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Book I
CONTAINING A PREPARATION FOR THE WHOLE TREATISE.
CHAPTER IV. THAT LOVE RULES OVER ALL THE AFFECTIONS, AND PASSIONS, AND EVEN GOVERNS THE WILL, ALTHOUGH THE WILL HAS ALSO A DOMINION OVER IT.
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Love being the first complacency which we take in good, as we shall
presently show, it of course precedes desire; and indeed what other thing do
we desire, but that which we love? It precedes delectation, for how could we
rejoice in the enjoyment of a thing if we loved it not? It precedes hope,
for we hope only for the good which we love: it precedes hatred, for we hate
not evil, except for the love we have for good: nor is evil evil but because
it is contrary to good. And, Theotimus, it is the same with all the other
passions and affections; for they all proceed from love, as from their
source and root.
For which cause the other passions and affections, are good or bad, vicious
or virtuous, according as the love whence they proceed is good or bad; for
love so spreads over them her own qualities, that they seem to be no other
than this same love. S. Augustine reducing all these passions and affections
to four, as did also Boetius, Cicero, Virgil, with the greatest part of the
ancients:—"Love," says he, "tending to the possession of what it loves, is
termed concupiscence or desire; having and possessing it it is called joy;
flying that which is contrary to it, it is named fear; but if this really
seizes it and it feels it, love is named grief, and consequently these
passions are evil if the love be evil, good if it be good. The citizens of
the heavenly city fear, desire, grieve, love, and because their love is
just, all their affections are also just. Christian doctrine subjects the
reason to God that he may guide and help it, and subjects all these passions
to the spirit, that it may bridle and moderate them and so convert them to
the service of justice and virtue. The right will is good love, the bad will
is evil love;" [27] that is to say, in a word, Theotimus, love has such
dominion over the will as to make it exactly such as it is itself.
The wife ordinarily changes her condition into that of her husband, becoming
noble if he be noble, queen if he be king, duchess if he be duke. The will
also changes her condition according to the love she espouses; if this be
carnal she becomes carnal, if this be spiritual she is spiritual, and all
the affections of desire, joy, hope, fear, grief, as children born of the
marriage between love and the will, consequently receive their qualities
from love. In short, Theotimus, the will is only moved by her affections,
amongst which love, as the primum mobile and first affection, gives motion
to all the rest, and causes all the other motions of the soul.
But it does not follow hence that the will does not also rule over love,
seeing that the will only loves while willing to love, and that of many
loves which present themselves she can apply herself to which she pleases,
otherwise there would be no love either forbidden or commanded. She is then
mistress over her loves as a maiden over her suitors, amongst whom she may
make election of which she pleases. But as after marriage she loses her
liberty and of mistress becomes subject to her husband's power, remaining
taken by him whom she took, so the will which at her own pleasure made
election of love, after she has chosen one remains subject to it. And as the
wife is always subject to the husband whom she has chosen as long as he
lives, and if he die regains her former liberty to marry another, so while a
love lives in the will it reigns there, and the will is subject to its
movements, but if this love die she can afterwards take another. And again
there is a liberty in the will which the wife has not, and it is that the
will can reject her love at her pleasure, by applying her understanding to
motives which make it displeasing, and by taking a resolution to change the
object. For thus, to make divine love live and reign in us, we kill
self-love, and if we cannot entirely annihilate it at least we weaken it in
such a way that though it lives yet it does not reign in us. As, on the
contrary, in forsaking divine love we may adhere to that of creatures, which
is the infamous adultery with which the Divine lover so often reproaches
sinners.
[27] De Civ. Dei, xiv. ix.
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