Enchiridion On Faith, Hope and Love
by Saint Augustine
CHAPTER VII
DISPUTED QUESTIONS
ABOUT THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE
AND CERTAINTY IN VARIOUS
MATTERS
20.
I do not rightly know whether errors of this sort should be called
sins--
when
one thinks well of a wicked man, not knowing what his character
really is, or
when,
instead of our physical perception, similar perceptions occur which
we
experience
in the spirit (such as the illusion of the apostle Peter when he
thought he
was
seeing a vision but was actually being liberated from fetters and
chains by the
angel36)
Or in perceptual illusions when we think something is smooth which is
actually
rough, or something sweet which is bitter, something fragrant which
is
putrid,
that a noise is thunder when it is actually a wagon passing by, when
one
takes
this man for that, or when two men look alike, as happens in the case
of
twins--whence
our poet speaks of "a pleasant error for parents"37--I
say I do not
know
whether these and other such errors should be called sins.
Nor
am I at the moment trying to deal with that knottiest of questions
which
baffled
the most acute men of the Academy, whether a wise man ought ever to
affirm
anything positively lest he be involved in the error of affirming as
true what
may
be false, since all questions, as they assert, are either mysterious
[occulta] or
36Cf.
Acts 12:9.
37Virgil,
Aeneid, X, 392.
uncertain.
On these points I wrote three books in the early stages of my
conversion
because
my further progress was being blocked by objections like this which
stood at
the
very threshold of my understanding.38
It was necessary to overcome the despair
of
being unable to attain to truth, which is what their arguments seemed
to lead one
to.
Among them every error is deemed a sin, and this can be warded off
only by a
systematic
suspension of positive assent. Indeed they say it is an error if
someone
believes
in what is uncertain. For them, however, nothing is certain in human
experience,
because of the deceitful likeness of falsehood to the truth, so that
even if
what
appears to be true turns out to be true indeed, they will still
dispute it with
the
most acute and even shameless arguments.
Among
us, on the other hand, "the righteous man lives by faith."39
Now, if
you
take away positive affirmation,40
you take away faith, for without positive
affirmation
nothing is believed. And there are truths about things unseen, and
unless
they are believed, we cannot attain to the happy life, which is
nothing less
than
life eternal. It is a question whether we ought to argue with those
who profess
themselves
ignorant not only about the eternity yet to come but also about their
present
existence, for they [the Academics] even argue that they do not know
what
they
cannot help knowing. For no one can "not know" that he
himself is alive. If he
is
not alive, he cannot "not know" about it or anything else
at all, because either to
know
or to "not know" implies a living subject. But, in such a
case, by not positively
affirming
that they are alive, the skeptics ward off the appearance of error in
themselves,
yet they do make errors simply by showing themselves alive; one
cannot
err
who is not alive. That we live is therefore not only true, but it is
altogether
certain
as well. And there are many things that are thus true and certain
concerning
which, if we withhold positive assent, this ought not to be regarded
as a
higher
wisdom but actually a sort of dementia.
21.
In those things which do not concern our attainment of the Kingdom of
God,
it does not matter whether they are believed in or not, or whether
they are
true
or are supposed to be true or false. To err in such questions, to
mistake one
thing
for another, is not to be judged as a sin or, if it is, as a small
and light one. In
sum,
whatever kind or how much of an error these miscues may be, it does
not
involve
the way that leads to God, which is the faith of Christ which works
through
love.
This way of life was not abandoned in that error so dear to parents
concerning
the
twins.41 Nor
did the apostle Peter deviate from this way when he thought he
saw
a vision and so mistook one thing for something else. In his case, he
did not
discover
the actual situation until after the angel, by whom he was freed, had
departed
from him. Nor did the patriarch Jacob deviate from this way when he
believed
that his son, who was in fact alive, had been devoured by a wild
beast. We
may
err through false impressions of this kind, with our faith in God
still safe, nor
do
we thus leave the way that leads us to him. Nevertheless, such
mistakes, even if
they
are not sins, must still be listed among the evils of this life,
which is so readily
subject
to vanity that we judge the false for true, reject the true for the
false, and
hold
as uncertain what is actually certain. For even if these mistakes do
not affect
that
faith by which we move forward to affirm truth and eternal beatitude,
yet they
are
not unrelated to the misery in which we still exist. Actually, of
course, we would
be
deceived in nothing at all, either in our souls or our physical
senses, if we were
already
enjoying that true and perfected happiness.
22.
Every lie, then, must be called a sin, because every man ought to
speak
38This
refers to one of the first of the Cassiciacum dialogues, Contra
Academicos. The gist of
Augustine's
refutation of skepticism is in III, 23ff. Throughout his whole career
he continued to
maintain
this position: that certain knowledge begins with self-knowledge. Cf.
Confessions, Bk. V,
Ch.
X, 19; see also City of God, XI, xxvii.
39Hab.
2:4; Rom. 1:17.
40A
direct contrast between suspensus assenso--the watchword of
the Academics--and assensio, the
badge
of Christian certitude.
41See
above, VII, 90.
what
is in his heart--not only when he himself knows the truth, but even
when he
errs
and is deceived, as a man may be. This is so whether it be true or is
only
supposed
to be true when it is not. But a man who lies says the opposite of
what is
in
his heart, with the deliberate intent to deceive. Now clearly,
language, in its
proper
function, was developed not as a means whereby men could deceive one
another,
but as a medium through which a man could communicate his thought to
others.
Wherefore to use language in order to deceive, and not as it was
designed to
be
used, is a sin.
Nor
should we suppose that there is any such thing as a lie that is not a
sin,
just
because we suppose that we can sometimes help somebody by lying. For
we
could
also do this by stealing, as when a secret theft from a rich man who
does not
feel
the loss is openly given to a pauper who greatly appreciates the
gain. Yet no one
would
say that such a theft was not a sin. Or again, we could also "help"
by
committing
adultery, if someone appeared to be dying for love if we would not
consent
to her desire and who, if she lived, might be purified by repentance.
But it
cannot
be denied that such an adultery would be a sin. If, then, we hold
chastity in
such
high regard, wherein has truth offended us so that although chastity
must not
be
violated by adultery, even for the sake of some other good, yet truth
may be
violated
by lying? That men have made progress toward the good, when they will
not
lie save for the sake of human values, is not to be denied. But what
is rightly
praised
in such a forward step, and perhaps even rewarded, is their good will
and
not
their deceit. The deceit may be pardoned, but certainly ought not to
be praised,
especially
among the heirs of the New Covenant to whom it has been said, "Let
your
speech
be yes, yes; no, no: for what is more than this comes from evil."42
Yet because
of
what this evil does, never ceasing to subvert this mortality of ours,
even the joint
heirs
of Christ themselves pray, "Forgive us our debts."43