitantiam (Vasquez, Tournely). De Lugo and Franzelin take the consecration to be the sacrificial act. The latter has this thesis, “We think, with Card. De Lugo, and a great many later theologians, that the intrinsic form (essence) of the sacrificial act is in this: Christ, the High Priest, by the ministry of the priests offering in His name, puts His body and blood, under the species of bread and wine, in a state of food and drink, by way of despoiling Himself (exinanitionem = κένωσις = ‘emptying’) of the functions connatural to His sacred Humanity.” In proof of his theory, he describes the state of victim as follows: Christ’s body and blood are present as meat and drink, i.e. as inanimate things; the Eucharistic body, not occupying space, cannot naturally receive actions from, nor react on, external material objects; His sense-life is suspended; He lies under the species as if He were dead, and subjects Himself, through the species, to be dealt with at the will of His creatures. Exception may be taken to this on two counts. The suspension of the lower life in Christ on the altar is a theological deduction not easily understood; at any rate, it is too dark to throw light upon other dark questions. Again, the state of meat and drink, and all the rest, do not produce in the real victim, i.e. Christ glorified, any change for the worse which may be called, or likened to, destruction. Christ dieth no more. The painful efforts of some theologians to inflict at least a semblance of death on the Giver of life, are entirely due to their narrow notion of sacrifice. If we eliminate the “change for the worse” from the notion of “victim,” and replace it by “a change for the better,” we obtain a notion of the sacrificial act which throws new light upon all sacrifices. That we are justified in so doing, has been shown above. The student may turn to Scheeben’s Dogmatik, vol. iii. p. 400, for further proofs and explanations.

In the definition of man as a rational animal, the specific element (reason) fixes the generic element (animal) as the form fixes and determines matter. The genus is the secondary, the specific difference the primary, element in the compound. The same is true of all definitions by genus and species. Hence, in the definition of the Mass as “a sacrifice relative to the sacrifice on the Cross,” the element “relative” is the form, and gives us the proper essence, the true nature, the essential character, of the Mass. The relativeness is founded upon the will of Christ and the identity of Sacrificer and Victim on the Cross and on the Altar; and also upon the similarity between the mystical and the real effusion of blood. The representation of the sacrifice of Christ is, therefore, the proper essence of the sacrifice of the Mass.

IV. It only remains to show how all the elements of a real sacrifice are found in the representation of Christ’s death. For our starting point we take the definition of Tanner, adopted by Scheeben (cf. Book V. § 209).

1. “Sacrifice is an oblation.” The prayers of the canon, before and after the consecration, abundantly show that the offering of a gift to God is the primary motive of the whole action. The oblation is expressed eight or ten times.

2. “Of a corporeal thing,” i.e. of some sensible object. The body and blood of Christ are corporeal, but it may be objected that we see only the appearances. The ready answer is that Christ cannot be perceived by us exactly as He is in heaven, and that He expressly willed to be sacrificed under these appearances. The representative nature of the sacrifice accounts for this slight divergence from other sacrifices.

3. “In which oblation this thing, by means of a transformation (per immutationem transformativam), is made and consecrated (conficitur et conficiendo consecratur).” Where does the transformation come in? There is no real effusion of blood, no material fire to consume the victim, no victim even capable of immutation as commonly understood. These difficulties disappear if we remember that the sacrifice is essentially representative, and, as much as possible, identical with Christ’s own. We have the same victim in the real presence; we have the mystical separation of body and blood in the separate presence under separate species; we have also the same sacrificial act (sacrificatio). Only this latter point requires elucidation. The making of the victim by the sacrificial act (conficere conficiendo) has always been understood to mean the productio corporis Christi per conversionem panis in ipsum (the production, or making present, of the body of Christ through the conversion of the bread into the body). In this sense conficere sacrum (to make the sacrifice) is a technical term with the Fathers, and in all liturgies. When Christ, through the priest, pronounces the words of consecration, he puts Himself, as much as possible, in the same state of victim as on Calvary. There He gave to His violent death the character of the most perfect sacrifice by an act of His will: the complete gift of Himself to God as the price of our redemption. That intention transformed His whole life, and especially His death, into the state of victim. For the crucifixion performed by the soldiers was but a preparation, a condition, of the sacrifice. This takes its being, its dignity, and all its effects from the holy will of Christ. Like the fire which consumed the victims and the incense of old, and made them a sweet odour to God, the love of Christ, burning with all the energy of the Divine Spirit Who fills Him, transformed Him into “a pure Host, a holy Host, an immaculate Host.” On the Christian altar, our Saviour does the same when He makes Himself “the holy bread of eternal life, and the chalice of everlasting salvation” (Prayer, Unde et Memores, immediately after the consecration).

4. “As an earnest (testimonium) of the Majesty and of the subordination (ordinis) of the creature to God, its first principle and last end.” These words express the objects for which sacrifices are offered. They are but an expansion of the simple and more appropriate idea of our communion with God, i.e. our sanctification. The Eucharistic sacrifice brings us into communion with God in more ways than one. For the real Sacrificer is Christ, the Spiritual Head of Whom we are the body. The Church, His bride, and we, its members, unite our intention with His, and make ourselves a joint sacrifice with Him. “Through Him, and with Him, and in Him (we give) to Thee God the Father Almighty, in the unity of the Holy Ghost, all honour and glory (per ipsum et cum ipso, etc.)” (Canon of the Mass). The same idea is beautifully rendered in the blessing of the water before mixing it with the wine at the Offertory: “O God, Who in creating human nature didst wonderfully dignify it, and hast still more wonderfully renewed it; grant that by the mystery of this water and wine, we may be made partakers of His Divinity, Who vouchsafed to become partaker of our humanity, Jesus Christ, Thy Son, our Lord.” Freedom from sin is the first condition of our participation in the Divine life; hence we pray, “In the spirit of humility, and with a contrite heart, may we be received by Thee, O Lord … (in spiritu humilitatis …);” and “May the Lord enkindle in us the fire of His love and the flame of everlasting charity” (Ascendat … prayer after incensing the altar). At the Orate, Fratres, the priest turns to the people and says, “Brethren, pray that my sacrifice and yours may be acceptable to God the Father Almighty.” The people answer, “May the Lord receive the sacrifice from thy hands, to the praise and glory of His Name, to our benefit, and to that of all the Church.” At the Preface, in union with the Angels in heaven, we offer thanks and praise to the thrice-holy Lord God, and then the Actio, the sacrifice, commences. First the Church on earth, with “our Pope, our Bishop, and all believers of the Catholic and Apostolic faith,” are introduced to the altar; then the Church triumphant in heaven with “the glorious Mother of our Lord, the Apostles and all the Saints,” is communicated with, and the Lord is besought to “accept this oblation of His whole family.” The objects of the Actio are again laid before Him: “Dispose our days in Thy peace, command us to be delivered from eternal damnation, and to be numbered in the flock of Thy elect.” The Divine High Priest now takes up the Actio, and performs anew the sacrifice He instituted at the Last Supper. The pure, holy, and immaculate Host is immediately presented to God, with a prayer “that as many of us as, by participation at this altar, shall receive the most sacred body and blood of Thy Son, may be filled with all heavenly benediction and grace; through the same Christ our Lord.” The “servants and handmaids who are gone before us with the sign of faith, and slumber in the sleep of peace,” are remembered; “we sinners” beg for “fellowship with the holy Apostles and all the Saints, not considering our merits, but expecting the free pardon of our offences.” The supreme and all-embracing object of the sacrifice receives its fullest expression in the communion of the priest and the people. “The body—the blood—of our Lord Jesus Christ preserve my (thy) soul to life everlasting.” The sacrificial action terminates with the sacrificial feast, in which the Victim is taken as food “with a pure mind, and of a temporal gift becomes to us an eternal remedy.” The eternal participation in the Divine life by the union of charity is not only foreshadowed, but actually commenced in the sacramental Communion. At this sacred banquet, the adopted sons of God sit down with the Natural Son, Who made them heirs of His kingdom; they appropriate the benefits of His Passion, and receive a tangible pledge, and a foretaste of the glory that awaits them “when that which is perfect is come” (1 Cor. 13:10). As now “they see through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face,” so also now they adhere to God in a true and real, but imperfect, manner; but then they will be “made participators of the Divine life.”

It may be useful and acceptable to the reader to have in brief the essential points of the Catholic doctrine on the Mass. We give them in the words of the “Vindication” of the Bull on Anglican Orders by the Bishops of England, n. 12: “The Mass, according to Catholic doctrine, is a commemoration of the sacrifice of the Cross, for as often as we celebrate it ‘we show the Lord’s death till He come.’ At the same time, it is not a bare commemoration of that other sacrifice, since it is also itself a true sacrifice in the strict sense of the term. It is a true sacrifice because it has all the essentials of a true sacrifice: its Priest, Jesus Christ, using the ministry of an earthly representative; its victim, Jesus Christ, truly present under the appearances of bread and wine; its sacrificial offering, the mystic rite of consecration. And it commemorates the sacrifice of the Cross, because, whilst its Priest is the Priest of Calvary, its Victim the Victim of Calvary, and its mode of offering a mystic representation of the blood-shedding of Calvary, the end also for which it is offered, is to carry on the work of Calvary, by pleading for the applications of the merits consummated on the Cross to the souls of men. It is in this sense that the Mass is propitiatory. To propitiate is to appease the Divine wrath by satisfaction offered, and to beg mercy and forgiveness for sinners. The sacrifice of the Cross is propitiatory in the absolute sense of the word. But the infinite treasure of merit acquired on the Cross cannot be diminished or increased by any other sacrifice. It was then offered once and for all, and there is no necessity of repeating it. That plenitude, however, of merit and satisfaction by no means excludes the continual application of such merit and satisfaction by the perpetual sacrifice of the Mass. Thus the sacrifice of the Mass is also propitiatory. And so, according to Catholic doctrine, even the dead in Christ are not excluded from the benefits of this sacrifice; we call the Mass ‘a propitiatory sacrifice for the living and the dead.’

“Such being our doctrine on the Eucharistic Sacrifice, its essential dependence on the doctrine of the Real Objective Presence is manifest. For, if there were no power in the words of consecration to make the true body and blood of Christ really and objectively present on the altar, we should not have on our altars the Victim of Calvary, and without its Victim the sacrifice could not subsist.”

Scholion. In 1905 the late Bishop Bellord suggested and defended the “banquet” theory of sacrifice. A long and interesting discussion ensued, in which his view was almost universally rejected, and various other theories were discussed. See American Ecclesiastical Review, 1905–6.

CHAPTER VI

PENANCE

AFTER being cleansed in the laver of regeneration, strengthened by the Holy Ghost, and fed with the body and blood of Christ, man would seem to need no further aids to secure his salvation. But his will is free; his flesh, since the Fall, is weak. He is therefore able and inclined to transgress. God, too, on His side, for His own wise purposes, permits sin to take place (supra, § 159). But He does not leave man helpless. “As a father hath compassion on his children, so hath the Lord compassion on them that fear Him; for He knoweth our frame, He remembereth that we are dust. He forgiveth all” our “iniquities, He healeth all our diseases” (Ps. 102:13, 3); “As I live, saith the Lord God, I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live” (Ezech. 33:11). Sins committed after baptism do not altogether undo the work of that sacrament. The original sin cannot return; the baptized sinner does not cease to be a Christian and a member of the Church. It is not fitting, therefore, that these sins should be remitted by a repetition of baptism, even if that were possible. Hence our Divine Lord instituted a special sacrament—Penance—for the forgiveness of sins committed after baptism. See St. Thomas, 3, qq. 84–90: Suppl., qq. 1–28, with the commentaries; Bellarmine, Controv. iv.; Chardon, Hist. des Sacrements; De Augustinis, De Re Sacrameutaria, lib. iii.; Faith of Catholics, vol. iii.

SECT. 268.—NATURE AND INSTITUTION OF THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE

I. We have already examined the stages by which the sinner is enabled to pass from death to life, and to blot out the stains of sin on his soul. In instituting a sacrament for this purpose, our Lord, as usual, took certain acts and endowed them with a special power. Here it is the acts of the virtue of penance which are the basis or matter of the sacrament. Penance is not a mere emotional sorrow, but a habit residing in the will. The penitent is sorry for his sin, inasmuch as it is an offence against God; and together with, or rather included in, this sorrow, there is a determination not to offend any more. Moreover, repentance involves not merely cessation from sin, but a readiness to make good the injury done to God and man (St. Thom., 3, q. 85, a. 3). We may go further, and add that confession also is an element of full and true repentance. The guilty man is persuaded that there is no forgiveness for him as long as his sin lies buried in his bosom. Sometimes the acknowledgment of his guilt is made to the world at large; sometimes, and perhaps oftener, to some trustworthy person, thereby satisfying the impulse to unburden himself, and at the same time securing immunity from punishment. The chronicles of crime, the plots of the novelist and dramatist, bear testimony to this instinctive impulse to confess. Contrition, Confession, and Satisfaction—the acts of the virtue of Penance—are therefore the matter of the sacrament. What elevates these acts of the penitent to the dignity of a sacrament—in other words, the form of the sacrament of Penance—is the priest’s absolution. “The form of the sacrament of Penance,” says the Council of Trent (sess. xiv. chap. 3), “wherein its force principally consists, is placed in those words of the minister, I absolve thee, etc.; to which words indeed, certain prayers are, according to the custom of Holy Church, laudably joined, which, nevertheless, by no means regard the essence of that form, neither are they necessary for the administration of the sacrament itself. But the acts of the penitent himself, to wit, Contrition, Confession, and Satisfaction, are, as it were, the matter of this sacrament (sunt quasi materia hujus sacramenti).” There had been much discussion among theologians concerning the matter and form of penance. Scotus, preceded by Robert Pullen and followed by Ockham, held that the absolution alone was of the essence of the sacrament, the acts of the penitent being merely necessary conditions; and, consequently, that absolution, considered as a sensible rite, was the matter; and, considered as signifying the effect, was the form. Durandus believed the absolution to be the form, and the confession alone to be the matter. In his view contrition was only a condition, and satisfaction the spirit, of the sacrament. Some theologians even held that the imposition of the priest’s hands was part of the matter. The decrees of the Council were so worded as not to exclude the Scotist opinion. (Cf. St. Thom., 3, q. 84, a. 1.)

II. That our Lord instituted a rite whereby His Apostles and their successors should forgive sin, is plain from Holy Scripture and the teaching of the Fathers.

1. After His resurrection He said to His Apostles, “As the Father hath sent Me, I also send you.… Receive ye the Holy Ghost: whose sins ye shall forgive (ἀφῆτε), they are forgiven them (ἀφίενται, al. ἀφέωνται); and whose sins ye shall retain (κρατῆτε), they are retained (κεκράτηνται)” (John 20:21, 23). These words clearly prove that the power on earth of forgiving sins (Mark 2:10) which the Son of Man possessed from His Father, He conferred upon His Apostles; and not on them alone, but also on their successors, for Christ’s mission was to be exercised by His ministers for all days, even to the consummation of the world (supra, § 240). Moreover, this power of forgiving sins was to be exercised by means of an external rite, because on the one hand the penitent must show signs of penance, and on the other the minister must make known to the penitent that his sins are forgiven. The Council of Trent says that it was when our Lord pronounced these words that He “principally” instituted the sacrament of Penance. Other words of our Lord also refer to its institution: “Whatsoever ye shall bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven; and whatsoever ye shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven” (Matt. 18:18). Here, too, the discretion as to binding or loosing can be exercised only by external manifestation on the part of the penitent and the minister.

2. These passages of Holy Scripture have served the Fathers as texts for discourses on the sacrament of Penance.

“He that, like the Apostles, has been breathed upon by Jesus—and who can be known by his fruits as having received the Holy Ghost, and become spiritual by being led by the Spirit, after the manner of the Son of God, to each of the things that are to be done according to reason—he forgives whatsoever God would forgive, and retains the sins that are incurable; ministering as the prophets ministered to God when they spoke not their own, but the things of the Divine will—so he also to God, Who alone has the power of forgiving. The words respecting the forgiveness which accrued to the Apostles are, in the Gospel according to John, ‘Receive ye the Holy Ghost,’ etc.” (Origen, De Orat., n. 28).

“God would never threaten the penitent if He forgave not the penitent. God alone, you rejoin, can do this. True; but that which He does through His priests is His own power. For what is that which He says to His Apostles, ‘Whatsoever ye shall bind,’ etc.? Why this, if it was not lawful for men to bind and loose? Is this allowed to Apostles only? Then to them alone is it allowed to baptize, to them alone to give the Holy Ghost, and to them alone to cleanse the sins of the nations; inasmuch as all this was given in command to none but the Apostles. But if in the same place both the loosing of the bonds and the power of the sacrament are conferred, either the whole has been derived to us from the model (form and power) of the Apostles, or neither has the former been abrogated from the decrees [of God] (Aut totum ad nos ex apostolorum forma et potestate deductum est, aut nec illud ex decretis relaxatum est)” (Pacian, Ep., i. n. 6).

The second book of St. John Chrysostom’s work on the Priesthood is almost entirely filled with rules as to the guidance of souls in the sacrament of Penance. We must here content ourselves with the following brief extracts:—

“Men that dwell on earth and have their abode therein, have had committed to them the dispensation of the things that are in heaven, and have received a power which God hath not given to angels or to archangels; for not to these was it said, ‘Whatsoever ye shall bind,’ etc. They that rule on earth, have indeed also power to bind but the body only; whereas this bond touches the very soul itself, and reaches even unto heaven; and what the priests shall do below, the same does God ratify above, and the Lord confirms the sentence of His servants. And what else is this but that He has given them all heavenly power? For He saith, ‘Whose sins ye shall,’ etc. What power could be greater than this?… The Jewish priests had power to cleanse the leprosy of the body; or, rather, not to cleanse it at all, but to decide on those who were clean, and you know what struggles there were for the sacerdotal dignity then; but these [Christian priests] have received power not to cleanse the leprosy of the body, but the uncleanness of the soul; not to decide that it is cleansed, but to cleanse it indeed (οὐκ ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν δοκιμάζειν ἀλλʼ ἀπαλλάττειν παντελῶς ἔλαβον ἐξουσίαν)” (De Sacerdotio, lib. iii. nn. 5, 6).

“ ‘Whose sins ye shall forgive,’ etc. He gave the power of forgiving sins—He Who by His own breath infused Himself into their hearts, and bestowed on them Him Who forgives sins. ‘When He said this He breathed on them,’ etc. Where are the men who teach that sins cannot be forgiven men by men? Who with a cruel spirit take from the sick and the wounded their cure, and deny them their remedy? Who impiously insult sinners with despair of a return? Peter forgives sins, and receives the penitent with all joy, and avails himself of this power which God has granted to all priests” (St. Peter Chrvsol., Serm. lxxxiv.).

Further passages will be cited below, when we come to speak of Confession.

“Our Lord then principally instituted the sacrament of Penance when, raised from the dead, He breathed on His disciples, saying, ‘Receive ye,’ etc. By which action so signal, and by words so plain, the unanimous consent of the Fathers hath always understood that the power of forgiving and of retaining sins, for the reconciling of the faithful, was communicated to the Apostles and to their legitimate successors. And with great reason did the Catholic Church reject and condemn as heretics the Novatians who obstinately in olden times denied that power.… If any one shall say that in the Catholic Church Penance is not truly and properly a sacrament instituted by Christ our Lord for reconciling the faithful unto God as often as they fall into sins after baptism, let him be anathema.… If any one shall say that those words of the Lord the Saviour, Receive ye the Holy Ghost,’ etc., are not to be understood of the power of forgiving and of retaining sins in the sacrament of Penance, as the Catholic Church hath always from the beginning understood them, but shall wrest them, contrary to the institution of this sacrament, to the power of preaching the Gospel, let him be anathema” (Council of Trent, sess. xiv. chap. 1, and canons 1 and 3). Cf. St. Thom., 3. q. 84, a. 1.

SECT. 269.—THE RECIPIENT

Penance differs from the other Sacraments chiefly in this, that the recipient must not merely have the intention of receiving it, and place no obstacle in the way of its efficacy; he must also positively contribute by his own acts to the working of the Sacrament. Some theologians, indeed, have held that these acts are only necessary conditions, and do not enter into the essence of the Sacrament; but even in this opinion the recipient must necessarily perform these acts in order that the effect may be produced. We need hardly point out that the efficacy of the Sacrament is not due to the merits of the penitent. His acts are part of the sacrament which, like the other sacraments, owes all its efficacy to the merits of Christ.

I. Contrition, which holds the first place among these acts, is defined by the Council of Trent (sess. xiv. chap. 4): “A sorrow of mind and a detestation for sin committed with the purpose of not sinning for the future” (Animi dolor ac detestatio de peccato commisso, cum proposito non peccandi de cetero).”

1. It is plain that God will not forgive a sinner without sorrow for sin. The penitent must not only cease from offending, and resolve to begin a new life; he must also have a hatred of the evil that he has done. “Cast away from you all your transgressions by which you have transgressed, and make to yourselves a new heart and a new spirit” (Ezech. 18:31). “Be converted to me with all your heart, in fasting, and in weeping, and in mourning; and rend your hearts, and not your garments, and turn to the Lord your God” (Joel 2:12, 13). “Against Thee only have I sinned, and done evil in Thy sight … I have laboured in my groaning; every night will I wash my bed; I have watered my couch with my tears.… I will recount to Thee all my years in the bitterness of my soul” (Ps. 1:6; 6:7; Isa. 38:15). “And Peter … going forth, he wept bitterly” (Matt. 26:25). “And standing behind at His feet, she began to wash His feet with tears, and wiped them with the hairs of her head” (Luke 7:38). “I will arise and go to my father, and say to him, Father, I have sinned against heaven and before thee; I am not now worthy to be called thy son” (ibid. 15:18, 19). “And the publican, standing afar off, would not so much as lift up his eyes towards heaven, but struck his breast, saying, O God, be merciful to me a sinner” (ibid. 18:13; see also Acts 2:37).

2. Detestation for sin may arise from various motives: the vileness of sin itself; the fear of hell, or other punishments; the love of God, Who has been offended. Hence there has been a discussion among theologians as to which motive is necessary for forgiveness.

(a) There can be no doubt that hatred of sin, because by it we have offended the infinitely good God, reconciles us to Him at once, even before the actual reception of the sacrament; but this sorrow, which is perfect Contrition, or Contrition properly so called, includes the readiness to do all that God commands, and consequently includes the desire to receive the sacrament instituted for the remission of sin (see Council of Trent, sess. xiv. chap. 4).

(b) The difficulty is therefore about the efficacy of imperfect Contrition (attrition); that is, sorrow arising from the lower motives already mentioned. That such sorrow, if accompanied with the resolve to lead a better life, is a true and profitable sorrow, and paves the way for grace, is defined by the Council of Trent (ibid.). Is it, however, sufficient for the efficacious reception of the sacrament? Unless it is so, it is hard to see in what the faithful are benefited by the institution of the Sacrament of Penance, except it be by a certainty of forgiveness, and an additional outpouring of grace upon the soul. The question was discussed with so much acrimony in the seventeenth century, that Alexander VII. was obliged to intervene, and forbid both parties to pronounce theological censures on each other. Later on, St. Alphonsus was able to say, “It is certain, and commonly held by theologians, that perfect Contrition is not required, but that Attrition is sufficient” (Theol. Moral., lib. vi. n. 440). See also Ballerini, Opus Theol. Mor., vol. vi. p. 24; De Augustinis, De Re Sacram., De Pœnit., part ii. art. 7.

II. By Confession is meant the acknowledgment, by word of mouth or in some equivalent way, of our sins to a priest. The sacrament is by its very nature similar to a criminal trial: the penitent is at once accuser, defendant, and witness; while the priest is the judge. When the penitent has declared himself to be guilty, and appeals for mercy on the ground of repentance, it is for the priest to decide whether the case is one for forgiveness or retention of the crime, and also to determine the satisfaction to be made in case of absolution.

1. The necessity of Confession is contained in the words of Christ: “Whose sins ye shall forgive,” etc. A the Council of Trent observes (sess. xiv. chap. 5), it is manifest that the Apostles and their successors could not exercise the power conferred upon them except after due knowledge of the case, nor could they observe equity in enjoining punishment unless the faithful declare their sins specifically and individually. The same may be inferred from the words relating to the power of binding and loosing (Matt. 18:18). Two other texts, though not directly enjoining confession to a priest, yet prove the necessity of confession, and have been interpreted to refer to Confession in the technical sense: “If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us; if we confess our sins, [God] is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all iniquity’ (1 John 1:9); “Confess, therefore, your sins one to another (ἐξομολογεῖσθε οὖν ἀλλήλοις τὰς ἁμαρτίας), and pray for one another, that you may be saved” (James 1:16; cf. 5:14). The meaning of this latter passage, as Estius observes (in loc.), is: confess yourselves not only to God, but also men to men; that is to say, to those whom you know to be endowed by God with the power of forgiving sins.

2. We have already seen in the preceding section that the Fathers taught that Christ conferred upon the Apostles and their successors the power of forgiving sins. They also go on to show that confession is required in order that this power may be exercised.

“If we have revealed our sins not only to God, but also to those who are able to heal our wounds and sins, our sins will be blotted out by Him Who saith, ‘Behold, I will blot out thine iniquities as a cloud, and thy sins as a mist’ “ (Origen, Hom, xvii., in Lucam). “If a man become his own accuser, while he accuses himself and confesses, he at the same time ejects the sins and digests the whole cause of the disease. Only look diligently round to whom thou oughtest to confess thy sin. Prove first the physician to whom thou shouldst set forth the cause of thy sickness, who knows how to be weak with the weak, to weep with the weeping, who knows the art of condoling and sympathizing; that so, in fine, thou mayest do and follow whatever he shall have said.… If he shall have understood, and foresee that thy sickness is such as ought to be set forth and cured in the assembly of the whole Church, and thereby perhaps others be edified and thou thyself easily cured, this must be prescribed with much deliberation, and on the very experienced advice of that physician” (Id., Hom. 2, in Ps., xxxvii.; see also Hom. 2, in Levit.) This comparison of the priest with the physician, and the penitent with the patient, is insisted on by Origen and many other Fathers, to bring out the necessity of confession, since the patient must declare his symptoms or show his wounds to his physician in order to be cured.

“The confession of sins follows the same rule as the manifestation of bodily infirmities. As, therefore, men do not disclose their bodily infirmities to every one, nor to a few at random, but to such as are skilful in the cure of them, so also ought the confession of sins to be made to those who are able to apply a remedy” (St. Basil, Reg. Brev., 228).

“Put off the old man … by means of confession (διὰ τῆς ἐξομολογήσεως) that you may put on the new man.… Now is the season of confession: confess the things that thou hast done, whether in word or indeed; the things done in the night and those in the day” (St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech., 2–5).

“Sin is to be confessed in order that pardon may be obtained” (St. Hilary, Tract. in Ps., cxviii.).

“Lo! we have at length reached the close of holy Lent; now especially must we press forward in the career of fasting, and make more fervent prayers, and exhibit a full and accurate confession of our sins (πολλὴν καὶ ἀκριβῆ τῆς ἐξομολογήσεως) … that with these good works, having come to the day of Easter, we may enjoy the bounty of the Lord.… For as the enemy knows that we can during this time, after having treated of what holds us fettered, and having confessed our sins and shown our wounds to the physician, attain to an abundant cure, he then in an especial manner opposes us” (St. John Chrysostom, Hom. xxx., in Gen., 1, 5).

Many other similar passages may be found collected together in Faith of Catholics, iii. pp. 36–113. It should be noted that, though some of these passages may seem to refer only to confession generally, or to public confession, they really prove the necessity of private, or auricular confession, as it is called. This is clear from the duty of confessing to a priest, and also from the duty of acknowledging even the most secret sins. To be obliged to make public declaration of hidden crimes, especially of those against certain of the commandments, would be too great a burden to impose upon the faithful, and would involve most injurious consequences. “Although,” says the Council of Trent (sess. xiv. chap. 5), “Christ hath not forbidden that a person may—in punishment of his sins and for his own humiliation, as well for an example to others as for the edification of the Church that has been scandalized—confess his sins publicly, nevertheless this is not commanded by a Divine precept; neither would it be very prudent to enjoin by any human law that sins, especially such as are secret, should be made known by a public confession.”

An account of the “Suppression of the Penitentiary,” narrated by Socrates (Hist. Eccl., v. 19) and Sozomen (Hist. Eccl., vii. 16), will be found in Chardon, sect ii. chap. 2.

3. Though the necessity of confession is plainly contained in and inferred from Christ’s words, yet, inasmuch as He did not expressly and explicitly command it, the mediæval theologians used to discuss whether it was or was not of “Divine institution (juris divini).” As the Council of Trent has decided this question in the affirmative (sess. xiv. can. 6 and 7), the utmost that may now be said is that the Church has promulgated or declared the necessity of confession. This, indeed, was the meaning of some of the Schoolmen who denied the Divine institution. Others, again, admitted the Divine institution, but denied that it could be proved from John 20:21, taken by itself, without the help of tradition. Before the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), a small number of theologians held, with Peter Lombard (Sent., iv. dist. 17), as an “opinion,” that it was enough to confess to God, without doing so to man. They were led to this view through not understanding that perfect charity—which undoubtedly remits sin before actual confession—includes the desire (votum) and the obligation of confession.

Further information concerning confession should be sought in the writings of moral and ascetical theologians.

III. The third act required on the part of the recipient is satisfaction. When the guilt (culpa) of sin has been pardoned by God, there often remains the liability to some temporal punishment to atone for the injury done to Him, and also to serve for the reformation of the sinner. If such punishments were not inflicted, “taking occasion therefrom, thinking sins less grievous, we offering as it were an insult and outrage to the Holy Ghost, should fall into more grievous sins, treasuring up wrath against the day of wrath” (Council of Trent, sess. xiv. chap. 8). There are numbers of instances of such punishments recorded in Holy Scripture. Adam received pardon for his sin (Wisd. 10:2), yet severe temporal punishment was inflicted upon him. The Israelites were punished for their murmuring, even after the sin itself was forgiven. “And the Lord said, I have forgiven, according to thy word … but yet all the men that have seen My majesty, and the signs that I have done in Egypt and in the wilderness, and have tempted Me now ten times, and have not obeyed My voice, shall not see the land for which I swore to their fathers, neither shall any one of them that hath detracted Me, behold it” (Num. 14:20–23). Even Moses was shut out of the promised land as a punishment for his want of confidence at the waters of strife (Deut. 32:49–52). When David repented of his adultery and murder, Nathan said to him, “The Lord also hath taken away thy sin: thou shalt not die. Nevertheless, because thou hast given occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme for this thing, the child that is born to thee shall surely die” (2 Kings 12:13, 14; cf. 18, 19). So, too, he was punished temporarily for the sin of numbering his people (2 Kings 24).

I. That the temporal punishments due to sin already forgiven may be atoned for by penitential acts, is also clearly taught in Scripture. The Israelites over and over again, by their fastings and tears and prayers, averted the chastisements due for their falling away from God (Judges, passim); the people of Ninive, by the same means, warded off the destruction of their city (Jonas 4); Manasses, after that he was in distress, he prayed to the Lord his God; and did penance exceedingly before the God of his fathers; and he entreated Him and besought Him earnestly; and He heard his prayer, and brought him again to Jerusalem into his kingdom (2 Paral. 33:12, 13); “Water quencheth fire, and alms resisteth sins” (Ecclus. 3:33); “Alms delivereth from all sin and from death, and will not suffer the soul to go into darkness” (Job 4:11). “As we have sinned greatly,” says St. Cyprian, “let us weep greatly.… Men must pray and entreat most earnestly, pass the day in grief, spend nights in vigils and tears, spend their whole time in sorrowing lamentations, lie stretched on the ground, prostrate themselves among ashes, sackcloth, and dust; after Christ’s raiment lost, wish for no other clothing; after the devil’s food, of choice must fast; apply themselves to just works (justis operibus incumbere), whereby sins are purged away; give abundant alms, whereby souls are freed from death.… He who has thus made satisfaction to God (Deo satisfecerit), who by penitence for what he has done, by shame for his sin has gained for himself an increase both of virtue and faith from the very suffering which his fall occasions, heard and helped by the Lord, will give gladness to the Church which he had lately grieved, and merit not only God’s pardon now, but a crown also” (De Lapsis, cap. 35). See also Tertullian, De Pœnitentia, cap. 3; St. Ambrose, In Luc., lib. vii. n. 156; St. Jerome, Ep., cviii.; “Whilst we thus, by making satisfaction, suffer for our sins, we are made conformable to Jesus Christ, Who satisfied for our sins, from Whom all our sufficiency is; having also a most sure pledge that if we suffer with Him we shall also be glorified with Him” (Council of Trent, l.c.).

2. In accordance with this doctrine, it has always been the practice of the Church that the minister of the sacrament of penance should “enjoin salutary and suitable satisfactions according to the quality of the crimes and the ability of the penitent.” If it be objected that such acts are opposed to the efficacy of Christ’s satisfaction, the Council of Trent replies, “Neither is this satisfaction which we discharge for our sins so our own as not to be through Jesus Christ. For we who can do nothing of ourselves as of ourselves, can do all things with the co-operation of Him Who strengthened us. Thus man hath not wherein to glory, but all our glorying is in Christ; in Whom we live; in Whom we merit; in Whom we satisfy; bringing forth fruits worthy of penance, which from Him have their efficacy; by Him are offered to the Father; and through Him are accepted by the Father” (l.c.; see also canons 12–15).

On the whole of this section concerning the acts of the penitent, see St. Thomas, 3, q. 90, and Suppl., q. 1 sqq.; De Augustinis, Op. cit., part ii. art. 7, 8, 9.

Scholion. It has been shown that the temporal punishment due to sin is not always remitted when the guilt of the sin has been forgiven, and that the penances imposed by the priest in confession are given for the purpose of securing this remission. But our Lord has given to His Church the power of remitting temporal punishment, even apart from the sacrament of Penance. Such a remission has been known by various names, e.g. relaxation, donatio, or condonatio, but is now generally called an Indulgence. It is not, therefore, as some imagine, a remission of sin; much less is it a permission to commit sin.

1. “Whereas the power of conferring Indulgences was granted by Christ to the Church, and she has even in the most ancient days used the said power delivered unto her of God, the sacred holy Synod [of Trent] teaches and enjoins that the use of Indulgences, for the Christian people most salutary and approved of by the authority of sacred Councils, is to be retained in the Church; and it condemns with anathema those who either assert that they are useless, or who deny that there is in the Church the power to grant them” (sess. xxv.). We are therefore bound to believe (a) that the Church has the power of granting Indulgences; and (b) that Indulgences are of benefit to the faithful.

(a) The power of binding and loosing on earth and in heaven, granted to St. Peter (Matt. 16:19) and to the Apostles (ibid. 18:18), in the widest terms and without any sort of restriction, must include the power of remitting all that is due to sin. In the case of the repentant, incestuous Corinthian, St. Paul exercised this power (2 Cor. 2:6, 7, 10) by remitting the sentence of excommunication and the remainder of the penance imposed (see Estius’s Commentary, in h.l.). In the ages of persecution, the canonical penances were frequently relaxed by the intercession of the martyrs (Tertullian, Ad Martyr., cap. i.). St. Cyprian, in particular, treats of this practice. “Since I am informed,” he says, “that some (of the lapsed) are urgent with you (the martyrs and confessors).… I beseech you with all possible earnestness, that, mindful of the Gospel, and considering what and what kind of concessions the martyrs your predecessors in times past made, how anxious they were in all cases,—you would also anxiously and cautiously weigh the requests of your petitioners; that as the Lord’s friends, and hereafter to judge with Him, you would look into the conduct and the merits of each, and examine also the kind and quality of their offences, lest, if anything should have been rashly and unworthily either promised by you or executed by us, our Church should begin to be ashamed even before the very Gentiles,” etc. (Ep. x., Ad Mart. et Conf., n. 4). These relaxations were actually granted by the bishops, and not by the martyrs themselves. “The blessed martyrs have written to me concerning some individuals, requesting that their desires may be considered. When the Lord shall have first given peace to all … then each of these cases shall be examined into, in your presence, and aided by your judgment” (Ep. xi., Ad Plebem. n. 1; see also Epp. Ad. Clerum, Ad Clerum Romæ). In the fifth canon relating to penitents, the Council of Ancyra (314) decreed that “the bishops have the power, having considered the manner of their conversion, to deal indulgently (φιλανθρωπεύεσθαι) with them, or to add a longer period. But, above all things, let their previous as well as their subsequent life be inquired into, and so let the indulgence be measured out” (οὕτεως ἡ φιλανθρωπία ἐπιμετρείσθω). And the Council of Nicæa: “For as many as, in fear and tears and patience and good works, manifest their conversion in deed, and not in appearance (only), these having completed the appointed time as hearers, may deservedly communicate in the prayers; together with authority to the bishop to determine something yet more indulgent respecting them” (can. 12). We have not space to trace the subsequent history of Indulgences. We may, however, mention the great Indulgence granted by Urban II. (1098) to Crusaders, releasing them from all canonical penances which they might have incurred.

(b) The benefit derived from an Indulgence does not mean that the person who receives it is simply let off his canonical penance here on earth. Unless his liability to temporal punishment was remitted by Almighty God, an Indulgence would really be of no benefit at all. But our Lord’s words, “Whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, shall be loosed also in heaven,” and the words of St. Paul, “I have done it in the person of Christ” (2 Cor. 2:10), abundantly prove that the relaxation is ratified by God. Although open to abuse, Indulgences are an encouragement to repentance: “You should rather pardon and comfort (the sinner) lest perhaps such a one be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow” (2 Cor. 2:7).

2. The Church grants these relaxations out of the superabundant merits of Christ and His saints, which constitute, as it were, a treasure at her disposal for distribution. “The reason why they are valid is the unity of the Mystical Body (the Church), in which many in their works of penance have paid more than their debt, and many have patiently borne unjust tribulations by which their punishments (pænæ) could be expiated, if any were due to them; whose merits are so great as to exceed the punishments due to all who are now alive; and, above all, on account of Christ’s merit which, although it works in the sacraments, is not restricted thereto, but by its infinity exceeds (excedit, ‘goes beyond’) the efficacy of the sacraments.… One can make satisfaction for another. Now the saints, in whom the superabundance of satisfactory works is found, have not performed these works for the benefit of any particular individual … but for the whole Church at large; as the Apostle says (Col. 1:24) that he ‘fills up those things that are wanting of the sufferings of Christ, in my flesh for His body which is the Church,’ to which he writes. And so the forementioned are common to the whole Church” (St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 25, a. 1).

3. Indulgences may be applied, by way of suffrage, to the souls in purgatory. As “the souls of the devout dead are not cut off from the Church” (St. August., De Civ. Dei, lib. xx. cap. 9, n. 2), they can still benefit (if they need it) by the prayers and good works of their brethren on earth; and in their behalf the Church can unlock the treasure of merit which she possesses. But she cannot directly apply this merit to them; she can only offer it to God, and beg Him to apply it to them as He may think fit.

4. Among the good works to which Indulgences are attached, are almsgiving and contributions for various ecclesiastical purposes. In the Middle Ages it was common to grant Indulgences to those who, unable to take the Cross themselves, gave sums of money towards the equipment of Crusaders. Such practices no doubt sometimes gave rise to abuses, and to the erroneous belief in the “sale” of Indulgences. The Council of Trent, “being desirous that the abuses which have crept therein, and by occasion of which the excellent (insigne) name of Indulgences is blasphemed by heretics, be amended and corrected, ordains … that all evil gains for the obtaining thereof—whence a most prolific cause of abuses among the Christian people has been derived—be wholly abolished,” etc. (sess. xxv.). See also St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 25, a. 3.

5. Indulgences are either plenary—remitting the whole of the temporal punishment; or partial—remitting only a portion. The expression, “an Indulgence of seven years,” does not mean a remission of seven years’ purgatory, but merely a remission of so much punishment as could be obtained by seven years’ canonical penance on earth. See St. Thomas, Suppl., qq. 25–27; De Augustinis, De Re Sacr., p. ii., Appendix.

SECT. 270.—THE MINISTER

I. The power of the keys—of opening and shutting, binding, loosing, forgiving, and retaining—was conferred by Christ upon the Apostles and their successors, the bishops and priests, as will be shown further on when we come to speak of the sacrament of Order. Hence bishops and priests alone are the ministers of the sacrament of Penance (Council of Trent, sess. xiv. chap. 6.). The passages already quoted from the Fathers leave this beyond doubt. The practice of confessing to lay persons, when a priest could not be had, was common in the Middle Ages, and continued until recent times. It was recommended by some of the greatest of the Schoolmen—Peter Lombard, Albertus Magnus, Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, and St. Thomas himself (In iv. Sent. dist., 17, q. 3, a. 3). This, however, did not imply that laymen could absolve. The act of confessing was looked upon as a humiliation, and as an endeavour on the part of the sinner to conform as far as in him lay to Christ’s ordinance. Hence the confession would tend to appease the offended God, and would be a means of moving the hearer to pray for him who had acknowledged his sins. In accordance with the general principle that the validity of the sacraments does not depend upon the moral worth of the minister, the Council defined that “even priests who are in mortal sin exercise—through the power of the Holy Ghost which was bestowed in ordination—the office of forgiving sins as the ministers of Christ” (ib.).

II. Every priest receives at ordination the power of the keys. “Receive the Holy Ghost,” says the ordaining bishop, imposing his hands on the candidate; “whose sins thou shalt forgive, they are forgiven them; whose sins thou shalt retain, they are retained.”

1. As, however, the exercise of this power is an act of judicial authority, it can be performed only upon such subjects as are assigned to the priest. In other words, he must have jurisdiction over the penitent before he can absolve him (Council of Trent, sess. xiv. chap. 7). This jurisdiction may be either “ordinary” (in virtue of office) or “delegated.” The Pope has ordinary jurisdiction over all the world; the bishops over their dioceses; the parish priests over their parishes. Hence the Pope can absolve any of the faithful; the bishops those of their dioceses; the parish priests the members of their flock.

3. Priests belonging to religious Orders obtain delegated jurisdiction from the Pope. This privilege gave rise to so much opposition during the Middle Ages, that the Council of Trent decided that no priest, even though he be a religious, should hear the confession of a secular person without the approbation of the bishop of the diocese (sess. xxiii., De Ref., cap. 15.)

3. It was the custom from the earliest times for those who had been guilty of certain grave crimes to be absolved only by the bishops, or even by the Sovereign Pontiff. For wise reasons the person conferring jurisdiction can rightly limit it as to time, place, person, or case. This power of “reservation,” as it is called, can be exercised by the Pope over the world, and by the bishops in their dioceses, “unto edification, but not unto destruction.” “Lest, however,” adds the Council of Trent (sess. xiv. chap. 7), “any one should perish on this account, it hath always been very piously observed in the Church of God that there be no reservation at the point of death (in articulo mortis), and that, therefore, all priests can absolve any penitents whatsoever from any kind of sins and censures whatsoever (omnes sacerdotes quoslibet pænitentes a quibusvis peccatis et censuris).”

III. The form of the sacrament of Penance, in which the efficacy of the sacrament chiefly resides, is the priest’s absolution. This word is used to denote the act of “loosing” (solvere, solutio), in accordance with the power conferred by Christ (Matt. 16:19; 18:18). In Roman Law absolutio meant acquittal. Like so many other legal expressions, it was adopted by Tertullian (De Pœnit., 10) to signify release or acquittal from the guilt and punishment of sin.

1. The priest’s absolution has been defined to be a judicial act, and not a mere pronouncing or declaring that the penitent’s sins are forgiven (Council of Trent, sess. xiv. chap. 6, can. 9). This is clear from the words of Christ: “Whose sins ye shall forgive” etc.; “Whatsoever ye shall loose” etc.

2. The exact formula to be used was not expressly stated by Christ or His Apostles. It is certain that for upwards of a thousand years a precatory form (“May Christ absolve thee,” or similar words) was in general use, as indeed is still the case in the East. The indicative form (“I absolve thee”) came into use in the Western Church during the early Middle Ages, and gradually supplanted the other. The two are found side by side in Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure; St. Thomas, however, was strongly in favour of the indicative form (3, q. 84, a. 3), and this was afterwards adopted by the Council of Trent (sess. xiv. chap. 3). At the present day a priest of the Western Church using the precatory form alone would grievously sin, and would expose the sacrament to the danger of nullity. Various explanations have been given of the difficulties connected with the variation of the formula of absolution. The best would seem to be to hold that where Christ Himself and His Apostles have not specifically determined the form of a sacrament, He left it to be determined by their successors; and that the Church in such cases may vary this form at different times and places, so as to bring out more clearly the exact force and significance of the sacrament. Thus, in the present case there can be no doubt that the indicative formula of absolution brings out the judicial character better than the precatory formula would do. The latter, however, does not altogether exclude the judicial character of the act of the minister, for it leaves him to decide whether the penitent is disposed for absolution, and also leaves him to determine the penance to be imposed.

3. The old Sacramentaries and Penitential books enjoin the imposition of the priest’s hands while he is giving absolution. So, too, the Roman Ritual at the present day contains the rubric, “Deinde dextra versus pœnitentem elevata dicit, ‘Misereatur,’ “ etc.; this lifting up of the hand being a sort of survival of the more ancient custom. Hence some of the Fathers speak of imposition of hands as a synonym for the sacrament of Penance, and attribute to it the forgiveness of sins. We have already (§ 254) spoken of the meaning of this rite. Its connection with the sacrament of Penance arose from our Lord’s words (Mark 16:18), “They shall lay their hands upon the sick, and they shall recover;” and from His practice of healing the sick by touching them (ibid. 6:5; Matt. 8:3). But, as St. Thomas points out, the laying on of hands there spoken of is not sacramental, but is ordained for the working of miracles; that by the touch of the hand of Christ, or of a sanctified man, even corporal infirmities may be taken away (3, q. 84, a. 4). No mention is made of it by the Council of Trent. It is therefore only an accidental adjunct, and not a part of the sacrament.

In addition to the works mentioned on p. 464, see also Batiffol, Études d’Histoire et de Théologie Positive, tom, i., Les Origines de la Penitence; Vacandard, La Confession Sacramentale dans l’Eglise Primitive; Turmel, Histoire de la Théologie Positive, pp. 141 sqq., 317 sqq., 453 sqq.

CHAPTER VII

EXTREME UNCTION

“OUR most merciful Redeemer, Who would have His servants at all times provided with salutary remedies against all the weapons of all their enemies: as in the other sacraments He prepared the greatest aids whereby during life Christians may preserve themselves whole from every grievous spiritual evil, so did He guard the close of life with a most firm defence, viz., the Sacrament of Extreme Unction” (Council of Trent, sess. xiv., Extr. Unct.). This sacrament has been known under various other names: e.g. “Oil of blessing” (oleum benedictionis); “Holy Oil” (oleum sanctum, ἁγίον ἔλαιον); “the Sacrament of Sacred Unction” (sacramentum sancta unctionis); and also among the Greeks, εὐχέλαιον (oil with prayer).

SECT. 271.—NATURE AND INSTITUTION OF EXTREME UNCTION—ITS MATTER AND FORM

I. In speaking of the number of the sacraments (supra, p. 372), we said that Penance and Extreme Unction were the two medicinal or healing sacraments: Penance for the healing of the soul, and Extreme Unction for the healing of the body, and also for strengthening and cleansing the soul when about to leave the body. Bodily disease and death are, as we have seen (supra, p. 24), the penalty of sin. Extreme Unction does not altogether remove these, for we must all die; nevertheless, even when it does not restore health, it robs death of its sting and its victory by making death the means of cleansing and purifying the body, and thereby fitting it for eternal life. More will be said on this subject when we come to speak of the effects of the sacrament. The natural act raised to a supernatural sphere is, in this case, anointing. As we saw in speaking of Confirmation, rubbing the limbs with oil was practised for the purpose of strengthening them; and we may add, what more concerns us here, anointing is a potent means of healing (Isa. 1:6; Mark 6:13; Luke 10:38). Hence it was chosen as the rite for supernaturally conferring the health of the body and strength of the soul. “Is any man sick among you?” says St. James, “let him bring in the priests (πρεβυτέρους) of the Church; and let them pray over him, anointing him with oil (ἀλείφαντες ἐλαίῳ) in the Name of the Lord. And the prayer of faith (ἡ εὐχὴ τῆς πίστεως) shall save (σώσει) the sick man, and the Lord shall raise him up (ἐγερεῖ); and if he be in sins, they shall be forgiven him” (5:14, 15). The rite here described is undoubtedly identical with the sacrament of Extreme Unction as administered by the Church. It is clear that the Apostle is giving a precept which is to hold good for all time, because it comes in the midst of other general commands: “Is any of you sad? Let him pray. Is he cheerful in mind? Let him sing. Is any man sick? etc.… Confess your sins one to another. Pray for one another that you may be saved.” Again, all the ancient authorities on Extreme Unction refer to this passage; and they declare that the Church in administering this sacrament is acting in obedience to the Apostle’s injunction. That the rite is a sacramental one is clearly indicated: there is the external action (prayer and anointing), and the inward supernatural effect (“shall save him,” “shall raise him up,” “the sins shall be forgiven”). The institution by Christ we shall now proceed to show.

II. “Now this sacred unction,” says the Council of Trent (l.c., ch. i.), “was instituted by Christ our Lord as truly and properly a sacrament of the New Law, insinuated indeed in Mark (6:13), but recommended and promulgated to the faithful by James the Apostle, and brother of the Lord. ‘Is any man,’ etc. In which words, as the Church hath learned from Apostolic tradition, received from hand to hand, he teacheth the matter, the form, the proper minister, and the effect of this salutary sacrament.” And the Council condemns those who say “that Extreme Unction is not truly and properly a sacrament instituted by Christ our Lord, and promulgated by the blessed Apostle James; but is only a rite received from the Fathers, or a human figment” (can. 1). Hence the Council teaches on the one hand that the passage in St. James is a “promulgation” and “commendation;” and on the other that the passage in St. Mark (the Apostles “anointed with oil many that were sick, and healed them”) is an “insinuation.” According to the Catechism of the Council (De Extr. Unct., cap. xvi.), this latter term means that our Lord gave a sort of specimen or example (specimen quoddam) of this unction. Some of the greatest mediæval theologians, e.g. Hugh of St. Victor (De Sacr., lib. ii. p. xv. cap. 2) Peter Lombard (Sent., iv. dist. 23), and St. Bonaventure (in Sent., l.c., a. 1, q. 2), taught that Christ did not Himself institute the Sacrament, but left the Apostles to do so. St. Thomas Suppl., q. 29, a. 3; and 3, q. 64, a. 2) and his school maintained the immediate institution by our Lord, declaring it to be one of the many acts unrecorded in the Gospels (John 20:30; Acts 1:3). The Thomist view, though not expressly defined, appears to be more in harmony with the teaching of the Council, and has therefore been the prevailing opinion in modern times. See, however, Franzelin, De Sacr., thes. xiv. p. 183 seq.

In the writings of the early Fathers there are fewer references to Extreme Unction than to the other sacraments. This comparative silence doubtless arose from the fact that it did not belong to the public life of the Church; and also that it was looked upon as an appendage of Penance (Council of Trent, sess. xiv., De Extr. Unct.), and so did not require separate mention. Thus we find the two spoken of together by Origen (In Levit., Hom. 2, n. 4); St. John Chrysostom (De Sacerd., iii. n. 6); St. Cæsarius (Serm., cclxv. n. 3). The most striking patristic authority on the subject is Pope St. Innocent I. “The words of St. James,” he says, “ought without doubt to be taken or understood of the faithful who are sick, who can be anointed with the holy oil of chrism, which, being prepared by a bishop, may be used not only for priests, but for all Christians, for anointing in their own need, or in that of their connections (non solum sacerdotibus sed omnibus uti Christianis licet in sua ant suorum necessitate inungendum [al. inungendo]).… For this chrism cannot be poured upon penitents, inasmuch as it is a kind (genus) of sacrament. For to persons to whom the other sacraments are denied, how can it be thought that one kind [of sacrament] can be granted?” (Ep. ad Decentium, cap. 8). The Liturgical books, from St. Gregory’s Sacramentary onwards, contain numberless proofs of the use of Extreme Unction; and frequent mention of it is made in Provincial Councils, e.g. Châlon sur Saone (813), Aix la Chapelle (836), Mayence (847), Pavia (850), and also in the General Councils of Constance (1414) and Florence (1439). All the Eastern Churches, too—Greek, Armenian, Coptic, and Nestorian—are at one with the Roman Church, concerning the doctrine of Extreme Unction. See Perpét. de la Foi, l. v. c. 2; Martène, De Eccl. Rit., tom. ii. cap. 7; Denzinger, Ritus Orient., ii. 483 seq.

III. As there is no express record of the immediate institution of Extreme Unction by our Lord, so there is no express record how far He Himself determined its matter and form. Nevertheless, “the Church,” says the Council of Trent (sess. xiv. ch. 1), “hath understood the matter thereof to be oil blessed by a bishop: for the unction very aptly represents the grace of the Holy Ghost, with which the soul of the sick person is invisibly anointed; and, furthermore, that these words, ‘By this unction,’ etc., are the form.”

1. In treating of the sacraments generally, we said that the matter of a sacrament is the natural action which has been raised by our Lord to a supernatural sphere. Certain of the sacraments, however, make use of material tangible objects (e.g. water, oil, etc.), and these are sometimes styled “the matter” of the sacrament. Theologians call these material things “the remote matter,” and the application of them “the proximate matter.”

(a) Oil is the remote matter of the sacrament. St. James expressly says, “Anointing him with oil.” “The spiritual healing,” says St. Thomas, “which is granted to a man at his last end should be perfect, for none comes after it; and it should be soothing, so that hope, which is especially needed by the dying, may not be broken, but encouraged. Now, oil is soothing, and penetrating, and flowing; and, therefore, as regards both the foregoing requirements, it is the fitting matter of this sacrament” (Suppl., q. 29, a. 4). There is some difficulty, however, regarding the necessity of the bishop’s blessing, as in the Eastern Church it is the priest who blesses the oil during the administration of the sacrament. Though the Council of Trent says that oil “blessed by a bishop” is the matter, yet the Council does not expressly say that this blessing is essential. Of course, in practice no oil may be used for the sacrament in the Western Church unless it has been blessed by a bishop. See two decrees on the subject in Denzinger’s Enchiridion, nn. 1494, 1495.

(b) There has been considerable diversity of practice in different times and places regarding the parts anointed. As a rule the oil was applied to the organs of sense: the nose, ears, mouth, and eyes. Sometimes only one portion was anointed. Thus St. Eugendus, as we learn from his Acts, was anointed only on the shoulders. Moreover, inasmuch as one of the purposes of the sacrament is the restoration of bodily health, it was often administered by anointing the diseased part (see Martène, De Eccl. Rit., tom. ii. c. vii. art. 4). According to the present usage of the Roman Church, the anointing of the four above-mentioned organs of sense, together with the hands, feet, and loins, is prescribed. The anointing of the loins is now, however, commonly omitted. Although the Decretum pro Armenis (Council of Florence) orders these, it does not declare them to be essential; and the Council of Trent speaks of unctio in the singular. One single anointing complies with St. James’s instruction, and is therefore sufficient; but in practice the ritual must be followed (see St. Alphonsus, lib. vi. n. 710).

2. While the minister of Extreme Unction anoints, he pronounces certain words which are the form of the sacrament. These words, in some rituals, are absolute; in others they are a prayer; in others, again, they are both absolute and also a prayer. As far as the essence of the sacrament is concerned any one of these is sufficient, though a prayer is more in accordance with St. James’s words, “Let them pray over him,” “The prayer of faith shall save,” etc. And the Council of Trent says that the words, “By this holy unction,” etc., which are a prayer, are the form. Here, again, the Council must not be understood in an exclusive sense, as though these words were the only valid form. In practice they must be used in the Western Church (see St. Alphonsus, l.c., n. 711). The various Eastern rites may be found in Renaudot, Perpétuité de la Foi, l. v. cc. 1, 2, 3; see also Chardon, l.c., ch. i.

SECT. 272.—THE MINISTER, RECIPIENT, AND EFFECTS OF EXTREME UNCTION

I. “The proper ministers of this sacrament,” says the Council of Trent, “are the Presbyters of the Church; by which name are to be understood in that place (James 5), not the elders by age, or the foremost in dignity amongst the people, but either bishops or priests, rightly ordained by the imposition of the hands of the priesthood” (sess. xiv. ch. 4, and can. 4). As St. James speaks of “priests” (in the plural), we find it prescribed in many ancient rituals that the sacrament should be administered by more than one priest (see also St. Thom., Contr. Gent., iv. 73). Sometimes one was to anoint, while another recited the prayers; sometimes one part was anointed by one priest and another part by another; sometimes each priest anointed each part and recited the prayers. At the present day Extreme Unction is administered in the Greek Church by seven, or at least three, priests. Nevertheless, there are numerous examples of the present Western usage in which only one priest administers (Chardon, l.c., ch. i.); and the Council of Trent condemns those that say “that the rite and usage of Extreme Unction, which the holy Roman Church observeth, is repugnant to the sentiment of the blessed Apostle James” (l.c., can. 3). See St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 31, a. 1, 3.

II. “It is also declared,” continues the Council of Trent, “that this unction is to be applied to the sick, but especially to those who lie in such danger as to seem to be about to depart this life; whence, also, it is called the sacrament of the departing. And if the sick should recover, after having received the unction, they may again be aided by the succour of this sacrament when they fall into another like danger of death” (sess. xiv. ch. 4). According to the usage prescribed by the Roman ritual, it is given after the Holy Viaticum. But nearly every ancient ritual reverses this order (Martène, De Ant. Eccl. Rit., tom. ii. p. 108). As sickness is a necessary condition for receiving this sacrament (“Is any man sick [ἀσθενεῖ] among you?” “The prayer of faith shall save the sick man [τὸν κάμνοντα]),” it cannot be given to soldiers going to battle, or to the condemned before execution. It should not, however, be delayed until the sick person has lost consciousness, and so cannot receive the sacrament with attention and devotion (Catech. of the Counc. of Trent, ii. 6, 9). It cannot be repeated in the same illness; but if the sick person recovers and falls ill again, it may again be administered. See St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 33; St. Alphonsus, l.c., n. 715.

III. The effects of the sacrament are thus described by the Council of Trent: “The thing (res) here signified is the grace of the Holy Ghost, whose anointing cleanses away sins, if there be any still to be expiated, as also the remains of sins; and raises up and strengthens the soul of the sick person, by exciting in him a great confidence in the mercy of God, whereby the sick person, being supported, bears more easily the inconveniences and pains of his illness, and more readily resists the temptations of the devil, who lieth in wait for his heel (Gen. 3:15); and at times obtains bodily health when expedient for the welfare of the soul” (sess. xiv. ch. 2). Here, then, are three effects enumerated: (1) remission of sin; (2) strengthening of the soul; (3) restoration of health.

1. Although remission of sin is the first effect mentioned by the Council, the sacrament was not primarily instituted for this purpose. St. James says, “If he be in sins (κἂν ἁμαρτίας ᾖ πεποιηκώς), they shall be forgiven him.” The sacraments of the dead are only two in number: Baptism and Penance; the former for the remission of Original Sin, the latter for the remission of Actual Sin. Nevertheless, if the sick person has been unable to confess, and has only attrition (supra, p. 471), the sacrament of Extreme Unction can remit his mortal sins. If, however, these have already been forgiven, the sacrament removes “the remains of sin” (peccati reliquias); that is to say, the evil effects of sin, the weakening of the will, spiritual sloth, disgust for heavenly things, etc. And it also remits, more or less, the temporal punishment due to sin.

2. The strengthening of the soul in the final combat with the Evil One is the primary object of Extreme Unction. “As in the other sacraments,” says the Council of Trent, in addition to the words quoted above, “our Redeemer prepared the greatest aids whereby during life Christians may preserve themselves whole from every grievous spiritual evil, so did He guard the close of life, by the sacrament of Extreme Unction, as with a most firm defence. For though our adversary seeks and seizes opportunities all our life long to be able in any way to devour our souls, yet is there no time wherein he strains more vehemently all the powers of his craft to ruin us utterly, and if he can possibly, to make us fall even from trust in the mercy of God, than when he perceives the end of our life to be at hand” (sess. xiv., of Extr. Unct.).

3. Seeing that we must all die, and, moreover, that the restoration of health may only give occasion for fresh sin, it is clear that the third effect of this sacrament is conditional; viz. if God sees that the prolongation of life will be beneficial to the sick person.

These various effects are admirably described by St. Thomas: “Every sacrament is instituted primarily for some one effect, though it may likewise produce other effects as consequences of this one. And inasmuch as a sacrament produces what it signifies, its primary effect is to be gathered from its signification. Now, this sacrament is administered by way of a cure, just as baptism is administered by way of washing. And a remedy is meant to remove disease. Hence this sacrament is primarily intended to heal the disease of sin. Hence, just as baptism is a spiritual regeneration, and penance a spiritual raising to life, so extreme unction is a spiritual healing or curing. But just as the healing of the body presupposes the body to be alive, so does the healing of the soul (medicatio spiritualis) presuppose the life of the soul. And therefore this sacrament is not given as a remedy against defects by which the life of the soul is taken away, e.g. original sin or mortal sin; but against those defects by which a man is spiritually weakened and is deprived of perfect strength for acts of life, grace, and glory; and this defect is nothing but a certain debility and unfitness (ineptitudo) left in us by original or actual sin; and it is against this weakness that man is strengthened by this sacrament. But inasmuch as this strength is given by grace which suffers not the presence of sin, therefore if [the sacrament] finds any mortal or venial sin in the soul, it removes the guilt (culpa) of the sin, provided that the recipient places no obstacle in the way, as already observed in the case of the Eucharist and Confirmation. And therefore James also speaks of the remission of sin conditionally, saying, ‘If he be in sins, they shall be forgiven him;’ that is to say, as regards guilt; for [the sacrament] does not always blot out sin, because it does not always find it present; but it always remits sin so far as regards the weakness aforesaid, which is called the remains of sin” (Suppl., q. 30, a. 1). See also Bellarmine, De Extr. Unct., c. 8; Suarez, Disp., xli.

On the whole of this chapter, see St. Thomas, Supp. xxix.–xxxiii.; Chardon, Hist. des Sacrements; De Augustinis, De Re Sacramentaria, lib. iii.; Turmel, Hist. de la Théologie Positive, pp. 154, 340, 463; Billot, De Ecclesiæ Sacramentis, tom. ii.; Ballerini, Opus Theologicum Morale, vol. v.

CHAPTER VIII

HOLY ORDER

THE powers with which Jesus Christ has endowed His Church are not exercised by the body of the faithful, nor are they merely delegated by the faithful to certain members chosen for that purpose. Our Lord Himself instituted the Christian priesthood, and gave to the Apostles and their successors the power of consecrating, offering, and administering His Body and Blood, as also of forgiving and retaining sins (Matt. 26; Mark 14; Luke 22; John 20). By Divine ordinance there is in the Church a hierarchy, consisting of bishops, priests, and other ministers of various ranks, who possess in different degrees the sacred powers belonging to or connected with the priesthood. Holy Scripture speaks not only of priests, but also of deacons (Phil. 1:2; 1 Tim. 3:8, 12; Acts 6:5; 21:8); and from the earliest times we find mention of other inferior orders, sub-deacons, acolytes, exorcists, lectors, and doorkeepers (Council of Trent, sess. xxiii. chap. 2). The means instituted by Christ for the transmission of the priestly powers is the sacrament of Order. We shall treat first of this sacrament generally, and afterwards devote a section to the consideration of each of the different orders.

SECT. 273.—ORDER A SACRAMENT—ITS MATTER AND FORM

I. Order (ordo), as St. Thomas explains (Suppl., q. xxxiv. a. 2, ad. 4), means “rank,” whether high or low but in ecclesiastical use it is taken in the sense of eminent rank—the clerical state as distinguished above that of the laity. It is also used to denote the particular rank occupied in the ecclesiastical hierarchy. And further, it designates the rite by which the rank is conferred; though this would be more clearly indicated by the word “ordination.” As a sacrament, it is defined by Peter Lombard: “A certain sign or seal of the Church whereby a spiritual power is given to the ordained” (Sent. iv. dist 24).

1. St. Paul, writing to his disciple St. Timothy, says, “Neglect not the grace (χαρίσματος), which was given thee by prophecy, with imposition of the hands of the priesthood (διὰ προφητείας μετὰ ἐπιθέσεως τῶν χειρῶν τοῦ πρεσβυτερίου) (1 Tim. 4:14); and again, “I admonish thee that thou stir up the grace of God, which is in thee by the imposition of my hands (διὰ τῆς ἐπιθέσεως τῶν χειρῶν μου”) (2 Tim. 1:6; cf. 1 Tim. 5:22; Tit. 1:5; Heb. 5:14). We also read that the Apostles ordained the deacons by prayer and laying on of hands (προσευξάμενοι ἐπέθηκαν αὐτοῖς τὰς χεῖρας) (Acts 6:6). And in the same book we read that the prophets and doctors at Antioch prayed and imposed hands (προσευξάμενοί καὶ ἐπιθέντες τὰς χεῖρας) upon Saul and Barnabas (13:3); and that these latter in turn ordained (χειροτονήσαντες προσευξάμενοι) priests for every Church (14:22). It is St. Paul, also, who tells that Christ Himself “gave some apostles, and some prophets, and other some evangelists, and other some pastors and doctors, for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry (διακονίας), for the edifying of the body of Christ” (Eph. 4:11, 12). Now, in these various passages we find all the elements of a sacrament: the external symbolical rite, consisting of the imposition of hands and prayer; the grace conveyed by this rite; and likewise Divine institution.

2. The Fathers, in commenting on these and similar texts, sufficiently indicate the sacramental nature of ordination. “Observe,” says St. John Chrysostom, “how the writer (of the Acts) avoids redundancy; for he says not how, but simply that they were ordained by prayer, for this is the χειροτονία, or laying on of hands (ἐχειροτονήθησαν διὰ προσευχῆς, τοῦτο γὰρ ἡ χειροτονία ἐστίν). The hand of man is laid on, but God works all; and it is His hand that touches the heart of him that is ordained, if he be ordained as he ought to be” (Hom. xiv. n. 3). “What some of these men, forced by truth, have begun to say, ‘He that recedes from the Church does not forfeit baptism, but yet loses the right of conferring it,’ is evidently in many ways a useless and foolish opinion.… For each is a sacrament, and each is given to man by a certain consecration (utrumque enim sacramentum est, et quadam consecratione utrumque homini datur): baptism when a man is baptized, the other when he is ordained; and for this cause, in the Catholic Church, neither is allowed to be repeated” (St. Augustine, lib. ii., Contra Epist. Parm., cap. 13, n. 28). “Let the Donatists explain to us how the sacrament of the baptized cannot be lost, and the sacrament of the ordained can be lost.… For if both are sacraments, which no one doubts, how is the one not lost and the other lost? No injury should be done to either sacrament” (ibid., n. 30). “The Sacred Scripture,” says St. Leo, “also shows how, when the Apostles were, by the command of the Holy Ghost, sending Paul and Barnabas to preach the Gospel to the Gentiles, they, fasting and praying, imposed hands upon them; that we may understand with what religious attention both of those who give, and of those who receive, care is to be taken lest the sacrament of so great a benediction seem to be negligently accomplished” (Ep. ix., ad Diosc., c. i.). And the Council of Trent says, “Whereas by the testimony of Scripture, by Apostolic tradition, and the unanimous consent of the Fathers, it is clear that grace is conferred by sacred ordination which is performed (perficitur) by words and outward signs, no one ought to doubt that Order is truly and properly one of the seven sacraments of Holy Church” (sess. xiii. chap. 3; cf. can. 3).

II. There has long been a celebrated controversy among theologians as to the matter and form of this sacrament. A short sketch of the rites and ceremonies of the ordination service will be of help to enable us to come to a decision on the question.

Episcopal consecration has always in all ages been given by imposition of hands and the invocation of the Holy Ghost, in accordance with what we read in the Acts, and Epistles of St. Paul. This has been proved to demonstration by numbers of passages from the Fathers, and from ancient Rituals and Pontificals published by Morin (De Sacr. Ecclesiæ Ord., part. 1 et 2), and Martène (lib. i., De Antiq. Eccl. Rit., cap. 8, art. 1). An additional ceremony of ancient origin, in use both in East and West as early as the fourth century, is the placing of the book of the Gospels on the head or shoulders of the bishop-elect. In the ordination of a priest there are, according to the Roman Pontifical, three impositions of hands: first, by the bishop and assistant clergy in silence; secondly, by the same, but the bishop reciting two prayers; and thirdly, after the communion, by the bishop only, who pronounces the words, “Receive ye the Holy Ghost, whose sins ye shall,” etc. The bishop also causes each to touch the chalice containing wine, and the paten with bread upon it, at the same time saying, “Receive the power to offer sacrifice to God, and to celebrate masses as well for the living as for the dead.” In the Greek rite, the third imposition of hands, with the accompanying words, and the handing of the chalice and paten, are omitted. A deacon is ordained in the Latin rite by imposition of the hands of the bishop, who pronounces the words, “Receive the Holy Ghost for strength, and to withstand the devil and his temptations;” and then, with hands extended over him, the bishop goes on to pray that the Holy Ghost may come down upon him. The stole and dalmatic are placed upon him; and lastly, the book of the Gospels is handed to him to be touched while the bishop pronounces the words, “Receive the power of reading the Gospel in God’s Church, as well for the living as for the dead.” In the Greek rite this last ceremony is omitted. It should be noted that the prayers recited by the bishop are not the same in the two rites. As the Church has always recognized both rites of ordination, it is clear that the matter and form of the sacrament must be sought in what is common to both. The neglect of this consideration has led to many erroneous opinions on the question.

1. When treating of the matter of the sacraments generally (supra, § 246), we said that our Lord took certain natural acts and made them, when performed with certain distinguishing marks, capable of producing a supernatural effect. In the sacrament of Order, as described in Holy Scripture, we find that the laying on of hands is the natural act so chosen. This act, as already pointed out (§ 254), is a way of singling out a person, setting him apart and conferring upon him some office or dignity. The imposition of hands, common alike in East and in West, and made use of in the ordination of bishops, priests, and deacons, is therefore the matter of Order. Holy Scripture, as we have seen, says that it was by imposition of hands that the Apostles ordained bishops, priests, and deacons. So, too, the Fathers and Councils use the word χειροτονία (imposition of hands) as equivalent to ordination. The Council of Trent (sess. xiv. ch. 3) says expressly that Extreme Unction can be administered only by bishops or priests “ordained by the imposition of hands.”

The tradition of instruments, which was commonly held by the Schoolmen to be the matter of Order, has never been in use among the Greeks, and is not mentioned by the ancient Latin rituals. It was introduced about the tenth century, and gradually spread during the Middle Ages, so as to be general in the West by the time of the Council of Trent. At that Council (sess. xxiii.) an attempt was made to define the matter and form of the Sacrament; but, at the suggestion of the Cardinal of Lorraine, the Fathers contented themselves with declaring that ordination “is performed (perficitur) by words and external signs;” and quoting St. Paul: “I admonish thee that thou stir up the grace that is in thee by the imposition of my hands” (2 Tim. 1:6). Nevertheless, as may be seen in the Preface to Morin’s De Sacr. Eccl. Ordinationibus, the Scholastic opinion was still prevalent as late as 1639. Mainly owing to his researches and those of Martène, it is now almost universally abandoned. We should mention that St. Bonaventure held that imposition of hands was the sole matter of Order (iv. Dist. 24, P. 2, a. 1, q. 4). As, however, the tutior pars must always be followed in the administration of the sacraments, the tradition of instruments must be strictly carried out in all Latin ordinations (St. Alph. Theol. Mor., lib. vi. tract. v. n. 742.)

2. As the form of a sacrament must be used at the same time as the matter, it follows that the difference of opinion as to the matter of Order implies difference of opinion as to the form. Thus, those who hold that the tradition of instruments is the matter, will also hold that the form is the words accompanying this action; and, on the other hand, those who contend for the imposition of hands, will maintain that the accompanying words are the form. As regards episcopal consecration, it should be noted that the words, “Receive the Holy Ghost,” do not occur at all in the Eastern rites, and were almost unknown in the West for more than twelve hundred years. The Council of Trent (sess. xxiii. can. 4) merely condemned those who held “that vainly do the bishops say, Receive ye the Holy Ghost,” without declaring in any way that these words were the form. Hence, by comparing the various rites of all ages and places, we find that an appropriate prayer is the form of the sacrament (Chardon, l.c, P. 2, ch. 1). The Apostles “praying, imposed hands upon them;” “then they fasting and praying and imposing their hands upon them,” etc.; “and when they had ordained (χειροτονήσαντες) to them priests in every Church, and had prayed with fasting,” etc. (Acts 6:6; 13:2; 14:22).

This prayer should specify the particular Order which is being conferred, or should mention the powers conveyed by the Order. “The imposition of hands … by itself signifies nothing definite, and is equally used for several Orders and for Confirmation.” In the case of priestly ordination, the words should “definitely express the sacred Order of Priesthood, or its grace and power, which is chiefly the power of consecrating and offering the true body and blood of the Lord in that sacrifice which is no nude commemoration of the sacrifice offered on the Cross.… The same holds good of Episcopal consecration” (Bull Apostolicæ Curæ, condemning Anglican Orders).

On the controversy concerning the matter and form of Order, see especially Benedict XIV., De Synodo Diæces., lib. viii. cap. 10, and the various authorities there quoted.

SECT. 274.—THE MINISTER AND RECIPIENT OF ORDER—ITS EFFECTS

I. The sole ministers of the sacrament of Order are bishops. In the Holy Scriptures we read that ordination was conferred only by the Apostles, or by those whom the Apostles had consecrated as bishops. It was the Apostles who imposed hands on the first deacons (Acts 6:6); Paul and Barnabas ordained priests for the Churches of Lystra, Iconium, and Antioch (ibid. 14:22); Timothy was consecrated bishop by St. Paul (2 Tim. 1:6); and the same Apostle instructs both Timothy and Titus as to ordaining others (1 Tim. 3, 4; Tit. 1). “What is there,” says St. Jerome, “which a bishop can do and a priest cannot do, except ordaining?” (Ep., 146, al. 85, ad Evang., n. 1.) “The order of bishops,” says St. Epiphanius, “is generative of fathers, for it begets fathers to the Church; whereas the priestly order, unable to beget fathers, begets, through the laver of regeneration, children to the Church, but not fathers or teachers” (Adv. Hæres., 75). And St. Chrysostom teaches that it is only in ordaining that bishops are superior to priests (Hom. 11, in Ep., 1 ad Tim.). So, too, the Canons of the Apostles (can. I et 2), the Apostolic Constitutions, and the ancient Councils (especially the Fourth Council of Carthage, A.D. 398) bear witness to the same doctrine and practice. The Council of Trent condemned those who maintain that bishops “have not the power of confirming and ordaining, or that the power which they possess is common to them and to priests” (sess. xxiii. can. 7). Finally, it is fitting that only the higher officers of the Church should possess the power of ordaining those who should be her ministers (St. Thom., Suppl., q. 38, a. 1).

So far we have spoken of the sacrament of Order generally. Various questions concerning the minister of each order will be dealt with in the next section.

II. In order to receive the sacrament of Order validly, a person must be (1) of the male sex; (2) baptized; (3) he must not have the intention not to be ordained.

I. “Let women keep silence in the Churches, for it is not permitted them to speak; but to be subject, as also the law saith. But if they would learn anything, let them ask their husbands at home. For it is a shame for a woman to speak in the Church” (1 Cor. 14:34, 35). “Let the women learn in silence, with all subjection. But I suffer not a woman to teach nor to use authority over the man, but to be in silence” (1 Tim. 2:11, 12). And in enumerating the qualifications of a bishop, St. Paul speaks of men only. Against certain early heretics who admitted women to the priesthood, see Tertullian, De Præscr., cap. xli., and St. Epiphanius, Adv. Hæres., 79. The latter points out that if any woman could be capable of exercising the ministry, it was the Blessed Virgin: yet God conferred upon her no priestly power.

2. “Baptism,” says St. Thomas, “is the gate of the sacraments. Since Order is a sacrament, it therefore presupposes baptism.… The character impressed in baptism makes a man capable of receiving the other sacraments. Hence, he who has not received baptism cannot receive any of the other sacraments” (Suppl., q. 35, a. 3).

3. That Order is invalid when conferred against the will of a person, follows from the general doctrine of intention on the part of the recipient of a sacrament. Pope Innocent III. expressly states this in the case of the sacrament of Order (lib. iii., Decret., tit. 42, c. 3, Majores; Denzinger, Enchir., n. li.). There is a difficulty, however, with regard to the ordination of boys who have not reached the use of reason. The common opinion is that it is valid, but that those who have been so ordained are not bound by the duties of the clerical state (e.g. celibacy), unless they afterwards elect to remain in this state. See Bened. XIV., Instr. on the Coptic Rites.

III. The effects of the sacrament of Order are Grace and a Character.

1. Although this sacrament is primarily intended for the benefit of the Church at large, and not for that of the individual upon whom it is conferred, nevertheless it bestows upon him sanctifying grace, and therefore not only makes him capable of performing certain sacred duties, but also fits him for the worthy performance of them. “Neglect not the grace (χαρίσματος) which was given thee by prophecy, with imposition of the hands of the priesthood” (1 Tim. 4:14). “I admonish thee that thou stir up the grace of God (ἀναζωπυρεῖν τὸ χάρισμα τοῦ θεοῦ) which is in thee by the imposition of my hands” (2 Tim. 1:6). “Just as,” says St. Thomas, “sanctifying grace is necessary for the worthy reception of the sacraments, so also is it for the worthy administration of them. And, therefore, as in baptism, whereby a person is made capable of receiving the other sacraments, sanctifying grace is given, so also in the sacrament of Order, whereby a person is ordained for the administration of the other sacraments” (Suppl., q. 35, a. 1). The Holy Ghost Himself is conferred by Ordination. “When He (Jesus) had said this, He breathed upon them (the Apostles), and said, Receive the Holy Ghost. Whose sins ye shall forgive,” etc. (John 20:22). “If any one shall say that by sacred ordination the Holy Ghost is not given, and that vainly therefore do the bishops say, Receive ye the Holy Ghost … let him be anathema” (Conc. Trid., sess. xxiii. can. 4).

2. On the character conferred by Order, see supra, p. 375. The Council of Trent condemns those who say “that a character is not imprinted by ordination, or that he who has once been a priest can become a layman” (sess. xxiii. can. 4). Such has ever been the doctrine of the Church. She has at all times refused to reordain those who have been ordained in heresy or schism, except when there has been any doubt of the validity of their former ordination. The Fourth Council of Carthage expressly forbade reordination; and St. Augustine, in his second book against Parmenian, and also in De Gestis cum Emerito (the bishop of the Donatists), strongly insists upon its unlawfulness. St. Athanasius, St. John Chrysostom, St. Cyril of Alexandria, Theodoret, and others were supplanted by intruding bishops who administered orders; but these ordinations were recognized when the rightful bishops were re-instated. Later on, however, we find that the orders conferred by intruders were sometimes declared invalid, notably in the case of the Antipope Constantine’s ordinations, and again in those of the heretic Photius. The doubt continued (see Pet. Lomb., Sent. iv. dist. 24) until the question was discussed with great clearness by Robert Pullen, whose opinion as to the validity of heretical, intruded, and simoniacal ordinations was accepted by Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas, and Scotus. See Chardon, P. ii. ch. 6.

SECT. 275.—THE DIFFERENT ORDERS

The so-called canons of the Fourth Council of Carthage mention eight different grades of Order: Bishop, Priest, Deacon, Sub-deacon, Acolyte, Exorcist. Lector, and Ostiarius (door-keeper). In connection with these, a word must be said on the ecclesiastical Tonsure.

According to the learned Père Morin, the cutting of the hair, as a distinct rite of initiation into the clerical state, does not date farther back than the end of the seventh century. Before this, however, it formed part of the ceremony of conferring the lowest of the Orders, as it does at the present day in the Eastern Churches. For the history and the various forms of the Tonsure, see Chardon, Part i. ch. 3. The Orders themselves are divided into Major (Sub-diaconate, Diaconate, and Priesthood, including the Episcopate), and Minor (Ostiarius, Lector, Exorcist, and Acolyte). “If any one shall say that, besides the priesthood, there are not in the Catholic Church other orders, both major (majores) and minor … let him be anathema” (Council of Trent, sess. xxiii. can. 2).

I. “Whereas the ministry of so holy a priesthood is a Divine thing, to the end that it might be exercised in a more worthy manner and with greater veneration, it was suitable that in the most well-ordered settlement of the Church there should be several and diverse orders of ministers, to minister to the priesthood by virtue of their office; orders so distributed as that those already marked with the clerical tonsure should ascend through the lesser to the greater orders” (Council of Trent, sess. xxiii. ch. 2). Whether these Minor Orders are part of the sacrament, the Council does not say. The mediæval theologians, as a rule, hold the affirmative (St. Thom., Suppl., q. 37, a. 2); at the present time the negative opinion is more common. That Christ instituted them cannot easily be proved; and, besides, the Eastern Church, at least in modern times, recognizes only one of them, viz. Lector. A bishop is the ordinary minister of them; but by the consent of the Sovereign Pontiff, a simple priest can confer them. “Henceforth,” says the Council of Trent (sess. xxiii., De Ref., cap. 10), “it shall not be lawful for abbots or for any other persons whatsoever … to confer the tonsure or minor orders on any one who is not a Regular subject to them.” The Council therefore recognizes that these orders can be given by others than bishops. The rites by which they are conferred at the present day are almost exactly as described in the canons of the Fourth Council of Carthage, and consist of handing the various instruments with appropriate accompanying words.

II. In treating of the Sacred or Major Orders, we are at once confronted with the difficulty as to the position of the Sub-diaconate, which in the East is considered as a Minor Order.

I. The office of a Sub-deacon, as the name implies, is to assist the Deacon at the altar: to prepare the chalice and paten, to read the Epistle, to pour the water into the wine intended for the sacrifice, and to wash the sacred linen. The bishop confers the Order by handing to the recipient the empty chalice and paten, and saying to him, “See what ministry is delivered to thee: Wherefore I admonish thee that thou so conduct thyself as to be able to please God.” Then the various vestments are placed upon him, and the book of the Epistles handed to him—all of which ceremonies are accompanied with appropriate words. This order is very ancient in the Church. St. Cornelius, who became Pope in the year 251, says, in his letter to Fabius of Antioch, that there were in his day sub-deacons in the Church of Rome; and St. Cyprian, who died in 258, himself ordained Optatus sub-deacon (hypodiaconum). The rite of ordination is described in the fifth canon of the Fourth Council of Carthage. The Council of Trent (sess. xxiii.), in its second chapter, says, “The sub-diaconate is classed among the greater orders by the Fathers and Councils.” Nevertheless, according to Chardon, it was not so classed as late as the end of the eleventh century (see Hist. des Sacram., Pt. i. ch. 1, and the authorities there cited). Even if the Sub-diaconate is now looked upon as a sacred order (as indeed it must be, at least in the West, after the decision of Trent), it does not follow that it is necessarily a sacrament; for the Council, in enumerating the various members of the hierarchy, speaks only of “bishops, priests, and ministers,” thereby leaving the question an open one. St. Thomas holds it to be both sacred and a sacrament (Suppl., q. 37, a. 3). In the Eastern Church it is still reckoned as a minor order. The ordinary minister is a bishop; nevertheless, there are many instances of priests conferring the sub-diaconate, e.g. chorepiscopi and various abbots. See the Synod of Meaux, A.D. 845, can. 44; and Pius V.’s Bull, denying the right to the Abbot of Prémontré, but admitting that the Abbot of Cîteaux enjoyed it.

2. The word “deacon” (διάκονος) means a minister or servant; but it has come to have a technical ecclesiastical meaning, and is now used to indicate one of the Sacred Orders of the Church. The functions of a deacon are to serve the priest at the altar, to sing the Gospel, to preach, and to baptize. The Order is conferred by the bishop imposing hands upon the recipient, and pronouncing appropriate prayers. The formula at present found in the Roman Pontifical, Receive the Holy Ghost, etc., is not older than the twelfth century. The diaconate is certainly a sacrament, for it is an efficacious outward sign (laying on of hands and prayer), of inward grace (the Holy Ghost Himself, Who is conferred by it). The Council of Trent condemns those who assert that “vainly therefore do the bishops say, Receive ye the Holy Ghost” (sess. xxiii. can. 4); and that “in the Catholic Church there is not a hierarchy by Divine ordination instituted, consisting of bishops, priests, and ministers” (can. 6). Hence deacons, at least, must be members of this divinely constituted hierarchy; and in this belief both the Eastern and Western Churches are agreed. The “seven” chosen in Acts 6 are generally recognized as the first “deacons.” They were ordained by the Apostles, who “praying, imposed hands upon them.” Although originally chosen for “serving tables,” we find them preaching and baptizing; and St. Paul requires deacons to “hold the mystery of the faith in a pure conscience” (1 Tim. 3:9). St. Ignatius speaks of deacons as “ministers of the mysteries of Jesus Christ,” “for they are not ministers (διάκονοι) of meat and drink, but servants of the Church of God” (Ad Trall., 2). See also St. Clement, 1 Ad Cor., 42; St. Ignatius, Ad Magnes., 2; Tertullian, Præscr., c. 41, De Bapt., c. 17; St. Augustine, Ep. 21, ad Valer., 1. To the objection that the order was instituted by the Apostles, and not by Christ, we may reply, with St. Ignatius (Ad Smyrn., 8), that Christ left the powers of the sacrament of Order to the Apostles to be transmitted by them entirely or in various degrees, and that they accordingly conferred upon “the seven” only a portion of these powers.

3. According to the Roman Pontifical, the functions of a Priest are “to offer (sacrifice), to bless, to preside (pnæesse), to preach, and to baptize.” He has also the power of forgiving sins, and is the ordinary minister of Extreme Unction, in addition to the sacraments mentioned. The precise nature of his powers can be best studied by comparing them with those of a Bishop.

4. The functions of a Bishop are thus set forth by the Roman Pontifical: “A Bishop should judge, expound (interpretari), consecrate, ordain, offer, baptize, and confirm.” According to the Council of Trent, “Bishops, who have succeeded to the place of the Apostles, principally belong to the hierarchical order; they are placed, as the same Apostle [St. Paul] says, by the Holy Ghost, to rule the Church of God (Acts 20:28); they are superior to priests; they administer the sacrament of Confirmation; ordain the ministers of the Church; and they can perform very many other things, over which functions others of an inferior order have no power” (sess. xxiii. ch. 4, and can. 7).

(a) Although there are plausible grounds for holding that “bishop” and “presbyter” are synonymous in the New Testament, yet we have clear traces of a real distinction recognized between them in Apostolic times. St. James the Less was beyond doubt Bishop of Jerusalem, as is clear from the relations of St. Peter and St. Paul with him (Acts 12:17; 15:13 sqq.; 21:18; Gal. 1:19), and from the belief universally existing as early as the middle of the second century. Moreover, St. Paul gives Titus (1:5) power to ordain presbyters; and to Timothy (1 Tim. 5:19) he lays down instructions regarding the judgment of presbyters. Hence both Timothy and Titus were superior in office to these presbyters. An argument may also be drawn from the Apocalypse (1–3), where the “Angels of the Churches” are plainly those officials to whom the care of each of these Churches or dioceses has been entrusted; in other words, they are the bishops of these dioceses.

(b) The Fathers in sub-apostolic times insist on the distinction between the office of bishop and the office of presbyter. St. Polycarp, the disciple of St. John, writes as a bishop, and distinguishes himself from his presbyters. “I exhort you,” says St. Ignatius (Ad Magnes., n. 6), “that ye study to do all things in a Divine unanimity—the bishop holding presidency in the place of God; and the presbyters in the place of the Apostles; and the deacons most dear to me entrusted with the service of Jesus Christ.… Be ye made one with the bishop, and with those who preside for a pattern and lesson of incorruption.” See also Ad Trall., nn. 2, 3, 7; Ad Philad., n. 7; Ad Smyrn., n. 8; Ad Polycarp, n. 6. St. Irenæus, speaking of Acts 20:17 sqq., says, “For at Miletus, having convoked the bishops and the presbyters,” etc.—thereby showing that he does not recognize the two as synonymous. “The degrees in the Church on earth of bishops, presbyters, deacons, are, in my opinion, imitations of the angelic glory, and of that dispensation which is said in Scripture to await all who, walking in the steps of the Apostles, live in perfect righteousness according to the Gospel” (Clem. Alex., Strom., lib. vi. n. 13). See also Tertullian, De Bapt., n. 17; Origen, De Oratione, n. 28; Hom. ii., in Numer., n. 1, and many other places; St. Hippolytus, De Charism. We say nothing of later Fathers, for by the fourth century it is admitted as a settled maxim that bishops only could ordain; and Epiphanius goes so far as to say of Aerius, the presbyterian, “His doctrines were, beyond all human conception, replete with madness” (Adv. Hæres., 75).

Whether the Episcopate is a distinct order, or only an extension of the priesthood, has long been a disputed point among theologians. The Fathers seem to look upon it as a distinct order; but most of the great mediæval doctors are of the contrary opinion (Albertus Magnus, Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas, in their commentaries on the fourth book of the Sent., dist. xxiv.). The Council of Trent refrained from coming to any decision on the question. The canons and decrees on the hierarchy, however, point in the direction of the earlier view; and hence this opinion has once more become the prevailing one. See Perrone, Præl. Theol., De Ordine, cap. ii. n. 78.

On the relation of the bishops to the Sovereign Pontiff, see supra, p. 336, and also Vol. I. p. 38.

On the whole of this chapter see St. Thomas, Supp. qq. xxxiv.–xl.; Chardon, Hist. des Sacrements; Morin, De Sacris Ecclesiæ Ordinationibus; De Augustinis, De Re Sacramentaria, lib. iv.; Turmel, Hist. de la Théol. Positive, pp. 155, 250, 344, 466; Billot, De Ecclesiæ Sacramenlis, tom. ii.; Ballerini, Opus Théol. Morale, vol. v.; Card. Gasparri, De Sacra Ordinatione; Atzberger, Handbuch der Katholischen Dogmatik, iv. p. 749.

CHAPTER IX

MATRIMONY

ON the sixth day of creation God formed man out of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and gave him a companion, Eve, whom He drew in a wondrous manner from the side of the sleeping Adam. By so doing, God willed that couple to be the source of the human race, which was to be propagated by successive generations; and, in order that His wise designs might be the better accomplished, He endowed the union of man and woman with the qualities of unity and perpetuity (cf. supra, §§ 128, 129). Christ Himself taught that, by its very institution, marriage should be between two only; that the two became one flesh, and that the marriage tie was so close that no man could loose it (Matt. 19:5, 6). But the primitive perfection of marriage gradually became corrupted even among God’s own chosen people. Moses permitted them, on account of the hardness of their heart, to give a bill of divorce (Deut. 24:1). Among the Gentiles every sort of abomination prevailed, so that woman was degraded from being the man’s companion to be his drudge or his toy, and children became the mere chattels of their parents. These evils, however, were not to be without a remedy. Jesus Christ, Who restored man’s dignity and perfected the Mosaic law, took marriage under His especial care. He deigned to be present at the wedding feast at Cana, and made it the occasion of His first miracle. He reproved the Jews for their corrupt practices regarding marriage, and particularly forbade divorce. But He did far more. He raised matrimony to the dignity of a sacrament, thereby giving it the power to confer upon those who receive it the grace required by their state, and making it a figure of the union between Himself and His Church. “Husbands, love your wives,” says St. Paul to the Ephesians, “as Christ also loved the Church, and delivered Himself up for it, that He might sanctify it.… Men ought to love their wives as their own bodies.… No man ever hateth his own flesh, but nourisheth and cherisheth it, as also Christ doth the Church; because we are members of His body, of His flesh, and His bones. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh. This is a great sacrament (μυστήριον); but I speak in Christ and in the Church” (5:25 sqq.).

There are thus three stages in the history of marriage: marriage under the natural law; marriage under the Mosaic law; and marriage under the Christian dispensation. By the law of nature there was little restriction as to entry into the marriage state, but only death could dissolve it. Moses put limits to the competency of persons to marry (Lev. 18), but permitted divorce under certain circumstances. In neither of these two stages was marriage a sacrament. Christ restored the primitive prohibition of divorce, and made the marriage of Christians a sacrament. We are here concerned with this third stage.

Marriage may be considered as an act or as a state; in other words, either as a contract, or as a status arising therefrom. Natural marriage is a contract whereby a man and a woman are united for the purpose of generation and education of offspring. This contract, when between Christians, is a sacrament conferring grace upon those who are rightly disposed.

SECT. 276.—CHRISTIAN MARRIAGE A TRUE SACRAMENT

The Council of Trent condemns those who hold that “Matrimony is not truly and properly one of the seven sacraments of the law of the Gospel, instituted by Christ our Lord; but has been invented by men in the Church, and does not confer grace” (sess. xxiv. can. 1).

I. The chief text of Scripture in support of this doctrine is that already quoted from the Epistle to the Ephesians: “Let women be subject to their husbands, as to the Lord; because the husband is the head of the wife, as Christ is the Head of the Church. He is the saviour of his body. Therefore, as the Church is subject to Christ, so also let the wives be to their husbands in all things. Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the Church, and delivered Himself up for it; that He might sanctify it, cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life; that He might present it to Himself a glorious Church, not having spot, or wrinkle, or any such thing; but that it should be holy and without blemish. So also ought men to love their wives as their own bodies. He that loveth his wife loveth himself. For no man ever hated his own flesh; but nourisheth it and cherisheth it, as also Christ doth the Church: because we are members of His body, of His flesh, and of His bones. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh. This is a great sacrament (μυστήριον, Vulg., sacramentum): but I speak in Christ and in the Church (εἰς Χριστὸν καὶ εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν)” (Eph. 5:22–32). The last words of this passage, as rendered in our version, would seem to decide the question. But reference to the original text, and to the use of the word sacramentum in the Vulgate itself, shows that this word alone cannot be relied on as an argument (see supra, p. 359). The proof, such as it is, is taken rather from the passage as a whole. The Apostle, speaking of Christian marriage, declares it to be a great sign of something sacred, viz. the union of Christ with His Church. Now, it is by sanctifying grace and by a continual influx of graces that this union takes place. A perfect representation of this union should therefore contain something corresponding with the graces bestowed by Christ upon His Spouse—should likewise confer upon the parties grace connected with their state. Besides, the due fulfilment of the obligations imposed upon Christian spouses requires supernatural aid.

Another passage of Scripture which may be quoted is St. John 2, where our Lord’s presence and conduct at the marriage feast are narrated. St. Cyril of Alexandria, commenting on this passage, says, “It was befitting that He Who was to renew the very nature of man, and to restore all nature to a better state, should bestow a blessing not only on those who had been already called into life, but should also prepare beforehand that grace for those not yet born, and make their entrance into existence holy.… He, the delight and joy of all men, gave a dignity to marriage by His presence, that He might do away with the former shame and grief attached to child-birth” (Lib. ii., in Joann.). And St. Augustine: “The Lord came to the nuptials that conjugal chastity might be strengthened, and that the sacrament of marriage (sacramentum nuptiarum) might be manifested” (Tract. 9, in Joann., n. 2). St. John Damascene, St. Epiphanius, and others interpret the passage in the same sense.

II. The Council of Trent, however, only says that St. Paul “alludes to,” or “hints at (innuit)” the Catholic doctrine of marriage. The strongest proof is drawn from tradition.

1. The value of testimonies found in ancient rituals and books of administration of sacraments cannot be denied. Those used by the Greek Church, the Churches of the Copts, the Jacobites, and the Nestorians, not to speak of the ancient Latin rituals, all contain ceremonies and prayers implying the belief that matrimony is an efficacious sign of grace (see Perpétuité de la Foi, t. v. 1. 6).

2. The following passages will serve as specimens of the doctrine of the Fathers: “This excellence (of matrimony) is threefold: faithfulness, offspring, the sacrament. In faithfulness it is required that neither should act in violation of the marriage tie; in the offspring, that it be received in love, fed with kindness, educated religiously; and in the sacrament, that the wedlock be not dissolved, and that neither, if divorced, be united to another, not even for the sake of offspring” (St. August., De Genesi ad Lit., ix. c. vii. n. 12). “Throughout all nations and men, the excellence of wedlock is in the procreation of children, and in the faithfulness of chastity; but as regards the people of God, it is also in the holiness of the sacrament, through which holiness it is a crime, even for the party that is divorced, to marry another whilst the husband lives” (St. August., De Bono Cojuugali, n. 32, al. 24). “There are in this matter two modes of life: one inferior and common—I mean matrimony; and the other angelic, and which cannot be surpassed—I mean virginity. He that chooses the worldly, matrimony, that is, is not to blame; but he receives not so great gifts; for some he will receive since he bears fruit thirty-fold. But whoso embraces a chaste state, and one that is above the world, although the road is, compared with the other, more rugged and difficult, yet has he more wonderful gifts, for he has produced a perfect fruit even an hundred-fold” (St. Athanasius, Ep. ad Amunem). “We know that God is the Lord and the guardian of marriage, Who suffers not another’s bed to be defiled; and he that commits this crime sins against God, Whose law he violates, Whose grace he dissolves. And therefore, and for the very reason that he sins against God, he loses the fellowship of the heavenly sacrament (sacramenti cælestis amittit consortium)” (St. Ambrose, De Abraham, c. 7).

To these various testimonies must be added all those which assert the sevenfold number of the sacraments, among which matrimony is included (see above, p. 373).

The doctrine concerning matrimony is a striking instance of development (§ 35). Even so late as the middle of the thirteenth century, St. Thomas contents himself with saying that it was “more probable” that matrimony conferred grace. But the Second Council of Lyons, held in 1274, decided that matrimony was a sacrament (Denzinger, Enchirid., lix.).

SECT. 277.—THE NATURE OF THE SACRAMENT OF MATRIMONY—MATTER AND FORM—MINISTER

Assuming that matrimony is a sacrament, we have now to consider wherein the sacrament consists. Some theologians have tried to make such a distinction between the contract and the sacrament as to hold that the contract may exist, even between Christians, without the sacrament. According to this view the matter of the sacrament is the act of the parties (i.e. the contract), the form is the blessing, and the minister is the priest; hence a marriage contracted without the priest’s blessing would be a true marriage, but no sacrament The Catholic doctrine as laid down by Pius VI., and afterwards by Pius IX. and Leo. XIII., is that in the case of baptized persons the contract and the sacrament are identical; the one cannot exist without the other. Hence the blessing is not the form, nor is the priest the minister.

1. I. It is plain from the foregoing section that Christ raised to the dignity of a sacrament that same marriage which God had instituted in the beginning. Now, this marriage was none other than a contract, and consequently it is the contract which constitutes the sacrament Moreover, the sacrament of matrimony is a sign of the union between Christ and His Church, which union is typified by the contract itself.

2. The unanimous teaching of the mediæval theologians is in favour of the inseparableness of the contract and the sacrament. It will be enough to quote passages from the leaders of the two rival schools to show that, in spite of their many differences, they were at one in this matter. “The words expressing the marriage consent are the form of this sacrament, not the priest’s blessing” (St. Thom., Suppl., q. 42, a. 1). “The external acts and the words expressing consent, directly produce a sort of bond which is the sacrament of marriage” (ibid., a. 3). “The sacrament of marriage has for its matter lawful persons, and for its form their consent.… For the essence of matrimony these two suffice: lawfulness in the persons, and unity in consent” (St. Bonav. In 4 Sent., d. 28, a. 1, q. 5).

3. The definitions of the Councils are equally clear. “The seventh is the sacrament of matrimony, which is a sign of the union of Christ and the Church, according to the Apostle’s saying, ‘This is a great sacrament, but I speak in Christ and the Church.’ The efficient cause of matrimony is properly (regulariter) the mutual consent by words at the same time expressed” (Council of Florence, Decr. pro Armenis). It is evident that these last words refer to matrimony as a sacrament, because the decree is an instruction regarding the sacraments The Council of Trent (sess. xxiv.) says, “The first parent of the human race, under the influence of the Divine Spirit, pronounced the bond of matrimony perpetual and indissoluble when he said, ‘This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh. Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh.’ But that by this bond two only are united and joined together, our Lord taught more plainly, when rehearsing those last words as having been uttered by God, He said, ‘Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh;’ and straightway confirmed the firmness of that tie, proclaimed so long before by Adam, by these words, ‘What therefore God hath joined together, let no man put asunder.’ But the grace which might perfect that natural love, and confirm that indissoluble union, and sanctify the married, Christ Himself, the institutor and perfecter of the venerable sacraments, merited for us by His Passion.… Whereas therefore, matrimony, in the law of the Gospel, excelleth in grace, through Christ, the marriages of olden time; with reason have our holy Fathers, the Councils and the tradition of the Universal Church, always taught that it is to be counted among the sacraments of the new law.” According to the Council, therefore, our Lord not only gave His approbation to matrimony as instituted in the beginning, but enriched it with the grace which He merited; consequently, the contract has been raised to the dignity of a sign conferring grace.

4. To the definitions of the councils the authoritative teaching of the Popes may be added. “It is a dogma of the Faith,” says Pius VI. (Ep. ad Episc. Motulensem), “that matrimony which, before Christ’s coming, was only an indissoluble contract, has become, since His coming, one of the seven sacraments of the law of the Gospel [a sacrament] instituted by Christ our Lord, as the Council of Florence defined.… Hence it is that to the Church alone, which has the entire care of the sacraments, belongs all right and power of assigning the form to this contract which has been raised to the sublime dignity of a sacrament, and consequently of judging of the validity or invalidity of marriages.” “The distinction, or rather separation [between the contract and the sacrament], cannot be approved of; since it is clear that in Christian matrimony the contract is not separable from the sacrament, and consequently that a true and lawful contract cannot exist without being by that very fact a sacrament. For Christ our Lord endowed matrimony with the sacramental dignity; but matrimony is the contract itself, provided that the contract is rightly made [lawfully, jure].… Therefore it is plain that every true (justum) marriage among Christians is in itself and by itself a sacrament; and that nothing is further from the truth than that the sacrament is a sort of added ornament or quality introduced from without, which may be detached from the contract at the discretion of man” (Leo XIII., Encyc. Arcanum).

II. From what has been said, it is evident that the contract is not the matter, and that the blessing is not the form. But it is by no means certain what the matter and form of matrimony really are. Since the Council of Florence all indeed agree, with some few exceptions, than the distinction of matter and form applies to this sacrament. We have already seen (p. 360) that the matter of a sacrament is the natural act which our Lord has raised to a supernatural dignity, while the form is that which differentiates the process or action, and makes it to be a sacrament. The common opinion regarding matrimony is that the offer is the matter, and the acceptance the form: in other words, the act of the promisor is the matter, and the act of the promisee the form. It is not easy to see how this view discriminates between sacramental and non-sacramental marriage. The following is suggested as one answer to the difficulty. Our Lord in instituting this sacrament acted on the same principle as in the others; He took a natural act and raised it to be something supernatural. But, instead of making the distinguishing element to consist of words, or the like, He placed it in the Christian character of the parties; in other words, He ordained that whenever the contract of marriage should be entered into by baptized persons, that contract should be a sacrament. To say that the form of matrimony is the fact of having been baptized, would sound strange. It may be better, therefore, to say that the contract considered as concerned with human beings is the matter; while considered as concerned with Christians (baptized) it is the form.

III. If it be granted, as we have already shown, that marriage contracted between Christians without the priest’s blessing is a sacrament, it is clear that the parties themselves, and not the priest, are the ministers of the sacrament. As, however, a person cannot administer a sacrament to himself [except in the case of the Blessed Eucharist (see supra, § 259)], we must hold that the man administers to the woman, and the woman to the man. It should be noted, however, that a few of the most learned theologians have followed the celebrated Melchior Canus in holding that the priest is the minister. After the repeated declarations of the Popes as to the validity of clandestine marriages, we do not see how Canus’s opinion can be defended. Nay, the Council of Trent had already clearly spoken, at least in its disciplinary enactments: “Although it is not to be doubted that clandestine marriages, made with the free consent of the contracting parties, are valid (rata) and true marriages, so long as the Church hath not rendered them invalid; and, consequently, that those persons are justly to be condemned, as the Holy Synod doth condemn them with anathema, who deny that such marriages are true and valid … nevertheless the Holy Church of God hath, for reasons most just, at all limes detested and prohibited such marriages” (sess. xxiv., De Ref. Matr.).

We have already seen that the chiefs of the two great mediæval schools of theology were at one concerning the nature of the sacrament of matrimony. They also agree that the priest is not the minister. “The priest’s blessing,” says St. Thomas, “is not required in matrimony as belonging to its essence” (Suppl., q. 45, a. 5). And St. Bonaventure: “Marriage contracted clandestinely is truly received, but not with salutary effect, because it is against the Church’s command” (In iv. Sent., d. 28, a. 5).

It may be objected that the Council of Trent distinctly enjoins that the priest shall say, “I join you together in matrimony,” which indicates that he is the minister. We answer that the teaching of the Council is clear from what has already been quoted. The words to be used by the priest merely mean that he, as the Church’s minister, declares the marriage to be valid and lawful, and confers upon it the blessing of God.

SECT. 278.—THE RECIPIENT OF THE SACRAMENT OF MATRIMONY—ITS UNITY AND INDISSOLUBILITY

I. All persons capable of entering into the natural contract of marriage are, if baptized, capable of receiving the sacrament of Matrimony. This rule, however, is subject to the laws of impediments, which will be dealt with in the next section, A lawful marriage between unbaptized persons is no sacrament. If, however, they are afterwards baptized, and then explicitly renew their consent, their marriage becomes a sacrament. Some theologians assert that this takes place even without any explicit renewal. There is a difficulty concerning the marriage of a baptized and an unbaptized person. The Church, as we shall see, makes such a marriage null and void. Sometimes, however, she allows it. Hence the question arises: does the baptized party in this case receive the sacrament? Theologians are divided in their opinions. The affirmative seems to us the better view. The contract is a true contract, and where there is a true contract, the sacrament must exist, unless there is something wanting on the part of the recipient or the minister. But here the baptized party is capable of being a recipient, and the unbaptized party is capable of being the minister, as in the case of the sacrament of Baptism.

II. Marriage, as originally instituted by God, was between one man and one woman. This is called monogamy. Opposed to it is polygamy, which may be the union of one man with several women (usually called polygamy, but more properly polygyny), or the union of one woman with several men (polyandry). Perfect monogamy implies complete unity of marriage, i.e. a union unbroken even by death. But in the ordinary use it does not exclude successive plurality of wives or husbands.

1. We need not here refer to the unlawfulness of polyandry, as natural law itself condemns it. Whether simultaneous polygamy is also forbidden by the law of nature is disputed among theologians. The difficulty arises from the practice of the Patriarchs, which is nowhere reprobated in Scripture. Some writers hold that plurality of wives was lawful until the Gospel law was enacted. But the commoner view is that it was always contrary to the law of nature, and that a Divine dispensation was granted in the case of the Patriarchs. “Friendship,” says St. Thomas, “consists in a sort of equality. If, therefore, while a woman may not have several husbands … a man might have several wives, there would not be a free, but a slavish friendship of the woman for the man. And this is proved by experience, for among men having several wives, the wives are as handmaids. Again, an intense friendship for many is impossible.… If, therefore, the wife has only one husband, and the husband several wives, there will not be an equal friendship on each side” (Contra Gent., iii. 124). The Saint elsewhere explains that God could grant dispensations in this matter, because plurality of wives, although forbidden by the law of nature, was not opposed to the primary end of marriage, which is generation (In iv. Sent., d. 33, q. 1).

2. Under the law of the Gospel, polygamy is strictly forbidden. The Council of Trent anathematizes those who say “that it is lawful for Christians to have several wives at the same time, and that this is prohibited by no Divine law” (sess. xxiv., De Matrim., c. 2). This doctrine is plainly proved by the words of our Lord when consulted by the Pharisees concerning divorce: “Have ye not read that He Who made man from the beginning made them male and female? And He said, For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they two shall be in one flesh (εἰς σάρκα μίαν). Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let no man put asunder.” When the Pharisees objected that Moses permitted divorce, our Lord appealed to the primitive institution of marriage, and declared that this was thenceforth to be observed: “Moses by reason of the hardness of your heart permitted you to put away your wives; but from the beginning it was not so” (Matt. 19:2–9). Now marriage, as originally instituted, was clearly monogamous: “male and female made He them;” “cleave to his wife;” “two in one flesh.” Again, Christ taught that he who put away his wife and took another committed adultery. A fortiori, therefore, would it be adulterous to take another wife without putting the first away. Moreover, Christian marriage is a figure of the union between Christ and His bride, the Church, which is one (Eph. 5:22, 23).

We have no room for the many passages which might be quoted from the Fathers against plurality of wives. One or two will be enough. “It is not lawful for thee,” says St. Ambrose, “to take a wife while thy wife is alive. To seek another while thou hast thine own, is the crime of adultery” (lib. I, De Abraham, c. 7). And St. Augustine: “So much do the laws of marriage continue between them (the parties) while they live, that they who are separated are more united to each other than to those to whom they cleave. They would not be adulterers unless they continued to be spouses” (De Nupt. et Concup., i. c. 10).

The history of the Roman Pontiffs shows how strenuously they have upheld the unity of marriage. But of this we shall speak presently.

3. Successive plurality of wives or husbands is not forbidden even under the Gospel law. “I say to the unmarried and to the widows: it is good for them if they so continue even as I. But if they do not contain themselves, let them marry; for it is better to marry than to be burnt” (1 Cor. 7:8, 9). And further on: “A woman is bound by the law as long as her husband liveth; but if her husband die, she is at liberty; let her marry to whom she will, only in the Lord.” The Apostle does not restrict his words to second marriages. He speaks indefinitely, and consequently the right has an indefinite extent. Nevertheless, in the Greek (Catholic) Church a third marriage is generally forbidden by ecclesiastical law.

III. Marriage, besides being one, is also indissoluble. To understand this rightly, some important distinctions must be made. Dissolution properly so-called is the breaking of the very bond of marriage so that the parties become free. Separation of bed or board, or both, does not involve dissolution of the bond. So, too, a declaration of nullity does not break the bond, but rather asserts that there has never been any bond at all. Again, we should carefully distinguish between (1) natural, i.e. non-sacramental marriage (legitimuin); (2) consummated sacramental marriage (ratum et consummatum); and (3) unconsummated sacramental marriage (ratum). We shall now state the laws applying to each of these cases.

I. It is commonly held by Catholic theologians that by the law of nature marriage is indissoluble. “Marriage,” says St. Thomas, “is intended by nature for the bringing up of children not merely for a time, but for their whole life. Wherefore, by the law of nature, parents lay up treasure for their children, and the children are their heirs. Therefore, since offspring is a good common to both husband and wife, their companionship should remain undivided, according to the dictate of the law of nature. And thus indissolubility of marriage belongs to the natural law” (Supply., q. 67, a. 1). And again: “Woman stands in need of man not only for the purposes of generation, but also for her own government, because man is wiser and stronger. Man takes woman into his companionship because she is required for generation; when, therefore, her comeliness and fruitfulness are at an end, she is prevented from being taken by another. If, then, a man, after taking a woman in the days of her youth, when she has comeliness and fruitfulness, could put her away when she grew old, he would be inflicting upon her an injury opposed to natural equity. In like manner it is clearly unbecoming for a wife to be able to put away her husband, since the wife is naturally subject to her husband as her ruler; for whoever is subject to another cannot quit that other’s rule. It is therefore against natural order for the wife to leave her husband. If, then, the husband could leave his wife, there would be no equal companionship between them, but a sort of slavery on the part of the wife” (Cont. Gent. iii. 123). The other arguments based on reason need not be insisted on here.

Our Lord Himself taught the indissolubility of natural marriage. “And there came to Him the Pharisees, tempting Him, saying, Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for any cause? Who, answering, said to them, Have ye not read that He Who made man from the beginning, made them male and female? And He said, For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and cleave to his wife, and they two shall be in one flesh. Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let no man put asunder” (Matt. 19:3–6). From Adam’s words, spoken under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, and relating to primitive, natural marriage, our Lord infers the indissolubility of that same marriage. The passage which follows shows that this is the rightful interpretation. When the Pharisees objected, “Why, then, did Moses command to give a bill of divorce and to put away?” Our Lord answered, “Because Moses, by reason of the hardness of your heart, permitted you to put away your wives; but in the beginning it was not so.” Christ therefore insists that the power of putting away was only a permission granted on account of hardness of heart (πρὸς τὴν σκληροκαρδίαν ὑμῶν). He affirms that, apart from this permission, which was only given by the law of Moses, it is not lawful to put away, because to do so would be against the primitive and natural institution of marriage.

The Council of Trent understands this passage in the sense given. “The first parent of the human race, under the influence of the Divine Spirit, pronounced the bond of marriage perpetual and indissoluble when he said, ‘This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh. Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they two shall be in one flesh.’ But that by this bond two only are united and joined together, our Lord taught more plainly, when rehearsing those last words as having been uttered by God, He said, ‘Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh;’ and straightway confirmed the firmness of that tie, proclaimed so long before by Adam in these words, ‘What therefore God hath joined together, let no man put asunder’ “ (sess. xxiv., proem). Pius VI., quoting these words of the Council, continues, “It is therefore clear that marriage, even in the very state of nature, and certainly long before it was raised to the dignity of a sacrament, was divinely instituted in such a way that it carried with it a perpetual and indissoluble bond which could be broken by no civil law” (Ep. ad Episc. Agriensem, 1789).

Although natural marriage is in itself indissoluble, it can nevertheless be dissolved by God, its author. It was He who inspired Moses to allow the Hebrews to put away their wives. Even under the Gospel law He has made it lawful to break the bond of natural marriage under certain peculiar circumstances. Writing to the Corinthians, St. Paul says, “If any brother have a wife that believeth not, and she consent to dwell with him, let him not put her away. And if any woman have a husband that believeth not, and he consent to dwell with her, let her not put away her husband.… But if the unbeliever depart, let him depart. For a brother or sister is not under servitude in such cases. But God hath called us in peace” (1 Cor. 7:12–15). That is to say, a Christian man or woman married to an unbeliever (i.e. not baptized) is not, in some cases, subject to a sort of slavery so as to be bound to live with the unbeliever, or to live apart in continence. If the unbeliever refuses to live with the Christian, the latter is not bound to go after the unbeliever, but may, after taking the proper steps, look upon himself or herself as free. Nay, more, even if the unbeliever is willing to live with the Christian, but with the intention of perverting or tempting the Christian, the latter is free in this case also. For the Apostle says that if the unbeliever consents, he should not be put away; hence, if he should not consent in the proper manner, we are to understand that he may be put away. Such is the interpretation given by St. John Chrysostom, Theophylact, Peter Lombard, St. Thomas, and many others; and the practice of the faithful, approved by the Church, abundantly confirms it. “If one of the parties of an infidel marriage be converted to the Catholic Faith,” says Innocent III., “and the other party will not dwell with him (or her), or not without blasphemy of God’s name, or in order to tempt to mortal sin, the one who is quitted shall, if he please, marry again, and in this case we understand what the Apostle saith, ‘If the unbeliever depart, let him depart, for a brother or sister is not under servitude in such cases;’ and the canon also in which it is said, ‘Contumely of the Creator dissolves matrimony in the case of him who is quitted’ “ (l. 4, Decret., tit. 19, c. 7). Gregory XIII., St. Pius V., and Benedict XIV. taught the lawfulness of these second marriages, and permitted them in practice.

2. Marriage between Christians is, as we have seen, always sacramental. This fact makes Christian marriage absolutely indissoluble. The Council of Trent has condemned those who say “that on account of heresy, or irksome cohabitation, or the affected (designed) absence of one of the parties, the bond of marriage may be dissolved; … or that the Church hath erred in that she hath taught, and doth teach, in accordance with the doctrine of the Gospel and of the Apostles, that the bond of marriage cannot be dissolved on account of the adultery of one of the married parties, and that both, or even the innocent one who gave not occasion to the adultery, cannot contract another marriage during the lifetime of the other, and that he is guilty of adultery who, having put away the adulteress, shall take another wife, as also she who, having put away the adulterer, shall take another husband” (sess. xxiv. cann. 5, 7).

(a) “Whosoever,” says our Lord, “shall put away his wife and marry another, committeth adultery against her (ἐπʼ αὐτήν). And if the wife shall put away her husband, and be married to another, she committeth adultery” (Mark 10:11, 12). And St. Paul teaches that death alone can solve the marriage tie. “For the woman that hath an husband, whilst her husband liveth is bound to the law; but if her husband be dead, she is loosed from the law of her husband. Therefore, whilst her husband liveth, she shall be called an adulteress if she be with another man; but if her husband be dead she is delivered from the law of her husband, so that she is not an adulteress if she be with another man” (Rom. 7:2, 3). “To them that are married, not I, but the Lord commandeth, that the wife depart not from her husband. And if she depart, that she remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband. And let not the husband put away his wife” (1 Cor. 7:10, 11). He also compares Christian marriage with the indissoluble union between Christ and His Church (Eph. 5:24 sqq.).

(b) Tradition, both theoretical and practical, inculcates the same doctrine. St. Augustine may be taken as representing the Fathers. “Throughout all nations and men the excellence of wedlock is in the procreation of children, and in the faithfulness of chastity; but as regards the people of God, it is also in the holiness of the sacrament (in sanctitate sacramenti), through which holiness it is a crime, even for the party that is divorced, to marry another whilst the husband lives (De Bono Conjug., vi. n. 3; cf. supra, p. 513).

(c) “It must be allowed,” says Leo XIII. (Encyc. Arcanum), “that the Catholic Church has been of the highest service to the well-being of all peoples by her constant defence of the sanctity and perpetuity of marriage. She deserves no small thanks for openly protesting against the civil laws which offended so grievously in this matter a century ago; for striking with anathema the Protestant heresy concerning divorce and putting away; condemning in many ways the dissolution of marriage common among the Greeks; for declaring null and void all marriages entered into on condition of future dissolution; and lastly, for rejecting, even in the early ages, the imperial laws in favour of divorce and putting away. And when the Roman Pontiffs withstood the most potent princes, who sought with threats to obtain the Church’s approval of their divorces, they fought not only for the safety of religion, but even for that of civilization. Future ages will admire the courageous documents published by Nicolas I. against Lothair, by Urban II. and Paschal II. against Philip I. of France, by Celestine III. and Innocent III. against Philip II. of France, by Clement VII. and Paul III. against Henry VIII., and, lastly, by Pius VII., that brave and holy Pontiff, against Napoleon I., in the height of his prosperity and power.”

There is a well-known passage of Holy Scripture which is commonly quoted in favour of divorce: “Whosoever,” says our Lord, “shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery” (Matt. 19:9). Catholic interpreters usually explain this difficult text by referring to Mark 10:11, 12; Luke 16:18; and 1 Cor. 7:39, where divorce is absolutely forbidden. They hold, therefore, that the apparent exception given in St. Matthew must be explained so as not to clash with the absolute rule given in the other Evangelists and St. Paul. There is, however, much difference of opinion as to the exact meaning of the text. Some writers lay stress on the word πορνεία, which they take to mean fornication, and not adultery (μοιχεία). Hence, according to them, the sense is: Whosoever shall put away his wife, except she be a wife of fornication, i.e. a mere concubine, etc. Others, likewise insisting that fornication is meant, hold that our Lord, speaking to Jews, told them that it was lawful for them to put away a wife who was found guilty of having sinned before marriage, because among them marriage with a virgin was alone looked upon as valid. Afterwards, when speaking to the disciples about marriage as it was to be among Christians, He forbade divorce under any circumstances. The common interpretation, however, allows that our Lord meant by πορνεία adultery, and that He spoke not merely of marriage under the Mosaic law; but it considers that He spoke not of divorce properly so-called, but of perpetual separation. The meaning would therefore be: Whosoever shall refuse to live with his wife altogether—which he may not do, except if she has committed adultery—himself commits adultery, i.e. becomes responsible for adultery on the part of his wife by exposing her to the danger of living with another. This interpretation may seem forced, but it may be proved from the context, and it has great patristic authority in its favour. The Pharisees asked our Lord whether it was lawful to put away one’s wife. Our Lord answered that it was not lawful. They objected that Moses allowed it. Our Lord replied that Moses did so on account of the hardness of their heart, but that in the beginning it was not lawful. He then laid down the new law, restoring the primitive indissolubility. Now, if He allowed divorce, He would not have restored the primitive perfection of marriage, wherein what God had joined together no man could put asunder. Moreover, in the Sermon on the Mount our Lord had said, “Whosoever shall put away his wife, excepting the cause of fornication, maketh her to commit adultery” (Matt. 5:32). Some ancient authorities read, “Maketh her an adulteress” (in 19:9, as well as here). That is to say, exposes her to the danger of adultery, and so becomes responsible for her sin. It should be noted, too, that our Lord does not say, “Whosoever shall put away his wife and shall marry another, except it be for fornication, committeth adultery,” but “Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication,” etc. And that both in 5:32 and 19:9 He says absolutely, “He that shall marry her that is put away committeth adultery.” The following passages from three of the greatest Fathers will show that they held the unlawfulness of divorce, even in case of adultery. “As long as the husband is alive, even though he be an adulterer, or sodomite, or covered with crimes, and be deserted by his wife for these enormities, he is still her husband, and she may not take another. It was not on his own authority that the Apostle so decreed, but, Christ speaking in him, he followed Christ’s words, Who saith in the Gospel, ‘Whosoever putteth away his wife, excepting the cause of fornication, maketh her an adulteress; and whosoever shall take her that is put away, is an adulterer.’ Note the words, ‘Whosoever hath taken her that is put away is an adulterer.’ Whether she puts her husband away, or is put away by her husband, whoso shall take her is an adulterer” (St. Jerome, Ep., 55). St. Augustine deals expressly with the question of divorce in two books, De Conjugiis Adulterinis. Pollentius, to whom the books were addressed, was of opinion that adultery was a lawful excuse for divorce. He asked why, if our Lord meant that divorce was never lawful, He did not say so simply. The Saint answered that our Lord wished to condemn the graver sin of divorce where there was no adultery, without, however, excusing divorce in the case of adultery. The words given in Mark 10:11, 12, and Luke 16:18, condemn both cases absolutely. St. John Chrysostom, in his sermon “On the Bill of Divorce,” insists strongly on indissolubility even in the case of adultery. “A woman is bound by the law as long as her husband liveth; and, therefore, even though he gives her a bill of divorce, even though she leaves the house and goes to another, she is bound by the law, and is an adulteress.… If [divorce] were good, [God] would not have made one man and one woman, but would have made two women for the one Adam, if He willed one to be put away and the other to be taken. But by the very formation [of our first parents] He made the law which I am now writing about. And what law is that? Let every man keep for ever that wife who first fell to his lot. This law is more ancient than the law of the bill of divorce,” etc. (nn. 1, 2).

The passages quoted from the Fathers in favour of divorce are for the most part either mere repetitions of our Lord’s words, as recorded by St. Matthew, and therefore capable of the same interpretation; or else are ambiguous, and may be understood to refer to separation rather than divorce. Civil laws favouring divorce, even when enacted by Christian princes, are of no weight as theological arguments.

3. The absolute indissolubility of the marriage bond applies only in the case of sacramental marriage which has been consummated. If the parties, although validly married, have not become one flesh, the marriage is capable of dissolution. The Council of Trent has defined that the solemn religious profession of one of the parties breaks the bond in such a case (sess. xxiv. can. 6). Long before the Council this law was recognized and acted upon. Many instances are mentioned by ecclesiastical writers in which the bridegroom left his bride intact and consecrated himself to God; and the practice is always highly extolled. Whether the Pope also had the power of dissolving these marriages, was formerly disputed among theologians; but it is now certain that he has the power. “There can be no further question,” says Benedict XIV., “about the power of the Pope concerning dispensation in the case of unconsummated sacramental marriage; the affirmative is commonly held by theologians and canonists, and is acted upon in practice, as is well known” (Quætion. Canon., 479).

SECT. 279.—THE CHURCH’S CONTROL OVER MARRIAGE—IMPEDIMENTS

I. The relation between man and wife has such an important bearing upon the religious and civil welfare of the community, that marriage cannot be said to be a mere contract. There must be some restriction as to the parties competent to marry, and some regulation as to their mutual rights and duties, and as to the continuance of the relation. To whom should this control belong? The State claims it on the ground of the civil consequences of marriage. On the other hand, Christian marriage is a sacrament, and therefore, like all else that is sacred, belongs to the Catholic Church. Leo XIII. (Encyc. Arcanum) teaches that Christ entrusted to the Church the entire control over Christian marriage. It is hers to limit, for wise reasons, the competency of certain persons to contract with each other, or at all. She has the right to decide whether error, or force, or fraud has annulled the contract. Above all, she is the guardian of the unity and perpetuity of the marriage bond. These powers she has always and everywhere exercised, not as derived from the consent of governments, but as given to her directly by her Divine Founder. When Christ condemned polygamy and divorce, He was not acting as the delegate of the Roman governor of Judæa, or of the tetrarch of Galilee. St. Paul’s judgment on the incestuous Corinthian in no way assumed the tacit consent of Nero. The Councils of Aries, Chalcedon, and many others down to Trent, have all issued decrees concerning marriage independently of emperors and kings. Nay, the three great imperial jurisprudents, Honorius, Theodosius the Younger, and Justinian, acknowledged that in matters relating to marriage they were merely the guardians and defenders of the sacred canons. “Therefore,” says Leo XIII., “rightly was it defined at the Council of Trent that the Church has the power of establishing diriment impediments of matrimony (sess. xxiv. can. 4), and that matrimonial cases belong to ecclesiastical judges (can. 12).”

Although the Pontiff teaches that Christ entrusted to the Church the entire control (totam disciplinam) of Christian marriage, he does not say that the State has nothing to do with marriage. On the contrary, he insists that the Church does not wish to interfere with the civil consequences of marriage. In her regulations she ever pays attention to circumstances of time, place, and character, and does her best for the public welfare. Her greatest desire is to be at peace with the State, seeing that so much good results when the two work together. It is worthy of note that a few great theologians and canonists have held that the State also has the power of establishing diriment impediments, but this opinion is now commonly rejected.

II. Just as civil contracts are subject to the laws of the State, in like manner the contract of marriage is governed by canon law. The chief laws concerning marriage are those treating of the capacity or incapacity of certain classes of persons to enter into the contract. The impediments are of two kinds: forbidding (impedientia), and diriment (dirimentia). The former render marriage unlawful; the latter make it null and void. Persons who marry under a forbidding impediment contract really and truly, but sin grievously thereby. When the impediment is diriment, those who attempt marriage not only sin grievously, but are not married at all. The full treatment of these impediments belongs to moral theology.

Scholion. Though Christian marriage is a sacrament, the Council of Trent has condemned those who hold “that the married state is higher than the state of virginity or of celibacy, and that it is not better and more blessed to remain in virginity or in celibacy than to be united in matrimony” (sess. xxiv. can. 10).

The teaching of the Council is based upon the words of St. Paul and of our Lord Himself. “He that is without a wife,” says the Apostle, “is solicitous for the things that belong to the Lord, how he may please God. But he that is with a wife is solicitous for the things of the world, how he may please his wife: and he is divided. And the unmarried woman and the virgin thinketh on the things of the Lord: that she may be holy both in body and spirit. But she that is married thinketh on the things of the world, how she may please her husband” (1 Cor. 7:32–34). “There are eunuchs,” says our Lord, “who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven. He that can take, let him take it” (Matt. 19:12; cf. Apoc. 14:3, 4). St. Thomas Aquinas has treated of virginity in his usual masterly fashion (Contra Gent., iii. c. 136). The reader will there find a complete answer to the common objections against the unmarried state.

On matrimony see St. Thomas, Supp. qq. xli.–lxviii.; Sanchez, De Sancto Matrimonii Sacramento; De Augustinis, op. cit., lib. iv.; Palmieri, De Matrimonio Christiano; Ballerini; op. cit., vol. vi.; Card. Gasparri, De Matrimonio; Scheeben, Mysterien, p. 471; Atzberger, op. cit., p. 769; Didon, Indissolubilité et Divorce; Turmel, op. cit., pp. 157, 346, 469.

BOOK VIII

THE LAST THINGS

TO complete our task, we have now to see how man—created and elevated, fallen and redeemed—finally attains the end for which he was created by God. Death has already been spoken of (supra, p. 22). We shall here treat (1) of the Resurrection of the Body; (2) the Last Judgment; (3) Hell; (4) Purgatory; (5) Heaven.

St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, iii. 1–63, iv. 79–97; Summa Theol., Supp. qq. 69–100; 1a 2ae, qq. 1–5; Jungmann, De Novissimis; Billot, De Novissimis; Atzberger, Handbuch der Katholischen Dogmatik, iv. p. 801; Die Christliche Eschatologie; Geschichte der Christl. Eschatologie; Oxenham, Catholic Eschatology; Turmel, Hist. de la Théologie Positive, P. 179, 356, 485; Tournebize, Opinions du Jour sur les Peines d’ Outre-Tombe.

SECT. 280.—THE RESURRECTION OF THE BODY

THE Fourth Lateran Council has defined that all men, whether elect or reprobate, “will rise again with their own bodies which they now bear about with them (cum suis propriis resurgent corporibus quæ nunc gestant)” (c. Firmiter That is to say, at the Last Day the bodies of all mankind will be raised up again from the dead, and once more united to their souls, which of course have never ceased to live since their separation from the body. This doctrine of the resurrection of the body (resurrectio carnis, resurrectio mortuorum, ἀνάστασις τῶν νεκρῶν) is found expressed in numberless creeds and professions of faith from the earliest days of Christianity: e.g. in St. Irenæus (Adv. Hæres., i. 10); Tertullian (De Præscr., 13); Origen (Periarch. præf., 5); in the Apostolic Constitutions (vii. 41); in the Apostles’, Nicene, and Athanasian Creeds; in the Creed of the Eleventh Council of Toledo (Denzinger, Enchir., xxvi.); in the Creed of Leo IX., subscribed by Bishop Peter—still used at the consecration of bishops; the profession of faith subscribed by Michael Palæologus in the Second Council of Lyons (Denzinger, l.c., lix.); and, finally, in the Creed of Pius IV.

I. 1. The Old Testament, as we should expect from its imperfect and preparatory character, speaks at first only vaguely, but afterwards with increasing definiteness, of the resurrection of the body. A Redeemer is to come Who will undo all the evil effects of Adam’s sin; Who will bestow upon men bodily immortality, and will restore to them the full enjoyment of the happiness lost in Paradise. “For I know that my Redeemer liveth, and in the last day I shall rise out of the earth; and I shall be clothed again with my skin, and in my flesh I shall see God, Whom I myself shall see, and my eyes shall behold, and not another; this hope is laid up in my bosom” (Job 19:25–27). Isaias foretells that the Lord of Hosts “shall cast death down headlong for ever” (25:8); “Thy dead men shall live, My slain shall rise again; awake and give praise, ye that dwell in the dust: for thy dew is the dew of the light. And the land of the giants thou shalt pull down into ruin [Heb., the earth shall cast forth the dead, or the shades] … the earth shall disclose her blood, and shall cover her slain no more” (26:19–21). Ezechiel’s vision of the resurrection of the dry bones (37) refers, of course, in the first instance to the restoration of Israel; but the selection of such a figure is a proof of belief in a literal resurrection. “Many of those that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake: some unto life everlasting, and others unto reproach to see it always” (Dan. 12:2; cf. 12; Apoc. 6:3; Ps. 15:10). In the Second Book of Machabees, the martyr brothers comfort themselves amidst their torments with the hope and belief that those very members which they were losing for God’s sake will be again restored to them by Him. The third “quickly put forth his tongue, and courageously stretched out his hands, and said with confidence, These I have from heaven, but for the laws of God I now despise them, because I hope to receive them again from Him” (7:11; cf. 9, 14). This shows the belief prevalent among the people at that time; and Martha’s words, “I know that he shall rise again in the resurrection at the last day” (John 11:24), prove the same for a later period. It should be mentioned that the resurrection of the dead is the thirteenth article of the Jewish Creed.

2. The doctrine of the resurrection was not only confirmed by our Lord (John 5:28 sqq.; 6:39 sqq.; 11:25; Luke 14:14), but expressly defended by Him against the Sadducees, whose unbelief He attributed to their ignorance of the Scriptures and the power of God (Matt. 22:29; Luke 20:37). It was preached by the Apostles as one of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity; e.g. by St. Paul at Athens (Acts 17:18, 31, 32), at Jerusalem (23:6), before Felix (24:15), before Agrippa (26:8); it is taught at great length in the Epistles (Rom. 8:11; 1 Cor. 6:14; 15:12 sqq.; 2 Cor. 4:14; 5:1 sqq.; Phil. 3:21; 1 Thess. 4:12–16; 2 Tim. 2:11; Heb. 6:2), and also in the Apocalypse (20:12 sqq.). Here we can quote only one of these passages: “If Christ be preached that He rose again from the dead, how do some among you say that there is no resurrection of the dead? But if there be no resurrection of the dead, then Christ is not risen again; and if Christ be not risen again, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain.… For by a man came death, and by a man the resurrection of the dead; and as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive.… Behold, I tell you a mystery: we shall all indeed rise again, but we shall not all be changed. In a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet; for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall rise again incorruptible” (1 Cor. 15:12 sqq.).

3. Where the teaching of Scripture is so abundant and so clear on a matter so repugnant to the prevailing pagan beliefs, we are not surprised to find it one of the commonest topics treated of by the Fathers. They had to defend it not only against those who denied immortality of any sort, but also against those who (like Plato), while firmly believing in the immortality of the soul, held that the body was nothing but the prison of the soul, and death was an escape from the bondage of matter. When certain philosophers of the Epicureans and Stoics heard of the resurrection of the dead, some indeed mocked” (Acts 17:32). “No doctrine of the Christian faith,” says St. Augustine, “is so vehemently and so obstinately opposed as the doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh” (In Ps., lxxxviii., Serm., ii. n. 5). The various sects of Gnostics and Manichæans, who looked upon all matter as evil, naturally denied the resurrection. So, too, did their followers, the Priscillianists, the Cathari, and Albigenses. We need hardly add that in our day the Rationalists, Materialists, and Pantheists are also opposed to the doctrine. See Justin Martyr, Dial. cum Tryph., 80; Tatian, Græc., 6; Origen, In Levit., Hom. v. n. 10; Tertullian, De Resurr. Carn., c. 1; St. Basil, Ep. cclxxi. n. 3; St. Ephræm, De Resurr. Mort.; St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, xx. 20; Theodoret, Hist. Eccl., i. 4, etc.

4. No real proof from reason can be adduced in favour of the resurrection; it is from revelation alone that we can prove the doctrine. Nevertheless, the Fathers commonly argue that man’s position in the universe as linking together spirit and matter, his desire for complete and perfect happiness, the share which the body takes both in our good and evil deeds—that all of these, if they do not absolutely prove the resurrection, at least point to its fittingness. And they appeal to certain analogies found in revelation and in nature itself; e.g. Jonas in the whale’s belly; the three children in the fiery furnace; Daniel in the lions’ den; the carrying away of Henoch and Elias; the raising of the dead; the blossoming of Aaron’s rod; the preservation of the garments of the Israelites in the desert; the grain of seed dying and springing up again; the egg; the seasons of the year; day succeeding day; and the mythical Phœnix. These form the subject of countless pictures in early Christian art. See Kraus, Encycl. Archäol., art. AUFERSTEHUNG; Northcote and Brownlow, Roma Sotterranea.

II. “Christ’s resurrection,” says St. Thomas, “is the cause and model of our resurrection (causa efficiens et exemplaris)” (3, q. 56, a. 1, ad. 3). “Christ is risen from the dead, the first-fruits of them that sleep; for by a man came death, and by a man the resurrection of the dead” (1 Cor. 15:20, 21).

1. The work of redemption was to undo the evil wrought by Adam’s sin, and to restore the gifts originally bestowed upon mankind (Rom. 5). By sin death was brought into the world (Gen. 3:19); but Christ has triumphed over sin and death (1 Cor. 15:54–57). “He was delivered up for our sins, and rose again for our justification” (Rom. 4:25). “I am the Resurrection, and the Life,” He said; “he that believeth in Me, although he be dead, shall live; and every one that liveth and believeth in Me shall not die for ever” (John 11:25, 26). “Our bodies are the members of Christ” (1 Cor. 6:15); “We are members of His body, of His flesh, of His bones” (Eph. 5:30). We have already pointed out that the preternatural gifts were not immediately restored to man by redemption; they are, however, kept in store for us, and are to be enjoyed by us in our resurrection.

2. “Christ will reform (μετασχηματίσει) the body of our lowness (ταπεινώσεως), made like to the body of His glory (σύμμορφον τῷ σώματι τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ)” (Phil. 3:21). “If we have been planted together in the likeness of His death, we shall be also in the likeness of His resurrection” (Rom. 6:5). In accordance with the doctrine of 1 Cor. 15 and other passages of Holy Scripture, theologians teach that the risen bodies of the just, like Christ’s risen body, will be endowed with four principal qualities (dotes):

(a) Impassibility, including incorruptibility and immortality. Just as “Christ rising from the dead dieth now no more; death shall no more have dominion over Him” (Rom. 6:9); so “they that shall be accounted worthy of that world, and of the resurrection from the dead … neither can they die any more” (Luke 20:35, 36); “It is sown in corruption (ἐν φθορᾷ), it shall rise in incorruption (ἐν ἀφθαρσίᾳ) (1 Cor. 15:42); “God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes, and death shall be no more, nor mourning, nor crying, nor sorrow shall be any more” (Apoc. 21:4).

(b) Brightness (claritas). As the face of Jesus at His Transfiguration shone like the sun, so “shall the just shine as the sun in the kingdom of their Father” (Matt. 13:43; cf. Dan. 12:3; Wisd. 3:7); for the body “is sown in dishonour, it shall rise in glory (ἐν δόξῃ)” (1 Cor. 15:43). According to the merits of each will be the brightness of each: “One is the glory of the sun, another the glory of the moon, and another the glory of the stars, for star differeth from star in glory (δόξῃ)” (ibid. 41).

(c) Agility, i.e. the power of moving from place to place, so as to be immediately anywhere that we wish. Our Lord’s risen body appeared and disappeared at His will, and ascended into heaven when it pleased Him.

(d) Spirituality (subtilitas), by means of which the body becomes so completely subject to the soul, and participates to such an extent in the soul’s more perfect and purer life, that it becomes itself like to a spirit. “It is sown a natural body (σῶμα ψυχικόν), it shall rise a spiritual body (σῶμα πνευματικόν)” (1 Cor. 15:44). This quality is generally explained in the special sense of subtilty or penetrability, that is, of being able to pass through material objects, just as our Lord’s risen body did. See St. Thomas, Suppl., qq. 83–85.

III. The great difficulty against the resurrection of the body is as to how its identity is to be preserved. That we shall all rise again with the same bodies is of the very essence of the doctrine (Job 19:25 sqq.; 2 Mach. 7:11; Rom. 8:11; 1 Cor. 15:53; Tertullian, Contr. Marcion, v. 9; Origen, Princip., ii. 10, 1; St. Ambrose. Fid. Resurr., 87; St. Jerome, Contr. Joan. Hieros., 33; St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, xxii. cc. 19, 20; Serm. ccxiv. 12; ccxxxv. 4; ccxliii. 3; cclvi. 2, etc.). Nevertheless, the particles of the body are continually passing away, and being replaced by others; and the particles of one human body may enter into the composition of other human bodies. We must not, therefore, press too far the material identity of the earthly and the risen body. Some theologians, following St. Augustine, have thought it sufficient if any of the particles which at any time formed part of the earthly body are preserved. Others have not required even so much as this. We cannot here enter into the discussion. See Jungmann, De Novissimis, c. iii. a. 2; Atzberger, op. cit., p. 916.

SECT. 281.—THE LAST, OR GENERAL JUDGMENT

We have seen that though “God wills all men to be saved,” and though Christ died for all, yet as a fact some will be saved and some will be lost. The decision of their eternal fate is given when their course is run: in the case of the individual, at his death; in the case of the human race as a whole, at the end of time. This latter, which is called the Last, or General, Judgment, is the one which concerns us here.

I. Mankind in the sight of God is not simply a number of individuals, but a great whole: one great family, having the same origin, involved in the same ruin, rescued by the same Redeemer. Although the Creator wills and promotes the good of every single creature, yet each is subservient to the good of the whole. Moreover, every man’s action is not isolated, but influences and is influenced by that of his fellow-men, whether past, present, or future. God “reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly;” nevertheless, to us who cannot contemplate the whole, “His ways are unsearchable” (Rom. 11:33). A day, however, will come, “the day of the Lord” (Joel 2:31), when all will be made clear, and His ways will be justified in the sight of all mankind (St. Thomas. 3, q. 59, a. 5).

1. In the Old Testament the Prophets speak of a great judgment which is to take place in the last days (Isa. 66:15 sqq.; Joel 2:29 sqq.; 3:2 sqq.; Mal. 4:1; Soph. 1:14 sqq.). From them the Jews gathered their notion of a glorious and mighty Messias; and hence they rejected our Lord, Who came to them in poverty and in weakness. But He, referring to these very prophecies, foretold His Second Coming in great power and majesty to judge the living and dead (Matt. 13:41; 19:28; 24:27 sqq.; 25:31 sqq.; Mark 13:24 sqq.; Luke 21:25 sqq.). The Apostles repeatedly preach this coming of Christ as an exhortation to a holy life, and as a consolation in the midst of sorrows and trials: e.g. St. Peter at the conversion of Cornelius (Acts 10:42); St. Paul at Athens (ibid. 17:31), and in his Epistles (Rom. 2:5 sqq.; 14:10; 1 Cor. 4:5; 2 Cor. 5:10; 2 Tim. 4:1; 2 Thess. 1:5 sqq.); and St. James (5:7 sqq.).

2. In all the early creeds belief in the General Judgment is professed, usually in connection with our Lord’s second coming. “Sitteth at the right hand of God the Father Almighty; from thence He shall come to judge the living and the dead” (Apostles’ Creed). “And He shall come again with glory to judge the living and the dead” (Nicene Creed). “He sitteth at the right hand of God the Father Almighty; from whence He shall come to judge the living and the dead. At Whose coming all men shall rise again (resurgere habent) with their bodies, and shall give an account of their works” (Athanasian Creed).

II. Having thus established the fact of a future General Judgment, we turn now to the various circumstances and details connected with it.

1. The time of Christ’s second coming has not been made known to us: “Of that day or hour no man knoweth, neither the angels in heaven nor the Son, but the Father” (Mark 13:32). Hence our Lord continually warns us to be on the watch, so as not to be taken unawares: He will come like a thief in the night (Matt. 24:42); “in a day that [man] hopeth not, and at an hour he knoweth not” (ibid. 50). “Take heed to yourselves lest … that day come upon you suddenly; for as a snare shall it come” (Luke 21:34, 35); “Watch ye therefore (for you know not when the Lord of the house cometh; at even, or at midnight, or at the cock-crowing, or in the morning): lest coming on a sudden He find you sleeping; and what I say to you I say to all: Watch” (Mark 13:35–37). The Apostles seem to have expected their Master’s return almost immediately: “The end of all is at hand; be prudent, therefore, and watch in prayers” (1 Pet. 4:7); “The coming of the Lord is at hand (ἡ παρουσία τοῦ Κυρίου ἤγγικεν); … behold, the Judge standeth at the door” (James 5:8, 9); “Little children, it is the last hour (ἐσχάτη ὥρα)” (1 John 2:18). On the other hand, St. Paul begs the Thessalonians not to be alarmed by those who speak “as if the day of the Lord were at hand (ὡς ὁτι ἐνέστηκεν ἡ ἡμέρα τοῦ Κυρίου)” (2 Thess. 2:2; cf. 2 Pet. 3:8 sqq.). Nor is the uncertainty removed by the various signs which are to announce the approach of the Last Day. “Wars, and rumours of wars,” “pestilences, and famines, and earthquakes in places” (Matt. 24:6, 7) are unhappily common enough; “the signs in the sun, and in the moon, and in the stars” (Luke 21:24), are the accompaniments rather than the forerunners of the coming; the universal spreading of the Gospel (Matt. 24:14) and the conversion of the Jews (Rom. 11:26) are not sufficiently definite; while the coming of Antichrist and the return of Henoch and Elias are themselves full of mystery. Hence, even some of the Fathers (e.g. St. Gregory the Great, Hom. i., in Evang.) and other Saints (e.g. St. Vincent Ferrer) have mistaken the date of the Last Day.

2. The place in which the Judgment will be held is here on earth; for all the various texts and creeds speak of a coming or return to where our Lord was before. We must not, however, take this to mean simply the solid earth on which we stand: “They shall see the Son of Man coming in the clouds of heaven” (Matt. 24:39); “We who are alive, who are left, shall be caught up together with Christ into the air” (1 Thess. 4:16). The valley of Josaphat has been mentioned by some as the exact spot, by reason of the prophecy, “I will gather together all the nations, and will bring them down into the valley of Josaphat” (Joel 3:2); but these words can have only a remote reference to the Last Judgment. The neighbourhood of Jerusalem, however, where our Lord suffered, and whence He ascended into heaven, would seem to be a fitting place for His return and His final triumph.

3. The Judge will be our Lord Jesus Christ in His human nature, as the Son of Man. “Neither doth the Father judge any man; but hath given all judgment to the Son … and He hath given Him power to do judgment because He is the Son of Man” (John 5:22, 27; Matt. 24:30; 25:31; Luke 21:27). His second coming will be the completion of the work of the Incarnation. Then it is that the prophecies which speak of His power and glory and triumph will be fulfilled. At His first coming “He humbled Himself, taking the form of a servant;” His Divinity was hidden; He came to be judged, to suffer, and to die; but at His return He will come with great power and majesty; His Divinity will shine forth in His humanity; He will come to judge the living and dead, to triumph over His enemies, and bestow eternal reward on the faithful. “This Jesus, who is taken up from you into heaven, shall so come, as you have seen Him going into heaven (οὕτως ἐλεύσεται ὃν τρόπον ἐθεάσασθε αὐτὸν πορευόμενον εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν)” (Acts 1:11).

This office of Judge, which properly belongs to our Lord, He will to some extent communicate to the Apostles and other Saints (Matt. 19:28; 1 Cor. 6:2 sqq.).

4. All mankind, both good and bad; those who shall be alive at the Last Day, as well as those who shall have died, will be judged: “We shall all stand before the judgment-seat of Christ” (Rom. 14:10; 2 Cor. 5:10; 2 Thess. 3:14 sqq.); “The hour cometh wherein all that are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and they that have done good things shall come forth unto the resurrection of life; but they that have done evil unto the resurrection of judgment” (John 5:28, 29). When it is said, “Judge not, that ye may not be judged” (Matt. 7:7), judgment here and in similar passages (John 3:18) is clearly meant in the sense of condemnation (cf. John 16:11). St. Paul says that “we shall judge angels” (1 Cor. 6:3); and of the fallen angels it is said that “God delivered them drawn down by infernal ropes to the lower hell to be reserved unto judgment” (2 Pet. 2:4); or, as St. Jude says (6), “unto the judgment of the great day.” We may believe that the Angels, good and bad, will be judged either on account of their relations with mankind, or because they are subject to Him to Whom “all power is given in heaven and on earth,” Whom all the angels of God are to adore (Heb. 1:6), in Whose Name “every knee should bow, of those that are in heaven, on earth, and under the earth” (Phil. 2:10).

5. Christ will judge men according as they have believed in Him, and have kept His commandments. “Whosoever believeth in Him may not perish, but may have life everlasting” (John 3:16); “He who heareth My word, and believeth Him that sent Me, hath life everlasting” (ibid. v. 24); “The Son of Man shall come in the glory of His Father with His angels, and then will He render to every one according to his works” (Matt. 16:27; cf. 25:31–46; 2 Cor. 5:10) Every deed, “every idle word that men shall speak” (Matt. 12:36), will be revealed before the eyes of all: “The Lord will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of the hearts” (1 Cor. 4:5). This manifestation is described by St. John in the words of the Apocalypse: “I saw the dead, great and small, standing in the presence of the throne, and the books were opened; and another book was opened, which is the book of life; and the dead were judged, every one according to their works” (20:12). And not only the works of men, but the works of God also, will be manifested on that day: the acts of His infinite mercy; the hidden workings of His justice; the unsearchable ways of His providence, so that He may be justified in the sight of all. “What I do thou knowest not now, but thou shalt know hereafter” (John 13:7).

6. When “all the nations shall be gathered together before Him, the Son of Man shall separate them one from another, as the shepherd separateth the sheep from the goats; and He shall set the sheep on His right hand, and the goats on His left” (Matt. 25:32, 33; cf. 13:24–43, 48). Then will follow the final sentence of reward or condemnation:

“Come,”

“Depart from Me,”

“Ye blessed of My Father,”

“Ye cursed,”

“Possess you the kingdom”

“Into everlasting fire”

“Prepared for you from the foundation of the world.”

“Prepared for the devil and his angels.”

“And these shall go into everlasting punishment, but the just into life everlasting” (Matt. 25:34, 41, 46). See St. Thomas, 3, q. 59, and Suppl., qq. 89, 90, and the commentators thereon; Freiburg Kirchenlexikon, art. GÖTTLICHES GERICHT.

SECT. 282.—HELL

“The everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels,” to which the wicked will be condemned, is called “Hell (שְׁאוֹל, ᾅδης, γέ́εννα, infernus).” We must, however, bear in mind that these words are sometimes used in Scripture to mean merely the grave, or the unseen world generally (e.g. Gen. 37:35; 42:38; Acts 2:27, 31; Apoc. 20:13; cf. Job 10:21, 22). It is from the context that we can ascertain whether the abode of the damned is referred to. We have already said something on this question when treating of our Lord’s descent into Hell.

I. That the wicked will be punished after death is acknowledged by all who maintain the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. God is holy, and therefore hates sin; He is just, and therefore claims satisfaction for the offences committed against Him; He is wise, and therefore requires punishment as a means of restoring the moral order. Inasmuch as sin does not receive its due punishment in this world, it must do so in the other. Hence the traditions of all nations speak of some sort of hell. It is from Revelation, however, that we derive our chief information about the fate of the damned. “The Lord Almighty will take revenge on them, in the day of judgment He will visit them; for He will give fire and worms into their flesh, that they may burn and feel for ever” (Judith 16:21). “Many of those that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake: some unto life everlasting, and others unto reproach to see it always” (Dan. 12:2; see also Isaias 33:14; 66:24; Wisd. 4:19). In the New Testament mention is made over and over again of “Hell,” “Hell-fire,” “everlasting fire,” “the fiery furnace,” where there “shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth” (Matt. 5:22; 7:13; 10:28; 13:42; 25:41, etc.).

The Fathers, from the very earliest times, all agree in teaching the real existence of Hell, and prove it both from Holy Scripture and reason (see St. Justin M., Apol., ii. c. 9; Athenagoras, De Res Mort., c. xix.; St. Ignatius, Ad Eph., c. xvi.; Tertullian, Adv. Marc., i. c. 26; St. John Chrysost., Hom. iv., De Fato et Provid.). The most important decisions of the Church on the subject are the profession of faith made in the Second Council of Lyons (1274), (repeated in the Decree of Union in the Council of Florence, 1439): “The souls of those who depart in mortal sin, or only with original sin, go down immediately into hell, to be punished, however, by different torments (mox in infernum descenders, pænis tamen disparibus puniendas);” and the definition of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), that the wicked “shall receive everlasting punishment (pœnam perpetuam) with the devil” (cap. Firmiter See also the Council of Trent, sess. vi. c. 14; sess. xiv. can. 5.

II. Putting aside as comparatively unimportant the question where Hell is, we have now to consider the nature and duration of the torments of the damned.

1. As sin is a turning away from God and a turning towards creatures (aversio a Deo, conversio ad creaturam), a twofold punishment is suffered by the sinner: one privative, the other positive.

(a) The pain (or punishment) of loss (pœna damni) consists in the privation of the highest good to which man is destined, viz. God Himself, and the enjoyment of His blessed vision. “Depart from Me, ye cursed.” “I know you not whence you are; depart from Me, all ye workers of iniquity” (Matt. 25:41; Luke 13:27; cf. 1 Cor. 6:9; Apoc. 22:15). Theologians rightly look upon this as the most dreadful of all the punishments of Hell; it is the utter blighting of one’s existence; nothing can be worse than to realize that one has lost for ever by his own fault the Greatest of all Goods, for which he was made, and which he might so easily have attained. It is “so great a punishment that no torments known to us can be compared to it” (St. Augustine, Enchirid., c. 112; see also St. John Chrysostom, Ad Theodos. Laps., i. nn. 10, 12).

(b) The positive punishment is called the pain (or punishment) of sense (pæna sensus). It embraces all the torments not comprehended under the pain of loss, and is so called because it produces sensible suffering, and is produced chiefly by a sensible object, viz. fire. That there is a fire of some sort in hell is taught in numberless passages of Holy Scripture (e.g. Matt. 13:30–50; 18:8; 25:41; Mark 9:42 sqq.; 2 Thess. 1:8; Heb. 10:27; Apoc. 18:8; 19:20; 20:9, sqq., etc.). The question is whether this “fire” is to be understood in the metaphorical sense of spiritual torments, such as anguish of conscience, etc., as Origen (De Princ., ii. 4 sqq.), St. Ambrose (In Luc., xiv.), Theophylact (In Marc., ix.), Catharinus, and some others maintain; or in the strict sense of material fire. This latter opinion is the common teaching of the Fathers and theologians, though not defined by the Church (Suarez, De Angelis, 1. viii. c. 12; Petavius, De Angelis, 1. iii. c. 5); and is supported by the various expressions used in the Sacred Writings when hell is spoken of: e.g. “the furnace of fire” (Matt. 13:42); “the bottomless pit” (Apoc. 9:1); “the pool of fire and brimstone” (ibid. 20:9); “the rage of fire shall consume,” etc. (Heb. 10:27); “I am tormented in this flame” (Luke 16:24); “a flame of fire yielding vengeance to them who know not God, and who obey not the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ” (2 Thess. 1:8); “the fire is not extinguished, for every one shall be salted with fire” (Mark 9:48). How pure spirits (the devils) and disembodied spirits (the souls of the wicked before the resurrection of the body) can be affected by a material substance is beyond our comprehension; but the fact is not therefore to be denied (see St. Thomas, In iv. Sent., dist. 44, q. 3, a. 2; Suppl., q. 70, a. 3; Contra Gent., iv. 90; Suarez, De Angelis, lib. viii. c. 14, n. 46). Besides the various torments arising from the action of fire, the damned suffer the pangs of remorse; “their worm (σκώληξ) dieth not” (Mark 9:43, 45, 47); their intellects are darkened, their wills are impenitent, and the companionship of the devils and other lost souls adds to their misery. After the resurrection their bodies will likewise be tormented, as having been the partakers of their sins (St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 98; Contra Gentes, l. iv. c. 89).

3. The various passages of Scripture already quoted clearly teach the eternity of the pains of Hell. The argument does not depend simply upon the meaning of the word “everlasting” (æternus, αἰώνιος); it is from the context, and also from other expressions, that we gather that the punishment is to have no end. “Their worm dieth not, and their fire is not extinguished (οὐ σβέννυται)” (Mark 9:44); “It is better for thee to enter lame into life everlasting than having two feet to be cast into the hell of unquenchable fire (εἰς τὴν γέενναν εἰς τὸ πῦρ τὸ ἄσβετον)” (ibid. 45). “Life everlasting” is opposed to “everlasting punishment” (Matt. 25:41); and as the one has no end, so also the other. Moreover the wicked are said, over and over again, to be absolutely excluded from the kingdom of God: “He that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost shall never have forgiveness, but shall be guilty of an everlasting sin” (Mark 3:29; Matt. 12:32). “Neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers … shall possess the kingdom of God” (1 Cor. 6:9, 10); “It were better for him if that man had not been born” (Matt. 26:24); “Not every one that saith to Me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven” (Matt. 7:21); “I never knew you; depart from Me, you that work iniquity” (ibid. 23); “There shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth, when you shall see Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, and all the prophets in the kingdom of God, and you yourselves thrust out” (Luke 13:28); “The pool of fire and brimstone, where both the beast and the false prophet shall be tormented day and night for ever and ever (εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων)” (Apoc. 20:9, 10).

Bearing these texts in mind and remembering that a judge’s final sentence should be clear, we are forced to interpret our Lord’s words, “Depart from Me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire,” as meaning a punishment that will have no end. “If Christ had intended to teach the doctrine of eternal punishment, could He possibly have taught it in plainer or more direct terms? If He did not intend to teach it, could He possibly have chosen language more certain, à priori, to mislead, as the unbroken experience of eighteen centuries proves, à posteriori, that it always has misled, the immense multitude of His disciples?”

The teaching of the Fathers on the eternity of Hell is almost unanimous. St. Clement of Rome, St. Justin Martyr, Theophilus, Tertullian, Minucius Felix, St. Irenæus (Contra Hær., iv. 28), St. Cyprian (Ad Demetr., 24, 25), and Hippolytus—to mention only the early Fathers—all speak of “eternal punishments,” “unquenchable fire,” “eternal fire,” “torments without end” (see Petavius, De Angelis, lib. iii. c. 8). The great Origen, it is true, held that all men, and even the devils, would be saved at last (De Princ., i. 6; In Josu., Hom. viii.); and his teaching to some extent influenced the opinions of St. Gregory of Nyssa (Or. Cat., 26), St. Gregory of Nazianzum, St. Ambrose, and St. Jerome (In Is., xiv. 20), see Petavius (l.c., cap. 7). But the long catena of passages quoted by Petavius (l.c.) proves that these were merely exceptions to the general teaching. Origen’s views were condemned by the Fifth Ecumenical Council (553), which brands the doctrine of restoration as monstrous (τερατωδῆ ἀποκατάστασιν) (can. i.). His name also figures in the eleventh anathema, though here no mention is made of any particular error (see the question discussed in Hefele, Hist. of the Councils, ii. 898). “Which faith,” says the Athanasian Creed, “except every one do keep entire and inviolate, without doubt he shall perish everlastingly.… They that have done good shall go into life everlasting; and they that have done evil, into everlasting fire. This is the Catholic faith.” The Fourth Lateran Council (c. Firmiter) and the Council of Trent (sess. vi. c. 14; sess. xiv. can. 5) speak of “everlasting punishment” (pæna perpetua), “eternal punishment” (pæna æterna), and “eternal damnation” (damnatio æterna.

It may be objected that a doctrine which seems opposed to the goodness and mercy, and even justice of God, cannot be contained in Holy Scripture, and that therefore these passages cannot be taken to mean that the punishments of the damned will be endless; especially as the Scriptures distinctly teach that God “will not always be angry, nor will He threaten for ever” (Ps. 102:9), and they also speak of a “restitution of all things (ἀποκαταστάσεως πάντων)” (Acts 3:21); “when all things shall be subdued unto Him, then the Son also Himself shall be subject unto Him that put all things under Him, that God may be all in all” (1 Cor. 15:28). We readily acknowledge the difficulty of reconciling the eternity of Hell with the existence of an infinitely merciful God; but the doctrine is taught so distinctly, that we have to accept it just like other doctrines which we cannot understand. “What shall we say, then? Is there injustice with God? God forbid” (Rom. 9:14). We must, of course, put aside all exaggerated notions as to the numbers of the lost. We cannot believe that God, “Who will have all men to be saved” (1 Tim. 2:4). will condemn any one who has not deliberately rejected Him. The difficulty about the salvation of those who are outside the Church has already been dealt with (supra, p. 385; and vol. i. p. 135); and the fate of unbaptized children will be considered presently. It is, however, the belief in Purgatory which is of the greatest help to a belief in Hell. If we admit that after this life the imperfect will suffer punishments which will have an end, we can more readily believe that the hardened sinners will be for ever cast out of God’s sight. It is surely noteworthy that the Protestants, who began by rejecting Purgatory “as a fond thing vainly invented, and grounded upon no warranty of Scripture, but rather repugnant to the Word of God,” should now be giving up their belief in Hell, and taking refuge in some sort of Purgatory, and appealing to the Scriptures in proof of its existence.

Scholion. Besides Hell, properly so called, there are other abodes of the departed which sometimes are called by that name. The just who died before Christ’s ascension into Heaven were unable to enter that place of bliss. “All these being approved by the testimony of faith, received not the promise” (Heb. 11:39). They were detained in “Limbo,” so called because it was believed to be on the border or fringe (limbus) of Hell. They suffered no torments, except that of hope delayed. Hence their abode was also called “Paradise” (Luke 23:43), and “Abraham’s bosom” (ibid. 16:23). This “Limbo of the Fathers,” which no longer has any existence, must be distinguished from the “Limbo of the children” (limbus puerorum), where unbaptized infants are detained (supra, § 164).

SECT. 283.—PURGATORY

Those who depart this life in a state of grace are not always fit to enter at once into the Beatific Vision. They may be burdened with venial sin; or, though entirely free from any kind of sin, they may still have not fully paid the debt of temporal punishment due for their forgiven sins. Such souls must be cleansed from their sins, or must undergo this temporal punishment. The abode or condition in which this takes place, is what is meant by Purgatory. It is therefore a sort of middle state between Heaven and Hell; but the souls who are there are really saved, and will infallibly enter Heaven as soon as they are fitted for that happy consummation. They can no longer merit or sin; they cannot properly satisfy God by meriting—they can only make some sort of satisfaction by suffering. On the other hand, the faithful who are still on earth can help them by their prayers and good works, and for this purpose nothing is so efficacious as the Mass. The Council of Trent, in dealing with the subject, confines itself to the definition of these two points: “that there is a Purgatory, and that the souls there detained are helped by the suffrages of the faithful, but chiefly by the acceptable sacrifice of the altar” (sess. xxv.; cf. sess. vi. can. 30; sess. xxii. chap. 2, can. 3; and also the decree of union in the Council of Florence, Denzinger’s Enchir., lxxiii.). The Council adds a warning which has not always been sufficiently borne in mind by spiritual writers and preachers: “Let the more difficult and subtle questions which tend not to edification, and from which, for the most part, there is no increase of piety, be excluded from popular discourses before the uninstructed people In like manner, such things as are uncertain, or which labour under an appearance of error, let them (the bishops) not allow to be made public and treated of; while those things which tend to a certain kind of curiosity or superstition, or which savour of filthy lucre, let them prohibit as scandals and stumbling-blocks of the faithful.” Before proceeding to the proof of the doctrine defined by the Council, we observe that the two points hang very much together; prayer for the dead implying that the souls could benefit thereby, and so implying the existence of a middle and temporary state.

I. The strongest proof of the existence of Purgatory is undoubtedly to be found in tradition and the general principles of theology; but Holy Scripture is not wanting in indications that there is a place of purgation after death.

1. “And making a gathering, (Judas) sent twelve thousand drachms of silver to Jerusalem for sacrifice to be offered for the sins of the dead, thinking well and religiously concerning the resurrection (for if he had not hoped that they that were slain should rise again, it would have seemed superfluous and vain to pray for the dead); and because he considered that they who had fallen asleep with godliness had great grace laid up for them. It is therefore a holy and wholesome thought to pray for the dead, that they may be loosed from sin” (2 Machabees 13:23–26). In these words is clearly expressed the belief in a middle state, in which the departed can benefit by the prayers and good works of those who are still here on earth. The Jews here spoken of had been slain while fighting in God’s cause, but they had been guilty of taking and concealing the idols of the enemy, and had fallen with this sin upon their souls.

The Fathers also appeal to Tob. 4:18, Ecclus. 7:37, and Ps. 65:12, as indications of the doctrine of Purgatory. Our Lord tells us that the sin against the Holy Ghost “shall not be forgiven neither in this world nor in the world to come (οὔτε ἐν τούτῳ τῷ αἰῶνι οὔτε ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι)” (Matt. 12:32); whence we infer that as some sins will be forgiven hereafter, there must be a state or place of purification for some souls which depart this life in sin. Again, His words concerning the prison, “Thou shalt not go out from thence till thou repay the last farthing” (Matt. 5:26), are taken by some of the Fathers as referring to Purgatory (St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, l. xxi. c. 24, n. 2; St. Gregory the Great, Dial., 1. iv. c. 39; St. Bernard, Hom. lxvi., In Cant.; Tertullian, De Anima, c. xxxv.; St. Cyprian, Epist., lv. al. lii., Ad Anton.; St. Jerome, In cap. v., Matt.; cf. Bellarmine, De Purgat., 1. i. c. 7; Suarez, In 3 Part., disp. 45, sect. 1). According to Bellarmine (l.c., cap. 5), the well-known passage of St. Paul (1 Cor. 3:13–15) is held by the common consent of the Fathers and theologians to refer to Purgatory. “Every man’s work shall be manifest: for the day of the Lord shall declare it, because it shall be revealed in fire; and the fire shall try every man’s work, of what sort it is. If any man’s work abide which he hath built thereupon, he shall receive a reward. If any man’s work burn, he shall suffer loss; but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire (οὓτως δὲ ὡς διὰ πυρός).” For an adequate interpretation of this most obscure passage, we must refer the reader to Estius (in loc.) or Bellarmine (loc. cit.). Other New Testament texts sometimes appealed to are Matt. 5:22; Luke 16:9; 1 Cor. 15:29; Phil. 2:10.

2. If we turn to tradition, the proofs both from Eastern as well as Western Fathers and Liturgies are overwhelming. “We make on one day every year oblations for the dead, as for their birthdays (oblationes pro defunctis, pro natalitiis annua die facimus)” (Tertullian, De Corona Milit., cap. 3). “The faithful widow,” he also says, “prays for the soul of her husband, and begs for him in the interim refreshment, and in the first resurrection companionship, and offers on the anniversary days of his death (et pro anima ejus orat, et refrigerium interim adpostulat ei, et in prima resurrectione consortium, et offert annuis diebus dormitionis ejus)” (De Monogam., n. 10). St. Cyprian says that if a priest disobeys certain laws of the Church (which he mentions), “there should be no oblation for him, nor sacrifice be celebrated on his falling asleep (nec sacrificium pro ejus dormitione celebraretur)” (Ep., lxvi., ad Clerum et Plebem Furnis; cf. Ep., xxxiv., De Celerino; Ep., xxxvii., ad Clerum; Ep., lii., ad Antonianum). “Give perfect rest to Thy servant Theodosius, that rest which Thou hast prepared for Thy saints (Da requiem perfectam servo tuo Theodosio, requiem illam quam prœparasti sanctis tuis); may his soul return thither whence it descended … I loved him, and therefore will I follow him, even unto the land of the living; nor will I leave him until by tears and prayers I shall lead him whither his merits summon him, unto the holy mountain of the Lord” (St. Ambrose, De Obitu Theodosii, 36, 37). “They who come not,” he says elsewhere (Enarr., in Ps. i. n. 54), “unto the first resurrection, but are reserved unto the second, these shall burn until they shall complete the time between the first and the second resurrection; or if they shall not have completed it, they shall remain longer in punishment.” In a letter of consolation to Pammachius, on the death of his wife Paulina, St. Jerome says, “Other husbands strew violets, roses … on the graves of their wives, and soothe with these offices the sorrow of their hearts; our Pammachius bedews the hallowed dust and venerable remains of Paulina with balsams of alms. With these pigments and sweet odours does he refresh her slumbering ashes, knowing that it is written, that as water quencheth fire, so do alms extinguish sin” (Ep., lxvi.). Many extracts might be given from St. Augustine’s writings bearing on this subject. “ ‘Lay,’ she says [his dying mother, St. Monica], ‘this body anywhere; let not the care of it anyway disturb you; this only I ask of you, that you would remember me at the altar of the Lord wherever you be (tantum illud vos rogo, ut ad Domini altare memineritis mei ubi fueritis).’ … Neither in those prayers which we poured forth unto thee, when the sacrifice of our ransom was offered for her (cum offerretur pro ea sacrificium pretii nostri), the corpse being placed by the graveside before being deposited therein, as the custom there is, not even in those prayers did I weep” (Confess., lib. ix. 27, 32). Writing against those who taught that God would in the end, at the request of His Saints, pardon all men; and having stated that the Church never prays for the lost souls and evil spirits, he adds, “For either the prayer of the Church or of some pious persons is heard in behalf of certain of the departed, but it is in behalf of those whose life, after they had been regenerated in Christ, was not so bad whilst they were in the body as to be accounted not worthy of such a mercy, nor so good as to be found not to need such mercy. So also, after the resurrection of the dead has taken place, there will not be wanting those to whom, after the pains which the spirits of the dead endure, will be granted the mercy that they be not cast into everlasting fire. For it would not be said with truth of some, that it shall not be forgiven them, neither in this world nor in the world to come, unless there were some to whom, though not in this, yet in the (world) to come, remission shall be granted” (De Civ. Dei, xxi. c. 24; cf. xx. cc. 9, 25, 26; xxi. cc. 13, 16; De Hæresibus, n. 53).

In the Eastern Church, we find Clement of Alexandria speaking of the fire which sanctifies the sinful souls (ἁγιάζειν τὸ πῦρ … τὰς ἁμαρτωλοὺς ψυχὰς πῦρ), and distinguishing between “the all-devouring fire” and “the discriminating fire which pervades the soul which passes through the fire (τὸ φρόνιμον λέγοντες, τὸ διϊκνούμενον διὰ ψυχῆς τῆς διερχομένης τὸ πῦρ)” (Strom., vii. n. 6; ibid., n. 12; vi. n. 14). “We also,” says St. Cyril of Jerusalem, “commemorate those who have fallen asleep before us, first patriarchs, prophets, apostles, that God by their prayers and intercessions would receive our petition; then also on behalf of the holy Fathers and bishops who have fallen asleep before us, and of all, in short, who have already fallen asleep from amongst us, believing that it will be a very great assistance to the souls for which the supplication is put up, while the holy and most awful sacrifice lies to open view (μεγίστην ὄνησιν πιστεύοντες ἔσεσθαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς, ὑπὲρ ὡν ἡ δέησις ἀναφέρεται, τῆς ἁγίας καὶ φρικοδεστάτης προκειμένης θυσίας)” (Catech. Mystag., v. n. 9). “I now wish, brethren,” says St. Ephræm in his Testament (tom. ii. Gr., p. 231), “to forewarn and exhort you that after my departure you make a commemoration of me, according to custom in your prayers … Do not, I beseech you, bury me with perfumes … Give them not to me, but to God; but me that was conceived in sorrows, bury with lamentations; and instead of a sweet odour and perfumes, assist me, I entreat you with your prayers, always remembering me in them.… And in your prayers vouchsafe to make the customary oblations for my shortcomings; and when I shall have completed the thirtieth day, make a commemoration of me; for the dead are benefited in oblations of commemoration by the living saints.” “It is not fitting that he who has lived to so great an extent in forbidden evils, and he who has been engaged in moderate transgressions should be equally afflicted in the sentence passed on their evil state; but that, according to the quantity of that matter, the painful fire be either for a longer or a shorter time enkindled, according as there may be wherewith to feed it” (St. Gregory of Nyssa, De Anim. et Resurr.). St. Epiphanius, writing against the heretic Aerius, maintains that prayer benefits the departed, and that the practice of praying for them has been handed down to the Church by the ancient Fathers (Adv. Hæres., lxxv.). “Not in vain,” says St. John Chrysostom, “are oblations made on behalf of the departed; not in vain supplications; not in vain alms (οὐκ εἰκῇ προσφοραὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀπελθόντων γίνονται, οὐκ εἰκῇ ἱκετηρίαι, οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐλεημοσύναι). All these things has the Spirit ordained, wishing us to be aided by each other,” etc. (In Act. Apost., Hom., xxi. n. 4; cf. In Matt. Hom., xxxi. n. 4; Hom., xxviii. n. 3; In Ep. i., ad Cor. Hom., xli. nn. 4, 5; In Ep. ad Philipp. Hom., iii. n. 4).

All the ancient Liturgies, without exception, contain prayers and mementos for the dead. (See Faith of Catholics, vol. iii. pp. 201–205.)

3. The existence of Purgatory is also a consequence of two recognized theological principles. The first of these is the distinction between mortal sin and venial sin (see supra, § 156); the other is the distinction between the guilt of mortal sin and the temporal punishment due even after the guilt has been forgiven (p. 475). As we have already pointed out at the beginning of this section, persons dying with venial sin on their souls, or who have not fully paid their debt of temporal punishment, cannot at once enter Heaven (Apoc. 21:27), and yet do not deserve Hell. Indeed, it is difficult to reconcile the holiness and mercy and justice of God without maintaining a place of purgation after death.

II. What is the precise nature of the punishment suffered by the souls in Purgatory has not been defined by the Church. Theologians, following the analogy of the doctrine of Hell, have taught that the souls undergo both a pain of loss and a pain of sense. They are, indeed, certain of their salvation, but they suffer from an intense longing to enjoy that Highest Good, which now they appreciate in a way which they could never do while here below (Lessius, De Perfect. Divin., xiii. c. 18). It is also commonly held, at least in the Western Church, that the pain of sense is caused by fire. The text, “He himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire,” has been interpreted by many of the Fathers and theologians, both Eastern and Western, as referring to a material fire in Purgatory. See St. Thomas, In iv. Sent., dist. 21, q. 1, a. 1; St. Bonaventure, Brevil., vii. 2; Bellarmine, De Purgat, i. c. 5, and ii. c. 11; Suarez, In iii. p. 3, disp. 46, sect. 2, n. 12). It should be noted, however, that at the Council of Florence the question was left an open one, whether the souls suffer from fire, or darkness, or storm.

SECT. 284.—HEAVEN

The Happiness of Heaven, being the original purpose for which man was created and elevated—”the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world”—has already been described in Book III., Part ii., especially § 141.

When the twofold sentence of reward and condemnation has been executed, mankind will fulfil their end and object: the happiness of the blessed being the complete manifestation of God’s infinite goodness and mercy, while the punishment of the damned is the manifestation of His justice.

“Afterwards the end, when He (Christ) shall have delivered up the kingdom to God and the Father; when He shall have brought to nought all principality and power and virtue (δύναμιν, might) … and when all things shall be subdued unto Him, then the Son Himself shall be subject unto Him that put all things under Him, that God may be all in all” (1 Cor. 15:24, 28).

O THE DEPTH OF THE RICHES OF THE WISDOM

AND OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD!

HOW INCOMPREHENSIBLE ARE HIS JUDGMENTS

AND HOW UNSEARCHABLE HIS WAYS!

OF HIM AND BY HIM AND UNTO HIM ARE ALL THINGS

TO HIM BE GLORY FOR EVER!

AMEN.