Of the third evil which comes to the soul by way of the
distinct natural knowledge or the memory.
THE third evil which comes to the soul through the natural
apprehensions of the memory is privative; for these apprehensions
can hinder moral good and deprive us of spiritual good. And, in
order that we may first of all explain how these apprehensions
hinder moral good in the soul, it must be known that moral good
consists in the restraining of the passions and the curbing of
disorderly desires, from which restraint there come to the soul
tranquillity, peace and rest, and moral virtues, all of which
things are moral good. This restraining and curbing of the
passions cannot be truly accomplished by the soul that forgets not
and withdraws not itself from things pertaining to itself, whence
arise the affections; and no disturbances ever arise in the soul
save through the apprehensions of the memory. For, when all things
are forgotten, there is naught that can disturb peace or that
moves the desires; since, as they say, that which the eye sees not
the heart desires not.
2. This we are constantly learning by experience; for we
observe that, whenever the soul begins to think of any matter, it
is moved and disturbed, either much or little, with respect to
that thing, according to the nature of its apprehension. If it be
a troublesome and grievous matter, the soul finds sadness in it;
if pleasant, desire and joy, and so forth. Wherefore the result of
the changing of that apprehension is necessarily disturbance; and
thus the soul is now joyful, now sad; now it hates, now loves; and
it cannot continue in one and the same attitude (which is an
effect of moral tranquillity save when it strives to forget all
things. It is clear, then, that knowledge greatly hinders the good
of the moral virtues in the soul.
3. Again, what has been said clearly proves that an
encumbered memory also hinders spiritual good; for the soul that
is disturbed, and has no foundation of moral good, is to that
extent incapable of spiritual good, which impresses itself only
upon souls that are restrained and at peace. And besides this, if
the soul pays attention and heed to the apprehensions of the
memory -- seeing that it can attend to but one thing at a time --
and busies itself with things that can be apprehended, such as the
knowledge of the memory, it is not possible for it to be free to
attend to the incomprehensible, which is God. For, in order to
approach God, the soul must proceed by not comprehending rather
than by comprehending; it must exchange the mutable and
comprehensible for the immutable and incomprehensible.
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